Created: 1/24/1962

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Submitted bv the DZBTCTOK OF CENTKAL INTELLIGENCE The SeUowing Intelligence orffoMzalttm,tnpreparationhu tHUull;Central Intelligence Agency and the tnteUtgtnce organizationsha Department* of State, Defense, the Army, the Nary, the Atr Font, and Tha Joint Staff.

Concurred tn by the DOTTED STATU INTELLIGENCE BO ABD mm CeneMu, war* The Director of in-mmmm ana Research. Department of State; The Director O'tense Intelligence Agency; the AuUUtnt Chief ol Staff tor intelligence, Department of tha Army; tha Assistant Chief of Naval Operation*epartment of the Navy; tha Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF; the Director for Intelligence. Joint Staff; and the Director of the MM Security Agency. Tha Atomic Energy CommUrion tentative to tha aSIB, and the Assistant Dtrtetor Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their farUdlctlon.


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The title of this estimate when used separately from the text, should be classifiedFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

materia]formnUonnational ieltjdW ot the Unitedthe meaoflB of the etpinnageU.and TM, the tzmna-

of which la anj manner to aa nnauUdhxed peraon Is prohibited by taw.


National Security Council Department of State Department of Defense Atomic Enemy Cconmcon FWeral Bnreaa of InwjUaauon




To estimate probable trends over the next few years in Soviet military assistance to other Bloc nations (excluding Communist China) and to non-Bloc countries.1


Soviet military assistance to Bloc and non-Bloc countries has not beenlimited by availability of arms and equipment tn the Soviet stockpile, and will not be so limited In the future.imitation would only be felt if theshould decide to include in theprograms substantial numbers of their newest weapons, and we do not think that they will consider it necessary or desirable to do so.

2 We believe that the Soviets willto provide military assistance to other Bloc countries substantiallyto the pattern they have alreadyfor these programs. Thisinvolves providing the Satellites with generous amounts of conventional arms and equipment, but it excludes nuclear weapons as well as medium and long-range missiles and bombers. While the modernization of Satellite armed forcesittle behind that of the Soviet

estimate deals essenually with assistance to established regimes and governments. It does not attempt to cover Soviet bloc support ofand dissident movements In which the supply of arms mayole, possibly by re-export from recipients ol overt Soviet aid.


military, some advanced weapons areto thesesurface-to-air missiles are now appearing in the Satellites, and we expect1 fighters soon will It is clear, however, that Soviet aid programs are primarily designed to equip the Satellite forcesubordinate role in any major war, and to contribute to thethe airthe USSR itself.

5 the Soviets have negotiated military assistance agreements totaling overillionozen non-Bloc countries in Asia. Africa, and Latin America. Moscow views this program as an integral part of its general campaign to expand its influence in theareas and,umber of disappointments, almost certainlylt has been an effective instrument for this purpose. The USSR's criteria for extending arms aid are broad and flexible (recipients include countries whosepolicies are stronglyand, though apparentlyto furnish its most advanced weapons, it has shown an increasing

SECR^bbbFROF orn

lo export selected items ofequipment (jet medium bombers have been shipped to Indonesia andndeed, the major restraint imposed on the program appears to be someamong non-Bloc countries to accept such aid. )

s opportunities emerge, the USSR will increase and extend its militaryto non-Bloc countries. Someare likely to receive increasing amounts of advanced equipment, such as short-range tactical guided missiles, but not nuclear weapons. Increasingmay be given to the training of non-Bloc military personnel, both within the Bloc and in the recipient states, using facilities there developed by the Soviets. Disputes with recipient countries might curtail the program in some areas, but Moscow's commitments are now so deep and so broad that it would be difficult for it to break existing agreements or even to refuse new ones, without riskingpolitical losses. )



Since the end of World War II the L'SSR has furnished extensive military assistance to the countries of the Bloc; sincet has extended such assistanceonsiderable scaleelected but growing group of non-Bloc nations. An examination of thesethrows some light on their pattern, the motives behind them, and the criteria by which they are operated. While such andoes not provide the basisetailed estimate of future Soviet programs, it does establish some broad limits within which these programs are likely to fall.

One conclusion which emerges from this examination is that the availability of military equipment ls. ln nearly all cases, not afactor ln Soviet aid arrangements. Thc USSRery large armaments industry, which is supplemented by the modest-sized arms production capacity of the Satellites. The Soviets traditionally create largeof those military Items which they put into production. More important, themodernization of all the arms of the Soviet defense establishment regularly makes available large quantities of weapons which, while obsolescent by major-power standards, remain useful for many recipients of Sovietprograms. Modern weapons arc also supplied, and.ufficiently attractive political opportunity, the USSR is alsowilling to export small quantities ofweapons, such as theet fighter.

ii. assistance to bloc nations;

ince the USSR wished to preserve the forms of national sovereignty in the areas which it dominated at the end of World War II, it had to provide these countries with the appurtenances of statehood,ational military establishment Thus the Soviets, unless they were to provide for adefense industry in each of thewere from the start committed toextensive and continuing militaryto these countries. In fact, theirhave gone beyond the creation of merely token military forces, and it ls clear that the Soviets intend the Satellites tofor their own Internal security and to make some contribution to the total military posture of the Bloc.

'The nature of the bilateral arrangement* tor thli assistance [whether fronts or credits or both' Ls not known.

S In shaping these forces, the USSR haa used its military aid largely to strengthen thecapability, and particularly the airof the Bloc and thereby of Its ownas well. However, It has supplied these countries with sufficient arms and equipment to enable them to conduct offensive operations of limited scale. Ground force equipment has Included artillery, armor, short-range tactical missiles, and transport vehicles, navalhas included all types of naval craft from destroyers and submarines down to service craft; and air defense equipment has included combat aircraft andurface-to-airThe Soviets have not seen fit, however, to provide the Bloc countries with their most advanced weapons and equipment. Nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems (such as heavy or medium bombers, medium or long-range missiles) have been entirely withheld. In general, the USSR has notany of the Bloc countries withreserve stocks of conventional arms. This patternoviet intention toirm hand on the major instruments of modern warfare, and to limit the possibility that individual Satellites could at some stage embark on independentr use such weapons to assert their own autonomy against the Soviet Union.

All the European Satellites except Albania now produce Soviet-type infantry weapons and ammunition. In addition,and Poland produce some artillery4 tanks, and haveubstantial number of early model iilG fighter aircraft Despite these capabilities, all the European Satellites continue to depend heavily on the Soviet Union to sustain inventories of military equipment, and they depend almost entirely on Moscow for naval vessels and armaments, and for newer model aircraft, air weapons, and electronic equipment,

Uke those of the European Satellites, the North Korean armed forcesovietthere Is no Indication of any significant Chinese military assistance to North Korea.eriod of years, the Soviets have sup-

or Soviet-supplied siocU eurrenUy In inventory In the Satellites.

plied the Koreansange of itemsto that provided to the Europeanincluding modern artillery and aircraftumber of naval vessels. The North Korean Air Force has twice as many aircraft as South Korea andair-to-goodfor ground attack, air defense, andWithout outside assistance,the North Korean armed forces are presently capable only of maintaining internal security and of conducting limited defensive and offensive operations

n the other hand, in North Vietnam,of its isolation from the USSR and the close ties formed with the Chineseduring thc revolution against the French, the armed forces have beeninfluenced and aided by Peiping Partly because of this, partly because offactors and the type of warfareand to some extent because of theimposed by the Geneva Accords, the range of armament in the North Vietnamese armed forces is much more limited than that of other Bloc countries, and does not include heavy armor or artillery North Vietnam has no combat aircraft at present, but It has the nucleus of an air forcemall number of pilots who have been trained tn other Bloc countries. It has no ma)or naval vessels, but0 it has received from the USSR three modem submarine-chasers andotorboats.

oscow has varied the amounts and the quality of Its military aid in accordance with the circumstances. Thus, the political schism In Soviet relations with Albania has resultedeverance of military aid to that country. In Hungary, Soviet military aid for some time after6 uprising was proportionately less than for some of the other Satellites. In East Germany, certain restraints have been apparent, probably because of the presence of Soviet forces in strength and possibly because of Soviet uncertainty over the reliability of the East Germans. Thus, East German forces were formed later than those of the other Satellites and have been relatively restricted in sice; until recently, moreover, the GDR was

the only East European Satellite (exceptwhich had not received theight bomber. In the Far East, as noted above, the nature of Soviet military aid to North Korea has differed greatly from that extended to North Vietnam.

General Prospect*

e believe that the Soviets will continue to supply the other Bloc countries withweapons and equipment to ensureeasonable level of combat capability is maintained. Thc policy of modernizing these forces with newer weapons and equipment will almost certainly continue. However, the Soviets will continue to reserve for their own armed forces the main strategic strikingof the Bloc. Thus, they will notthe other Bloc countries with annuclear capability. We believe that the Soviets will be prepared in the next few years to supply some of the Bloc countries with limited quantities of advanced weapons, but we doubt that in the next few years they will provide them with theedium bomber or longer range surface-to-surface missiles, except perhaps in token quantities for prestige purposes. The course of the Sino-Soviet dispute may in tune affect the nature of the Soviet military programs in Northand North Vietnam.

*and Polish participation, under Soviet aegis, is Included in this assessment. The Chinese Communist military aid program, which has been of very limited scope, ls operated Independently ot Soviet efforts.

'List prices are frequently discounted (averagingercent on all deals made thusash down payments are often not required: the terms usually stipulate repayment over Ave years or morewo percent annual Interest charge

III. ASSISTANCE TO NON-BLOChe Soviet Bloc has been involved in an expanding program of military assistance to non-Bloc countries sinceyozen countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America had negotiated agreements to purchase on credit armaments and associated equipment totaling over S2 billion (at list prices before discount).' To date, the value of deliveries under these commitments has comprised about three-quarters of this total.

Recent Developments

he pace of the Bloc military assistance program was stepped up concluded important additional arms agreements with the three principal recipients of such aid (Indonesia. Egypt, and Iraq) and committed Itself to supply further quantities of arms to Afghanistan and Cuba. et fighters were delivered for the first time to Egypt (which had asked for them. Iraq, Cuba, and Indonesia. Deliveries of Bloc arms were made for the first tune to Morocco and Mali, and offers of aid were extended to the Congo. Cambodia. Burma, and Syriaits split from thendto the Sudan, the Somali Republic, and India as well.

ore important,1 the USSR for the first time provided more advanced Soviet arms and weapons systems to non-Bloc Indonesia, Egypt, and Iraq were promised delivery ofet fighters andBADGER) medium jet bombers; some of thes have already arrived in Indonesia and Egypt. Thc Soviet-Indonesian arms agreement of1 includedfor the shipmentariety of short-range guided missiles to the Indonesian air force (air-to-air. air-to-surface, andavy (ship-launchedand army (surface-to-air).agreements with Egypt and Iraq also specified delivery of missiles; Egypt Issoon scheduled to receiveand ship-launched surface-to-surfacewhile Iraq has contracted for aturface-to-air system.

ilitary assistance was also an important factor In exploitation of the Communistinto the Western Hemisphereby the Cuban revolution. Soviet arms deliveries01 have provided Cuba with ground and air weapons superior to those of any other Latin American country.the USSR apparently does not intend to provide Castro with the means to threaten the US militarily, lest the US be provoked to Uke


preventive action or lest control over major risks pass from Soviet hands. Furthermore, materiel supplied does not Include equipment which wouldajor militaryagainst other Latin Americanourse of action which could gravelySoviet and Cuban political objectives in that region.

Soviet Motive* and Criteria

oscow views its military assistanceas an integral part of its generalto expand Soviet influence in non-Bloc areas. Arms shipments are thus Intended to serve the same broad political objectives as the Bloc's economic aidof Western influence, the creation of pro-Soviet alignments, and the encouragement of pro-Soviet forces within recipient countries. The USSR can often arrange arms exports in quantity at relatively little cost to itself and can promise quick delivery. Further, theof arms aid at discount prices and on favorable credit terms, with "no stringsis well-geared to appeal to poor but proud, highly nationalistic states which, in some cases, are unable to procure arms from other sources of the type and in the quantity desired. It fits well into Moscow's efforts to convince the underdeveloped states that the USSR is in the vanguard of the "anti-colonialist" struggle and may also serve to buttress Bloc propaganda concerning Soviet military pre-eminence.

he Soviets probably hope that theaid program, including not only materiel deliveries and subsequent maintenancebut also the furnishing of Bloc military technicians and the training of non-Bloc personnel In the USSR, will haveinfluence on military elements in the recipient countries. The Soviets probably consider that such influence couldseful relationship, especially in thosecountries where the military is likely toubstantial role in theof existing governments and in the choice of their successors. For example, the USSR must be well pleased by the fact that in Indonesia the strongly anti-Communist army

is now receiving Bloc equipment, previously accepted only by the navy and air force.

ecause of political considerations.has been less rigid in its handling ofaid programs with non-Bloc countries than with its own Satellites. Although it may once have held high hopes for short-run political gains from these non-Bloc programs, Moscow appears to have acceptedof these hopes and no longer counts on Immediate successes. Qasim's suppression of the burgeoning Communistraq, for example, did not deter the USSR fromexisting arms agreements ornew ones The cooling of Soviet-Egyptian relations8 was probably responsible for some reduction and delay in Soviet assistance, but the program was never suspended. Bitter propaganda exchanges between Moscow and Cairo in the spring1 did not prevent the subsequent signingajor new arms deal. Other elements of friction between the USSR and recipient countries, such asfor equipment Moscow Is reluctant to provide, have sometimes caused negotiating difficulties but have not prevented theor continuation of military aid

nlike the Chinese Communists, whoto stress aid to militant revolutionaries, the Soviets appear to be willing to extend arms aid to any government which offers some promise of being useful to long-run Soviet objectives. Soviet programs have beentn fostering local rivalries through arms races (as ln Africa and the Middlend in encouraging regional hostilities (as In Indonesia). The USSR has not been deterred by the prospect of irritating then India). The characteregime and its attitude toward communism do not seem to have much bearing onattitude, as can be seen in Soviet arms shipments to Yemen and offers to Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Nor does the apparent inability of some recipients, such as theto use or maintain sophisticated equipment prevent shipments Of such materiel Restraints on the USSR's military assistance program are thuseneralized



as Its disinclination to create situations which might directlyits own forces inare those imposed by such factorseluctance to export its most modern weapons.

he principal factor limiting Soviet arms exports is, In fact, ihe reluctance ofrecipients to accept such aid. Some states regard acceptance of Soviet military assistance as fundamentally incompatible with their pro-Western orientation- Among thoseeutralist policy, some, such as India. Burma, and Ethiopia, have thus far preferred to refuse such aid because ofconcerning Bloc motives orto compromise their neutrality. In still other cases, such as Saudi Arabia, professions of interest in Soviet offers are designedto elicit greater Western help. Thus, while the list of recipients of Bloc armsto grow, we do not foresee any radical expansion In the near future,

Soviet Evaluation of Remits

he USSR probably judges its arms aid. noteparate program, but in terms of its contribution to the totality of Soviet foreign policy. In this context, Soviet leadersestimate that the program has helped to extend Soviet influence, and in some areas to sustain, if not create, pro-Bloc political sentiments While Moscow cannot claim any recent political gainsesult of lisin Egypt and Iraq, lt has maintained its presence in these countries without suffering any noticeable loss of prestige Despite somenotably in theSoviet leaders probably count their expanded program in Africauccessful one and are probably optimistic about its potential. They almost certainly consider that, in Indonesia. Sukarno is movingtill closerwith Bloc policies and attributeevelopment largely to the close association of their arms aid program with Djakarta's desire to acquire West New Guinea. The Soviets must also view with pleasure the'effectiveness of their program In aggravating problems In various areas of the world where Westernare directly involved, as in Indonesia and Cuba.


rends observable during the pastmost notably the further expansion of arms aid offers, the conclusion of additionalwith major recipients, and theof more modern and powerfulcan be expected to continue. Certain key countries, such as India and Morocco, which have hitherto resisted large Soviet offers, will probably be pressed anew with attractive Shipments to rebel movements tnhitherto largely confined tomay receive greater emphasis, and may be open or masked as suits Soviet purposes. on the solution of logistics problems and the political opportunities open to them, the Soviets may. for example, supplyinhe Congo, or Angola. Offers to Latin Americanfar limited to Cuba andbe quickly extended to any likely new candidates.acet of the military assistance program which may receive increasing attention over the next few years is the training of non-Bloc military personnel within the Bloc. for the trainingreater number of such personnel for longer periods of time will probably grow apace with the expansion of programs in the more backward, newly emergent countries of Africa. Sovietand staffing of military schools and training facilities within the recipientmay also receive greater emphasis. Chances of influencing non-Bloc armed forces are greater in states where such forces have no prior traditions of their own and wherefacilities are negligible or nonexistent.

hile we believe that Moscow will agree lo supply more modern weaponsreater number of countries, such aid will probably tor the most part exclude the most modern Soviet conventional weapons and will certainlyall nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future. Short-range conventionally armed missiles will probably be supplied to the more advanced recipient countries. Deliveries of medium-range bombers will probably be

limited In quantity and restricted toew recipients. The Soviet program is aand opportunistic one, however, and It may become increasingly difficult politically for Moscow to resist demands for advanced weaponry from at least those states which have the potential ability to use moremateriel.

e believe that the Soviet rnihtaryprogram will remain an Important element in the USSR's policies toward non-

Bloc states. Political disputes like that with Egypt or even the failurearticularto achieve notable and tangible results might result in the curtailment or even the suspension of aid. But Moscow'sare now so deep and so broad, and so Intertwined with its general "anti-imperialist" posture, that it would be difficult for the USSR to break existing agreements, or even to refuse new ones, without risking serious political losses.

Bulgaria East Qerroany Poland Rumania North Korea North Vietnam




Altcrafl (Fighters and Bombers) and Surface-to-Air Missile Sites









The reliability of these figures varies widely.

Includingites under the control of Soviet forces ln Germany.



Table iii

estimated value (before discounts) of bloc military assistance agreements with non-bloc

Subtotals as


Millions or us pa cent or

Mid East:






I rounded)

Note: Values are based on quoted list prices before discounts. For new and for more advanced equipment, the quoted list prices are roughly equivalent to what the cost to provide the Item would be In tbe us: for obsolescent equipment the quoted list prices are from one-half to two-thirds what lt would cost to produce the item in the us.


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