NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
PROBABLE TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY
Stbtnltted by lhe DIIUCCTOK OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The /allowing Intelligence organisations participated in the preparation of this estimate; The Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence organizations of the Departments of Stale, De/enie. the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred In by the UNITED .STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARDanuaryoncurring were The Director of In. tclllgence and Research. Department ol State; The Director. Delense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Slag /or intelligence. Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Natal OperationsIII.enl of the Hoop; the Assistant Chief oj Staff, Intelligence. USAF; the Director for intelligence. Joint Staff; and the Director of the National Stcstrity Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Repre tentative to the USIB. and tha Assistant Director. Federal Bureau of Inwtlgction. abstained, the subtect being outside of their furisdtclion
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male rial the naUonal within the mise. mlulon to ui ur
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PROBABLE TRENDS IN SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE
To estimate probable trends over the next lew years in Soviet military assistance lo other Bloc nations (excluding Communist China) and to non-Bloc countries.1
military assistance to Bloc and non-Bloc countries has not beenlimited by availability of arms and equipment in the Soviet stockpile, and will not be so limited in the future.imitation would only be felt if theshould decide to include in theprograms substantia] numbers of their newest weapons, and we do not think that they will consider it necessary or desirable to do so.
We believe that the Soviets willto provide military assistance to other Bloc countries substantiallyto the pattern they have alreadyfor these programs. Thisinvolves providing the Satellites with generous amounts of conventional arms and equipment, but it excludes nuclear weapons as well as medium and long-range missiles and bombers. While the modernization of Satellite armed forcesittle behind that of the Soviet
'ThM estimate deals essentially vithestablished reeimes and govcrnrneDta. IIattempt lo cover Soviet btoc support ofand dissident movements in whichol arms mayole, possibly by rerecipients of overt Soviet
military, some advanced weapons areto thesesurface-to-air missiles are now appearing in the Satellites, and we expect thatighters soon will. It is clear, however, that Soviet aid programs are primarily designed to equip the Satellite forcesubordinate role in any major war, and to contribute to thethe airthe USSR itself.
5 the Soviets have negotiated military assistance agreements totaling overillionozen non-Bloc countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Moscow views this program as an integral part of its general campaign to expand its influence in theareas and,umber of disappointments, almost certainlyit has been an effective instrument for this purpose. The USSR's criteria for extending arms aid are broad and flexible (recipients include countries whosepolicies are stronglyand, though apparentlyto furnish its most advanced weapons, it has shown an increasing
readiness to export selected items ofequipment (jet medium bombers have been shipped to Indonesia andndeed, the major restraint imposed on the program appears to be someamong non-Bloc countries to accept such aid. )
s opportunities emerge, the USSR will increase and extend its militaryto non-Bloc countries. Somearc likely to receive Increasing amounts of advanced equipment, such as
short-range tactical guided missiles, but not nuclear weapons. Increasingmay be given to the training of non-Bloc military personnel, both within the Bloc and in the recipient states, using facilities there developed by the Soviets. Disputes with recipient countries might curtail the program in some areas, but Moscow's commitments are now so deep and so broad that it would be difficult for it to break existing agreements or even to refuse new ones, without riskingpolitical losses. )
Since the end of Worldhe USSR has furnished extensive military assistance to the countries of the Bloc; sincet has extended such assistanceonsiderable scaleelected but growing group of non-Bloc nations. An examination of thesethrows some light on their pattern, the motives behind them, and the criteria by which they are operated. While auch andoes not provide the basisetailed estimate of future Soviet programs, it does establish some broad limits within which these programs are likely t'o fall.
Ono conclusion which emerges from this examination is that Lhe availability of military equipment is. in nearly all cases, not afactor in Soviet aid arrangements. The USSRery large armaments industry, which is supplemented by the modest-sued arms production capacity of the Satellites The Soviets traditionally create largeof those military Items which they put Into production. More Important, themodernization of all the arms of the Soviet defense establishment regularly makes available large quantities of weapons which, while obsolescent by major-power standards, remain useful for many recipients of Soviet as-
sistance programs. Modern weapons are also supplied, and.ufficiently attractive political opportunity, the USSR Is alsowilling to export small quantities ofweapons, such as the MIO-21 Jet
II. ASSISTANCE TO BLOC NATIONS1ince the USSR wished to preserve the forma of national sovereignty in the areas which It dominated at thc end of World War II, IL had to provide Ihese countries wllh the appurtenances of statehood,ational military establishment. Thus the Soviets, unless they were to provide for adefense industry In each of thewere from thc start committed toexlenslve and continuing militarylo these countries. In fact, theirhave gone beyond the creation of merely token military forces, and It Ls clear that the Soviets intend the Satellites lofor their own internal security and to make some contribution lo the total military posture of the Bloc.
"The nature ol the bilateral arrangements for this assistance (whether iinnU Or credits or both! is mil known.
n shaping these forces, the USSR has used ita military aid largely to strengthen thecapability, and particularly the nirof the Bloc and thereby of its ownas well. However, it has supplied these countries with sufficient arms and equipment to enable them to conduct offensive operations of limited scale. Ground force equipment has included artillery, armor, short-range tactical missiles, and transport vehicles; navalhas Included all types of naval craft from destroyers and submarines down to service craft, and air defense equipment has included combat aircraft andurface-to-airThc Soviets have not seen fit, however, to provide the Bloc countries with their most advanced weapons and equipment. Nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems (such as heavy or medium bombers, medium or long-range missiles) have been entirely withheld. In general, the USSR has notany of the Bloc countries withreserve stocks of conventional arms. This patternoviet Intention toirm hand on the major Instruments of modern warfare, and to limit the possibility that Individual Satellites could at some stage embark on Independentr use such weapons to assert their own autonomy against the Soviet Union.
All the European Satellites except Albania now produce Soviet-type infantry weapons and ammunition. In addition,and Poland produce some artillery4 tanks, and haveubstantial number of early model MIG fighter aircraft. Despite these capabilities, ail the European Satellites continue to depend heavily on the Soviet Union to sustain Inventories of military cquipmenl, and they depend almost entirely on Moscow for naval vessels and armaments, and for newer model aircraft, air weapons, and electronic equipment.
Like those of the European Satellites, the North Korean armed forcesovietthere is no indication of any significant Chinese military assistance to North Korea.eriod of years, the Sovietsot Soviet-wpp)led itoeks eurrenUjr
in Inventory In Ihc Satellites.
piled the Koreansange of itemsto lhat provided to the Europeanincluding modern artillery and aircraftumber of naval vessels. The North Korean Air Force has twice as many aircraft as South Korea andair-to-goodfor ground attack, air defense, andWithout outside assistance,the North Korean armed forces are presently capable only of maintaining Internal security and of conducting limited defensive and offensive operations.
ll. On the other hand, ln North Vietnam,of Its isolation from the USSR and the close ties formed with the Chineseduring the revolution against the French, the armed forces have beenInfluenced and aided by Peiping. Partly because of this, partly because offactors and the type of warfareand to some extent because of theImposed by the Geneva Accords, the range of armament in thc North Vietnamese armed forces is much more limited than that of other'Bloc countries, and does not include heavy armor or artillery. North Vietnam has no combnt aircraft at present, but tt has the nucleus o' an air forcemall number of pilots who have been trained in other Bloc countries. It has no major naval vessels, but0 It has received from the USSR three modern submarine-chasers andotorboats.
oscow has varied the amounts and the quality of its military aid In accordance with the circumstances. Thus, the political schism In Soviet relations with Albania has resultedeverance of military aid to that country. In Hungary, Soviet military aid for some time after6 uprising was proportionately less than for some of the other Satellites. In East Germany, certain restraints have been apparent, probably because ol the presence of Soviet forces in strength and possibly because of Soviet uncertainty over the reliability of the East Germans. Thus, East German forces were formed later than those of the other Satellites and have been relatively restrictedmm^lmIiI recently, moreover, the GDR was
only Kast European Satellite (exceptwhich had not received the light bomber. In the Far East, as noted above, the nature of Soviet military aid to North Korea has differed greatly from that extended to North Vietnam.
e believe that the Soviets will continue lo supply the other Bloc countries withweapons and equipment to ensureeasonable level of combat capability ls maintained. The policy of modernizing these forces with newer weapons and equipment will almost certainly continue. However, the Soviets will conUnue to reserve for their own armed forces the mam stralegic strikingof the Bloc. Thus, they will notthe other Bloc countries with annuclear capability. We believe that the Soviets will be prepared In the next few years to supply some of the Bloc countries with limited quantities of advanced weapons, but we doubt that in thc next few years they will provide them with the TU-ifl medium bomber or longer range surface-to-aurlacc missiles, except perhaps in token quantities for prestige purposes. Thc course of the Slno-Sovicl dispute may in time affect thc nature of the Soviet military programs In Northand North Vietnam.
III. ASSISTANCE TO NON-BLOChe Soviet Bloc has been involved in an expanding program of military assistance to non-Bloc countries sinceyozen countries In Asia, Africa, and LaUn America had negotiated agreements to purchase on credit armaments and associated equipment totaling overillion (at list prices before discount).* To date, the value
" Czechoslovak and Polish participation, under Soviet aegis, Is Included In this assessment The Chinese Communist military aid program, which has been of very limited scope, la operated independently of Soviet efforts.
'List prices are frequently discounted laveragincercent on all deals made thusash down payments are often not required: the terms usually stipulate repayment over five years or moreercent annual interest charge
of deliveries under these commitments has comprised aboul three-quarters of this total.
The pace of thc Bloc military ass Ls lance program was stepped upconcluded Important additional arms agreements with the three principal recipients of such aid (Indonesia. Egypt, and Iraq) and committed itself to supply further quantities of arms to Afghanistan and Cuba.et lighters were delivered for the first time to Egypt (which had asked for them, Iraq, Cuba, and Indonesia. Deliveries of Bloc arms were made for the first time to Morocco and Mali, and offers of aid were extended to the Congo. Cambodia, Burma, and Syria (fol-krwing its split from thendto the Sudan, the Somali Republic, and India as well
More important,1 the USSR for the first time provided more advanced Soviet arms and weapons systems to non-BlocIndonesia, Egypt, and Iraq were promised delivery of MIGet fighters andBADGER) medium jet bombers; some of thcs have already arrived in Indonesia and Egypt. The Soviet-Indonesian arms agreement of1 Includedfor the shipmentariety of short-range guided missiles to the Indonesian air force (air-to-air, air-to-surface, andship-launchedand army (surface-to-air).agreements with Egypt and Iraq also specified delivery of missiles; Egypt issoon scheduled to receive alr-to-sur-facc and ship-launched surface-to-surfacewhile Iraq has contracted for aturface-to-air system.
Military assistance was also an important factor in exploitation of the CommunistInto the Western Hemisphereby Lhe Cuban revolution. Soviet arms deliveries01 have provided Cuba with ground and air weapons superior to those of any other Latin American country.thc USSR apparently does not intend to provide Castro with. Uie means to threaten the US militarily, lesl the U8 be provoked lo lake
action or lest control over major risks pass from Soviet hands. Furthermore, materiel supplied does not Include equipment which wouldajor militaryagainst other Latin Americanourse of action which could gravelySoviet and Cuban political objectives In that region.
Soviet Motive* and Criteria
oscow views its military assistanceas an integral part of its generalto expand Soviet influence in non-Bloc areas. Arms shipments are thus Intended to serve the same broad political objectives as the Bloc's economic aidof Western influence, thc creation of pro-Soviet alignments, and the encouragement of pro-Soviet forces within recipient countries. The USSR can often arrange arms exports In quantity at relatively little cost to itself and can promise quick delivery. Further, theof arms aid at discount prices and on favorable credit terms, with "no stringsIs well-geared to appeal to poor but proud, highly nationalistic states which, in some cases, are unable to procure arms from other sources of the type and in the quantity desired. It fits well into Moscow's efforts to convince the underdeveloped states that the USSR is ln the vanguard of the "anti-colonlaust" struggle and may also serve to buttress Bloc propaganda concerning Soviet military pre-eminence.
he Soviets probably hope that theaid program. Including not only materiel deliveries and subsequent maintenancebut also the furnishing of Bloc military technicians and the training of non-Bloc personnel in the USSR, will haveinfluence on military elements in the recipient countries. Thc Soviets probably consider that such influence couldseful relationship, especially in those under-developed countries where the military is likely toubstantial role In theof existing governments and in the choice of their successors. For example, the USSR must be well pleased by the fact that in Indonesia the strongly anti-Communist army
Is now receiving Bloc equipment, previously accepted only by the navy and air force.
ecause of political considerations.has been less rigid in Its handling ofaid programs with non-Bloc countries than with Its own Satellites. Although It may once have held high hopes for short-run political gains from these non-Bloc programs. Moscow appears to have acceptedof these hopes and no longer counts on Immediate successes. Qaslm's suppression of the burgeoning Communist movement in Iraq, for example, did not deter the USSR fromexisting arms agreements ornew ones. The cooling of Soviet-Egyptian relations8 was probably responsible for some reduction and delay in Soviet assistance, but thc program was never suspended. Bitter propaganda exchanges between Moscow and Cairo In the spring1 did not prevent the subsequent signingajor new arms deal. Other elements of friction between the USSR and recipient countries, such asfor equipment Moscow Is reluctant to provide, have sometimes caused negotiating difficulties bui have not prevented theor continuation of military aid
nlike the Chinese Communists, whoto stress aid to militant revolutionaries, the Soviets appear to be willing to extend arms aid to any government which offers some promise of being useful to long-run Soviet objectives. Soviet programs have beenIn fostering local rivalries through arms races (as In Africa and the Middlend tn encouraging regional hostilities (as In Indonesia). The USSR has not been deterred by the prospect of irritating thon India). The characteregime and its attitude toward communism do not seem to have much hearing on Mas-cow's attitude, as can be seen In Soviet arms shipment* to Yemen nnd offers to Saudi Arubia and Jordan. Nor docs the apparent inability of some recipients, such as the to use or maintain sophisticated equipment prevent shipments of such materiel Restraints on the USSR's military assistance program are thuseneralized
X: ET/ NUiDHK
as its disLncliiiation to create situations which might directlyits own forces inare those imposed by such factorseluctance to export its most modern weapons.
principal factor limiting SovietIs, ln fact, the reluctance ofrecipients to accept such aid.regard acceptance of Sovietas fundamentallytheir pro-Westerneutralist policy, some,India, Burma, and Ethiopia, have thusto refuse such aid because ofconcerning Bloc motives orto compromise their neutrality. Incases, such as Saudi Arabia,interest In Soviet offers are designedto elicit greater Western help.the list of recipients of Bloc armslo grow, we do not foresee anyin the near future.
Soviet Evoluarion ol Results
USSR probably judges itseparate program, but in terms ofto the totality of SovietIn this context, Soviet leadersestimate that the program hascxlend Soviet influence, and in somesustain, if not create. pro-BlocWhile Moscow cannot claimpolitical gainsesult of itsin Egypt and Iraq. It has maintainedIn these countries withoutnoticeable loss of presUge. Despitenotably ln theleaders probably count theirin Africauccessful one andoptimistic aboul its potential.certainly consider that, inis movingtill closerwith Bloc policies and attribute suchlargely to the close associationarms aid program with Djakarta'sacquire West New Guinea. Thealto view with pleasure tbetheir program In aggravating problemsareas of the world where Western in-
terests arc and Cuba.
directly involved, as in Indonesia
Trends observable during the pastmost notably the further expansion of arms aid offers, the conclusion of additionalwith major recipients, and theof more modern and powerfulcan be expected to continue. Cerium key countries, such as India and Morocco, which have hitherto resisted large Soviet offers, will probably be pressed anew with attractiveShipments to rebel movements initherto largely confined tomay receive greater emphasis, and may be open or masked as suits Soviet purposes.on the solution of logistics problems and the political opportunities open to them, the Soviets may, for example, supplyln Cameroons, the Congo, or Angola. Offers to Latin Americanfar limited to Cuba andbe quickly extended to any likely new candidates.
A facet of the mUltary assistance program which may receive Increasing attention over thc next few years is the training of non-Bloc military personnel within the Bloc.for the trainingreater number of such personnel for longer periods of time will probably grow apace with the expansion of programs ln the more backward, newly emergent countries of Africa. Sovietand staffing of military schools and training facilities within the recipientmay also receive greater emphasis. Chances of influencing non-Bloc armed forces are greater in slates where such forces have no prior traditions of their own and wherefacilities are negligible or nonexistent.
While we believe that Moscow will agree to supply more modem weaponsreater number of countries, such aid will probably for the most part exclude the most modern Soviet convcntion:il weapons and will certainlyall nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. Short-range conventionally armed missiles will probably be supplied to the more advanced recipient countries. Deliveries of mcdiuni-iiiiicc bombers will probably be
in quantity and restricted Loew recipients. The Soviet program is aand opportunistic one. however, and It
may become Increasingly difficult politically for Moscow to resist demands for advanced
weaponry from at least those states which
have the potential ability to use more sophistl-
e believe that thc Soviet militaryprogram wil! remain an important t'lement in the USSR's policies toward non-
Bloc states. Political disputes like lhat with Egypt or even the failurearticularto achieve notable and tangible results might result in the curtailment or even the suspension of aid. But Moscow'sarc now so deep and so broad, and so Intertwined with Its general "anti-Imperialist" posture, that lt would be difficult for the USSR to break existing agreements, or even to refuse new ones, without risking serious political losses.
Table I. ESTIMATED OPERATIONAL INVENTORY OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT HELD BV OTHER BLOC COUNTRIES'
DssTROTER Sub- Patrol v; Type marines Craft Craft
Combat Aircraft IPIiblen and Bombers) and Surface-lo-Air MUtllc Sites
Rumania Korea MO
' The reliability ol these figures variesot includingites under thc control of Soviel forces ln Germany.
ESTIMATED VALUE (BEFORE DISCOUNTS* OF BLOC MILITARY ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS WTTH NON-BLOC COUNTRIES
Values are based on quoted list prices before discounts. For new and for more advanced equipment, the quoted list prices are roughly equivalent lo what lhe coat to provide the Item would be In the US; for obsolescent equipment the quoted list prices are from one-half to two-thirds what it would cost to produce the Item in the US.Original document.