INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY OF THE CUBAN OPERATION AND ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS

Created: 2/16/1962

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

ISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS7

2 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Inspector General Survey of the Cuban Operation

(dated

It la my understanding that you have requested informationtha distribution of the IG Survey of the Cuban Operation and theomments on It. At the time the report was written it waa understood that copies of the report would be sent to the President's Board aad consequently ZO copies were made. However, the only distribution made of ths report Ls aa follows:

r.11

CI (than Mr.4 November

- DDCI (tbea Gen.4 November

-then Mr.4 November

- IG (Mr. Kirkpatrlea)

- On file In office of Acting IG (Mr. McLean)

H (Col.ovember

r. Eater line (WH Division) via Col.4n file ln my office

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, via

Mr.rm an at request of DCI, IS2

n file in my office

cJU*

INDEX

KOTE

This document contains the Items listed below and Bhould not be broken up. Thli; Is at the direction of Mr.cCone, Director of Central Intelligence.

Tab:

General's Survey of the.

-a

of .transmittal of IG Survey of the CubanMr. John McCone from Inspector General;

3* Memorandum oftransmittal of IG Survey of the Cuban Operation to Dd from Inspector Ceneral; 2l*

k. DDCI Memorandum for the Record concerning restricted distribution of IG's Report on Cuba;

'j. Memorandum for the DCIubject; Report on the Cuban Operation;

6. Memorandum prepared by DDCI, subject: The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation; l.

7- An Analysis of the Cuban Operation by the Deputy Directorentral Intelligence Agency;

8. Letter to Dr. James R. Killlan,hairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Board, from DCI, transmitting the IG Survey and thenalysis of the Cuban Operation;

9- Memorandum for Deputy Directorrom C. Tracy Barnes,

subject: Survey of Cuban Operation;

Memorandum for Mr. C. Tracy Barnes from Lyman B. Kirkpatrlck referencing Barnes'anuary memorandum;

Memorandum for DCI from DD(P) transmitting Mr. Barnes'anuary memorandum;

asp

0 Copy 1

12.

13-

to Mr. Kirkpatrlck from Meet

taffsubject: The IG^Gurvey and the DD/P's Analysis of the Cuban Operation;

Memorandum for Kr. John McCone, ECI, front Allen W. Dullea. subject: The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation;

DCI'e letter of acknowledgement of Mr. Dulles' memorandum;

February

INSPECTORURVEY of the 1 CUBAN OPERATION

TABLE OF COWEHTS

Page

1

of the

of*-

of Organization and Connand

of

of

Miami Operating

Political Front and the Relation of Cubans

to the

J. Clandestine Paramilitary Operations

K. Clandestine Paramilitary Operations --

L. Clandestine Paramilitary Operationsraining

Underground

M.

mericans in

0. Conclusions and

Biimi.il.

This ls the Inspector General's report on the Central Intelligence Agency's ill-fated attempt to implement national policy by overthrowing the Fidel Castro regime in Cuba by meansovert paramilitary operation.

The pjrpose of the report is to evaluate selected aspects of the Agency's performance of this task, to describe weaknesses and failures disclosed by the study, and to make recommendations for their correction and avoidance in tbe future.

3- The report concentrates on the organization, staffing and planning of the project and on the conduct of the covert paramilitary phase of the operation. Including comments on intelligence support, training, and security. It does not describe or analyze in detail the purely military phase of the effort.

h. The supporting annexes have been chosen tothe evolution of national policy as outlined inf the body of the report. s the basic policy paper approved by President Eisenhower on aper prepared by the project's operating chiefs for the briefing of President Kennedy in February ig6l. Annexes C, d,re the planning papers successively prepared during March and1 in the last few weeks before the invasion.

5- The report includes references to the roles played by Agency officials In Presidential conferences andmeetings at vhich policy decisions affecting th* course of the operation were taken, but it contains no evaluation of or Judgment on any decision or action taken by any official not employed by the Agency.

6. In preparing the survey the Inspector General and his representatives interviewedgency employees of all levels andarge quantity of documentary material.

Tbe history of tbe Cuban project begins9 and for the purposes of the survey ends with the invasion of Cube by the Agency-supported Cuban brigade onI and its defeat and capture by Castro's forces in the next two days.

. Government adoption of the project occurred onhen, after preliminary preparations by the Agency, President Eisenhower approved an Agency paper titled

rogram of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime" (Annex A) and thereby authorized the Agency to undertake this program:

uban exile organization toloyalties, to direct opposition activities, andcover for Agency operations.

propaganda offensive in the name of tbe opposition.

Inside Cubalandestineand action apparatus to be responsive toof the exile organization.

outside Cubamall paramilitarybe introduced into Cuba to organize, train andgroups.

budget for this activity was estimated atbreakdown was: Politicalntelligence

km This document, providing for tbe nourishmentowerful Internal resistance program through clandestine external assistance, vas tbe basic and indeed the. Government policy paper Issued throughout the life of the project. The concept was classic. The Cuban exile council would serve as cover for action which became publicly known. Agency personnel ln contact with Cuban exiles would be documented as representativesroup of private American businessmen. The hand of. Government would not appear.

Preparatory Actio,-)

months of preparation had preceded presentationpaper to the President. In9 the Chief ofParamilitary Groupeeting

to discuss the creation of acapability to be used in Latin American crisis situations. At this time Cuba was only oneumber of possible targets, all of which appeared equally explosive. The Chief of theGrouperies of staff studies for the Western Hemisphere (WH) Division on various aspects of covert limitedand urged the creationivision paramilitary staff. Ue also setmall, proprietary airline in | ^ eventual support use.

9 the WH Division assigned an officerpotential Agency action for contingencies which might develop

umber of Latin American countries. Thereack of sufficient readily available operational information on potential target areas,equirement, with Bpeclal emphasis on Cuba, whose Communist control was now becoming more and more apparent, was sent throughout the intelligence community, and resultedhree-volume operational study.

7* By9 these studies hodlan formall cadre of Cuban exiles as paramilitary instructors, these In turn to be used for training other Cuban recruits,atin American country, for clandestine infiltration into Cuba to provide leadership for anti-Castro dissidents.

Organization of Brancb

8. On0 the W3 Division organizedWH/k) as an expandable task force to run tbe proposed Cuban The Initial Table of Organisation totaled kC persons, witht Headquarters,t Havana Station, and two at Santiago Base.

9* Tho brancb also began negotiationsanama training site. Its officers reconnoitered the area of Miami, Florida, in search of suitable Installations for office apace, warehouses, safe sites, recruiting centers, communications center, and bases for the movement of persons, materiel, and propaganda into or out Of Cuba.

10. At the same time Headquarters and tbe Havana Station weretudy of Cuban opposition leaders to prepare

for tbe formationnified political front to serve ac the cover Instrument for clandestine operations andallying point for antl-Castro Cubans. They were alsoap reconaalnsance of the Caribbean,iteowerful medium-wave and short-wave radio station.

Preliminary ProgreBB

11- esult of this intensive activityelatively brief period the Agency was able to report considerable preliminary progress and to predict early performanceumber of respects, when It carried Its request for policy approval to the President In mid-March

12. Among the facts so reported (Annex A) were: Thatwas in close touch with leaders of three major andgroups of Cubans whose representatives,with others, wouldnifiedays; that the Agency was already supportingfrom Miami, had arranged for additional radioMassachusetts, ^ nowerful

V;ny" station, probably on Swan Island, could be made ready In two months; that publication of an exile editiononfiscated Cuban newspaper had been arranged;ontrolled action group was distributing propaganda inside Cuba, and that ontl-Castro lecturers were being sent on Latin American tours.

13- The President was further informed tbat nm effective intelligence and action organization Inside Cuba, responsive to direction by the exile opposition, could probably be created withinays and that preparations for the development of on adequate paramilitary force would requireinimum of six months and probably closer to eight."

Policy Discussions

1%. Discussion at high policy levels of the Government had preceded submission of this program to the President. In the last months9 the Special Group, composed of representatives of several departments and agencies and charged by KSCresponsibility for policy approval of major covert actionconsidered several Agency proposals for exile broadcasts to Cuba. During January and February0 the Director of Central Intelligence Informed the Special Group of Agency planning with regard to Cuba, and on lh March an entire meeting was devoted to discussion of the Agency's program. Concern vas expressed over tba length of time required to get trained Cuban exiles Into action, and there wan discussion. capabilities for Immediate overt action If required. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is reported to have said that forces0 men were ready if needed and that the first of tbem could be airborne within four hours after receipt of orders. Members or the group urged early formation of an exile Junta. The Agency announced its

intention of requesting funds to pursue the program, and no objections vere.raised by the group.

35* The project to unseat Castro had thusajor Agency activity with the highest policy sanction, engaging tbe full-time activity of the personnelapidly expandingbrancb,reat amount of detailed day-to-dayin higher Agency echelons and entailing frequent liaison with other agencies and departmenta of the Government.

activities described to the President continuedaccelerated rate, but the financial approach to the project:cautious in the early weeks.

Financial Preparations

0 tbe project was approved by theCentral Intelligence in the initial amount0 forof Fiscal However, only two weeks later, on

7 April, WHA Branch reportedf0 had been obligated. Byune an0 was obligated.

April the Director of Central Intelligence toldofersonnel that he would recall people fromtbe world if they were needed on the project. From Januaryit had Uo people, the branch expandedyprilone of the largest branches in the Clandestinethan seme divisions. Its Table of Organization didthe large number of air operations personnel who worked

8 -

on the project and who were administered by their own unit, the Development Projects Divisionor did it include the many people engaged in support activities or in services of common concern, who, though not assigned to the project, nevertheless devoted many hours to it.

In the early months of tbe project there were intensive efforts to organize an exile front group, toroad and varied propaganda program under way, toaramilitary program, and to acquire sites in Florida and elsewhere for training andactivities and for office space.

The so-called "Benderomposed of projectaction officers, was set upotional organization of

businessmen to provide cover for dealing with the Cubans.

eries of meetings in New York andominally unified Pronto Revolucionarlo Deraocratlcoomposed of several Cuban factions, was agreed upon on

Propaganda Activity

broadcasts from Miami Into Cuba werethe sponsorshipuban group. Preparations wereexile publication of Avance, whose Havana plant had beenCastro. Anti-Castro propaganda operations werelatin America,oat for marine broadcasts was The Swan Island radio station, on which the Presidentbriefed, was completed and on the air with test signals by

IT May.

O

22. The action-cadre instruction training program vas being prepared,orth of sterile arms wore being sent to the Panama training base, which was activateday. At the same time Useppa Island, Florida, was acquiredite for assessment and holding of Cuban paramilitary candidates and for training radio operators. Screening of paramilitary recruits had begun in Miami in April, and the training in Panama began in June.

23- The Miami Base was opened onay in the Coral Oablee business district under coverew Tort career development and placement firm, beckstoppedepartment of Defense contract, and onommunications site, with Army cover, was opened at the former Richmond Bars! Air Station, which was held under lease by the University of Miami. Safe houses were also acquired in the Miami area for various operational uses. Tbe use of other sites for project activities, in the United States and other countries, was acquired for varying periods as time went on.

24. Project officers were engaged In liaison on numerous matters. In April they reached an agreement with tbe Immigration and Naturalization Service on special entry procedure for Cubans of Interest to the operation. They consulted with Voice of America and tbe United States Information Agency on propaganda operations. There were many discussions with tbe Federal Communicationson the licensing of Radio Swan and with the Defenseconcerning its cover. The State Department was regularly consulted on political matters.

25- Although Cuban leaders hadfront" at Agency urging. It vas an uneasy one. They vere by no means in agreement, either among themselves or with Agency case officers, on politico or on operations.

Power struggles developed early In the life of tbe FRD. Tbe Cuban leaders wanted something to say about the course of paramilitary operations. Aa early as0 one of the more prominent leaders vas urging an invasionairly large scalehird country.

By June the American press was beginning to nibble at the operation, principally at'Radio Swan, some of the stories implying that it wasompletely legitimate commercial venture. Another Indication that operational security was leas than perfecttatementefected Cuban naval attache that it wasknowledge among exllea ln Miamiertain Cuban leader

was backed by tbe Agency and that "there were entirely too many Americans running around the area waving money."

une the Deputy Director of Centralthe National Security Council on tbe project. of the training program, according to tbe paperthis briefing,inimum forceeneams skilled ln organizing, training anddissident groups, each team to be providedadio

T J Ii l Ii f

operator. Preparations were under way for creating an exile Cuban air force, and attempts were being made to develop maritime capabilities for support of paramilitary groups.

29- This briefing contained an expression of doubturely clandestine effort would be able to cope with Castro's Increasing military capability, pointing out that Implementation of the paramilitary phase of operations would be contingent upon the existence of dissident forces who were willing to resist and that such groups had not as yet emerged in strength.

Training In Panama

The air training program began to get under way In0 with the screening of Cuban pilot recruits and negotiations with Defense fornd the Navy being asked to supplynstruction and maintenance personnel.

In mid-Juneubans had arrived In Panama to begin training in small-unit infiltration.

Tbe FRD was resisting Agency attempts to persuade it to move its headquarters to Mexico and was demanding direct contact with the State Department or with some high government official in order to argue its cose. It also showed reluctance to become involved in the recruiting of Cuban pilots. Itudgetonth, excluding paramilitary costs, but was told it would have to get along0 and would get this only if it agreed to mow to Mexico. Tt did agree to

paramilitary candidates and finally gave in on the Issue of moving lo Mexico. It remained thereew weeks because of harassment by the Mexican Government, ln spite of prior agrecmento to the contrary. It appears that one reason why the FRD leaders were ao reluctant to be basedhird country Is that they desired toirect, official channel to. Government. Emphasis on Inranch prepared papers for use In briefing the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, respectively. Byovember it vas expected toiejomllltary trainees andadio operatora ready for action. It was stated that this group would be available for use as Infiltration teams or as an Invasion force. The briefing paper for the Joint Chiefa made the point that "obviously the successful implementation of any large-scale paramilitary operations is dependent upon widespread guerrilla resistance throughout tbe area."

The paper prepared for the President's briefing identifiedroups or Individuals with whom the Agency bad some sort of contact and who claimed to have assets in Cuba. The paper for tbe Joint Chiefs spoke of the problems of obtaining support bases nnd trained man power and warned that an exile invasion force might have to uo backed upontingency force, augmented. Army Special Forces personnel.

35- The ternsnd "assault" vere used In these documents although the strike force concept docs not seem to have been given any sort of policy sanction until the Special Group meetings which took place toward the end

Plan of The Presidential briefing paper of0 outlined the plan of operations as follows:

"The initial phase of paramilitary operations envisages tbe development, support and guidance of dissident groups In three areas of Cuba; PIoar del Rio, Kscambrny andaestra. These groups will be organized for concerted guerrilla action against the regime.

'The second phase will be Initiatedombined sea-air assault by FRD forces on the Isle of Pines coordinated with general guerrilla activity on the main island of Cuba. This willlose-In staging base for future operations.

"The last phase will be air assault on tbe Havana area with the guerrilla forces In Cuba moving on the ground from these areas Into the Havana area also."

37- Expenditures were rapidly running beyond the original estimates. The WH Division estimated operating costs for four weeksuly0 and for the fiscal year at. Onugust an

n if . .

was requested and obtained. About half of this figure was tne estimated coot of paramilitary activities, with about anotheratlmated for propaganda.

Antl-Coatro Propaganda activity bad gotten off to an early start and had developed rapidly. After an Initial shakedown period Radio Swan had gone on tbo air first with antl-Trujillo, then with antl -Castro broadcasts. Radio programs were also originating in Miami and tmslmmmmmmr^ The newspaper Avonce In Exile was being published by tbe end of the summer,econd papereekly magazine were planned. There had also been some successful black operations. Most ouch operations had thus for been conducted without participation by the FRD.

39- By tbe end of August tbe FRDawyer team setatin American propaganda tour and was ready with Its firston Radio Swan, which was reported to be getting world-wide reception with many listeners In Cuba. An antl-Castro comic book was being reprinted,panish-language television program was being prepared In Miami.

SO. At the end of Augustranch was reportingachine run search had fulled to find any bilingual Agency employee suitableadio Swan announcer. (This search wentor some time. Onecember tbe branch reportedandidate, but on1 that he had backed out.)

late0 oaw the almost simultaneousof tbe first maritime operation and the first air drop over Cuba. Tbe former vas (successful. The latter, the firsteries of failures, resulted in the capture and executionaramilitary agent on whom tbe project had set great store.

Maritime Several successful maritime operations took place during tbe latter months0 before severe winter weather began to make them almost impossible. But tbe project bad only one boat regularly available during this period, and the process ofand buildingesistance movement through clandestine means began to seem Intolerably slow, especially since during this same period Castro's army was reported to have been strengthened withhousand tons of Bloc arms, and Cuban Internal security was being tightened.

The strike force concept which, as noted, had already begun to be associated with the project as early as July, began to play an ever greater role inlanning. Thin role became dominant ln0 with tbe assignment to the project, as chief of Its Paramilitary Staff,arine Corps colonel experienced in amphibious operations.

Uk. In late October the Nlcnroguan Government offered tbe Agency the use of an air strip and docking facilities at Puerto Cabezas,iles closer to Cuba than the facilities in

Guatemala,. At about the some time, the Agency requested the Army to supplypecial Forces personnel as Instructors. Due to prolonged policy negotiations, these trainers did not arrive Id Guatemala untilI.

Swltch_ln 0ook formal action to change the course of the project by greatly expanding the size of the Cuban paramilitary unit and redirecting its training along moremilitary lines. Appropriate orders were sent to the Guatemala Base, whichir and ground trainees onovember, and to Miami where recruiting efforts were Increased.

u6. By this time Miami Base, through liaison with the FRD military staff, had already recruited and dispatched toiraramilitary trainees, plus six specialists (doctors, dentists, and chaplains). The base had alsoaritime personnel for manning the invasion fleet that was being acquired.

Vr. By1 the strike force strength,ebruary it, byarch it had risen, byarch- 1 brigade strength was reported.

U8. 0eported It had0 left for the reot of Fiscalnd byecember this was almost gone. upplementary budget estimate was prepared, and anas obtained from the Bureau of the Budget.

Freedom Fund Consign There were also financial problemsmaller scale. To publicize Radio Swan, and perhaps to enhance its cover, the Cuban Freedom Fund Campaign was organised in November to solicit donations through newspaper advertisements. The radio station, which was budgetedooo for Fiscal0 in gifts during the next few weeks.

andsome weeklyut actually costingn issue,luck from the start in seeking advertising and onceissue on that account. Additional funds had to beit several times. Yet it developed an audited circulation

aid to be second only to the Reader's Digest in

the Spanish-language field.

While the project moved forward, acquiring boats, planes and bases, training men, negotiating with foreignseeking policy clarification, training an FRD security service, publishing magazines and newspapers, putting out radio broadcasts, and attempting to move arms, men and propaganda into Cuba by sea or air, the FRD, in whose name most of thlG activity was being carried on, was making little progress toward unity.

Members would resignuff and have to be wheedled back. Each faction wanted supplies to be sent only to its own

.O *.

t-g

followers In Cuba, while groups Inside were reluctant to receive Infiltrees sent In the naae of the FRD. The FRD coordinator had his own radio boat which made unauthorized broadcasts until halted by the Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Provisional Government Tentative plansrovisional government were first discussed with FRD leaders In December, and this setlurry of Intrigue and bickering which delayed the recruiting process and did nothing to advance the cause of unity. In mid-January Miami Base reported that "the over-all problem is simply tothe Prente (FRD) as an operational facade until military action Intervenesrovisional government can bentil the question of how and by whomovernment was to te selected could be answered, the base reported, "we are at political dead center."

>U. This dead center remained until very near the target date and was only resolved by an ultimatum to the frd Executive Committee directing its members to agree on the chairmanevolutionary Council or risk the loss of all further support.

55- However, In selective ways the FRD proved toesponsive and useful Instrument. An example of this was the counterintelligence and security service which, under close

project control, developed Into an efficient and valuable unit In support of the FRD, Miami Base, and the project program.

56. Byl this security organ! rat Ion comprisedmployees of vboaere trained case officers, the service having graduated four classes from its own training center, whose chief instructor ^police officer.

Security The TOD'S service ran operations Into Cuba, many of them successful. It builtoluminous set of card files on Cuban personalities. One of Its most helpful services vas reporting on meetlngo of FRD committees and other anti-Castro groups and on political maneuvering within the FRD hierarchy. It also helped In recruiting for the strike forceime when the political leaders were sabotaging this effort. Security and counterintelligence teams were also trained for integration with the strike force. These had the primary mission of securing vital records and documents during the invasionecondary mission of assisting in establishing and maintaining martial law.

he service also carried on radio monitoring andinterrogations and debriefLngs. An indication of its alertness and efficiency is the fact that it supplied Miami Base with its first Information on the locationlane which was forced down In Jamaicaission over Cuba. The chief of the service was largely responsible for personally persuading the crew of the downed plane to return to the training caap.

59- In the first three acr.thn1 the problems faced by the project were many and complex. Although the Army Special Forces instructors had finally arrived In Guatemala the brigade trainee quota was still only half fulfilledall went to the training camps for special recruiting teams to be sent to Miami. Meanwhile trainees who had been In the caap for several months had had no contact with the political front and were wondering what sortuban future they were expected to fight for. Disturbances broke out, and the project leaders persuaded three FRD figures to visit the camp and mollify the men. Training In.

this period the Nicaraguan air stripbeen placed at the project's disposal was being madeuse and two new training sites were activated. Although

a definite policy determination on tbe training of Cubans In. had never been made,ank operators weretrained for the strike force at Fort Knox. Another eleventh-hour training requirement was fulfilled when the project acquired the use of Belle Chase Ammunition Depot near New Orleans. This was used for the trainingompany-olsed unit hurriedly recruitediversion landing ond of an underwater demolition team.

the period between. nationaltbe inauguration of President Kennedy the Government's

policymaking machinery had slowed down. unber of piecemeal policy decisions were vouchsafed, hut not all the specific ones tho project chiefs were pressing for, for example, authority for tactical air strikes and permission to use American contract pilots.

Elsenhower hadeneralovember and had reaffirmed Itl, hutchange in admLnletratlon was slowing matters down. roposed propaganda drop was turned downhis reason. Onanuary, at tbe Special Group'sbefore tbe Inauguration, it was agreed that ato include the new Secretaries of State andbe set up as soon as possible to reaffirm the basicthe project.

PfPpnnitlonB Endorsed

a meeting was heldanuary, and the projectpreparations were generally endorsed. eetingnew President onanuary the Agency was authorizedpresent activities and was instructed tc submitparamilitary plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Shortly thereafter, in an attempt to get areview of the plan, it was briefed to Geo. Cabell,

Oen. Bull (consultant)m. Wright (OWE). ebruary the Joint Chiefs hadavorable evaluation of tbe strike plan, togetherumber of suggestions.

6u. Onebruary the Agencyaper (Annex B) to the Preoldent which outlined three possible courses of action against Castro.

Noting plans for early formationovernment in exile, the paper described the growing strength of the Castro regime under Bloc support and observed: "Therefore, after some date probably no more than six months away It will become militarily lnfeaslble to overthrow tbe Castro regime except by tbe commitment to combatizeable organized military force. The option of action by the Cuban opposition will no longer be open."

66. This paper found the use of small-scale guerrilla groups not feasible andurprise landing of aforce, concluding that the brigadeood ehance of overthrowing Castro "or at the very leastamaging civil war without requiring. to commit Itself to overt action against Cuba."

67- Following presentation of this paper to the President, tbe project leaders were given to understand that it would be at least two weeksecision would be made as to use of the invasion force. They thereupon withheld action to expand the force upor the time being.

Movement of Agents

66. Although the Invasion preparations were absorbing most of the project's energies and funds Vttfk Branch was still

j *

attempting to nourish the underground. There vere sixboat operations, carrying sen and materials. In February andn March, and two successful air drops In March. of agents was continuing. As ofebruary Miami Base reported the following numbers and types of agents ln Cuba:ositive intelligence,ropaganda,aramilitary, k. As ofarch the base reported that these numbers had risen, respectively,, and 6.

69- By the invasion date the personnel strength of Miami Buoe had grown. The Intensity of activity there during the latter months of the operation is indicated by the recorday picked at randomit happened toebruarywhenase officers spent ikO man hours in personal contactubans.

70. Successive changes in the operational plan andof the strike date are discussed later ln this report and are documented ln Annexes C, D, and K. Detailed policy authorization for some specific actions was either never fully clarified or only resolved at the eleventh hour, and even the central decision as to whether to employ the strike force was still somewhat in doubt up to the very moment of

During the weeks preceding the Invasion the pace of events quickened. In early March the State Department asked tbe

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Agency not to announce formation of the Revolutionary Council or to commit any untoward act until afterarch Mexico City Peace Conference. The Cubans conferring in New Yorkon various aspectsoet-Castro platform. The Guatemala camp was having counterintelligence problems.

Sabotage Action,

Onarch the LCI "Barbara J" successfully launched andabotage team in an action against the Texaco refinery in Santiago.

arch project chiefs were workingtoevised plan which would meet policycited by the State Department. Onh tbe new plan was presented to the President.

7^- In mid-March ten members were added to the FRDCommittee, the politicians continued their platform talks, andarch vas set as deadline for choicehairman. An intensive defection project vas started from Miami Base. urvey was started with the object of determining the trainees' knowledgeabllity. involvement in the strike preparations. Trainees at Guatemala vere Impatient,umber had gone AWOL.

75- Jose Miro Cardona was unanimously elected Chairman of the Revolutionary Council.

late Marchowner of tbe Swan Island radio station, thankedsponsors of political programs and advised them that nowould be required; purpose of tbls action was tonity program during the action phase of theRadio Swan listener survey hadeplies from Snips with strike force equipment were arrivingand the Guatemala camp was still receivinglate as tbe weekpril.

Overflights Suspended

Cuban overflights were suspended onarch. Two reasons have been given for this suspension: (a) that tbewere needed to more the strike force from Guatemala to Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, for embarkation on the Invasion ships; (b) that the Agency wished to avoid any incident, suchlane being downed over Cuba, which might upset the course of events during tbe critical pre-lnvaslon period.

hite House meeting onarch papers were pro-pared on these subjects: (a) The 3tatus of the defection program; (b) Internal Cuban support which could be expected for the landing operation.

79- pril6 "defection" plan was prepared In an effort to knock out some of Castro's air forceayanner which would satisfy State Department objections. Project

- MP flHBWllB.

chiefs agreed that In eventolicy decision to call off the invasion they would move the troops to sea, tell them that new intelligence made tha Invasion inadvisable, and divert the force to Vieques Island for demobilization.

prileeting with the President Itthat Mr. Berle would tell Miro Cardona there would beU.S. support of the invasion. The Presidentthere would be. support. Onpril allsections wenthour duty. Thevas assembled in Hew York and advised that it wouldln stages on the military aspects of the project. On

pril the Council agreed to go into "isolation" during the landing phase of the military operation.

The raids on three Cuban airfields were carried out bybs onpril, and destruction of half of Castro's air force was estimated on the basis of good post-strike photography. Afterward, according to plan, one of the pilots landed in Florida and announced that the raids had been carried out by defectors from Castro's own air force. The Council was briefed on tbe air strike. The diversionary expedition by the force which had been trained in Hew Orleans failed toanding on two successive nlghtn preceding the strike.

Immediatelyay, Radio Swan and other outlets were broadcastingay on aedium-wave and l6 hours on short-wave. Immediatelyay, these totals were Increased

f onnni't

toours andours, respectively. Fourteen frequencies

vere used. By the time of theotal0

pounds of leaflets had been dropped on Cuba.

83- Late onpril, the eveay, the sir strikes

designed to knock out the rest of Castro's air force on the

following morning vere called off. The message reached the field too late to halt the landing operation, as the decision

to cancel the air strike vas made after the landing force had

been committed.

6%, The Invasion fleet which had assembled off the south coast of Cuba on the night ofpril included two LCXs owned

by the. Kavy LSD carrying three LCUs and four LCVPs, ell of them pre-loaded with supplies, and seven charteredfreighters. All these craft participated in the assault phase, except for three freighters which were loaded with follow-up supplies for ground and air forces. These vessels were armedcaliber machine guns. In addition, each LCI mountedmm. recoilless rifles.

85. In addition to the personal weapons of the Cuban exile soldiers, the armament provided for combat Included sufficient numbers of Browning automatic rifles, machine guns, mortars, recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, and flame-throwers. There were alsoanks,eavy trucks, an aviation fuel tankractoruHdozer, two large water trailers, and numerous small trucks and tractors.

86. The invasion brigadeen, all cf thea or. tbe invasion ships excepting one airborne Infantry companyen. The brigade Included five infantryeavy veapons company, an Intelligence-reconnaissance company,ank platoon.

87- These troops had been moved by air on three successive nights from the Guateaala training camp to the staging area in Nicaragua where they embarked on the ships which had been pre-loaded at New Orleans. The ships had moved on separate courses from Nicaragua, under unobtrusive Navy escort, to theiles offshore in order to avoid the appearanceonvoy. Froa there they had moved in column under cover of darknessards from the landing area, where they met the Navy LSD. These complicated movements vere apparently accomplishedecure manner and without alerting the enemy.

Of the three follow-up ships, one was due to arrive from Nicaragua on the morningaynd two others were on call at sea south of Cuba. Additional supplies were available for air landing or parachute delivery at airfields in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Florida. efense base In Annlston, Alabama, there were also supplies ready0 men. Altogether there were arms and equipment available to0 dissidents expected to rally to the invasion force.

The landing was to be carried out at three beaches aboutiles from each other on the Zapata Peninsula. The left flank of the beachhead was Red Beach at the bead of Cochlnos Bay; Green

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Beach waa at tbe right flank, with Blue Beach at tbe center. The lodgment to be seized wasoastal strip about fcO ml las long, separated from tbe Interior by an impassable ownmp penetrated only by three roads from tbe north and flankedoastal road from the east.

In the early hours of IT April Cuban underwaterteams, each led by an American contract employee, went ashore to mark Bed and Blue Beaches. Each of these parties engaged ln fire fights with small enemy forces but accomplished their tonka, and the troops began moving ashore ln small aluminum boats and LCUs. Before daylight small militia forces were encountered at both beaches. These offered little opposition, and many of tbe militiamen were quickly captured.

Not long after daylight the airborne Infantry company was successfully parachuted6 aircraft to four of the five scheduled drop zones where its elements were given tbe mission of scaling off approach roads.

9P. At dawn began tbe enemy air attacks which the project chiefs had aimed to prevent by the planned dawn strikes with Nicaragua-baaed aircraft against Castro's fields. Action by, Sea Furies, andesulted in the sinkingupply ship, the beachingransport, and damage to on LCT. The plananding at Green Beach was thereupon abandoned, and these troops, with their tanks and vehicles were put ashore at Blue Beach. Shipping withdrew to the south under continuous air attack.

93- Tne air attacks continued throughout tne day. Tbef the Cuban exile force which were available for close nupport and Interdiction were no natch for3 Jets. However, at least four of Castro's other aircraft were shot down by machine gun fire from maritime craft, assisted by friendly air support.

$k. The first ground attacks by Castro's forces occurred at Red Beach which was hit by successive waves of militia in the morning, afternoon and evening ofpril. While ammunition lasted these attacks were beaten off with heavy enemy casualties, and several of Castro's tanks were halted or destroyed by ground or friendly air action. On the morning of l8 April, the Red Beach Force, nearly out or ammunition, retired In good order to Blue Beach without being pressed by the enemy.

95. in addition to supporting tbe ground forces andshipping onpril, tbelsoastro patrol escort ship and attacked the Cienfuegos airfield. Four of theere shot down, while three returned safely to Nicaragua, and four landed at other friendly bases.

9o. Attempts were made to resupply the brigade withby air drops. On the nightpril^ drop was made nt Red Beach and three et Blue Beach, and on the following night Blue Beach received two drops. Preparations for resupply by sea had to be cancelled due to enemy air action.

9T- At Blue Beach the enemy ground attacks, supported by aircraft, began from three directions on the afternoon of l8 April. Six, tvo of them flovn by Americans, Inflicted heavy damage on the Castro column moving up from the west, using napalm, bombs, rockets, and machine gun fire to destroy several tanks and aboutroop-laden trucks. Air support to tbe Blue Beach troops vas continued on the morning ofpril, when three, Including two piloted by Americans, were shot down by. Jet cover from the Kavy aircraft carrier "Essex" had been expected to protect thepril sorties,isunderstanding over timing hampered its effectiveness.

98. In spite of this air action, however, and In spiteasualties suffered by tbe Castro forces, the brigade's ability to resist depended in the last resort on resupply of ammunition, which hod now become Impossible. On tbe night ofpril, when failure appeared inevitable, the Cuban brigade commander refused on offer to evacuate his troops. And on tbe morning ofpril, with ammunition rapidly running out, tbe brigade was still able toutile counterattack against the forces relentlessly moving in from the west.

d the last hours of resistance tbe brigade commandereries of terse and desperate messages to the task force command ship pleading for help:

"We ore out of ammo and fighting on the beach. Please

send help. We cannot hold."

"In water. Out of ammo. Enemy closing In. Help aunt arrive la next hour."

"When your help will be here and withWhy your help ban not conet"

The last mensage wan aa follows: "Axe destroyingequipment and communications. Tanks are in sight. are nothing to fight with. Aa taxing to woods. annot repeat cannot wait for you."

An evacuation convoy was headed for the beach oa the afternoon ofpril. When it became known that the beachhead

had collapsed the convoy reversed course.

ICS. During the next few days two Americanarew of Cuban frogmen succeeded in rescuingurvivors from the beach and coastal islands.

C- SUJ4MARYVALUATION

In evaluating the Agency's performance it Is essential to avoid grasping Immediately, as many persons have done, at the explanation that tbe President's order cancellingay air strikes was the chief cause of failure.

Discussion of that one decision would merely raise this underlying question: If the project had been better conceived, better organized, better staffed and better Banaged, would that precise issue ever have had to be presented for Presidential decision at all? And would It have been presented under the same ill-prepared, inadequately briefed circumstances?

3- Furthermore, It ls essential to keep in mind the possibility that the invasion was doomed in advance, that an Initially successful landingen would eventually have been crushed by Castro's combined military resources strengthened by Soviet Bloc-supplied military materiel.

4. The fundamental cause of the disaster was tbe Agency's failure to give the project, notwithstanding Its Importance and its Immense potentiality for damage to the United States, the top-flight handling which it requiredppropriate organization, staffing throughout by highly qualified personnel, nnd full-time direction and control of tbe highest quality.

5- Insufficiencies in these vital areas resulted in pressures and distortions, which in turn produced numerous

eeiious operational mistakes ond omissions, and in lack, of awareness of developing dangers, ln failure to take action to counter them, and ln grave mistakes of Judgment. There was failure at high levels to concentrate Informed, unwavering scrutiny on the project and to apply experienced, unbiased Judgment to the menacing situations that developed.

D. EVALUATICTi OF ORGANIZATION AMD COMMAND STSUCTURE

project vas organized at the level of anthe fourth echelon in the organization of the Agency,Western Hemisphere Division. Itsasthe independence and the broad, extensive powers of acommander. Instead, he had to apply constantly forof policy questions and Important operationalthe Deputy Director (Plans)ho was In fact directing

the project, although this was only one of his many responsibilities. Theelegated much of his responsibiLlty to his Deputy for Covert Action, especially the handling of policy matters Involving contact with non-Agency officials. The office of tbend the offices of the project were In different buildings. Consideration was given by then0 to raising the project out of WH Division and placing It directly under his Deputy for Covert Action, but tbls was not done.

Chief of WH Division vas In tbe chain oftbe chief of tbe project and theut only in a He exercised his right to sign tbe project's outgoingthe week, of the Invasion even though the project's ownwas activated at the end of He supervisedactivities and attended some of the meetings of the But thend his deputy dealt directly with theand gradually the Chief of WH Division began to play onlyrole.

3- The DD/P, in turn, reported to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Deputy Director of Central(DDCl) who usually represented the Agency at the meetings of theSpecial Group.

k. The Director delegated his responsibility for major project decisionsonsiderable extent. Be relied on the DDCI, an Air Force general, for policy matters involving air operations. For military advice be relied on the military officers detailed to the project. This reliance deprived tho Director of completely objective counsel, since the project's military personnel were deeply involved In building up the strike force and the DDCI vas taking an active role In the conduct of air operations.

Fragmentation of Authority

5- Thus, tbe projectingle, high-level full-time commander possessing stated broad pavers and abilities sufficient for the carrying out of this large, enormously difficult mission. In fact, authority vaa fragmented among the project chief, tbe military chief of the project'sStaff, and several high-level officials, vhose wide responsibilities elsewhere in the Agency prevented them from giving the project tbe attention it required. There were too many echelons; tbe top level had to be briefed by briefers who themselves wore not doing tbe day-to-day work.

further extraordinary factors must he mentioned:

Tbe Chief of Operations of the Clandestine Servicesho is tbehief staff advisor on clandestine operations, playedery minor part in the project. On at least two occasions COPS vas given expressthat the project was being perilously mismanaged, hut he declined to Involve himself with the project.

The three Senior Staffs, the Agency's top-level technical advisors in their respective areas, were not consulted fully, either at the important formative stages of the project

or even after grave operational difficulties bad begun to develop; Instead, they allowed themselves to be more or less ignored by the chief of the project and his principal assistants. This state of affairs is partly attributable to the Inadequate managerial skill and the lack of experience in clandestineoperations of thehiefs; it was not corrected by tber his deputy or by the Chief of WH Division.

was no review of the project by tbeReview Committee, which would at least have allowedof the most senior review body in the Agency to be heard.

Independence of DPD

another Important factor in the diffusionaod control was the insistence of the Agency'sthe Development Projects Divisionn preserving

Its Independence and remaining outside the organisational structure of the project, in which itital, central role, including air drops to the underground, training Cuban pilots, operation of air bases, the iraoenoo logistical problems of transporting the Cuban volunteers from Florida to Guatemala, and the procuring and servicing of the military planes. Tbe project chief bad no command authority over sir planning aad air operations. The DPD unit established for this purpose was completely Independent.

The resultivided command dependent upon mutual cooperation. Tlie re was no day-to-day continuing staffwhich ls essential for properly coordinated operations. Headquarters of the two units were ln different buildings far away from each other. The chiefs of air operations In Guatemala and Nicaragua were DPD representatives, independent of tbehiefs of these bases, and the Headquarters confusion was compounded in tbe field.

Inhortly after bla assignment to the project, the paramilitary chief noted coordination difficulties betweennd DPD. He pointed out that the organisational structure was contrary to military command principles, to accepted management practices, and to tho principles enunciated by theimselfnd recommended that the DPD unit be integrated Into WH/U, under command of Its chief.

<

o n ni

rai lure of Integration Effort

Theejected thia re commendation as not being tho most efficient solution for technical reasons. The insufficiently effective relationship between the project and the DPD unit was one of the gravest purely organisational failures of the Tbeoa subsequently confirmed this conclusion and has ascribed this lack of effectiveness to personality frictions and to tho "classic service rivalry." (Ue would note that this does not exist in present-day combined commands.)

The organixational confusion was augmented by the existencearge forward operating base ln the Miami area, which in turn had loose control over several sub-bases. Tht mission of this base was vaguely defined and not well understood. In theory the baseupporting role; actually It wasoperations which for the most part paralleled similar operations being conducted byfrom Headquarters. This divided effort vas expensive, cumbersome, and difficult to coordinate. In some coses the efforts of the tvo elements

were duplicating or conflicting or even competing with each other.

12. The upshot of this complex and bizarre organizational situation was tbat In this tremendously difficult task the Agency failed to marshal its forces properly and to apply them effectively.

it

B. EVALUATION OF STAFFING

in0 the Director of Central Intelligence stated that he would recall from any station in the world personnel vhose abilities were required for the success of tbe project- This recognition of the need for high-quality personnel is nowhere reflected in the history of the project. The DD/P's Deputy for Covert Action advised his subordinates that the Director's words did not mean that the project was to be given carte blanche in personnel procurement but that officers could be adequately secured through negotiation.

In actual fact, personnel for tbe project were secured by the customary routine method of negotiation between the project and the employee's office of current assignment; no recourse was had to directed assignment by the Director of Central Intelligence- The traditional independence of tbendividual division and branch chiefs in the Clandestine Services remained unaffected by the Director's statement. The lists prepared by tbe project for the purpose of negotiation for personnel naturally reflected the preferences of tbe chief of the project and the willingness of tbe person in question

to accept the assignment. ID many cases, tbe reason fora given person to the project was merely that he had Just returned from abroad and was still without an assignment.

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3. The basic mistake vas mode of filling the key spots

f

early, without realizing how much the project would grow and that It should be staffedajor effort. In some cases, officers originally selected to supervise five persons ultimately bad to superviserimes as many. Of tbe threefficers assigned to the project, none was given top-level managerial responsibilities. The result of all these factors was that none of the most experienced, senior operating officers of the Agency participated full time In the project.

An Indication of Quality

k. An Interesting Insight Into the quality of the personnel ofs afforded by the Initial "Relative Retention Lists" prepared Inl by the divisions and senior staffs of tbe Clandestine Services and other Agency units pursuant to the requirements of1 (Separation of Surplusach such unit was required to group its officers In each grade Into ten groups, on tbe basis of tbe performance andof each one. (Under tbe prescribed procedure, these lists ore to be reviewed at ccveral levels before becoming definitive.)

5. Of tbe u? officers holding tbe principal operational Jobs in Wll/lt In gradehrough7 officers were placed In the lowest third of their respective grade, andn tbe lowest tenth. The ratings off these k2 were mode by WE Division, which placed seven in the lowest third, andere rated by other units, which together placed ten in the lowest third.

6. It la apparent from these ratings tbat tbe other units bad not detailed their best people tout bad in soae Instances given tbe project their disposal cases.

7- Furthermore, although the project eventually Included the large numberersonnel, there vere long periods in which Important slots went unfilled, due to difficulty in procuring suitable officers. For example, tbe counter Intelligence officer of the Miami Ease vas never suppliedaae officer assistant, thereong period in which tbe project professed inability toI officer for the Guatemala Base, and months were spent in search of an announcer for Radio Swan. Few Clandestine Services people were found who were capable of serving as base chiefs; tbe support services had to supply most of them. All of tbe paramilitary officers bad to be brought from outside WE Division, or even from outside the Agency. (Air operations presented no staffing problem forince DPD supplied its own people.)

8. There wore In fact insufficient people to do tbe Job during the latter stages of the project. Personnel worked such long hours and so Intensively that their efficiency was affected. Personnel shortages were one of the reasons why much of the work of the project was performedcroon" basis.

Scarcity of Linguists 9> Very few project personnel spoke Spanish or had Latin-American background knowledge. umber of Instances those senior operating personnel in tbe field stations that did speak Spanish had to be interrupted In their regular duties merely in order to act as Interpreters. This Lack occurred in part because of the scarcity of Spanish linguists ln the Agency and in part because WH Division did not transfer to the project sufficient numbers of its own Spanlah speakers.

There were many other examples of improper use of skilled personnel. In many instances, case officers were used merely as "bondholders" for agents and technical specialists were used as stevedores. Some of tbe people who served the project on contract turned out to be Incompetent.

Staffing of the project was defective because the whole Clandestine Services staffing system, with absolute power being exercised by the division and branch chiefs, is defective. Each division seeks to guard its own assets; scanty recognition is given to the respective priorities of the various projects.

In spite of the foregoing, therereat many excellent people ln the project who worked effectively and who developed considerably in the course of their work. It should also be emphasized that, almost without exception, personnel

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worked extremely long hours for months on end without complaint and otherwise manifested high motivation, together with great perseverance and ingenuity in solving tho manifold problems that the project constantly raised. It should be stated that In general the support people sent to the project by tbe support component were of excellent quality and effective performance.

13. Unfortunately, however, while many persons performed prodigies of effort, these were often directed towardsobstacles which better organization and management would have eliminated. Such efforts were especially necessary (a) in support of the chimera of *non-attrlbutability" of tbeb) in negotiating with the Armed Services for equipment,personnel,hich tbe Agency should have been able to request as of rigbtj and (c) in providing tbo support for an overt military enterprise that was too large for the Agency's capabilities.

Be Tore proceeding to an evaluation of the Agency's planning, the over-all policy decisions of the United States Government with reference to the Cuban operation will first te stated In sumary form. These decisions not onlytbe background against which Agency planning was conducted but also presented numerous important factors that limited or otherwise determined its scope.

He will next endeavor to point out the various occasions on which we believe that the Agency officials responsible for the project made serious planning errors, both of commission and of omission, which affected the project in vital respects.

Between the plan approved by President Eisenhower on0 (Annex A) and the Invasion plan actually carried out on1 (Annex E) thereadical change In concept. Originally the heart of tho planong, slow, clandestine build-up of guerrilla forces, to be trained and developed In Cubaudre of Cubans whom the Agency would recruit, train and Infiltrate Into Cuba.

k. But thirteen months later the Agency sponsored an overt assault-type amphibious landingombat-trained and heavily armed soldiers. Most of them were unversed In guerrilla warfare. They were expected to maintain themselves

eriod of time (someeek) sufficient toshock" and thereby, it was hoped, to trigger an uprising.

Discard of Original Plan

0 the original planning paper (Annexfor practical purposes ceased to existharteraction. By that date the Special Group had come to

be unanimously of the opinion tbat tbe changed conditions, chiefly Castro's increased military strength through Soviet support and the increased effectiveness of his security forces, had made the original covert activities plan obsolete.

The Special Group had, however, not yet agreedubstitute plan and strong doubt was expressed whetherless than. forces would suffice to obtain Castro's downfall. But there appeared to be agreement tbat, whatever the ultimate decision, it would be advantageous for the United States to have some trained Cuban refugees available for eventual use, and that CIA should continue to prepareorce.

At the end ofbe Agencyevised plan to President Eisenhower and his advisors. This included (a) infiltration into Cuba by air ofen io small paramilitary teams, after reception committees had been prepared by men infiltrated by sea; (b) an amphibious

landingeamen vita extraordinarily heavy firepower; (c) preliminary air strikes against military targets. CIA stated that it believed it feasible to seize andimited area in Cuba and then to draw dissident elements to the landtag force, which would then gradually achieve enough stature toeneral uprising. At this stage of the planning, clandestine nourishment of resistance forces was still an important element, though now overshadowed by the overt strike force concept.

8. President Elsenhower orally directed the Agency to go ahead with its preparations with all speed. But this meeting occurred during. political interregnum and the proposed target date was later thano that ln effect the President's instructions were merely to proceed and to keep the preparations going until the new Administration should take office and should make the definitive decisions, especially whether and under what circumstances the landing should take place.

Search for Policy Decisions 9- As an example of the decision-making process, at the meeting of the Special Group0 the Agency requested authorization (a) to make propaganda leaflet flights over Cuba; (b) to screen. personnel for use in maritime operations; (c) to resupply Cuban resistance

elements. air bases at the rate of twoeek. Only the first authorization was given at that time,

10. In1 various major policy questions were, at CIA's request, under discussion by the Special Group. These Included: (a) use of American contract pilots for tactical and logistical air operations over Cuba; (b) use. air base for logistical flights to Cuba; (cj commencement of air strikes not later than dawn of the day before the amphibious assault and without curtailment of the number of aircraft to be employed from those available; (d) use of Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, aa an air-strike base and maritime staging area.

11- In the end only one of these policy questions was resolved In tho affirmative, that with regard to tbe use of Puerto Cabezaa. It should be especially noted that the project's paramilitary chief bad strongly recommended that the operation be abandoned if policy should not allow adequate tactical air support.

Conflicting Views

12. Tbe raising of these questions and tbe failure to resolve many of them demonstrates the dangerous conflict between the desire for political acceptability and the need for military effectiveness. It also indicates thepolicy background against which the officers running the

project had to do their day-to-day business. This policy undertainty was, in several respects, never satisfactorily resolved right up to tho very hour of action, snd many problems arose out of themitations to which authority to do certain things was subjected in the name of political necessity.

13> Thus, during the months Immediately preceding tbe Inauguration onl, the Agency was recruiting and training Cuban troops and otherwise proceedinghanged plan not yet definitely formulated or reduced to writing, with no assurance that the Invasion, which was now the essence of the plan, would ultimately be authorized by the new Administration. The Agency was driving forward without knowing precisely where it was going.

IU. The first formal briefing of President Kennedy and his advisors took place on (He bad received briefings on earlier occasions, even before hist this meeting thereresentation, largely oral, of the status of preparations, and President Kennedy approved their continuation. But there was still no authorization, express or implied, that military action would In fact eventually be undertaken.

15. In the ensuing weeks, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Deputy Directorccompanied in

soae instances by other Agency representatives,umber of meetings vith the new President and his advisors. (The paper prepared7 February meeting is appended as In the course of these meetings, the Agency presented three Informal planning or "concept" papers, dated61 andl,evision of its predecessor (Annexesnd E, respectively). These papers served chiefly as the bases for oral discussions at these meetings.

Successive According to our information, the revised concept, as exposed by the paper ofan apparently acceptable to the President although he indicated he mightiversion. Before that he had authorized the Agency to proceed vith mounting the operation, but had reserved tbe right to cancel at any time. The President was advised that noon onb was tbe last houriversion. Thohecked with Mr. Bundy shortly after noon onh, and no diversion being ordered, authorized the landing to proceed.

17- These three papers disclose that, starting with the World War II commando-type operation outlined In theI paperhe plan had been swiftly and successively altered to incorporate four characteristics which had been deemed essential in order to ensure that the operation would look like anof guerrillas in support of an Internal revolution and would therefore te politically acceptable.

four characteristics vere:

unspectacular night landing;

of conducting air operations fromon seized territory;

build-up period, after tbe initialprecede offensive action againstorces, and

suitable for guerrilla warfare inthe Invasion force could notodgment.

The airfield requirement obliged the planners to shift the invasion site front Trinidad to Zapata. The former area was close to the Escambray Mountains and therefore offered better guerrilla possibilities, but only the latteruitable airfield.

The third paper alsolanuerrilla-type, diversionary landing in Oriente Province two days before the strike and provided that supplies should be landed at night during the initial stages. It also provided for air strikes

on military objectives at dawnay as well asay minus 2.

Guerrilla Bole

reading of the three papers also disclosesinvasion was no longer conceived as on effort toguerrilla forcesoordinated attack. Theno claim that significant guerrilla forces existed witb

wliooafter evaluative reporta froa our own trained agents, confirming their strength, sufficiency of arms and ammunition, and their readinesse bad worked out plansoordinated, ccabined insurrection and attack against Castro. As the1 paper expressly states, the concept was that the operation should have the appearance of an internal resistance.

With reference to the strength of tha resistance in Cuba, thoI paper refers to anuerrillasther individuals engaging in acta of conspiracy and sabotage, but it makes no claim of any control exercised by the Agency or even tbat coordinated plans had been made and firm radio communications established.

The1 paper states the estimate atnsurgents" (without specifying tbe number of guerrillas Includedho were "responsible to some degree of control through agents with whom communications are currently active." It locates these in three widely separate regions of the Island and states that the individual groups are small and very Inadequately armed and that it was planned to supply them by olr dropsay, with the objective ofevolutionary situation.

The foregoing language suggests existencensurgents but refrains from claiming any prospect of Immediate help from trained guerrilla forces ia being. Tbe term

"insurgents" seems to have been used in tbe sense of "potential" insurgents or mere civilian opponents of Castro. tatement about military and police defectors vas similarly vague; the Agency was in touch withuch persons whom it hoped to Induce to defectay.

Arrests of Agents

25- These tacit admissions of the non-existence of effective, controlled resistance In Cuba correspond to the intelligence reports which clearly showed the unfavorable situation resulting from the failure of our air supply operations and tbe success of the Castro security forces In arresting our agents, rolling up tbe few existing nets, and reducing guerrilla groups to Ineffectiveness.

It is clear that the Invasion operation vas based on the hope that tbe brfgu.de would be able to maintain Itself In Cuba long enough to provall by attracting insurgents and defectors from tbe Castro armed services, but without having In advance any assurance of assistance froa identified, known, controlled, trained, and organized guerrillas. Tbe Agency hoped the Invasion would,eus exhich would cause these defections. In other words, under tbe final plan tbe invasion was to take the place of an organized resistance which did not exist and was to generate organized resistance by providing the focus ond actingatalyst.

Tbe Agency waa catchingea brigade, after an amphibious landing, againat Caetro'a combined military forces, vhlch the. intelligence (USIB reports entitled "The Military Buildup inated0espectively) estimated as follows: The Revolutionary0 men; tbeen; employing more thano Uo thousand tons of Bloc-furnished arms and heavy materiel of the value.

It is difficult to understand bow tbe decision to proceed with the Invasion could hare been Justified In tbe latter stages of the operation. Under the Trinidad planccess to the Escambray Mountains for possible guerrilla existence might have constituted scoe Justification for the enormous risks Involved. This Justification did not apply to the Zapata area which was poor guerrilla terrain and offered little possibility for the break-outurrounded Invasion force. The lock of contingency planning for either survival or rescue of the brigade has never been satisfactorily explained.

Tbe argument has been made that the Agency's theory of on uprising to be set offuccessful Invasion and the maintenance of the battalioneriodeek or so has not been disproved. It was not put to the test, this argument goes, because tbeay air strikes were essential

to the lavas ion'o success. Such ma orgun-nt falls in the face of Castro's demonstrated power to arrest tens of thousands of suspected persona immediately afterir strikes and the effectiveness of the Castro security forces In arresting agents, as demonstrated by unimpeachable Intelligence received. Views of Joint Chiefs

Agency participants in the project hove sought to defend tbe Invasion plan by citing the approval given to the plan by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). To this argument, members of the JCS have replied, in the course of another Inquiry, (l) that the final plan was presented to them only orally, which prevented normalbat they regarded the operation as being solely CIA's, with the military called on to furnish various types of support and tbe chief interest of tbe JCS being to see to It that every kind of support requested washat they went on tbe assumption that full air support would be furnished and control of the air secured and on the Agency's assurancesreat number of Insurgents would Immediately join forces with the Invasion forces; and (u) that, In tbe event the battle went against them, tbe brigade would at once "go guerrilla" and take to the hills.

The Agency committed at least four extremely serious mistakes in planning:

a. Failure to subject tbe project, especially In its latter frenzied stages, old and objective appraisal

by the beat operating talent available, particularly by those not Involved in tbe operation, such as the Chief of Operations and tho chiefs of the Senior Staffs. Had this been done, the two following mistakesnd c, below) might have been avoided.

to advise the President, at anthat success had become dubious and to recommendoperation be therefore cancelled and that theunaeating Castro be restudicd.

to recognise that the project hadand tbat the military effort had become too largehandled by the Agency alone.

to reduce successive project planspapers and to leave copies of them withand his advisors and to request specificand confirmation thereof.

32. Timely and objective scrutiny of the operation in the months before tbe invasion, including study of all available intelligence, vould have demonstrated to Agency officials that tbe clandestine paramilitary operations had almost totally failed, that there was no controlled and responsive underground movement ready to rally to the invasion force, and that Castro's ability both to fight back and to roll up tho internal opposition must be very considerably upgraded.

33- It would alao bavo raised the question of why the United States should contemplateoldiers, however well trained and armed, against an enemy vastly superior In number and armamenterrain which offered, nothing but vague hope of significant local support. It might also have suggested tbat the Agency's responsibility in the operation should he drastically revised and would certainly have revealed that there was no real plan for the post-invasion period, whether for success or failure.

Existence of Warnings

34. The latest United States Intelligence Board, Office of National Estimates, and Office of Current Intelligence studies on Cubaavailable at that time provided clear warningalm reappraisal was necessary.

35- But the atmosphere was not conducive to it. The chief of the project and hia subordinates had been subjected to such gruelling pressures of haste and overwork for so long that their impetus and drive would have been difficult to curb forurpose. The strike preparations, under the powerful Influence of the project's paramilitary chief, to which there was co effective counterbalance, had gained such momentum that the operation had surged far ahead of policy. The Cuban volunteers were getting seriously restive and threatening to get out of band before they could be committed. The Guatemalan Government

was urging the Agency to take avay its Cubans. The rainy season was herd upon the Caribbean. The reappraisal never happened, though these very factors which helped prevent It should have warned the Agency of Its necessity.

36. These adverse factors were compounded and exacerbated by policy restrictions that kept coming one upon anothera period of weeks and right up until the point of no return. These caused successive planningt piled up more confusion. Rapidly accumulating stresses. In our opinion, caused the Agency operators to lose sight of the fact that the margin of error was swiftly narrowing and had even vanished before the force was committed. At some point in this degenerative cycle they should have gone to the President and said frankly: "Here are the facts. The operation should be baited. We request further instructions."

Consequences of Cancellation

37- Cancellation would have been embarrassing. The brigade could not nave been held any longeready status, probably could not have been held at all. Itn members would have spread their disappointment far and wide. Because of multiple security leaks la this huge operation, the world already knew about the preparations, and the Government's and the Agency's embarrassment would have been public.

owever, cancellation would bave averted failure, which brought even more embarrassment, carried death and misery to hundreds, destroyed millions of dollars' worth. property, and seriously. prestige.

39- The other possible outcometbe one the project strove to achieveuccessful brigade lodgment, housing the Revolutionary Council but isolated from the rest of Cuba by swamps and Castro's forces. Arms were held in readiness0 Cubans who were expected to make their way unarmed through the Castro army and wade tbe svampa to rally to the liberators. Except for this, we are unaware of any planning by the Agency or by. Government for this success.

Uo. It is beyond the scope of this report to suggest. action might have been taken to consolidate victory, but we can confidently assert that the Agency had no Intelligence evidence that Cubans in significant numbers could or would Join the invaders or that there was any kind of an effective and cohesive resistance movement under anybody's control, let alone the Agency's, that could have furnished internal leadership for an uprising in support of tbe invasion. The consequencesuccessful lodgment, unless overtly supported. armed forces, were dubious.

The choice wae between retreat without honoramble between ignomlniouii defeat and dubious victory. The Agency cbose to gamble, at rapidly decreasing odds.

Tbe project had lost Its covert nature by As it continued to grow, operational security became more and more diluted. For more than three months before the Invasion the American press was reporting, often with some accuracy, on tbe recruiting and training of Cubans. Such massive preparations could only be laid to. The Agency's name was freely linked with these activities. Plausible denialathetic illusion.

43. Insistence on adhering to the formalities Imposedon-attributablllty which no longer existed produeod absurd-ltlea and created obstacles and delays. For example, the use of obsolete andircraft, instead of the mores originally requested,oncession to nan-attributablllty which hampered the operation severely. ertain type of surgical tent requested for the landing beach was not supplied because it could be traced to. ertain modern rifle was not supplied, for the same reason, although several thousand of them bad recently been declared surplus. In the end, as could have been foreseen, everything was traced to.

Uk. . policy calledovert operation and assigned it to the agency chartered to handle such things. When tbe project became blown to every newspaper reader the Agency should have Informed higher authority that it was no longer operating within its charter. Ead national policy then called forof the overt effortoint national task force, vastly greater man-power resources would have been available for the Invasion and the Agency could bave performed an effective supporting role. The costly delays experienced by the Agency in negotiating for support from the armed services would have been avoided.

Piecemeal Policy

In the hectic weeks before the strike, policy was being formed piecemeal and the imposition of successive restrictions was contracting the margin of error. Tbe last of thesedecisions came from the President when tbe brigade was already in small boats moving toward the Cuban shore- Had itew hours earlier tbe invasion might bave been averted and loss of life and prestige avoided.

U6. If formal papers outlining the final strike plan in detail and emphasising tbe vital necessity ofay air strikes had been prepared and left with the President and bis advisors, including the Joint Chiefs,equest for written confirmation that the plan had received full

comprehension and approval, the culminating incident vhich preceded the loss of the Cuban brigade might never have happened.

We are informed that this took place aa follows: On the evening ofpril tho President Instructed the Secretary of State thatay strikes eetfor the following morning should be cancelled, unless there were overridingto advise him of. The Secretary then informed the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the Director being absent from Washington, and the Deputy Director (Plans) of this decision, offering to let them call the President at Glen Ora If they wished. They preferred not to do so, and the Secretary concluded from this tbat they did not believe the strikes to be vital to success.

A Civilian Decision

k&. Earlier that evening the project chief and hischief had emphatically warned theo Insist that cancellation of the strikes would produce disaster. Thus theivilian without military experience, and the DDCI, an Air Force general, did not follow the advice of the project's paramilitarypecialist in amphibious operations. And the President mode this vital, last-minute decision without direct coo tact with the military chiefs of the invasion operation.

The President nay never have been clearly advised of the need for command of tbe sir in an amphibious operation like this one. Theas aware that at least two of the President1 military advisors, both members of the Joint Chiefs, did not understand this principle. This might well have served to warn thehat the President needed to he impressed most strongly with this principle, by meansormal written communication, and also have alerted him to the advisability of accepting the Secretary's invitation to call the President directly.

f the project's paramilitary chief, as leader of the overt allltary effort, had accompanied the DDCI and theo tbe meeting with the Secretary he might have brought strong persuasion to bear on the decision.

51* This fateful incident, in our opinion, resulted in part from failure to circulate formal planning papers together with requests for specific confirmation.

Shifts ln Scope

The general vagueness of policy and directionontinual shifting of tbe scope and scale of the project, that is, the type of operational planning commonly referred to as "playing It bynd thia in turn led to various kinds of difficulties about people, money, supplies and bases.

A staffing guide prepared in0otalersonnel required for the foreseeable7 being

on board). By September, tbe strength had been built up. In October another staffing guideotalositions. By the end of tbeeople wereIn WB/4. Thereeople in tbe Miami area alone.

5k. The original planubansontingency force. Byorceas being considered. In early November, tho plan was toen, and there waa talk of as many. In earlyrigadeas agreed upon. Its strength was built upy tbe end of January. Byarch the ground forces in training- Byarch equipmentO0 men bad been ordered, and the actual brigade strengthpril. Such changes made it very difficult for the supporting components, particularly the Office of Logistics and Development Projects Division, who were not given much lead time.

The original estimate for tbe project anticipated expenditures to the totaluring tbe two fiscal0 On0 was released for the balance of Fiscal This amount was expendadonth and an additional million do Liars released to carry the project to the end of Juno.

Inudget was presented for FiscalI which amounted. Byad

been obligated and anas requested and authorized. InI, on0 was requested to neet obligations Incurred. The total amount of money for this project for Fiscal, Instead,.

57- When the project started, It was not realised that bases would be needed at Useppa Island, Key West, Miami, and Opa-locka, Florida; New Orleans, Puerto Rico, Panama, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, as well as Innumerable safe houses and other facilities. Consequently the project suffered, because many of thesewero not ready when needed. Tbe WH Division launchedarge paramilitary project without the bases, the boats, tbe experienced paramilitary personnel,omplete and sufficient plan, and never really caught up.

G. THB MIAMI OPERATrUG BASS

confused relationships between VS/hthe forward operating base in the Miaul area were afactor in the over-all performance oftbe projectbase was activated in late0 and was put inbecause it was tbe chief center of Cuban refugees in the

s

United States.

the beginning, thend his associatesfirm stand against allowing this base to become more thansupport organisation, and until0 thelittle except cany on liaison witb the Cuban. law enforcement agencies. For example,only one paramilitary officer at the base during this period.

DD/P's Chief of Operations wrote inO:

ecognize your need for some operational personnel in the Miami area to service end conduct certain activities there. m firmly opposed, however, to the growth of an organisation which wouldecond headquarters or intermediate echelont this same time, the BD/P's Assistant for Covert Actionthat the function of the forward operating base should te one of coordination, with command remaining in Headquarters.

a. Th August tberote that he was worried about Miami and wanted to be sure that "we are not duplicating there any functions that nre being performed in Headquarters. For

o not quite clear vbat are tbe duties of the PM types there since this ccenionent iseadquartersraining Installation nororward command poet." And in another memo In November, he again urged thate especially careful to avoid any duplication of effort between Miami and Headquarters.

Implication of Effort

5- By tbls tine there was plenty of duplication.. Bead-quarters and the Miami Base bad become engaged in many parallel or overlapping operations and were even competing with each other. Both components were handling all minds of agents and In some cases the same ones. The only activity that Miami did not get Into was air operations, but even here it necessarilyole in many of tbo clandestine air drops.

6. Thereeneral feeling at Headquarters tbat the forward base existed solely for support and that Headquarters was In the best position to handle operations because It had ready access to policy guidance and fast radio comwunlcatlona to and from all elements. This view ignored the fact that much of the communication with Cuba was only by secret writing and couriers] tbat Miami was tbe main source of information,agents, and soldiers for the project; that it was tbe logical location for Infiltration and exflltration; that the base, through the maintenance of effective liaison, had tbe

complete cooperation of the local FBI, the Border Patrol,Coast Guard, FCC, Customs, Navy, and police officials.

for the Director of Central Intelligence,the base, top Agency officials concerned with thenot have first-hand knowledge of what was being donecould be done at Miami. The limitations they placedactivities had serious consequences. For example, when

the resistance organizers being trained in Guatemala were ready to go into Cuba In September, the maritime capability tothem did not yet exist. By the time the base had built up some capabilities In various lines, valuable months had been lost.

The Miami View

the other hand, thereeneral feeling atthat It shouldonducting operationsHavana was able to do (up to the date when diplomaticwere brokenith Headquarters providingand policy. This view failed to realize that afleveral hundred people would have been very difficultthat it would haveillion dollars toto Miami, and tbat Headquarters would have gottenoperations anyhow, due to the easy access to Miamiespecially by telephone.

The letter of instructions to the case chief,as pretty vague. It stated that ha would have

authority over all project personnel and responsibility for tbe supervision of any project activities conducted through the Miami area from other areas. It authorized him to use personnel, materiel, facilities and funds for the accomplishment of the over-all Agency mission. Re vas made responsible to the chief of the project.

first intelligence (Fl) case officer reportedbase in0 and proceeded to acquire, trainagents. At the time of tho invasion, the Miami BaseFI agents ln Cuba, all of vhoa vere reporting and all ofbeen recruited by the base.

The CI Section

The counterintelligence (Cl) section began to function in By the time of tbe strike, this section hadarefully selected, highly educated Cubans trained as case offlcera touture Cuban Intelligence Service)elected Cubans trained as future CI officials and civil government officials;eservelder non-political individuals trainedeserve intelligence corps.

Tbe paramilitary (PM) section vas opened in late0 vltb one officer. His job vas to conduct liaison vitb tbe Cuban leaders in order to obtain recruits for the Guatemala camps. econd PM officer reported in August, and at this time thereeginning of an attempt to infiltrate arms.

ammunition and personnel into Cube clandestinely by boat. (These vere the "PM types" whose duties had nystified thehere were also two maritime "types" who were training the creworrowed email boat for clandestine trips.

yovenbereople had been assigned to the Miami base in addition to kk people from the Agency's Office of In addition to support elements, there were sections for propaganda, Fl, CI, political action, and PM.

Ik. Byha base and Its sub-baneersons assigned, as follows:

5h

GG 3

CI

Political Action

Propaganda

Support PM

Security

Communications

Miscellaneous

While the Havana Station was still operating, Miami Base vas in close touch with It by courier and secure caomunications. When Havana Station was closed, Miami expected to take over the stay-behind assets, such as they were. However, Headquartero took over their control. Miami concentrated on the training and infiltration of agents.

PM Support Hole

Co providing support in recruiting soldiers and running small boat operations. This tight control meant that the PM officers at the base looked to Headquarters for guidance rather than to the chief of base. The PM and other sections had their own channels to Headquarters, and thia led to uncontrolled action and considerable confusion. PM officers in Keyub-base of Ml ad, also sometimes communicated directly with.

are alleged to have been cases In which adecision vas convoyed to the Miami Base bysimultaneously, each over the telephone. The result

of this was that the base had an enormously high phone bill and the base chief often was not Informed of events until after they were over, if at all.

Miami case officers retained their agents asthe agents vere reporting by secret writing. Oncereported by radio, they were taken over bywas resented by the Miami case officers, who feltwere In the best position to know the agents,and trained them.

ase officers in Headquarters, on the other hand, felt tbat Miami case officers tried to steal their agents when they passed through the Miami area. One agent who visited Headquarters received promises of money and support which went

far beyond what the case officer in Miami had offered. The base was not informed of these promises until the agent mentioned them. For the next several months, this particular agent was unmanageable and would not even meet with the Miami case officer. This was naturally viewed as Headquarters meddling.

Examples of Confusion

Case officers in Miami also felt that they were unduly handicapped in that Headquarters was not only competing with them but also reviewing their actions, which was something likeame with the umpire on the other team. Iteviewing component can maintain objectivity when It is also competing with the component whose activities it is

Numerous examples could be cited to illustrate the confusion that existed. The divided control over maritimeIs discussed elsewhere In this paper. There wae anfiasco over some special lubricating oil additivefor sabotage use in Cuba. Tbe organizational arrangement cade necessary hundreds of telephone calls and cables which otherwise would not have been sent, and the areas for uncertainty and misunderstanding were still considerable. Foriami cable ofebruary referred to an agent message and asked, "Does Headquarters intend to answer and arrange this operation?"

22. The general situation also led to an extraordinary number of temporary-duty trips back and forth between Washington and Miami. These were not only expensive butreat many problems in the way of support and security.

23- In0 the base chief pointed out tothat the base needed "clarification and specification of the requirements it Is expected to fulfill and tasks that it ls expected to perform, together with the investment of sufficient authority and discretion for the operational action which may be Involved." Inl he pointed out that "the base vould welcome more precise requirements for Its agents than had been received up to tbat time ln the interests of making efficient use of then."

24. in1 heemorandum on control of denied-area operations which pointed out that future operations should either be controlled from Headquarters ororward operating base, but that the divided control which had existed during the project had resulted in parallel, sometimes duplicative and conflicting efforts and in operational relationships which were competitive, without purpose, and sometimes counter-productive.

25. The inspectors agree that this divided effort represented an ineffective and uneconomical use of time, money, and materiel, and less than maximum utilization of Agency employees, plus unexplolted, delayed or poorly coordinated use of Cuban agents and assets.

B. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

The WH/I* Branch had not only the responsibility for the Cuban project but also the normal ares dutieseographical unit in the Clandestine Services. BeBldee beingask force with the mission of overturning the Castro government, it also had the Headquarters desk responsibility for Cuba,support of Havana Station and Santiago Base until the break in diplomatic relations.

This sxrangeoent required VH/tt's intelligence (Fl) section to collect intelligence on Cuba not only for the task force, with its special requirements, but also for the. intelligence community, with its diverse and long-range needs.

he section was plagued with personnel shortages from the start, but as long as. Embassy in Havana remained open, thus assuring communications, it received andood yield of Intelligence from Cuba, chiefly on political, economic, and Communist Party matters. Ute0 the section was directed to place emphasis on military information, but It found tbat its agents in Cuba lacked access to high-levelsources.

tt. The Fl section transmitted copies of all the reports It processed to the paramilitary section as well as to the rest of its regular Intelligence customers.

The section devoted considerable effort to supporting Havana Station in preparing its agents for stay-behind roles in the eventreak in diplomatic relations. When the embassy finally closed1 the stationingle net for positive intelligence. It comprised someersons,f vhom vere reporting agents and tbe rest radio operators, cutouts and couriers. The principal agents and one of tbe radio operv ators. citizens and thus had doubtful status after the break In relations.

In0 as the military invasion concept vas beginning to gain ascendancy In project planning, the chief of the projectnit. But Instead of placing this unit directly under himselfroject-vide unit and making Itsember of his Immediate staff, he put it in the paramilitary section under the aggressive Marine Corps colonel vho became the paramilitary unit chief at about that time.

As chief of this lov-echelon Intelligence unit, whose analyses were to have Important influence on an action vitally affecting national security and prestige,rought in an officer of undoubted ability but of limited experience inand FI operations. Itrave error to placenit Inubordinate position in the project, and this error produced the serious consequences described below.

1 TT TI T

Functionnit 8. Thenit cons la ted of four officer* and several secretaries. Its principal function vas to prepare intelligence annexes to the successive Invasion plans. Its sources of Information Included, ln addition to the Fl section's reports, photographic intelligence, cartographic Intelligence, Special Intelligence, armed services reports, and messages received from the paramilitary section's own agents ln Cuba. Reports from the armed services vere procured rapidly through direct informal liaison rather than through the usual slover channels.

9- In various vays the functioning of the regular Fl section, vhich vas directly under the project chief, vasaffected by thenit.

he FM unit absorbed the available personnel. The chief of the Fl section vas not invited to attendtaff meetings, and for security reasons, he never had access to WH/Vs war room. During the final weeks tbe Fl section vas not permitted to examine the PM section's incoming operational cables for possible positive Intelligence content. The FT section chief did notlearance for photographic

lack of Ldalsop U. There vas no close liaison between tbe two sections, and this resulted in some duplication ln preparation of reporta

requested by the DD/P, because neither section would leurn of the requests made of tbe other. Until the end0 the two sections were housed in different buildings.

The most serious consequence of tbe third-echelon position ofnit was that it concentrated in the hands of the unit chief the dual function of receiving all the Infor-astlon available froa Governaent-vide sources, including that from the agents of his own paramilitary section, and ofall these data for tbe purpose of supplying intelligence support to the various Invasion plans.

Interpretation of Intelligence affecting the strike force aspect of the operation was thus entrusted to officers who were so deeply engaged in preparations for the invasion that their Judgments could not have been expected to be altogether objective. This circumstance undoubtedlytrong Influence on tbe process by whichrrived at the conclusion that the landing of the strike force could and would trigger an uprising among tbe Cuban populace. This conclusion. In turn, became an essential element in the decision to proceed with the operation, as it took the place of tho original concept, no longer maintainable, that the invasion was to be undertaken in support of existing and effective guerrilla forces.

Ih. Irrespective of the validity of that conclusion, It Is clear that the Interpretative analysis should have been made not

by the persons who were working day and night to prepare the invasion but by an objective and disinterested senior Interpretation specialist from the Agency's FI Staff or froa Its Office of Current Intelligence.

Intelligence Support Another serious error la the field of intelligence support was that Miami Base received alaost no intelligence support from theection. This may be attributed to tbe facts tbat the paramilitary chief was almost completely preoccupied with the strike force preparations and that hisas not given project-wideand to the rigid security restrictions under which the paramilitary section was expected to operate, as well as to the general confusion in the organizational position of thease.

l6> This serious support vacuum at Miami was compounded because the base. In spite of its large size and the fact tbat It woe deeply engaged in Its own operations In Cuba, had no Intelligence support section. There was so single officer or unit charged with responsibility for Interpreting tbe considerable amount of Intelligence derived directly from base sources and free Special Intelligence.

urthermore no photographic Intelligence was available to Miami Base, which had no officerlearance entitling

hlra to receive it. There was substantially no intelligence support covering the Cuban beach areas or the political situation Inside Cuba. There was no analysis or interpretation of Special Intelligence, and there was no mechanism to call critical material to anyone's attention.

18. The result of this highly defective state of affairs was that individual Miami case officers were forced to rely upon their own interpretation of the separate intelligence reports, instead of having this material Interpreted for them by specialists. They were notumber of other itens of operational Intelligence which were in existence Innit of the paramilitary section at Headquarters.

I. THE POLITICAL FRONT AND THE RELATION Of CUBANS TO THS PROJECT

Cuban opposition front, as conceived by theconsultation with the State Department, was to havecharacteristics:

restoration of0 Cuban constitution.

to the basic principles of theenunciated In8 Caracas Declaration.

and strongly ant1-Coonunlst orientation.

complexion rangingittle toof center to somewhat left of center.

to muster the broadest possiblethe Cuban population.

functions ofront organization werebe:

cover for covert action against the

catalystallying point forvariously reported to,.

possible nucleusrovisional governmentfollowing Castro's downfall.

terms of reference thus excluded followers ofdictator, Fulgenclo Batista. They also excluded

of the Batlstlanos and otherone kind of problea. Many of the exiles had been Many of tbea vere rich and had assets, such asrollovers, vhich could be used. Some had militaryof then had American friends who vere influential enoughtheir claims to consideration upon the White Bouse.

The Leftist Fringe

Exclusion of the far-left fringe caused another kind of problea. It vas hard to tell hov far left some persons vere. And some of those whose political acceptability vas questionable nevertheless claimed such substantial following inside Cuba that it was difficult to ignore them.

In forming tho Frente Revoluclonario Dcaocratico (FRD) the Agency focuseed its attention principally on personalities and groups who had cither participated ln Castro's government or supported his revolution but had become disillusioned and gone into opposition.

7- In9 the Havana Station was alreadyide variety of anti-Castro personalities with whom It was ln contact. Intation agent was exploring tbe possibility of covert support to the Montecristi Movement of Justo Asencio Carrlllo Hernandez.

8. In thehe Montecristi group had been active against Batista, who exiled Carrlllo. He returned after tbe

resolution to take an Important banking post but found Castro's Communiot tendencies intolerable and went into opposition again. Els group is deserlbed as liberal and progressive but rejecting any accommodation with Communism.

The Organizing Committee 9. Corrillo was one of several Cuban flgurco whom the Agency Induced to defect In9 or the early months Others were Manuel Francisco Artlne Buesa, Jose Ignacio Rasco Bermudas, and Manuel Antonio Verona Lore do. It vas these four who, after long negotiations, formed the organizingof tbe FRD in

10. Artlne, who is stilloined Castro's movement as an anti-Batista student. Under Instructions from the Catholic Church horoupatholic Action students to gain the farmers' help against Batista. The view has been expressed tbat he waa the Jesuits' penetration of theuly Movement. Castro gaveigh post in National Agrarian Reform Institute (IXRA) from which he resigned after ten months to form the Movement to Recover the Revolutionomposed in part of his former Catholic Action follovers. This exile opposition grouparge proportion of the recruits for the strike force.

U. ollege and university clasp mote of Castro's,awyer and history professor, describedice young

Intellectual without much talent for action. In the fall9 he became the first president of the Christian Democratic Movementn anti-Communist Catholic group which Castro drove underground In0 at which time Rasco fled tbe

country.

career In government and Ingoes back to. During the regimePrio Socarras he held several Important posts, . that of prime minister, and wbb responsiblepolicies and measures. Be collaborateduntil the Communist pattern of the new regimecoming to. In Beforehe badlan for Castro'snified opposition. aid forand military capabilities.

The Political Spectrum

was representative of the older(Autentlco and Ortodoxo) which hod survivedand Castro and which were roughly In the middlepolitical spectrum. Artlme's group also occupiedposition, but its membership was drawn fromgeneration on Cubans. Carrillo and Rasco appeared

toittle leftittle right of center, respectively.

1

la. Thus the original group of organizersairly broad range of political views. They were Joined In0 by Aurellano Sanchez Arango who claimed leadership of the AAA group, the initials possibly representing Asoclaclon de Aalgoa de Aureliano. Both Sanchez Arango and Verona claimed to have considerable following ln the Cuban labor field. Sanchez Arango and his followers appeared to have seme general knowledge of the use of clandestine techniques.

five associated themselves in issuing aMexico City on This document called uponLatin Americans and the world at large to help the FRDCastro's dictatorship. The FRD pledged Itself to establish

representative democratic government with full civil liberties

under0 Cuban constitution. It pledged free general elections withinonths of establishmentrovisional government. It proposed to ban the Conrjunlst party androgram of social end economic progress for all classes of Cubans.

maturity and experience led to hiscoordinator, in effect, general manager, of the FRD. precipitated the resignation of Sanchez Arangoturn led to the beginningroblem in establishingFRD unity which the project never fully solved.

Change Inhe FRD bed originally been conceived as the channel through which all of the project's old to the Cuban cause would flow. However, Sanchez Arango's walkoutoss of assets and capabilities which tbe project wanted to preserve. The result was expressed as followsriefing prepared byor CINCLANT in

"In October wehange in operational policy. Heretofore we hod kept our efforts centered on the frd;e will now consider requests for paramilitary aid from any anti-Castro (and non-Batista) group. Inside or outside Cuba, which can show itapability for paramilitary action against the Castro regime. We feel that the combination of our controlled paramilitary action under the FRD aegis and the lesser-controlled operations of other Cuban revolutionaries will bringonsiderable acceleration of active anti-Castro expressions within Cuba. Ve will. In any event, have the lever of supportechanism for Influencing the ultimate emergence of one Individual or group as the primary figure in the anti-Castro Because of the gregorlousneas of Cuban exiles, the project was unable to prevent this change In policy from becoming known to the FRD executive committee. When the

Bender Group, now generally understood by Cubans and cany others to represent the CIA, began responding to requests froa and giving support to defectors from the FRD and to groups which the FRD considered politically unacceptable, th* organization which was supposed toorld-wide symbol of Cuban freedom and which was being groaned as tho nucleus of the next government of Cuba naturally felt that its prestige had been undermined.

Diffusion of Effort

19> This complicated relations between project cose officers and the FRD leaders. It also appears to have resulted ln some diffusion of effort in tbe attempts at clandestine infiltration of anas and paramilitary leaders into Cuba. It seriously hampered progress toward FRD unity, sharpened internal FRD antagonisms, and contributed to the decline in strike force recruiting efforts.

30. The composite political complexion of the FRDittle to tbe right in0 with theof Ricardo Rafael Sardinia, who headed an organization called the Movimiento Institutional Democrat Icq (MID).

21. ource of friction between the FRD and its project sponsors was the effort to Induce it to set up its headquarters outside. The Cuban leaders wore finally persuaded by financial leverage to move to Mexico City where the Mexican

Government had agreed to be hospitable. Bousing and office space vere arranged for the executive committee members and their families androject case officer and his secretary. 1

In Mexico City was reactivated for support

V and the move vas

22. However, the Mexican Government appears not to have kept its word, and the Cubans vere subjected to surveillance and other harassment. ev veeks it became evident that .the situation vas intolerable, and everybody moved back to Miami, vhich is where the Cubans wanted to be in the first place.

The Bender Group

23> Ihe man responsible for laying the groundwork of the FRD,ong series of meetings among the Cubans, and persuading them to merge their differences and issue a

Joint manifesto, was tbe chief of the project's political section. He vas known to the Cubans and inevitably to the press as "Frank Bender". The Bender Group, for reasons of plausible denial, purported to be composedho wanted to help overthrow Castro. The Cubans do not seem to have cared whether this was true or not, but the guise irritated them because they wanted to be In direct touch with. Government at the highest level possible.

Bender's linguistic accomplishments did not include Spanish and this may have diluted his effectiveness In dealing with Cubans.

After the FRD was launched the handling of purely FRD affairs In Mexico City and later in Miami was turned overase officer with fluent ^Spanish and long experience in Latin American affairs.

However, Bender continued to be identified with thehe FRD leaders' antagonism toward the Bender Group was sharpened when, at tho time of the change ln operational policy noted above,ssigned Bender the responsibility of dealing with Cuban individuals and groups outside of the FRD framework.

The Rubio Padilla Group

of the outside groups the project continuedwith was tbe Action Movement for Recovery (MAR),Juan Rubio Padilla. Use of thiB conservative group ofwas strongly advocated by William D. Pawley, anMiami businessman. aper prepared byorof Central Intelligence's use in briefingin0 stated MAR's claims to aorganization needing only arms and ammunitionto go into action and called the MAR relationshipencouraging development.

However, Rubio vas too conservative for the FRD's taste, and the MAR vas never incorporated into the FRD.

An organization vhich resisted incorporation in the FRD untill and vhich mean voiletormywith the Bender Group vas the Movirai ento Revolucionario del Puebloeaded by Manuel Antonio Rsjjt Rivero. Ray had been Castro's minister of public works until he lost bis Jobommunist. He arrived in this country in0 and agreed to accept assistance from the Bender Group but wished

to maintain Mb freedom of choice. The project's unilateral use of Ray resulted in some successful maritime operations.

efforts to get Ray to join the FRDrelations, but in December Ray agreed to acceptthrough the FRD. Ray's program appeared to be identicalbut without Communism and without hostility to the Ray became less intransigent as time wentndand1 was participating in talks witbVarona on the formation of the Revolutionary Council which

he ultimately joined. There seems to be no substance toin the press tbat Ray was ignored. In fact, hisclaims to wide underground resources are said to have been received uncritically by come project personnel.

Contact with Batistianos

31- Another allegation which gained some currency was that the project wae supporting end otherwise using former associates and supporters of Batista. At one pointid have contact with one ex-Batista leader, Sanchez Mosquerra, and gave some support to his group, but this effort was scon called off. There were also attempts by Batlstianos to penetrate tbe project's military effort, but these wore resisted. The FRD'a ownsection was active In attempting to screen out Batlstianos. The strike force contained some members of the former Cuban Constitutional Army, which existed under Batista, but these were recruited as soldiers not as politicians.

32. The brigade officers seem to hove been clean of the Batista taint. However, tbe FRD, for whom they were supposedly fighting, Justly complained that it had had no hand in their selection.

33- Jose Miroistinguished lawyer who turned to politics late in his career, was the first Cuban prime minister after the Castro revolution, was later ambassador to Spain, and was ambassador-designate to the United States when he broke with Castro, took asylum In the Argentine Embassy, and was eventually granted safe conduct to this country (inhere he became the FRD's secretary-general for public relations.

Under the guidance of Bender hetrong force for unity in the FPU during Its most difficult period, the virtual political Interregnum before the Inauguration of President Kennedy. Miro vas influential in bringing Bay into the Revolutionary Council vhich vas formed onarch with Miro as chairman.

Visit to Training Cantp

Miro, with other Council members, visited the striae force in Guatemala onarchuch-needed effort to spur troop morale. There had been far too little contact between the FRD and the soldiers being trained In its name. Artine, Verona, and Antonio Jaime Maceo Hackle had been there ln February in an attempt to calm mutinous spirits. Tbe last previous visit had been made in the fall0 by Col. Eduardo Martin Biena, head of the FRD's military stafformer constitutional Army officer. Martin Elena antagonized the trainees, and with the beginning of straight military training. Army officer, who bad no interest in Cubanan was placed on visits to the camp by Cuban politicians.

This vasistake and an unreasonablein tbe Cubans' management of their own affairs. contact between the FRD and the troops could have cone much to improve the morale and motivation of the troops and make the training job easier. There was nobody in the Guatemala camp who could answer the political questions of the trainees, who

were all volunteers and deserved to know what kinduture they were preparing to Tight for. Furthermore, the FRDhance to develop the loyalty of the troops who were presumably to Install and protect Its leaders on Cuban soil as membersrovisional government.

37> This was one exampleigh-handed attitude toward Cubans that became more and more evident as the project progressed. Cubans were the basic ingredientuccessful operation and, although the aim of having the exiles direct activities vas probably idealistic and unattainable, nevertheless the Agency should have been able to organise them for maximum participation and to handle them properly to get the Job done.

An American But with the Americans running tbe military effort, running Radio Svan, and doing unilateral recruiting, the operation became purely an American one in the exile Cuban mind, and in tbe public mind as well. In by-passing the Cubans the Agency was weakening its own cover.

39- The official attitude which produced this situation is reflected In the project's progress reports. Ineport noted that the Agency had "plenty of flexibility to choose the Cuban group ve would eventually sanctionrovisional government." anuary report indicated that the Agency, rather than the Cubans, was making the plans and decisions: "We have

charted five different lists of proposed assignments for any future provisional government of Cuba and are compiling biographic data on those Cubans who might be utilized by us inuture Cuban government."

crovning incident vhich publicly demonstratedrole of the Cuban leaders aad tbe con tempt invere held occurred at tbe time of the Invasion. Isolated

iami safe house, "voluntarily" but under strong persuasion, tbe Revolutionary Council members swatted the outcomeilitary operation vhich they had not planned and knew little about "while Agency-written bulletins were Issued to the world in their name.

had not been puppets In the early days of Some of the Cubans had drawn up detailedfor resistance in areas of Cuba that they knewprovided cover and support. One wealthy exile evenvent through the assessment routine at Useppe.vith the young trainees. They had reason to feel tbatvas In tbe natureoint venture, at least.

The Military Emphasis

when the project began to shift fromilitary operation, Cuban advice andno longer seemed necessary. Cubans who upad been close to some of the plans andwere cut out. To the military officers on loan to tbe

project, the problemilitary one, and their attitude vas "to hell vith the Revolutionary Council and the political side."

The paramilitary and the political action sections ofere not in effective touch vith each other; in effect, they treated their tasks as unrelated, and this vas reflected In the field. The diminished relationships vith the Cuban leaderseasure of the extent to vhich people in the project became carried awayilitary operation.

44. The effective utilisation of Cubans and cooperation vith them vas also hampered to some extent because many of tbe project officers had never been to Cuba, did not speak Spanish and made Judgments of the Cubans on very slim knowledge. otable exception vas the propaganda section, vhich vas veil qualified In this respect.) They considered the Cubansand difficult to work vith. Members of theCouncil have been described to tbe inspectors as "idiots" and members of the brigade as "yeHov-beUled."

However, many staff employees in the project realized that tbe Cubans would have to be dealt with realistically and allowances made for their differences and weaknesses. In some instances, case officers achieved quite remarkable rapport vith tbe Cubans they were handling. These officers were ones

who had had considerable experience In dealing with foreign nationals In various parts of the world, and the results showed it.

Dealing with Cubans

Some military officers on loan to tbe project were less successful In dealing with Cubans. They simply gave military orders to these foreign nationals and expected to be obeyed.

47. Some of the contract employees, such as ships' officers, treated tbe Cubans like dirt. This led to revolts, mutinies, end other troubles. Some very able Cubans withdrew from the project because of the way they were treated.

uq, The inspecting team hasefinite impression tbat this operation tookife of its own,umber of the people involved became so wrapped up in the operation as such that they lost sight of ultimate goals.

Thereubstantial question whether any operation can be truly successful when tbe attitudes toward tbe other people are so unfavorable. There does not seem to be much excuse for not being able to work with Cubans. If this nationality ls so difficult, how can the Agency possibly succeed with tbe natives of Black Africa or Southeast Asia!

Tbe Agency, and for tbat matter, the American nation is not likely to win many people away from Communism if the Americans treat other nationals with condescension or contempt,

flQiim

J. CLANDESTINE PARAMILITARY GPERATIOJCAIR

The first attemptlaodestiDe air drop over Cuba took place on (By coincidence this was the sane night as the first maritime operation.) an arms pack was dropped for an agent rated as havingesistance leader. The crew missed the drop zone by seven miles and dropped the weaponsam. Castro forces scooped them up, ringed the erea, caught the agent and later shot him. The airplane got Lost on the way back to Guatemala and landed in Mexico. It is still there.

This operation might have Indicated an unpromising future for air drops. In fact, its failure was influential ln persuading the chiefs of the project of the futility of trying to build up an internal resistance organization by clandestine neanB, and within the next few weeks the operational emphasis was beginning its fateful swing toward the overt strike-force concept. To this extent the portent of failure was heeded, but it did not suffice either to halt the air drops or to ensure arrangements for their success. The attempts vent on and on with results that were mostly ludicrous or tragic or both.

Oneadquarters received worduban agent, who had been given Agency training in this country, wanted an air drop of not moreounds of demolition and sabotage materiel and weapons. He clearly specified the

Layout exd the location of tbe drop tone, and also the amounts and kinds of materiel desired, abled this requirement to tbe air base in Guatemala, where all the flights originated. However, the Development Projects Dlviaion (DPD) then cabled Guatemala tbat arms and ammunition would be dropped with fcod toum load,ounds of leafletsrop elsewhere. This cable was not coordinated withwhichessage to the agent the following day statingargo drop would take place as requested and that the weight wouldounds.

Rice and Beans

k. rop was made onecember. man reception team received, notounds of materiel which vasfrom the original request because the specific items could not be packed in waterproof containers in time, butounds ofounds of riceounds of lard.

5< This was the only drop to this Cuban agent. Be was so vexed with the drop that he came out of Cuba specifically tocaiplalnt and toucceeding drop which had been planned. Be stated that he would not accept another drop, no matter what the cargo vas. He pointed out that the Agency had endangered bis safety by dropping cargo vhich be had not asked for, did not need, and could not handle. Furthermore, the aircraft had stayed In tbe vicinity too long, had flown with its landing lights on, had circled around and madeurns and even dropped

propaganda leaflets on bis property. He decided tbe Agency lacked the professional competence to make clandestine air drops.

operation vas recorded as "successful" by thecargo vas actually delivered to the people it vas meantvere four such "successes" in all, out ofissionstopril (The FiscalI budget called fordrops.) The first of these took place onecemberattempts beginning in mid-October. Therettempts during January and February. The thirdplacearch, when three agents vere droppedto drop them had been madeebruaryourth successful drop vas onarch.

The Successful Drops

Except for the rice-and-beans drop, the successful drops were all to an agent who had been trained in air receptionby staff personnel at Headquarters.

The three cargo drops known to be successful were all made in the Pinar del Rio Province. In other words, practically all tbe supplies went toof western Cuba. Small amounts are thought to have been received in Carjaguey and Orients, but none in Matanzas or Havana. Ten missions were flown into the Escambray at the request of an agent who had no training in air reception. Twice the cargo was not dropped because the drop zone was not located, and once the plane turned back because of bad

weather. On the seven occasions cargo was dropped. It vas either totally or in large pert recovered by the Castro forces. Three times cargo was dropped blind, three tines In the wrong place, and once on the drop rone when the reception committee was not there.

9- In all,ounds of arms, ammunition and equipment were transported by air. Rot more0 pounds of this was actually dropped; the rest was returned to base. Of0 pounds, at0 pounds were captured by Castro forces, who recovered allarge part of ten drops, compared with our agents, who recovered three. In other words, out ofons which were air-lifted, paramilitary agents actually got about twelve (about enough toen,oundsundred-man pack).

10. Except for the one team, there were no clandestine personnel drops made or even attempted during tbe entire project.

Lack of Procedure

U. The agents on tbe ground did nottandard procedure for air reception (most of them had not beenbe locations of drop zones vere variously and insufficiently described by coordinates, sketches, or azimuths, vothe requesting agents did not even have maps of their areas. In one of theseeadquarters, DPD and Miami Base each arrivedifferent set of coordinates froa tbe reference points given.

In another case the coordinates givenrop tone were ln the ocean. Reception parties proposed tohe drop tone with various bizarre and Impractical patterns, such as: two red lights and one white light abouteet apart moving clockwise; an arroweters long with lights at two-meter Intervals; lights in the formtraight lineign in the middle lit up with Christmas lights (on this one, the crew at one point mistakenly identified carsoad as the drop-tonewo crosses side byriangle of three lightsourth light in the center. In some areas there were ao many small lights in the vicinity that no pattern could he located. For one drop the agents made four proposals in rapid succession: noine-manine of fivemcter line of colored

The standard light patterns taught by paramilitaryand generally accepted as best, were (a) an "L" oflights;T"ights; androssghtB. All lights should beoards apart, with one light different from the others.

The Cuban air crews must share the blame for the failures, as must their trainers. Policy did not allow American observers to go along on the missions to correct the errors. Pilotwas lacking and instructions were not followed In numerous instances.

lft. For example, one air crew, under specific orders to abort tbe mission If the drop zone was missed on the initial run and not to search for it or circle around, mode four pusses four miles away, according to the ground report (which added, "Pilots drunk or

15- Another crew commander, under orders not to drop unlessattern was positively identified, elected to drop without seeingecause hepositive feeling" that be was over tbe drop zone. Another aircraft remained in the drop zoneinutes before dropping cargo.

headquarters Direction

16. The Headquarters direction of these air drops left much to be desired. DPD, vhich controlled tbe crevs end planes, neverepressntatlve physically assigned to we A, and the two activities were operatingivided comnahd situation on the basis of mutual cooperation rather than generally acceptedpractice snd military command principles.

1?. Daily consultation proved impossible although thereequirement of it. There vas trouble on cover stories, on funding, on security, and on cables, among other things. It vas difficult to determine where the responsibilities of one carponent ended and those of the other began.

he WBA paramilitary chief re commanded that tbe DPD unit be assigned to the chief of the task force for Integration vithln

ii nr

his staff. But no action was ever taken, and the situation remained as described for the duration of the project.

and DPD did not even agree on doctrine and In addition, all flight plans had to be personallyapproved by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligenceby2 Special Group. The requests for air dropsCuba by radio, secret writing or telephone to Miami andforwarded toeadquarters, which then put in anrequest to DPD, which in turn directed the Guatemalato mount the flight after approval had been given by DDCI.

DPD could and did release its own cables, without coordination.

cumbersome system was complicated even more byof agent radio operators inside Cuba. Some of thehad to be made by secret writing, which vac not only slowto misunderstanding, necessary last-minute changesby the reception groups or air crews could not beeach other.

Example of Confusion

The drop finally accomplished onecember is anexample of tbe confusion that prevailed.

nformed Havana that the drop would be madeeet. DPD told the Guatemala ip.se that the drop vould beeet. Guatemala, on the other hand, felteet

would be best. nformed the agents that the aircraft definitely

UIU1

would make only one pass over the drop zone. But DPD authorized0 turn in order to make the drop good if the drop zone was not located on the initial run. (Actually, the crew made three passes.) This drop then failedecember) because thegroup understood that the plane would make only one pass, and turned off the lights when the plane came backecond try. There was also confusion over the time of the drop and the Dumber of bundles. The difficulties in arriving at an understanding among all parties concerned were so great that this operation, first planned forctober, was re-scheduled forovember, runecember without dropping, then scheduled forecember. Then this had to be changed toecember and finally toecember.

For another operationold Guatemala that the cargo shouldounds, but DPD told Guatemala It could not be moreounds. The DPD message was not coordinated with WS/L, as Guatemala then pointed out.

Some of the techniques used by DPD were highly In one instance DPD told Guatemala tbat ln the event the drop-zone lights were not seen by the crew the pilot shoulddrop his cargo on the drop zone as determined by dead As it turned out, the reception group had dispersed after an encounteruban array patrol and vas unable to be at tbe drop zone. The Castro forces then picked up at least half of the bundles dropped.

Supplies for Castro

In anotherounds of food and materiel were dropped blind (in the dark of the moon) on each of four hilltopsroup which was known to be inrecarious position that it was not able to stay in place long enough to layrop zone. Again, the Castro'forces got most of the load.

In still another/ DPD told Guatemala that turns were allowed if the plane was not lined up on the initial run over the drop zone. .The agents reported that the plane pas cod over twice without dropping and that this alerted tbe .Castro army to attack the resistance group and to disperse it.

27- Once two planes were sent over the drop zone half an hour apart and allowed to make two passes each. Notilitia searched the area the next day and seized the cargo. The drop altitude for another operation was sethe pilot reported he had hit the drop zoneeet, even though unable to recognize the marker, but there is -evidence that the enemy got at least half the drop.

28. One aircraft received heavy fire and was damaged. Its crew thus learned the hard way tbat dropping leaflets first had helped to alert the area and recommended that in the future the cargo be dropped first. Miami Base pointed out to Headquarters that itistake to drop heavy weaponsroupnown capability of using them or had specifically requested them.

1'

29- ong tine the results of the drops, as reported by the ground elements, vere not forwarded to the air crews, who got no critiques but continued to report successes when In fact they were missing the drop tone by many kilometers.

Handling an Emergency

30. The handling of an emergency also left something to be desired. One of the planes had to land In Jamaica. The commander's phone call to an emergency number In Guatemala produced tbe reply.

Sever heard of you."

fi

If the Agency'b FT Staffstudy which raised pertinent questions about tbe air drops. paramilitary stafftudy In March andthe Cuban crews did not have sufficient experience ortraining in clandestine paramilitary air operations toproject objectives end that they were too undisciplinedInstructions or to make correct reports. This studythat contract American aircraft commanders be used, butnot receive the approval of the paramilitary chief and went

no further.

also made an analysis In March and recommended cer-

tain overdue corrective action such as obtaining agent reports of drop results for prompt dispatch to the air base in Guatemala,

critiques for each mission regarding compliance with Instructions, elimination of blind drops, and better Identification of drop zones. DPD cabled Guatemalaarch that an analysis of the mission results to date would be forwarded shortly to be usedasis for refinement of tactics and Improvement of coordination with tbe reception teams. And at the end ofheck pilot was included for the first timeission crew. He noted discrepancies In pilot procedure and crew coordination.

Tardy Corrective Action

33* These corrective actions came too late. The seeming inability to support resistance elements augmented the growing reliance being placed on the idea of an amphibious strike force to accomplish tbe objective; then, as the strike Idea took over more and more, interest in clandestine drops decrcaued among officers in charge of tbe project. On or aboutolicy decision vas made that there would be no more clandestine drops until after the amphibious assault. Inasmuch as the WH/I* cuoe officers handling these drops were not Informed as to the strike plan or the date, thisroblem for them becauserops to specific drop zones were requested betweenarch andpril, and it was necessary to stall off the requests with such messages as:

"Don't give up hope. We'll drop as' soon as wc can."

"Regret unable mount BERTA. Definitely planning support your

operation. Beg you understand our problems."

loi nirrnifir

But the agents had their own problems during thie time:

"Unjust to delay operation so much. . .This isHow longave to wait for the drop. The lives of peasants and students depend on you."

"Bear Allies: Arms urgent. Ueommitment. Ue have compiled. You have not. If you bave decided to abandon us, answer."

"We are risking hundreds of peasant families. If you cannot supply us wo will havedemobilize. Your responsibility. We thought you were sincere."

"All groupsThey consider themselves deceived because of failure of shipment of arms and money according to promise."

Perhaps the situation was best summed up by this agent message: "impossible toEither the drops increase or weMen without arms or equipment. God help The Inspector General reluctantly concludes that the agent who was showered with rice and beans was entirely correct ln his finding that the Agency showed do professional competence in its attempts at clandestine air drops into Cuba. Furthermore, these attempts ln their over-ail effect probably hurt themore than they helped.

K. CLANDESTINE PAKAMILITARy OPERATIONSMARITIME

ranch had two separata maritime problems. It needed to transport men and supplies clandestinely to tbe coast of Cuba by small boats, and It needed ships to transport and support on amphibious landingilitary force, more or less overtly. This section of the report will be mostly concerned with small boat operations.

The VH Division had no assets In being; there was no Agency element comparable to DPD to call on; and for obscure reasons the Navy wae not asked to provide the help It might have. ad to start with nothing; there seemed to be very little maritime know-bow within the Agency.

The original operational plan called fox buildingubstantial resistance organization, which could be done only if supplies and people were delivered to the right places. During tbe critical periodad one boat, the "Metuaafoot pleasure cruiser which wae lent to the Agencyriend. Two maritime operations officers, more or less under deep cover, labored from March to October to outfit this boat and train its crew.

The boat went on Its first mission oneptember,ounds of cargo and picking up two exfiltrees. By January it had made five additional trips and transported about five tons, but only one infiltree. It had another successful operation In1 and another In April.

5. In November and December there vere aLx other successful small boat operations conducted vlth boats ovned by various Cubans. The arrangements vers made by Individual case officers at Miami (there being no maritime section) and mainly ln response to requests by the owners. Ho memoranda of understanding vera made and the agreements as to supporting! equipping, and funding thesa Cuban boats vere exceedingly loose, thus causing many problems later.

6* uban vould Bay, "Olveank of gasachine gua, and you can use our boat and ve will help run it." After the operation he was likely to come back and say that the boat needed all sorts of equipment which had been damaged by the operation, and many claims were built up in this way.

7- Although more than twenty of these boats vere offered to case officers, most of them vere too small and too limited In range to be of much use. Furthermore, the had weather which lasted from December Into March made small boat operations impossibleime vben they were badly needed. In1 there wasingle successful operation.

8. By December the need for sci^oats vas becoming obvious. The "Sea Cull" (see be low) vas picked up by Headquarters about this time. It turned out toomplete

. Ul -

a TOT . .

the "Wasp",

ne of the most experienced employees in small boats spent most of bis time from December to June trying to get it to run, and it never did participate in an infiltration or exflltratloc operation. Also, aboutfoot yacht.

Itknot speedile

range and ran Its first successful mission onebruary.

9- About February tbe Tejena" also be caae operational. Thisoot yacht which became availableuban contactase officer. The arrangements made by

tbe case officer vith tbe Cuban owner vere so vague that

payment of bills incurredontinuing problem. Ebvever, then four operations In March,0 pounds, as compared0 pounds which had beenfrom September up to February by all available boats.

The statistics complied bynd by Miami Ease on the small boat operations are somewhat confused and Inconsistent. Hovever, tbe general picture is clear. The small boat operations succeeded In getting abouteople Into Cuba clandestinely. Most of these vere taken in during March. Up to the middle of February only ten bad been successfully infiltrated by tbls means, tbe first being in mid-November.

In the matter of arms, ammunition and other supplies to tbe resistance, tbe boat operations vere not an outstanding

success. Frco September to .the time of tbe strike0 pounds were successfully infiltrated. Tbls was about three times as much as was put In by air drops. The total amount of supplies put into Cuba by air and boat operations amounted to0his would be about enough toen.

Limited Area

There was one successful boat operation In September; two in October; three In November; six In IWcember, none In January; six in February; thirteen in March; and two in April. Up to February only sixalf tons were sent in.

One should not get tbe Idea that these supplies were uniformly distributed throughout Cuba. Most of them vere placed In one small area, the north coast of Cuba close to Havana. The small boats did not have the range to go farther.

In almost all cases the supplies were transferreduban boat or an offshore key rather than deposited on tbe shores of Cuba itself. In the fall, boat operations were restricted by policy to offshore rendezvous,. By January Miami had begun to plan beach landing operationseans of overcoming tbe unreliability of Cuban-based boats. At this time Miami Base did not even have aerial photos of the north coast of Cuba.

theissions rated as successful onlyould

be considered entirely so since the cargo on the other operations

was later recovered by tbe Castro governaent or the success was only partial. The reception ccenlttees did not seem to have had ouch training In narltlae reception procedures.

16. Innail aaount of materiel vas put Into the Havana area In the period September-December by some ill-suited small boats. Thenng the "Wasp" and theubstantially larger amount of supplies was put in during February and Karcb as veil as some people, butimited area only. At this point the "Barbara j" and the "Blagar" (former LCIs) vere used because of their longer range and larger size; however, for various reasons they vere also unsuccessful in placing anything on tbe south coast except at the vesternmost part.

Lacklan

17- Officers vho worked on these operations reported that there was no effective project plan for using small boats to deliver men and equipment to- forces inside Cuba who were best suited to use them to buildowerful underground movement against Castro. According to these officers,id not plan small boat operations: the case officers simply responded to requests by individual Cubans and groups. One officer remarked that the Cubans vere running tho operations.

18. Of all the attempts made to land men and supplies In Cube clandestinely by water some of the most notable were mode

by theurplus LCI vhich the Agency bought In It vaa Intended that this craft vould serveother ship for small boat operations and alsoong-range lift capability.

19. hakedown voyage In December, featuredutiny, the ship vas scheduled for clandestine maritimeof three paramilitary teams into Cuba. Initially there vas some confusion as to who vas running the operation since Miami had been handling small boat operations and had made the rendezvous plans for this one, but Headquarters bad responsibility for the WH/ft then sent the chief of Its maritime section to Miami to coordinate, to brief the captain, and to dispatch the boat cn lta mission onanuary.

Tbo "Barbara J" put into Vieques Island on1 after having been unsuccessful in putting anybody ashore In Cuba. The crew's morale continued to deteriorate. Some refused to take direct orders, attempts to discipline the men were Ineffective, the engineers refused to stand watch, and all of the crew wanted to return to Miami and resign. Also, nine of the ten agents did not wish to stay on the ship for another mission.

A Sit-down ebruary the "Barbara J" sailed from Viequesendezvous on the south coast of Cuba,crew members having

been leftieques beech, where theyit-downunger strike. ebruary thoeported that the contact had not shown up at the rendezvous point.

22. After trying again onebruary, the captain of tbe "Barbara J" cabled! essage to Garcia: The reluctant heroes In fishing boat again conspicuous by theirebruary he eent another odd cable: "Last message to Garcia: Your fishing boat still manifesting extreme shyness. Suggest next operation seed in varsity." Onebruary he sent; "Cruised vithout making contact. Picked up small target

on radar, tracked It down, aod scared bell out of somevho wanted no part of us."

he case officer and the team leadersifferent story. They stated that when the "Barbara J" arrived at the

rendezvous point it was approachedmall boat that came

at the right time aod gave tbe correct signals, but tbat as

the boat came alongside the captain of tbe "Barbara J" ordered two floodlights turned oo the boat which apparently scared it away. On l8 February the reception partyessage that their boat had been at the right place at the right time andatrol boat had showed up. Therrived at

onebruary without having received arrival

Instructions. Onebruary Miamiessage saying that it vas setting up facilities at Key West to receive the

U f 1 II x

Upon landing In Key West the ten peraallltary agents, having been on this triponth after spending two monthsafe house, were ready to resign and itonsiderable amount of persuasion to get them to stay with tho program. They vere tben sent to New Orleans for holding.

itation 2u. Several officers who vere associated with the captain of tbeontract employee acquired from Military Sea Transportation Serviceave testified to bis drinking on duty, his bullying of Cubans, and his disregard for security. Drew Pearson wrote about tbe drunken American LCI skipper vho scared away Cuban underground leaders vith his ship's floodlights, and vho threatened toabotage team. Onarch the project's paramilitary chief relieved tbe captain of his command and requested tbat be be terminated. However, tbe captain vas retained on duty and eventually received full payonusix-month contract period In the amount of

25. ranch initiated action to get the captain commended by his parent service for outstanding performance. InI he wa6 cited "for completing an assignment involving extreme hazards in an outstanding manner, and displayingskill snd courage" and given tbe Navy Superior Civilian

Service Awardthe highest hocorary civilian award within the authority ofS coexannder.

branch had never taken action either toor to convict hi* of serious charges, and thebe received casts doubt not only on tbeotherecommendations for merit citations but also

on the quality of personnel management In the project.

Peculiar Organization

organisation for controlling clandestinewas peculiar. Tbe forward operating base Inthe responsibility for small boat operations but couldany without Headquarters approval. It was seldombad any query or refused to give approval.

2d. But -the Miami Base did not have the equipment and experience that vere needed. ong time the docking facilities were Inadequate. The desirability ofase at Key Vest vas recognized as early asut this base was not established until It was insufficiently staffed andreat many cover, security ond administrative problems on which it received little assistance. At first it was under the direction of tbe Miami paramilitary section; eventually It was placed under tbe chief of the Miami Base.

29> i.ll staff st Key West sot only supported ssall coat operations; It also had to take whatever action was necessary when disabled black flights cane in to tbe localir station since DPD bad no representative in the area. Bach unsuccessful maritime operation doubled the work. Boats coming backafe haven loaded with arms and explosives, usually crewed by Cubans and sometimes disabled ln various ways, hod to be unloaded again by whoever was available among paramilitary case officers and security and support people. ew staff employees worked almost around the clockonth loading and mi loading cargo without benefit oforklift. Hury tons were so handled.

30. It is clear that there was no over-all policy in regard to the small boats. There was no clear directive as to whether to acquire short-range, speedy boats or long-range, slower boats; whether to use fishing craft and crews or special-purpose boats built specifically for our use. There was no policy on the useother craft. There was no control over the amount of money spent on these small boats and their outfitting.

The Maritime Unit

31- WHA Headquarterstaff employee whosewas small boat coordinator. This meant, ln effect, checking proposed operations with tbe Intelligence section, extending approvals and keeping records. lsoeparate maritime

unit which handled the technical aide of tbe small boats, approved funds for thesi, and arranged for personnel for then, but had nothing to do with their operations-

This maritime unit alao had the responsibility for acquiring and fitting out the larger ships such as thebehe three LCUs and the ships used in the strike. This unit also had the responsibility for training underwater demolition teams, directing raiding operations, and overseeing the Vieques Base.

The lack of equipment, the shortage of experienced personnel, the press of time and the problems of coordination are shown by the experience which the maritime unit had with the acquisition and outfitting of tho LCIs and the LCUs. The press of time hardly allowed for advertising for specific types of craft or soliciting competitive bids. The two LCIs (the "Barbara J" and theere purchasedrivate corporation ln KismlOO. 0 was then spent in modifying, repairing and outfitting them.

3h. This work, which extendederiod of several months, was directed by officers from Headquarters during short temporary duty tours In the Miami area. The day-to-day supervision of the work was under several Navy chief petty officers (borrowed from the Agency's Office of Training) who had co contact with Miami Base, no authority to spend money or

give orders, and no channel to procure parts and equipment* The technical and training abilities of these Navy chiefs vere grossly misused by the project; much of their time vaa spent at stevedore or deckhand labor.

Training on LCVl

were bought directly from the 3avy In00 each. Supposedly In operating condition, these craft had been stripped and vere In such bod shape that they could hardly be moved from the dock. Tho dozen or so Agency employees vho vent to Little Creek to get them Into operational condition vere so busy vith repairs that there vas little tine left for learning hov to operate the craft, even though some members of the group vero not familiar with LCUs, the engineers did not all knov engineering and the skippers did not all knov navigation. Tbls group got tbe LCUs to Vieques Island somehov and proceeded to train tbe Cuban erevs, which, however, vere given no training In night landing ond very little in navigation.

36. In all,as spent on boats ond ships, and tbe total cost of tbe maritime phases of tbe project vas Wagesonsiderable Item. For example, ship's masters on contract vere budgetedonth, cooks There seemed toeneral failure at tbe top to

realize how much boata coat to run and to keep In repair. The arrangement whereby officers in Headquarters tried to control the expenditures being made In Florida to repair and operate boats which were urgently needed was highly impractical. The high cost of boats in this project is yell illustrated by the dismal case of the "Sea Cull".

Case of the "Sea Gull"

37- bad pre-

viously been used to service offshore oil-drilling rigs and was estimated toair market value.

38. The request forwas signed for the chief of the projectpecial assistant in the FI section (acting for tbe actingnd approved by the Deputy Chief of WH Division (acting for his chief). It vaschristened tbe "Sea Gull" and transported to Miami, vbere it brokeards from the pier on its first trial run. 1 it was estimated that repairs and modiflcations would; byanuary, tbo estimate bad grovn; byebruary,; and onebruary, tbe shipyard doing the vorkill! In all, tbe "Son Gull" cost:

Repairs (eventually reduced)

gear, tools, arms, navigation

aids

The "Sea Gull" vas not ready to be used until the last veek of March; at this time it vas commandeered (along vlth theeadquarters unit vhich vaseception operation in connection vith the amphibious strike, over the strong protests of Miami Ease, vhich never got to use the boat on an infiltration operation.

The lack of qualified personnel, the confusion of responsibility, the lack of planning, and the skyrocketing costs Ln the maritime activity ledigh-level requesttbe assignmentualified senior Naval officer to the project. aptain reported, no one seemed to know vhat to do vlth him and, after he briefly visited Miami and Key West

bases, be vas assigned to ths naval side of the strike planning at Headquarters. Be ls reported to have been not entirely nappy vlth bis brief Agency tour. Tn any event he vas another example of poor handling of people ln this project, and be vns nothance to solve tbe problems of maritime operations.

t ls apparent that tbe Agency had very little capability for maritime operations evenlandestine nature. It lacked

trained personnel, boats, bases, doctrine, and organization. The employees who worked In this sadly slighted activity were veil avare of this, and morale was not high. As one of them said, "The lowest kind of operations officeraramilitary operations officer, aad the lowest kind of FM officeraritime operations officer."

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L. CLANDESTINE PARAMILITARY OPERATIONSTRAINING UNDERGROUND LEADERS

Early In thearefully selected group of Cubans vas trained for Infiltration into Cuba to organize resistance. Tbe loose management of tbe project isby tbe confusion betveen the headquarters elements and the training elements over vhat these men vere being trained, for, and by tbe failure to have their missions, means of entry, and reception ready for them.

The trained Cubans put into Cuba vere too fev and too late to do very much, snd the strike planners Ignored them. The cost of training snd holding these men probably ran wellillion dollars, yet most of them vere never used for what they vere trained tc do, and some vere not used at all.

This particular endeavor began in9 vben tbe WH Divisionecision tomall group of Cubans and train them to train other Cubans for infiltration into Cuba in small paramilitary teams to organize resistance forces. Possible training sites In Panama vere surveyed at this time, but no further action vos taken. The basic policy paper approved by the President in0 included the above proposal.

u. Inhe Cuban leaner Manuel Artho vas ln Miami,umber of bis folio vers as recruits for this program. Uucppa Island vas acquired as an assessment and holding site,reliminary screening of the candidates for the training program began.

May and0 complete polygraphs,and psychiatric tests, and evaluationsndividuals. Basic Morse code training vas begunIsland. In Junerainees vere sent fromUseppaPanama for basic paramilitary training. Inent to Guatemala to be trained as radio operators,Island vas then closed down.

Theg

worse training site could hardly, have beenthe one ln Guatemala, it being almost inaccessible,training facllitlee and almost no living facilities. were put to work: building the camp, working during

tbe day and studying at night. This went on for several sooths.

7- The number of Americans at the camp was heldare minimum for security reasons. They vere represented to be either tourists or adventurers. The camp commander vas also the chief of training sod the project officer for Guatemala. When he arrived, he had to set up the temporary camp, find ao areaermanent camp, contract for buildings, supplies.

and equipment; he also had to find sitesuitable airar itbase,rison and contract for these facilities to be built. Ee had threeommunications officer and two contract employees.

initial group of paramilitary trainees vasto the Guatemala Base from Panama after two months Byugust there werearamilitary trainees,

oamuni cat ions trainees, end nine staff and contract eeployeos.

September the training camp had enoughInstructors toour-week basic trainingtrainees were sorted Into seven-man teams accordingarea knowledge and their aptitudes. Sixty werego Into Cuba (either legally or illegally) and togroups;ere selected for action teams to goand Join tbe resistance groups tbat had beenthe first teams; tbe remainder of tbe trainees would bea small conventional strike force. Tbe trainingthe teams to be ready to go in October and askedto provide the Infiltration plans.

10. The trainers did not realise that Headquarters had changed tbe plan. Already In July the FRD, the exile political front, had been asked tondividuals for aaction cadre, and the training base was asked If It could accommodate this number. Obviously, it could not.

Conditiooa actually got worse. In September the training camp was plagued by torrential tropical rains, shortages of food and supplies, plus trouble with agitators and hoodlums among their recently arrived trainees, who were not being screened and assessed as the first ones had been. The training base chief got into disfavor with Headquarters apparently because of bis blunt cables asking for assistance. y men are going hungry and barefoot.")

Request for In October the Infiltration teams tbat had been selected from among the trainees worked out detailedplans for themselves, complete with maps, propaganda handouts, and resistance operations. When the base announced thatundred men were ready to go. Headquarters replied tbat it was proposing tbe illegal infiltration of tbe teams In November by boat. (Actually, the only boat the project bad at this time wasfoot "Sfetusa Time".) Headquarters further cabled that it was engaged ineneral plan for the employment of the infiltration teams but that tbe details were not yet ready. The base chief was recalled In October, and thereafter the training baseew chief each week for five weeks. One trainee was put into Cuba legally at tbe end of October.

8 Ii' '1 II

12. Inonths after the originalbeen aade to train Cuban teano for resistanceteans vere reported ready to go. But they vere still avalplans for Infiltration. Inanradio operators) had been trained ln security, basicintelligence collection and reporting, propagandasubversive activities, resistance organization,operations, explosives and demolitions, guerrillasimilar

13* Headquarters approved the use off these men for the resistance teams; all others vere scheduled to begin formal, conventional combat training onovember as an elementtrike forceen. This drastic change In over-all plan vas announced to the training baseableovember and led the base to plead for closer coordination in the future between Headquarters planning and the field training. During this month six trainees were movediami safe house where they stayed for two months, awaiting transportation into Cuba.

Move to Panama

ik. In0 Headquarters advised the training base that It was expecting approval of Its operational concept, which included internal resistance stimulated by teams as well as the useround and air assault force. It advised tbe basean brigade (instead) was being planned

and thaten (insteadere approved for infiltration teams. During this month theen were moved to Panama where they vere held until somebody could find out what to do with them. An offer from DPD to give them jump training was turned down by the project.

15- Byl tbe morale of the trainees in Panama had declined considerably. There vas not even an interpreter available for briefing and debriefing them. Headquarters then hadf them brought to safe bouses ln Miami to be made, ready for dispatch. Twelve radio operators were moved from Panama to the Agency's training base in the United States for further training.

16. ByI therainees still in Panama vere described as disillusioned and at the breaking point. They were then transferredase in Hew Orleans to be given additional training in sabotage and air-maritime reception. February wased-letter month. Six of tbe radio operators were infiltrated legally. On lh February tbe first resistance team was put into Cuba, and two more teams went in at the end of the month. However, the two teams which had satiami safe bouse from mid-November to mid-January returned to Miami in bad humor in mid-Februaryonth on the "Barbara J" circumnavigating Cuba without being put ashore.

effective infiltration mechanism never wasone of the paraoilitary teams was ever delivered by air. March the project was able to put four agents into CubaEase. It ls not clear why this could not haveearlier. No infiltration was ever tried by submarine.

Morale Problems

onths after thetrain resistance teams) theen who had been trainedvere distributed as follows:

nfiltrated, including lk radio operators

at seaabotage mission

in New Orleans as membersaider teamn New Orleans still awaiting infiltration

etached to Miami for various impending operations. The morale of the remaining trainees was low snd their anger high. Thisreat many problems in Rev Orleans. Some of these men had been held in five different campsen-month period. Onarch, about three weeks before tbe Invasion, the remainder of the groupere transferred to Miami and turned loose, being describedollection of spoiled individuals distinguished by bad conduct. At leastf tbe agents who were recruited between May and0 never got into Cuba at all; among thoere eight who came into tbe project in tbe original group in0 and who were in training almost continuously from that time up toI.

The time opent In training la no measure of the quality of the training, of course, and there vasreat vaste of time. One of the Cubans trained for Infiltration into Cubs wrote that after he arrived in Panama lnuring almost three veeks, the onlyasmall dam and the shoting range, after tbat ve Just din't do snythlngh. Just sleep aad ate, thats all." When he arrived in Florida on l8 January: *rhere, the same history, sleep, eat, play card and vatch television. The onlyeceveld during -that time vas on secret writtlng, vich vas very good but nothing else." The same agent pointed out serious deficiencies In his weapons training and his final briefing.

One of tbe instructors in Guatemala in the early months later claimed that only two Instructors knev their business; the others vere chosen froa the trainee cadre, vho had only aof two months' training themselves. He Included himself among the unqualified.

Training Omlnnlon

remoteness of the training site caused When brigade training startedere only two compassesroops, and thesetrainees. Compasses had first been requested on 2when they were not received tbe training in their use had

to be omitted from the program.

More serious, there had never been any definition of training goals, and the base andere working at cross-purposes. The chief of the training base in Guatemala never received any letter of instruction.

The situation at the New Orleans Base ln1 vas even nore chaotic. The instructorsraining area vhichvamp end filled vlth poisonous snakes. Demolition classes had to be conductedootpath leadingheateress hall, with constant interruptions from passers-by. Bbbody seemed able to define the training that

vas required. emolitions instructor vas assured on arrival that the group he had come to train did not need the instruction; in any case, there vere no explosive training materials, no adequate range, and no gear to set one up. Another instructor, sent to Sev Orleans tomall raider group, found himself expected to train, organise andman guerrillaeek later be found himselfan assault battalion instead. The training requirement vas never spelled out, and the training equipment never Bhoved up.

2k. Training activity of various sorts vas going onthere vere requirements for everything fromto small boat handling. But there vas no full-time chief of training ln the project to oversee requirements, define responsibilities, set up facilities and provide support.

Consequently, vhat training was done, was done without control, by Individual case officers doing tbo best they could. Bow effective this training vas cannot be determined. Much of It took place In Miami, where personnel from the base wereCubans In intelligence collection, counterintelligencepsychological warfare activities, or paramilitary subjects, according to need.

training wae necessarily conducted inonsiderable expenditure of time on the partpersonnel. Other training was conducted in theusually by case officers. One man was trained in atoarachute jump (he made one successfully!). vere levied on tbe Office of Training for instructors

and training materials. But these vere uncoordinated and wasteful. Many of tbe Instructors, when made available, vere not used in their specialties, ending up in such Jobs as stevedoring Instead.

veil thought-out project would have had awhich would nave laid specific requirements on tbeTraining, particularly when tbe training of hundreds ofan Integral part of the venture. Instead, tbemet In piecemeal and improvised fashion, underand with dubious results.

M. SECURITY

The assault cm Cuba is generally acknowledged to haveoorly kept secret. It could hardly have been other-vise, considering the complexity of tbe operation and the number of people involved, both Cuban and American. The inspection team did notetailed study of tbe security aspects of the operation but came across many veaknesses in tbe protection of information and activities from those vho did not "need to -knov."

In general the Cubans vho vere in the operation do not seem to have had any real understanding of tbe need to keep quiet about their activities. Many of them knev much core than they needed to knov, and they vere not compart cent ed from each other and from Americans to tbe extent that vas For example, one wealthy Cuban vho vas close to the operation vas being contacted by at least six different staff employees.

3- Some agents vere being bandied by tvo or three different case officers at tbe same time, vith confusing results and lack of control. Many of tbe agents vho vere sent into Cuba had known each other during training; forozen radio operators had been trainedroup. If one was arrested he would know who tbe other ones were. One radio operator Inside Cuba was aware of almost every paramilitary operation in Cuba from tbe beginning of the project.

k. Agents who were supposedly well trained disregarded elementary rules of personal security and were arrested because they needlessly gave away their true identities by visiting relatives who were under surveillance or by carrying identifying documents in their pockets.

Hazard in Miami

Miami areaarticular hazardand rumors spread rapidly through the largewhich included Castro agents. Movements of boats .

and people soon become known. One agent, who bad been infiltrated into Cuba by boat, reported later that within three days his family in Miami knew when and how he bad landed, because one of the crew members of the boat had told many people in Miami about It. Letters from the training camp, although censored, managed nevertheless to convey information to the Miami Cubans.

Americans on the project In many cases also failed

to observe strict security discipline. One senior case officer

holding an operational meeting with Cubansiami motel was

overhearditizen, who reported to tbe Federal Bureau of m

Investigation.

7- It has been testified that the security measures at the training camps In Guatemala and at New Orleans were Inadequate, furthermore, the training camps had no adequate counterintelligence capability. Except for an instructor borrowed froa tbe Office of.

trainingew weeks, toe agency was unable toounterintelligence officer to the camps. this lack was serious because, ln order toreat many recruits for the strike forceurry, there was very little screening of the volunteers, and some who were sent to camp had been inadequately checked.

poor backstop?lng

8. instances were noted of poor backs topping of the cover stories of agency employees, sketchy briefings on cover, weak cover stories, and faulty documentation. much of this can be ascribed to lack of attention to detail due to the press of time. many of tbe early difficulties in guatemala stemmed fromadvisability of providing supplies and support to instructors who vere posing as "tourists" and "soldiers of fortune". this pretense eventually had to be dropped because of itsy. erious weakness showed up in the poor arrangements for backstopping overflights (for example, the plane that landed in jamaica).

9- somewhattrict compartmeatation was applied in certain areas of the project which actually denied information to people who needed it. those who were engaged in running agents into cuba were never allowed into the war room or given the plan for the strike.

bop ODORDg.

10. For security reasons, the resistance elements inside Cuba were not advised of tbe tLne of tbe assault, and could hardly have risen up even if there badf then. Tbe entire complement of the Miami Base was likewise uninformed and was unprepared to take action when tbe strike occurred. Staff employees at the Miami Base, who could nave benefited by special clearances, did not get them until much too late.

Use of Guatemala

U. Tbe use of Guatemala for training bases was. In terms of security, unfortunate. It is obvious now tbat tbe training could have been done more securely in tbo United States (as for example, the tank crew training, which got no publicity athe Guatemala camps were not easily bidden and net easily explained. The air base was locatedell-traveled road and In viewailroad where train loads of Guatemalans frequently haltediding.

12. It is strange that the training of the Cubansoreign country, whore tbe trainees were necessarily exposed to tbe natives and reporters could pick up information. Presumably this vas done on grounds of security and non-attri-butablllty; however, the radio operators who were trained In Guatemala wero later brought to tbe United States for further training. The forco for the abortive diversionary expedition vas trained in hev Orleans rather than being sent outside the

country. Other Cubans wore trained in both paramilitary and espionage subjects in the outskirts of Miami and Washington, and still others were trained on American soil at Vieques Island. Of all these training locations, only the ones in Guatemala became known to the world.

13- It is acknowledged that many Cubans and Americans observed strict security discipline, that the security officers of tbe project made on outstanding contribution, and that many arrangements and activities are not open to criticism regarding their security. Unfortunately, this vaa not good enoughroject of this size and importance, conducted by professional intelligence officers.

IM. Because of the operation's magnitude, the errors cccmitted resulted in the exposure of Agency personnel and modus operandi to many uncontrolled individuals, both foreign and American.

aDflFFB

During the Invasion landing tvo Agency contract employees, aouigned as operations officers aboard the two LCIs, went ashore to Bark two of the beaches and exchanged gunfire with Cuban militia. One of these employees had token partabotage raiduban oilonth earlier. Both of them engaged in rescue operations along the Cuban shore after the brigade collapsed.

Inhe project leaders ware becoming doubtful of the motivation of the Cuban pilots they vere training and of their ability to perform tactical missions successfully. Inl tho Agency requested the Special Group to authorise tbe use of American contract pilots. The authorisation given was limited to tbe hiring of the pilots and reserved for later decision the question of their actual use. The Special Group also granted authority to recruit and hire American seamen to serve in tbe invasion fleet.

3- Three American contract pilots with long Agency experience were made available from another project. umber of other pilots and air-crew technicians, members or ex-members of several Air National Guard units, were recruited especially for the project ln1 under coverotional commercial company.

I*. Through the first day of fighting,pril, only Cuban air crews were used for combat or drop missions. Ofhich had gone over the beachhead, only three had returned to base, and four of the others bad been shot down. That night the available Cuban crews were exhausted and dispirited.

Onpril the hard pressed exile brigade was calling for air support. Two American fliers volunteered to go, und several Cuban crews followed their example. The resultighly successful attackolumn of Castro's forces moving on Blue Beach. Four American -manned aircraft vera in combat over the beachhead the following day, and two of them were shot down by- Later the same day two American crews returned for another sortie. Four American fliers were either killed in combat or executed by Castro forcea after being shot down.

In addition to these actions, an American-manned FBI patrolled the waters south of Cubaotal ofours during five days on air-sea rescue and conmunlcatlons relay duty.

7- The American pilots lost in combat were aware of united States Government sponsorship and probably also of Agency interest, but had been instructed not to Inform their families of this. In spite of wide press coverage of tha Invasion failure, the story of the American pilots has never gotten Into print, although Its

- lUl

sensational nature still lakesossibility. In dealing vith the surviving families it bas been necessary to conceal connection vith the United States Government. This effort baa been complicated by the fact that the original cover story vas changedecond notional company substituted.

he resolutionecure manner of the legal and moral claims arising from these four deaths baa been costly, complicated and fraught vith risk of disclosure of tbe Government's role. These problems vere aggravated by tbe Inclusion in tbe employment contracts of certain unnecessarily complicated insurance clauses and by the project's failure to prepare in advance on effective plan for dealing vith ths eventual legal and security problems.

0. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Certain basic conclusion3 have been drawn from this survey

of the Cuban operation:

1. The Central Intelligence Agency, after starting to build up tbe resistance and guerrilla forces inside Cuba, drastically converted the project Into what rapidly became an overt military operation* The Agency failed to recognize that when the project advanced beyond the stage of plausible denial it was going beyond the area of Agency responsibility as well as Agency capability.

2. The Agency became so wrapped up in tbe military operation that It failed to appraise tbe chances of success realistically. Furthermore, it failed to keep the national policy-makers adequately and realistically informed of the conditions considered essential for success, and it did not press sufficiently for prompt policy decisionsast moving situation.

3* As tbe project grew, the Agency reduced tbe exiled leaders to the status of puppets, thereby losing the advantages of their active participation.

k. The Agency failed to build up andesistance organization under rather favorable conditions. Air and boat operations shoved up poorly-

The Agency failed to collect adequate information on the strengths of the Caetro regime and the extent of the opposition to It; and It failed to evaluate the available Information correctly.

Tho project was badly organized. Command lines and management controls vere Ineffective and unclear. Senior Staffs of tbe Agency vere not utilised; sir support stayed Independent of tho project; the role of tbe large forward base vas not clear.

The project vaa not staffed throughout vith top-quality people,umber of people vere not used to tbe best advantage.

The Agency entered tbe project vltbout adequate assets in the vay of boats, bases, training facilities, agent nets, Spanish-speakers, and similar essential Ingredientsuccessful operation. Had these been already In being, much lime and effort would have been saved.

Agency policies and operational plans were never clearly delineated, with the exception of the plan for the brigade landing; but even this provided no disaster plan, no unconventional warfare annex, and only extremely vague plans for actionuccessful landing. In general. Agency plans and policies did not precede tbe

various operations In the project hut vere drawn up In response to operational needs as they arose. Consequently, the scope of the operation itself and of the support required was constantly shifting.

There were some good things In this project. Much of the support provided was outstanding (for example, logistics and communications). umber of Individuals did superior Jobs. Many people at all grade levels gave tbelr time and effort without stint, working almost unlimited hours over long periods, under difficult and frustrating conditions, without regard to personal considerations. But this was not enough.

It is assumed that the Agency, because of its experience in this Cuban operation, will never again engage in an operation tbat ls essentially ua overt allltary effort. But before it takes on another major covert political operation it will have to Improve its organization and management drastically. It mustay to set up an actual task force. If necessary, and be able to staff It with the best people. It must govern Its operation vlth clearly defined policies and carefully drawn plans, engaging ln full coordination with the Departments of State and Defense as appropriate.

Previous surveys and other papers written by the Inspector General bave called attention to many of these problems and deficiencies, and have suggested solutions. For example, in

one nidation was made,urvey of the Far Bast Division,igh-level Agency study be made of the extent to which the Agency should be engaged In per amiary operations, "Ifnd that It Include an evaluation of tbe capabilities of other government departments to assume primary responsibility in this field.

In9 the Inspector General pointed outM=rorondun to the Deputy Director (Plans) that: asic problem in the PM field ls the delineation of responsibility between tbe Agency and the military services. In our view, the Clandestine Services tends to assume responsibilities beyond its capabilities and does not give sufficient consideration to the ability of other Departments of the Government to conduct or participate in these operations."

5 survey of the then Psychological and Paramilitary Operations Staff warned against the by-passing of this staff by tbe operating divisions, who were dealing directly with the Deputy Director (Plans) and tbe Director of Central Intelligence instead. In1 the survey of the Covert Action Staff again warned against ignoring the staff and falling to utilise its services.

The9 survey of tbe Deputy Director (Plans) organization again stressed the Importance of the functional staffs, particularly In relation to the conduct of complex

operations, and advocated the useask force for covert operations having major International significance.

"Thesehe survey stated, "nay be aimed at tbe overthrowostile regime and may require extensive

paramilitary operations, and clandestine logistics and

air support of substantial magnitude. Such operations must be coordinated with national policyontinuing basis, and may require constant high-level liaison with tbe State Department and tbe White House' To be successful, major covert operations of this nature require the effective mobilisation of all the resources of the DD/P, and ore clearly beyond tbe capabilities of any one area division."

Tbe some survey added that the Caribbean task force located In the WE Division vas planningreat rate, but accomplisbing little because it was too low-level to act decisively or to obtain effective policy guidance from other departments of the Governmentj It did not even Inspire confidence among many seniorfficers. Such task forcesingle divisionoefully inadequate responseroblem of major national significance. Ccsnand ofask force mustull-time Job, and tbe task force commander must be of sufficient stature to deal directly vith tbe Under Secretary of State or with other senior officials of tbe government as tbe need arises."

The sane survey also discussed the management problea in therea at length, andumber of reccaaseadations which are on record. Among other things. It pointed out the confusion as to the relationship and functions of the three top officers.

The study of tbe Cuban operation shows that these criticisms and many others discussed in previous Inspector General surveys are still valid and worthy of review. But the Cuban operation, ln addition to demonstrating old weaknesses again, also showed Agency weaknesses not clearly discerned before.

The Inspector General,esult cf his study of the Cuban operation, makes the following recomaendatIons regarding future Agency Involvement in covert operations which have major International significance and which may profoundly affect the course of world events:

Such an operation should be carried outarefully selected task force, under tbe commandenior official of statureull-time basis, and organisationally outside thetructure but drawing upon all the resources of tbe Clandestine Services.

The Agency should request that such projects should be transferred to the Department of Defense when they show signs of becoming overt or beyond Agency capabilities.

.

a

3* The Agency shouldrocedure under which the Board of National Estimates or other body similarly divorced from clandestine operations would be required to evaluate all plans for such major covert operations, drawing on all available intelligence and estimating the chances of success froa an intelligence point of view.

4. The Agency shouldigh-level board of senior officers from its operational and support components, plus officers detailed from the Pentagon and the Department of State, to make cold, bard appraisals at recurring intervals of the chances of success of major covert projects from an operational point of view.

echanism should be established for communicating these Intelligence and operational appraisals to the makers of national policy.

6. Inechanism should be established to communicate to the Agency the national policy bearing on such projects, and the Agency should not undertake action until clearly defined policy bas been received.

7- The Agency should improve its system for the guided collection of information essential to the planning and carrying out of such projects.

8. Tbe Agency should take immediate steps to eliminate tbe deficiencies In its clandestine air and maritime operations.

9> The Agency should toko steps to Improve Its employees' competence ln foreign languages, knowledge of foreign areas, and capability ln dealing with foreign people, when such skills are necessary.

10. The Agency shouldore orderly system for the assignment of employees within therea than that currently ln use.

0

A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTIOH AGAIMST THE CASTRO REODC

Objective: Tho purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime vlth one more devoted to the true Interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to. Inanner as to avoid any appearance. intervention. Essentially the method of accomplishing this end vlll be to Induce, support, and so far as possible direct action, both Inside and outside of Cuba, by selected groups of Cubansort that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative. risis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be provoked by circumstances beyond control of. before the covert action program has accomplished its objectivej every effort will be made to carry it out inay asto improve the capability of. to actrisis.

Summary Outline: The program contemplates four major courses of action:

a. The first requirement ls the creation of aappealing and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime, publicly declared as such and therefore necessarily located

outside of Cube. It Is hoped that within oneolitical entity can be formed In the ohapeouncil or junta, through the merger of three acceptable opposition groups with which the Central Intelligence Agency Is already In contact. The council will be encouraged to adopt as Its slogan "Restore thetoolitical position consistent with that slogan, snd to address itself to the Cuban people as anpolitical alternative to Castro. This vocal opposition wlllt serveagnet for the loyalties of then actuality conduct and direct various opposition activities; and provide cover for other ccmpartmented CIA controlled operations. (Tab A)

b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis of popular support undermined, it Is necessary to develop the means for mass communication to the Cuban people soowerful propaganda offensive can be initiated In the name of the declared opposition. The major tool proposed to be used for this purposeong and short wave gray broadcasting facility, probably to be located on Swan Island. Tho target date for its completion is two months. This will be supplemented by broadcasting. commercial facilities paid for by private Cuban groups and by tbe clandestine distribution of written material inside the country. (Tab B)

Is already in progress in the creation ofintelligence and action organization within Cubabe responsive to the orders and directions of the etwork must have effectivebe selectively manned to minimize the risk ofeffective organization can probably be created within Its role will be to provide hard intelligence, tothe illegal infiltration and exflltration of individuals,

to assist in the internal distribution of Illegal propaganda, and to plan and organize for the defection of key individuals and groups as directed.

have already been made for theof an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba,mechanisms for the necessary logistic support ofoperations on tbe Island. adre ofbe recruited after careful screening and trained asinstructors. econdumber ofwill be trained at secure locations outside of.

so as to be available for Immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance. The creation of this capability will

inimum of six months and probably closer to eight. In theimited air capability for resupply and for Infiltration and exfiltratl on already exists under CIA control aad can be rather easily expanded if and when tbe situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel thismall air resupply capability under deep coverommercial operation in another country.

3' leadership! It Is Important to avoiddivisive rivalry among the outstanding Cubanfor the senior role in the opposition. effort will be made to have an eminent,uncontentious chairman selected. The emergence

uccessor to Castro should follow careful assessment of tbe various personalities active in the opposition to Identify the one who can attract, control, and lead the several forces. As the possibility of an overthrow of Castro becomes more imminent, the Benior leader must be. support focused upon him, and his build up undertaken.

Coverl Au- actions undertaken by CIA in support and on behalf of the opposition council will, of course, beas activities of that entity (insofar as tbe actions become publicly known at all). The CIA will, however, have to

_mLm^BbmmnBm%ammmmmtmmWftk9

5

have direct contactsertain number of Cubans and, to protect these, vlll make usearefully screened group. businessmentated Interest In Cuban affairs and desire to support the opposition. They will set ae asmmammmmma. channel for guidance and support to tbeof the opposition under controlled conditions. CIA personnel will he documented as representatives of this group. In order to strengthen the cover it is hoped that substantial funds can be raised from private sources to support the 0 has already1 been pledged. sources. At an appropriateond Issue viU be floated by tbe council (as an obligationuture Cuban government) to la an

5. Budgeti It is anticipated that approximatelyof, CIA funds will be required for the above program.On the assumption that it vlll not reach its culmination earlieronths froa nov, the eotimated requirements forunds0 vitb the balance0 required In The distribution of coots between fiscal years could, of course, be greatly altered by policy decisions or unforeseen contingencies which compelled accelerated paramilitary (Tab C)

Hfr^lfBT"

i 11

6. Recoaaendatlor.fi: That the Central Intelligence Agency be authorized to undertake the above outlined program and to withdrew the fundi; required for this purpose as net forth in paragraphroa the Agency's Reserve for contingencies.

THE POLITICAL OPPOSTHOB

is already In close touch with three reputablegroups (the Montecrlsti, Autentico Party and theFront). These all meet tbe fundamentalto. they are for the revolutionbeingh of Julyare not identified with either Batista or Trujillo. ant1-Castro because of his failure to live up to tbeof July platform and his apparent willingness to sell out

to Communist domination and possible ultimate enslavement. These groups, therefore, fit perfectly the planned opposition slogan of "Restore the Revolution".

opposition Council or Junta viU be formeddays from representatives of theae groups augmentedrepresentatives of other groups. It lsixed platform for the Council but the Caracasof8umber of exploitableof the CIA group leaders were signers of tbe Manifesto. points are suggestedew possibilities:

a. The Castro regime Is the new dictatorship of Cuba subject to strong Slno-Soviet influence.

PROPAfiANTlA

and trsnsmlsslon of opposition viewsbegun. Private opposition broadcasts. purchasetime by private Individuals) have occurred lawave) and ajrangements have been made with Stationadditional broadcasts from MaesBchusetts (short wave)(broadcast band). ^[

agreed to the use of coxae rcial stations for short

* vave broadcasts froaas

furnished support to these efforts through encouragement, negotiating help and providing some broadcast material.

tbe major voice of the opposition, it lsestablish at least onecontrolled station. probably be on Swan Island and will employ bothand broadcast band equipment of substantialpreparation of scripts will be done in. andbe transmitted electronically to the site forsome experience and as the operation progresses, itdesirable to supplement the Swan Island station withone other to ensure fully adequate coverage of allCuba, most especially the Havana region. Such on additional

facility might be Installed. base in the Bahamas or temporary use might be madehlpborne station if it is desired to avoid "gray" broadcasting froa Florida.

3. Hevspapers are also being supported and further support Is planned for tbe future. eading Cuban daily (Zayaa1as been confiscated as has El Nundo, another Cuban dally. Dlarlo de la Marina, one of the hendBphere's outstanding conservative dallies published in Havana, is having difficulty and may have to close soon. Arrangements havebeen made to print Avance weekly in. forinto Cuba clandestinely and mailing throughoutegular basin. As other leading newspapers are expropriated, publication of "exile" editions will be considered.

k. InsideIA-controlled action group ls producing and distributing anti-Castro and antl-Cosminist publications regularly. CIA is in contact with groups outside Cuba who win be assisted in producing similar materials for clandestine introduction into Cuba.

5. Two prominent Cubans are on lecture tours ln latin America. They will be followed by others of equal calibre. The mission of these men will be to gain hemisphere support for the opposition to Castro. Controlled Western Hemisphere assets

FINANCIAL ANTtEX

I. Political of Opposition Elements

end other Group Propaganda

Radio Operations and(includingof

Press and

III- Paramilitary

In-Exfiltration Maritime and Air

Support Material and

IV. Intelligence

figures are based on the assumption that majorwill not occur until ifeason of policy decisions or other contingencies over which the Agency cannot exercise control, the action program should be accelerated, additional funds will be required.

r,

i-r

COPY

I

CUBA

mACKGBCUSD: ear ago tbe Agency vas directed to set In action tbe organizationroadly based opposition to tbe Castro regime and the development of propaganda channels, clandestine agent nets vltbin Cuba, and trained paramilitary ground and air forces wherewith that opposition could overthrov the Cuban regime. The concept vas that this should be So far asuban operation, though it vas veil understood tbat support in many forms vould have to come from the united States. Great progress bas been made In this undertaking. overnment-ln-2xlle will soon be formed embracing most reputable opposition elements. It willeft-of-center political orientation and should comand tbe support of liberals both within Cuba and throughout the hemisphere. It vlll sponsor and increasingly control trained and combat-ready military forces based In Central America. ecision must soon be made as to the support (if any) the united States will render the opposition henceforth.

2. PROSPECTS FOR THF. CASTRO REGIME: The Castro regime is steadily consolidating its control over Cuba. Assuming that the United States applies political and economic pressures at roughly present levels of severity. It will continue to do so

iii in

u

regardless of declining popular support. There is no significant likelihood that the Castro regime will fall of its own weight.

regime is proceeding nsthodlcally tocontrol over all the major institutions of tbeto employ them on tbe Communist pattern asrepression. The Government now directly controlstelevision, and thet has placedleadership ln labor unions, student groups,organizations. It has nationalisedand financial enterprises and ia usingof so-called land reform to exerciseover the peasantry. It bas destroyed allexcept tbe Communist party. PoliticallyIncreasingly effective internal security andare being built up.

is In economic difficulties but thewill almost certainly take whatever steps areforestall any decisive intensification of thesedislocations will occur but will not lead toor tbe significant weakening of the Castro regime.

tbe present time the regular Cubanespecially tbe Navy and Air Force, are of

extremely low effectiveness. Within the next few months, however. It ls expected that Cuba will begin to take delivery of jet aircraft and will begin to hare available trained Cuban pilots of known political reliability. During the same period the effectiveness of ground forces will be increasing and their knowledge of newly acquired Soviet weapons will Improve. Therefore, after some date probably no more than six months away it will become militarily Infeaslble totbe Castro regime except through the commitment to combatizeable organised military force. The option of action by the Cuban opposition will no longer be open.

KATURE OFBAT: Cuba will, of course, neverirect military threat to the United States and It is unlikely that Cuba would attempt open invasion of any other Latin American country since the U.ould and almost certainly would enter the conflict on the side of tbe invaded country, meverthe-less, as Castro further stabilizes bis regime, obtains more sophisticated weapons, and further trains tbe militia, Cuba will provide on effective and solidly defended base for Soviet operations and expansion of Influence In tbe Western Be ml sphere. Arms, mosey, organizational and other support can be provided from Cuba toleaders snd groups throughout latin America In order to create political instability, encourage Ccmmuninm, weaken the

prestige of thend foster the Inevitable popular support that Castro's continuance of power will engender. ational Estimate states: "For the Cccasunist powers, Cuba represents an opportunity of incalculable value. More Importantly, the advent of Castro has provided the Communistsriendly base for propaganda and agitation throughout tbe rest of Latin America andighly exploitable example of revolutionary achievement and successful defiance of tbe United States."

k. POSSIBLE COURSES UK ACTION: For reasons which require no elaboration the overt use of U. S. military forces to mount an invasion of Cuba has been excludedractical alternative. Broadly defined the following three possible alternative courses of action remain for consideration:

of economic and politicalvith continued covert support of sabotage andactions but excluding substantial commitmentCuban opposition's paramilitary force.

of the paramilitary force but in awould not have tbe appearance of an invasion ofthe outside.

of the paramilitary force in athe installation under its protection on Cubantbe opposition government and either tbe rapid spread of

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the revolt or the continuation of large scale guerrilla action

ln terrain suited for that purpose. These alternatives are discussed in the following praragraphs.

5- DIPLOMATIC AMD ECONOMIC PRESSURE: There Is little that can be done to Impose real political and economic pressure on the Castro regime and no such course of action now under seriousseems likely to bring about its overthrow.

true blockade of Cuba enforced by the Unitedinvolve technical acts of war and has now beenInfeaslble.

to halt arms shipments from Cuba intopart of tbe hemisphere would be cumbersome and easily

if air transport were employed. While undoubtedly of

some value It is difficult to see that the institution of such measures would either impose severe pressure on the Castro regime or effectively insulate the rest of the hemisphere from It. Castro's principal tools of subversion are people, ideology, the force of example and) money. The flow of these items cannot be dammed up.

economic sanctions are theoreticallycan quite readily be offset by an increase of tradeBloc.

d. In any event, it is estimated tnat the prospects for effective International action are poor.

6. THB MIDDLE COURSE: Careful study has been given to tho possibility of Infiltrating the paramilitary force gradually to an assembly point In suitable terrain, hopefully avoiding major encounters In the process and committing It to extensive guerrilla action. This course of action vould have the advantageingle majorvhich could be described as' an invasion. The Infiltration phase would take on the coloration of efforts by small groups of Cubans to Join an already existing resistance movement. Unfortunately, it has been found to be infeaslble on military grounds. Basically the reasons (explained more fully in the attachment) are:

is considered militarily infeaslble tosmallorce of this sizeingle area' whereassemble, receive supplies, and engage laaction. Such aa operation would have to bea period of time and tbe loss of the element ofinitial infiltrations would permit government forcesfurther reinforcements to the same area.

units significantly smaller thanpresently undergoing unit training would falltbecritical mass" required to give anyof success. Smaller scale infiltrations would not

sychological effect sufficient to precipitate general uprisings of wide-spread revolt among disaffected elements of Castro's armed forces.

c. Actually, the least costly and most efficient vay to Infiltrate the forceerrain suitable for protracted and powerful guerrilla operations would beingle landing of the whole force as currently planned and Its retirement from tho landing point into tbe chosen redoubt.

T. AWDTNO DC FORCE; The Joint Chiefs of Staff hare .

i

evaluated tho military aspects of the planaaaJag byopposition. They have concluded tbat "this plan has aof ultimate success" (that ls ofajorsuccessful revolt against Castro) and tbat. If ultimate

success ls not achieved there is every likelihood tbat tbe landing can be tbe means of establishing in favorableowerful guerrilla force which could be sustained almost Indefinitely. Tbe latter outcome would not be (and need not appearerious defeat. It would be tbe means of exerting continuing pressure on the regime and wouldontinuing demonstration of Inability of the regime to establish order. It could create an opportunity for an OAS Intervention toease-fire and hold elections.

a. Any evaluation of tbe chances of success of tbe assault force should be realistic about tbe fighting qualities

of the militia. No definitive conclusions can be advanced but it must be remembered that the majority of the militia ore not fighters by instinct or background and are not militiamen by their own choice. Their training has been alight and they have never been exposed to actual fire {particularly any heavy fire power) nor to air attack. Moreover, the instabilities within Cuba are such that If the tide shifts against the regime, the chances are .strong that substantial numbers will desert.or change

Is no doubt that the paramilitary forcewidely assumed to be U. S. supported. Nevertheless,vould be difficult to prove and the scale ofwould not be inconsistent with thesupport by private Cuban and American groups ratherthe U. S. Government. It must be emphasibed,'this enterprise would have nothing in common (asuse of U. S. military forces) with the RussianHungary or the Chinese suppression of tbe Tibetans. orce of dissident Cubans with Cuban politicalleadership.

would be adverse political repercussions toin force but it ia not clear how serious these Most latin American Governments would at least privately

approve of unobtrusive U.upport for such anespecially if the political coloration of thele ft-of-center. The reaction of the rest of theIt ls estimated, would be minimal in the caseU. S. support for such an attempt. Ita good deal of cynicism throughout tbe vorldU. S. role but if quickly successful little Generally speaking it is believed tbat thewould be low in the eventairly .quick success. Thedangers flowing froa long continued largewarfare would be greater but there arethat could be made to forestall extremein this,

ISSOLUTION OF THE MILITARYecision not to use the paramilitary force must consider the problem of dissolution, since its dissolution will surely be tho only alternative if it is not used vlthin the next four to six weeks. It is hoped that at least one hundred volunteers could be retained for infiltration in small teams but it ls doubtful whether more than this number would be available or useful for tbls type of activity.

a. There ls no doubt tbat dissolution in and of Itself willlow to v. S. prestige as it will be interpreted In many Latin American countries and elsewhere as evidence of

tbe U. S. Inability to take decisive action with regard to Castro. David will again hare defeated Goliath. Antl-U. S. regimes like that of Trujillo would gain strength while pro-U. S. Betancourt would undoubtedly- suffer. Surely Tdigoras, who has been an exceedingly strong ally, would also be placedery difficult position forupportisbanded effort. It must be remembered in tbls connection that there are sectors of Latin American opinion which criticise tbe D. s. for not dealing sufficiently forcefully with the Castro regime. In fact, one reason why many latin Americanare holding back In opposing Castro Is because they feel tbat sooner or later the TJ. S. will be compelled to take strong measures.

b. The resettlement of the military force willcause practical problems. Its members will be angry, disillusioned and aggressive with the Inevitable result tbat they will provide honey for the press bees and tbe U. S. will have to face the resulting indignities and embarrassments. Perhaps more Important, however, will be tbe loss of good relations with tbe opposition Cuban leaders. Tb date almost all Don-Batista, non-Communist political leaders have been encouraged or offered help in fightingn abandonment of the military force will be considered by them aa a

withdrawal of all practical support. In view of tbe breadth of the political spectrum Involved, this will cause seme difficulties for the future since it is bard to Imagine any acceptable post-Castro leadership that will not Include seme of the exiles dealt with during the past year. 9-

position Is daily getting stronger wndbe consolidated to the point that his overthrow willpossible by drastic, politically undesirable actionsan all-out embargo or an overt use of military .force.

failure to remove Castro by external actionln the near future to the elimination of all internalCuban opposition of any effective nature. continuance of the Castro regime will be afor tbe Slno-Sovlet Bloc which will use Cuba as aincreased activity throughout the Westernaccentuating political Instability andnd influence.

Cuban paramilitary force, if used, has aof overthrowing Castro or at the very least causingcivil war without requiring the U. S. toto overt action against Cuba. hough deniable) D. S. support may cause, it

say veil be considerably leas than that resulting from tbe continuation of tbe Castro regime or from the more drastic and more attributable actions necessary to accomplioh the resultater date.

d. Even though the best estimate of likely Soviet reactionuccessful movement against Castro Indicates problems to the U. S. arising from the removal or substantial weakening of the Castro regime, Soviet propaganda and political mores will still be much less prejudicial to the long-range interests of the U. fl. than would the resultsailure to remove Castro.

A. CIAHDESTDtE PfflLTftATICH BY SEA OP SHALLTOSN)

Tbe only areas of Cuba with mountainous terrain of sufficient extent and ruggedaess for guerrilla operations are tbe Sierra Escambray of La Villas Province in Central Cuba and the Sierra Maestra of Oriente Province at the eastern extremity of tbe Island. The Sierra de les Orgnnoe of Western Cuba do not encompass sufficient area and are not rugged enough to sustain guerrilla operations against strong opposition. Of tho tvo areas wtth adequate terrain, only the Sierra Escambray Is truly suitable for our purposes, since the mountains In Eastern Cuba are too distant from air bases in Latin America available to CIA for air logistical support operations. Primary reliance would have to be placed on this method of supply for guerrilla forces.

The Government of Cuba (GOC) has concentrated largo forces of army and militia in both Las Villas and Oriente Provinces. Estimates of troop strength in Las Villas have varied recently0 to as high0 men, while up0 men are believed to be stationed In Oriente.

While of dubious efficiency and morale, tbe militia, by sheer weight of numbers has been able to surround and

eliminate small groups of Insurgents. anding byen of the Mnaferrer Group In Oriente, for example, was pursued and eliminatedl litis. imilar group of Insurgents In Western Cuba, was attacked and destroyed by six battalions of army and mllltluen).

k. uild-up of forceiven area by Infiltration of small groups voulderies of night Tawing* la the same general vicinity. Discovery of tbe Initialy GOC forces would beertainty, since security posts are located at all possible landing areas. Even if the Initial landing were successful, tbe GOC could be expected to move troops and naval patrol craft to the area making further landings difficult If not Impossible. Any small force landed, experience bas shown, will be rapidly engaged by forces vastly superior in numbers. Therefore, it is considered unlikely tbat small groups landing on successive occasions would succeed In Joining forces later. eries of surrounded pockets of resistance would be tbe result.

5. Repeated approaches to tbe Cuban coast by vessels large enough to land up toen would probably provoke attack by the Cuban Bavy and/or Air Force, either of which is capable of destroying any vessels which could be used by CIA for these purposes.

6. In the Sierra Eoeambray, which is the only area of Cuba in which true guerrilla operations are now being conducted, ill-equipped and untrained groups of upen have been bard pressed to survive and have been unable to conduct effective operations. The only worthwhile accomplishment of these bands has been to serveymbol of resistance. Smaller groups, even though better trained and equipped, could not be expected to be effective. .

7- There are very few sites on the south coast of the Sierra Escambray where small boats can be landed. These are found principally at the mouths of rivers and are "Ti guarded by militia posts armed with machine guns. mall group landing atoint by shuttlingarger vessel in small boats would probably receive heavy casualties.

8. Small-scale infiltrations would notsychological effect sufficient to precipitate general uprisings and widespread revolt among disaffected elements of Castro's armed forces. These conditions must be produced before the Castro Government can be overthrown by any means short of overt intervention by United States armed forces. As long as the armed forces respond to Castro's orders, he can maintain himself in power indefinitely. The history of all police-type states bears out this conclusion.

9- The CIA Cuban Aseault Force, composed entirely of volunteers, has been trained for actionompact, heavily amed, hard-bitting allltary unit, and tbe troops are aware of tbe combat power which they possessnit. They have been Indoctrinated ln the military principle of mass and instructed tbat dispersion of force leads to defeat in detail. They will be quick to recognise the disadvantages of the infiltration concept, and it Is unlikely that all would volunteer for piecemeal commitment to military action in Cuba. The troops can be used in combat onlyoluntary basis. The Government of the united States exercises no legal command or disciplinary authority over them.

CXMCLUSIOKS:

This course of action would result in large scale loss of life, both through allltary action against forces vastly superior in numbers andesult of drum-head Justice and firing squad execution of those captured.

This alternative could achieve no effective military or psychological results.

arch 6l

PROPOSED OPERATION AGAINST CUBA

1. Status of Preparatcry Action: ear ago tha Agency vas directed to set in Motion: the organisationroadly-based opposition to tbe Castroajor propaganda campaign; support for both peaceful and violent resistance activities in Cuba; and the development of trained paramilitary ground and air forces of Cuban volunteers.

ecision saould shortly be made as to the future of these activities and the employment or disposition of assets tbat have been created. The status of the more Important activities is as follovs:

a. Political: eriod ofear, the FRD (Frente Revoluclonariohich vas created in the hope tbat it would become tbe organizational embodimentnified opposition to Castro, has proved to be highly usefulover and administrative mechanism but important political elements refused to Join it.

ajor effort vas undertaken three weeks ago toore broadly-based revolutionary council which would include tbe FRD, and which could lead to the setting uprovisional government. Considerable progress has been made In

negotiations with the principal Cuban leaders In which great efforts have been Bade to permit the Cubans to chart their own course- It Is expected that the desired result will be accomplished shortly. Vhat is emerging from these negotiationsrovisional governmententer to left-of-center political orientation,olitical platform embodying most of the originally stated goals of theuly movement. It ls believed that this willthe supportery large majority of on tl-Castro Cubans although it will not be altogether acceptable to the moregroups.

b. Military: The following paramilitary forces have been recruited and trained and will shortly be ln an advanced state of readiness.

A reinforced battalionresent strengthhich will be brought uptrength ofhrough tbe addition of one more infantry company to be used primarily for logistic purposes andeserve.

A briefly trained paramilitary force ofntended to be usediversionary night landing to be undertaken In advance of commitment of the battalion.

(3) An air force of6 light bombers,.

('0 ShippingontonCDs andCS team recently Inspected the battalion and the air force at their bases in Guatemala. Their findings led them to conclude that these forces could be combat-readypril. Certain deficiencies were indicated that are in progress of correction partly by further training and partly by the recruitment of the additional infantry company referred to above.

c. Timing: It will be infeasible to hold all these forces together beyond early April- They are in large part volunteers, some of whom have been in hard training, quartered in austere facilities for as much as six months. Their motivation for action is high but their morale cannot be maintained if their commitnent to action is long delayed- Tbe onset of the rainy season in Guatemala in April would greatly accentuate this problem and the Guatemalan Government is in any event unwilling to have them remain in the country beyond early April. The rainy season In Cuba would elso make their landing on the island more difficult.

ne Situation in Cuba:estimateime is against us- The Castro regime is steadily consolidating its control over Cuba. In tbe absense of greatly increased external pressure or

action. It will continue to do so regardless of declining popular support as tbe machinery of authoritarian control becomes Increasingly effective.

regime ls proceeding methodically to solidifyover all the major institutions of the society andthem on the Communist pattern as Instruments ofGovernment now directly controls all radio, television,press. It has placed politically dependable leadershipunions, student groups, and professional organisations. nationalized most productive and financial enterprises anda program of so-called land reform to exerciseover the peasantry. It has destroyed all political

except the Communist party. Politically reliable and

increasingly effective internal security and military forces are being built up.

la still much active opposition in Cuba. Ittbat there are0 active guerrillas andindividuals engaging in various acts of conspiracytbe tempo of which has been rising in recentthe government has shown considerable skilland counter-espionage. It Isgood use ofagainst guerrilla activities and the infiltrationand hardware. The mllltla ls relatively untrained and

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there la evidence that its morale is low but the government is able to use very large numbers against small groups of guerrillas and ls able to exercise surveillance of suspicious activities throughout tbe island. Short of some shock that vlll disorganise or bring about the defection of significant parts of the militia, it must be anticipated tbat violent opposition of all kinds will gradually be suppressed.

c. At tbe present time the regular Cuban military establishment, .especially the Havy and Air Force, are of extremely low effectiveness. Within the next few months, however, it is expected that Cuba will begin to take delivery of Jet aircraft and will begin to have available trained and veil indoctrinated Cuban pilots. During the same period the effectiveness of ground forces will be increasing and their knowledge of newly acquired .Soviet weapons will improve. Therefore, after some date, probably no more than six months away it will probably become militarily infeaslble to overthrow the Castro regime except through the commitment to combatore sizeable organized military force than can be recruited from among the Cuban exiles.

3- Possible Courses of Action; Four alternative courses of action involving tbe commitment of tbe paramilitary force described above arc discussed in succeeding paragraphs. They are:

a. Employment of the paramilitary forceanner which would minimize the appearance of an invasion of Cuba from the outside.

b. Commitment of tbe paramilitary forceurprise landing with tactical air support, the installation under its protection on Cuban soil of the opposition government and either the rapid spread of tbe revolt or the continuation of large scale guerrilla action ln terrain suited for that purpose.

e. Commitment of the paramilitary force in twooperations: First, the landing of one companysupportemote area in which it could sustain itselfdays (hopefullynd second, the landing offorce forty-eight hours lateridely differentthe same manner as in paragraph

d. Commitment of tbe whole force ln an inaccessible region where it would be expected to keep controleachheadong period of time to permit installation and recognitionrovisional governmentradual build-up of military strength.

a. Covert Landing of the Paramilitary Forces: Careful study bas been given to the possibility of infiltrating the paramilitary forcesight amphibious landing, using man-portable equipment and weapons and taking ashore only such supplies as can bo carried by the troops. Tho force would move immediately in-land to tho mountains and commence operationsowerful guerrilla force relying entirely upon continuing air logistical support. Shipping

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would retire I'rom the coast before dawn and no tacticol airwould be conducted. Unfortunately, It Is believed that such an operation would Involve unacceptable allltary risks.

paramilitary force would run the risk ofdisorganized and scatteredight landing. operation is very difficult for even highly trainedamphibious operations.)

force would not have motor transport, heavymm recoiling rifles, heavy machine guns, nor tanks. Initial,and food supplies would be limited and It would beon air logistical support. If the rainy seasonApril, overcast conditions could prevent effectivecould not be evacuated.

e. Since tactical aircraft would not participate, the objective area could not be isolated; enemy forces could move against the beachhead unimpeded. Tbe Castro Air Force would be left Intact.

5- Andlng in Full Force: This operation would Involve an amphibious/airborne assault with concurrent (but no prior) tactical air support, toeachhead contiguous to terrain suitable for guerrilla operations. The provisional government would land as soon as the beachhead had been secured. If initial military operations were successful and especially If there were evidence

of spreading disaffection against the Castro regime, the provisional government could be recognisedegal basis provided for at least non-governmental logistic support.

military plan contemplates the holding ofaround tbe beachhead area. It Is believed thatby the Castro militia, even if conducted Incould be repulsed with substantial loss to tbe The scale of the operation and the display ofand of determination on the part of the assaultit ls hoped, demoralize tbe militia and Induceimpair the recuatle of the Castro regime, andrebellion. If tbe Initial actions proved to bein thusajor revolt, the assaultretreat to the contiguous mountain area andowerful guerrilla force.

course of actionetter chance thanof leading to the prompt overthrow of the Castroit holds the possibility of administering a

this operation were not successful in settingrevolt, freedom of action of the U. S. would bebecause there ls an alternative outcome which wouldU. S. intervention norerious defeat)

guerrilla action could be continuedizeable scale in favor* able terrain. This wouldf exerting continuingon tbe regime.

6. iverslonary Landing: ariant of tbo abovewould be feasible to conduct awith a

force ofen in an Inaccessible areareludeanding of the main assault force. The initial operation would be conducted at night without tactical air support. Atart of tho provinlonal government would go in with tbelanding and presumably tbe establishment of the pro visional government on Cuban noil would thereupon be announced. Tbelanding of the main assault force would be carried out as outlined Inreceding.

course of action might have certainin tbat the initial action in the campaign would becharacter that could plausibly hove been carried out bywith little outside help.

wouldilitary advantage In thatlanding would distract attention and possiblyenemy forces from the objective area for the mainreports bad reached the Castro government that troopsGuatemala were on the move, tbe diversionarymighttaken to be the main attack thus enhancing tbe element of

surprise for the main assault force. These advantages would be counterbalanced by the diversion of troops otherwise supporting the main unit.

7- Landing and Slow Build-up: Under this fourth alternative tbe whole paramilitary force could carryanding andeachhead in the most remote and inaccessible terrain on tbe Island with intent to hold indefinitely an area thus protected by geography against prompt or well-supported attacks from the land. This would permit the installation there of the provisionalits recognition by the U. S.ecent interval, and (ifong period of build-up during which additional volunteers and military supplies would be moved into the beachhead.

major political advantage of this course ofbe that the Initial assault might be conducted in such ato Involve less display of relatively advanced weaponry andmilitary organization than the landing in forceabove, especially so as there is every likelihood thatlanding would be virtually unopposed by landcoulduitable political and legal basisprotracted build-up after the initial assault.

an operation would, however, require tacticalsufficient to destroy or neutralize the Castro Airthis were not provided concurrently with the landing, it would

be needed noon thereafter ln order to permit ships to operate into the beachhead and the planned build-up to go forward. If the initial landing could Include seizure of an air strip, the neceBsary air support could fairly soon be provided from within the territory controlled by friendly forces. There is, however, no location which bothseable airstrip and is so difficult of access by land aa to permit protectionlow build-up.

c. This type of operation by the very fact of being clandestine in nature and remote geographically would have far less initial impact politically and militarily than courses two or three.

8. Conclusions:

Castro regime will not fall of its own weight.

In tbe absence of external action against it, tbe gradual weakening of internal Cuban opposition must be expected.

a matter of months tbe capabilities offorces will probably increase toegree thatof his regime, from within or without the country,Cuban opposition will be most unlikely.

c. The Cuban paramilitary force if effectively usedood chance of overthrowing Castro, or ofamaging civil war, without the necessity for the United States to commit itself to overt action against Cuba.

d. Among the alternative course of action here reviewed an assault in force precedediversionary landing offers the best chance of achieving the desired result.

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l-President fchrono

2-Sec. State fcestroyed -V. Pres. fcestroyed -Adolphestroyed

5-Thomas Mann State fcestroyed

6-Sec.estroyed

etained

8-McGeorgeetained

Vn.Gen.Mr.ubJ.ubaDestroyed

I

1

REVISED CUBAM OPERATION

1. Political Requirements: planuban operation and the variants thereof presented onarch were considered to be politically objectionable on the ground that theoperation would not have the appearance of anof guerrillas in support of an internal revolution but rather thatmall-scale Worldype of smphihious assault. In undertaking to develop alternative plans and" to Judge their political acceptability, it has been necessary to infer from the comments made on the earlier planew plan should possess in order to be politically acceptable. They would appear to be the following:

a. An Unspectacular Landing: The Initial landing

*v v"

should be as unspectacular as possible and should have

neither immediately prior nor concurrent tactical air

support. It should conform as closely as possible to the

typical pattern of the landings of snail groups intended

to establish themselves or to Join others in terrain

suited for guerrilla operations. In the absence of air

support and in order to fit the pattern, it should probably

be at

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copy

or Tactical Air Operations: It waszed tbat ultimate success of tbe operation willair operation* leading to tbe establishment of

the control of the air orer Cuba. In order to fit tbe pattern of revolution, these operations should be conducted from an air base within territory held by opposition forces. Since it is impracticable to undertake construction of an air base in tbe rainy season and before any air support istbe territory seised in the original landing mustan air strip that can support tactical operations.

Tempo: The operation should be sothere could be an appreciable period of build upinitial landing before major offensive action was This would allowinimum decent Intervalthe establishment and the recognition by. of

a provisional government and would fit more closely tbe patternypical revolution.

Warfare Alternative: Ideally, thenot only be protected by geography against promptattack from land but also suitablewarfare in the event that an organizednot be held.

2. Alternative Areas: Flvo different areas, three of them on the mainland of Cuba and two on islands off the coast, were studied carefully to determine whether they would permit an

operation fitting the above conditions. One of the areas appears to be eminently suited for tha operation. All the others had to be rejected either because of unfavorable geography (notably the abeenceuitable air strip) or heavy concentrations of enemy forces, or both. Tho urea selected Is located at the headeil protected deep water estuary on the south coast of Cubs. It is almost surrounded by evampe Impenetrable toin any numbers and entirely Impenetrable to vehicles, except along two narrow and easily defended approaches. Although strategically isolated by these terrain features, tbe area Is near the center of the island and the presence of on opposition force there will soon become known to the entire population of Cuba anderious threat to the regime. The beach-bead area contains one and possibly two air strips adequate tos. There arc several good landing beaches. It is of interest tbat this area bas been the scene of resistance activities end of outright guerrilla varfare forundred years.

3. Phases of the Operation:

a. The operation vlll beginight landing. There are no known enemy forces (even police) in thearea and it is anticipated that the landing can be carried out with fov If any casualties and with no serious

combat. As many supplies aa possible will be unloadedbeaches but the ships viU put to sea in time tooffshore by dawn. The whole beachhead areatbe air strips will be immediately occupiedroutes defended. Ho tanks will be broughttbe Initial landing. It is believed tbat tblsbe accomplished quite unobtrusively and that thewill have little idea of the size of the force-.

second phase, preferably commencing atthe landing, will Involve the movement Intoof tactical aircraft and their promptstrikes against the Castro Air Force. will move In wltb gas in drums, minimaland maintenance personnel. As rapidlythe whole tactical air operation will bethe beachhead but Initially only enough aircraftbased there plausibly to account for all observableover the Island.

the third phase, as soon as there isfor shipping from enemy air attack, shipsback into the beach to discharge supplies and(including tanks). It must be presumed that counter

attacks against the beachhead will be undertaken withino k3 hours of the landing but the perimeter can easily be held against attacks along the most directroutes. The terrain may well prevent any sizeable attacks (providing the enemy air force has been rendered ineffective) until the opposition force is ready to attempt to break out of the beachhead.

d. The timing and direction of such offensive action will depend upon tbe course of events in thet least three directions of break out are possible. Because of tbe canalization of tbe approaches to the beachhead from tbereak out will require close support by tactical air to be successful unless enemy forces ere thoroughly disorganized. The opposition force will have the option, however, of undertaking an amphibious assault with tactical air supportifferent objective area if it should seem desirable.

k. Political Action: Tbe beachhead area proposed to be occupied is both large enough and safe enough so that it should be entirely feasible to Install the provisional government there as soon as aircraft can land safely. Once Installed, the tempo of the operation will permit. Government to extend

recognitionecent interval and thus to prepare the way for nore open and more extensive logistical support if this should be necessary.

p. Military Advantages:

afer military operation than thein force originally proposed. The landingmore likely to be unopposed or very lightly opposed

and the beachhead perimeter could be nore easily held.

are no known communications facilities intarget area. This circumstance, coupledight landing. Increases the chance of

comparison with any of the knownof the Oriente Province the objective area isrear bases for air and sea logistical support.

plan has the disadvantage that the build upcan be only gradual since there is virtually nofrom vhich to recruit additional troopsfrom other parts of Cuba will be able toInto the area only gradually.

olitical Acceptability: The proposal here outlined fits the three conditions stated inbove for the political acceptabilityaramilitary operation. The landing

Is unspectacular; no tactical air support will be provided until an air base of sorts ls active within the beachhead area; th* tempo of tbe operation is as desired; and the terrain Is such as to minimize the rlelc of defeat and maximize the options open to the opposition force.

may be objected that the undertaking ofoperations so promptly after the landing lstbe patternevolution. But most Latinin recent years have used aircraft and Itnatural that they would be used in this case asthe opposition had secured control of an airIn thearamilitary operation iswhatever its tempo, command of the air will soonerhave to be established, and aircraft will have to

be flowneachhead to enable this to be done. Sooner or later, then, it ls bound to be revealed tbat tbein Cuba has friends outside who ore able snd willing to supply it with obsolescent combat aircraft. Thiswill be neither surprising nor out of keeping with traditional practice.

alternative way to handle this problemew strafing runs against the Castro Airdays before the landing and apparently as anunrelated to any other military moves.

7. Conclusion: The operation here outlined, despite the revision of concept to meet the political requirements stated above, vlll stillolitical cost. The study over the post several months of many possible paramilitary operations mokes perfectly clear, hovever, that it is impossible tointo Cuba and commit to action military resources that viUood chance of setting in motion the overthrow of the regime without paying some price in terms of accusations by the Communists and possible criticism by others. It isthat the plan here outlined goes as far as possible in the direction of minimizing the political cost withoutits soundness and chance of successilitary operation. The alternative would appear to be the demobilization of the paramilitary force and the return of its members to the United States. It is, of course, well understood that this course of action too involves certain risks.

f 8)

1

CUBAN OPERATION

1. Orientation and Concept: Tae present concept of the operation being counted to overthrow Castro ls that It Should have the appearancerowing end Increasingly effective internal resistance, helped by the activities of defected Cuban aircraft and by the infiltrationeriod of time and at several places) of weapons and snail groups of sen. External support should appear to be organized and controlled by the Revolutionary Council under Miro Cardona as tbe successorumber of separate groups. To support this picture aod to minimize emphasis on invasion, the following steps have been taken:

public statements of Cardona havethe overthrow of Castro was the responsibility ofthat it must be porformed mainly by the Cubansrather than from outside, and that he and hisorganising this external support free of control byhelp from. Government.

plans for air operations have been codifiedfor operationsimited scalend again

Copy No.

ay Itself Instead of placing reliancearger striketh the landingsay.

after tho first air strikesCuban pilot will land at Miami airport seekingviU state that he defected with twoircraft and tbat they strafed aircraft on tbedeparting.

preliminary diversionary landing of truewill be made In Oriente Province. The mainwill be made by three groups at locationsdistance apart on the coast. These will beone week laterurther guerrilla type landingdel Bio (at tbe western end of the island).

carrying the main forces leave tbeat staggered times. (The first one sailed on They will follow Independent courses tofor the final run-in. Until nearly dusk onwould appear to air observation to be pursuingso there will be no appearanceonvoy.

tho landings will be at night. At leastours, supply activity over the beaches will be There will be no obtrusive "beachhead" to be seen by Most troops will be deployed promptly to positions inland.

2. The Time Toble of the plan la as follows:

staging maintaging

completed night.

vessel sails froa stagingast

vessel departs early mo.

defectionimited air strikes.

landing in Orienteo

landingsoimited air

strikes. nd liaison plane land on seized air strip.

D: Vessels return nighto complete discbarge of supplies.

landing in Pinar del Rio.

3- Diversion or Cancellation: It would now be in feasible to bait the staging and embarkation of the troops. In the eventecision to modify the operational plan or to cancel the operation, ships will be diverted at sea, either to Vieques Island or to ports ln. If cancellation is directed, the troops and ships' officers will be told that the reason for the diversion is that all details of the operation, including time and place of Intended landings, had been blown to tbe Castro regime and that under these circumstances the Landings would be suldical. This explanation would be adhered to after tbe demobilization of the force in. . Government could take the position that this

r

bad been undertaken by the Cubans. Governmental support, that It had failed because of their poor security, and that. could not refuse to grunt asylum to the Cuban volunteers. If by reason of either newrace or policy considerations it Is necessary toajor change in tbe operational plan, it will be necessary to divert to Vieques Island oo that officers of tbe brigade and ships' captains can be assembled ond briefed on the new plan. (The advantages of this location are its security together with the opportunity for tbe troops to be ashore briefly after seme days on board ship.)

*. Naval Protection: The ships carrying tbe main force will receive unobtrusive Tfaval protection up to the time they enter Cuban territorial waters. If they ore attacked they will be protected. Naval vessels but following such anthey would be escorted. port and the force would be demobilized.

5- Defections: Every effort ls being made to induce the

t

defection of individuals of military and political significance. At tbe present time contact has been established by and through Cuban agents and anti-Castro Cuban groups vith soae thirty-one specific military and police officers, including1

An approach la bo log made to There are, of

course. In addition many others rumored to be disaffectedvhom no channel of approach is available. Thothoses not to induce immediate defections butthe Individuals for appropriate'action ln place

'6. Internal Resistance .Mc^ameats: On the latestarensurgents responsive to some degreethrough agents with whom ccamaniicatlans arc f these are in Havana Itself, overOriente,n Las Villas in central Cuba. Forpart, the Individual groupsvery Inadequately

armed. Air drops are currently suspended because available aircraft are tied up ln the movement of troops from theirarea to the staging base. ay when it ls hoped that the effectiveness of the Castro air force will be greatly reduced, it ls planned to supply these groups by daytime air drops. Every effort will be made to coordinate their operations with those of the landing parties. Efforts will be-made also to sabotage or

destroy by air attack the olcrovave links on vhich Castro's cotanunlcatlon system depends. The objective la of course toevolutionary situation. Initially perhaps In Oriente and Las Villas- Provinces, and then spreading to all parts of the island.

7. propaganda and.Communications: Currently medium and short vave broadcasting In opposition to Castro ls being carried on from seven stations In addition to Radio Svon. Antennae modifications of tha latter have Increased its effective power In Cuba and it is believed that there is new good medium vave reception of Svan everywhere except In Havana itself where It can still be effectively jammed. The number of hours ofper day will be Increased beginning Immediately from abouto almostoonay. The combination of multiple long and short vave stations which will then be in use, supplemented by three boats which carry broadcasting equipment (two short wave and one medium wave) will assure heavy coverage of all parts of tbe Island virtually at all times. Radio programs will avoid any reference to on Invasion but will call for up-rising and will of course announce defections and carry news of all revolutionary action. Soonmall radio transmitter will be put in operation on Cuban soil-

aOTf.flilftlJlJir

Political leadership: An of the presentsix members of Cardona's Revolutionary Council,Ray, have reaffirmed their membership. ave been confirmed, tbeare currently under discussion: Varona,Gobernaclonerrllllo, Finance; Be via.Public Health. The political leaders have not yeton the military plan but they will be informed atof military operations. Advance consultation vithleaders Is considered uaacceptably dangerous onand although last minute briefings will be resented. Itthat the political leaders will want to take creditassume control as quickly as possible over theseagainst Castro. The present plan is that ono ofwill go Into Cuba with the main force, othersas soon as possibleay and they will announce

tbe establishmentrovisional Governaent on Cuban soil.

Military command will be exercised In tbethe Revolutionary Council and later of the Provisional Xn fact, however, tbe CIA staff constitutes tbe generalthe operation and the Agency controls both logistics support Accordingly, In the early stages at least, tbe

Qi 0 4*

l

MKMOFAKDIM FOR: Mr. McCone

Survey of tbe Cuban Operation

L. Presented herewithags survey of tbe Cuban operation, together with the moot important basic documents on the operation vhich axe Included, in the five annexes. In this report we have not attempted to go into sn exhaustive step by step inspection of every action In the operation. Nor have ve tried to assess Individual pcrfarnanrc, although our inspection left us with very definite views. Rather, ve have tried to find out what vent wrong, and why, and to present tbe facts and con* elusions as briefly aa possible. This report has been double-spaced for ease in reading. Tbe ten recommendations far corrective action start on page lV8.

2. onducting tbls survey ve reviewed all of the basic files and documents, including all of the material prepared by the Agency for General Maxwell Taylor's Committee, as veil as the minutes of tbat Committee vhich were made available to us. In addition, we conducted extensive Interviews with all of theofficers on the project from the Wfe oa down, and made detailed memccanda for our files on all of thesey meeting with tbe top three officers of tbe Branch reviewing tbe

operation the veek after the landing failed lo reported in someages. Thus, vhiLs the analysis and conclusions presented herewith regarding the operation are those of tbe Inspector Cone rai, the bases for these conclusions are extensively documented in the files.

3. This, in my opinion,air report even though highly critical, unfortunately, there hasendency in the Agency to gloss over CIA's Inadequacies and to attempt to fix all of the blame for the failure of the invasion upon other elements of the Government, rather than to recoffiize the Agency'o weaknesses reflected in thia report. ill make no additional distribution of this report until you indicate whom you wish to have copies. In this connection, the President's ForeignAdvisory Board hasopy in time for Mr. Coyne torief report on It at theireeting. ill await your wishes in this regard.

/s/ Lyman Klrkpatrick Lyman B. Klrkpatrick Inspector General

Attachment

2ft1

MFMCEAKXUM FOR: Director of Central Report on tbe Cuban Operation

1- The report on the Cuban Operation, as in true Of all Inspector General reports, vas prepared Undur ay personal direction and verted on by myself and By deputy, Mr. David Jfclman, aa veil as the three officers vho did the principal collecting of infcrmailcci and preparation of the text: Messrs. | l bbbf-The final editing was done by myself personally and the report represents the vievs of the Inspector General.

In preparing the report ve had access to all of the material prepared by thia agency and submitted to the Taylor Ccmadttce, as veil as the minutes of the Toy Lor Committee meetings,o see their final conclusions and recommendations. In addition to thia vc bad all of the documentaryavailable in the VH Division, VH-ft, and other staffs and divisions of the agency vho had cognizance Of or prepared material for WH-ft. These particularly included OKE, OCI andf the DD/p.

As Is noted particularly In our report, ve did not go outside of the agency ln any respect and tried to confine can- Inspect ion to only internal agency Batters, except vhere reference had to be made

-

to outside actions that affected then Intervieving

persons connected vlth this operation, we talked Initially to three of the top officers in the operation, commencing with Mr. Esterllne and Colonel Hawkins, and having our Initial lengthy discussions with themeek of the operation. We Interviewed all of the appropriate supervisors in the DD/p, starting vlth theimself and IncludingDP/A, Chief, WH, Chiefndther officers and employees directly Involved in the operation. We kept extensive notes and material of all of these discussions vhich are documented in our files.

Iyman B. Klrkpatrick Inspector General

cc: ddci dd/p

: 3

1 I*I

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Report on the Cuban Operation

1. In our conversation on Friday morning, the first of December, you mentioned your concern that tbe Inspector General's Report on the Cuban Operation, taken alone, might give an erroneous Impression as to the extent CIA Is responsible for the failure of the operation. In my opinion the failure of the operation should be charged in order to tbe following factors.

over-all lack of recognition on the part of theas to the magnitude of tbe operation required tothe Fidel Castro regime.

failure on the part of. Government toall contingencies at the time of the Cuban operationnecessity for using. military forces In thethe exiled Cubans could not do the Job themselves.

failure on the part of. Government toto commit to the Cuban operation, as planned andnecessary resources required for Its success.

/b/ Lyman Klrkpatrick Lyman B. Kirkpatrlck Inspector General

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SUBJECT: Tbe Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation

To comment on the subject report in detail would resultaper approaching in length, tbat of tbe survey Itself. ccnentary would have to deal in depth with the aim of the survey, its scope, and the method used In compiling it. ccnentary would,arge number of pages, be required to note Inaccuracies, omissions, distortions, unsupported allegations, and many erroneous conclusions.

A detailed inquiry on tbe Cuban operation on elements other than clandestine tradecraft, has already been completed by the group beaded by General Taylor. General Taylor's report was based on testimony by all the principal officers involved In the Cuban operation. Tbe Inspector General's report is not based on complete testimony; some of Its conclusions are In conflict with General Taylor's conclusions.

It Is not clear what purpose the Inspector General's report Is Intended to serve. If it is intended primarily as an evaluation of the Agency's role, it is deficient, neither Mr. Dullesas consulted in tbe preparation of the Inspector General's report.esult, there are many unnecessary Inaccuracies.

The report tries to do both too much and too little.

On the one hand, it attempts to describe tbe processes of national security policy-making as though thisrocess in logical deduction likeroblem in geometry. According to tbe Inspector General's account, firm propositions should be laid down in writing and In advance from which correct conclusions as to proper actions must Inevitably be drawn. In thia respect the report goes far beyond an analysis of the Agency's role, and It is not accurate. It tries to do too much.

on the other hand, the report treats the preparations for the april landings as if theae were the only activities directed against castro and bis influence throughout the henlsphere and the world. it chooses to ignore all other facets of tbe agency's intelligence collection and covert actions program which preceded, accompanied, and have followed the landings in aprilI. thus, it does too little.

the report misses objectivityide margin. in unfriendly bands, it caneapon unjustifiably to attack the entire mission, organization, and functioning of tbe agency. it fails to cite the specific achievements of persons associated with tbeandicture of unmitigated and almost willful bumbling and disaster.

in its present form, this isseful report for anyone inside or outside the agency. if complete analysis beyond tbat already accomplished by general taylor and his group ls still required,ew kind of report is called for,report with clear terms of reference based on complete testimony. eport could concentrate on clandestine tradecraft, an asset for which the agency remains uniquely responsible.

/s/ c. p. cabell c. p. cabell general, USAF deputy director

W iii ci*

Original document.

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