USSR
T-iCJCKT: cce Questions in the Preparation and Conduct of Initial Offensivey Colonel-General A. Babadxbanysn
OF IHFO: 1
APPRAISAL OF CONTENT
reliable source
Followingerbatic translation of an article titled "Some Questions in the Preparation snd Conduct of Initial Offensivey Colonel-General a. Eabedzbanyan.
This article appeared in1 Third Issueersion of Voyennaya My si (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET by tbe Soviets and Is issued Irregularly. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to tbe level of Army Canconder.1 Third Issue was sent to press on
headquarters Coment: Tbe Special Collect ion article which isfootnotesages h,ndac.-mitten *vPavlovskiy, and was disseminatedmay be of
interest to note that the footnote oaefers to-the intermediate version of tbe three known versions of Military Thought.
-1-
/
/ -
I
Sons Questlona in the Preparation and Conduct of Initial Offensive Operations
Colonel-General A. Babatizhanyan
The constant quantitative and qualitative growth of missile weapons and the Increase in the quantity of nuclear warheads allotted for the execution of an operation are causing continuous changes in the methods of combat operations of ground troops. These changes are now occurring ao rapidly that, at tloes, that which only several months ago was new and progressive becomes obsolescent and ceases to correspond to the requirements of the day. Specifically, the methods of execution of tbe offensive operations of the initial perioduclear/missile war have undergoneapid development. The purpose of this article, which is on the orderesponseumber of articles published in previous issues of the Special Collection, is to examine some of the questions In tbe preparation" and conduct of initial offensive operations.
As is welluclear/misslie war will be of an exceptionally decisive nature. The availability of modern, powerful combat weapons permits even ans being defeated and is close to destruction to deliver telling thermonuclear strikes against the deep rear area and groupings of the sraed forces holding the upper hand. In order to fully deprive the enemy of any opportunity to use nuclear weapons, it is not enough to deliver strategic massed nuclear strikes against bis territory. Mo nuclear" strikes can guarantee the complete destruction of all the enemyV weapons of nuclear attack or eUaJnate his capability to dclirar-Btrlkes.
^ fuin^pyof .this, .mission con benly byg&-capture llsn-Of-^ejKjerrl^ory. By thla very ccBns_cjn car- rnunfrry-be.jmda,coag>le+,ely secure from strikes by tbe coeny's ground putlcyr weaponse .enemy deprived of bases forchis aubimrinc end, surface missile-carrying fleet which can still operateoceap for ascertain period of time after the land farces'are' destroyed.
_o_
"I
For tb* quickest caoturo of enemy territory (of course, that territory tbe eelture of which will not" require 'the organltatioo_of_ landing opera'tloias across thet is necessary to carryecisive strategje offensive throughout "the" entire depth of tbe tbeatera. In this regard, under nc conditionsituationronT be slow in shifting to the offensive, or alternate the latter with defense In all or the greater part of its sooe of operations.that, lmedlately at ths beginning of coebat operations, "all fronts, without exception, must shift to the offensive on tbe_ axe's" where the sclsure"of ericgy territory is possible andhift to the dofonsive on such axes is not permissible. The'troops of tho front must shlfjt_to_the.offensive regardless of .thaix.condition, even sTter undergoing enemy nuclear strikes.
In coocection with this, In our opinion there ousthange in the point of view regarding tbe nature of tbe combat operations of ground troops in tbe esse when the enamy pre-empts ua in operations. Previously, we considered that, under theseront must shift to the defensive in order to repulse an eaeay attack. Bow, it is necessary to consider that, even in thisront with all available forces will Immediately shift to tbe offensive,which, moat probably, will assume the natureeeting engagement.
Tbe next question Is of greet practical interest. What will be the duration and tbe depth of the first strategic offensive operation directed at attainingdiate strategic goalsar:
By lookingap, it can be seen that the goal*trategicontinent can be defined as the destruction of the armed forces of the"aggressor*countries located there and reaching the sescoasrsAtlantic Ocean end thea See.ernj or depth, tsls'c'fcsists" gp'jrarlous strategic axes ofo oQO km ISoutHwestern Theater00 ka (Western TVD).
According to modem views, tbe average speed of an offensiveejpsr _day.. It is also considered"ystem of strategic offensive, tbe offensive operations of formations must follow one after the other without operational pauses. Consequently, the taskstrat?glc_orf ensive in the theaters' being" examined can be fulfilledour'periods: If adjustments
-3-
are cad'*cerprnt for mountainous conditions,
for delays ln forcing wide vater barriers (for example,nd forca of radioactive cantamlnotlon, then it will take sore thanU-hour periods. It is possible that these time periods will tivyfl comprise the duration of the initial period of war.
How many subsequent front offensive operations will it becarry out on the two above-Indicated basic theaters lnar7 '
According to existing opinions, tbe depth of an offensive operationront cao. .be_fr oao 6QOLupe consider that the second opinion correspondsreater degree to the conditions of the initial perioduclear/miS6ile war.
front_ offenfilva_operation Is determined by the range of. operations,he weapons, of destruction, by tbe noeuVer capabllltiea of the troops, by the capability for uninterrupted supplyy ihe depth cr_then ihe past war,ractical matter, tbe range of tbe front bomber aircraft wasm; the rear services could, uninterruptedly, support tbe advancing troopsistance of not
marem from the area where they were Initially based;
tbe depth of tbe operational formation of the enemy's group of armies
m. All this determined tbe depthront offensive
operationm.
The offensive operations of the concluding stage of World War IIpecial place in their scope,ignificant quantity of tank and mechanized large units and forpetiors, which sharply increased the mobility of troops, appeared in the composition of our ground troops- For example, the depth of the Viatula-Oder offensive operation was sorem, and the depth of the Manchurian offensive operation was 6COm. The scope of these operations, achlevecTln 1CA5 when tbe troops did not have those weapons of
1Special Collection of Articles of the Jejunal "MilitaryIssue,
2. "Modernublished by the Military Academy of tbe General.
-h-
L
destruction or those raneavering_capablllties which modernhave, shows thatpthodem frontof
Even now the weaponsront and the means of reinforcingcan ensure the destruction of the enemyepth of upkm. The question of supplying the front with missilesgreat range of fire is in the stage of practical resolution. pissile trooos of strata^*willused in tbe front zone during
In comparison witb the pest war, the depth of the enemy operational formation has, at present, also increased. Certain, the enemy'*rmay. rear_aerylc
locatedistance of upkm.froa.the .front
The only thing that still causes one to doubt the reality ofission of such depthront is the limited capabilities of the operational rear services. The fact is that the capabilities of the rear services have not undergone any substantial
f^ m" and' t0 fiaae ^erec, have even decreased, if one considers the probable destruction of railroads and tbe mass destruction of motor vehicle roods. Decisive measures are necessary to increase the capabilities of the rear services for
UX> la tbe firatproviding tbe rear services with units and large units of aircraft, helicopters, and motorcapacities, and tbe extensive introduction
**theservices ensure
the execution of deep and swift offensive operations.
necessary to carryuccessive front0pCratIOns ord"ttain tbe immediate strategic goalsho Southwestern TVD and two on the
At the present time, various opinions exist as to how the strategic offensive will be executed organizationally.
he,believe that in tbe system
n 6rOUndtbe first position will be given to
-5.
In tbe article "Tbe Question of the Theory of the Operationroup ofolonel S. Kozlov considers It necessary to create high commands In all TVD's and to subordinate to them not only front formations but also tbe other types of armed forces operatingiven TVD (missile troops, tbe Havy, long-range aviation, and troops of tbe PVO of the Country).
A compromise is expressed in tbe point of view presented byf. Pavlovskiy2 that offensive operations In tbe initial periodar can be executed by fronts and groups of fronts.
Itt us examine this question. During the years of World War II, beginning with the Soviet Army counteroffensive near Moscow (December lokl toll tbe main offensive operations were carried out,ule, not by separate fronts but by the united efforts of several fronts, usually, the goals of an offensive operationtrategic axis were achieved by the effortsronts. The conditions of the past war required this, when an enormous density of weaponsuperiority of no leasimes over tbe enemy were neededreakthrough of defenaea. The efforts of several fronts were usually concentrated ontrategic or operational axis, the geographic conditions of which provided the capability for close operational coordination among the fronts.
In the conductuclear/missileoncentrationmasses of personnel andot required to carry an offensive. Even now the density of troops has sharplythe zones of offensive of formations haveo 2of this indicates that under modern conditions the efforts
one front are sufficient for those axes where in tLC past war It was necessary to concentrate the efforts of several fronts.
Consequently, the troops of one front will now operate,ule, on each of the strategic or important operational axes. It Is our view that under these conditions tbe combining of several frontsroup Is not advisable, if only because operational coordination
iypQCOLLeCt"^ ArtlCles Military Thought" Ho.
2. Special Collection of Articles of tbe Journal "MilitaryIssue,
-6-
between fronts operating on Independent strategic or imp extant operational exes is not always possible, or is almost Impossible.
Tbe Ceneral Headquarters (Stavka) will organize
coordination between the fronts, or rather, implement
coordination of tha efforts of strategic nuclear/missile
with tbe operations of the
On the basis of the sbove, we conclude thatuclear/missile war the main role in attaining the goals of armed combat in theaters will belong ant to tbe operationsroup of fronts, but to the system of simultaneous and successive front operations. This does not preclude, of course, tbe conduct of operationsroup of fronts at Individual stagestrategic offensive operation on axes where operational coordination of several fronta Is feasible.
In our view, the limited number of frontsuclear/missile war also makes the formation of TVD cotanacds inadvisable. It is known that, at the beginning of World War II, tbe number of fronts was limited (five fronts) and corresponded exactly to the number of strategic axes which existed at tbe time (Northern,estern, Southwestern, end Southern). Under these conditions the fronts fulfilled not only operational, but also strategic missions.
The coenaands of three axes were created In Julytbe Northwestern, the Western, and the Southwestern; they were called upon to carry out the operational-strategic direction of the fronts (which generally numberedot various periods). The complexity end the Intensity of the situation at the fronts of war frequently forced the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Comtand to directly control the fronts, bypassing the commands of the axes, thereby making them useless. As is known, after existing for about one year altogether, these comrands were abolished.
Inuclear/missile war the number of fronts on tbe Indicated axes will be less than in the pest war. The conditions for military operations will become still more complex. Tbe maneuverability of troops and tbe mobility of the front line will increase by aeveral times. All thisasis for considering the creation of ccamods of axes or of TVD'suture war
In ourhe formation of TVD commands is possibleremote theaters where the control of the armed forces willfor the General Headquarters, for example, In the Far,It was In the past war) or oo other continents when our
However, granting the possibility of creating strategicremote TVD, it is not possible to agree with the proposalnaval forces operating in the waters adjoining the theatersubordinated to these commands. The mission of supportingis secondary for the naval forces, in comparison'with.blockading enemy countries and of disrupting enemysea Intercontinental transport, which missions areout in remote ocean areas or even on other oceans. Forof theseroad strategic maneuver byis required. The subordination of all naval forces tocommand could thus fetter and limit the Navy's capabilityIts main missions. Of course, the part of thewhichwlll be operating fb* support of the troops of adestruction of enecy strike miss lie-carrying andnaval forces, the disruption of enemy amphibious landingthe participation in amphibious landing operations ofust be subordinated to the TVD
The thought expressed by some authors of articlescreation of operational-strategic cossBnds in our theatersoperations was undoubtedly Influenced to some degree byof such control elements on the territories of thethe Imperialist coalition. However, such an analogy is
Justified here. Tbe fact of the matter is that tbe American Joint taff in essence controls the armies of the countries which comprise the imperialist coalition. But the Acer lea no are notosition to effect centralized control of all the armed forces that'make up tbe coalition and which are dispersed on almost all the continents of the world. Therefore, they formed Intermediate control elements, ccemnds of the TVD.
Under our condltlona, when theaters of military operations are located_on two continents (Europe end Asia) and are_connected by land* well-established means of communications and supply, itWW^form such eri intermediate comoandVD
-8-
/
Several words on the Initial offensive operations ofoperations can begin under various conditions cf ashifting of fronts to an offensive can be preceded by a It will take placear starts after aof tension In the relations between theand.those of thewhen it becomes clear that the political relations of thewill inevitably bringilitary conflict. Thecan also take pieceprld war starts throughthe principal countries* in the course" of' a" local war" in" one ofof the "
Mars o_eny. strike, when there wiii_be no .threatening period. The most characteristic versionsurprise attack can be tbe delivery by the probable aggressorass thermonuclear strike against tbe socialist countries under tbe guise of carrying out large training exercises.
A surprise attack is the most advantageous method ofar. It may be assumed that war will be unleashedmprise attack, if the Imperialists decide on this. Therefore, In the -practical activity of our armed forces and In their operational and combat training, it is necessary to embark decisivelyourse for tbe preparation of troops for the entryar which is not precededhreatening period. If tbe armed forces are ready to begin military operations when there is no threatening period, then tbey will always be able to do so when therehreatening period.
An. important situational condition, under which fronts caninitial offensive operations, is the location of tbe troopsTront In relation to the enemy before the start ofront (group of forces) which, prior to the startoperations, is located directly on the border beyondcountries of the imperialist coalition are located, willcontact with tbe ground enemy immediately. However,istance from tola border at .the start ofnsca c_ shift to'"the"offensive only.after reaching theaggressor troops and the_armles ofto " "' , " " r.
In all cases, tbe troopsront will shift to aimmediatelyounterstrlke ortrikea surprise enemy attack. ounterstrlke,trike.an enemy attack, will be carried out on the basis ofof tbe higher party and government leadersmain role in carrylna it outof strategic designation. It is understood thatalso make tae decision for the front troops toa decisive
Thereide-spread point of view that front nuclear/missile weapons must also participateounterstrlke tourprise enemy attack, which are measures of the Supreme High Command. In our opinion, the front weapons will not beositionciuatersTrlke or'Tn tbe firsTcTucIear striketoij.owing reasons;
nuclear/missile weaponsonsiderable number of the fronta, which are locatedistance from the borders adjacent to the enemy prior to the start of military operations, cannot be used because of tbe comparatively short range of the operations;
nuclear/missile weapons of these fronts, even those directly io tbe border tone, will not be able to participate in immediate operations, because considerable time (up to several houra, and, under certain conditions, up to several days) will be required to bring them up to combat condition (basically, for the assembly and checking of missiles aod warheads).
In addition to the above, it is necessary to take into account tbe following consideration. In an offensive operation, the planned transport of missiles, special charges, and missile fuel will be greatly hampered because of the mass destruction of communication lines and the destruction of certain depots which bad become known to the enemy. Therefore, it is not advisable toignificant amount of tbe nuclear/missile weaponsront at the very beginning of an operation. They should be saved for subsequent use in the course of an operation and io completing It.
The extensive use of nuclear/missile weapons compels ato solving the problem of tbe combat compositionhe past war, the combat compositionront was determinednecessity ofwofold or threefold (and sometimessuperiority of forces and weapons over"tne enemy ooe
Under modern conditions, the criterion for determining the compositionront is its capability to inflict destruction on an opposing enemy grouping with nuclear weapons and to complete its rout with motorized rifle, tank, and airborne large units. Figuratively speaking, one can say that combined-arms and tank large units will now play the rolebroom" by means of which the front's offensive zooe will be cleared of the remaining enemy troops after they are routed by nuclear weapons. Under conditions when, as the result of nuclear strikes, the correlation of forces can rapidly and sharply change in favor of the side that has executed tbem, an offensive operationront can be carried out successfully even when the Initial correlation of forces and weapons was equal.
Tbe combat compositionront in an initial operation will depend on the method of unleashing tbe war.
ar startsurprise enemy attack, the.opera tionsimited number ofin consent readiness. During the course'Qf_anwill be reinforcedunits aod by large
1^nt. readiness arriving from tbe zone ofccordance with the plan for the strategic deployment of the'flTound troops).
If,_JiowEyer, mllitaryjjperations develophreatening period, then the first front operation can startarger number of troops:
rjr,-ss Bad'thoo? fully mobilized. luit is oecessary_tp conildir'tpat'tbe approach ofzone of interior can be frustrated or delayed by the enemy bystrifces_affl_inst_these large units and also by thecommunication
Missile large units and units are tbe skeleton of the operational formationront, without which the conduct of combat operations under modern conditions is impossible. Therefore,order district (group ofhe composition of the missile troops must be auch
as is necessary for achievement of the objectives of the first operation. In addition, the composition of the missile troops and their supply of ammunition must compensate for the shortage of
combined-arms and tank large units when these are put out of action
on the field of battle or when their arrival from the zone of interior
la disrupted or delayed.
let us dwell briefly On tbe methods of operations of the troopsront in initial offensive operations.
The following factors will exert on influence on the methods of conducting initial offensive operations: the limited number of front troops; disorganization of the enemy's gorernoental control and tbe control of bis armed forces, and, consequently, the isolation of the enemy's troops and the putting out of action of entire elements of his operational formation; the enemy's lack of prepared and occupied lines of defense; and the existence of large areas of radioactive contamination.
The above-listed factors create favorable conditions for an offensive by several strike groupings on axes. An offensive on separate axes ensures the splintering of the enemy frontispersal of his attention and efforts. At the same time, an offensive on axes is much more complicated than an offensive which is carried out with close lateral contact between units, large units,
and even armies. During an offensive on axes, each grouping will be in
a difficult situation and will have to operate independently with its flanks, and even its rear area, exposed. In view of this, the
significance of preparing our command cadres for such operations
becomes clear.
In the years of World Mar II, an offensive was conductedolid front in close combat formations,ethodical breakthrough of enemy positions and defense tones. Actually, combat operatlono were conducted in the zone of effective fire of the infantry and artilleryoneom on both sides from the line of. contact, if one does not consider sporadic aerial strikes against the depth. Under these conditions, the effect of fire against the enemy was exploited Immediately. Close coordination in timing and location was executed between the fire weapons, the Infantry, and tanks.
Under modern conditions, the sharply increaaed capabilities of fire weapons have led themontradiction with tbe capabilities of tbe infantry and tanks. The infantry and tanks have become incapable of immediately exploiting the effect of nuclear/missile strikes against the entire depthefending enemy. To ensure rapid seizure of the entire depth of the enemy defenses by active
ri
coobat operations and to achieve the objectives of tbe operationshortest period of tine, jt la necessary to increases he.nf_lhe_Qff enslve-whlcfa, by the Directive..of .the Minister ofOrdered to be increased to'
e perperiod. Thisery high rate. It la sufficient to state that tbe distance coveredhour period In tbe executionarcfa consists of loOnly two tines greater than the distance which must be covered by attacking troopshour period.
In plannlng_an_operatlon. is It possible to guaranteeate of.o1 per day, wlUbo austalnedjeyeryot. There will be days in an operation' when troops will be able to advance only negligibly, dayo when they will not move at all, and, possibly, daya when they will even fall back. We are speaking of those days when front troops will be repulsing enemy ccunteretrikes, conducting meeting engagements with the enemy, forcing water barriers, and overcoming substantial zones of radioactive contamination and mountain passes. Consequently, on the other days of the operation, the rate of advance must be such ao as to compensate for the days of slow or of no rate oft must approach the apeed of executing a
In the offensive operations of tbe past war, tbe most decisive results were achieved by encircling the enecy operational grouping* and subsequently annihilating and capturing the=. However, at the end cf the war, especially in tbe Vistula-Oder operation, the
.ineffectiveness.of encirclementorm of conducting an operationeady becor.- cbvlrxjr.. Tbote eiMM* groupings aroundolid ring of encirclement was not closed turned into so-called "roaming pockets" and quickly ceasedst. But those enemy groupings that were encircled by our troops (for example, the Poznan
and the SchneidemuSil groupings) continued to fight while surrounded
until the end of the war,ubstantial number of our troops
to then.
We cannot agree with the statement1 thatodern war encirclement and destruction of large enecy groupings can be employed along with the delivery of awift, deep strikes on separate axes.
pecial Collection of Articles of the Journal first issue,
Under tbe condition* of highly Baneuverlng combat operations. It will be Inadvisable toarge eaesy grouping which la dispersedarge area. The Halted number of troopsront will not permit the creation of inner and outer froata of encirclement and the conduct of methodical combat for tbe purpoae ofing of encirclement, breaking up the encircled grouping, and destroying It piecemeal. Such operations threaten loss of tbe rate of the offensive and, possibly, even its frustration-It Is much more advisable to use small forces to Intercept the main routes of retreat of an enveloped enemy and subsequently destroy him with nuclear/mlaalle weapons. In this, the main body of tbe front troops oust move forward without delay and without glancing back at the encircled enemy grouping.
In the most general terss, this Is bow we visualize tbe Initial offensive operations cf the Initial period of a Undoubtedly, some of the problems we fcave examined require further consideration and critical analysis.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: