Created: 2/16/1962

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible



MEMORANDUM FORI At* si slant to the DCI, Mr. Chapin

Return of Available Copies of "An Analysis of the

Cuban Operation by the Deputy Director.

Transmitted herewith are all the completed copies available to us of subject document. Included arend

To confirm our original understanding: Copies,ent to the DCI onanuary;ent to Mr. Dulles onanuary;ent to the Inspector General onanuary; and copiesre unassembled, with the pieces residing in theegistry. We will destroy these latter materials if you have sufficient copies without assembling the last five.


Assistant to the


As stated

Registry (Margaret Porter) advised that these copies were being destroyed.



SECTION (Indicated by Blue




Decisions that Led to


vs. Government

an "Overt"

vs. Agency

Lessons for the






Memorandum dated rkr-1 for Secretary of State. Secretary of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, "Tasks, Para-Military Plan, Cuba. "



Cablearamilitary dated1 to CIA Headquarters.



Memorandum daledctober

DP/A,rocedures for Cuban Overflights.

Memorandum dated0 for Chief,Organization and Commandnd Development Projects Division. "

iographic Summary of Certain Senior Officials.

Memorandum dated0

for Chiefs of All Special Staffs and Operating Divisions, "Clerical Assistance for WH Division. "





t "in iw nrr


The purpose of this paper is to contribute to an understanding of the nature of and the reasons for the failure of the Cuban operation and in so doing to suggest what are the correct lessons to be learned therefrom. It is prompted by and is. for the mostommentary on the IG Survey.

That documentlack picture of the Agency's role in this operation. Itumber of different kinds of allegations.

First, there arc numerous charges of bad organization and incompete execution, including specifically criticisms of: command relationships; the quality of personnel; the internal operational planning process; the conduct of maritime and air operations; and the collection and evaluation of intelligence. These deficiencies are portrayed as responsible for the failure to build up and supply resistance organizations under rather favorable conditions.

Sccund, and more serious is the allegation of major errors of judgment, notably (a) the decision to convert the project into what rapidly became an overt military operation beyond the Agency's capability, (b) the treatment of the Cuban exiles asc) the inadequacy of the military plan for the invasion, and (d) the failure "to appraise the chances of success realistically".


Third, the Survey ia critical of the Agency's failure to insure that the decision making process in the Executive Branch was orderly and effective. The Agency, it is alleged, "failed to keep the national policy makers adequately and realistically informed of ths conditions considered essential for success, and it did not press sufficiently for prompt policy decisionsast moving situation". orollary of this judgment, the Survey attributes the blame for incompetence of execution and for errors of judgment essentially to this Agency alone.

It is almost self-evident that some of these allegations are true, at least in part. In any large and rapidly organised undertaking there are cortain to be errors of organization and of execution. In all likelihood major errors in judgment were committed. Similarly, the decision making process in the Executive Branch of the Government operatedanner that left something to be desired. Nevertheless, this paper argues: arge majority of the conclusions reached in the Survey are misleading or wrong; that the Survey is especially weak in judging what are the implications of its own allegations and, therefore, that its utility ia greatly impaired by its failure to point out fully or in all cases correctly the lessons to be learned from this experience. This generalized rejection can be made more meaningful by an elaboration

at this point, which will at the same time serve the purpose of outlining

the structure of this paper and summarizing certain of its main conclusions.

A. Organisation and Execution

As to the first set of allegations, there is not too much that can be said short of detailed discussion which is contained in later sections, except to make the obvious point that perfection in organization and execution is never attained and that the real question is whether the mistakes that were made were worse than thoy reasonably should have been and justify blanket condemnation. Stated flatly, the conclusions reached here on the main substantive points are:

Agency command andwhat they should have been.

any shortcomings in the internal planningfor the most part, the difficulty of securing clear policyoutside the Agency and prompt, willing, support based on

the failure of most air operations in support ofwas the result of circumstances completely beyond thethe air arm and probably not remediable by any action that thehave taken.

the intelligence on the Castro regime and on the internal

opposition thereto was essentially accurate.

UOP ALLHk'l1 /

n in nni iu'. r*

Tha greatest operational weaknesses were in the early phases of maritime operations and, possibly, in the failure to place trained paramilitary agenis with resistance groups, although it must be recognized that major efforts were made to accomplish this result and even with hindsight it is not clear that any different operational procedures or any greater effort could have achieved greater results.

The ultimate test of any project such as this is, of course, its outcome butudgment of the effectiveness of organization and execution is to be made, the deficiencies need to be balanced by the accomplishments. As even the Survey remarks, "There were some good things in this project". lowizable number of small boat operations were run efficientlyarge number of persons and volume of cargo were infiltrated successfully into the Island. In the last weeks before theolitical organization was formed whichemarkably broad spectrum of political opinion and brought together what was describeetate Department officer at the time as the best group of exile leaders that could be assembled and that left outside no Important politically acceptable element. In the militaryorce was created that was twice as large as originally envisaged and larger than any paramilitary force ever developed by the Agency. It was broughtigh stats of combat

effectivenessemarkably low percentage of individuals who had to be eliminated for unsuitability and with high morale later proven In combat. This force was airliftedtaging base, the location of which was never revealed until after the finish of the operation. It was loaded on ships which sailed on dispersed courses and achieved complete surprise five days later. The Brigade then successfully carried out what had been described ae the most difficult type of militaryandingostile shore, carried out largely at night. Finally, as the battle was joined, adequate supplies of all sorts were availableew hours of the beaches, had conditions permitted their off-loading. These various results were accomplished inay thatmall number of Agency staff officers were ever exposed to the Cuban participants and the true identities of these Americans have never been revealed. Moreover, the entire build-up was accomplished under the limitation that it contemplate no use of Americans in combat and no commitment of American flag shipping. As the event proved (and the SurveyThis was not enough". ecital of affirmative accomplishments suggests that whatever shortcomings there were in organization, personnel, and execution were not the decisive reasons for failure. It will be necessary to return to this point later.


B. Errors of Judgment

The second set of criticisms, those described above as allegations of major errors of judgment and the third, relating to the Agency's relationships with the rest of the Executive Branch, are more complex. Their validity is discussed in separate sections below (Section III onilitary Type Invasion and IV on The Decision Making Process, Section VIII on The Relationships with the Cubans, andn The Assessment of the Adequacy of the Plan and on the Appraisal of its Success.) Summarized in flat statements, the conclusions there reached are these:

basic reason for placing increasing emphasis asprogressed upon the planned military operation andon the internal resistance is thatumber of reasonsof the resistance to achieve an overthrow without afrom the outside appeared to be diminishing rather thanthe best efforts of which the Agency was capable to supportpreparation for the military operation was not intendedsupport of the resistance and the two efforts becameonly in the last week before the invasion was mounted.

decision to deny the Cuban political leadershipor close contact with the Brigade and to withhold from them knowledge

of the impending invasion was based on two considerations. First, it was believed at the time that if the Brigade was to achieve unity and esprit de corps, it must not be split by political rivalries and its officers must be chosen on professional grounds. Thia clearly precluded control of the Brigade, or even free access to it, by the political leaders. Second, the insecurity of the Cubans was notorious. It was quite inconceivable that they could know the details of times and places without the gravest risk that the essential advantage of surprise would be lost. It was clear at the time that the Agencyignificant risk in denying responsibility to the Cubans and inevitably assuming this responsibility itself. No evidence that has come to light during or since the invasion suggests that military effectiveness and security could have been obtained without paying that price.

c. The conclusions of this paper on the adequacy of the military plan are really too complex to be summarizedentence or two. All that can be said hare ishere was solid reason to believe that itood chance of at least initial success; (Z) the last minute cancellation of theair strike significantly reduced the prospects ofhere wasest of whether internal support for the invasion would materialise on the scale and in the manner anticipated;he main deficiencies in the plan and in the capabilities of the

Cuban force which may have contributed to the defeat have not been touched on in the Survey.

d. The appraisal of the chances of success may well have been faulty. The intelligence was generally good but it may have under-estimated the skill with which the Castro forces would be directed, the morale of the militia units he would deploy against the Brigade and the effectiveness ofs that remained in operation. There was some exaggeration of the capabilities of both ground and air forces of the invasion. It is impossible to say how grave was the error of appraisal since the plan that was appraised was modified by elimination ofay air strike. Had the Cuban air been eliminated, all of these estimates might well have been accurate instead of underestimated. Probably, therefore, the primary fault lay in having one factor (i.he elimination of Cuban air) achieve soignificance to the whole plan. Althoughay air strikes were essential to the destruction of the Cuban air, no guaranty of such destruction was possible even had there been authority for the strikes.

The conclusions summarized above bear on the correctness of the Survey's allegations of deficiencies of execution and major errors of judgment but for the purposes either of understanding what happened or of learning how to avoidailure in the future, it is far from

sufficient to know tbat certain activities were (or were not) incompetently performed and certain mistakes were (or were not) made. With many of the deficiencies it is essential to understand why they existed. And with all of them it is important to know what part they played in causing the outcome to be what it was. The central weakness of the Survey is that it is often misleading in its implications as to why certain thingsone and it is grossly incomplete in its analysis of the consequences of mistakes alleged to have been made. Accordingly, before proceeding


to the detailed discussion beginning in Section rJT of this paper which supports the conclusions summarized here, it has been felt necessary to make good in some degree these errors of omission by commenting on the nature and causes of the failureanner which will be in part alternative and in part supplementary to the Survey. C. The Decisions That Led To Failure

It has been suggested not only in the Survey but elsewhere tbat the operation against the Castro regime should never bave been allowed to take the form that it didilitary invasion. It ultimately did take this form, however, and it was in this form that it failed. The military failure has been analyzed far more exhaustively and with greater authority by General Taylor and others than this paper can pretend to do.

Nevertheless, certain conclusions as to the nature of the military failure must be restated here if its causes are to be understood.

There is unanimous agreement that the proximate causehortage of ammunition on the beachhead and that this shortage was directly traceable, in turn, to the effective interdiction of shipping and air resupply by the Castro Air Force. It has been less emphasized that Castro's command of the air deprived the Brigade of its capability for battlefield reconnaissance, of the equivalent of field artillery, and of close air support against enemy ground forces. It deprived it, too, of the possibility of "strategic" strikes against enemy lines of supply and communications. Finally, reliance had been placed on daytime and virtually unopposed air and sea resupplyecessary condition for the activation of resistance groups throughout the Island. It is incontrovertible that, without control of the air, and the air crews and aircraft to exploit that control of the air, the whole military operation waa doomed. Even with control of the air it might have failed but without it there could not have been any chance of success. If, then, one wishes to learn what actually caused the military operation to fail, rather than what might have done so, the starting point must be an inquiry into why control of the air was lost and never regained. Of equal significance


for an understanding of the whole operation is an awareness of the circumstances that did not contribute to the failure in the air.

Fortunately, it is possible to list without much possibility of controversy the circumstances that led to the outcome in the air. First, the nearest real estate that could be used was Puerto Cabezas inistance ofilcB from the target area. The only way to avoid this* severe limitation on the capability of any but the most modern aircraft would have been toase. territory. Second, In choosing types of aircraft, no sort of plausible denial could be maintained unless the project limited itself to the kinds of obsolete aircraft that might plausibly be found in the handsrivately financed Cuban force. There was the further argument that it was desirable to use types of aircraft that could have defected from the Castro Air Force. The choice was thus rapidly narrowed downs. Third, policy guidance throughout the project was to the effect that. air crews could be committed to combat or placed where they might be involved in combat. This restriction was not relaxed until the second day of the invasion and then only in desperation. This had implications not only for the quality of the air crews but also for the number that could be assembled, screened for security, and trained within the time period available.

Givcn these limitations, the only way in which there was the slightest possibility of achieving control and maintaining control of the air was by destruction of the Castro Air Force on the ground before the dawnay when vulnerable shipping would be exposed to air strikes. The one air strikeas not expected to be, and in fact was not, sufficient to accomplish this purpose. Only one other strike was planned for this purpose and that was cancelled. Moreover, in the interests of making the air strikes appear to have been done by the Castro Airestriction was placed on the number of aircraft that could be committed to these strikes by the invasion force.

Even after the very considerable damage doneay itself by enemy air, it is possibleetermined and major strike on the nightould have crippled the Castro Air Force, the final destruction of which might have been completed the following night. By the eveningay, however, the Cuban air crews were exhausted and dispirited and the opportunity could not be fully exploited.

Even if things had gone betteray, it is questionable whether theuban air crews that constituted the air arm of the strike force would have been adequate to accomplish all of the tasks for which reliance was placed on the air arm. The chance of success would have

'hvp firrrtiTT

bcen greater (with or withoutay strike) if it had been possible to assemble and commit to action more trained Cuban. air crews.

D. Washington Decision Making

These, then, were the circumstances which together led to defeat in the air and madeefeat on the ground. Several things are notable about them. In the first place, it should be emphasized that these all trace back to Washington decisions. The defeat in the air cannot be blamed on bad maintenance at Puerto Cabezas, orhortage of spare parts or fuel. It cannot bo blamedhortages. inasmuch as it proved possible rapidly to replace losses from. It cannot be blamed on the cowardice or lack of skill of the Cuban air crews, who by and largeood account of themselves. Nor can il be attributed to bad tactical decisions made either at Puerto Cabezas or in the Washington command post. The crucial defeat in the air was to no significant degree the result of bad execution. It was directly andattributableong series of Washington policy decisions.

Before exploring the touchy question of whose decisions these were and how they were made, the implications of this conclusion deserve emphasis and elaboration. It suggests that the bad organization, improperly drawn lines of command, low quality personnel and operational

inadequacics alleged by the Survey were not in the actual event responsible for the military failure. If organization and execution had approached perfection, the invasion would still have failed in the absence of more and largeray air strikes or the use of more modern aircraft. bases.

To be sure, this conclusion derives from an:analysis only of the failure to gain control of the air. It It arguable that even if control of the air had been achieved, maintained, and exploited, the beachhead would not have been consolidated nor the Regime ultimately overthrown. Without arguing that point here, however, the evidence strongly suggests that if the Brigade had been defeated by ground action under these more favorable circumstances, it would have been because of errors of planning and conception rather than by errors of execution. The Brigade fought long enough to prove its determination and tactical skill. It appears to have been well handled by Its officers. There were ample supplies at hand to support continued ground action. And Castro himself has admitted that the terrain was well chosen. Given control of the air, the Brigade might ultimately have been defeatedomplete failure of any resistance to materialize under conditions which would have


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encouraged it and permitted air support coupled with continued effectiveness in the face of heavy casualties of the Castro militia. Either of these possible developments would have confirmed the errors of intelligence and assessment that are alleged but would have given no support to the view that errors of organization and cxocution in the build-up phase were responsible for the military defeat. Despite whatever mistakes of this character there were, the Agency did after all (with the invaluable help of the Department of Defense) build up, train, equip, andorce that proved itself in combat to be of high quality.


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E. Agency vs. Government Responsibility

Another notable feature of the decisions that together were responsible for failure to achieve control of the air (in addition to the fact that they were all Washington policy decisions) is that they were all interdepartmental decisions. Other elements of the Executive Branch were involved along with the Agency in making them. This is not to imply that in all cases they were imposed on the Agency. Regardless, however, of how blame should be assessed between the Agency for accepting restrictions and the policy makers outside the agency for imposing them, it is necessary to have clearly in mind the nature of the decision making processroject of this sort in order to understand how the ultimate failure came about.

Inherent in this situationlear conflict between twoonflict of the sort familiar in recent American history. Onewas that, mainly through the various activities comprised in this project, the Castro regime should be overthrown. The other was that the political and moral posture of the United States before the world at large should not be impaired. The basic method of resolving this conflict of objectives that was resorted to was that of attempting to carry out actions against Castro inanner that the official responsibility of the U. S. Government could be disclaimed.

If complete deniability had been consistent with maximum effectiveness, there would theoretically have remained no conflict of goals but in fact this could not be (and never is) the case. The most effective way to have organized operations against the Castro regime, even if they would have been carried out exclusively by Cubans, would have been to do so perfectly openly, on the largest scale and with the best equipment feasible. Practically every departure from this pattern of behavior imposed operationaland reduced effectiveness. Inherent in the concept of deniability was that many of these restrictions would be accepted but at every stageeriod of many months questions had to be answered in which operational effectiveness was weighed against the political requirement of deniability.

As these decisions presented themselves week after week, the Agency as the executive agent for the conduct of the operation was usually and naturally the advocate of effectiveness. The State Department and. with respect to certain matters, the Department of Defense were the guardians of the correctness of the country's political posture and thus the advocates of deniability. There was obviously no way ineneralized policy could have been laid down which would have furnished guidance as to the way the many successive decisions ought to be made. There was no quantitative

measure of either the improvement in the chances of success that would have resulted from say, permission to use American air crews inor of the decrease in deniability that would have resulted Each of many such decisions had to be discussed and made on its own merits, and in almost all of them several agencies had to take part.

One of the consequences of this state of affairs was that prompt decisions were hard to obtain. Another was that, like so manydecisions, these were subject to differing interpretations by different participants in the process. Delays and differences of interpretation were compounded by the constantly changing situation both of Cuba and the Castro regime on the one side and of theon the other, which would have rendered rigid and entirely orderly planning difficult under the best of circumstances.

The nature of the decision making process had other consequences as well. It explains in large measure the failure to write tidy andplans and have them properly approved in writing byauthority well In advance. It explains why thereong succession of alternate plans and of modification to plans ur.der Above all, the constant weighing of costs and benefits in the effort to satisfy the military requirements for success without excessive

Impairrrierit of the political requirement of deniability explains why the final plan (and most of the variants considered in the last six weeks)ompromise. F. Why An "Overt" Operation

Against the background of these remarks on the way decisions were made and on the nature of policy issues Involved, it is worth commenting briefly on one of the major errors of judgment alleged by the Survey: the decision to "convert the project into what rapidly became an overt military operation beyond the Agency'sn part this "decision" waa compelled by the failure of the internal resistance the reasons for which are discussed in later sections and are not germane to the current context. As for the Agency'senough has already been said to suggest that the operation was not bo much beyond the Agency's capability as it was beyond the scope of activities judged to be acceptably deniable. The question that is highly relevant to the policy making process is how and why thewas allowed to become overt and, when this had happened, why it remained the responsibility of the Agency.

That it did become "overt" in the sense that there was extensive public discussion of the preparations for invasion and that the military action was widely attributed to the United States Government, both before and after it took place, there can be no doubt. Nor is there any mystery as to why this happened. It was quite out of tha question

lo infiltrate men and arm* by sea and air for months, recruit, train andtrike force of0 Cubans, to organise the political fronts, first the FRD then the CRC andajor propagandawithout at leaat reporta and rumors of these activities becoming widespread. Nor were there any illusions either in the Agency or elsewhere in the Executive Branch as to the degree to which the facts were surmised and accepted as true by journalists and other informed persons. Why, then, would anyone continue to regard the involvement of the United States as plausibly deniable and why was the undertaking not converted into an overt operation, which presumably would have become the responsibility of the Department of Defense?

The answer to the first part of this question is that up to and through the invasion itself the operation remained to an extraordinary degree technically deniable. Funds were disbursed inay that their U. S. Government origin could not be proved. No Agency case officer who played an active role was publicly revealed as such by true name. No Americans were captured (although the bodies of an6 crew were probably recovered after its loss on the second day of the invasion). In short, even the best informedin Miami who published what purported to be detailed, factual reports could substantiate them only by quoting Cubans who themselves were often not well informed.


This limited and purely technical maintenance of deniability was less important to the decisions of the Executive Branch, however, than the fact mat no one In the Executive Branch was ready at any point until after the defeat officially to avow U. S. support. Indeed, this alternative was never seriously considered. Even the mostfig leaf was considered more respectably than the absence of any cover whatsoever. Indeed, the final changes in the operational plan made in March, the official announcement in April that the United States would not give support to the rebels, and theofay strike were all last minute efforts to shore up the plausible deniability of an enterprise for which Governmental support was bound to be conclusively surmised even if it could not be proved. These decisions were made by the senior policy makers of the Government who were reading the newspapers every day and knew well to what degree the project had in fact become "overt". These men simply were not willing to state officially either that the United States itself was about to make war on Cuba or that the U. S. was openlyroup of Cubans, not even recognisedovernment in exile, ilitary invasion. In the aftermath of failure this decision may haverong one. Had the operation succeeded reasonably quickly and without too much bloodshed, the decision would probably haveorrect one. Be that as it may

it was not Che Agency's decision and, as the above cited actions suggest, the pressure to strengthen deniability in the last few weeks came from outside the Agency and led to decisions which wereto the Agency. To suggest, as the Survey seems to do, that the Agency was responsible for this clinging to deniability ia demonstrably false.

G. Government vs. Agency Decisions

The same comment applies in some degree to the three other alleged major errors of judgment. (These have to do respectively with the treatment of the Cuban exiles, the adequacy of the military planning, and the appraisal of the chances of success. They have been touched upon above and are discussed at some length inelow. ) In the context of the decision making process, the most important conclusion that emerges is that, whether they were wise or unwise, they were Governmental decisionsery real sense. As to the handling of the Cubans, thisatter of the most intimate consultation with the State Department, especially In the two months preceding the invasion when the CRC was in process of As to military planning, the record clearly shows that there was detailed consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the JCS considered the successive plans both formally and informally, and that these were the subject of review and discussion at the highest

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levcls of Government. The chances of success were assessed favorably by the Joint Chiefs {minus, of course, the last minute cancellation ofay strike) as well as by the Agency. The Agency mustizable share of the blame for whatever mistakes were made in these three areas but no one who studies the record with care can assert (and no one who has done so has asserted) that the responsibility was narrowly focused on any one of the participants in the decision making process. H. Conclusions

This introductory and summary section began with aof the main allegations of error made in the Survey and it followedummary of the conclusions reached in this paper (partly in the foregoing discussion but principally in the later more detailed sections) with respect to these allegations. For tho most part the allegations are rejected. In concluding this section it may be useful first to list, for comparison and contrast with the Survey, what in the Judgment of this paper do appear to have been the strengths and weaknesses of this undertaking and second to suggest some of the lessons to be drawn therefrom. The list is as follows:

mall boat infiltration and oxfiltration operations were slow to start (but by and large were effective and well run in the last three months). Moreover, due to the existence of the U. S. Embassy


in Havana, defectors and legal travel, the need for illegal infiltration was comparatively slight until

for this reason, the effort to place trainedparamilitary types, and other agents with resistancethe Island, and thereby toeception capability formaritime resupply, never caught up with Castro's improvingmeasures. This impaired the build-up not only of guerrillaof intelligence nets. It is doubtful, however, whethercould have been accomplished in building up an effectiveparticularly in view of the timing of the whole operation

and the lead time involved in recruiting and training.

Aside from these weaknesses, alleged defects ofand execution had little to do with the unsuccessful outcome. In particular, the limiting factor on air operations in support of thewas not bad management but the limitations of the reception parties and competence of Cuban air crews.

The air arm should have been stronger by the time of the invasion in numbers of air crews, type of equipment, availability of

U. S. bases, or some combination of all these. If relief could not have been obtained from any of the politically motivated restrictions, andarger number of competent Cuban air crews could not have been recruited, the Agency should on its own responsibility have

assembled more U. S. nationality air crews in the hope that their commitment would be permitted in an emergency.

There should have been moreay air strikes and they should have employed the full strength of the air arm. ay strike should not have been cancelled.

The military planood one (except for theon, and possible inadequacy of, the air arm). It wasworked out as bctweon the Agency and the Joint Staff androduct of highly competent, professional military planning.

The appraisal of the chances of success was probably faulty for reasons summarised above (para, d,

The important decisions were Governmental not those of one Agency. It was frustrating but of little practical consequence that the decision making process was at times cumbersome and did not promote tidiness. It was inevitable that the whole shape of the operation was determinedompromise between the conflicting goals of deniability and effectiveness.

For The Future

What are the lessons for the future to be drawn from this unhappy experience? Perhaps the main one is that. should not support an operation such as thiB involving the use of force without having also


made the decision to use whatever force is needed to achieve success.

If the political decisions necessary to facilitate the effective use of

force on an adequate scale, up to and possibly including the overt

commitment. military forces, are too difficult to make, then

the operation should be called off unless the odds in favor of success

within the politically imposed restrictions are very great.

Itact of life that the use of force by the U. S. (or any

major Western nallon--the Communists seem to be judged by a

different standard) in an effort to influence the course of events in

another country is deeply unpopular with an important body of opinion.

Most of the damage to the political posture of. that is done

by such action occurs when the action is identified, whether on the

basis of evidence or of pure surmise, with. Once this point

of identification has been passed, it will almost invariably be true

that ultimate failure not only means loss of the original objective

but further exaggeration of the political damage. Ultimate success,

on the other hand, is the only way partially to retrieve and offset

the political damage. It is, therefore, only the part of wisdom to

reassess an undertaking of this sort when identification of.

Government with il has begun to occur or appears imminent and to

determine at that time cither to insure success or to abandon it.

The feeling has been widespread that another major lesson to be learned has to do with respect to the decision making process in the Executive Branch. In any major operation involving the actual exercise of power by the U.overnment {as distinguished from the threat to exercise power), some branch of the Government will be responsible for execution, preoccupied with the achievement of success, and therefore generally the advocateassive and effective exercise of power. At the same time, the U. S. will always be in pursuitariety of essentially political objectives which willequirement toertain public posture (notably in thehis requirement, in turn, will imply limitations on the manner in which and the scale on which power can be exercised. The guardian of the public posture whose primary responsibility it will be to devise and support restrictions on action will typically be the Department of State, or policy makers outside the action organization. Inituation there is almost bound touccession of operational decisions that present (or appear to the participants to present) major issues of policy and, since there is an Inevitable, andense legitimate, conflict of Interests between departments reflecting the conflict of objectives, there will typically have to be an arbiter who is himself neither the activist operator nor the statesman-like guardian of the country's political posture.

Such issues are continuously brought to top levels for resolution. The resultery human tendency on the part of the decision makers to decide not only the policy matters which only they can handle but also operational matters in which they have little of the expertise necessary for judgment and can rarely acquire through briefings enough depth of factual detailull understanding. Admittedly, expert advisors can be used but under pressure of lime compounded by the unavoidable ambiguity of committee considerations, decisions are often made by the policy makers without full concurrence of the experts based on an inadequate understanding of the issues or their implications.

These are of course eternal problems of high level decision making and minor changes in governmental structure will not cause them to disappear. Nor are they in any sense unique to clandestine operations conducted by this Agency. Whenever something like the Cuban situation arises, what seem to the operators to be operational decisions will in fact raise policy issues. The issues will be real because they arise outeal conflict of objectives. The decision making process could be tidier than it usually iseticulous written record would minimize recriminations after the fact, but tidinessood written record will have little bearing on the substantive wisdom of the decisions

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themselves. Whether in important matters of this sort any one other than the President himself can resolve the conflict between the requirements for effectiveness of action and acceptability of the political consequences remains to be seen. Perhaps the most useful lesson about Government decision making to be learned from the Cuban case is that one must be prepared for and philosophical about this process.

A third lesson of lesser generality has to do with the covertness or deniability of paramilitary and other large scale operations. An operation can be said to be covert only so long as the knowledge that it is being performed can be restricted to authorised individuals. This is possible if an activity can really be concealed (e.hotographyocument without the knowledge that the document has been reproduced) or if that part of the activity which is observable by unwitting people can be made to appear to them to be perfectly normal (the black movement of bodies or cargo from place to place through the use of false documentation). ood many large projects including notably most paramilitary operations cannot be covert in this sense. Journalists and other unwitting people are almost certain to learn that something untoward is afoot. The only

aspect in which such operations can be kept clandestine is by successfully concealing the part played by. Government.

Itecessary condition for the preservation of such deniability that no unwitting individual acquire hard evidence of Governmental participation but this is by noufficient condition. If it comes to be widely believed even in the absence of hard evidence that. Government is assisting or participating in an illegal activity,onsiderable part of the benefit that accrues from deniability has already been lost. After all, the effect on public opinion depends on what is believed by that part of the public with which the policy makers are for the moment concerned. There may still remain,enefit to be derived from deniability after the public has decided that the denials are false because the Government can stillormally "correct" posture. The Soviets frequently derive advantage from this limited official deniability. ule,however, the advantages that accrueestern Government,ively and at least partly hostile press and with statesmen who shrink from the utterances of flat untruths, are limited.

The lesson suggested by these remarks is that in future clandestine operations of any size, it behooves all concerned to assess realistically the degree to which the operation is, and is likely to remain, clandestine. If the very scale of the activities makes it impossible to conceal them, can they be made to appear to suspicious journalists and others to be perfectly normal? If it is becoming apparent that something newsworthy Is going on, can suspicion of Government involvement be kept to an acceptably low key? Or is the only .option that remains open that of firm, repeated, public official disclaimeresponsibility which will generally be attributed to the Government anyway? orollary Is that the advantages of whatever degree of deniability that remains feasible should not be overestimated. With hindsight,. did not buy very much political advantage with all the restraints imposed on air activity in the Cuban operation. Had it been decided even ten days before the invasion that responsibility for the operation would be unanimously attributed to. and that only official deniability could be preserved, consideration might have been given to recognizing the Cuban Revolutionary Councilovernment in exile and allowing it to make as many and as powerful

air strikes as it could. Another possibility might have been to. aircraftight strike. No one proposed either course of action at the time. They are mentioned here as theoretical possibilities only to illustrate the kind of conclusion that might have flowedore realistic assessment of the achievable degree of covertness and of the benefits to be obtained by maintaining only that limited degree of covertness.

There mayourth lesson to be drawn with respect to the assessment of the chances of success of any inherently risky operation. As statedonclusion of this paper is that the assessment may have been faulty. Generally, this has been attributed, both in the Survey and elsewhere, to the circumstance that those responsible for conducting the operation were doing the appraising andredictable bias. But this diagnosis ignores the role of the JCS who were directed by the President to review the prospects for the opcrationzprincipally so that there would be an independent and professionally competent judgment. It is also true that in judging the temper of the Cuban people, principal reliance was placedational Estimate. Nevertheless, it is probably true that the views

opy /

of men deeply involved in the operation received too much weight in the assessment of the probable outcome, though it is far from clear where and how additional skeptics could have been introduced into the process of judgment without simply adding to the confusion. The only clear lesson is that policy makers should not make mistakes, which is scarcely helpful.

Finally, there are various lessons to be drawn with respect to Agency organization, procedures, and resources. No attempt will be made here to elaborate them, partly because to do so would require rather detailed exposition and partly because these are not among the really important lessons. It must be repeated still again tbat errors of execution did not have much to do with the failure and it must be emphasized that ways were found of bringing to bear on the conduct of the operation professional talentigh order, especially in the military field. The mistakes were mainly those of judgmentifferent organization would not have forestalled.




Survey quite accurately refers to changes in the "military" plan which occurredumber of occasions prior to the adoption of the final planhe Zaprta plan). The final plan, however, is the only one here considered except that earlier plans will be discussed to the extent that they are relevant to it.

As described by the Survey, the attack involved0 "combat-trained and heavily armed soldiers" in an "overt assault-typeara.n certain beaches on the Zapata Peninsula on the south coast of Cuba. The troops had been moved by air on three successive iiightauatemalan trai-vl-ig camp to the staging area in Nicaragua where theyhips which had been pre-loaded at New Orleans.

"The shipsovc* on separate courses from Nicaragua, under unobtrusive Navy escort, to the rendezvousiies offshore in order to avoid the appearanceonvoy. From there they had moved in column under cover of darkness0 ya;*vls from the landing area, where they met the Navy LSD. These complicated movements were apparently accomplishedecure manner and without alerting the. The intention was tocoastal strip aboutiles long, separated


from the interior by an impassable swamp penetrated only by three roads from the north and flankedoastal road from the east. " .

The landing which occurred during the night ofasunopposed. In addition, shortly after daylight an "airborne infantry company was successfully parachuted6 aircraft to four of the five scheduled drop zones where its elements were given the mission of sealing off approach.

Air support prior to the landing was given by raids bys on three Cuban airfields on IS April and "destruction of half of Castro'b air force was estimated on the basis of good post-strike. Air strikes planned for dawn onpril in order to knock out the rest of the Cuban air force were "calledate on.

Early mor tj nemy air attacks onpril resulted inupply ship ransport as well as damage to an LCI.. Ground attacks by Cuban militia occurred during the day ofpril. "While ammunition lasted, these attacks were beaten off with heavy enemy casualties, and several of Castro's tanks were halted or destroyed by ground or friendly air action. On the morning ofpril, the Red Beach Force, nearly out of ammunition, retired in good order to

Blue Beach without being pressed by the.

Adequate resupply (whether by sea or air) became increasingly difficult and finally impossible due to enemy air actionith the inevitable collapse resulting. The Survey, referring to air support attempted for the Brigade on v& andpril:

"In spite of this air action, however, and in spite0 casualties suffered by the Castro forces, the Brigade's ability to resist depended in the last resort on resupply of ammunition) which had now become. /NB: No mention has been madeeparate landing plannedointiles east of Guantanamo. Nino Diaz, whoollowing in Oriente Province, was to landen with the idea ofairly large scale diversion by drawing to him his followers and the resistance known to exist in Oriente. Although the Diaz group put to sea and reached its Cuban landing area on schedule, it never in fact landed dueumber of factors. control. Since the group played no role, no further discussion seems warranted. /

/TlB: By letter, datedhe President charged General

Maxwell D. Taylor with the responsibility of investigating among other

things the Cuban operation and of reporting the lessons to be learned

therefrom. General Taylor, in association with Attorney General

Kennedy, Admiral Burke and Mr. Allen Dulles (known as the Cuban


Study Group) immediately held continuous hearings receiving testimony from all possible informed witnessesumber of individuals who had been on the Zapata beachhead. General Taylor filed no written report but gave the President an interim oral report on1 and wrote the Presidenlon1 that he was ready to make his final report orally, which he did thereafter. The oral reports were supported by foji* memoranda which are here referred to as theyar more complete review of all aspects of the military portion of the operation than given above or in the Survey. Brief references to certain of these memoranda are made hereafter. /


The answer is basedumber of factors. First, it became clear through the summer0 that Castro was more firmly settled as Chief of State than had originally been hoped. Moreover, it became apparent that he was receiving and would continue to receive significant support from the Soviet Bloc (including the Chinese) economically. In military materiel, and in much neededilitary, internal security, positive intelligence and communications (to name the main fields). Thus, it was recogniacd that it was becoming more and more difficult to organise and maintain internal opposition, and, moreover, it was daily becoming more apparent that forceful evidence of outside support was needed to cause the internal opposition to show its hand.

During the summer and fallome guerrilla resistance continued in the Escambray Mountains and in some of the provinces. Although poorly fed and equipped, this resistance was respected by the ihe -nilitia which despite vast superiorities in number would not engage the resistance in direct combat. Rather, the militia surrounded resistance pockets, staying on the main roads away from the hills; kept food and supplies out of resistance areas, and captured the guerrillas when they came out of the hills singly or in small numbers seeking food or other aid. Nevertheless, until the morale of the militia could

in1 nr

be shaken, it seemed clear that, due to its vast superiority in numbers, it could continue at least to contain the resistance. Moreover, it became evident through the fall and early winter that the outside force to be successful needed to be self-sustaining since small bands or elements would, due to numerical inferiority in all likelihood, be cut off, surrounded and overwhelmed or rendered harmless by the militia.

In addition, difficulties of supplying the opposition soon became apparent. Air drops were rarely successful which is not an unusual operational experience. Under much simpler conditions approximately the firstrrops in support of Castillo Armas were wholly unsuccessful in Guatemala. Thereafter, slight improvement occurred but mainly due to the fact that the drops were made in daylight and directed to terrain held by the invaders who were in open conflict and not in hiding. Even in France during WWime when experienced pilots were dropping to experienced reception committees in vastly more fa .arable terrain than available in most of the attempted Cuban drops the rule of thumb was thatuccess should be expected. At any rate the lack of success by air and the difficulty of distributing within Cuba the substantial amount of materiel landed by boat (plus, of course, the restrictions imposed by the constantly increasing and improving internal security) made it clear that no internal resistance buildup could achieve adequate size to eliminate

Ihe regime without substantial outside support.

As early as November, therefore, the Government decided Io continue to aid the internal resistance as much as possible but to begin to plan for the introduction into Cubarained force from the outside. Unquestionably, Castillo Armas in Guatemala was an analogy and precedent. Over the period from November until April thendeed the probabilityilitary type invasion wasenerally approved part of the concept. In addition, by common consent of all involved, the size of the Brigade was increased bit by bit unlil the0 total was reached.. There was no magic in any particular number. Nevertheless, factors such as features and size of terrain to be attacked desired fire power and logistics were carefully weighed by officers experienced in guerrilla and special force actions with the resultinimum basic forceas decided in0 to be the properfor the requirements. Thereafter, the increase was undertaken to provide extra strength on the simple theory thai as long as flexibility was retained more men and guns would inevitably be useful.

Although the decisions involving size and use of the Brigade were in general based on its employmentingle force, the possibility of piecemeal use through infiltrations in small groups was seriously studied. Obvious political advantages would have been gained with such use rather than the larger "invasion" type landing. Nevertheless, the considered


Copy /

rnilitary judgmentf both Agency and JCS staff and military officers) was that small groups would not be able to prevent the large numbers of militia from either isolating or gradually eliminating them. Moreover, it was felt that the state of the internal opposition was such that they would not respond aggressively to the undramatic and, at best, slow impact of small bands of this sort. Consequently,lan could only resultasting of assetsailure to use effectively the trained manpower of the Brigade. The military-type concept of introducing the entire Brigade into Cubaingle force, therefore, emerged as the most feasible possibility.

Of* agoitrjT


In order to place the Agency's role in the proper perspective and to indicate the general participation of the Executive Department, it is essential to examine the planning process that was involved. The Survey is highly critical of this aspect but it should be noted that the Survey is particularly incomplete in the discussions of decision-making and planning.

Regarding the planning process, for example, the Survey comments that in1 "the Agency was driving forward without knowing precisely where it wasPage . What is meant is unclear, particularly as in the next paragraph the SurveyAt thiahere was a

presentation, largely oral, of the status of the operation, and

President Kennedy approved their.

In the same connection, the Survey states that at the end ofhe Agencyevised plan to President Eisenhower and his advisors and "President Eisenhower orally directed the Agency to go ahead with its preparations with all

Some direction, therefore, was visible to two Presidents even though no definitive decisions wore made until the very last minute. The fact, however, that the Survey could maketatement and at the same time include only the barest factsack of understanding of the decision-making process.

The Special Group prior to1 (McESrt. Dulles; Gray; Hcrter until appointed Secretary, then Merchant; Douglas, with Irwin sitting for him On occasion) reviewed the entire situation on numerous occasions and considered special issues on others. Cuban discussion in the Special Group started9 when concerns about the political situation and the undcsirability of Castro were aired. Covert actionsadio broadcasting, economic actions, possible sabotage) were discussed at several meetings in January, February andhe examinationetailed "General Covert Action Plan for Cuba" on This plan was approved by the Special Group, then partially rewritten and finally approved by President Eisenhower onnd the Survey's

Between mid-March andhe Special Group had discussions of Cuba ateetings, of which aton the period during and following0 were detailed discussions. Gordon Gray, as the President's representative on the Special Group, reported to the President regularly on such Special Group activities. Moreover,eneral briefing on the project at the Special Group meetingssistant Secretary Mann and Mr. Joseph Scott of State also attended as did General Lansdale from Defense. InH regularly held weekly meetings with the Assistant Secretary of State at which Cuba was often discussed; liaison with Mr. Scott's office



in Statend other* was almostaily basis on Cuba alone; and members oflso had substantially daily contact (on Cuba) with General Erskine's office in Defense (General Lanscale, the Deputy) regarding Defense support and details of the preparation for the possible "invasion".

President Eisenhower, in addition to the0 meeting referred to in the Survey,urther detailed meeting1 so that with these plus the reports which he received from Mr, Gray and others he was personally familiar with the status of the project at the time he left office.

Also as the result of an understanding first worked out with General Boncsteel of the JCS and later adopted by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and theask Force (or committee) was created chaired by Ambassador Willauer with representatives of State (Assistant Secretary Mann and his deputy, Mr.CS (General Gray and other military members of hisnd CIAr when absent, his deputy). Later William Bundy of Assistant Secretary of Defense Nitze's office joined the Task Force. The Task Force was responsible for examining the projectiew to determining what actions should be considered which were either not covered by existing plans or necessary to support existing plans. Ambassador Willauer reported to the Special Group at Its meetings ofnd

The work of this Task Force resulted in the creationpecial JCS team headed by General Gray (discussed below) to review military planningommittee to keep track of non-military aspects of planning consisting of Defense (Generaltate (Mr. Braddock, last Charge in Havana prior to the break in relations) and CIAhis latter committee met regularly from about mid-February andist of tasks to be discharged by the Agency and each Department. This paper was approved by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and the DCI and was usedheck list. opy is attached as Annex A. As noted, it contained no reference to the military or Brigade action.

The new Administration was brought into the picture as soon as possible. President Kennedy waseneral briefing by the DCI and then0 and Secretary of State Rusk was briefed by the DCI prior to inauguration on Rusk was again briefed onanuary by the DCl and theroup including the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General.

Thereafter, thereumber of meetings with the President at which the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, the Attorney General, the DCI were present. In addition, Messrs. McGeorge Bundy and Schlesinger from the White House Staff; Berle and Mann from State;nd William Bundy from Defense;

General Gray from the JCS; and theere present. Such meetings were held on:


March (smaller meeting)


(Special communications regarding action under the Plan were also held wil the President onndpril via McGeorge Bundy and the Secretary of State).

In addition to the foregoing, the Presidentarch met with the Ambassador from Guatemala to. and the Ambassador'special emissary from President Ydigoras, who presented President Ydigoras' views. Numerous meetings also were held with Messrs. McGeoi Bundy, Berle and Mann, and Mr. Berle met with Miro Cardona, President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. Also in the second week in April due to attacks in the UN by Foreign Minister Roa of Cuba and stories in the press, mainly the New Yorkubstantial amount of time had to be spent with the State Department preparing material for use by the USUN delegationriefing of Ambassador Stevenson. It is fair to say, therefore, that the senior members of the Administration were personally and intimately familiar with the status of the project and the issues and problems involved.

Copy f_

On the military side. General Ijemnitzer with the approval of the Secretary of Defense designated General Gray of the JCS1 as the chief military liaison for the project. General Gray, thereafter, became closely associated with the military planning. Fromanuaryomplete, detailed review of the operations plan was made by General Grayeam of officers. Thishorough briefing by Esterline,nd Colonel Hawkins,M, and officers of their staffs plus several days of study by the JCS team. The Trinidad plan was the one reviewed on this occasion. During theemorandum was prepared by the team, approved by the JCS, and sent to the Secretary of Defense. (JCSo Secretary of Defense, Subject: Military Evaluation of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba).

This memorandumavorable assessment of the plan.

It stated, however, that it was unable to evaluate the combat capabilities

of the Cuban Brigade and Air Force except on the testimony of others

since the Team had not seen these themselves. eam of

3pecial Forcesarine Colonel, and an Air Force

Colonel, were selected by General Gray from among the officers briefed

and sent to Guatemala fromhroughebruary to examine the air and

ground forces personally.ubsequent report to the Secretary of Defense

confirmed their finding that the forces were capable. (JCS1 of

o Secretary of Defense; Subject: Evaluation of CIA Cuban


Volunteer Task Force). This latter report recommended that an instructor "experienced in operational logistics" be assigned to the training unit "Immediately for the final phase ofarine Colonel with these qualifications was so assigned.

Thereafter, General Gray and his team were intimately connected with all plans and moves of Colonel Hawkins' PM Section. In fact, it would not be inaccurate to say that General Gray and his team were the equivalentull partner of the Agency in this phase from1 untilpril. (This did not, of course, affect the primary CIAuring this period General Gray briefed General Lemnitzer at frequent intervals and also briefed the JCS at formal JCS meetings.

Wheneadquarters elements wenthour duty oneneral Gray's staff did likewise andull time liaison officer to sit with Colonel Hawkins' section in order to be able to brief General Gray fully each day. General Gray, in turn, briefed General Lemnitzer.

The Trinidad Plan was always the plan preferred by the military,he JCS, General Gray and Colonel Hawkins and his staff. It was, however, considered unacceptable in certain aspects for political reasons so that on or about President Kennedy decided that it should not be executed. urther study of the entire Cuban shore line was then conducted by CIA, mainlyromhrougharch. As indicated in the Survey this study resultedhift from Trinidad to Zapata. Two alternate concep



i'm1 ononnr


were sketched oul but the Zapata area concept was the only one which met the political requirements andeasonable chance of success. This concept was fully described to General Gray and his team and passed on by the JCS aB the best alternate to the Trinidad plan (JCS1 of1 to Secretary of Defense; Subject:Evaluation of Military Aspects of Alternate Concepts of CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba.) The covering memorandum from General Lemnitzer as Chairman of the JCS states in part:

"3. The conclusions of the evaluation of the military aspects of the three alternative concepts are as follows:

* *

"c. Alternative UI" (substantially the final Zapata Plan) "has all the prerequisites necessary to successfully establish the Cuban Voluntary Task Force, including air elements, in the objective area and sustain itself with outside logistic support for several weeks; however, inaccessibility of the area may limit the support from the Cuban populace.

"4. It is recommended that:

"a. the Secretary of Defense support the views of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff as expressed in the above conclusions. "

Afterarch, the JCS reviewed the Zapata planody four

times. The final plan was reviewed by individual Chiefs since it was only

prcsented to the JCS onpril which was too late for its review by the JCSody.

Th' only, reference in the Survey to JCS participation states that "members of the JCS" have stated "in the course of another that the final plan was presented to them only orally, which prevented normalhat they regarded the operation as being solely CIA's with the military called in to furnish various types of support and the chief interest of the JCS being to see to it that every kind of support requested washat they went on the assumption that full air support would be furnished and control of the air secured and on the Agency's assurancesreat number of insurgents would immediately join forces with the invasion forces;hat, in the event the battle went against them, the Brigade would at once 'go guerrilla' and take to the hills. "

Neither the "members of the JCS" nor the other "inquiry" are identified nor is there any citation supporting the alleged testimony. Being unable, therefore, to locate the full text from which the quotation was taken, it is not possible to analyze or clarify the points made. the "inquiry" referred to was that conducted by General Taylor although no verbatim minutes were kept. At least no transcript or full report of these hearings is available to the writer. In response, therefore, it can only be repeated that the JCS, as indicated, did review the Zapata

plan and continued to be closely associated through their representatives and briefings with all actions taken thereon.

It is quite clear from the four memoranda supporting General Taylor's oral report mentioned above that the Cuban Study Groupthe operation to be one by the United States, not by the Agency, even though the Agency was the Executive Agent. Memorandumntitled "Immediate Causes of Failure of Operationays on this point

"The Executive Branch of the Government was not organizationally prepared to cope with this kind of paramilitary operation. There was no single authority short of the President capable of coordinating the actions of CIA, State, Defense andMemorandums far as the concurrence of the JCS is concerned, Memorandum No.ntitled "Conclusions of the Cuban Studyoncluded:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff had the important responsibility of examining into the history of the operation. By acquiescing in the Zapata plan, they gave the impression to others of approvingMemorandum No.ara.

nnex A



MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of State

Secretary of Defense

Director of Central Intelligence Agency

Para-Military Plan, Cuba

Working Group assigned to work out the detailed tasks forand conduct of the CIA Para-Military Plan, Cuba, andentral Office for the operation, bas agreed upon the tasks

to be accomplished by the representatives of your respective departments and agency. The tasks are set forth for three phases:ayay anday Phase until Recognition; and Post-Recognition Phase.

The tasks for theay Phase are set forth inereto.

The tasks foray anday Phase until Recognition are set forth inereto.

The tasks for the Post-Recognition Phase are set forth inereto.

The proposed time schedule for theay Phase is attached asereto.

Department of State Representative Department of Defense Representative CIA Representative

Atts:s stated



1. Department of State representatives will:

White Paper for Presidential approval.

assistance to Mr. Schlesinger in preparation ofPresidential statements.

Working Group with Policy Statement as to whatmeans.

action, if any, to be taken regarding disclosuresAmerican



and other countries, e, g. ,

United Kingdom


policy guidance for all aspects of the development ofCuba Government.

plans for overt moral and other possible nonmilitaryto recognition of the Free Cuba Government of the objectives of theForce and of the Revolutionary Council, including possible action

in the United Nations or in the Organization of American States.

plans for overt moral and other possibleof the objectives of the Free Cuba Government when established.

policy guidance to USIA to support this plan.

plans foray actions.

of Defense representatives will:

to provide training and logistic support to theForce as requested by CIA.

logistics plans for arms, ammunition, andbeyond the capabilities of the initial CIA logistics support.

plans for provision of support from operationalrequired.

letter of instruction to the Services, CINC LANTfor support of this operation.

c. Keep CINCLANT planners informed.

representatives will:

a Central Office from which Executive Departmentrepresentatives will coordinate planning and conduct operations.

to supply guerrilla forces in Cuba as feasible

in the organizationree Cuba Government.

an interrogation of two or three members of theForce to determine full extent of their knowledge of actualprovide information to the President as soon as possible.

m. Finalize detailed plans for the employment of the Volunteer Force in Cuba and follow up plans. Execute these plans on order.

to recruit, train and equip the Cuban Volunteer Force.

detailed plans for establishing contact with theestablishing such control, coordination and support ofas may be desirable and feasible.

effort to arrange defection of key CubanB: The defection of the military commander of the Isle of Pines, or

at least officers who could control the Isle, would be particularly desirable. )

..TOP nnoiuiT

i. Continue detailed intelligence collection on Castro activities throughout Latin America particularly his efforts to export revolution.

j. Support the preparationhite paper to be issued by the Free Cuba Government.

k. Review cover plans.

1. Coordinate with DOD representatives logistic follow-up support requirements.

m. Review anday psychological warfare plan, n. Review Psychological Warfare Planay anday


o. Intensify UW activities in Cuba.

p. Prepare contingency plan for the disposition) if necessary, of the Cuban Volunteer Force.

q. Prepare final briefing on entire operation.


of State representatives will:

such steps as may be feasible for the protectionuba.

plans for support of the Revolutionary Council orGovernment in the United Nations or Organization of Americanto counter communist and/ or Castro charges in the United Nationsof American States, as appropriate.

support to the objectives and actions of the Cubanand the Free Cuba Government.

plans as necessary for support of the Free Cuba Government.

Free Cuba Government as Department of Defense representatives will:

follow-up logistic support as requested by CIA and/orwith logistics plan.

support from operational forces as directed.

detailed plans to support the U. S. aid plan for theGovernment for implementation when overt support is given.

support by DOD agencies and CIA representatives will:

and support over-all paramilitary plan.

DOD representatives of logistics requirements.

execution of psychological warfare plan.

responsible for tbe continuous operation of the Centralpresent briefings of the situation as required or directed.

TS# /



The Departments and the Agency will prepare, coordinate and execute, as appropriate, such contingency plans as may be required and will, moreover, plan for the resumption of their regularly assigned functions in relation to the new Cuban government.


of State Representatives:

Complete White Paper for Presidential approval.

Provide policy guidance for all aspects of the Free Cuba Government (continuous).

of Defense Representatives:

(1) Continue to provide training and logistic support to the Cuban Volunteer Force as requested by CIA.


a Central Office.

to supply guerrilla forces in Cuba as feasible(continuous).

Assist in organization of Free Cuba Government.

Continue to train and equip the Cuban Volunteer Force.

with DOD representatives logisticrequirements (continuous).

UW activities in Cuba.

a. Department of State Representatives:

Provide assistance to Mr. Schlesinger in preparation of material for Presidential statements (continuous).

Complete plans for overt moral and other possible non-military support of the objectives of the Free Cuba Government when established.

a. DOD Representatives:

(1) Complete letter of instruction to the Services, CINCLANT and GONAD for support of this operation.

of State Representatives:

Provide Working Group with Policy Statement as to what "recognition" really means.

Have approved policy position regarding action, if any, to be taken regarding disclosures to foreign countries.

Complete plans for overt moral and other possible nonmllitary support prior to recognition of the Free Cuba Government of the objectives

of the Cuban Volunteer Force and of the Revolutionary Council, etc.

plans foray actions.

-DOD Representatives:

{1) Complete logistics plans for DOD follow-up support.


(1) Finalize detailed plans for the employment of the Cuban Volunteer Force.

(2i Complete detailed plans for establishing contact with the internal opposition and for establishing such control, coordination and support of this opposition as may be desirable and feasible.

Initiate effort to arrange defection of key Cuban personnel.

Complete review anday psychological Warfare Planay anday phase.

(5) Complete review of Psychological Warfare Planay anday phase.

a. CIA Representatives:

(1) Complete supporthite paper to be issued by the Free Cuba Government and arrange to have that Government issue same.

a. CIA Representatives:

(1) Complete review of cover plans.

a. CIA Representatives:

(1) Conduct an interrogation of two or three members of the Cuban Volunteer Force to determine full extent of their knowledge of actual facts and provide Information to the President as soon as possible.


{1) Brief CINC LANT and CON AD planner s.


contingency plan for the disposition, ifthe Cuban Volunteer Force.

preparation of final briefing on entire operation.

a. Department of State Representatives:

(1) Provide policy guidance to USIA to support this plan.

b. CIA Representatives:

(1) Complete detailed intelligence collection on Castro activities throughout Latin America.



(1) Complete plans for provision of support from operational forces as required.


(1) Present final briefing on entire operation (if not given prior to this date).

top 'Phohdt


As stated above one of the considerations raised by the Agency's

capability to perform the operation is the question of what it thought the

chances of success to be and if, aa was the case, these were thought to

be good, how reasonable this conclusion was in the light of the known facts. An examination of the adequacy of the military plan is essentialesolution of this latter point.

Whatever conclusions or inferences may be drawn from the defeat of the Brigade, no one can deny that, in the absence of theay dawn air strikes, the operational plan was never tested. Perhaps these air strikes would have had no significant effect but in view of the essentiality of eliminating Castro's air force, it can be asserted that without these air strikes the plan neverhance. No issue has received more thorough analysis since the failure of the operation than the decision to cancel. Although the Survey fails to tell the full story, it is felt that nothing can be gained from further review. There is no doubt, however, that the informed military view without exception and at all times was that complete control of the air was absolutely vital.

(N. B. The Survey's statement Indicating that "two of the President's military advisors, both members of the Joint Chiefs" did not understand thia principle is considered inaccurate.)

rnn fnmiLi *

To lhe extent that thereailure to communicate this to the appropriate political levels, blame should be attached. Quite candidly, it is unknown where this failure occurred, if, in fact, it did.

Before analyzing the reasonableness of the view thatay air strikes could have changed the result it is important to examine the basic theory of the operation and what was accomplished, what failed and what was not tested. As to the last the only possible judgments are whether the theory based on existing evidence was sensible. The operational theory in outline was:

destroy the enemy air force. Not testedaccomplished.

land the Brigade on the Zapata beachhead Accomplished successfully.

maintain the Brigade on the beachhead perhapsweeks. Not tested.

persuade the Cuban populace (both privategovernmental, including military) actively to oppose thewas never expected that this would happen until the populacethat an opposition force supporting democraticoutside support waa able to maintain itself on Cubanlong this would take was unknown. Not tested.

The failure to knock out Castro's airpower (particularly3 jcti was fatal. How reasonable was the assumption thatay strikes would have eliminated thia airpower or at least made it non-operationaleriod of time?

The best estimates based on all sources, including photography,

(later confirmed as substantially accurate) were that prior

Cuban combat aircraft strength was


All of these were at threean Antonio, Libertad. and Antonio Maceo. The in-commission rate was assumed tobelieved to be slightly high) so that presumablyombat aircraft were operational at the time of thetrikes.

Based on all sourcereports, including COMINT and photography, the Cubans subsequent totrikes were able to launchircraft against the beachhead, namely:

Sea Furies


Photography, of course, cannot determine serviceability but photography of aircraft movementsere consistent with, and, it is fair to say, confirm the above figures.

c<>py t

In addition, these operational aircraft were concentrated by the

Cubans at San Antonio with the possible exception6 at Libertad. Wiih the potent fire power carried bys flown by the Brigade, and based on the results oftrikes, the elimination of these

the landing achieved surprise and since the Cubans had no effective anti-air warning system, surprise would almost certainly have been


With regard to the ability of the Brigade to maintain itself once ashore (assuming the elimination of hostilehe theory was

that the Zapata area was so difficult of access via only three exposed

roads across swampsmall force could easily defend it against vastly superior forces for "several weeks" as stated by the JCS. Hostile concentrations and artillery woull have been almost impossible to conceal from the air due to the terrain and6 fire power would have been devastating against these. This is confirmed by the one actual encounters against Cuban tanks. The Brigade's fire power was also heavy and could have prevented passage of any Cuban troops or equipment down the narrow access roads. As long as the ammunition lasted the Brigade actually succeeded in doing this. Supplies, absent

hostile air, could have been landed in large quantities since ships could have been brought in to the beachhead.

The accuracy ol this conclusion depends, of course, on technical considerations and must be based on experienced military judgments assessing such matters as the terrain involved; the size and capacity of friendly and opposing weapons involved; and the capacity particularly of the attacking force to maintain logistic support. Such an analysis could again be made but it would seem sufficient to support the reasonableness of the judgment reached in April by reference to the judgments reached by the Agency military planners and supported by the JCS and its staff.

Although it was believed that the Brigade under the assumed conditions could maintain itself on the beachhead almost indefinitely, still for ultimate success internal support wait obviously needed. The concept of the plan was as indicated that at some point (not immediately) the existence of the Brigade would be recognized and Castro's quiescent opposition would become active.

As far as internal opposition was concerned, there was essentially general agreement regarding the situation. Such disagreement as has existed has been with respect to the accuracy of the prognosis regarding internal support the Brigade might expect after landing.

The. estimate regarding the internal situation was that Castro was firmly in control; that his regime had consolidated its hold; that Cuban internal security was being rapidly built up; that Bloc assistance in the form of military technicians and instructors was; that Cuban pilots and other specialists had been taken overseas by the Bloc for training; that the Cuban Communist Party controlled key positions; and that no one group or combination of the regime's enemies seemed well enough organised or sufficiently strong toerious threat without outside help to Castro's authorityrospects for the Castro Regime).

Essentially the same facts were presented in the pamphlet released in early April by the State Department on Cuba, the facts in which were worked on jointly by all interested departments and agencies, (Department Of Statenter-Americanntitled

Again the same conclusions were stated by the Agency in its presentations. An example is the memorandum, datedf the Survey which sets forth the view on these points consistently presented by the Agency throughout this period and up to

What then was the Agency prognosis? The Zapata plan took the view that there was evidence to justify the conclusion that once it could be

Cuban political leaders of political stature and democratic views, waa capable of maintaining itself on Cuban soil, there would be substantial defections from the Castro regime in all walks of life, private and


In December thead estimated that, despite the hold established by Castro and his regime, "Internal resistance lo the Castro regime has risen sharply in the last six months."

"The Catholic Church, the only major institution not brought to its knees by the regime, has taken an increasingly firm stand against Castro."

"The middle and professional classes are now lor the most part disaffected. Some campesinos are disgruntled, notably over the regime's failure to redistribute large landholdings as it had promised; thus far only token allotments have been made."

umber of anti-Castro guerrilla groups are operating in the Sierra Escambray area and in Oriente Province, but the regime has demonstrated its ability to contain these bands."

"Within the Army, Navy, and Air Force, there probablyeasure of dissidence and probably considerable resentment at the regime's decided preference for the civilian militia, but this may decline as more Bloc equipment is made available to them."

(The above quotations are all from,

The militia numbering atas estimated to have been drawn largely from the lower income peasants and urban workers.

"Thus far, the militia's overall combat efficiency is low; many units are stillart time training basis. asic cadre of well organized well equipped, and trained units is emerging andumber of occasions the militia has been used effectively to control mobs and to perform other security duties."

"The regular forces are still disruptedesult of successive purges, and rehabilitation has been delayed by the employment of substantial army and navy detachments in construction and other public works. At present, the combat effectiveness of the air force is virtually nil, that of the navy poor, and that of the army at best fair, although it probably now exceeds that of all but the best militia units."

(Above quotes from,. For similar conclusions approved by theeeeport prepared by an Ad Hoc Committee of the OCI, Part I, para.agend Part I, para.

Further evidence of the instability of the Castro regime was apparent in the constantly growing list of individuals once close to Castro who were defecting from him. Many of these were referred to in the State


Department pamphlet referred to above. Some significant examples (and onlyrc:

Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, once Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Government.

Dr. Manuelleo, hero of the Revolution, Provisional

President of the Revolutionary Government. Under house

arrest after being forced to resign. Manuel Ray Rivero, organized anti-Batista underground in Havana.

Castro's Minister of Public Works.Sori Marin, Castro's first Minister of Agriculture. Major Huber Matos Benitez, hero of Sierra Maestra, revolutionary

commandante of Camaguey Province, then thrown in jail. Manuel Artime )

Nino Sierra Maestra heroes.

Justo Carrillo )

Raul Chibas, fund raiser for the Revolution and fought with Castro in the hills.

Felippe Pazos, representedh of July on the Junta of Liberation, and was appointed by Castro as President of the National Bank of Cuba.

Pedro Diaz Lanz, chief of the Cuban air force and Castro's personal pilot.

David Salvador, labor leader, "anti-Yanqui" pro-Castro secretary-general of the Cuban trado union federation. Castroon the Communist side against Salvador's free labor movement and jailed Salvador. Miguel Angel Quevedo, editor of Bohemia. Luis Conte Agucro, radio and television commentator. Jose Pardo Llada, radio official famous for attacks.

on Castro's behalf. Further available evidence supporting the conclusion that internal support would be forthcoming if an effective internal opposition force could be established was:

a. Many requests for aid during the periodarch topril were received through Agency communications channels, some of which are noted in the Survey at. The issue discussed by the Survey as to why aid was not given is not here involved. The messages, however, do emphasize the number of groups anxious to engage in active opposition. For example, betweenarch andpril there werenfulfilled drop requests in supportlaimed totalen. Even after the landing betweenndpril seven groups totaling aboulen begged for support in order to fight. These groups were inen

Camaguey (two groupsas Villas (three groupsnd Pinar delen).

Ray Rivero, the organiser ofember of the Cuban Revolutionary Councilview that the internal resistance was so strong that Castrooverthrown without an "invasion" from the outside. His viewofficially accepted but represented the informed view ofexperienced in this field regarding the oppositiondisagreement with his conclusion had to do with what actionto persuade the opposition to rebel, not as to its existence.

from0 to1 was evidenceopposition activists even though aside fromto the opposition, the sabotage caused insignificantand of itself to the regime. Examples were:

ons of sugarifferent fires.

ther fires, includingobacco warehouses, two paper plants,ugardairies, four stores, twenty-one Communist homes.

ombings, includingoffices, Havana power station, two stores, railroad

terminal, bus terminal, militia barracks, railroad train.

uisance bombs in Havana Province.

Derailment of six trains, destruction of microwave cable and station, and destruction of numerous power transformers.

view of many of the Brigade who had been membersmilitia which confirmed the official estimate mentionedthatmall percentage of the militia would fight against

a resolute opposition with strong fire power. This hard core was considered to numbert the most. The Army was considered to have been too disrupted lo fight.

and their professors were inof the faculty of the University of the Oriente in Decembercondemned Castroublic statement. Other studentsengaged In acts of disruption and subversion workingsupported by the Agency.

was in opposition. Not only was David Salvador inindicated above, but open acts of opposition. ,workers in0 marched from unionin Havana to the Presidential Palace to proteston1 workers' wives were attacked byarm squads for demonstrating against the execution of workers

(aalleged to have sabotaged the Havana power plant. Since the issue of what the internal reaction would have been under the conditions assumed necessary for effective internal support never arose, it is Impossible to evaluate the accuracy of the prognosis. It can be said that no one expected an immediate uprising; no advance warning was given to the internal resistance,ecurity precaution, to avoid any disclosureay; ample supplies existed to support uprising had groups showed themselves; communications existed that could have identified areas of resistance (though no communicator was able to join the resistance in theo one expected the resistance to join the Brigade on the beach in anything but very small numbers; and it was estimated that the psychological impact of unopposed heavily6 aircraft flying up and down the island would ben assumption based, of course, on control of the air.

Whatever the correct conclusion, in fact, might have been, the situation was such as to render the judgment (mentioned above) regarding internaleasonable one. Surely it was one painfully reached by many informed observers.

Post-invasion planning did exist contrary to the Survey's contention. Some of it has been discussed above. In addition plansreakout from the beachhead had been generally worked out recognising that precise details


had to await knowledge of the exact situation. As indicated, the Brigade, it was considered, could maintain itself on the beachheadubstantial period assuming no hostile air. Consequently, large reserves of supplies and materiel could have been landed; air attacks against enemycould have been flown; and an attack following heavy air strikes could have been executed when the time was considered most propitious. Such attack could also have been supported by concurrent air strikes, plus, if desired, the droppingmall airborne force back of the enemy lines to cause disruption. Similarly, air drops of individuals or teams plus supplies could have been made to any active resistance throughout the island.

A further possibility was. support in the form of supplies on the basis that the opposition government (the Cuban Revolutionary Council) would have landed on the beachhead, declared itself as the rightful government of Cuba, and requested and received recognition from. Such recognition could have been accorded on the theory that Castro's regimeoviet-dominated dictatorship and, therefore, not representative of or the choice of the Cuban people while the opposition government waa democratic, as representative as possible, androgram for choice by the Cuban people, if it attained power. Conversely, the Castro regime by its dictatorial actions had removed from the people

all methods ofhange except forceful overthrow. . recognition, it was believed, would. materiel support, if not active support to an offensive. It should be emphasised. recognition was not considered an essential part of the plan (useful as it would have been) since materiel support could have been provided anyhow.

The planning for failure was, it is believed, all that was possible. If, as happened, the failure occurred before the consolidation of the beachhead, there was little that could be done except an effort to salvage what little was possible. Had the beachhead beenumber of possibilities were planned, none too satisfactoryailure of the beachhead was at anyerious blow. If the Brigade or parts thereof could move together, they were to attempt to reach the Escambray. Assuming some help from the country people, this might well have been feasible. "Another possibility was the removal of individuals, conceivably units, by air and sea while teams and materiel could have been airdropped in other parts of Cuba, if resistance had become apparent.

As to the Agency's capability and the adequacy of the plan, the bestince the rnilitary aspects are the soles to refer to the supporting military judgments which were based On full knowledge of the facts. Seme evidence of attitudes just prioray

is the message sent by Colonel Hawkins from Puerto Cabezas regarding the desirability of despatching the Brigade. (Attached ashis message is significant as it received wide circulation at the time in Washington, including the White House, and was accepted as essentially accurate.

The allegation of failure to appraise the chances of successmay be accurate but it is submitted that the available facts at least made the judgments reasonable. Moreover, what actually occurred supports these judgments. The Brigade landed with the benefit of surprise; it held its own while ammunition lasted (even though it failed to land some of itss when theyhot at the Cuban tanks demolished them; and the attitude of many of the militia during the early states of the fight was favorable to the Brigade, including defections by militia men to the Brigade even at this early indecisive moment of the engagement. All serious damage was inflicted by the Cuban's air, essentially the3 jets.

The supporting memoranda to General Taylor's oral report are relevant on these points. Memorandum No. n discussing the Operation expresses the view in paragraphn pagehat "the beachhead could not have survived long without substantial help from the Cuban population or without. assistance." Two of the Cuban Study Group

(Admiral Burke and Mr.owever, differed with this statement on the grounds that there was "insufficient evidence to support the conjectures of this paragraph."

A footnote on their views at the foot of pageent on to say: "The well motivated, aggressive CEF fought extremely well without air cover andhortage of ammunition. They inflicted very severe losses on the less well trained Cuban Militia. Consequently, it is reasonable to believe that if the CEF had had ammunition and air cover, they could have held the beachheaduch longer time, destroyed much of the enemy artillery and tanks on the roads before they reached the beachhead, prevented observation of the fire of the artillery that might have been placed in position and destroyed many more of the local Militia en route to the area. ocal success by the landing party, coupled with CEF aircraft overflying Cuba with visible control of the air, could well havehain reaction of success throughout Cuba with resultant defection of some of the Militia, increasing support from the populace and eventual success of the operation."

Therefore, even in retrospect the Brigade's inability to hold the beachhead for some time was not clear to well-informed individuals who had soaked themselves in all the available evidence. rospective judgment in favor of success prior to the event would, therefore, seem understandable.


FinaLly, regarding the question of intelligence failures, the supporting memoranda to General Taylor's oral report state that the effectiveness of the Castro military forces, as well as that of his police measures, was not entirely anticipated or foreseen. Memorandum No.owever, setting forth conclusions says:

"Although the intelligence was not perfect, particularly as to the evaluation of the effectiveness ofs, we do not feel that any failure of intelligence contributed significantly to theMemorandumara.















if experiences the last few days had in any way changed Colonelvaluation of the brigade.



The Survey reaches the flat conclusion that the project was "badly

organized." The reasons given are:

"Command lines and management controls were ineffective and unclear. Senior Staffs of the Agency were not utilized; air support stayed independent of the project; the role of the large forward basis was not clear." (Para.

The Survey directs these criticisms exclusively at the Agency structure making essentially no effort to relate Agency organization and managerial problems to the participation in the project by other elements of the Government. Before responding, therefore, it should be stated that we share the views set forth in one of General Taylor's supporting memoranda and quoted in another section of this paper that "the Executive Branch of the Government was not organizationally prepared to cope with this kindaramilitary operation" and that "there was no single authority short of the President capable of coordinating the actions of CIA, State, Defense, and In other words, it. ratherIA project.

The real organizational problem is one of the basic dilemmas of. Government, namely, how to manage military or quasi-military operations inilemma accentuated in those instances

-lnvolving an effort to maintain ctandestinity. Since most of theacts involved in paramilitary projects of this nature raise or could, under certain circumstances, raise significant political issues, they normally require high level political clearance prior to being undertaken. Such clearance involves at least the State Department, often the White House, and, due to military implications, the Defense Department plus one or more of the military services. The description in another section of this paper of the extensive participation by and with other elements of the Government indicates that the Cuban project was clearly of this troublesome type.

The Survey's failure to examine or consider these relationships means that most of its criticisms limited as they are to Agency consideration alone, are too localized or provincial to be realistic or fully understandable An analysis will, however, be attempted.

The criticism of command lines is, if properly understood, directed essentially at two major defects, one that the projectingle, high-level full time commander possessing stated broad powers and abilities sufficient for carrying out the mission; the other that thereragmentation of authority between the project chief, the military chief of the project's Paramilitary Staff and several high level officials, whose -wide responsibilities elsewhere in the Agency prevented them from giving the project the attention it required. (Para..

The DCI allegedly "delegated his responsibility for major project decisionsonsiderable extent." (Para.. The Survey appears to support this statement on two grounds, first that the DCI relied on the DDCI "for policy matters involving air operations" and for "military advice he relied on the military officers detailed to thehe consequence of this "reliance" according to the Survey was that the DCI was deprived "of completely objective counsel."

"Relianceccording to normal usage, does not mean the same thing as "delegation of responsibility". Whatever the Survey intends to say in this connection, itact that the DCI never delegated any portion of this responsibility at any moment during the project. Naturally he relied on others for many things (he could hardly run the entire project himself) and he even delegated authority (not responsibility) in some limited respects.

He did, for example, authprize within clearly understood limits the DDCI to approve certain aspects of Cuban overflights for him. It should be noted in this connection that the clearance of Overflights resided in the first instance with the Special Group or the White House and was requested through briefings by the DCI or the DCI plus one of his people, normally the DDCI, ther both. Thereafter, whether or not an overflight

was within the terms of the top level approval and was operationally sound was cleared by the DDCI on behalf of and at the direction of the DCI.

The DCI never released the authority regarding over-all air planning recommendations. The word "recommendations" is used because final air plans decisions layigher level outside of the Agency. Before presentation to such outside authority (the Special Group or the White House) these recommendations were first passed on within the Agency by the DCI.

As far as reliance on military officers is concerned) the DCI obviously received briefings which were mainly given by theut often theresentation was expanded by statementsthe Task Force Commander) his Paramilitary Chief or other individuals connected with the project as appropriate.

Both with regard to air and ground, the DCI also insisted upon and received the advice and judgment of air and ground military officers assigned by the Pentagon to study project plans and activities; of the JCSody, and of individual members of the JCS. This entire process has been explained elsewhere in this paper and is developed in considerable detail in the supporting memoranda to General Taylor's oral report.


Moreover, the DCI, almost without exception, held three staffeek attended by his senior officials including the DD/P, COPS,DP/A. When any significant matter relating to Cuba needed approval or clarification, the DCI was briefed after one of these meetings. These briefings and meetings plus continuous telophone communications, plus cable traffic, kept the DCI current on all but the smallest details.

Thes criticised by the Survey for "in fact directing the project, although this was only one of his manyPara.. Presumably the Survey did not mean to suggest that thehould have given up his other duties to be full time Task Force Commander. Consequently, his alleged fault must haveailure toroad enough delegation of authority.

The Survey defines the limitations on theelegated authority by statingad "to apply constantly for the decision of policy questions and important operational problems" to the DD/P. It is suggested that, except in very unusual or certain "hot war" situations, such reservation of authority is the normal one between any unit commander and his next higher echelon. Moreover, until1 (the landing date) urgencies, although great, were never such as to make this sort of review impossible. Undoubtedly it was irksomeH/4

in the same way that any higher authority isroblemommander who is anxious to push ahead without hurdles or outside restraint.

Quite apart from these considerations, however, the DD/P, because of the requirement to clear outside of the Agency many issues (including details) as policy questions, had tolose control over the project in order to guard against omissions of such outside clearances and to beosition to request them through the DCI.

To avoid delays in communications between WH and the DD/P, the

pent substantially full time on the project. His position was

thoroughly understood by all involvedurist chart-maker might

have felt some concern as to the proper designation of the jobhart.

as, in fact, an extension of therm. He was physically

located next to the DD/P; saw him constantly; had immediate access to

him whenever he was available, and, therefore, knew instinctively what

theeaction to most problems was and would be.: Consequently,

he could act for him in many instances while at the same time being fully

aware of those situations which should be brought to theor decision.

If chart terms are necessary, heenior special assistant with a

perfectly clear and understood delegation of authority on matters which

he could decide for the DD/P. This individual's availability plus the


Copy /

Ihe Task Force was able to obtain decisions from theevel rapidly provided that they were in the DD/P's jurisdictional competence. The many decisions already mentioned which required outside clearance had

the Special Group or by special arrangement if some other tribunal such as the While House was involved. Thendere both positioned effectively with respect to the senior Agency or non-Agency officers involved to be able to arrange on the most expeditious basis

existing decision-making procedures were, it is believed, well

understood orew clearance procedure was needed for recurring

pecial procedure was created. An example is the procedure for clearance of Cuban overflights, datedhich is attached as Annex A.

The SurveyH because he was "in the chain of command" but "onlyartialPara.. He signed many outgoing cables, supervised staffing activities and attended some of the meetings of the Special Group. "But thend his deputy dealt directly with the project chief, and gradually the Ghief of WH Division began to play only

a diminished role." (Para.. All of this is essentially trueH. however, was not in the chain of command except on certain specified well-understood matters) although the Survey fails to stateH also sat in on substantially all of thend DCI meetings on the project attended by any WH personnel, and handled many of the policy negotiations with the State Department as well as some oi the more difficult special problems with the Cuban political leaders and some other special. those involving possible economic sanctions (with the Treasury and some. businessmen and lawyers) and those with particular individuals such as William D. Pawley. Also, of course, interrelationships with the many Agency stations throughout the Hemisphere and their activities were supervisedH.

Even in retrospect, this arrangementH is believed to have been organizationally sound and would again be adopted under similar circumstances. Black and white organisational answers often do not meet the complex interplay of problemsroject involving as many facets as the Cuban one. Granted, each echelon, starting with the DCI, should have one individual in the next lower echelon to hold responsible for all decisions of that echelon but such individual responsibility was quite

clearly identifiable in the project.

C/WH could have been the Task Force Commander but the DCI, having discussed Che matterH, decided that,H could not be the Commander and also run the rest of WH Division, it was preferable for him to do the latter. H had long and wide experience in the WH area; connections with many Latin Americans as well as Americans with WH associations; intimacy with the WH Division, its personnel and activities, and had been for many yearsolicy level in the Agency. Consequently, his advice and reactions were wanted in the Cuban project and he was asked to stay as close to project activities as he could while performing his other duties. The matters listed above were, therefore, coveredH pursuant to this concept. H had substantially the same relationship to this project as he had to the Guatemalan anti-Arbenz project which worked well. Nothing new, therefore, was involved.

The Chief of the Task Forces not criticized but his superiors are criticized for selecting for this postS-t the fourth echelon in the organization of the Agency. With regard to grade,eniorr, in other words, the equivalentenior full colonel in the Army. More grade could hardly be required for the top operational command job. As to competence and experience for the post, it is felt that he will compare favorably with any officer in the CS.

Pcrhaps the echelon was too low but thisatter of judgment. Actuallyas at the third not the fourth echelon, the first being the DCI and the DDCI and the second the DD/P. If the Agency alone is considered, it is believed that the echelon was not too low. If all of the Executive Department elements involved are considered, numerous other factors are introduced which involve so different an organisational concept as to make any relative analysis Impossible. This overall organizational problem has been mentioned and is now under Governmental study so that it would seem preferable here to discuss only the internal Agency relationships.

At anyor reasons already discussed was obviously not free to make all decisions on his own whatever the Survey may advocate in this respect. He was, however, very much the Task Force Commander. All elements ofn and out of Washington responded to his command. The extent to which he had to clear decisions with higher authority has been indicated. Itatter of judgment whether or not the delegation of authority was adequate but it must be re-emphasized that .the-judgment of most non-delegated items lay outside of the Agencys General Taylor's memorandum said, "there was no single authority short of the President capable of, and within the

Agcncy (once the problem of non-Agency clearances is recognized and accepted) the powers reserved by thend the DCI were in keeping with normal relationships between command echelons. Moreover, the DD/P, supplemented byDP/A, was able to expedite decisions so delay was held down as much as possible. Admittedly,. organizational structurehole was not satisfactory for this type of operation. The Government, as indicated, fully appreciates this and is attempting toolution.

The Survey makes another point regarding too many echelons, namely, that "the top level had to be briefed by briefers who themselves were not doing the day-to-day work." (Para.. Thisis another statementroublesome problem of senior governmental management in che complex modern world. How can the individuals informed On details communicate to the top policyChe relevant parts of their knowledgeimely and fully informative way? In the Cuban project, it can only be said that the top level saw more of the detail people than is usual. The DCI and ther the project's Paramilitary Chief with them toall Che Presidential meetings on Cuba. Moreover, the Chairman of the JCS brought General Gray (and often another member of his team) with him. Detail knowledge was, therefore, represented.

Moreover, of course, briefingi at high levels within each interested element were numerous. General and the Secretary of Defense received daily briefings in the period immediately prior topril. The Assistant Secretary of State <ARA) and the Secretary of State were constantly briefed throughout the project. McGcorge Bundy, Rostow and Schlesinger had almost daily contact with therDP/A. The DCI and the DDCI, of course, also were kept current on details. In view of this and the extensive interdepartmental coordination involved in this project and described in another section, the amount of top level detailed information was unusually complete. Admittedly, however, this does not mean that it was satisfactorily complete on all issues and this is one of the problems involved in the above-mentioned Governmental study on organization for projects of this nature.

Three other Washington Headquarters factors are described as "extraordinary" by the Survey, namely, that:

ery minor part in the project". COPS"declined to involve himself with the project" although on atoccasions he was given "express warning that the project wasmismanaged";

enior Staffs, the Agency's top level technicalnot consulted fully" but "they allowed themselves to be more orand

llll -i'i'


3) The Project Review Committee did not review the project. (Para..

These allegations are so "extraordinary" (to borrow the Survey's word) that it is difficult toerious intent on the part of the Survey's authors. Quite naturally COPS spent little time on the project. Thefficehree-man office, one of whomDP/A) was spendingli-iime on the project and another of whom (DD/P) wasery substantial part of his time. Consequently, it was only logical, if not essential, that COPS devote his time to the rest of the world as well as to the numerous remaining issues of internal management.

As to the statement about express warnings of perilous mismange-

ment, it is indeed strange thatharge should not be identified at least

sufficiently to permit some assessment of how responsible the warnings

were and of what they consisted. COPS remembers receiving no such warnii

Of course, COPS, as well as many other people were told on numerous

occasions that some mismanagement as well as oilier mistakes were

occurring in.the project. In what project does this not occur, particularly

if it is urgent, complex, and disruptive of normal procedures? These

"warnings" were given such attention and recognition as the facts in each

instance warranted. Actually, the Survey is unclear as to what it believes

COPS should have done though the inference is that he should have used the

alleged "warnings"asis for taking the project away from the DD/P.

The criticism regarding consultation with the Senior Staffs obviousl is directedailure to obtain available competent advice. Undoubtedly, the Senior Staffs had good officers who could have been helpful. The judgme involved, however, was at what point do you draw the line when you have operational activities to be accomplished. Each of the Senior Staffs assignee officers to work with the project staffs. No Senior Staff officer not so assigned could have been kept sufficiently well-informed without full and constant briefings. In view of the briefing obligations already in existence, it was decided that additional briefing burdens were unacceptable. Moreove as indicatedine had to be drawn and it was felt that sufficient seni< personnel were fully involved. The Survey's criticism in this connection is basedonceptormalroject rather than an extraordinary one like Cuba. In this connection, it should again be emphasized that participation by other elements of the Government is wholly omitted by the Survey.

The Project Review Committee's (PRC) clearance at the most under PRC procedures would haveeview of the proposed project in its early stagesiew to determining whether or not it should proce> The peculiar nature of the Cuban project resulted, as already indicated, in clearances throughout the Government at levels which make it hard tohow the PRC would have affected the process. Moreover, even


Trail /


internally in the Agency, the PRC is only advisory to the DCI and it is doubtful if its normal procedures were intended to apply to this type of project.

The Agency, particularly the DD/P, is criticized for failing to deprive the Development Projects Divisionhe Agency's air arm, of its independence by placing it within the organizational structure of the project. The proper organizational positioning of an air commander in relation to the ground commander has longatter of argument in the Armed Services. The same difference evidenced itself in the Cuban project withavoring the Marine view of completeof air conflicting with the DPD air vieweparate command with responsibility to support. This conflict was never fully settled and did cause friction {and probablyroader sense never will be to the full satisfaction of all the services). It is not felt that it created any more serious difficulties. At any rate, theealt with this difference in the only possible practical way in early ctober the Paramilitary ChieftudyH toxpressing at length his views on the command relationships for air operations. Onherote an answer which set forth the controlling decisions. opy of this memorandum is attached as Annex B. Operational control of air forces and facilities required for the project was assigned to Chief of the Task Force. An air staff

section for air operations was created in the Task Force. The Acting Chief of DPD was designated chief of the new air section which was toall DPD personnel when actually employed on project business.

Since DPD had many air commitments to service outside of the Cuban project, AC/DPD was directed to report to then the usual manner as to this non-Cuban business.

In view of the foregoing, the Survey is simply wrong when it says "The project chief had no command authority over air planning and air operations. The DPD unit established for this purpose was completelyPara..

The Survey is also wrong in stating that there was no day-to-day continuing staff relationship. Two DPD officers (one, an air operations officer) were assigned full-time from DPD to the project and werelocated with it. Inenior air operations officer attended daily staff meetings. He also spent all of his tame with and on the project. Consequently, the air unit was organized to be completely responsive to the requirements of the Task Force with the exception of air safety considerations. In addition, DPD facilitieseather, communication mapping and, planning air operations, photographic intelligence and related interpretation services) were made available as needed. These were not physically moved as they were more effective in place and were able by remaining to service other Agency requirements as well. In fact the DPD

relationship with WH was much closer than quite effective relationship* which it had with other Area Divisions having similar requirements.

The Survey devotes several pages to criticism of thentelligence collection)umber of points. The most serious allegation is that the interpretation of intelligence was "entrusted to officers who were so deeply engaged in preparations for the invasion that their judgments could not have been expected to be altogether objective. " . One of the essential items referred to is the estimate regarding the effect of the strike force landing in triggering "an uprising among the Cuban population". . The Survey's lack of understanding of the project's theory on this point and the evidence for the judgments reached has beenin detail elsewhere.

It might be noted again that one of the supporting memoranda to General Taylor's oral report concluded "we do not feel that any failure of intelligence contributed significantly to the defeat". Moreover, two members of General Taylor's four-man Cuban Study Group, even in retrospect, still felt after hearing all the evidence that the operation might have been successful had the Cuban air power been eliminated.

Probably if any similar effort were to be attempted in the future an even greater association betweenndhould be worked out

would ictm fair to say thai admitting failures (which indeed is done) they were not as obvious as the Survey suggests. Inase can still be made that the estimates were right.

The Survey's other criticism regardingntelligence activities will be dealt with briefly. The creationn the paramilitary unit rather than with the Project FI Section is strongly criticized. he alleged bad consequence of thismproper estimates, has just been discussed. In other respects on this point the Survey is inaccurate The Chief Of the FI Section did attendtaff meetingsagehere was liaison betweennd FI Sections. The both saw cables. They exchanged intelligence and generally supplemented each other.

The remaining criticism regarding intelligence is directedailure to support the Miami Base. Since the Baseumber of other considerations, they will be discussed together.

The Survey, in effect, commends many of the operational results achieved by the Miami Base. The FI and CI activities are mentioned in paragraphsndn pagend, it is believed, that thesearc commendable.

The PM sideore complicated picture. The Survey is critical of the fact that Headquarters in Washington kept tooontrol on Miami. Consequently, too little authority was delegated to enable Miami to function effectively. There is no doubtumber of Miami officers felt that they were being over-controlled. No good operations officer ever feels differently or if he does, he is not doing his job. Consequently, the normal, healthy operating effort to shake the bit and run free was part of the attitude held by Miamielation to Washington.

Washington, on the other hand, was anxious to avoid moving

Headquarters functions to Miami or treating Miamiield station

which it clearly was not. Miami was not Cuba. Communications from

target areas could be received and handled just as fast in Washington as

in Miami. Many aspects of operational planning could be handled just as

well, if not better, in Washington than Miami. Coordination with other

operating areas was better handled in Washington. There were, of course,

exceptions. Some of the more obvious exceptions were that Miami was a

center for Cubans and an active interchange by sea between Miami and

Cubaact of life. The project organizational concept, therefore,

was to provide Miami with people and the authority needed to take advantage

of these potentials. Mainly, of course, this meant FI and CI activities,

i rui iTi'fip"^

wme propaganda activities.pecial training, and ihr handling of

the Cuban exile leaders. The Survey apparently does not (ind major fault (except as noted in the following paragraphs) with respect to Headquarters-Miami organizational relations in these fields, whatever the Survey may say about these activities in other respects.

The Survey does to some extent criticize the training run by Miami by saying that there was no full-time chief of training, no training objectives or plan and that much of it wasase officer doing the best he could. , The results allegedly were haphazard. For example, "one man was trainedotel room toarachute jump". ull jump course would have been preferable but the Survey's commentack of understanding of the problem. Inany officers did successful operational jumps with only minimal ground training. Combat pilots and air crews, when forced to jump, did so without having even been trainedotel room. Anyhow, as the Survey says the hotel-trained jumper "made one (jump) successfully 1" It might also have been stated by the Survey that the man in question was in his early thirties, in excellent physical condition and an expert tumbler. Moreover, his one successful jump was the only one he was asked to do. This case, unimportant in itself, is referred to because It brings out several relevant points,

in projects of this kind operating necessities are handled in the best possible way. Agents are often used without adequate training in the hope of getting some benefits; training sites are often inadequate but are accepted as the only available ones in view of all applicable conditions; operationalis not selected as being the best for the job but the best for the job in the light of applicable limitations; drop zones, reception committee* and internal organization are rarely what would be described as ideal in the training text book. Communications are difficult, zones hard to identify and agents arc on the run and harassed. Since the Survey at no point suggests the existence of these problems, some reference to their presence seems essential.

The hotel roomraining site for parachute jumping is only one of many examples of the Survey applying unrealistic criteria. We repeat what has been previously stated that the project surely had many faults but they should be tested against what was possible notheoretical and impossible ideal.

Moreover, the Survey provides some evidence inconsistent with the foregoing. Innhe care taken in selection and screening of Useppa Island trainees is described. Paragraphnets forth the training givenrainees originally prepared for infiltration. "Inhe Survey8 menadio




operators) had been trained in security, intelligence collection, and reporting, propaganda and agitation, subversive activities, resistance organization, reception operations, explosives and demolitions, guerrilla action, and similar matters." This would seem reasonably complete and organized. ormal complement of faults and failures, it is atill believed that the Miami PM operational and training recordood one and that this will be supported by the results.

After0 the PM focus was away from Miami. Under the "invasion" concept training, air operations, and planning were the major problems and these were primarily located outside of Miami. Nevertheless, Miami had much lo do in connection with portions of these activities. Recruitment was largely done in Miami. Despatching of materiel and recruits took place from Opalocka; PM agents werefrom and exfiltrated to Miami; communications and certain other limited training was handled in Miami, and the efforts to find and maintain maritime assets centered in Miami.

As between the two offices, Headquarters retained the final decisions on any operation activity directly Involving Cuban soil or territorial waters. The concern of non-Agency elements of the Executive Department, already described, meant that it was inadvisable to permit operational decisions involving Cuba to be made outside of Washington. Moreover, with the speed of communication the extra time required was normally

acceptable, since not operationally fatal, even though aggravating to those involvedainly Miami officers). Of course, overflight decisions had to come to Washington as did landings of any substantial amounts of materiel. Small exfiltration and infiltration operations could have been decided in Miami but policy limitations, such as no entry into Cuban territorial waters of boats having Americans aboard, made close Washington supervision advisable. Moreover, delay in obtaining decisions on these latter type operations was especially minimal since in substantially all of these casesas authorised to make the decision. Actually, as pointed out by the Survey, Headquarters seldom had any difference of view with Miami. agellB).

As far as PM results were concorned, the statistics were that in3 trained PM agents (these are in addition to theI agents mentioned in Para.agef the Survey) were on the ground in Cuba of whichere regularly functioning, non-doubled radio operators and four more were radio operators but in reserve since they had no sets of their own. The geographic distribution of both these agents and radio operators was pretty good, covering most of the island.

The maritime operations handled by Miami had by mid-April0 pounds of materiel (which with0 lbs. actually delivered by air provided the resistance up toprilotalbs.),


Copy /

had infiltratedodies and exfiltrated SI bodies. Admittedly, much of

the material, though by no means all of it, was landed on the north shore

in Havana Province since thisesistance center. Consequently,

those who wanted it and those who could handle it were concentrated there

- particularly in the early days. Ofbs. total, however, about

bs. was in provinces other than Havana,

in Matansas0 lbs. in Plnar del Rio, Las Villas and Camaguey.

In addition, some materiel *vae landed on the south coast at both the west

and east ends, i.mall amount,bs. in Oriente and

bs. in Pinar del Rio. In the early dayship with the range

wasew efforts were made to land some materiel in the central

part of the south coast but connections were never made with the reception

parties. ubstantial period (at least two months) prior to the landing

the central south coast was intentionally avoided since it was felt to be

vital not to provide even the slightest suggestion of operational interest

near possible landing areas.

Some of the specific criticisms of the Miami Base should be mentioned.

Conflict and confusion between Headquarters and Miami was said

to exist, resulting in duplication of effort (para. nd division of

control as to both agents and in the maritime field as well as high phone bills

and unnecessary cables. The duplication of effort undoubtedly existed to some

extent, particularly in the summer and fall0 as the organization was being set up, but the Survey does not give enough specifics to enable direct answer, and undue or serious duplication is not remembered. As to confusion of channels, there was surely some confusion in the early days on Washington-Miami calls, but in the fallules were established which, it is believed, adequately clarified thia problem. The division of control on maritime assets was intended, namely, the small boats were considered tactical and were under Miami control, the big boats strategic and were, therefore, kept under Headquarters control in order to keep them available for and ready to support the main landing. As far as is known, this division of control, which is considered to have been sound, caused no real difficulty.

Miami allegedly received almost no intelligence support, The general nature of these allegationsailure to indicate what the alleged consequences of the errors were once more make it difficult to answer directly. Obviously, there was no intention to deprive Miami of needed support and no Miami operation is known to have failed because of lack of operational intelligence. Beach areas and theCuban situation were as well known to Miami as to Washington. (See. hotography did not go to Miami, but it was not needed for any of the Miami decisions. Also, it was available in

Washington to Miami officers. As to Special Intelligence, the Miami Base was supportedholenit at another location. Miami did not. It is true,fficer in Base Headquarters. An FI officer, however, was given the responsibility of digesting all Special Intelligence material in order to pass it to operations officers if important. In addition, he briefed the operations officers on this materialeek.

3.) Security is attacked (paras.t Obviously many aspects of the Cuban project were public knowledge. With the required relations with many Cubans, politicians, military, and otherwise;efforts; press, magazine, radio and other propagandaubstantial amount of undcsired publicity along with the desired was Otherwise, it is believed that the security record of the project was not too bad. For example, it is now known that any case officer was ever "blown" by true name. The Useppa Island operation was never disclosed. IT. S. training sites were mentioned in the press but not located specifically and were not, it is believed, identified. The movement of the brigade from Guatemala to Nicaragua and from Nicaragua to Zapata was not discovered. In view of the efforts to find out everything by the Cubans and the U. S. press, these were significant accomplishments. Sending agents to Cuba who had known each other in training is criticized and blame is registered for one radio operator who knew "almost every paramilitary operation in Cuba from

the beginning of the project". In reply, it can be said that every effort

was made to send agents trained together to different parts of Cuba.

Admittedly, there were cases where they may have moved together after arrival (e.orking their way into the city of Havana). No case is

known, however, where two agents trained together were despatchedto the same place. As to the knowledgeable radio operator, itia quite true that therean witb exclusive knowledge of operations. He served under three resistance chiefs, the first two having been killed. Each of these chiefs chose him as their command communications channel, thereby evidencing the utmost confidence in him. He managed to escape and is now an instructor for the Agency. No reason is known as to why the belief in him was not justified. The disregard of security rules by trained agents (para.) was regrettable but Cuban, or indeed human, discipline is fallible. No instance is reported or known where such indiscipline was too serious or could have been avoided. As to American lack of discipline the Survey cites only one case, i.hatase officeriami motel (para. The Survey might also have said that this case was thoroughly investigated immediately and reported on long before the project was completed. Had the Surveythis. It might also have indicated that unfortunate as the incident was, the DCI on the recommendation of the DD/P, decided that in view of

Ten cBCfirrT

all the circumstances the officer hadistake but an understandable one and not one requiring action otherarning to increase future safeguards. As to screening recruits, it was impossible to use the same precautions regarding recruits to the camps, particularly toward the end when the recruiting rate was high (para, , as was used with individual agents. In camp, however, they were membersroup making individual activity difficult and even if they had known something, they had no means of communication. The pre-Ianding movements and the landing, it must be remembered, remained unknown. Also, the brigade members discharged their duties well. Bad consequences,of the looser procedures were not too evident.

Trip fiiPL.RH

nnex A




C/WH Division


AC/DP Division

The following procedures shall apply to all Cuban overflights undertaken under the Cuban Project, with the exception of econnaissance missions. Approval for the latter shall be obtained and instructions issued in accordance withrocedures.

to sending any notification to the field, ther one of them if either is unavailable) shall be briefed onplan. If possible DDPflSBM shall be included in the briefing

in order to be informed when the matter is presented to the Special Group.

should be responsible for arranging this briefing. Asit should cover at least the following aapacta of the proposed operation:

and means of communication with reception party.

flight plan,


A representative of DPD ahould always be included to cover the second aspect.

DD/P,n his behalf, shall makean appropriate briefing ofCI on each such flight. Normallywill occurlan has been decided upon followingreferred to inbove. In case of urgency,n his behalf, may decide to combine these briefingssingle briefing in order to save time. ll briefings of eitherorCI on Cuban Project matters including the above shallthrough the

Following the above briefings an appropriate message, or messages, will be sent to the field. Since an approval of the operation and of specific operational plans will have been obtained in the briefings, messages may be releasedand AC/DPD asrovided they communicate plans reviewed at the briefings. If, however, any message includes important instructions the substance of which has not already been reviewed then it should be released by theCI as appropriate.

No flight shall be dispatched until the Special Group has been advised of the plan or the DCI has specifically waived this requirement.

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR. Deputy Director (Plans)

nnex B



and Command Relationships-

nd Development Projects Division

M, subject: Study on "Organization and Command Relationships of Cuban Task Force (CTF) for Air Operations"

Comment on Reference: The referencedindand well expressed. The facts set forth inre accurately presented and the considerations elaborated in3 have great force. On the other hand, certain additional considerations bearing on the problem appear to have been ignored. When these are taken into account, the conclusions as stated inequire slight modification and the recommendations set forth inust be substantially modified in order to be acceptable.

Additional Considerations Bearing on the Problem:

a. As stated in the reference present command relationships do not give the Cuban Task Force Commanderontrol over all the major assets committed or proposed to beto this operation. In particular, air capabilities are under the control ofeparate component subject to no common command below the level of the DD/P. Although the referenced paper does not specifically refer toother resources required for the CTF which are not under the commandt isto emphasize that this project will require extensive support from other organizational components and that no contemplated arrangements willommand authority over all the resources and supporting activities upon which the success of the project depends. Accordingly, the issue raised by the paper is whether with respect to air assets the dividing line between assets under the command ofnd other assets remaining under separate command but used in support of the Cuban Project should be drawn as at present or should be redrawn inay as to place part of DPD under commandH-4

reference argues that the proper placethe line is between the Ai r Support Section of DPD,be transferred to the controlnd theof that component. Itelieved that this judgmentctual fact, the Cuban Project will require ator another the performance of operational andby most of the branches of DPD. The reason ishas been developedargely self-sufficient,which includes staff sections for not onlylogistics, personnel, finance, security, and administrationof which may have some part to play in the Cubanil will probably be desirable for logistic support

of air operations to be managed by DPD. As for operational planning and Headquarters monitoring of operations, it may well be desirable to use the DPD control room and communications facility. The DPD Cover Officer certainly has importantto make as does the Security Section, Even the Air Proprietaries Branch will be concerned with the Cuban Project because of the need for some of its resources. In order,to place under the commandll of the air assets he may require it would be necessary toubstantial part of DPD.

foregoing suggests that the properbetween the authoritynd that of AC/DPDredrawn Inay that perhaps half of the latterbe under the command of the Cuban Task Forcefact, however, it would be inefficient and probably whollytoividing line in this fashion. All of theDPD which have responsibilities for the Cuban Project, andthe personnel who will discharge these responsibilities,concurrent duties which fall outside of the responsibility

H-4. If DPDarge Headquarters it would at least be feasible to split each Branch into two pieces but such is not the case. Moreover, the burden of the Cuban Project activities and of other business will vary from day to day and week to week. Efficient utilization of personnel requires that in many cases the same individuals perform both sets of duties.

Supplementary Conclusions: It is concluded that DPD as an organizational unit cannot be split into two parts, one of which would have full and exclusive responsibility for Cuban Project activities and be placed under the commandaking this conclusion in conjunction with those stated in4 of the reference it would appearolution must be sought not by splitting DPD, but by placing the whole of that Division under the control of the CTF Commander with respect to air activities which are in fact Cuban project operations. This solution will have the added and vital advantage ofenior staff officer, AC/DPD who is the senior air commander in the Agency.

Physical Separation: The considerations set forth inbove suggest that no modification of command relationships will overcome the major difficulties that grow out of the physical separation ofnd DPD. It is manifestly infeasible to house the whole of DPD in the Cuban Project headquarters. The physical location of the DPD Air Support Section withay be desirable but obviously will leave the DPD Operations Control Room and its Logistics andBranchesemote location. Accordingly, such matters as the devising of cover stories, the working out of budgets and funding arrangements, certain security business,

and the clearance of many cables will still have to be done between officers who are housed some distance apart. It should bethat this is inherent in any arrangement whereby the full resources of DPD are employed in support of the Cuban Project. Perhaps the most serious problem is that presented by the remoteness of AC/DPD's office from thathis can only be overcome by reasonably frequentetween these two individuals. The inconvenience which is the cost of this solution is the price that must be paid for thein the Cuban Project of the best technical talent available to the Agency under circumstances that will permit that talent to be used parttime for the performance of other essential tasks.

Force Concept: olution along thebove is in the main consistent with comments

on the military task force concept contained in. of the reference. In particular, the proposed solution will permit unity of command. It must be recognized, however, that this solution will in effectarge air section and with the servicesenior staff officer for air activities. It is the size and competence of the air section thus provided that precludes physical integration as explained inreceding. Moreover, if such an air section is to be used efficiently and tc make its fullust practice substantial delegation to his air section and should recognize that it is competent to handle details in theof broad instructions issued by him. It is especially, desirable that full use be nude of DPD in its capacity as the air section of the Cuban Project, along with other staff sections ofs appropriate, in the development of military plans. It will be necessary, if high professional standards are to be maintained, for several military specialists, of which air represents one, to be made use of in planning as well as in operations,

6. Approved Action:

a. Operational control of all air forces and facilities required and employed in the Cuban Project will be assigned to Chief, CTF.

b. Chief, CTF will exercise this controlewly created staff section for air operations in the CTF.

will serve as the Chief of the CTF The staff of the Air Section will include any and allwhen actually employed on Cuban Project business.

DPD business unrelated to the Cubanwill continue to report in the usual manner to theand if questions arise concerning the allocation ofas between the Cuban Project and otheractivities, such questions will be resolved by the DD/P.

The Cuban Task Force as presently constitutednified forceingle Headquarters. If and when it should seem desirable toorward Headquartersield Command having responsibility for military operations in which air and other forces will be employed, the constitution of any such Field Command and its command channels to CTF Headquarters will require careful consideration. The desirability ofombined Field Command and relationship between the CTF Air Section (DPD) and air assets committed in Field operations will be considered when military plans are more nearly complete.

(signed) RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR. Deputy Director (Plans)


The Survey is critical of the Project's personnel management in two major respects:

The Project was not staffed throughout with top-quality people; and

A number of people were not used to the best advantage.,

There are three basic difficulties common to the entire Survey which are equally and perhaps especially applicable to the sections On personnel and which make specific responsive answers almost impossible. They are the existence of:

Unsupported allegations of fact as innhich will be discussed further below.

Conclusions unsupported by facts as in paragraphn pageumber of "obstacles" are stated in such general terms as to make their understanding difficult or inn pajehere it is stated thatesultumber of factors "none of the most experienced, senior operating officers of the Agency participated full time in theUnderlining supplied).

An admixture of allegations some of which apply to theenerallyack of Spanish linguists, para.efective nature of entire CS staffing system,;


some of which apply lo lhe government or the Department of Defenseroblems with Armed Forces,; and some relate to the Project.

An effort, however, will be made to be specific in reply and where this is impossible to indicate the difficulty. Regardingcompetence in staffing, it should be stated that the Survey mentions no names. omewhat general response is, therefore, unavoidable, but to be reasonably specific, it has been felt that the names and the backgroundsumber of the senior officers in the project, excluding theDP/A,H, would be helpful in determining the managerial judgments in this selection. (See Support personnel, including communications, have not been included since the Survey is rightly complimentary of their performance.,

A major criticism by the Survey in connection with personnel assignments was an alleged failure to carrytatement made by the DCI in0 that he would do anything necessary to provide the personnel needed for success. In fact, this was given substantial recognition. Onhe practice wasthat if the Project wished to secure the servicesarticular

individual about whose release there was someH would adviseho would examine the case with the DD/P. Obviously carte blanche could not be givenapid procedure was established for resolution of difficult cases. In this connection, it is not clear if the Survey inn pagesailure to give carte blanche, but, if so, the conclusions suggest an organizational concept with which we disagree.

The Chief of the Clandestine Service Personnel Office (CSPO) also had meetings withn which the DCI's views were discussed (at least one of which is recordedemorandum for the Record, datednd the CSPO arranged awithhereby personnel requests were brought to him either by name or by skill requirement, then by him to thePanel and finally to the clement in question. Thewas, as indicated above, that difficult cases would be brought to theiaDP/A. The purpose of thiswas to avoid the need foregotiating directly with other elements regarding personnel thereby eliminating any potential divisional conflicts.

OnOPS sent an EYES ONLY memorandum to Staff and Division Chiefs and Chief, Operational Servicesthe need of WH for clerical assistance as well as imposing

certain requirements on the addressees lor help in thisopy Is attached as Annex B.

Again on0 at theeekly staff meeting attended by Division and Staif Chiefs of the CS, COPS, in order to re-omphasizc the above, announced that theanted to bo sure thatas receiving "enough first class people to assure success in their efforts." The solution announced was;

"We have staffedhus far without seriouslywith other operations and activities. Theof the situation demands your most sympathetic consideration of requests for temporary assistance to them. They now haveozen critical officer vacancies. We have agreed to havinguggest the names of those officers whom they would prefer to have particular jobs. The CS Personnel Office will be in touch with you on the names produced bynd on others identified as being qualified. If you can possibly spare them for the next fewrge you to do so. If you feel you cannot spare them, please tell the CSPO your reasons. Mr. Barnes, Mr. Biasellill then attempt to judge the relative priorities andecision respecting such assignments. "

In view of the foregoing, there can be little doubt that senior CS officers knew of the CIA policy to supportn its personnel requirements. The success or failure of the application of the policy is, ofatter of judgment. Obviously no personnel roster

is ever wholly satisfactory. Conversely, no project can take any officer regardless of other commitments. The attached roster, it is believed, establishes that on an impartial judgment the

project was served with officers of experience and competence.

Obviously the requirements of the Project were unusual and urgent,eview of the pace at which officerstaff not contract) were assigned and detailed has revealed no more than the usualequesting officer wanting help more rapidly than provided and some junior officers being less qualified than desired. On the whole, however, assignments and details were kept pretty well up-to-date and the caliber adequate. umber of cases the performance of many officers responded to the challenge of the project, and, consequently, was better than might have been anticipated. In this connection, it might be noted that despite the enormous time demands, inconveniences, family separations, and other difficulties imposed on personnel the project's record for sick leave or absenteeism was so good as to be spectacular.

It might be noted that the CSPO, one of the few senior officers with whom. or his representatives had any discussions on this matter, asked the chief investigating officer what officers


were considered poor. One PM officer was named. The CSPO then demonstrated that, although this officer was disliked by-some people, he had been specifically requested byad performed extremely well and in fact was continued infter the misfortunes of1 because of his performance in the project. No more was then said about this individual but no other examples were offeredpecific request for names.

In view of the foregoing, it is suggested that the Survey allegations be at the very least set aside until specific evidence be introduced to which an answer can be addressed.

The few minor points listed by the Survey regardingare discussed below:

1. asic mistake was made by filling key spots early without realizing how much the project would grow with the result that officers often endod up supervising three to four times as many people as orginally anticipated.

The inference of supervisors beyond their depth is clear. It can only be said that supervision during the project in no place seemed to require change due to inability. Moreover, it must be


recognized thatast moving situation an informed junior officer, who has lived with the project often is more effective than ansenior officer. At any rate, further factual support of tho criticism must be produced before any more thorough answer can be provided.

2. None of the threefficers assigned to the project was given top-level managerial responsibilities

Actually, there were fourfficers with the project. One, however, was detailedpecial assignment. One of the other three was Chief of Station, Havana until the Embassy was closed in1 when he returned and became the senior man dealing with the Cuban political elements. Anotheras Deputy Chief of Station in Miami. The Chief in Miami was junior to him in grade but he had been with the project from the start (having initially been the projecte was an old hand in the WH area and was performing well. All, including thegreed that the Deputy Chief of Station, Miami was appropriate for theince itigh enough post to permit him to be effective and still did notituation by changing purely for reasons of grade an officer, performing well, in favoratc-

comer who was not an area expert. The thirdfficer,fficer, who performed wellesponsible overt post. To have madeanager would have created problems since he did not have operational experience.

3. Of thefficers "holding the principal operational jobs inn Gradehrougharge percentage were ratedow position in the initial "Relative Retention,.

Without analyzing specific cases, it is submitted that these statements are completely deceptive as possible evidence of poor quality of personnel. The reasons are:

a. The ranking of individuals under the above procedure in many cases had nothing to do with competence or ability in given assignments. Rather the criteria were the needs of theover the years to come. igh grade specialistittle needed field, therefore, might be rated very low. pecific examplearamilitary officer assigned torom another division who served in the project with distinction. Nevertheless, since his parent division had no foreseeable need for such officers, he was ranked low in the initial list. Moreimilar result might well be true of paramilitary officers since the feeling is that the Agency, particularly

post-Cuba, will in all likelihood have few similar projects in the future. Surely this view would be reflected in initial lists prepared by Divisions and would tend to be corrected as necessary during the elaborate policy level review of the lists.

b. Ranking is competitive, and since many of the project officers were not WH officers, they were ranked in the retention lists initially by WH officers in competition with WH officers for long term WH assignments. On this scale, they might well come out badly regardless of their competence for the Cuban Project. In the first place, If paramilitary officers, their speciality is not in future demand; and if not WH area specialists, they would be poor competitors with area specialists lookingong term future. They might, however, have been excellent officers in many Cuban Project assignments without area knowledge.

C The initial lista were substautially revised for the above and other reasons in subsequent reviews. Consequently, by themselves they are of little validity.

Again, therefore, it is recommended that at the very least the Survey's allegations in this respect be set asideore detailed examination is possible covering the specific individuals in question; why they were rated low on initial lists; did their ratings change on

later lists and, more specifically, what relation the rating for retention purposes had to the performance on the Cuban Project. Obviously, the reverse might also be true,n officer couldop rating for retention purposes but still have poor qualities for the type ofrather peculiar requirements existing in the Cuban Project.

4. ery few project personnel spoke Spanish or had Latin-American backgroundPara..

Obviously, it would be desirable for most officersroject of this sort to have both the language and area knowledge. Admittedly, the Agency has not achieved this capability to the extent desired, and probably never will. It must also be recognized that in special projects like Cuba the personnel demands must be met in substantial part by assignments based on functional experience even though the individual assigned lacks area or language qualifications.

As to the Project itself, the need for Spanish should also be analyzed. Obviously it was necessary primarily for those dealing withot all such officers, however, needed Spanish, since, for example, PM instructors were quite able to perform effectively without the language since they taught by showing and example. Actually, there were Spanish-speaking trainers in Guatemala so this point is made only for purposes of analysis. Moreover, the training job both on the ground and in the air was never an issue as it was generally conceded to have been excellent.


As to others dealing with the Cubans, the officers working with the Cuban politicians were all fluent in Spanish with oneenior officer who had no difficulty dealing with the Cubans inand who was relied on very heavily by many of the senior Cubans. His lack of Spanish, therefore, did not prevent hisosition of personal confidence.

The officers in propaganda had native Spanish and in addition the publications, the newspapers and the radio scripts were written and produced by Cubans who, in the case of most of the newspapers and publications, had run and produced the same items in Cuba immediately prior to defecting.

The senior FI and CI officers had fluent Spanish. In Miami, an officer with native Spanishorps ofoubansI organization of considerable competence. Even the Survey calledresponsive and useful instrument". ,.

nd his Paramilitary Chief had fluent Spanish, as did the Chief in Miami. To generalize, of the sixteen seniorofficers listed in Annex A, eleven had fluent Spanish. During the last four months, the Project operated its own Signal Center and its own Cable Secretariathour coverage. Two of the

three post-duty Duty Officers had fluent Spanish. ranslation


Unit of seven people was developed tohour coverage of direct communications.

It can be asserted that Spanish speakers were available for all needed uses. Some inconvenience may have been caused on occasion due to not having even more Spanish speakers,ack of adequate Spanish speakers cannot honestly be allegedround for any major failure in the project.

of the people who served the project on contract".

Undoubtedly, this statement has some basis in fact, but since no more is said and the consequences to the Project noteply is not possible in any manageable context.

the improper use of skilled personnel, thelittle to say. Inadequate use ofs is discussed above.other comments in the Survey are:

a number of instances, those senior operatingin the field stations that did speak Spanish had to be interrupted

in their regular duties merely in order to act asPara.. This is answered above.

many instances, case officers were used asfor agents and technical specialists as stevedores.any case officer does some handholding. Wherein this was

particularly serious in the project is not known nor indicated by the Survey.

opy #/

The "stevedore" reference is elsewhere expanded by the Survey to the effect that the "technical and training abilities" of several Navy Chief Petty Officers who were borrowed in connection with work in certain of the Project's ships were "grossly misused" as "much of their time was spent at stevedore or deckhand, It is quite true that some Navy personnel on duty with the Agency were made available by their components to represent the Agency interests and keep an eye on maritime repairs and modifications. Unquestionably, they were not fully employed though their presence at moments was very important. In all likelihood, therefore, thisituation where some inefficiency of employment resulted. One Chief Petty Officer was upset by the assignment and asked to be returned to his regular duties. Others, however, accepted the situation as special and largely unavoidable, and served without complaint as long as their experience was needed.

c. The Navy Captain assigned at Agency request to the Project to handle maritime activity was "reported to have been not entirely happy with his brief Agency tour. In any event, he was another example of poor handling of people in this project, and he was nothance to solve the problems of maritimet is not know who "reported" the Navy Captain (Captain Scapa) as "not entirelyut we are surprised at the statement since Agency


officers close to him thought that he leftretty good frame of mind. Of course, it must be remembered that his experiences might well have caused some discouragement. He was flown on short notice from his shipboard Navy assignment to detail with another Agency with which he had no previous experience. He arrived in1 so that the project was well along and he had to fit himself to itreat hurry and under pressure. He was, however, able to provide substantial help and his assignment was distinctly worthwhile. He examined such ships as the project had; went to Vieques and inspected the Cubanubstantial amount of time at Project Headquarters working on the maritime aspects of the Trinidad and Zapata plans and finally accompanied the Paramilitary Chief to Puerto Cabezas to participate in the final briefing of the Brigade and the ships' crews. Thereafter, he returned to Project Headquarters and spent night and day in the war and operations rooms working on all maritime aspects of the final days of the effort. Such employment of Captain Scapa, it is submitted, was sensible and constructive.




ebruaryCuban Task Force

Mr. Esterline's prior Agency experience included an assignment asofficial on the anti-Arbenz project in Guatemala and

K Mr. Egterline hadiluentSpan^h^ le has since been assigned as Chief of Operations. WH Division.

During World War II he hadonths with OSS including two lours behind the lines in Burma. Heaptain and commanded guerrilla units up to battalion strength.

hief Instructor at Guerrilla Warfare School at FortChief

Edward A. StanuUs .2 Deputy Chief, Cuban Task For<

Mr. Stanulis served in succession as Chief, Plans and Programs, Chief of Operations, and ultimately as Deputy Chief of the Cuban Task Force.

His military service was with the u. S. Army20 wherein he progressed in rank from 2nd Lt. to Major.

He ia now permanently retired for combat incurred disability (loss of leg). His assignments prior to combat duty included:

Asst. Reg. Intelligence Officer, Eastern Defense Command Regimental Adjutant, Instructor, Intel. School Asst. Plans and Ops Officer Training Officer, Infantry Tactics

In combatith the rank of Captain and Major, he served as Commanding Officer of an Infantry Co. (Rifle) with tactical control of battalion attacking elements. Having been wounded, heOW for six months.

On return to active duty in Washington he servedajor in Public Information Divisions of the Army and the Department of Defense until


He has also had broad experience in public affairs, writing, editing, and publishing. His prior Agency experience included assignments totaff, and PP Staff. Assigned as an instructor and ultimately Chueibf Headquarters Training, Ops School/OTR. Mr. Stanulis instructed in and assisted in the revision of PP, FI, and PM courses.

Richard D. Drain . D.1 Chief of Operations, Cuban Task Force

Mr. Drain reported to the Project from an overseas assignment in where he was Chief of Internal Operations and on occasion 1

His military record includes service as an officer with tho U. S. Army, Field Artillery (Armored). His active duty extended from3 to His training included the Ground Forces Intelligenceith special emphasis on O. B. and the Armored Command Hqtrs. CombatCourse.

Among other assignments he conducted Basic Training; served as Assistant and Acting; was an Instructor at the Armored School; and was Battery Officer in Advanced Training.

In combat (ETO) he was Forward Observerombat Teamlatoon Commander.

His decorations include the Silver Star and Bronte Star.

Heawyer and practiced in D. C. prior to Agency EOD. Hisexperience also included Agency assignments as Executive Asst. to the DD/I, Staff OfficerC (Office of Intelligenceecretary. Intelligence Advisory Committee; and he was detached from the Agency for two extra-Agency assignments. In the first he served on the White House Staff of the Planning Coordination Group under Mr. Nelson Rockefeller. In the second he served with the Department of Statepecialultilateral Affairs.

John F. Mallard,SMC 7 SA Military, Cuban Task For-

Prior to his assignment with this Agency, Col. Mallard had served with the Office of the CNO, Assistant Head Naval War Plans Section. His performanc was outstanding with comments indicating an excellent background of staffand professional capabilities. Noted as diligent, thorough andmature judgment. He had earlier served as Assistant Plans Officer on the


latter two as Second Secretary. He has fluent Spanish, Portuguese, and French, and has wide experience in Latin American affairshorough knowledge of economic matters.

His WH Division assignments include the following

He is now preparing to assume duties of

Ralph G. Sechafer .2 DC/FI Section/Cuban Task Force

Mr. Seehafer entered on duty with the Agency in Auguat2 andexclusively with WH Division. His overseas tours of duty included He possesses fluent Spanish and also

speaks Portuguese and German. Mr. Seehafer took his undergraduate degree in Hispanic studies. He is noted for his deliberate and untiring efforts andource of strength to the several senior officers who served as Chief of the PI Section.

David A. Phillips .5 P Section/Cuban Task Force

ontract agent and

Mr. Phillipstaff employee with the Agency on assignmenttaff and PP/Operations. He then had assignments to the Havana Station andas an outstanding propagandist with excellent supervisory qualities. Mr. Phillips has fluent Spanish with excellent area knowledge as evidenced by the fact that he often speaks publicly on the area, including having been on the "Town Hall of the Air".

Philip A. Toomey .1 DC/Propaganda Section/Cuban

Task Force

Entered on duty with the Agency in1 and has had prior assignment with OPC/WE/Plans and Ops, served abroada PP Ops Officer, returned to the PP Staff in Headquarters and was serving

Titan riprrnn

witht the time of his assignment to the Project. He has native Spanish and possesses ability toremendous amount of work. Mature judgment and skill in the propaganda field areouple of his attributes.

Jack Hawkins,SMC . October

Col. Hawkins was serving on the staff of Marine Corps School, Quantico, Virginia at the time of his appointment by Commandant, USMC to the Cuban Task Force. Heaval Academy graduate and saw service in the Philippines at Bataan and Corregidor until taken prisoner. Having escaped from his prison camp, he joined guerrilla forces and led raiding parties in attacks against the enemy for which action he was awarded the DSC. He was laterronze Medal for the Okinawa campaign. Following World War II he servedember of the Naval Mission to Venezuela and later as Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines in combat in Korea. He was there awarded the Silver Star. Served as an instructor in Quantico for three years and thent Camp LeJune where he was promoted to his present rank of Colonel. Col. Hawkins possesses native fluency in Spanish. He was personally selected for the assignment by General Shoup,

Frank J. Egan, Lt.SA .0 PU/PM/WH/4

Col. Egan reported to the Cuban Task Forceackground ofin Special Forces, U. S. Army. He had on earlier occasion workediaison capacity with this Agency and alwaysrue appreciation of the peculiar requirements of covert action. Serving originally as Chief of the Strikes and Plans Unit/PM Section, Col. Egan later proceeded to Guatemala where he assumed command of all indigenous Brigade training. He held this position with the helpew staff and contract employees until the arrival of the group of Special Forces Trainers. His capacity for work was outstandinj and the rating he received by his senior officer, Col. Hawkins, reflects Col. Hawkins' respect for his abilities. Comments particularly pertinent refer to his ability to influence and inspire the confidence and respect of troops.

4 Sr. Cuban Task Force Rep/Guatema

Entering on duty as Ops Instructorr. Sparks departed for Korea with the USMC and remained there as an IO/PM and Maritime Officer

TQr rfiCftBT

He (hen8 first as an Instructor,

then Chief of the Maritime Branch, later as Instructor, and ultimately. Chief of the Ops Course. He was commended as an outstanding instructor and capable administrator. Prior to his assignment to the Cuban Task Force be served as Chief/Cover Trainingwhere he set up andighly competent tutorial facility. His performance was noted as being

Jacob Scapa,SN .1 aritime Ops/

_>i^ Cuban Task Force

Assigned to the Cuban Task Forcepecial Assistant for Military Matters by the CNO, Capt. Scapa appeared on the scene in the late stages of Project development. He was at the time of his assignment on the Staff of the Commander, Amphibious Training Command, Atlantic Fleet. He had earlier served as Commanding Officer of the USS Walke and served aboard the USS Wisconsin, and had been on the Staff of the Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic. Capt. Scapa quickly reviewed and made himself familiar with all maritime operations and plans. He participated in pre-invasion briefings andignificant touch of professionalism to maritime matters.

TDY visit to Miamieview problem o! Maintenance Facility for LCI's and Small Boats. On return recommended and as sisted in acquisition of Navy CPO's (Machinists).

Then assigned to Plans and Strike Operations Unit where he assisted* greatly in liaison with Navy components and in preparation of sailingetc. He participated in final briefings of Brigade and maritime personnel Active during actual strike in War Room, Headquarters, Cuban Task Force. Currently Chief of Naval Mission, Ecuador.

.1 I Section/Cuban Task For 1

Entered on duty with the Agency as an instructor in the Ops Course. He remained with OTR until his assignmenti^tJJJr'-

He served thereraining and Intel Officer and Director of FI Operatioos. Returning to OTR6 as an instructor in the CE/CI Training Course, he was responsible for the training o{se 1 He became Chief Instructor in the Agency Orientation, CI Familiarization and Security Officer Courses. All reports indicate heuperbood executive and supervisor. He has been noted as being the outstanding instructor on the Headquarters Operations School faculty.

Gerard ProHcr .9 A/Cuban Task Force

Extremely capable PP Officer, original, enthusiastic,challenge. Outstanding PA man. Long time EE Officer. duty with the Agency9 in OPCtour in BBBW^ VAEivSplvBaVIBh DC,


E. Reichhardt .7

Officer/Cuban Task Forcel Section)

Reichhardt's earlier Agency assignments included that of Finance Officer, later Chief/Cover Division. He served FE Divisionaseadquarters. Later assignments were to the PP Staff and withH Division. His assignments with the Projecttint of duty at Miami Base before returning to Headquarters as DC/PA Section/ Cuban Task Force. He was then moved up as Plans and Policy Officer and ultimately served as Cnic^IScction. Mr. Reichhardt has native fluency in Spanish. He is currently

.7 Specialuban Task Fp:

Prior assignments-i

Department of Statefor extraordinaryC/WHD. Characterized

as dependable and resourceful, and having the ability to get the most out Of employees.

E. Howard Hunt .9 PP/PM/Cuban Task Force

Mr. Hunt's background prior to his service with the Agency was.workingriter andorrespondent for Time, Inc. He was assigned to OPC and served in fQfflff ears, was then reassigned to SE/P PW Staff. HeP Officer toeing

selectedej^Paw. He was rated, before his assignment to the Cuban Task Force, as having outstanding ability in the covert action field. He is exceptionally talented and imaginative in the PP field. His assignment

in lJg5Siy^rew o'-ts'.ar.difig reports. f.h.

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VII AnnexB



MEMORANDUM FOR: Chiefs of All Special Staffs and OperatingAssistance for WH Division

1. Certain activities of the WH Division require experienced clerical personnel. It is desired that all CS components contribute to this effort to the maximum extent possible.

Z. Requirements now exist for first-class stenographers and typists, grade immaterial, who have had general experience in the Clandestine Services for temporary detail to WH Division for an indefinite period. It is requested that you provide at least one such person from your component. Please notify the Clandestine Services Personnel Officef your selection so that the necessary arrangements may be made. The CSPO will notify you several days in advance of the date when your nominee should report to WH for duty.

Richardhief of Operations, DD/P


One of the conclusions of the Survey (as stated innas "as the project grew, the Agency reduced the exile leaders to the stati of puppets, thereby losing the advantages of their active participation".

This summarizes the Survey's general criticism of the handling of the

Cuban leaders. Two more specific criticisms arc made at least by inference In the discussion of this matter In the body of the Survey. The first was that ihe decision in0 to consider requests for paramilitary aid from groups other than the FRD "complicated relations between Project case officers and the FRDnd "appears to have resulted in some diffusion of effort". It also "seriously hampered progress toward FRD unity, sharpened internal FRD antagonisms, and contributed to the decline in strike force recruiting efforts". The second criticism is that the Agency prevented close contact between the political leaders, first of the FRD and later of the CRC, and the military forces in training in Guatemala. The Survey stateshat "this wasistake and an unreasonable interference in the Cubans' management of their own affairs. Controlled contact between the FRD and the troops would have done much to improve morale and motivation of the troops and make the training job easier".

As will be shown in the following paragraphs, the generalized criticism that the exile leaders were treated as puppets has little if any basis in fact. As to the two more specific criticisms, the facts are correctly stated, but as explained below there were plausible reasons for both decisions and even with the benefit of hindsight these decisions appear to have been wise. This does not mean that no disadvantages attached to them. The Survey is correct in pointing out that relations wit the FRD were strained by the decision to support certain non-FRD groups and that the lack of contact between the political leaders and the Brigade gave rise to difficulties on both sides. What is omitted from the Survey's discussion, however, is any explanation of the considerations that made these two decisions seem necessary, let alone any attempt to balance the risks and costs of different courses of action against the disadvantages of those actually pursued.

The press has carried many stories especially after the events of1 citing the sentiments of Cuban exiles to the effect that they were disenchanted with their role in the affair. It is understandable that after the defeat these Cubans would look for scapegoat nr. and allege that they had been used as puppets. It is, on the other hand, disturbing that

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these Cuban utterances in the press are accepted as fact in the Survey, particularly when considerable documentary evidence to the contrary was available to the Survey team.

Before analyzing the Survey's above conclusions, it ls important to examine various aspects and complexities of what the Survey calls "exile leaders"- First, one must differentiate between the political and military leaders. Second, one must recognize the pressures which existed within each of these two groups. Third, one should understand what the term "leadership" meant within the Miami Cuban exile community.

From the very beginning of the Project it was evident that there wer considerable differences of opinion--on almost all important question -among Cuban exiles of varying political shades and leadership capabilities Clearly, there was unanimity on the desirability and need to overthrow Castro; but during the great debate on how to accomplish this, two main trends became discernible: the activists, principally the military element in this category, wanted to fight. Political considerations meant little to tbis segment of exiles who believed political solutions would evolve automatically after Castro's demise. atter of fact, they had the greatest contempt for "the politicians". On the other hand, the

poll tic ally-minded exiles realized that the overthrow of Castro without specific plans and preparations to fill the vacuum created by his departure would be an immense error. They agreed with the activists that thecould only be accomplished by violent action but they feared that during the fighting one or more of the military leaders would emerge whos politico/economic postures were unknown quantities and who--in the exuberance ofbe accepted by the population as the new political chief of Cuba. Consequently, the political and military exile elements grew apart despite the existence of bonds of friendship and loyalty between individuals in one element and people in the other. Thus, when speaking of "exileistinction must be made between political and military leadership.

Also within the political and militaryigh degree of competition existed. Personal ambitions were rampant. Each individual claimed larger foliowings inside and outside Cuba than the next man; each tried to belittle the potential and capabilities of the other; each proselyted the other's assets. In the early autumnver sixty different anti-Castro political groups were active and vocal, almost all of them in the Miami area. They ranged in size from an Individual exile with three or four personal henchmen to sizeable bodies with


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substantial organizations still active within Cuba itself. The Agency representatives were in contact with many of these and its constant effort was to induce as many groups and individuals as possible toroadly based unified movement which would exclude only the supporters of Castro on the left and the Batistianos on the right. The Agency exerted pressure on the Cubans throughout the whole period fromp to the invasion in only two ways: to promote the greatest and most inclusive unity of effort and to promote the greatest feasible effectiveness. Decisions, however, as to who should be the dominant leader and what the political platform of the opposition should be were studiously left to the Cubans themselves.

Despite the pressure for unity, it remained true up to the election (by the Cubans) of Jose Miro Cardona as president of the CRC inhat exile Cuban lcadership--if taken in the broadest meaning of the term--consisted of the spokesmenreat number of anti-Castro groups whose prominence, importance and capabilities for active participation in the operation varied greatly and whose claim for leadership remained highly controversial. If the term is to connote the FRD Executive Committee then it is highly pertinent to keep in mind the barrier between the "Politicians" and the "Militarists" mentioned above and the very


remarkable checks the FRD Executive Committee members imposed oo each other. For rather obvious reasons they attempted to make the FRD an "Exclusive Club" by restricting, if not closing, membership in it and they insistedystem of parity throughout all FRD working elements, that is to say that each Executive Committee member placed the same number of his followers, as did any one of his fellow members, on any working group. This concept ofsurprising in exile politics and somewhat reminiscent of past Cuban history andhad, of course, its effect on dynamic action and puts the term leadershipomewhat different context. Moreover,. and the Agency did not feelifferent concept could be forced on the Cubans.

As the pace of the build-up and of current operations accelerated in the autumnt became increasingly apparent that any approach to the effectiveness which was the second of the two objectives of Agency pressure wouldigher degree of control over and direction of the anti-Castro movement by the Agency than had originally been hoped. The Cubans never did succeed inuban organisation sufficiently free of internal divisions and competently enough staffed to perform the rapidly expanding operational tasks. Radio broadcasts bad to be organized, publications arranged, and propaganda material

prepared. Paramilitary personnel had to be recruited, screened, and trained. Boats had to be procured, crewed, and maintained. Air crews had likewise to be selected and trained and air operations mounted. Two bases had to be built in Guatemala. There was the large and continuing task of logistic support. All of these tasks would have had to be performec" in one form or another even if the major emphasis had continued to be on the internal resistance rather than on the preparationtrike force. The FRD never came close to achieving the capability to take the major initiative in planning, directing, or conducting these activities. The hope entertained in the summer0 that the FRD would soon evolve into an organization which could take increasing responsibility for the direction of the effort, relying on the Agency mainly for financial and logistic support and for some help in training, proved completely illusional. It is fair to say that by mid-autumnhe choice wasegree of initiative and control by the Agency recognized at the time to be undesirable and, as the only feasible alternative, the abandonment of any serious effort to accomplish the end in view.

Against this background one can examine whether the FRD's political and military elements were reduced to the status of puppets and whether the advantages of their active participation was lost by this.


the outset, the basic principle was establishedthe independence of the Project's Cuban collaborators and, forand purposes, to treat and deal with them as equals; no ordersbe issued, results were to be accomplished by persuasion and byof normal, generally accepted practices of0 New York meeting which resulted in the formationFRD is but one example of the application of this Agency'srepresentatives served as hosts for the assembled Cubans,the view that formationnified oppositionuban affair and then withdrew leaving it to the delegates

to establish their organization in terms upon which they could agree.

staffing of the FRD working elements andof activities via these elements was in the hands of tbewere not obliged to check their moves with. contacts. the inclusion of Aureleano Sanchez Arango in theonhich took place without Agencywas at that time at least considered an undesirable development,example of the freedom of action the Cubans enjoyed. Itbe said that Sanchez Arango never had any assets of any kind to offer.

Heongstanding friendship with "Pepe" Figucrcs of Costa Rica and President Betancourt of Venezuela which enabled him to muster some pressure in the early daysigh position. In view, however, of his lack of following, his resignation was of no significance whatsoever contrary to the statement of the Survey (Para..

the moment the FRD was formed inork, the Cubans were aware of the importance attributed in theof the Project by their U. S. contacts to having FRDto Mexico. The Cubans opposed this movearietypersonal and some, from their view point, political.

Had the Agency treated its counterparts as puppets, this move could have been accomplishedatter of weeks. However, in spite of considerable pressures on the Agency, the principle of tactful persuasion was relied upon and it was not until0 that the FRD got to Mexico and then it was onlyhort time.

The establishment of FRD branch offices in numerous Latin American countries was accomplished by the FRD Executive Committee,. contacts merely playing an advisory role.

The aforementioned self-imposed system of parityunning the FRD by Committee resulted in less dynamic action than was

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desirable. artnership with divergent views among the partners is not the best mechanism for decisive action. . contacts suggested inhe creation of the position of an FRD Generaluggestion accepted in principle by all Cubans concerned. The Cubans, however, wanted their U. S. colleagues to declare their preferencesarticular person. Again this was not done because of the principle of non-U. S. interference in strictly unilateral exile Cuban affairs. The exile internal warfare on this leadership issue assumed rather remarkable proportions but finally the FRD Executive Committee selected Antonio de Varona as General Coordinator on

f) The concept of permitting the FRD Cubans to run their own show as much as possible coupled with their own preoccupation on mending their political fences and creating their own political machines, caused many tactical difficulties to those Agency elements charged.with day-to-day propaganda activities whose successful implementation hinged on immediate action without protracted negotiations on each detail. Thus, of necessity unilateral Agency operations had to be created in substantiall} all the action fieldsropaganda, intelligence collection,which were impossible to conceal from the FRD. The FRD leadership resented what they considered competition and demanded

exclusive control of these activities; they also demanded that the FRD be the only channel. dealings with any segment of the internal Cuban opposition or the Cuban exile community. On the latter point the Department of State did not agree; on the former, the Agency could not acquiesce because of operational considerations. Moreover, on the former point theretrong feeling throughout the U. S. Government that it would be wrong to permit the FRD to beosition to rule out any Cuban elements which might have usable internal Cuban assets. It was clear at least by0 that the effort to broaden theof the FRD to the point where it included all political acceptable elements of the opposition had failed and that the effort of its members to use it to advance their own political fortunes within the exile community was resented. All elements of. Government were agreed that it could not be an exclusive chosen instrumentonopoly of governmental support. These problems were certainly not the product of coercion.

g) The inability of the FRD Cubansof their incessant preoccupation with political advantage--to establish an effective paramilitary recruiting mechanism within the Project deadlines called for the utilization of Cuban officers and men outside the FRD channel.

tfiin nnr nn

This action waa in line with the realities of the situation,he inability of the political elements to tackle the military tasks as speedily and effectively as necessary and the aforementioned unwillingness of the rnilitary (or activists) to accept the political leadership. (Only after the election of Miro Cardona as CRC President did the Liberation Army support and accept the political structure.) Thus, political personalities retained their independence in their specialty and the military (and activists) worked--with the guidance. militarytheirs. If closer coordination had been possible between the political and the military it would clearly have been desirable. Only the political urgencies of an actual attack were sufficient to achieve any real unity and this was in manyiragesometime thing".

It is true as stated in the Survey that the Agency intervened actively to prevent visits by the political leaders to the training camps in December and January, and that this was deeply resented by the political leaders. It Is also true that this lack of contact with the political leadership left the Cuban military personnel unsure of what and for whom th were going to fight, even though being activists not political scientists they were generally satisfiedere "Down with Castro" slogan. There were, however, the most specific and urgent reasons for following


this policy- During these months, as the crucial role of the strike force was recognized by all concerned, the competition between the political leaders to secure control of it was at its maximum. Varona used the FRD recruiting machinery to try toreponderance of loyal personnel that would be acceptable to and have some loyalty to him. Other members of the CRC were equally anxious to insure the inclusion of recruits loyal to them. Most (but not all) of the FRD leaders resented the inclusion of men who had not been supplied through their own recruitment machinery. The FRD leadership, and later some members of the CRC, were determined lo try to displace the senior military officers of the Brigade with political appointees acceptable to them. During (he four months before the Invasion, no one of the political leaders could have been allowed to visit the camps alone without accusations of favoritism. Meanwhile, the Cuban military leaders in training and the American training officers who were endeavoring to fashion the Brigadeohesive and powerful force, feared above all any encouragement of factionalism in the ranks. Moreover, although the troops needed indoctrination in the ideology for which they were going to risk their lives, it was known that some members of the FRD and later of the CRC were unpopular in the camps. Thereeal possibility that if there


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were many visits of the political leadership, and if these visits were not carefully controlled when they wereeal cleavage would have opened up between the military force and the political comrnittee.witr the possible disruption of the Brigade, the one essential asset at the time. The decision to isolate the Brigade from the political leadershiponsiderable period wasifficult one and no one can state with certainty that the course of action actually followed was the wisest. It did, however,ituationay in which the Brigade was unified and the political leadership had, at least superficially, accepted their relationship to it.

h) As the deadline for the Project approached the need to broaden by democratic means and strictly by Cuban action the FRD base and torovisional government became pressing. Continuoui negotiations were conducted during1 andnd or1 the CRC was created. Every Agency position paper prepared on this matter stressed the need for letting the Cubans have their own say. Indeed it was felt that only Cuban selection could have any real value. This policy had tbe approval of the Department of State and was carried out to the letter. The following excerpts from an address by an Agency representative to the Cuban Revolutionary Assembly

i 5

onl just prior to the start of the selection of the CRC exemplified this: "Naturally, the procedures employed in the election of your leader or Provisional President must remain entirely in your hands.,. Obviously we are not trying to tell you whom you shouldis your responsibility and yours alone. .. The decision Is up to you. m confident you will make the right one. " Thus, acting independently the Cuban exiles elected Miro Cardona as their provisional President.

i) It Is quite true that CRC members went into isolation during thepril invasion; it is also true that statements on the invasion were issued in their names. On the former, CRC members were briefed and counseled by two high ranking Agency officials and the Cuban agreement was given voluntarily and without coercion and in recognition of the demands of the hour. In fact Miro Cardona was told that he might stay in New York City over the fateful weekendpril. He, however, asked to be isolated with the other members of the CRC.

j) In summary, the facts prove that FRD (and later CRC) members were not reduced to the status ofof their feeling in the ice cold reality ofthat their action capabilities

were exploited to the fullest (an outstanding example is the greataws and plans which were ready for promulgation and implementation upon the assumption of power in Cuba by the Provisionaluch limitations as existed on active participation by Cubans in post-Castr plans for Cuba were created by their own preoccupation with matters relating to personal ambitions, long-standing personal biases and exile politics Caribbean style. Indeed as pointed out above, politicians had httle to do with the military aspects of the operation since they lacked by their own admission technical competence. Just before the landing, however, the politico-military understanding was at its best. The Brigade and its leadership recognised the political leadership of the CRC and Manueleading member of the CRC, stayed and landed with the Brigadeepresentative of the CRC.

2. The FRD Military Element.

a) The military element similarly enjoyed freedom of action consonant with traditionally accepted rules of military discipline and order. Although American advisors, of necessity, directed the planning of the troop training from the basic stage through advanced large unit exercises and maneuvers, the Cuban military leadership participated in this planning and was solely responsible for the conduct of the training and for the control of the troops. In this latter connection, the Cuban

military leaders were responsible for the maintenance of law, order and discipline and in the discharge of these responsibilities meted out disciplinary punishment ranging from "company punishment" to incarceration.

Without coercion on our part, the Liberation Troops pledged their loyalty to the Cuban political leadership as represented by the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

The traditional cleavages of military versus political leadership naturally were evident in this operation as they are in almost an^ organized state in the world. There is no evidence, however, to support any contention that the gap between their respective objectives and methods to be employed to achieve these objectives was any wider than would be expected given the circumstances that existed. Merely because those like Manuel Ray who never favored an invasion said after the defeatold you so" to all available newspapers did not mean thatay unity was

not sufficiently strong to havelatform on which to build. Failure, quite naturally, provided the most potent fuel to the flames of dissension which lay only just below the surface.

3. Miscellaneous. Other than the main conclusion mentioned above, (here are some minor criticisms in the Survey. Project officers are criticised for not speaking Spanish. This point is discussedbut it might again be noted that of the six senior

officers dealing with the Cuban leaders, five had fluent Spanish and the one officer who did not succeeded nevertheless inlose relationshipumber of the top Cubans including Miro Cardona.

n pagesof the Surveycries of criticisms and preachments which are so general, unsupported or unconnected to some specific consequence that we can only comment that they have been noted with dismay and that we regret that until more detail is furnished, an answer is not possible.

The remainder of the Survey's section on the political front and the relations to the Cubans starting on pages mainly factual. It is only unfortunate that it treats soroblem so superficially and fails to include any of the extensive Agency relationships with the State Department and the White House with respect to the proper line to take with the Cuban leaders and the correct interpretation of the political views of these leaders. Also, what political attitudes were the most desirable from the point of view of the U. S? In addition, the Agency did considerablt work on the preparation of political documents. Moreover, some non-Agency experts were obtained to work with the Cuban leaders at their request in the development of the planks for their political platform. The absence of this whole story and the problems faced as it unfolded makes it difficult to have any real understanding of what was involved on the politlca side.



The Survey onlyne sentence conclusion regarding the

carrying out of paramilitary operations (as distinguished from the

basic militaryamely, "Air and boat operations showed

up The body of the Survey, however,

has three chapters on this point dealing withMaritime",

and "Training Underground. The major

points in these chapters will be considered below.

/ NB: Three maps have been kept and are available, if desired, which show all air and maritime deliveries into Cuba plus all PM assets on Cuban soil as of These can be examined at any time. They are believed relevant to these paramilitary points^/


1. Before discussing the many specific criticisms of theew background points should be presented.

a. For reasons already. bases could not be used. Consequently, drop missions had to be flown the longer distance from Guatemala, the only foreign soil within range for which permission from the local government was possible. Conceivably, President Somoza might have approved Nicaragua, but for many reasons Guatemala was preferable for these missions, e.sable base in Nicaragua was not ready until late in the project; Nicaragua


wai farther from. and during this period supplies had to come fromhe trainees were in Guatemala, so that by using the same country tho logistic support was simplified;eparate country for the strike base was desired. Moreover, it was advisable to keep pro-strike activities out of the country providing the strike base.

airmen could not be used. Thehad extensive experience and wereot ofair background, however, was commercial flying which, asout, did not provide them with the kind of night flyingdesired. Moreover, being Cuban and emotionallydiscipline was not good. For example, they oftenby remaining over targets too long in an effort to find thehelp their countrymen.

committees were either untrainedunder difficult conditions. rainedurveyor, canlight error inZ, particularly in rough terrain. mallenough to destroy Uie effectiveness of an air drop.

recent and productive experience of makingdifficult areas, such asconvinced us thatwith tlie receiving group, including ground to airfrom the DZ to the dropping aircraft (whether byr


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s essential to any assurance of success. In the Cubancommunications at best were difficult. For example, although contact was established with groups in the Escambray by courier, efforts torained radio operator with equipment were never In other cases it was advisable, if not necessary, to keep the radio operator away from the DZ in order to avoid risking so scarce a This meant an unavoidable delay with respect to last minute messages between the senders and the actual receivers. In no case were the desired communicationB mentioned above ever possible.

Cuban land mass is not easy for drops. terrain is rough and DZs are few as in the Escambray or the area

is relatively crowded making an isolated spot difficult to find. In addition, Castro,ormer guerrilla leader, had surveyed possible DZs and was thoroughly familiar with their location.

operations without all aids are As already stated even toward the end ofkilledto skilled and experienced reception committees werea rule of thumb on the basis of lessons learned,Ofi chance

of success. The technical facilities in Cuba were less good than those in Francend the human capabilities much less good.

Having made the foregoing comments, it should then be admitted that the drop record in Cuba was poor. Efforts to improve it, however, were

not successful, nor is it clear that any permissible action would have done any good. bs. of materiel were actually delivered (somewhat more than stated by the Survey). (See para.he major deliveries, however, as already explained, were by boat. Only one body drop was made. The reason for this was that drops were obviously going badly and individuals could be infiltrated more successfully by boat.

2, Specific allegations of the Survey follow:

first drop was close but missedilesby the Survey (para.. ontributing factor was

an unknown dam construction marked by lights. lights had been approved at this stage of the project and knowledge of the construction was not available. On return the plane hit the proper coast-in point in Guatemala, and the crew captain then turned the plane over to the co-pilot. The latterhort cut, climbed above some cloud cover, was lost when he came down and landed on the first field he found,n Mexico, even though he still had sufficient fuel to return to Guatemala. Obviously, this was bad procedure and poor crew discipline.

rice and beans droptagean exaggerated case. In order to fill out the load, the DDCIdrop some food, as food shortages wereroblem with the


resistance. Probably loo much food was dropped and the agent was disturbed and angry. He continued, however, to work for the resistance and with the Agency, coming to Miamiater date and returning again to Cuba thereafter.

c. Reception procedures,) were the best that could be devised in each instance, givenhe DZ, the local situation, the communications and the materiel available or that which could be used,onfires often were impossible, thereby making flashlights necessary). As toof view, there is no doubt thatinal flight plan was decided upon in particular cases there were often varying suggestions as to what should or should not be done. The clearance procedures already described were fully understood, however, and, it is believed, worked. In view of all the circumstances, they were nots alleged by the Survey. The Special Group gave the overall clearance; the Task Force made the requestrop and recommended the time, the place and the load; DPD handled the preparation of the flight plan and suggested any changes prompted by air safety considerations; and the DDCI gave the specific flight plan and final operational clearance. The crews were briefed in Guatemala. Their air discipline, as already indicated, was poor but how to correct it was difficult. Pilots and crews were hard to find so that they could not be fired. Navigation also was


faulty though usually mistakes occurred in the difficult area after hitting the Cuban coast-in point,

were often told, as indicated by thedrop if they had any reason to believe that they were close to Often the need was so urgent that any effort towas justifiable. Moreover, capture of materielatter of no consequence as the Cubans had morethan they could use. Also, there were cases whereby non-resistance Cubans who then passed the materiel to Consequently, this chance was always present. If the


blind drop theory was wrong, at least it was consciously adopted by all concerned at the time.

so-called "tardy corrective action"as misunderstood by the Survey. In late February ora review of drops was made to try to see what, if anything,done to improve results. The findings merely confirmed thereally provided no solutions. Some suggestions were made which,

in effect, wereestatement of existing procedures. as already indicated, were continuedatter of policywere urgent, even though the review recommended The other study made in1agestopped by the Paramilitary Chief as he knewolution by use


of American pilots was politically unacceptable no matter how desirableationally.

In conclusion it might be said that the DPD overallood one and will stand close examination. The failureswere not the result of lack of competence nor of poorwere rather the result of many complex factors, some beyondsome undoubtedly within Agency control. During theonly real solutions were believed to be in the area of politicalalthough an improved record might have otherwise Surely if better communications could have beenthe resistance elements at the time of drops, there would have been

greater success. It must be remembered in this connection that during the early months1 the communications picture improved materially. Moreover, during the last two or three weeks before the invasion somerop requests were received which could not for other reasons be fulfilled. The groups making these requests were, however, well equipped and capable.


In the maritime field, it should be noted that the Survey makes no mention of the operational atmosphere or difficulties. This, of course, is true throughout the Survey, but, because of the particular difficulties encountered in connection with ships and crews and the amounts

of money involved, the omission of realities seems perhaps more conspicuous in the maritime field.

One major omission, for example, is the effort made by the Agency to find boats in the Navy and the Coast Guard. Although such effort was made and both Services were thoroughly cooperative, no usable boats could be found. Consequently, although the Agency fleet was not what might have been desired, it was, of necessity, obtained out of what could be found.

Another omission is any review of performance in relation to difficulties. For example, under the circumstances, it is suggested that the infiltration0 lbs. of materiel plusodies and the exfiltration ofodieserfectly reasonable performance. Moreover, the transportation of tho Brigade to the beachhead without hitch wasommendable operation.

As to supplies, the Survey criticizes the limited distribution achieved geographically in Cuba, but the fact is that the distribution was fairly good. This has been explained in an earlier section along with the reasons why the central south coast was not covered.

As to the condition of ships and the money required for their purchase and repair, no detailed discussion seems justified, although the Survey devotes considerable space to these items. The onlyof these allegations, it is felt, would be if, in the light of the

existing requirements, urgencies and availabilitiesfandhe judgments exercised werethe Agency fleetubstantial amount ofas stated, the craft were not ideal. The issue,what It is doubted that anything could have

been done ai the time which would have materially altered the situation.

Admittedly, as indicated in the Surveyhe Agency capability in the maritime field at the start of the Cuban project was not very substantial. Thia, however, is no great surprise in view of the unlikelihood pre-Cuba that the Agency would become involvedroject requiring this type of maritime capability. It should be noted that for two years prior to Cubafficers examined all aspects of PM requirements, including maritime, to determine what preparatory steps, if any, could be constructively taken in advance of an actual project requirement. umber of actions were taken, the Cuban maritime needs were not anticipated.

In this connection, in retrospect it would probably have been wise to have requested Captain Scapa or some other senior Navy officer earlier in the project. arine Colonel was, of course, the Paramilitary Chief and had charge of maritime operations. Also, continuous liaison

' fil"4


with the Navy and Navy officers in Defense was taking place. ull time Navy Captain in the project could have resulted in the adoption of more imaginative methods which might possibly have produced greater performance. Even in retrospect, however, it is not known what these would have been.

1. The main specific criticisms of the Survey are:

a. Difficulties with crews particularlyhere is no question that trouble was experienced with the Cuban crews. One problem was that the Cubans, when recruited, thought that they were going to control the ships. This impression could have been given by Agency officers in good faith. At any rate, it soon became apparent that such control was impossible, particularly for the landing operation. Clearance was, therefore, requested by the Agency and obtained to hire American mastersew American officers for special postshief engineer, communications) on the main landing ships. The heads of MSTS went to extensive pain and trouble to help the Agency find such officers. When hired, however, they were resented by the Cuban seamen, who felt that they had been deprived of their own command and control, and time and circumstances did not permitcruises. The consequence, particularly when the crews were first put on board ship, was trouble, partly for the reason given and partly


because of differences between lhe Cubans themselves. These latter conflicts were unfortunate, bul it is unknown how they could have been discovered or anticipated during the recruitment unless more time had been available. These problems, moreover, were ironed out before the landing movement in which these particular ships were involved. In addition, the crews were effectively given good training at Vieques as evidenced both by Captain Scapa's examination and the later performance of lhe crews.

b. The Surveyreat deal of the case of one of the Masters of lhe "Barbara J" who was discharged andhad his name includedetter of commendation. This caseong history known to the inspectors which unfortunately the Survey does not choose to mention. Briefly, the Master was considered by MSTS as one of their best men. In fact he was one of the youngest of their meno beaster. trong personality difference arose between him and one of the senior Agency contract employees who was toentral figure in the landing. This employee made charges against the Masterharge that the Master had been drinking on an operational trip. He, therefore, demanded that the Master be The case was such that under the circumstances the Agency

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top oriGnnT


employee had to be backed or lost. Due to the employee's importance to the mission, the fact that heery good officer, and theof time, he was backed and the Master discharged. On further investigation, it was found that the Master not only denied all theagainst him but claimed that he could find men to substantiate his story and asked in writing to vindicate himself. In view of his superior MSTS record and faced with serious issues of fact plus obvious security problems and with no time or opportunity to hold hearings to resolve these issues, it was decided to give the Master his contract pay and to explain the facts to the Industrial Relations Officer of MSTS. This was done. Thereafter, at the last moment it became essential toaster for one of the reserve supply ships. Due to the urgency of the situation, the Master's background and the very good impression that the Master had made following the other incident he was asked to take the job. Knowing of the problems at theincluding the dangers from enemy air attack and despite his strong disagreement with the decision resulting in his discharge, the Master still immediately accepted, took command of the ship and put to sea. Due to subsequent events beyond his control, he was recalled. In view of all these facts, his name was later included in the general letter to MSTS commending the performance of the more thanfficers provided by MSTS. On this record, the action taken still seems correct.

c. As to infiltration of teams ( were some difficulties but again the situation must be examined in regard to all the existing facts. In the first place through the summer, fall andoearly winterhe Havana Station was in existence (the Embassy and thus the Station was closed In early January). Consequently, internal Cuban contacts and communications were excellent. Moreover, legal travel was relatively easy and as pointed out by the Survey,adio operators were put into Cuba legally. In addition, defectors, as indicated in an earlier section, were exfiltrating in large numbers. Many of these held responsible positions in the Castro Government or in the community and were in close touch with resistance groups. Moreover, the Miami exile community, many of whom. representatives of internal resistance groups, had their own communications through couriers or otherwise. Consequently, the six maritime operations mentioned by the Survey inOctober, and November must be assessed in relation to this Also, in addition, in the summer and fall0 (ending in December) the RIO ESCONDIDO was used to infiltrate and exfiltratc as many aseople. The shipmuggling compartment in the boiler room which could take two individuals, preferably one. The Survey does not mention these movements, probably because they were not considered maritime operations, rather arrangements with the ship's captain. Five of theeople infiltrated during this period were key resistance leaders andperators. Another factor during this period was that


JLUKi- 1


legal movement was relatively easy for individuals legally in Cuba so that the desirability of putting in individuals who had to live and leave black was reduced. In view of all these factors, it was decided to keep out many of the teams originally planned for infiltration. The reaction of trained teams to such inactivity was, what might have been expected, anger, discouragement and lowered morale. On top of this the ill-fated trip of the "Barbara J" was unfortunateeams were aboard who were not put ashore in Cuba. Consequently, the attitude of this group of Cuban trainees was at times bad. After tlie Havana Station was closed, however, the infiltration efforts picked up despite being thwarted by bad weather through January. By the end of March or early April, the paramilitary agent infiltration had achieved an adequate total. Moreover, thirteen communicators was anumber although it is probably fair to say that there is no such thing as too many communicators.

d. The Survey alleges that small boat operations were not planned Probably under the press of events the paper work was not as tidy as might be found in normal charter parties. Planning, however, was, it ia believed, what was possible. Maritime operations can only be planned in relation to known facts such as an available reception, an available boatoment timelyission. Overall plans are obviously possible and it is believed that

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it can be shown that such plans existed. In the tame way what was desired in the way of boats was known but actual purchases were only feasible as particular craft materialized on the market. C. TRAINING UNDERGROUND LEADERS

The major criticisms of the training were that the sites were inadequate and in some cases too remote; training on foreign soil would have been better accomplished inome of. training was with haphazard facilities and trainers; and the training was piecemeal without plan.

Before responding to the particular allegations, it must be noted that, with all due respect, the Survey's criticism suggests the attitudeswellerecure and well-ordered academic "Never-never Land" who assumes that all training must be similarlyor it is poorly managed. It is the Harvard Law School trying to comment on the advantages of sandlot training for baseball players. The only difference being that the HLS would be judiciously analytic whichoint of view never achieved by the Survey.

The facts are that none of the project's training sites were ideal or picked solely for the accomplishment of the training Security considerations, or. In other words,ital role.

Moreover, if results are any criteria, the training sites were adequate. As far as the Brigade and its air arm are concerned, the conclusions of impartial expertshe JCS team) regarding the competence achieved are recorded in writing. The performance of the trainees on the beachhead is further proof. The training of the landing ships' crews at Vieques was good and effective in operation. The training in Panama was excellent on all reports as was the screening and handling of personnel to be trained at Useppa Island. The Nino Diaz group at New Orleans was, according to all observers, well trained and ready to fight. Its failure to land was due to poor leadership and not the fault of the troops.

The communications training has always been reported as excellent and the Survey itself commends the communications effort. Practice also established that the trained agent communicators in Cuba had far fewer garbles In their messages than normally found in such transmissions.

The agents, who were trained (and all those who were infiltrated as agents were giveneceived courses in how to live black; some weapons and demolitions training; some CE; air reception and how to handle drops; resistance organization and how to contact underground groups. The teams who were to be infiltrated received.

) III LL 1


as stated by the Survey) and mentioned earlier, training in "security, basic clandestine tradecraft, intelligenceand reporting, propaganda and agitation, subversive activities, resistance organization, reception operations, explosives andguerrilla action and similar action. "

There was, therefore, no lack of training doctrine or planning. Incidentally, since it has been raised by the Surveythe air reception procedures taught to all agents were those taught ln the Agency School on this subject.

Regarding Bites, it should be pointed out that, whether good or bad, the Guatemala sites were the only ones available. . was politically unacceptable and the Guatemala government was the deciding element as to the sites in Guatemala that could be used. Tho Survey says that the ground training base in Guatemalaouldndividuals. The fact was that it did plus many more and worked.

Similarly the initial situation at New Orleans was difficult. Again, however, the problems were adequately corrected to provide adequate training. It took work and some help from the Armed Services to get the base functioning but both occurred and prevailed.


Copy /

The Survey, as indicated, also alleges that training could have been more effective and secure if done in the United States, The Survey points to tank and communications training which did take place in. to support its conclusion. What is not said is that the tank training only involveden and was done. base accustomed to training foreign groups and quite able tomall group of this size. Similarly, communications could be and were taught in small classes. Political clearances, therefore, were

granted specifically for these classes,. S, base for' tankers


. safehouses for communicators, butecognized exception

to the basic rule of generally denying the use of the U. S. for any kind of

training. The Nino Diaz group at New Orleans was obviously another

exception and one which was somewhat inconsistent with the general

rule, but the clearance was given nevertheless because time was short

(the invasion was imminent) and an attempted diversionary operation was

considered important. Moreover, no other site was available that was

either better or usable, taking all factors into account.

The question of haphazard facilities and trainers has been discussed

earlier. Obviously, thereood deal of adjusting to the needs of the

momentroject of this sort. It is believed, however, that the record

will show that the training plans were reasonably detailed and complete.

Moreover, thatraining course of any length was involved,

therepecific training plan.




Dr. James H. Killlan, Jr.

Chairman, President'b Foreign Intelligence

Advisoryxecutive Office Building. C

Dear Dr. Kllllan:

Attached is copy of the CIA Inspector General's "Survey Of Cuban Operations" together with coamento thereon by General C. P. CoboU, Deputy Director of CIA and "Analysis of ,Bie .Cuban Operation" by Deputy Director (Plans). Thia latter report is intendedomment on the Inspector General's report,

Ao you readilyx notosition toersonal opinion concerning the validity of the IG's report or the statements by the DDCI and the BDPaa not in CIA at the tlie. However it Ib my personal opinionesult ofave made of this operation after the fact tbat both the report and the rebuttals arc extreme. elieve an accurate appraisal of the Cuban effort and the rcanons for failure rest some place in between the two points of view expressed in the reports.

I believe it is safe to say the failure of the Cuban'Operation waa OOTernment-wide and in this respect the Agency must bear its full share (though not the entire) responsibility.

For thinould recommend that your board, inthe Inspector General's Survey also review the commente and analysis of the DDCI and the DD/P.

Yours very truly,

/b/ John A. McCone

John A. McCone Director

Attachments As stated


: Deputy Director Survey of Cuban Operation

My work in support of your "Analysis of the Cuban Operation" gave me an unusual opportunity to study with care the document which caused tbe Analysis to be written, namely, the "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation,.

My consideration of the Survey has forced ma to reach certain conclusionseelot record. o so in writing because these conclusions are, in my opinion, of sufficient significance to demand the disciplinerit tan expression. eel that those who disagree with me should have ths opportunity to direct any replies that they may choose to make to specific identifiable comments.

3* ay say tbat ay decision to write this memorandum waa reached with considerable reluctance and only after long deliberation. The deciding factor was ray belief that the suggestions for net ion lnelow are worthwhile and should be submitted. They would have been meaningless without the reauons set forth ln the earlier psjagraphs. The views expressed ore, needless to say, exclusively mine.

k. In my opinion. Survey ls most unfortunate for three reasons:

is an Incompetent Job. Theunderstood the problems with which they wereand failed to express their viewa with anyproper use of relevant facte.

is biased. Basically relevantvital issues was not only left out but never The Survey undertook only to presentwhich suggested failures or inadequacies. however, were not fully depicted so tbat awas given. Admittedly,. must exposeit Is also his Job to do so accurately.

c. Italicious, or, to put It alternatively; It la Intentionally biased. Admittedly, thiserious charge aad is, at best,tatement of opinion. on only sayold such opinion firmly. In my view It could be supported solely on the basis of the Survey's total emission in nany places of significantly relevant evidence. Such omissions are so excessive and one-sided as to substantiate the conclusion that they eust have been Intentional. In addition,ould like to mention four other points:

lhe fact, that the Inspectors, in Baking their Investigation, omitted any discussions of their findings with the senior officers responsible for the project. . can accurately state that he talked to thend thebout the Survey, the fact is that these discussion were exceedingly brief and covered none of the real issues la the Survey. The ac/dpd was not spoken to at all. Tbo Security Officer of VH/fc was not spoken to at all. Other senior officers, suchHere never given an opportunity to express their views in relation to statements in the Survey.

Some officers with whom the Inspectors had discussions felt after theyhance to see the Survey, that it did not Impartiallythe Information which they had provided and left out such of the relevant Information given. Iforeover, some officerc have reported that the attitude of the Inspectors and their line of questioningesire to obtain facte or views to support Judgments already formed. Opinions contrary to these judgments were not only disregarded but resisted.

The distribution of tho final Survey was so peculiar and contrary to normal practice that it raises an Inference of Intended partiality. Tbe method of distribution la known and will not be repeated here. It might be added that there

were other facta with respect to the distribution of the Survey worthy of dent ion. as called one day and asked if he wanted to read tbe Survey. Ue said that be would like to do so but sinceE and DC/WE were away he could not 'leave since he was Acting Chief of the Division. Particularly, he could not meet the requlreneats of the offer which were that he would only have an hour from the tine of the telephone call to see the Surrey (including travel tine) since it then had to be sent to the printer. Why the urgency waa so great is not clear. As far as is known, only one individual outside of. Staff saw the Survey in final or substantially final form before It was distributed, namely, an officer who was the Chief of Operations for WH/a, during the project. Why ho van selected instead of one of his superiors who was connected with tbe project is not known.

-) Since this particular operation, without question. Involved more political interest and dynamite than any in which the Agency has ever participated, there was every reason for following regular pnxedures meticulously. In addition to the distribution point mentioned above. It seomo relevant to wonder how Dr. kit linn and the Attorney General knew of the Survey's existence so as toopy.

I should say that, whatever the appearance of theI have not been trying.. The Information reported came to me unsolicited and ln the normal course of ay work with you and your Analysis. Maybe there is additional evidence of Importance,ave not looked for it and do not plan to do so.

The significance of the foregoing ls to provide the reasons for the main purpose of thisheof the following recommendations for action.


DCI should resolve to his ownconflicts on major issues between6 SurveyAnalysis. Since both these documents are internalAgency, there ls no Agency position on the Cubanunless the conflicts are resolved. Id view ofof and the continuing Interest In thehigh levels of the Government, an Agency position osition is also important for The operation is bound to be studied forand there should be an Agency position at leastwhathat were the mistakes and what were Moreover, the DCI, having assumed officeoperation was thoroughlyas every reasonto have some definitive findings and conclusions.

the DCI agrees with a. above eachthe Surrey and Analysis (and it is. understood thatonly be distributed together) should be advised ofthat such an Agency position is being sought. help to avoid independent conclusions outside ofbeing reached first.

following requirements should beall future'I.G. surveys at least on any aspects ofarea of responsibility.

Ho survey shall be undertaken without specific written terms of reference approved by the DCI.

Thehall be satisfied that In each future survey covering any portion of his area of responsibility. or his staff willat -least all officers having had responsibility for any part of the activity inspected by the

I.G. and prior to the distribution of the survey tbend each such officer will be given an opportunity to express his views on pointsin the Survey. Obviously. need not accept these views. Such procedure, however, will save an enormous amount of time required to answer

liliiiillll'l 'I'll" llllll

surveys such as the Cuban one which fall toull factual picture regardless of thereached.

m addressing this memorandum to you as my Immediateope, however, that you will agree with my request that the memorandum be passed to the DCT for hiso not, of course, ask that you associate yourself with it or any part of It merely because you transmit it.






MrXORfUIDUM FOR: Mr. C. Tracy Barnes Dear Tracy:

Thank you for your courtesy In sendingopy of your memorandum ofanuary concerning the Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation. o hope that Dick forwards It to the DCI,nopy of this note to you in cose you wish toopy to Dick.

I have not had time to study your memorandum, or even in fact do more than glance at thenalysis In view of the meeting with the President's Board all day Friday and the factm going to be away all this week. ill make the following comments. Seedless toompletely disagree with your statement that it is an Incompetent Job. eel that it le competentelieve that the more than one file cabinet drawer full of background documents will prove its competence. o not believe that it is biased. We made it very clear at tbe start of the report that it would only deal with inadequacies and failures and would not purport tohorough analysis of tho operation.

Most ofbject most strongly to your thirdnamely that it is malicious and intentionally biased. ave asked the men who did this survey to review your memorandum and comment on the reasons you believe that It is biased. hould perhaps acknowledge that more time should have been spent with you or Bissoll, but inasmuch as this devolved on me. If thereault, It is mice personally. But to Imply that for soae reason, unknown to me, that we would slant this report is an unfair comment. You apparently feel there was something unusual in the distribution of the final report. The only thing unusual in it was that we bad two Directors at tbe time, and Kr. McCone having asked for it received It as be was leaving for the West Coast on the day before Thanksgiving and everybody else got their copies on the day after Thanksgiving. Tour concern as to how the President's Board and the Attorney General knew of the survey's existence can be answered very simply. 6 the President's Board In writing advised all agencies that all

Inspector general reports should be forwarded to them on't believe Iteek after the Cuban operation tbat the direct question case free tbat Board as to whether an Inspection was going to be done to which an affirmative reply was given. The Attorney General'eo not know.

Finally, as far as to what should be done next, you and Dick should know that at the conclusion of my discussion with the President'srgedroup, or individual, who had not in any way been associated with the operation be charged with taking the Taylor Report, our report and your comments and all background material andruly national and detailed report. elieve that wouldar better solutIon than trying toIA position, which really is not very practical Inasmuch as there were so many outside factors affecting thlo operation.

/s/ Kirk Lyman B. Klrkpatrick



MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Mr. Barnes1 Memorandum on the IG Survey of the

Cuban Operation

you are aware, Mr. Tracy Barnesajor partwork in preparing our comments on Mr. Klrkpatrlck's Survey

of the Cuban Operation. At the conclusion of the task, Mr. Barnes wrote me the attached memorandumereby pass on to you.

may saym In agreement with Mr. BarnesSurvey, largely by reason of the omission of materialits conclusions,ighly biased document andbias ls ofharacter that It must have been Intentional.

will be glad to discuss this with you if you so desire.

/s/ Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

KICEARD M. BISSELL, JR. Deputy Director (Plans)


Barnes' Memo

IG Memo to Mr. Barnes


MfXORANDCM FOR: Hr. Ktrkpatrick

The IO's Cuban Surrey and the UD/P'b

Analysis of the Cuban Operation

acope of the IG Survey Is briefly and.clearlythe Introduction. The Survey's intent was to identifyvcakncoceo within the Agency which contributed toresult and to make rcconoeadat.lono for their futureIG bad no authority tourvey of the machinerydecisions and policy at other levels of government. was covered by the group beaded by Oea. Taylor. Theavoided detailed analysis of the purely military phase

of the operation.

Much of the DD/P's Analysis is devoted, however,iscussion of Bovernmental decision-mo king andehash of the military operation. It criticizes the Surrey for Insufficient attention to these matters, putting the major blame for thefailure on factors beyond the control of the Agency.

The Analyels attempts to refute most of the weaknesses described by tho Surrey. The few which it admits were. It contends, not significant to the final result. It rejects the Surrey's statements that intelligence was inadequate and misused and tbat staffing was inadequate. It blames the failure of the air drops

on the Cuban reception crews and air crews. It states that small boat operations could not well have been handled ln any other way. And It states that other weaknesses were not important because they were not the decisive reason for latlure.

k. Thereundamental difference of approach between tho two documents. While the Analysis is preoccupied withpolicy-making and military strategy, tbe Survey is mainly concerned with the failure to build up internal resistance ln Cuba through clandestine operations. The Analysis falls to shed any further significant light on this fundamental issue.


5. The Analysisoorer grasp of what vas going on at tbe cane-officer level than of events .In policy -aa king circles. This lo apparentumber of inaccuracies in the Analysis. For example, the discussion of activities in Miami le Inaccurate and misleading. Conduct of training In Miami Is defended although it vas not criticized by the Survey. 8 trainees alluded to In the Analysis as trained in Miami vere In fact trained In (Hut cm la. The PM section in Miami vas being built up_ beginning Inather than being de-emphasized. These and other inaccuracies -suggeet that the Analysis should be read with caution where it deals with events on tbe working level of the project.

.ThenvcDtlgvtor6 centered their phases which are significant to' iheperation and of the Agency'ssicmannot'be ignored or argued.away Just cecause^of policy made outside the Agency.'




Director of Central Intelligence

Inspector General's Survey of the

Cuban Operation

receipt of the Inspector General'sn the Cuban Operation, which reached toyto my resignation as Director of Central Intelligence,

I Immediatelyopy to the Deputy Director (Plans) for his comment. This was in line with thead consistently followed In dealing with tbe reports of the Inspector General: namely, the Office which is the subject of the inspection is given an opportunity to comment on. report before the Director determines the action to be taken thereon. The reply of the Deputy Directoratedfaveopy, was submitted to you following my resignation.

I have also received and consideredof the Deputy Director of CentralCabell.

3. emain at your disposal for any consents you may wish me to submit on any phases of this matter relating. responsibilities. ill not submit detailed written comment on tbe Inspector General's report.

h. At this time,ish to make certain general comments:

a. ember of the Taylor Committee appointed by thearticipated fully in the work of his Committee and Joined in his Memorandum and oral reports to the President on this subject. o not nowopy of theseade only one or two reservations to the general conclusions and recommendations of tbese reports. onsider them to be sound and believe they should be accepted as the best available Survey of this particular operation.

t>. The Inspector General's report suffers from the fact that bis Investigation was limited to the activities of one segment of one agency, namely,* Opinions based onartial review fell to give tbe true story or toound basis for the sweeping conclusions reached by him.

could not properly be renderedull analysis, as was made by theof actions of all of tbe participating elementsoperation and the influences brought to bear outsideAgency vhich affected the operation. This appliesto the participation of the Department of State,of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and toof tbe Executive Department of the Government.

no time during the preparation of histhe Inspector General request any information from memakes certain serious errora in areas where mywas clearly involved.

5. Two major areas of criticism ln. report cover (l) the operational arrangements for the organization, training, transportation and deployment of the Brigadehe relations of Agency personnel to the Cuban emigration and their political organization. As to theseubmit the following:

while certain organizational matters,light of developments, may be open to some criticism,with its entire complement of men and equipmentlanding area on schedule and under circumstancescomplete surprise. The situation in the landingsubstantially as predicted. The enemy battle orderwas essentially correct. The failure to get thesupplies ashore was due to circumstances beyond thethe Brigade commander or Its personnel.

with respect to the organization of apolitical committee la support of the operations, Iout that prior to engaging In theroadCuban leaders, and one acceptable to our State Department,

These two important achievements covered major areas. responsibility.

6. Aseemed It desirable and necessary In viev of ay other duties to delegate certain responsibilities within the Agency for the day-by-day management of tbe operation, and on military matters andelied heavily on military personnel assigned. aod on Department of Defense personnel and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ssumed throughout full responsibility for the Agency's participation and actions and kept currently advised of all important developments. During the coo-eluding days of theas particularly influenced by the judgments im Col. Hawking dispatch, datedelating to the high state of readiness of the Brigadeo Chapter IV of DDP report).

7- Whether or not the operation vould have succeeded if the Brigade had landed with its entire personnel aod equipmentatter vhich can be debated and on vhich even today military experts differ. Certainly, the responsibility for failure does not lie primarily in the main areas of criticism stressed in the Inspector General's report.

8. Of course, there are lessons to be learned as pointed out in the Taylor Reports. Theseelieve, should be taken as the main basis for any reviev of the Agency's actions in support of the operation.

/s/ Allen W. Dulle Allen W. Dulles


The Honorable Allen V. Dulles Washington, D. C.

Dear Allen:

I have received your memorandum of2 containing your comments on the Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation. Copies of this memorandum, together with tbenalysis of the survey, the comments made by General Cabell, Mr. Kirkpatrlck, and the personal vlevs Mr- Tracy Barnce, will be bound in lhend therefore will be known to anyone who might hove occasion to read it.

Sincerely, signed

John a. McCone Director

Original document.

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