MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND POLICIES, 1961-1966 (NIE 11-4-61 M/H)

Created: 1/10/1962

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-WP SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS

ND B,:

"MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND

dated1

by the

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The following iHleaicenet orpanlationihe preparation of thii estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organUattcmt of the Department of State. Defense, the Amy, thehe Air Force. The Joint

Staff, ASC, and NSA

Concurred In by the UNITED- HOARD

onanuary mi. Concurring were The Director of In. telltgence and Research, Department of State: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency: the AsiUtant Chief of Staff for intelligence. Department of tht Army: the Atsittant Chief of Natallclltgencet. Department of the Navy: the Autttant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF. thefar Intelligence. Joint Staff, the Atomic Energy Commit. non(oUSIB; and the Director ol the National Security Agency. The Auiitant Director, Federal Bureau of Inotitlgolion. obetatned. the lubfect bein*r

of All turtnSKtlan

TOR SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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I. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy is lor the information and use of the recipient and ol persons under his )urlsdic:ioneed to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments.

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an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retaina period not in excess ol one year. At the end of this period, the estimatebe destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should betne lorwarding agency to retain lt ln accordance with2

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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OFnd B,MAIN TRENDS IN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND

dated1

The United States IntelUgence Board has recently approved aof estimates on Soviet capabilities and policies, in order to provideeries of relatively shirt, topical estimates on these subjects, to be Issued at intervals over the coming months. The new series will replace the compendium on the USSR, formerly scheduled annually asMain Trends In Sovietandn accordance with this rescheduling, there wiil be no full text issuance of.

To insure that up-to-date, coordinated statements are available on Soviet military forces, the United States Intelligence Board has reviewed recenton this subject and has prepared the attached paragraphs on selected developments of major significance. These paragraphs supplement theIn, Annex A, "Soviet Military Forces andatedhere appropriate, they also contain numerical estimates superseding those in the Tables appearing Innd B. In cases where estimates Issued subsequent to1 contain Judgments supplementing or modifying the Annexes to, cross-references to these more recent issuances are provided.

JOHN A: MCCONE, Director

SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE TO SOVIET MILITARY FORCES AND CAPABILITIES

in the Size and Composition of the Soviet Armed Forces

(See. Annex A.)

The total number of men under arms Ln the USSR has been Increased sinceevel which we believe approximates the strength maintained prior to the militaryand personnel reductionsby Khrushchev ineriod of reductions and0 and possibly thc early monthsotal personnel strength Intood at approximately three million men. This reflected the completion of about half the cut which thc Soviets originally announced would reduce their armed forces fromoillion men by the endn the summer and fallthe Soviet Government announced that it had suspended further reductions and would retain certain conscripts beyond their normal terms of service; other information indicate* that. In addition, selected reservists were recalled to active duty. At the same time, the regular annual induction of new conscripts has occurred on schedule. As awe estimate that the personnel strength of the Soviet armed forces has increased to approximately ZVi million men as. not counting militarized security forces numbering.

In general, we believe that most of thepersonnel have been used to fill outcombat and support units and tosome units which were originallyfor deactivation. Because information on the manning of Soviet military unitspiecemeal over an extended period, no new breakdown of strength by component can be given at this time. However, we be-

lieve that the primary effect has almostbeen on ground elements of the theater field forces, which probably now haveine divisions and increased non divisional support. The retirement of older air and naval equipment has probably been slowed down and in some cases halted. By these measures, we believe that the USSR isground, air, and naval forces at levels higher than originally planned while at thc same time proceeding with the plannedof capabilities with advanced weapon systems.

changes in personnel policy haveby Soviet spokesmen aspending solution of the Berlinand they are portrayed In Sovietas reactions to Increases In USUSSR is thus publicly leavingubsequent reduction lnWe continue to believeeconomic, political, andconsiderations will probably causeleaders torogram ofwhenever In their view theoutlook makes this feasible.any such decisionime advantageous toand foreign policy.manning levels and the retentionpersonnel contribute to increasedreadiness of the Soviet forces.

Soviet MilitarySee, Annex A,)

the past six months, the Sovietstwo substantial increases inallocated to thc1 Khrushchev announced thatallocation for that year was being

2

from5 billion new rubles originally planned4 billion rubles. In the annual budget announcement of early December, planned military expenditures2 were set4 billion rubles, moreillion rubles orercent grcntcr than the1 allocation. Thc announcements themselvesarge propagandacalculated to show publicly that the USSR is determined totrongfoundation for Its current foreign policy and to convey the impression that it will match Increases in US military spending.

It is highly unlikely that the full amount ofillion ruble Increase announced1 could actually have been spent in that year as claimed. It is likely that the bulk of the increase was achieved by transferring to the overt military category certainwhich had previously been hidden in other categories of the Soviet budget.in the budget forhere are unusual decreases totaling three or more billion rubles In these other categories.

esult of the accounting changesby theseuch larger part of total Soviet military expenditure now appears to be Included in thc overt military category, but wc continue to believe that real military costs are larger than those explicitly allocated to defense in the published budget. Based on our estimates of actual Sovietprograming, we believe that these real costs were nearlyillion rublesnd that they will increase ton This estimated Increaseretention through the coming year? million military personnel and takesof likely increases in allocations to long-range attack and air defense forces, and to military research and development. Some additional Increase may be Incurred bytraining activities and otherto increase the readiness of existingforces. Because the Soviet economyhole is expanding, however, actual military expenditures2 will probably continue to comprise on the order of one-tenth of gross national product when measured In ruble terms.

rom thc available data, we are able toslightly more than two-thirds of total military spending among the following major missions: theater operations. Including ground and tactical air; air defense; long-rangeand naval missions. We now estimate that allocations to theater operations will not decline2 as previously expected, and that they will continue to absorb nearly one-third of total Soviet military expenditures. Expenditures on forces for air defense and long-range attack will each probably rise from somewhat under to somewhat overercent of total military spending, andon forces for naval missions will probably remain at roughlyercent. The major part of thc unapportloned residual is for research and development.

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 1

(See,

nc estimated thatICBM strength, then in the rangeaunchers, would probably notew. second generation ICBM system was ready for operational use. probably in the Utter halfystem,andem-staged missile, probably smaller than tho first generation Soviet ICBM and using storable liquid pro-

In September 1MI. Uie Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF, call ma ted the numbers ofICDM launchers as follows;

About SO

Atime he believed that the Soviets would continue to deploy first generation ml Miles as an Interim measure unUl the second generaUon mla-sites become available Ine further be lieved that once the second generaUon systemoperaUonal. deployment would be accelerated It was erldent from their test program thai theelt obliged lo Increase the tempo of their fflorW.

The Assistant Chief of Staff. IntelUgence. USAF. now believes that developments over the pastmonths are In keeping with Ms previously stated view, and notes with Interest Uie chance ln ludement reflected In the text with respect to the IOC of Uie second generaUon ICDM Irom Iho laller Dart2 to the first half

P t-rfrT-

pe Hants, was under Intensive development on the Tyuratam test range evidence and analysis Indicates lhal thc Soviels have made somewhut more rapid progress than wc had estimated In developing their second generation ICBM. The ICDM tests into the Pacific in Septemberncluded successful tests of the new system to. range. It has also become apparentn this ICBMwas aided by development work on an IRBM system which employes similar design concepts and components. Finally, ouron Soviet construction ofcomplexes with road-served launchers suitable for the second generation ICBMleads us to believe that some such launchers are now ready to receive missiles.

these reasons, we now estimate thaiwill probably achieve an Initialcapability (IOC) with their secondICBM system during the first halfInhe USSR willa totalaunchers fromcan bc fired against the US,at first and second generationlaunching complexes In the fieldaunchers at Tyuratam.

six-month advance Ln estimateddoes not necessarilyirectthe number of operational launcherswill have inf It reflectsIn the Sovietmerelyestimate ofmay mean only thataspects of the second generationhave made up for lost tune andIn proper phase with the preparationlaunching complexes. intensityinformation on launch complexesunder construction, the leadtimestor their activation, and theof unidentified complexes underwo now believe that thc actualof operational ICBM launchers inls likely to fall toward the highange which we estimated for that

date last September. Additional evidence, and reanalysls to be undertaken Infor the forthcoming,urther change in these estimated numerical ranges.

or general trends in numbers ofICBM launchors, together with the factors likely to affect Soviet ICBM deployment concepts In this period, seeThe Soviet Strategicatedor estimates of the strength and deployment of Soviet ballistic missiles of medium and intermediate ranges, see NIE, "Strength and Deployment of Soviet Long-Range Ballistic Missileated

Long Range Aviation

(See, Annex A,ne estimated Soviet Long Range Aviation strength In heavy bombors and tankers atISON Jet andEAR turboprop aircraft as ofndradual decline in the heavy bomber force over the next live years. It has been established that over about the past IB months two additional regiments have been activated at Soviet heavy bomberadditional aircraft have been assigned to units at these airfields, and flying activity has Intensified. This Is particularlyIn the case of units containing BEAR bombers. ompleteof evidence on Soviet heavy bombers has been made,

n the basis of this review, we believe that the production of BISON bombers and tankers continuedery low rate until about the middlend that thisprogram has probably now ceased. Total production of BISONs was probably;ISONs are now Inunits.'

"See the footnote of tho Assistant Chief of Stafl, intelligence. USAF. following paragraph M.

roduction of IJEARs. on tho other hand, is less certain. We believeotaleic produced and that it is unlikely that any new BEAR bombers have Continued activity at the 8EAR factory is probably accounted for by producUon of the CLEAT transport and by two consecutive major modifications ofBEARs, the first to correct defects ln the aircraft and the second to fit them forof air-to-surf ace missiles. Theactivity at BEAR bases, together with some other bits of evidence, can be interpreted to mean that production continued and that there are somewhat larger numbers of BEARs in operational units than we have estimated. However, it Is much more likely that theunit activity results from theto BEAR bases of additional BADGER jet medium bombers in aboutome number of BADGERs has always been present In Soviet heavy bomber units, apparently to perform ECM. decoy, and other supporting missions in conjunction with heavy bomber strikes. We therefore continue to estimate that the most probable number of BEARs ln operational unitsut do not exclude the possibilityew additional BEARs In units at the present time.1

resent Soviet strength In BISONs and BEARs will probably be maintainedear

The Assistant Chief of Staff. InUlllfer.ee, USAF. concurs In the estimate that BISON producUonuntil aboutut believes that the tolal of BU^Ns produced Is moro probablyircraft. He does not concur ln the esUmate lhat BEAR producUon ceasedather, he believes that the evidence indicates that BEARcoiiUnuednd that at least SO BEARs were produced. lie further believes that Increased activity at Long Range AvlaUoo heavy bomber bases and other direct evidenceotallflONa andEARs In operaUonal units at the present time.

or so and then decline graduallyesult of normal attrition. There continues to be no good evidenceoviet Intention to series produce the BOUNDER or any other follow-on heavy bomber, although research and development in new heavy bomberscontinues. Thereossibilityew such aircraft will be In units In thebout half of the BEAR force has now been modified toir-to-surf ace missiles for standoffon land targets, and we believe thatall operational BEARs will have been so modified by There is no evidence that BISONs have been equipped for alr-to-surfacc missile delivery.

BADGER medium bomber strength in Long Range Aviation was reduced byircraft in the last two years It will probably continue to decline, but by thconsiderable portion of the medium bomber force is likely to be supersonic "dash" BLINDERs, some of them probably equipped for standoff missile delivery. Although the rridence Is inconclusive, we believe that BLINDERs are now beginning to enterunits.

The table below projects the trends in Long Range Aviation over the next five years, on our assumptions that the Soviets make no drastic policy changes and that the forceto comprise presently-known aircraft types. In addition to the medium bombers shown in the table, the USSR now hasuch aircraft In Naval Aviation and will probably haven thes. the bulk of them BADGERs but probablysome BLINDERs.

' Thc Assistant Chief of Staff, intelligence, USAF. believes. In consideration of continued Soviet re. search and development in new bombers and other relevant factors, that the USSR will probablya new heavy bomber Into the

Strength of Soviet long Range Avialion

1 Jan-

Bombers'

Bombers

* . .

few

...

' BISON and BADGER figures Include aircraft fitted aa tankers. These are available In all BISON uniu aod In aboutercent of thc BADOER unit*.

They can probably be reconverted to bombing use ln

a lewirtually aU BEARs will probably

have been modified to carry andjn.

alr-to-surface missiles rather than bombs.

* Some BLINDERs will probably be equippedew alr-to-surface missile We have no present evidenceUNDER Unlet; modified BADOER and BISON tankers could probably perform this function.

'Does not Include medium bombers assigned to Naval Aviation.

- The Assistant Chief of Staff. InteUigence. USAF. believes that the numbers of heavy bomben should read:

1Mid- Mid- Mid- Mid-2 3 4 S

Heavy Bombers

BISON

60

75 70

..

20

..

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, further believes that, with these numbers ofIn Long Range Aviation, and hion of pertinent operaUonal factors (excluding combatie USSR could putombers over North America on two-way missions In an initial attack. Moreover, he estimates lhataximum effort, again not consideringattrition, and employing one and two-way missions, over SOD bombers could reach UrgeU In North America. (See pagearagraphf, Annex rt,>

Tactical Avialion

<See, Annex A, paragraphs

ecent observation oloviet fighter aircraft practicing low altitude over-the-shoulder bombing maneuvers In Easttogether with other evidence, confirms our previous belief that the Sovietsighter atomic delivery capability.

Nuclear Submarine! and Submorine-launchcd Missiles

. (See, Annex A,)

t is still not possible to state incontro-vcrtibly lhal the USSR has any nuclearat all. However, the Interpretationubstantial body of evidence, takenwith thc statements of Soviet leaders, brings us to the estimate thatubmarines in thc Soviet fleet arc nuclear propelled. Eight of these are believed to be the "H" class ballistic missile submarines, and theare "N" class torpedo attackWe believeonstruction rateuclear submarines per year can soon be achieved and that the Soviets will continue to build them at this approximate rate through This estimate Is based on available evidence of Soviet nuclear submorlne construction and operations, the estimated capabilities of the two Soviet shipyardsto be engaged in nuclear submarineand the estimated Soviet capability to build nuclear reactors. It is possible thatthe next five years the Soviets wOl expand their nuclear submarine effort, but we believe that limitations on Soviet reactor technology, as well as the time required to develop Im-

The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF, believes thatuclear submarines per year as Indicated In this paragraph Isum production capability. Considering pastwith other Soviet weapon systems,producUon is not likely to be sought or achieved by them. In view of this, and considering construction and flttlng-out time required for new submarines, balanced against current evidence on the number of submarines under corulrucUon. the numbers and raUonale on this subject expressed In,nd B. appear to remain sound.

proved submarine types from earlier classes, would tend to limit the annual building rate.

here is evidence that missiles olthe same typo are carried by allSoviet ballistic missileincluding the seven convenUonally-poweredon version" andG" class units as well as the eight nuclear-powered "H" class submarines. These missiles are believed capable of delivering nuclear warheads in the low megaton range to distances of up toEP. againstargets under operaUonal conditions. can probably be launched only while the submarine ls surfaced. Thc 33 presently-operational ballistic missile submarines carry two or three missiles each, depending on their class, and the total complement of all these submarines Is aboutissiles. Available evidence indicates that these submarines are also equipped for torpedo attack.

ecause of the technicalagainst the likelihood of submerged launch of the present missile system, andof the complete absence of evidene* of current Soviet workubmarine system for submerged launching of longer range ballistic missiles, we now esUmate4 Is the earliest date at which the USSR could achieveystem. Indeed, the chances seem about even that the Soviets will regard present systems as satisfactory for some years touccessor to the "H" class, if It appears, couldoremissile system with some six miss tics per submarine.

he majority of nuclear submarinesto date have been ballistic missile types.

However, we believe that the Soviets willmore nuclear-powered torpedofor various purposes, including thc interdlcUon of sea lines of communication,on naval surface forces at sea, andwarfare. In the future, somesubmarines may be equipped with missiles suitable for use against surface ships and submarines.

n the table below, the estimated totals represent our best Judgment regarding the construction of nuclear submarines of off types. On the basis of classes Identified to date, they are shown in two categories: ballistic missile and torpedo attack. This allocation is believed generally valid for the next year or so. but beyond that point, asIn Uie preceding paragraphs, the totals maylass with antishiplass with more sophisticated ballisticor both. We cannot now estimate tbe magnitude of such programs, nor can wewhich of the identified classes will bc affected.

n addition to the nuclear-poweredprograms described above, there Isevidence pointingrogram to equip conventional submarines with cruise-type missiles. Within the past year,"W" class submarines equipped with cylinders or tubes suitable for carrying missiles have been observed in three of the four Soviet Fleet areas, and there is evidence that at least two Important shipyards are Involved In modifying these submarines. Moreover, we believe that the USSR hasa cruise-type missile with homing guidancepeed of about Machc-

Missileand/or successorAttackand/or successor

4 12

10

& li

9 11

the footnote of the Assistant Chief of Stan. Intelligence. USAP. to para

e-fi-y

signed to fly.ew thousand feet altitude and capable of carrying aofounds. While the direct association of these developments cannot be established at this tunc, we estimate that some "W" class cruise-type missile submarines are probably now operational. Additionalof this class may be similarly modi-fled over thc next fiveew class of conventional submarines designed specifically for this purpose may also be under

he new Information on thesetends to clarify the missions of Soviet missile submarines. Because of theirranges. "W" class submarines equipped with cmise-type missiles are suited primarily for operations against surface ships In the North Atlantic and Western Pacific, whereas missile submarines of thend "ll" classes have sufficient range to operate In US coastal waters and their ballistic missiles are designed for employment against fixed targets. In an Artillery Day pronouncement ln a Soviet naval spokesman clearly distinguished between the navy'smissiles, described as "basically assigned to the destruction of coastalnd Its "self-homing" missiles, described as the "most effective means" of destroying ships, especially aircraft carriers Wc continue to believe that the Soviets regard submarine-launchedmissiles as supplementing other means of nuclear attack against the US. The cruise-type missile program, together with thc program to equip naval BADQER aircraft with antiship missiles,ontinuing major Soviet effort to counter Westernnaval capabilities, especially carrier strike forces.

Defenseallistic Missiles

(Sec, Annex A. paragraph 4)

he Soviets have made further progressn systems to defend against ballistic missiles, especially In the recent nuclear test scries. During that scries, three tests were conducted at high altitudes: one ofT. detonatedeet, and two of low yield, detonated atjn. ln

thc latter teats, the nuclear devices werocarriedm. ballistic missiles fired from Kapustin Yar toward the Sary Shagan antimissile research center. The tests were probably designed to determine the ability of antimissile system radars to track incoming ballistic missiles, and possiblymissiles as well, in thc presence of debris and Ionization from nuclear bursts. Although these tests probably were notantimissile system tests, they contributed valuable effects information to the antimissile development program.

ur evidence Is still insufficient towhether or not the Soviets haveconducted firings against Incoming ballistic missiles, but we believe It likely thai they have done soumber of occasions over the past year. Nor can we determine thc method the Soviets have chosen tothe complex tasks of detection,discrimmalioc. and tracking necessary to successful solution of the InterceptWe know, however, that they areon terminal Intercept techniques, andnterest apparenUy includes techniques for interception both inside and outside Uie aUnosphere.

hile many uncertainties remain as to Uie role of Uie electronic installations at thc Sary Shagan antimissile research center, we believe that Uie great number and variety of these InstallaUons represent Sovietof more than one type of antimissile system. In addlUon to defense against IRBMs and ICBMs. thc USSR is probablysystems to cope with other types of Western ballistic missiles. For defense against free rockets and short-range ballistic missiles, thc Soviets can probably achieve some capability by modifying their surface-to-air missile system designed for use against aircraft. Considering the years of experience tn antimissile research at Sary Shagan, the intensity of thc Soviet program there, and Uie availability of antiaircraft systems such as thec believe that the USSR could probably achieve an IOC againsi tacticalwith ranges up to about. An entirely new system would prob-

ably be required lo defend against Western tactical missiles ol longer ranges. We believe thatystem Is under development at Sary Shagan. and that It Is designed loSoviet targets, including those of theater field forces, against ballistic missUes with ranges of roughlyun. An IOC could probably be achieved.

onsidering the status of therogram and the political and military advantages of early deploymentystem to defend against IRBMs and ICBMs, we have estimated that the USSR will begin al least limited deployment ofystem. Lead times of some two to three years are probably required for the construction and installation of radars and olher systemin the vicinity of targets to be de-

fended, and we have not yet Identified any such activities. Deployment activities might go undetectedonsiderable time after their initiation, however, and at present we do not regard the lock of evidence asa change in the estimated IOC date.

Recent Soviet Nuclear Tests

(See, Annex A,)

ummary of conclusions drawn from the recent Soviet test series, based onanalysis, seeThe Soviet Strategic Militaryatedoreanalysis, see the forthcoming, 'The Soviet Atomic Energynow scheduled for completion in February or

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