OCIopy No. ^
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY
THE NEW STAGE OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE (October
(Reference Title: ESAU
of Current Intelligence CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Thisorking paper, our first systematic survey since1 of the Sino-Soviet dispute. This paper discusses tho stage initiated by Khrushchev's aew offensive atd CPSU Congress inxamines the forma of pressure on the Chinese still available to Khrushchev, and speculates on the possibilityino-Soviet break in the next year or so.
We have had profitable discussions, on many of tho ut* ters considered in this paper,umber of other analysts
None of our
colleaguos should be held responsible, however, for ourwhich are controversial.
The Sino-Soviet Studies Group would welcome furtheron this paper, addressed ln this instance to theof the group,
THE HEW STAGE OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
Programs and Soviet
& Discipline in the
ATD CPSU CONGRESS
Programs Criticized, Soviet Aid
Authority in Movement
THE BREAK .VITH ALBANIA (November
AND RESISTANCE (December
Sino- Albanian Counter-Off ens
Soviet Warnings to
Forces in the Chinese
Prospects for a
THE NEW STAGE OF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
Su andn s
In usingd CPSU Congress in1 primarily to renew the deStalinlzation campaign ln the USSR and to extend this campaign to the entire worldmovement, Khrushchev was breaking the uneasy truce with the Chinese party reached at the Moscow conference of the 81 parties ln Through the "antlparty group" and the Albanian leadership, Khrushchev attacked the Chinese along four main lines: tbe "personalityorld Communist strategy, the building of socialism, and authority and discipline in the movement.
Despite the apparent Sino-Soviet agreement at tbeconference not to engage in polemics on the course of deStalinization in tbe USSR and the question oi Just which parties were still practitioners of the "personalitys of1 the Soviet and Chinese parties clearly remained in serious disagreeatent on this matter. It was obvious that the concept of tho "cult" stood ready to serve the leadership of either partyresh attack on the other.
Similarly, in discussing the mishmash of Soviet and Chinese positions on world Communist strategy presented in the equivocal declaration of the0 conference, Moscow and Pclping1 had reaffirmed all of their conflicting views. Although these differences had not usually been stated polemicallyhe Soviet party had continued to favor an opportunistic strategy ofWestern resistance by peaceful gestures while exploiting indigenous political movements In non-Communist countries primarily by non-military means, whereas the Chinese party had continued to advocate a more militant revolutionary program for the world movement on all fronts, particularly lo the underdeveloped areas. Moscow contended that tbe bloc should not accept serious risks of world war, while Peiping arguedore militant program would not the existing risk. Moscow spoke of the danger of expansion of local wars andeed for caution ln supporting "liberation" wars and popular uprisings, whereas Peiping minimized the dangers of local wars and called for
ouch stronger support of liberation wars. Moscow held that "peaceful coexistence" should be the general lino of bloc foreign policy, while the Chinese held that this concept was retarding tho world revolution; as part of this, Moscow endorsed, and Peiping criticized, the idea of negotiations with tbe West. As regards both colonial areas and independent countries, Moscow minimized and Peiping emphasized theof armed struggle and other forms of violence; whereas Moscow emphasized, and Peiping minimized, theof cooperation with bourgeois nationalist forces there. As for specific foreign policies, Peiping bad been pleased by th* militant features of Soviet policy during Soviet statements on Berlin and the Sovietof nuclear testing, but had been very cool to the Kennedy-Khrusbchev meeting and the Soviet emphasis onanxiousoviet rap?rocbe-ient with tho United States and Yugoslavia, irritated by Soviet relations with India, and concerned that Khrushchev might not stand firm on Berlin.
As ofhere also continued to be important differences between Soviet and Chinese positions on building socialism and Communism. Moscow had continued to criticize Chinese domestic programs and the Chinese aim of economic autarky, while Folpiog had defended its programs and spoken of need for economic independence to ensure political, lndepend ence. The USSR as of1 had not moved to restore the program of economic, military, and scientific aid.which had existed prior to the withdrawal of the Soviet technicians in Further, 1 Moscow had cut back shipments of military goods aod had apparently discontinued the special preference given China in trade relations; Chinese Imports -from the USSR had dropped, scientific cooperation had been greatly reduced, and Soviet aid to ailitary research had been drastically reduced or halted.
he most offensive feature of Chloese behavior had clearly remained that of Pciplng's challenge to Soviet authority in the world Communist movement. Thehad been most dramatically illustrated in Albania, but it was also evidont in Sino-Soviet relations with the small Asian Communist states and the Communist parties of oon-bloc Asian states. The Soviet party had continued1 toon its right to make generalizations for the movement, it had reaffirmed Its favor for the principle of majority rule it had warned of the dangers of nationalism in the bloc, and
it had hinted at the possible expulsion from the bloc of states continuing to defy Soviet authority. It had been apparent that thed congress would be used in part for fresb affirmations of Soviet authority, although It was not foreseen that these would be as spectacular as they turned out to be.
As for Albania, Soviet-Albanian relations sincead deteriorated along the same general lines as had the Sino-Soviet relationship, but as of1 weret had boon the Soviet campjs practice to condemn Albania explicitly and openly Instead of China, whilethe criticism to apply to both; and the USSR had taken several political, economic, and military measures against Albania. 1 the Albanian regime had belligerently reaffirmed pro-Chinese positions, and had been acquiring the statushinese dependent; by October, Albaniaembor of the bloc largely through its ties with Peiping.
In attacking tho "antiparty group" and the Albanianin his reports and speeches tod congress, Khru-shebevwas aiming primarily at the leadership of the Chinese party, the only significant challenger for leadership of thu world movement. His charges against both of his overt targets were roughly the same as the charges that the Soviet party had made repeatedly against tbe Chinese privately, in party letters and in international Communist meetings, or had made publicly (sometimes ln very harsh terms) without naming the Chinese. In making these fresh attacks and in warning the Chinese by name on tho limited issue of supporting Albania, Khrushchov was giving tho Chinese yet another chance to retreat while at the same time seeking to persuade them that this would be their last chance before the Soviet adoption ofmeasures.
Khrushchev in bis central committeectober) used tho concept of the "personality cult" to describe the fundamental error of his left-wing domestic and foreignerror responsible for their other errors; and he declared that the Soviet party could not yield onprincipled question" to the Albanian loaders or "anyone else."
In reaffirming propositions on world Communist strategy disputed, orifferent emphasis, by the Chinese,was particularly emphatic in insisting that tbe Soviot interpretation of the concept of "peaceful coexistence" was sufficiently militant and that only "hopeless dogmatists"
thought otherwise, with respect to specific foreign policy goals which had given Peiping concern, Khrushchev was hardly reassuring; he described disarmament as Moscow's mostforeign policy goal, he withdrew tbe deadline (of the enderman peace treaty, he spoke of furtherwith India, he ascribed great significance towith the United States, and ho was in part conciliatory toward Yugoslavia.
Khrushchev also reaffirmed Soviet propositions on the building of socialism and Communism in individual countries and in the blochole. He and others empbasized the importance of Soviet aid to other members of the bloc. In private meetings during the congress, he reportedly ridiculed Chinese programs.
As for questions of authority and discipline, Khrushchev in his first report asserted that tho Soviet party had been seeking and continued to seek means of resolving itswith the Albanian party. He concluded his attack oo the Albanianattack which at this point in the congress was stilla call for them to "abandon their mistaken views" and return to the path of unity and cooperation.
Chou En-lai, probably uncomfortable in his role,io one way or another to each of the main lines of Khrushchev's attack. In hisctober speech, Chou did not mention tbe "personalityut he made the Chinese point sharply two days later byreath ioscribed to Stalin the "great Marxist Leninistr " Chou ln hisctober speech did. not take up questions of strategy systematically, but hethroughout that Soviet strategy was insufficiently militaot, particularly toward the United States and in support of revolutionary struggles everywhere. Chou praised the general course of Soviet foreign policy but spoke sharply about coociliatory gestures to. With respect to building socialism aod Commuoism, Chou praised the Soviet party's draft program aod madeinimal defense of Chinese principles and programs (about which he personally had shownnd be also expressed gratitude for past Soviet support of Chinese programs; however, hethe principle of self-reliance for China.
The most important part of Chou's speech related to authority and discipline in the movement. He clearly expressed Peiping's displeasure that Khrushchev had brought the Soviet-Albanian (and therefore the Soviet-Chinese) dispute to this new stage. Reaffirming the Chinese view that differences between parties should be resolved by consultations, and thus implicitly reiterating the Chinese rejection of the principle of majority rule in the movement, Chou condemned tbe public censure of the Albanian party leaders as being contraryserious Marxist-Leninist attitude."
The day after Chou's speech, the central committee of the Albanian party (not represented at the congress) issued an incendiary statement which concentrated its attack onpersonally. The statement presented the dispute as one between Khrushchev and "his group" on one hand and the Albanian party and other Soviet leaders on the other, and it asserted that the Albanian party had support in the struggle.
Stung by Chou's criticism, by the Albanian statement, and by the Chinese act of homage to Stalin, Khrushchev ln his summaryctober) reviewed the deterioration in the Soviet-Albanian relationship, spoke of attacks on theparty from both "overt and concealed onemies ofnd commented sarcastically on Chinese "anxiety" over bloc unity, inviting the Chinese Co impictient their hope bywith the Albanian leausrs. ilo then made this invitation meaningless by calling publicly *or the overthrow of theleaders. The following day, Kozlov directlyhad ostentatiously left the congressescribing the airing of the Soviet-Albanian dispute ascorrect, serious Marxist-Leninistnd on the same day the congress voted unanimously to remove Stalin's body from the mausoleum.
By the end of the congress,f the other Communist parties represented at theaddition to the CPSU and theechoed various parts of the Soviet charges against the Albanian leaders, while none had supported Chou in criticizing the Soviet party for its action; althoughdditional parties which had spoken had failed to second tbe Soviet attacks andad not spoken, most of thesearties were also Soviet supporters, as they later made clear. If the matter of condemning Albania had been broughtoteonference following the congress, the Chinese camp would
probably have consisted only of the same handful of parties which had supported the Chinese at the Moscow conference of thoarties in However, perhaps because the Chinese handful would have included four of theloc parties (China, Albania, North Korea, and North Vietnam) and several parties of non-Communist Asian states,ote would have shown publicly the seriousness of the split in the bloc and movement, the congress was not followed byonference. Subsequently, Soviet and friendlypresentedd Congress as having been in effect an international Communist conference, so that no newwas necessary.
Id the five weeks between the close ofdctober) and the break in Soviet-Albanianvents moved rapidly along; the lines foreshadowed by the congress.
The most important of the speeches on October Revolution Dayovember) and the Albanian party anniversaryovember) was made by Hoxha. He accused Khrushchev personally of slander, blackmail, and blockade. He echoed Chinese positions on the "cult" and on questions of strategy and foreign policy, among other things accusing Khrushchev of cowardice in withdrawing his German treaty deadline. He further charged Khrushchev with being "afraid" to convoke another international Communist conference because he (Khrushchev) would again fail to mass tho parties solidly behind his positions. And he concluded that Khrushchev would fail in bis campaign against Albania, in view of Chinose and other support.
Chinese comment, which had been cautious in the first few days after the congress, in early November movedew stage of assorting just those things about tho Albanian party which Khrushchev and other Soviet spokesmen had denied: its correct leadership, its fidelity to Marxism-Leninism, its adherence to the multiparty agreements7 and its concern for the "unity" of the movement.
Moscow onovember took the first step in breaking diplomatic relations with Albania. It informed tho Albanian charge that the Soviet ambassador (already absent) would be recalled,emanded tho recall of the Albanian ambassador.
While increasing its pressure on Albania, Moscow in tho last two weeks of November lightly underlined its point that it was willing to take severe measures against China as well. The Soviet press reprinted several foreign Communist criticisms of the Chineseon the single issue of supportingpublicly named the Chinese as offenders. The Soviet press also foreshadowed the logical next step of criticizing the Chinese by name on otherby reprinting foreign Communist comment to the effect that other parts of the world Communist movement besides the Albanian party (but the Chinese were not yet named) were guilty of supporting the "antipartyn the USSR, of following dogmatic and foolish policies in economic develop* sent, and of "dangerous and adventurous" opposition to "peaceful coexistence." (One Eastern European leadertook prematurely the step of charging the Chinese by name with offenses other than that of supporting Albania: his reported statementpeech that the Chinese party as well as the Albanian had practised and indeed hadthe "personality cult" did not appear in presn versions of the speech.) In addition to keeping the Chinese conscious that Moscow at any time might attack themide front, bloc comment in this period referred ofteo to the importance of bloc aid in overcoming the economicof individual states, and to the importance of Soviet military protection for all bloc states.
Tho Chinese reiterated their praise of the Albanian party in commentaries on Albania's liberation anniversary in late November, and implied their agreement with the Albanian line on Khrushchev's lack of support in bis own party as well as in the movement. At the samehinese Communist leader reportedly asserted, for the first time, that the Chinese believed that Khrushchev would eventually be At month's end, Kao and other Chinese leaders hailed the "glorious" Albanian party and directly contradicted Soviet assertions that the Albauian leaders woro "isolated."
Peiping choseecember anniversary ofparty declaration for its most important pronouncement since theChinese version of that declaration, reaffirming Chinese positions on matters both of strategy and of authority and discipline, and putting the Chinese onthe anticipated Soviet-Albanianfavoring anotherconference of the0 type before any further action was taken against Albania,
ecember Pravda answeredovember speech, defending Khrushchev against the charge of practising the "personality cult" himself, and defending too Soviet party against tha charge of violating the0 agrcomont on holding multiparty conferences if necessary to resolveit Insisted that Albanian efforts to destroy the "unity" Of the bloc had made necessary tbe public attacks on theleaders. Tho Soviet party newspaper treated Albania as having already "Isolated" itself in theforeshadowing the diplomatic break which came the next day.
ecember, Moscow broke diplomatic relations with Albania, stating that it would recall all Soviet diplomatic and trade personnel and demanding that Tirana recall all such personnel. However, developments in December did not move as rapidly as might have been expected after this action.
In early December, the Soviet press systematicallyMoscow's action, and prepared the ground for theof Albania from the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. However, at the CEMA meeting in mid-December, at which neither Albania nor China was represented, no public action was taken against Moreover, although three of the Eastern European states followed Mohcow ln withdrawing their ambassadors from Tirana, none followed Moscow In breaking relations with Tirana, and there apparentlyignificant amount of trade between tbese states and Albania.
ecember Pravdaomparatively dignified Soviet version of the declaration of tbeommunist parties which had beeneply to the Cbinese versionecember. Pravda was mainly concerned with denying the charge that the Soviet party was renouncing the struggle with the West, althougb it continued to evade tbe hard question of support for revolutionary forces. pronouncements kept the pressure on Moscow on this point, insisting that revolutions must not be subordinated to "peace" efforts. Khrushchov publicly retorted, at the WFTU congress in Moscow in mid-December, that those who could not understand hisincluded an interest ln negotiations with tbe"clear their brains."
Soviet and Chinese representatives clashed directly at this WFTU meeting, at an Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization meeting in Gaza at the same time, and at the
VYorld Peace Council meeting in Stockholm the following week. At the AAPSO meeting, the Chinese challenged Soviet authority on matters of both procedure and substance; and this challenge, for the first known timeorld Communist front, was At tbe tTFtu meeting, the Chinese delegationeparate statement on one of the principal items on thetatement emphasizing American perfidy and the need forstruggle" for liberation. And at the RPC meeting, Soviet and Chinese representatives clashed on the question of whether the "peace" movement should be used primarily toSoviet propaganda positions on disarmament or primarily to support tbe "liberation" movement; the Chinese delegates strongly attacked Soviet overtures to the United States, going so far as to return to the extremely offensive formulation0 that it was wrong to "beg for peace fromnd they insisted that the primary task was not to achievebut rather the verystrengthen theforces of revolutionary movements; and tbe Chineseattacked the Soviet proposal to make disarmament the theme of the next ffPC meeting.
In several commentaries published during thesemeetings of the fronts, the Soviet party ignored the Chinese call for unanimity in the movement to be reached throughcontinued as long as necessary (inall for veto power in thend denied that tbe Albanian party had any significant support in theMoscow's reluctance to convene another multiparty meeting in Itself showed that the Albanians did indeed have significant support. Such Soviet commentaries spoke of tbe responsibility of every party to tbe entire movement, of the "universal" recognition of the Soviet party as the "vanguard" of the movement, and of -the unconditional obligation of all parties, wbether large or small, to proletarian internationalism (all of these beingways of reaffirming Soviet authority and Soviet favor for tbe principle of majority rule).
In late December, the Soviet partyit further forward in criticizing the Chinese by reprinting additionalCommunist comments on the obstructive attitude of tbeparty (named) in tbe dispute with Albania, and, lnby reprinting an article by Kadar calculated to infuriate the Chinese. Kadar took the line of denying that the Chinese (not named) were effectively militant: summing up Chineseon strategy, Kadar described these (rather unjustly) as
"nothingoftlst and adventurous policy ofand mere abuse of the imperialists, which will do them no harm.*1 In this article published by Pravda onecember, Maoh birthday, Kadar also observed that leftism, ln addition to being the infantile disorder described by Lenin, could alsoisorder. (This was probablyandom insult: there is some medical, as well as inferential, evidence for the Judgment that Mao's capacity for disciplined and sustained thought has been substantially reduced ln recent years) .
Two daysro-Peiplng Hong Kong newspaper with Chinese Communist advisers attacked Khrushchev by name forthe "personality cult." At month's end. Moscow took another step by conceding tbat the Albanian "degenerates"bad their protectors,. were not Isolated as bad been contended previously; the commentary argued comically tbat both tbe Albanians and their protectors were in "complete isolation."
During1 tbe Sino-Soviet relationship continued to movehowdown, although still not as rapidly ik might have been expected. Soviet pronouncements in Januaryin indirect threats to break relations with the Chinese party and to withdraw the Soviet military protection of China.
The Chinese party's intention to persist in defiance of Uoscow was clearly reflected in the party newspaper's New Year editorial; this acknowledged that certain events which "grieved" Communists had taken place In tbe camp, it went on to urge the Chinese line of "revolutionary struggle" as in tbe interests of the "revolutionary people" who constitutedercent of the world; it attributed anti-Chinese sentiment among imperialists and revisionists precisely to this Chinese revolutionary line; it predicted an Increase in anti-Chinese activity; and ln this long survey of tbe world scene which did not once mention the USSR, It linked tbe Chinese fate with that of all revolutionary peoples. On tbe same day, tbe Chinese party's theoretical journal again denounced those who put Issues of war and peace before tbe Issue of the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle, and who gave (as the Soviet party program gave) primacy to domesticrather than to tbe support of oppressed nations.
In the same period, Chinese leaders returned to tbe theme of relying on one's own efforts for domestic development, and for the first tlmo specified that problems of "national defense" as well as economic construction could be solved in this way.
Moscow soon commented Ironically (without naming China) onrospects for going it alone.
anuary the Albanian party stated openly and inthe Chinese case against Khrushchev (although not naming tbe Chinese as their authority) for his attitude toward tbe "personalityor revising fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism with respect to both world Communist strategy and relations between the parties, and for imposing sanctions which reduced tbe economic and ailitary capabilities ofCommunist states; while predicting further sucb actions by Kbrushchev, it contended that Kbrusbcbev had been unable to induce his Eastern European followers to break with Tirana. In mid-January Peiping and Tirana announced tbe successfulwithout details, of their talks onnd at their banquet Chou En-lai made tbestatement yet in praise of the Albanian party.
In tbe last two weeks of January Moscow issued additional warnlngs--lncludlng some strongerPeiping, Soviet media asserted that Moscow could not be silent about deviations in "other parties" (but specified only theeprinted additional foreign Communist criticisms of tbe Cblnoso attitude, one of these naming the Chinese; criticized by implicationpractice of the "personalitynsisted on the need for "absolute respect" by every party for the decisions ofconferences; and denounced critics of Soviet strategy, especially the Soviet use of "peacefuloractions, adventurism and anti-Sovietthis charge tooew level by twice describing as "enemies" those who opposed the Soviet line. Tbe strongesta possible Soviot break with the Chineseln Pravda onanuary, which presented Lenin's struggle with tbe Men-shevlks and their supporters as providing an example for other parties of an "irreconcilable revolutionary struggle against opportunism going as faromplete organizationalostscript to this warning, Soviet Defenso Minister Mal-inovsky was quoted onanuary to theewformulathat tbe USSR bad sufficient strength to defend those socialist countries "friendly to us." (This was twlco repeated in the following two weeks.)
There are various forms of pressure still available to Moscow in its effort to force the Chinese leadership to retreat or tohange of leadership. These lncludo: Indirect
pressure through Albaoia; additional political pressure;economic pressure; and additional pressure on themilitary establishment.
As lor Soviet pressure on China through Albania, Uoscow has used up almost all of its political and economic pressure already, without bringing Hoxba down. The USSR could accomplish this by military action, and might manage it through Inciting military action by others oroviet-supported coup, but ln either event the Chinese would probably be even more bitterly intransigent.
As for political pressure in China, the mere surfacing of thethe sense of publicly criticizing theby name on the entire list ofnothinese retreat. Neither would representations by other parties of the movement. urther decline in Soviet consultation and cooperation with Peiping in specific foreign policies would also be an insignificant pressure. The only significant political pressure is that presented by the Sino-Soviet Treaty ofand Alliance, with its Soviet commitment to China's defense. We think that an official Soviet threat to withdraw from this treaty would shock tbe Chinese party aod perhaps do much toa challenge to Uao's leadership, but we do not believe that it would force the present leadership to retreat.
As for economic pressure on China, Khrushchev inook the most damaging measure available by withdrawing tbe There is no evidence that Uao is now or soon will be prepared to abandon bis positions ln tbe dispute in tbe hope of inducing Uoscow to restore tbe level of aid which existed before There seems almost no chance that the anticipated food crisis in tbe spring will force Peiping to turn to Moscow for aid. Only the area of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Soviet trade appears at all promising for Moscow, inessation of this trade would mean fairly serious sbort-run dislocations while Peiping attempted to develop other sources of supply; such sources appear to be available, however, for tbe most important items, essation of Sino-bloc trade would not force tbe Chinese to accommodate, it would simply turn them more to tbe West.
As for military pressure, we see no chance of the use of Soviet military force against China, The USSR has used up most of its pressure against tbe Chinese military establishment, in the withdrawals of technicians and advisers and the drasticin military shipments and aid to research. Soviet economic
sanctions which could further affect thecutting off petroleumas noted above, be countered by purchases in the West. The complete cessation of militaryand aid to research would nowelatively insignificant additional blow. The repudiation- of the Sino-Soviet treaty would probably give additional encouragement to Chinese militaryto challenge the dominant leaders, but, as noted above, we do not think that it would be effectual against the dominantthemselves.
As for the questionhallenge to the dominant leaders of tbe Chinese party, it should be remembered that there hasbeen onehat of Peng Te-huai and others, inthe Sino-Soviet dispute has developed. We think that there are other pro-Soviet and anti-Mao forces who have kept their counsel and who may be better prepared when the next opportunitythis year. This may coincide with another dramatic development in Sino-Soviet relations, suchreak in economic relationsoviet threat to repudiate tbe Sino-Soviet treaty,reak between tbe parties. However, while thereossibility that Uao can be brought down, we think it more likely that Mao and his most important lieutenants will stand together successfully against theirofUao retires or dies. He may, of course,or die ln the next year or two, which would present pro-Soviet forces with another opportunity.
Both the Soviet and Chinese parties may, as manybelieve, be content with an indefinite prolongation of the present state of thedisunity shortreak in either party or party-and-stats relations. However, we think that Khrushchev would not have launched and pressed on with this new offensive since1 if he bad meant theto continue indefinitely in that uneasy state. Thus wethat Khrushchev does intend to exert some combination of the remaining pressures available to him. Although we recognize tbe possibility that he has already concluded (as we have) that he cannot hinese retreat and that he might as well break with tbe Chinese party right now, we lean to the view that he will exert most of these pressures before breaking. There are several points in that process atreak between themight come.
If the Soviets were to use military force against theleaders, that action would probablyreak between
the Soviet and Chinese parties right there. Soviot sponsorshipuccessful coup,ess clear-cut affair, might not loadreak.
If Moscow were to criticize the Chineee publicly, by name, on the full range of Issues In the dispute, Moscow might be ablo to run through the entire list withoutreak between the parties, unless It were to attack Mao personally. The latter action would probably soon leadreak.
In the economic and military relationships, Moscow could probably go through all the rest of tbe stages in reducing its support of Peiping withoutreak between theof ceasing support entirely. omplote cessation of support would be In effect an embargo, and might soon be followedreak.
A Soviet threat to repudiate the Sino-Soviet treaty would probably notreak between the parties. The Chinese instoad would probably challenge Moscow to repudiate tho treaty publicly. We doubt that Moscow would do this; if it did, that action would almost certainlyreak.
If Khrushchev were to directly intervone in Chinese partyconspiring with anti-Mao forces or authorizing them to speak forwould certainly break.
Should Khrushchev exert some combination of these various prossures (short of breaking party or party-and-stateand still fall (as we think he will fail) to force the dominant Chinese leadors to retreat or tohange ln the Chinese leadership, and should the Chinese party not have broken relations with the Soviet party at some point in this process, Khrushchev himself might then decide that the onlypressure remaining to him is that of making the break himself.
The various possibilitiesino-Soviet break as we definebreak in either party or party-and-state rela-tions--seem to us to add up to the probabilityreak in the next year or so, if no large nuw Iactor is introduced.actor wouldhange ln the leadership of eitherchange that, regardless of which leaders were toeither Khrushchev or Mao, would probably serve to deter or at leastreak while the leaders of one partythe attitudes of the new loaders of the other.
With Moscow still reprinting rather than originating criticism of the Chinese by name, and still issuing onlywarnings to China of tho consequences of continued defiance, the Soviet party seems to be marking time before the exertion of one of the forms of pressure discussed above. Ha do not know what Moscow is waiting for: conceivably, for the resultshinese party plenum oronference in Peiplng of pro-Chinese parties, both of which are rumored (in mid-February) to be scheduled for the near future.
As notedino-Soviet break could come at any time, but we think that it will take some months forto work through the process ofressure, evaluating the response, choosing another pressure, and so on. Whatever the pace, if there is no change in tbe leadership of cither the Soviet or the Chinese party beforee thinkino-Soviet break as we have definedbreak in either party or party-and-statethat time is more likely than not.
THK NEW STAGE OR THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
Instead of usingd Congress of tbe Soviet party primarily to celebrate the achievements of tbe USSR and to rejoice in its prospects, as had been generally expected, Khrushchev used the congress primarily to renew the de-Stalin-izatlon campaign in the USSR and to extend this campaign to tbe entire world Communist movement. His plan was to link and discredit all those, within tbe USSR and without, who had opposed his attack on Stalin ath CPSU Congressho had not accepted the changes ln strategy for tbe worldmovemont which Khrushchev had introduced then aod later, who had been "building socialism" along unorthodox lines and with special claims for these innovations,greatesthad rejected his propositions on authority aod discipline in the world Communist movement.
Khrushchev's attacks on the Soviet "antlparty group" and on the Albanian leaders were of course genuinely aimed at those targets among others, but there was little doubt that tbeparty was his most important target, as the onlychallenger for leadership of tbe movement. In directing this attack, Khrushchev was breaking the uneasy truce reached at tbe Moscow conference of tbearties inhrushchev's charges against tbe Albanian leaders, and some of bis charges against.members of the "aotipartyere roughly the same as the charges that the Soviet partyhad made against the Chinese privately, in party letters and in international Communist meetings, or bad made publicly without naming the Chinese. In making these fresh attacks, aod ia warning the Chinese by name oo tbe limited issue of supporting Albania, Khrushchev seemed to be giving the Cbioese yet another chance to retreat while at the same time seeking to persuade them that this would be their last chance before the Soviet adoption of extreme measures. This paper is cooceroed with developmeots io this new stage of tbehas extended from1 through2 into February.
Jt may bc useful to recapitulate developments in the first nine monthsn four"personalityorld Communist strategy, the building of "socialism" and the role of Soviet aid* and authority and discipline in the movement and to outline the deterioration of the Soviet-Albanian relation ship1ifth section.
A. Tbe "Personality Cult"
As ofbe Soviet and Chinese partiesin serious disagreement about the "personalityhe Chinese early6 had made clear their feeling that Khrushchev's extreme denigration of Stalin was both unjust and stupid, giving aid and comfort to enemies of Communism and encouraging indiscipline in the movement itself. By tbe endhe Soviet and Chinese parties hadeasure of agreement in alike describing Stalin as one whose merits had been on balance weightier than his faults, but within this agreement there wasreat difference.
In the free-swinging private exchanges in the Sino-Soviet disputebe concept of the "personality cult" had not been one of the principal categories of discussion. However, it had clearly been an extremely sensitive issue: the Chinese asserted that the beginning of tbe deterioration of tbe Sino-Soviet relationship was Khrushchev's attack on Stalinhe Soviets rebuked them for bringing up this issue again; Khrushchev implied strongly that the "personality cult" was being practiced in China, and said that Uao was as vain and as isolated from reality as Stalin bad been; the Chinese implied just as strongly that it was Kbrusbcbev who was practicing the "cult" and expressly denied that tbe concept was ln any way applicable to Mao; and so on.
In0 declaration, the Soviets had succeeded in inserting the observation that one factor in the good health of tbe world Communist movement had been theof tbe harmful consequences of tbe cult of theormulation which in effect endorsed the dcStalinizationand the declaration bad also included an injunction that it was the duty of Communist parties to prevent the emergence ofore amblgous passage, as it would permit either Khrushchev or Uao to attack the other. In commenting on the declaration then and in both Moscow and Peiping had ignored the passages on thend it looked as though there was atacit agreement not to engage in further polemics on this matter. It was obvious, however, that thestood ready to serve either partyresh attack.
B. Wor Id Commun ist Stra tegy
As ofhere remained significantbetween the Soviet and Chinese views as to the proper strategy for tbe world Communist movement, although1 these differences were not being stated The Soviet party continued to favor anstrategy of softening Western resistance by peaceful gestures while exploiting indigenous political movements in non-Communist countries primarily by non-military meanst whereas the Chinese partyore militantprogram for the world movement^on all fronts,in the underdeveloped areas. Moscow contended that bloc strength was such that the West was probably deterred from world war, but that the West was stillstrong, and, because the consequences of world war would be disastrous for all of the developed countries, that tbe bloc itself should not accept serious risks of world war; while Peiping contended that the balance of power and world political trendsore militant program, thatrogram would not increase tbe existing risk of world war, and that Uoscow in any case exaggerated tbe consequences of world war. The Soviet party had continued to argue that tbe West was increasingly deterred from local wars (small-scale wars between states) as well as world war, and itto hold that local wars were dangerous for the bloc as well as the West, because such wars might easily expand, and that tbe bloc's aims should be to deter or halt tbem; while the Chinese party argued that local wars (byinitiated by Western forces) could be contained aod should be fought, using local forces and if necessary bloc forces, Uoscow held that the bloc should supportwars and "popular uprisings" (in both colonial areas and independent states) but should be wary of action whichigh risk of Western intervention, while Peiping held that the bloc should give much greater encouragement and stronger material support to such anti-colonial and civil wars, which would not significantly increase tbe risk of larger wars.
*As various observers have noted, and as Khrushchev himself had pointed outhe Cblnese party'swas more Trotskyist than Stalinist.
Further, tbe Soviet party contended that "peaceful coexistence" should be the "general line" of bloc foreign policy and that Moscow could be trusted to interpret this concept with sufficient Militancy, vbile the Chinese party contended that the Soviet presentation of this concept was retarding the world revolution, particularly in tbeareas. art of this, Moscow held thatwith the Vest could be fruitful, wboroas Poiping held that there was little to gain and perhaps auch to lose from negotiations and that Moscow had been too conciliatory in its approaches to the West, again wltb the result ofrevolutionary movements.
Further, the Soviet party contended that "armed struggle" was of declining importanceeans ofindependence in colonial areas, and that Communistshould plan on protracted cooperation with thethere; while the Chinese party contended that armed struggle was still of first importance in colonial areas and that Communist parties there should attempt to seize leadership in the early stages of the revolution whergean attempt which would be facilitated by armed As for the newly-independent countries, Moscow held that their bourgeois nationalist leaders were pursuing aims compatible with Communist interests, that bloc aid wasin ensuring the neutrality and eventual seduction of these countries, and that "national democracy" (as in Cuba) was the proper middle-run objective; whereas Peiping held that Moscow exaggerated the importance of the neutral states and of bloc aid to them, that "national democracy" was too modest an objective, that more pressure should be put on bourgeois nationalist leaders, and the Communist parties in the newly-independent countries could achieve power finally only by violence. Similarly, Moscow held that Communist parties in the West faced difficultand should pursue "democratic" (as distinct from goals for some time, while Peiping held that more militant offensives should be conducted in the West, and that even civil wars there ell as in the newly-independent countries mightealistic early objective.
There is an unconfirmed report that tbe Chinese reiterated privately, befored congress, some of their charges against Soviet strategy, including softness,
revisionism, sacrifice of the Communist parties inareas, and lack of support for Chinese objectives such as recovering Taiwan.
As for the actua1 conduct of foreign policy, as distinct from pronouncements oo strategy, there bad continued to be generally effective cooperation between Moscow and Peipingerhaps better cooperation than in thethree years. Khrushchev's initiatives after0 had undercut much of tbe Chinese criticism of Soviet policy by the time of tbe Uoscow conference of thearties in November. Following the conference, tbe Chinese hadagreed to refrain from open attacks on tbe Soviet conduct of foreign policy, including Khrushchev's personal contacts with Western leaders. Certain features of Soviet policy duringparticular Khrushchev's militanton Berlin and the Soviet decision to resumo nuclearseemed to please the Chinese very much. the Chinese had clearly been cool to tbe Kennedy-Khrushchev mooting and to the Soviet emphasis on they had continued to indicate anxietyoviet rapprochement with both tbe United States and Yugoslavia and irritation over Soviet relations wltb India, and they had made clear that they regarded Khrushchev's Berlin policy as an important test of Soviet professions of sufficientIn leading the world revolution.
C. Chinese Programs and Soviot Aid
As ofhere continued to bedifferences between Soviet and Chinese propositions on building socialism and Communism. Despite the substantial Chinese retreats in the actual policies pursued under tbe general lino, tho "leapnd the commune program, and in tbe Chinese claims for these innovations, the Soviet party1 had continued to attack them, Implying that China's economic difficulties resulted primarily from these departures from the Soviet model. Tbe Chinese party, on tbe defensive, continued to insist on the greatof their domestic policies and to reject any criticism of them as ignorant dogmatism. Uoscow had also continued to criticize tho Chinese aim of economic autarky; tbe Soviets spoke of tbe need for better coordination of bloc economies and for international specialization of labor, whereasspoke of the need to attain economic independence in order to ensure political independence.
Owing to Chinese dissents and departures from Soviet positions on world Couunist strategy and oo buildingand Communism, and ln particular tbe continuing Chinese challenge to Soviet authority in the world Communist movement, the USSR as of1 had not moved to restore theof Soviet economic, military, and scientific aid towhich bad existed prior to tbe withdrawal of the Soviet technicians in In withdrawing the technicians, Moscow had taken the strongest single measureserious damage to the Chinese Industrial program, especially in tbe fields of military industry (including missile and atomic energy. In late0 or early the USSR had begun to cut back shipments of military goods to China, an additional blow both to military industry and the current effectiveness of the armed forces; very few such shipments had come Further, the USSR1 had apparently discontinued the special preference given tbe Chinese in tradetransportation priority and leeway in meeting short-term obligations. Chinese imports from the OSSEhough still substantial, had dropped to two-thirds of0 level and less than three-fifths of9ino-Soviet scientific cooperation bad apparently continued, butreatly reduced level, and Soviet aid to military research had been drastically reduced if not baited. Id tbe face of all this, the Chinese1 had continued to affirm their determination to depend on their own resources toextent necessary. The Chinese had also been conducting trade probes in theabout various types of manufactured goods, Industrial equipment (Including completeetroleum products, and transport aircraft. Moscow had continued to imply (Id comment on tbe dangers ofthat additional pressure could be brought against China and other deviants if necessary.
D. Authority and Discipline ln tho Movement
hat feature of Chinese behavior most offensive to Moscow clearly remained that of the Chinese challeogc to Soviet authority ln the world Communist movement. Owing to Chinese intransigence, the Moscow conference of
"For allhinese imports from the USSR0 million, as7 million05 million
0 had not affirmed the authoritative character of unilatera1 Soviet pronouncements and had not established the principle of majority rule in the movement. While tho declara tion emerging from the conference had enjoined all the parties to be faithful to positions "jointly worked out" atand ln the interim to take up their problems with one another in bilateral talks, such agreement on principles clearly could not prevent sharply differing interprotations of "jointly worked out" positions and could not ensure the success of either bilateral talks or full-dress conferences. Early the Soviet and Chinese parties had Indeedto offer very different interpretations of tbe "Jointly workedositions taken in the declaration, and tbeparty at that time hadecision to give "all-out" support to its only all-out supporter, Albania, in tblsto Moscow. In subsequent months, the Sino-Sovietfor influence ln the movement had been mostillustrated in Albania, but it had also been evident in Sino-Soviet relations with the small Asian Communist states (Outer Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam) and theparties of the nonbloc Asian states. The Soviot party had continued1 to insist on its right to develop Marxism-Leninism and to make generalizations for tbe entire movement, to reaffirm its favor for the principle ofrule ln the movement, to warn of the dangers ofin the bloc, and to hint at the possible expulsion from the bloc of states which continued to defy Soviet It was apparent that thed Congress of tbe Soviet party would be used in part for fresh affirmations of Soviet authority, although it was not foreseen that these renewed assertions of authority would be as spectacular as they turned out to be.
E. Soviet-Albanian Relations
Soviet-Albanian relations sinceadalong tbe same general lines as had the Sino-Soviet relationship, but more rapidly, and as of1 were worse. While the Bucharest conference of0 had been convened by Moscow primarily to deal with the Chinese challenge and the principal disputants at the conference were the Soviet and Chinese parties, the Albanian party had played
an important role as Pelplog's only all-out supporter.* thereafter, the Albanian leaders hadoup against them which was appareutly supported bya venture not yet carried so far ln the Sino-Soviet Moreover, Moscow and its followers had begun to reduce their trade and aid commitment to Albania.
According to Khrushchev, the Albanian party in0 bad twice rejected Soviet bids for bilateral talks while Khrushchev inccording to the Albanians, had stated that be would treat Albania like Yugoslavia. At the Uoscow conference of Communist parties inbe Albanian delegation bad again been Pelping's only all-out supporter; and Hoxha bad denounced Khrushchev lnterms; according to Khrushchev, Hoxha and Shebu at this conference had rejectedhirdidilat-oral meeting and had then agreed but had "wrecked" the<which may have immediately preceded their early departure from theod shortly thereafter had againa bilateral meeting.
In any case, following the Uoscow conference, L'l-bricbt had publicly criticized Albanian behavior at tbe thus beginning tbe Soviet camp's practice ofAlbania explicitly and openly instead of China, while intending its criticism to apply to both. Hoxha had soonthat he would not bow on mattors of principle.
By the endoviet and perhaps Eastern European credits to Albania had been canceled, and Uoscow had begun to demand Albanian repayment of earlier Soviet credits boginning insteadlso by tbe ondhinese had reportedly purchased moreons of wheat for Albania, more than had come from the USSR
lbania had been acquiring tbe statushinese dependent. The USSR in Januarytoadroup of its technicians, Implying that it might withdraw othors. At the Albanian
There had already been some evidence that tbe Albanians were hostile to the Warsaw Pactspringa nuclear-free zone in tbe Balkans. Hoxha ln0 openly denounced tho idea.
party congress in February, Iloxha had belligerently reaffirmed pro-Chineso positions and had announced that there hadoup attempt (without directly accusing Moscow of supporting it). According to the Albanians, Khrushchev in1 had declared that the USSR would stop all aid to Albania andTirana of this by letter in April, noting that tbelevel of aid was reserved for "friends and truen April, the Chinese had agreed to provide Albania withaid5 million, about the same sum which had been promised but withdrawn by the USSR and some of theEuropoan states.
In lateoviet note had charged that Albania had forced the first group of technicians to leave and that in consequence all technicians would be withdrawn; most of them were ln fact withdrawn in tho following week. Inhow-trial of "spios and traitors" had boen held in Albania, which was in fact an anti-Soviet demonstration. This had immediately been followed by evacuation of the important Soviet submarine base at Valona, tbe mutual expulsion of Soviet and Albanian military attaches, the expulsion or withdrawal of some Soviet military advisers, the sending home of some or all of thestudents (both civilian and military) in the USSR and other Eastorn European states, the withdrawal of some of the Eastern European technicians fromonsiderablein Soviet trade with Albania,umber of Albanian trade probes ln Western Europe.
Subsequently, there had been ovldence of an influx of Chinese military advisers, economic technicians (possibly hundreds) into Albania, the withdrawal of the remainder of the Soviet technicians (although some Eastern European technicians remained as of earlyhe continued Import of much Chinese grain by Albania despite Chinese shortages, and, in all, the emergence of China as virtually tbe only source of foreign economic aid to Albania. In the same period, Albania bad attacked Soviet policy on Germanyarsaw Pact mootinghe USSR had sent no ropresentatives to tho coremonles throughout Soviet-Albanian Friendship Monthnd the Albanian press (alone in the bloc) had failed to publish ln full the Soviet party's draft program.
By October, Albania hadember of the bloc largely through its ties with the Chinese, as its membership
in the Warsaw Pact and CEMA was nominal. ctober, Hoxha had publicly denounced plots against Albania and bad declared that he would never submit. Shortly thereafter, the Albanian party press had gone so far as to state that Albanianwith the USSR would be based on both "proletariantlonalism" and "principles of peacefullatter being the formula for relations with non-Communist states, including hostile states.
deve:-opments atvd cpsu co.vghess
The principal Soviet speakers atd CPSU Congress inotably Khrushchev himself, attackeddomestic and foreign opponents ln the Communist movement (apart from the Yugoslavs) as the survivingof the "personalityhis concept serving to describe the fundamental error which was responsible for their other errors. Khrushchev and othors alsoat length the related questions of world Communist strategy, principles of building socialism and Communism, and, of greatest importance, authority and discipline in the movement. We outline below, ln these categories, the developments at the congress.
A. The "Personality Cult" Again
In his central committee report ofctobor (the principal address of tbehrushchev answered at length tbe rhetorical question of whether It hado attack Stalin and Stalinism "so sharply and openly." It had been absolutely necessary, ho said, in the interest of good relations between the party and tbe people, of Soviet economic development, aod of the Soviet position in tho world. Khrushchev then reviewed ln familiar terms his persistence in this course of deStalinizatlon against the opposition of tho "antiparty group" and his triumph over this group and Zhukov He then brought the offensive against the Chlnesoew stage bythat bis course of deStalinizatlon "did not receive proper understanding" from the Albanian leaders, although, be said, this had not become clear What he did not say was that the Chineso had openly opposedfrom the start; ho did not have to say it, as hisknew at once that he was attacking the Chinese through the Albanians. The Albanian deviation, be went on, had been very clear sincehe reference was to Albanianat the Bucharest conference inonference which was convened primarily to Isolate and discipline the Chinese, who were defended strongly by tbe Albanians and who did not rotreat. The Albaniai JMmmVmV leaders' opposition toKhrushchev continued, was aue to tho fact that they themselves employed the methods of the "personality cult." Tho line ofh CPSU Congress (thecongross, Khrushchev said,eninist line.
and "wo cannot yield onrincipled question to theleaders or to anyone else" lear reference to tho Chinese). Roports differ as to whether Khrushchev forowarnod any other parties of his intention to make thisfirst open denunciation of another bloc party by name since the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform
In his speech ofctober, Chou En-lai did not mention the "personality cult." He made tho Chinese point on this matter two days later, arvellously Chinese way, byreath for Stalin (as well as one for Lenin) on the Lealn-Stalin mausoleum. The wreath for Stalin wasas Khrushchev himself had described Stalin lateo Stalin the "great Marxist-Leninist.'*
In tho speeches that followed, many of the Russian and foreign delegates reiterated and embroidered the theme that the Albanian leaders were practicioners of the "personality cult." It was Khrushchev again, ln his summary speech ofctober, who made the strongest attack. He gave muchon tbe errors of the Albanian leaders, asserted again that these orrors stemmed from their adherence tond observed that "Everything vicious that existed in our country during the period of tbe personality cult is being manifested in the worst form" in the Albanian party. Ho wont on to speak at length about Stalin's vicious-ness and about the collusion in this of the antlparty group, and was at pains to show tbat the deference given himself at the congross should not be regardod as evidence of yet another personality cult.
On the following day Frol Kozlov, Khrushchev's apparent choice as his successor, had much to say about the "personality cult" as exemplified by the antlparty group and the Albanian leaders. On the same day, the congress replied to Chou En-lai 's act of homage to Stalin onctober; tho congress (Russians only) voted unanimously to remove Stalin's body froa the Lenin-Stalin mausoleum, which was soon done.
In the sameeng Chen, the senior Chinese delegate remaining after Chuneparture onctober, is credibly reported to have attacked tbe entire course of deStalinizatlon in private talks with other delegates. Peng is said to have contended that Stalin had been and remained tbe symbol of worldtbat Khrushchev was destroying the Stalin image, and that this could only harm the movement. Bewent on to say that the Chinese party still stood for Sino-Soviet friendship but'"thereimit."
B. Soviet Strategy Reaffirmed
Khrushchev in his speeches ofndctober reaffirmed most of tho propositions on world Communist strategy disputed, orifferent emphasis, by tbe Chinese. He contended again that bloc military "superiority" had deterred the West from war, that wars between states were no longernd tbat world war might become impossible even before the end of While reaffirmingorld war would mean the end of capitalism, he conceded again that the West was "still strong" and he reaffirmedar wouldisaster for "allhile giving more attention than usual to tbe possibility of Western initiation of world war and stating that bloc defenses must be perfected, he went on to imply that the West would probably continue to be deterred fromenture. He again expressed confidenceommunist victory in "peaceful competition,"
Khrushchev reaffirmed "peaceful coexistence" as the "immutable basis" of Soviet foreign policy, and be reiterated the desirability of negotiations with the West. However, he did not, aspeak of mutual concessions in such negotiations but instead specified that coexistence did not entail concessions on "vitally importanto reaffirmed that the USSR would continue to "support" (by unspecified means) anti-colonial forces and newly-independent states. He reiterated that-:Jhe latter, although oftenstrong anti-Communist elements, were making acontribution" to bloc aims and continued to qualify for bloc aid. He reaffirmed that Communists in Western countries should work with non-Communist forces for limited objectives. He repeated that revolutionary forcesin the non-Communist world could expect the "might" of the bloc to be used against Western attempts to suppress uprisings, thus leaving himself an opening to supportor pro-Communist forces lit the newly-independent states.
In his speech of summation onctober, Khrushchev went out of his way to reject charges the Chineso were known to have made against his interpretation of "peaceful He noted thatccuse us of simplifying or softening our assessment of the international atmosphere when we emphasize tho need for peaceful coexistence in present conditions," and he went on to assert that only "hopeless dogmatists" of the Molotov 4mmmTmTmVpB typo contested his interpretati Finally, the congress resolution ofctoberctober report, both in general and with respect to his specific propositions on world Communist strategy.
Khrushchev and many other speakers attacked the "antlpartyarticularly Molotov, for holdingon world Communist strategy known to be held by the Chinese or attributed by Moscow to the Chinese; and the speakers denounced the anti-party group" in part in terms previously applied to the Chinese. Molotov, treated as the principal figure of the group and its ideologist on strategy, was describedalseopeless dogmatist who had contributed only confusion in important questions of war and peace, domestic policies, and intrabloc relations. He was charged with the (Chinese) offenses of incorrectly assessing the balanco of power, of believing war to bebtuse, factionalputrid anti-Leninistf equating "peaceful coexistence" with "cold war" (so does Khrushchev, but ho does not envisage the same degree of tension),ofeduction of economic and cultural contacts with the West and of
one point in this speech, Khrushchev seemed to be deriding the Chinese claim to be the leader of the militant forces in the world Communist movement. In discussing changes in the balance of power, Khrushchev observediger (the West) does not attack an elephant (tbe bloc) because the tiger knows that the elephant is stronger. He went on to note that Asian-African dignitarios "go tiger-hunting onbecause they know that this form of tiger-hunting is not dangerous." This passage may bo readimple extension of the former passage, but may also beprobably was read inimplying that the Chinose are able toierce attitude toward the West only because the might of the USSR protects all Communist states from tho "tiger." The Chinese are indeed vulnerable to the charge of being brave for otherthe USSR and revolutionary movements everywhere without regardautious policy themselves.
opposing meetings between bloc and Western leaders, and of not believing in the force of the Soviet example. He was said to havedogmatic" article (rejected) on Lenin during the Lenin anniversary of0 (the time when the Chinese made their comprehensive attack on Soviet strategyeries of articles ande was said also to haveetter to the CPSIA central committee in1 declaring the Soviet party's draft program asrogram manifesting "pacificism andhere -is"an unconfirmed report that the Chinese hadimilar criticism of the program (on which they did not comment publicly), just prior to Molotov's One speaker (Kuusinen) went so far as to charge Molotov with attempting to conspire with the Chinese (not named): Molotov he said, had beensectarianrying to "catch if not in domestic resorvoirs, then perhaps in some foreign waters" (animation in the hall, laughter).
Chou En-lai in hisctober speech did not take up questions of strategy systematically, and was content with implying rather than stating emphatically the Chinese dissent from some of them. The central implication throughout Chou's speech was that the Soviet party strategy was insufficiently militant, particularly in its policies toward the United States and with respect to support of revolutionary struggles In this connection, in discussing areas of the non-Communist world in which things had been going well, Chou specified only countries in which anti-government forces had employed violence (Cuba, Laos, South Vietnam, South Korea, Algeria, the Congo, Angola, the Cameroons, Japan, and Brazil).
As for the specific foreign policies of the USSR which had given Peipinc concern, the pronouncements ofd Congress were hardly calculated to reassure the Chinese. Khrushchev described the "struggle" for complete disarmament as the USS 's "most important" foreign policy. He also said that the West showed some disposition toolution on Germany, and he withdrew his deadline of the end1erman treaty. He spoke of further cooperation with India, one of tbe "great powers of Asia" (he named Indonesia as the ther). He ascribed "great significance" to relations with the Western powers, especially the United States, called for "normalizing" relations as tbe best way to avoid general war, and invoked Lenin in support of personal diplomacy. Further, while describing the Yugoslav Communists as "revisionist" and
"anti-Leninist" in hisctober report, In his report the following day he spoke of the desire to develop and strengthen relations wlh Yugoslavia "along state lines" and said that in the struggle for peace "our position coincides with that of Yugoslavia in many ways." Similarly, Gromyko in hisctober speech on foreign policy gave great praise topersonal diplomacy, spoke of the great importance of the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting, stated that the Soviet party would "spare no effort in trying toommon language with the Western powers"erman settlement, and spoke of the great prospects for peace if the "two giants" (the USSR and were to join their efforts.
In discussing foreign policies in hisctober speech, Chou En-lai had much praise for the general course of Soviet policy but spoke sharply about conciliatorytoward the United States. Ho reminded Khrushchev thatthe United States was the "most vicious enemy ofhe "public enemy" of the world, and that (Mao's line) the Kennedy administration was even "more deceptive and than its predecessor. Chou linked Americanand Yugoslav revisionism as the forces attempting tothe unity of the world movement. He did not mention India among the non-Communist nations with which China had "friendly relations." Chou did not refer to the withdrawal of1 deadlineerman treaty, but Chinese anxiety about this had been expressed ln summer1 and the Chinese attitude was probably reflected inovember speech In which he accused Moscow of cowardice inerlin settlement.
C. Chinese Programs Criticized, Soviet Aid Brandished
Khrushchev in his reports of nd ctober also reaffirmed Soviet propositions on the building of socialism and Communism in individual countries and in the blochole. In his first report, he pointed to the Soviet model for "forms and methods of leadership" of the national economy, for the "maximum, rational employment" of resources, for theof "scientifically-based" balance between sectors of the economy. At anotherpoint, aiming at the rationale of the principal Chinese programs of recent years and at some of tbe claims for them which had been modified but not he observed that the principles of Communism must be implemented gradually, because "subjective desire alone mallis necessary to proceed from objective
conditions and to take into consideration the laws of social development." Thus the transition to Communism could not occur in the absence of the conditions (absent in China)trong "material-technicaligh level of education, and exhaustion of the possibilities of the socialist stage of development. Further, the party would continue to rely on the principle of material incentive, "Lenin'sontinuing to deride tbe Chinese, Khrushchev noted that "It iso outline the loftiest rates of economicbut if the workers were not both educated and materially interested the plans would fail. Any effort toe said, "means to undo tbe cause of socialist and Communist construction." In hisctober report on tho draftrogram presented as showing "what Communisme discussed these points in greater detail; and, in citing the "contributions" made by other bloc states toexperience in building socialism, he failed to include any specifically Chinese contributions and by implication criticized programs regarded by the Chinese as contributions.
Khrushchev in hisctober report observed that it was "becoming increasingly necessary to use wisely and most efficiently thef socialismorld system, the international socialist division of labor, specialization and cooperation in production, coordination of national economic plans, and the possibilitiesorld socialist market. He enlarged on this thesis in-thectober report.
Khrushchev and other Soviet speakers discussed at several points tho importance of Soviet aid to otherraembers^ of tho bloc. Kozlov observed that the Albanians jp^HmmmfllV
had forgotten what bloc aid and support had meant to them.
Chou En-lai in hisctober speech praised the prospects for Soviet society set forth in the draft programpowerful inspiration to allnd he madeinimal defense of Chinese principles and programs (which he personally had indicated reservations about). He noted briefly that the Chinese continued to hold high the three "red banners" of the general line, the leap forward, and the commune program. He conceded that in "struggling" toodern economy there would be "no lack ofand in this connection he reiterated the officialthat bad weather (rather than mismanagement) wasresponsible for the troubles in agriculture. At one .
point he spoke of Chinese gratitude for Soviet aid (the importance of which he personally had oftenut at another point he offered Peiping's official view that the Chinese could attain their goals by thework of our own hands."
During the congress, Khrushchev reportedly ridiculed Chinese domestic programs in private meetings with other delegations, including several of those from parties which on balance were supporters of Peiping. Some members of these delegations reportedly protested Khrushchev's action as improper in tbe absence of the Chinese.
D. Soviet Authority in the Movement Reasserted
Khrushchev in hisctober report asserted that the Soviet party had been seeking and continued to seek means of resolving the differences with the Albanian party. After asserting that the Soviet party "cannot yield" in the dispute "to the Albanian leaders or to anyonehrushchev concluded his attack on theattack which at this point in tbe congress was stilla call for them to "abandon their mistaken views and return to the path of unity and close cooperation" with the bloc and theinternational Communist movement."
The Soviet speakers in the next twoj'days did not discuss Moscow's grievances against Albania; Khrushchev was presumably waiting to see what line Chou En-lai would take (there was no Albanian delegation). 9 October speech in which, as noted above, he lightly reaffirmed Chinese positions on matters in dispute with the Soviet party but strongly suggested that the Chinese bad not como to Moscow seeking orublic- fight, Chouthe Chinese party's displeasure that Khrushchev had brought the Soviet-Albanian struggle to this new stage. Specifying that the Chinese conception of the socialist camp included Albania, Chou said:
We hold thatispute orunfortunately arises between fraternal parties or fraternal countries, it should be resolved patientlypirit of proletarian internationalism and on the principles of
equality and unanimity through And public, onesided censure of any fraternal party does not help unity and is not helpful in resolving problems. To layispute between fraternal parties or fraternal countries in tho face of the enemy cannot be regardedorlous Marxist-Leninist attitude...
Cbou pointed out that theS. Imperialism and the Yugoslavattempting "by every means" to disrupt the unity of the Communists and their friends; as Khrushchev had said about Yugoslav revisionism, the Soviet attack on Albania was playing into the enemy's bands.
In bis formula on "equality and unanimity throughhou was reaffirming the positions thebad takon ln tbe lengthy discussions of authority aod discipline at the Moscowearthe partlos did not standather-son relationship, that no party could impose its opinions on another party, that the movement could not operato by majority rule, and that consequently unity could be achieved only by prolonging consultations until an agreement was reached in bilateral talks or, falling this, until unanimity was achieved lnmeetings. These positions, if accepted, would permit any party to persist indefinitely in opposition to tbe Soviet party, and would give anyeto power in the world Communist conferences.*
subsequent private meetings with other delegates, Peng Chen is credibly reported to have defended Albanianin much these terms. He reportedly said the Soviet approach to the Albanians in bilateral talks was that of master to servant and had included threats, that thehad been right ln refusing to give in to this, that the Chinese hoped that other parties would take note of the Albanian example, that Peiping wanted no party to dominate another, and that the Albanians should behance to plead their own caso at the congress. Both Chou and Peng were attacking Khrushchev at a vulnerableto other parties.
Each of the four important speakers whoonctober added to Khrushchev's charges against(andhus making clear thatarrangedustained assault even prior to tbeof tbe incendiary Albanian central committeeofctober; and each accused the Albanians ofestablished authority. Gomulka made explicit tbethe Albanian leaders (all except one of thetbe congress conf ined "the attack to the leaders)proletarian internationalism; Thorez specifiedAlbanian course was "sectarian and adventurous";the point that the Soviet party had "donepossible to restore the relationship; andthat tbe proceedings of the congress would serve"serious new warning to all sorts of apostates from"rovi: im:ists*and "dogmatists'1
In its central committee statement ofctober, the Albanian party, again concentrating its attack onpersonally, presented the dispute as one betweenand bisnd the Albanian partyhole plus other Soviet leaders. The statement denounced Khrushchev personally for violating the provisions of the0 Moscow conference (ln airing the dispute after bilateral talks had failed, rather than submitting it to another world Communist conference). The statement asserted that tbeparty had tried to resolve the dispute by tho agreed procedure, and it noted that tbe party had "sympathetically rocoived" Chou En-lai'sctober speech. However, tbestatement went on, even aftor Chou's "principledbe "attacks and slanders" had continued. It was the Albanian intention, the statement said, to make known-to the world the "wholehich would "unnask"and "bis group." The statementong bard struggle, but, it said, "We will win because we are not alone.
In the speeches of the followingOctober throughctober, leading up to Khrushchev's call onctober for the overthrow of the Albanianol the charges made against the Albanians ln the first three days of the congress was reiterated by several speakers.*
general propositions ln tho complete case were that the Albanian leaders had forsaken Marxism-Leninism andinternationalism and were instead exhibiting sectarianism, nationalism, adventurism and depravity
v(Continued at bottom of next page) NOPCRN
Also, several speakers echoed Khrushchev'sctoberthat the Soviet party and world movement could not yield od the matters of principle in dispute with Albania (and China) and echoed too his call for Albania to return to the path of "unity." Several also replied to Chou En-Lai'sctober speech, contending that the Soviet party had done everything possible, that it was Albanian and not Soviet actions which were delighting tbe imperialists, and that tbe dispute could not be concealed even If this were "not to the liking ofeveral speakers also warned of the possible expulsion ofand perhaps even China (not named) froa the bloc. It was not said that Albania was already regarded as outside the bloc; it was said, for example, that Albaniathat Albanian policy could leadjmroking away froa the camp and to its isolation in the movement, and that both revlslopispTsmmmmmmmammBBmmmaaTsV LfrnTmBmrnTflLp could lead countries out of the camp.
The Chlucjj^Wfere of course aware that those attacks were directod at them too. Thereredible report that
(Coot'd) Tho spocific charges were that the Albanian leaders had come to disapprove the proceedings ofh6 (which had attacked Stalin and laid down the theses of tho non-inevitability of war, tho need for peaceful coexistence, and the increasing possibilities for peaceful accession to powor by Communisthat they had attacked tho line of that congress and continued to practice the "personalityhat they bad violated the decisions of the7 and0 Uoscow coofereoces of the parties and of the Warsaw Pact countries (only Ulbrlcht made the latterhat in doing these things they had shamelessly presented themselves as the ooly true Marxists; that they had hypocritically professed friendship with the USSR while slandering the Soviet party and refusing to(in full) its draft program, mistreating and expelling Soviet personnel, and stopping Soviet publications; and that tbey had practiced terrorism in Albania, lntor aliaand arresting friends of the USSR. All of these offenses against truth, unity, and justice, tbe charges declared, were harming the causo of socialist construction In Albania and were harming tho world Communist cause, especially since they were being exploited by tho imperialist enemy.
Peng Chen in this period, briefing another party's delegation, said that the attacks on Albania were the "same thing" as attacks on China and that the Chinese party could withstand all of the pressures that tbe Sovietinto apply.
Onctober Khrushchev brought the dispute with Albania (and China) to another new stage by calling clearly for the overthrow of tbe Albanian leadership. (He had made clear tn his heated exchanges with the Chinese0 that ho would also like to see the overthrow of Mao Tse-tung and his most influential lieutenants, but he had never stated or even implied this publicly.) In this speech, Khrushchev reviewed the deterioration in the Soviet-Albanian gave some detail in support of his contention that the Soviet party had done "everything in its power" toood relationship, reforred 'bitterly to attacks oo theparty from both "overt and concealed enemies ofinsisted that the Soviet party had to tell the "whole truth" about the Albanian leadership ln order not to appear cowardly (another warning to the ChlnosoX and thenarcastic paragraph to the "anxiety" oxpressed by Chou En-lai about airing the dispute. (Chou had left the congress onctobejr.iA,eportedly having tried and failed tooviet Invitation to the Albanian party toelegation to the congress to state the Albanian case; Chou did nothrushchev said:
ffe share the anxiety of our friends
eflMp1 and appreciate their concern for tbe strengthening of unity. If the Chinese comrades wish to apply their efforts to normalizing relationsthe Albanian party and tbeparties, there is hardly anyone who couldetter contribution to tbe solution of this problem than the Chinese comrados.*
*Kozlov" onctober directly contradicted Chou,that the airing of the dispute was precisely theMarxist-Leninist
Khrushchev went oo in this speech to reiterate his denunciation of the Albanian leaders for various offenses earlier ascribed to the Chinese privately: forspecialor being unreconstructed Stalinists, for manifesting Stalinism ln its "worstor purging party leaders who had adhered to Khrushchev's (instead of Chinese) positions, and so on. He then made meaningless his invitation to the Chinese to Intercede with Albania, He said:
o put an end to tbe cult of personality for Sbehu, Hoxha, and others would mean in essence to renounce their commanding posts in tbe party and state, and this they do not intend to do. But we are confidentime will come when the Albanian Communists and tbe Albanian people will have their say, and then the Albanian leaders will have to answer,..
The resolution adopted by the congress onctober returned to the more moderate position ofeport, namely that Albanian leaders must abandon their erroneous views and return to the path of unity, rather than that they should be overthrown. But Khrushchev had made his point: he would not bo contont with anything less than tho heads of those who had defied and denounced him.
Following Khrushchev's speech ofctober and Chou's speech ofctober, thether Communist party delegations to the conferees had been in effect invited to line up with one or the other. By tho end of thectober session, the last day of speeches by foreign delegates,f them had spoken. Of these,elegations had echoed various portions of the Soviet charges against the Albanian leadership, whilo none, apart from the Chinese and the absent Albanians, had criticized the USSR for attacking the Albanian leaders. However,f them had failed to second the Soviet attacks; of bloc parties. North Korea and North Vietnam; of parties of Asian non-bloc statos, Indonesia, India, Japan, Burma, and Malaya (in other words, all of those that spoke exceptf Commonwealth parties, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Canada; of Scandinavian parties, Norway,
Denmark, Sweden and Iceland; of Western European parties,and Switzerland; of the African parties, Algeria; and of Latin Amorlcan parties, Martinique, Guadeloupe, and theRepublic.
This tally wasegree misleading, asf tbe lastarties named above (not Iceland and Switzerland) had supported the Sovietstrongly or onat the Moscow conference ofear before, and most oi them would bc expected to line up with Moscow again if the matter were putote (at an international Communistsay in the formtatement censuring tbe Albanianost of them did in fact indicate their support of the Soviet party in subsequent statements. Moreover, there were several delegations from very pro-Soviet parties among tbeelegations which did not speak. The Soviet camp at the congress probably totalled no fewer thanf thearties, as had been the case at the Moscow conference.
The Chinese camp did not clearly consist of anyone other than China, lnere abstention from criticism of Albania did not make the abstainerhinese supporter. Nevertheless, among tho abstainers, if those who had reportedly supported the Chinese on questions of authority and discipline at the Moscow conference0 could bo regardod as Chinese supporters again, who would line up with the Chinese if the matter were putote, the Chinese camp would total at least seven to nine parties; those of China, Albaniaorth Korea, North Vietnam, Indonesia, Burma, and Malaya, among those who spoke, and probably Thailand and Laos, among those who did not speak. Also among the abstainers were the delegations of at least four parties known to beAustralia, New Zealand, and Japan; and eome of the parties which seconded the Soviet attack were believed to be split (Ceylon, Chile, Peru, Panama,s well as some of those which did not speak (Paraguay, San Marino).*
Although numerically the Chinese campmall
minority. It wasignificant minority. It included four of theloc parties, and of the non-bloc parties it
pronouncements by several of tbese parties made clear that most of the Asian parties were Indeed Chinese supporters, and suggested that some others (even ln Western Europe) had pro-Chlnose factions.
included or threatened to include virtually all of the Asian parties, thus presenting again to Uoscow the threat of an eventual Asian bloc dominated by and responsive to Peiping,
Just as tbe Soviet party had not calledote at the Moscowearvote which would have formalized and made public the split ln thesod Congress was not followedonference of the parties at which the Soviet-Albanian issue could have been submittedote. There were reports that the Chinese during the congress had pressedonference, and that the Soviets had blocked this or that negotiations had foundered oo the issue of Albanian representation: the latter may be true, because, as noted earlier, Khrushchev had reportedlyhinese request during thefor an Albanian delegation to attend the congress Subsequently. Soviet aod friendly commentators presentedd Congress as having been in effect an international Communist conference, so that no new conference was necessary-
III. TO*REAK WITH ALBANIA)
In the five weeks between the close ofd CPSCctober) and the break in Soviet-Albanianrelations (takenecember) events moved rapidly along the lines foreshadowod by the congress. Theseare discussed below ln terms of Soviet-Albanian polemics and related actions, peiplng's support of Albania, and Soviet warnings to China Itself*
A. Soviet-Albanian Polemics
The Albanian party came out fightingovember editorial describing Khrushcheviar, slanderer, bully, and anti-Marxist intriguer, and noting that Chou En-lai had "openly opposed" Khrushchev's action at tbe congress- Peiping's people's Dally reprinted this, as it had the Albanianonctober, Khrushchev'sctober summary speech, thoctober resolution on removing Stalin's body from the mausoleum, and an Albanian editorial of the same date on the Marxist-Leninist basis of Albanian foreign policy. In such material, Peiping for tbe first time printed attacks onby other party leaders.
There wore sharp Soviet-Albanian exchanges in Peiping itself during the celebrations of tbe Soviets' Octoberanniversaryovember) and tbe Albanianovember). Soviet Ambassador Chervonenko, speakingally, denounced the Albanian party for persisting ln Stalinism and for trying to split the world movement; thereportedly walked out. ovember, the Albanian -ambassador, at another rally, insisted on the Albanian party's fidelity to Marxism-Leninism and to7f the parties, cited Albanian efforts to strengthen tho unity of the movement, and argued that it was those who were attempting to eject tbe Albanian party fx:om the worlddisagreeing with tho decisionsoviet partywere the real splitters of the movement.
The most important of the speeches on these occasions was made by Hoxha in Tirana, addressing himselfovember to both anniversaries and to questions of strategy, authority sod discipline, and state relations. Identifying his enemies as imperialism, Tito, and Khrushchev, Hoxha accused Khrushchev
personally of slander, blackmail, andnd hothis with Stalin's role as friend and protector of Hoxha insisted that Stalin's merits had outweighed his weaknesses (precisely the Chinesee chargedthat Khrushchev was using the issue of Stalinism to bring down people he disliked; and be said that Khrushchev himself was flagrantly guilty ofcult of(his own).
As for questions of strategy, Hoxha rejected the Soviet party's positions with terms and arguments used by tbe Chinese party in attacking Soviet positions (ofton distorting them io order to do so). Hoxha observed that it was the revisionist practice to cite new conditions ln order to justify anpoint of view and to describe any opposition as "dogmatic, sectarian, orndeed, he said,on the pretext of combatting dogmatism, wasMarxism-Leninism and departing from fundamental principles (precisely tbe Chinese cbaree), The Soviet presentation of the balance of power, he said, encouraged "reformist and pacifist" illusions and weakened tne struggle against He criticized the "incorrect" and "harmful" view that imperialism was deterred from wars, and said that in trying to avert wars one should emphasize tbe power of the bloc and the struggle of peoples, not the "good Intentions" of the West. It was not Albania which was afraid of imperialism, he went on, but those (Khrushchev) who haderman settlement-* He also criticized Khrushchev personally forto make "peaceful coexlstenco" the general line of bloc foreign policy, for overemphasizing the possibility ofaccession to power by Communist parties, and forYugoslavia.
Soviet party on2 answered thisommentator argued that the issue was not "fear" or absence of it, but the need toolution; he described theattitude as "adventurism."
or were prepared to make. It was true, Hoxha said that the Albanian party dissented from the decisions ofh CPSU rwrefla fas outlinedut it was free to do
As for questions of authority and discipline, Hoxha again made the charges against Khrushchev that the Chinese had made
congress (as outlined aoovej, out , cause decisions of one party could not be binding on other parties (the Chinese position). In attacking the Albanian party publicly, he went on, Khrushchev was violating theof the0 declaration (which had called for international conferences if bilateral talks hadecause Khrushchev had failed (as he had) at tbe Bucharest conference of0 and again at the Moscow conference of0 in massing the parties solidly (against tbeande was "afraid" of another conference and had used his party congress to sabotageonference.
Hoxha also reviewed the steps Khrushchev had taken in state-to-state relations:. the withdrawal of credits and specialists, tbe demand for early repayment of old credits (thus greatly reducinghe reclslon of scholarships of Albanian students in the USSR, the adoption of unspecified military measures, and tho slander of Albania in the press. Hoxha stated tbe other Eastern Europe states had cooperated in this effort to Isolate Albania politically, economically, and militarily. Finally, Hoxha saidhrushchev had gone so far as to call openly for the overthrow of the Albanian leadership.
Hoxha concluded with an expression of confidence that Khrushchev would fail. Ho had claimed earlier in the speech to have friends who "bad not loft and will not leave us ln thend he specified these at tbe end as the soviet and Chinese "people" and other friendly peoples.
Shortly thereafter, the Albanian embassy in Moscow began to circulate to otherthose of countries with which Albania did not have diplomaticpacket of Albanian statements on the dispute. Two of the items were the central committee statement ofctober andovember speech. According to credible Soviet charges, tbe Albanians also sont such material to tho central committees of the Soviet party organizations in the republics (presumably as part of their effort to bring Khrushchevnd they also were intensifying tbeir use of Albanian students in the USSR to conduct "anti-Soviet propaganda."
Hoxha inovember speech said virtually everything there was to say, from tbe Sino-Albanlan point of view, and other Albanian pronouncements,ovember and the receipt of the Soviet noteecember breaking offrelations with Albania, added almost nothing. One point made in Hoxha's speech, that Khrushchevhorned devil" for encouraging Greece in its quarrel vlth Albania, wasby another spokesman onovember, who asserted that Khrushchev was encouraging the "Imperialist wolves'1 to attack Albania. This same spokesman pointed to tbe Chinese party as the "shining example for Communists of the whole world...
with wbich party the Albanians would march together through
"any storm or tempest,"
Onovember pravda asserted that the "international Communist movement"ajority of the parties) bad "decisively condemned" the Albanian leaders, but that the latter had not only failed to heed this criticism but had actually "deepened theirlandering the Soviet party and others and attempting to conceal their splitting activities. Onoviet deputy foreign minister summoned the Albanian chargd in Moscow and made two statements to him. One of these notod that the work of the Soviet ambassador and other Soviet diplomats in Tirana had been obstructed, that tbe embassywashat the Albanians had demanded aof the embassy staff by almost two-thirds, and that In consequence the USSR would recall, its ambassador (mho had actually been back ln Moscow nlncebe other statement protested the actions of the Albanian embassy in Moscow in circulating the anti-Soviet material noted above and in using Albanian students for such purposes, and itthe recall of the Albanian ambassador,
Onovember Pravdaumber of the Soviet charges (summed up as "deceit, fraud, adventurism and crude violation of the principles of proletarians did Izvcs't'ijM onovember. The Soviet press reversed its previous treatment of Yugoslav and Albanian Nationalommentingriendly manner on Yugoslavia and in an unfriendly way on Albania*
ecember (one day before the date of the Soviet note closing the Soviet embassy inravda replied 'toovember speech. Evidently stung by Hoxha's cbargo that Khrushchev had built his own "personalityravda
defended the "historicf Comrade Khrushchevln restoring Leninist methods and spirit in the Soviet party and in intrabloc relations. It reiterated that the "anti-party group" ln the CPSU and tbe Albanian leaders alike wished toegressive course. Foreshadowing tho break, the article treated Albania as bavlng already "isolated"aod as already having cut itself off from the Warsaw Pact and CEMA.
Taking up Hoxha's claim to be free to dissent fromofh CPSU Soviet party congress, Pravda contended that "all" the parties had approved the results of6 congress. (This was not quite true; although both the Chinese and Albanians had approved Khrushchev's report at thattho Chinese and otbors had soon criticized the hand-ling of do-Stallnizatlon and tbe Chinese even then had not approved one of the principal theses on strategy.) As for the charge of violation of the agreement on holding multiparty conferences to resolve disputes, Pravda evaded this by arguing that it had been necessary toublic attack io the face ofefforts to "uodermioc the unity of tho socialist Pravda reiterated that tbe Albanian party hadrejected Soviet efforts to resolve the dispute, and It cited tbe Albanian editorial ctober which had gone so far as to state that Albanian relations with the USSR would henceforth bo governod by the "principles of peacofuli.e. principles governing relations between states with "different social systems." Pravda went on to criticize Albanian bohavior since the congress, in particularovember speech, full of "abuse" and containing the unprecedontedly "foul slander" that the USSR and Yugoslavia had conspired' to provoke the uprising in Hungarybe Pravda article coocluded with an expression of coofldence that tho bloc (presumablyew Albanian leadership) would again emerge froa its trials "even aoro monolithic."
B- Chinese Support of Albania
NOT OR N
The Chineso party had begun to defend the Albanian party Indirectly even duringd congress, by prlotlog Albanian statements (along with soao of the attacks oo tbe Albaolan party) and through declarations by low-level spokesmen of solidarity with Albania. Through tho first week after the congress, Chinese comment was cautious, Doting siaply that Albania wasember of the "socialist caap" as thedefined it, and emphasizing the need for "unity" ln the camp and between the USSR and China.
In comment on tho Soviet and Albanian anniversariesovember, Peiping movedewJust those things about the Albanian party whichand other Soviet spokesmen had denied. armup editorial praising Stalin, People's Daily praisedyear record of the Albanian party, asserted that it has provided "correctescribed Hoxha as the "long-tested leader of the Albanianoted tho fidelity of theparty to Marxism-Leninism and the closeness of the party to the masses, specified that it had adhered to the No*7 and0 declarations of the parties, and stated that it bad "resolutely safeguarded" friendship with the Soviet people and the "unity" of the world movement. China and Albania were said to be "linked in theirnd, in the same phrase used on other occasions to describe Sino-Soviet unity, it was said that Sino-Albanian unity could not be shaken by any force on earth. Many of these points was also madeally, and they were again in tho Chinese party message to the Albanian party on the anniversary.*
The Chinese party rested for three weeks before making another important statement onontent to print from time to time statements of other bloc leaders and free world Communist parties alcng with Albanian statements, giving the latter more space and highlighting thea. Onovember, an Albanian mission arrived in Peiping to discuss trade andrelationsn the same day, People's Da 1lythe full text ofovember speech, there was an unconfirmed report in this period that large portraits of Stalin were appearing again ln Peiping, and that instructions had been Issued for study of Stalin's works.
ovember, at rallies celebrating the anniversary of Albania'shinese spokesmen again praised
*Ten Communist parties in addition to the CCP sontto the Albanian party on this occasion: tbe parties of Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, and San Marino; abd of North Korea, North Vietnam, Indonesia, Burma, Malaya, and Thailand. Tbe Belgian, and San Marino parties later criticized the Albanian leaders, but the others ail gave fresh indications of being in tbe Chinese camp in tho dispute.
Albania's "loyalty" to Marxism-Leninism and proletarianits adherence to multiparty declarations, its efforts to prosorve the unity of the camp and the movement, and its contributions to "preserving tho purity of Marxism-Leninism." At the samo time. People's Daily assailed the Yugoslavs as "renegades" engaged lo "treacherous dealings" and scheming to subvert and annexthe clear implication that Yugoslav support of Khrushchev's policyAlbania in itself discredited that policy. The article observed also that the "modern revisionists" (not justwere opposed by the great majority ofthe Albanian line on Khrushchev's lack of support.
Also onovember, Tao Cbu. first secretary of the CCP's Central-South Bureau, who hadelegate to thed Congress in October, reportedlyarty-goveromont meeting in Kwangtung on the subject of intrabloc relations. Tao is said to have forecast the Soviet-Albanian diplomatic break; to have charged that the USSR was trying to persuade the Yugoslavs to overthrow the Albanian leaders; to have said that Chou En-lai left the congress early after having tried and failed to moderate Khrushchev's attitude toward Albania; to have asserted that China would give large-scale economic support to Albania, and would respond openly to open soviet attacks oo China; to have said further that Peiping did not need any further Soviet economicnd did not foar that the USSR would attack China militarily; and, ln the first explicit assertionhinese belief that there are significant anti-Khrushchev forces in the Soviet party, to have said that the conduct of other Soviet leaders at the congress (and other unspecified evidence) led to the conclusion that Khrushchev would eventually be overthrown.**
Tao is also reported to have exhorted Hong Kong observers at this meotlng to try to persuade their friends with technical and scientific training to return to Communist China, as otherwise it might be necessary to seek the return of Soviet technicians.
Chinese reportedly tried and failed to split other Soviet leaders from Khrushchev ln talks before and during the Moscow conference of Since then there have been some slightin an FBID/RPB internala Chinese hope that Kozlov can bo split off.
Onovember, Mao and other Chinese leaders, in aon the Albanian anniversary, hailed the "glorious"party, described the Tirana regime as "worthy members of the Rreat socialistnd spoke of the Chinese and Albanians as "close brothers" struggling together against imperialism and "contemporary revisionism." On the samehinese speakerally stated that the Albanians "are notdirect contradiction to Soviet assertions. Mrs. Hoxha,ally in Tirana, said that Albania would show Khrushchev that Albania could live without Soviet aid; and Sbehu boasted that Albania's friends bad "guaranteed" all the foreign aid It would need." Thereredible report that tho Soviet charge walked out of the Albanian National Day reception, followed by all tho bloc delegations, except the Chinese, North Koreans, and North Vietnamese.
Peiping choseecember anniversary of the signing ofparty declaration0 for its most importnat pronouncement since the"Chinese version" of0 statement. As Soviet and Albanian editorials were soon to do, the People's Daily editorial again set out theof the Chinese position on matters both of strategy and of authority and discipline. (The Chinese pronouncements on strategy can be outlined later, together with the Soviet and Albanian statement, but the Chinese statements on authority and discipline should be noted at this point.) Peipingknew about tbo Soviet note ofovomber announcing tbe recall of tbe Soviet ambassador and demanding tbe recall of the Albanian ambassador, andecember editorial was cloarly designed to put theocord before the anticipated break ln Soviet-Albanian relations, which came two days later.
Dealing with the Soviot attack on the Albanian party by first pointing out that it was tho Yugoslavs (not the who had been condemned by thearties 0 for "betrayinghe editorial insisted that "revisionism remains tho mainnd it noted that the Yugoslavs were not tbe only revisionists. It stated that the
Albanian tidsntsV (more) reportedly' left for Peiping at about this time to take up studies there.
eclaration had put "special emphasis" on the importance of unity and that it was the "supreme international duty" of every party to work for this. Reiterating that each party is "independent" and "equal" (so that none can Impose its will ont asserted that reaching unanimity through "consultation" was the best method of resolving disputes and that70 multiparty conferences were the "best example" of this principle. The implication was clear: the Soviet party should havo convenedonference before attacking Albania, and it shouldonference before taking any further action such as ejecting Albania (or China) from the "socialist camp." The editorial concluded that "we must protect the unity of the socialist camp comprisingraternal. including Albania.
C. Soviet Warnings to China
The developments in Soviet-Albanian relations between mid-Octoberecember were meant, of course, to convince the Chinese that the Soviet party was willing to take extreme measures against the Chinese as well as the Albanians; in* deed, Soviet speakers at the congress bad stated that the congress should serveerious "warning" to others who opposed Soviet positions. In taking these measures against the Albanians, the Soviet party setattern of action which, it Implied, it would follow with Peiping (perhaps in dlf feronthe withdrawal from communication with theparty (which was came beforedhen the naming of names (Khrushchev'sctoberhen the detailed charges, with the warnings that persistence incould load to exclusion from the Soviet camp (tbe
severing of economic and military relationships and the forma exclusion of the offender from the camp.
Without having withdrawn from communications with the Chinese party, the Soviet party and its followers continued the process of naming. publicly identifying theparty as taking anovember. Pravda printed Togliatti's comments ofovember that "we consider what the Albanian comrades are doing, partially supported by the Chinese comrades. Is erroneous andand that the "exception taken by Comrade Chou En-Lai
to Comrade Khrushchev's critical remarks is unacceptablet because in this case public criticism vas being exercised only after all these questions bad been posed and discussed confidentially, without result.."
The Soviet party continued in the next two weeks toits Eastern European friends to criticize theby name, reprinting this criticism rather than originating criticism itself, on this single issue of supporting tbe In order of appearance. Novotny said publicly that the Chinese "attitude" wan wrong; Gomulka,engthy de-fenso of the "leadingf the Soviet party, said publicly that it was only the Chinese who believed that the dispute should not have been publicized and xhat "it is difficult to agree withlbricht said publicly that theinstead should have given attention to the anti-Soviet utterances and violations of the Warsaw Treaty by the Albanianulgarian central committee resolution said publicly that the Chinese hadcortain support" of the Albanian leaders and that^ the Chinese should realize the dam-age that the Albanians 4hHHH--iMB*^rt? doing to tbe world Communist cause; and KacTar said puEllcly that only tbehad opposed the majority view on policy toward Albania and that "almost everyone" had rejected tbe Chinese position.
Two pronouncement in Eastern European media, reprinted by Uoscow. foreshadowed the logical next step in the appli- p_ cation of Soviet pressure onthe Chinuse with specific offenses similar to those committed by the(charges the Soviet party had long ago made against the Chineseolish editorial ofovember, commenting onovember speech, concluded that "These flowers from the Albanian garden show in what mannerform of dogmatism, not only Albanian dogmatismthe principle of peaceful coexistence, and how dangerous and adventurous its practical conclusionshivkov onovember observed that the "complete unmasking" of the Soviet anti-party group was "all the more Imperative" because elements of the world Communist movement "were taking under their protection, through the cult of Stalin, the most inveterate members of the anti-partyhivkov went on to contend that thereelationship betweon overcoming the "personality cult" and eliminating "subjectivism and administration by mere injunction" in economic planning and direction. These passages suggested that Moscow would, if
neccs5 the pe
ary, accuse the Chinese leadership directly of practicing liiv personality cult, of interfering ln the Soviot party'saffairs, and of following dogmatic and foolish policies ln Chinese economic development.
One bloc loader may in fact have taken this further stoppublicly charging the Chinese (by name) with specific offenses--in this period. According to the Peiping People's DailyNovember)ovember speech by Czech politburo member Siroky, Siroky bad said that the Chinese party as well as the Albanian party had practiced tbecult and indeed had intensified it in recent years. This alleged specification of the Chinese was not included in the available Czech and Slovak editions oi the party's paper. However, it is doubtful that tbe Chinese invented it, so it probably did appoar in Siroky's speech as delivered. If so, it was probably deleted from the published version or later editionsall other materialSoviet camp was not yot ready for this advanced stage of the offensive
Moscow and its friends-also kopt tbe Chinese conscious of tbe still important economic aod military bonds with tbe Soviet camp which the Chinese were jeopardizing by their Several spokesmen,oint often made duringd tfongress, discussed the connection between successes in domestic construction and adherence to proletarian(supporting Soviotnd Pravdaecember observedcorrect internationalist position" was tho_kcj_todifficulties"
IBss^ BBmrnmpammmmmmmV In building soclaTi.sc
as "disregard of the common interest of tho socialistcan resultituation ruinoushich was "precisely what occurred" in Aibama^B BUflB
BmBBmrnvT. Moreover, perhaps with an eye on the Sino-Soviet treaTy of alliance, Gomulka contended that one reason the Soviet party deserved the "leading role" was "becauso tBe Soviet Union is the main factor io the security of
IV. PRESSURE AND RESISTANCE
Tbe month of1 was marked by Increasing Soviet pressure on Albania, the return of the Chinese to the polemical tones and direct challengesnd sharper criticism of the Chinese by the USSR and its friends. These developments can be discussed most conveniently under tbe headings of Soviet pressure on Albania. Sino-Soviet exchanges on questions of stratogy, and Sino-Soviet conflicts on questions of authority and discipline,
Soviet Pressure on Albania
oviet deputy foreign minister again
also recall ail other personnel of the embassy and tne trade mission, and demanding the recall of all Albanian diplomats and trade representatives.*
The Albanian government protested these Soviet decisions in notesecember. Tbe first of these rejectedcharges and made similar charges against the USSR. Tbe second reviewed at length tbe history of Soviet-Albaniandenounced the "anti-Marxist" views and actions of "Niklta Khrushchev and his group" in familiar terms, and enlarged on the earlier defense against Soviet charges and on the Albanian counter-charges. Tbe Albanian party press editorialized at length along tbe same lines onecember; the editorial noted (correctly) that Khrushchev's actions had made clear whatreally thought of "equality, independence, and non-interference" as principles governing tbe relations of Communist states, and it also noted (again correctly) that Khrushchev in so acting was deliberately warning and threatening "any other party which dares to contradict his points of view,"
*There had apparently been no partyof communications between themid-October, when'the Albanian party central committee hadessage of greeting tod CPSU Congress.
Moscow broadcast onummaryCommunist article (by its chief editor) which elaborated some of the Soviet charges against Hoxha, Shehu, and other awp leaders " The article pointed to the "disgraceful" speeches of inxha and Sbebuovember, noted that the imperialists were
Its leaders. Another Moscow broadcast (to Albania) on tbe sane day rejected Albanian charges that the USSR at its own initiative had stopped work on the Palace of Culture ln Tirana md bad withdrawn its technicians (described as "tbe best engineers, technicians, workers of high qualifications, scientific workers, and builders").
Onecember Tirana retorted by flourishing the close relationship between the "illustrious Marxist-Leninist leaders. Comrades Uao Tse-tuag and Enver Hoxha." Tbe head of tbe Chinese youth delegation to Albania was quoted at length in praise of Albania's struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism." On the same day, Czechoslovakia became the first of tbe Eastern European followers of Moscow totbe Soviet action in recalling its ambassador from Tirana and demanding the recall of the Albanian ambassador; the embassies remained open, howeveru
Pravda struck again onecember, with an article on tbe Albanian leaders* "dangerous road." ong list of Albanian offenses which were expressions ofnd attacking Albanian (Chinese) positions on questions of strategy and discipline (to be discussedbe article noted that the Albanian leaders bad organized hostile propaganda against the bloc, had "provoked variousnd had "attempted to undermine tbe concerted actions of the socialist states in tbe Warsaw Treaty ln the Council of Economic Mutualnd in tbe international latter chargu laying the ground for possible expulsion of the Albanians from the Warsaw Pact and from CEMA. Tbe article concluded with an expression ofKhrushchev's speechhe "time will come when Albanian Communists and the Albanian people will have their say, and the Albanian leaders will thee have to assume responsibility for the barm tbey have caused to their country, their people, and tbe cause of building socialism in Albania."
ThereEMA meeting in Warsaw ironoecember. After the meeting, Moscow announced that "Albania's representative did not come to this session." Moreover,observors were identified from Outer Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam, there was no Chinese observer. The session's communique swiped at tbe Albanians and Chinese by noting that the realization of the Soviet party program would further develop "international socialist division ofof long-term economicconomic and scientific-technical cooperation, and trade, "thereby increasing the might of tbe entire world system of socialism." Tbe CEMA session took no public action against the Albanians, however, much asTirana to bo noember of CEMA. Similarly, Moscow did not convene any Warsaw Pact meeting to expel Albania. At least for the time being, the Soviet party preferred to take thestatedolish spokesman after the CEMAAlbania, by not participating in such activities, was divorcing itself from the bloc.
Onecember, Moscow announced tbe arrival therehinese trade delegation, for talks which were to establish the "nomenclature and quantity" of trades the CEMA communique strongly implied, tbe results of these Sino-Soviet trade talks would almost certainly reflect Peiping's continued bad behavior.
On ecember, East Germany followed tbe Czech lead by withdrawing its ambassador to Tirana and demanding theof the Albanian ambassador. Hungary took the same action onecember. None of the other four pro-Soviet Eastern European regimes had done so by the end of December, but all of their ambassadors were believed to be absent.
Byecember, virtually all Soviet diplomatic porsonnel had left Tirana and all or amost all Albanian diplomatic personnel had left Moscow. On this date, Albanian deputy premier Kellezi arrived in Peiping to join the
Albanian.economic delegation that been there since mid-November.
Onecember, Tirana again stood behind tbe Chinese to thumb its nose at Moscow. Tbe Albanian financo minister stated publicly that it was "hopeless" for Khrushchev and its friends to try to force Albania to its knees, as tbe Albanian party was supported by the people and "internationally assisted by the Chinese People's Republic." On the following day, Peiping reportedlno-Albanlan joint-stock shipping company had
bocn formed; tbe Albanian party press, commenting on this, bailed tbe "tremendous aid given us by our Chinese brothers to fulfill the third five-year plan and overcome and offset the imperialist and revisionist
Onecember, Moscow took another step towardAlbania to be out of tbe socialist camp. TASSaraguayan Communist party communique as having observed that the Albanian party loaders, by departing from tbead (in TASS' language) "deliberately placed themselves outside of the world Communist movement" and were indeed "lo opposition to It."
The USSR during December did not in fact exert all of the pressure on Albania that It could have exerted. There wasittle Soviet-Albanian trade, and trade continued between Albania and other Eastern European statesay-as-you-go basis, apparently in sufficient volume to be important to Albania.
Throughout tbe month, there were rumors that the USSR was planning to intervene militarily io Albania. Pretexts could easily be found for sucb. Albanian violation of the unpublicized agreement governing Soviet use of the Valona naval base before tbe withdrawal.inlbanian seizure of Soviet property (seizure of some vessels at Valona was rumored), or Albanian mistreatment of Soviet citizens in Albania. However, there were no military indicators of early Soviet military action of any kind. Similarly, rumors that tbe USSR planned tougoslav attempt to overthrow Hoxha were hotly denied by Belgrade.
At month's ond, there were unconfirmed reports of asubstantial reduction in the staff of the Chinese embassy in Moscow. It was confirmed that the Chinese embassy badseveral of its Soviet employees', presumablyecurity measure. It was also reported that most of the possibly00 Chinese students in tbe USSR were being withdrawn before the end of their academiceport which, if true, might'explain the reported reduction in tbe embassy staff.
B. Polcnics on Strategy
The Pravda editorialecembera comparatively dignified "Soviet version" of0 declaration of the parties, just as the People's Daily editorialecember hadChinese version." Whereas the Chinese editorial had emphasized the possibility of world war and had contended that wars would end only with tbe end of imperalisn, the Soviet editorial emphasized the prospects for deterring the West from world war and reiterated that world war might be made impossible oven before the endapitalism. Whereas Peiping had noted that the United States was preparing also for local wars, Moscow evaded the question of such wars.People's Daily hadilitant interpretation of "peacefulmphasizing that revolutions must be given the "fullest moral and material aid" and that peace would be secured by increasing tbe strength of the bloc and the liberation movement and encouraging revolutionsPravda declared simply that tbe USSR was notstruggle* anQ it evaded the question of support forforces.
People's Dallyecember responded to Soviet publicity given to President Kennedy's interview with Adzfaubei. The Chinese newspaper, unlike Soviet commentators, denounced. position in toto. Reiterating that "revolutions" must not be subordinated tohe article Implied that tho USSR was continuing to do just that andhus doing proclsely what. wished it do so. The article called for tbe socialiststreched from Tirana toand its followers to "tear off tho peace mask" of tho Unitod States.** On the same day, Liu Cbang-sbong, speaking to the
Sovietthe Chinese distort Khru-
shchov's position onvalid. Moscow has not renounced struggle, it has simply been cautious, avoiding high risks.
**Onecember the Albanian party press made some of the points about the Kennedy-Adzhubei interview which Peiping would have liked to make, and which the Chinese had Indeed made privately0 in denouncing some of Khrushchev's remarks about Eisenhower9 anddzhubei's cordial remarks about tho President were said by Tirana to bo echoes of the praise which Khrushchev "showers on the leaders ofpractice whichgroat. policy ^mong "poorly informed people."
WFTU congress in Moscow, gave much detail on tho preparations for large and small wars which. was making "under tbe cover of its peace mask."
December,peech to tbe WFTU congress
by negotiations." In tms connection, sm bad not changed but it was no longer able to impose its will by military neans,act which "somemmHmW should "clear their brains" io order to understand. Hehis confidence that Soviet missiles were an effectivo deterrent. He said also that the "principal aim" of the Soviet foreign policy was to "free mankind from an annihilating world war."
Soviet and Chinese commentators onecember made some old points against each other. People's Dally,that the Chinese party did indeed bolieveao's dictum that all power grows out of the barrelun, asserted again that tbe Chinese did notorld war (Khrushchev had said more than once that anyone in his right mind would fear it) and that inar tbe victorious camp wouldeautiful new future on the debris of imperialism" ormulation very offensive to Moscow). Reaffirming also tbe Chinese view on the primary importance of armed struggle ln revolution, the newspaper stated that Mao's theories, strategy, and tactics were increasingly influential with peoples seeking liberation, especially those of the underdeveloped countries. The TASS summary of tbe Komnaunlst attack on Albania on that date made tbe points, iotor alia, that the Albanians (Chinese) failed to recognize tbe changes ln tbe balance of power, refused to accept "peacoful coexistence" as the general line of foreign policy, falsely accused tbe USSR of advocating only peaceful accession to power, resented bloc economic aid to underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa, and could not understand the role of the neutral status io the struggle for peace.
Onecember, tbe Chinese delegation at tbe WFTU meeting in Moscoweparate statement on tbe second Item of the agenda, tbe "struggle againstn action which in itself suggested that there badlash on this question. According to tbe KCKA summary, tboassorted that the Kennedy administration was hypocritical
in its declared opposition to colonialism, that its "fine words are nothing but sheep's clothing. imperialism was the "most vicious enemy" of all people who wished to win and keep independence, and that it was necessary to conduct anstruggle" for liberation. On the same day, Peipingthe conclusion of the Albanian delegation to tbo WFTU meeting that "only by mercilessly unmasking. policy of aggression can peace be safeguarded."
Pravda'secember article on the Albanians' "dangeroushile not concerned primarily with questions of strategy, reaffirmed two important Soviet positions. Those who rejected ,Efac25ul coo**stence" as tbe general line of bloc foreign policy (The Chinese aod their followers) were playing into tbe hands of tbe "most militant and adventurous" circles of imperialism, Pravda
said, becauso there was no third choice between cooxistence and"
world war. Similarly, those (the Chinese camp) who opposedpolicy on disarmament as contrary to the lntorests of the bloc had gone so far as to misrepresent that policy as calling for the unilateral disarmament of tbe bloc.
The Chinese launched another offensive against Soviet
positions on strategy at tbe World Peace Council meeting in
ecember. There wasispute at the
sovlet propaganda positions on disarmament or orimarilv to rt the "liberation" movement.
meeting between the Soviet camp and tbo Chioose camp as to
whether the "peace" aovcmeot should be used primarily to
bead of the Chinese delegation, spoke
onecember.* Liao contended that the Keonedy-Adzhubeibad revealed the United States* "frantic ambition for aggression against and enslavement of tbe wholehat peace-lovors and their friends could not cherish any illusions" about this vicious enemy; that an emphasis on oegotiatioos over mass struggle" would bo to disarm oneself against imperialism, and, indeed, the principal international problems could not be solved through negotiations "conductedew bighat general disarmamentorthy goallong wayhat the peace movement must rely on tho masses,ew leaders, and that it must notool of the foreign policy
-Liao at one point during the meeting is said to have walked out, reportedly in responseemarkoviet
of "each and everyhat it was "wrong aod extremely harmful" to place the peace movement and the liberation movement in opposition or "to beg for peace from imperialism" (awhich infuriates thend that "words and deed which whitewash imperialism" were in the servico of imperialism.
Liu Ning-i's speech at the IPC meeting onecember was even sharper. He described as "erroneous and most harmful" the view that disarmament is the "basic task" of tbe peace movement and tbat the liberation movement should be subordinated to it. For tbe oppressediu went on (warming to tho favorite Chinese themo) tbe important issue is notbut tbebuilding and strengthening of their armed forces to defend themselves against the West. Thenations would be liberated, Liu said, by their own struggles, notampaign for disarmament; and tbey must not be frightened. threats of war but must "daro to carry out revolutions." Finally, io discussing disarmament, tho camp must constantly inform the world of. character as tbe "most ferocious enemy of peace'? (which Moscow bad not done)
Ooecember, Pravda printed an article by Kadar which carried forward Khrushchev's tactic of denying tbat the Chinese are effectively militant. Summing up Albanian (Chinese) positions on strategy, Kadar asked what the Albanian (Cbineso) leaders proposed: "Nothingeftist and adventurous policy of pseudo-radicalism and mere abuse of tbe imperialists, which will do tbem no barm." This was, ofistortion, as tbe Chinese are genuinely inciting revolutionaries everywhere to an "adventurist" policy aimed at doing the West as much harm as possible; but it is true that tbo Chinese thomselves are cautious toward the West.
At month's end, Peiping gave some examples of the most valuable forms of "struggle." ommentary on tbe "spectacular victories" of tbe liberation movement in Africaeiping cited: tbe "shining example"'of the Algerians,
Soviet and Chinese spokesmen regard colonial areas aod newly-independent countries alike as "oppressedhe question of bloc "support" for these nations relates to support of anti-colonial forces, of newly-independent nations against the West, and of Communist or pro-Communist forces within the newly-independent. Lumumba in tho Congo.
entering their eighth year of "aimedilitary action against the French in the Cameroons; the "organized armed struggl in Angola and Portuguese Guinea; tbe "large-scale armed revolt" in Northern Rhodesia; "demonstrations and strikes" against the British in other parts of Africa; the struggle of "Congolese nationalisthe retaliation of Nkrumah against his actual and alleged opponents; the effort of Mali toilitary force; the struggle for removal of French forces from Mali, Morocco, and Tunisia; tbe formation of organizations dedicated primarily to the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism; and so on. Such achievements promised "new and still greater victories."
C. Authority and Discipline
Questions of authority and discipline in tbe world Communist movement continued in December to be discussed in terms of adherence or non-adherence to the0 declaration of thearties, and of manifestations of revisionism, dogmatism, sectarianism, and nationalism.
As previously noted, the Chinese inecember anniversary commentary on0 declaration had insisted that "revisionism remains tbe main danger" and that the best method of resolving disputes among tho parties was that of
prolonging consultations until unanimity could be reached
thus putting tbe Chinese on record as favoring further The Soviet aod Albanian editorials on tbe anniversary of theon 6took up these questions.
Tho Albanian editorial asserted that the Albanian party had been "rigorously faithful" to0 declaration, while Khrushchev had been "trampling on it" and indeed bad described the declara^on, before its publication,document of comproraii shortho oditorial went On to discuss the ways In which "Khrushchev and his group" hadeneral revival of revisionism in the world Communist movement, and the ways in which Khrushchev had violated the principles expressed in0 declaration on relationships among Communist parties. Khrushchev's real principles, the paper said, were Soviet party dictatorship and coercion.
tbe Chinese member that he took off bis coat and offered to fight him. Tbore is also an unconfirmed report that the Chinese, in private talks with other delegations at tbe AAPSO meeting, attempted to secure the removal of tbe USSR itself from AAPSO on tho grounds that the Soviet Union was not genuinely an Asian country.
As noted previously, tho Chinese delegation to the WFTU meeting in Moscow in early Decembereparate statement on one of the principal items on tbeminority statementlash with Soviet representatives.
Tbeecember Pravda article (previously cited) on the Albanian leaders' "dangerous road" was based entirely on the proposition that the Albanians were acting against the "general line of the world Communist movement." The article denied that tbe Soviet party was attempting to impose its own positions on other parties, as witness that tbe Soviet party itself bad proposed that tbe USSR not be described as tho "head" of the movement. The positions taken by tbe Soviet party ath congress (primarily those on tbo "personalityhe non-inevitability of war, the need for poacefuland the possibility of peaceful accession tohe article pointed out, bad been accepted by theommunist parties in their declaration0 as havingcw stage in tbe international Communist movement and facilitated its further development on the basis of Marxism-Leninism." The Albanian party, tbe article went on, bad repudiated its agreement with this position and both openly and secretly had been engaging in schismatic activity, "trying to find support" among the other Communist parties. Tbe article did not concede that the Albanians already had upport, or, more accurately, that it was the Chinese who bad first challenged the Soviet positions and that tbe Albanians were supporting the Chinese. Indeed, the article, taking advantage of the fact that Chou En-lai atd CPSU congress had confined bis criticism of Khrushchev's action to tbe surfacing of the dispute rather" than discussing Khrushchev's charges, went on to quote Gomulka to the effect that "not one party disputed the essentially correct criticism" of tbe Albanian leaders.
Tbeecember Pravda article, after giving examples of the "isolated" position of the Albanians on such questions as peaceful coexistence, disarmament, and tbe personality cult, repeated Khrushchev's charge that the Albanian leaders
"persistently demand special privileges fornd then made its main points:
It is completely obvious that in tbe problem of fidelity to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism there cannot be exceptions for any party, Theae principles arelijtatory for both large and small parties f| HUHilMHH^ - -There cannot be any question about it.
Thislear reflection of the Soviet charge against tbe Chinese, made several times in private exchangeshat Peiping demanded recognitionpecial position in tbe movement -
The Soviets and Chinese again collided directly at tbe World Peace Council meeting inecember, the polemical Chinese speeches ofnd IS December on negotiations and disarmament, the Chineseovietto make disarmament the theme of the next WPC meeting (inhe Soviet resolution was carried, however,oteith the Chinese delegation castingf the dissenting votes. Presumably io the interest ofthe Chinese claim to be the principal friend andof revolutionaries Id colonial countries, the WPC alsoesolution calling for "preparations" to be madeonference on the national liberation movement at an unspecified date.
Onecember, the Soviet partyit forward toward openly criticizing tbe Chinese,oscow radiowhich quoted the Austrian party as having expressed "regret" that the Chinese continued to regard the policy of Hoxha and Shebu as a Leninist policy. Onecember, Pravda printed an Iraqi party statement ond CPSU congress which criticized the "negative" attitude of Chou Rn-lai at the congress aod argued that the Chinese party could contribute more than any other to returning tbe Albanians to tbe path of "unity."
The Kadar article (previously cited) publishedda onecember discussed among other things the rela-tiooship between tbe personality cult and nationalism, revisionism, dogmatism, and sectarianism. This being Mao
h birthday, Kadar and Pravda offered Mao the following birthday greeting:
onin called "leftism" an Infantile disorder in Communism, We can, unfortunately, observe that this disorder appears in some peoplesenilend in combination with pdwer it canarmful and revolting character.*
Onecember Liu Chang-shong responded to the strongly implied Soviet charges sincod congress that the Chinese as well as the Albanians were guilty of "scbls-matlc" activity. Reporting in Peiping on the WFTD meeting, Liu said: "The Chinese workers and people, following tbe guidance of Uao Tse-tung, have consistently been doing only things beneficial to solidarity and not doing thingsto solidarity. This is our consistent position, and it can stand any test.**
*TUere is some medical evidence that Mao may be suffering from cerebral Ischemia ormaller possibility) from senility-disorders which ln the first case would reduce, and in the second would eliminate, bis capacity for disciplined andthought. There is also inferential evidence that Mao has deteriorated. As other observers have noted, Mao'sin Decemberto accept nomination for another term as chairman of tbe regime was plausibly presented by the Chinese at tbe time as motivated in partish to have "more time for Marxist-Leninist theoreticalut in fact the regime has not published any substantialby Mao made since that time, and none has been reported.-
the sameong Kong Chinese newspaper which has consistently followed Peiping'sis known to have Chinese CommunistKhrushchev by name. It declared that "Khrushchev's cult of personality is to blame" for the split with Albania, and it went on to assert thatwas attempting to make himself the sole heroho world Communist movement, making use of, Stalin's achievements in building Soviet strength in order to advance his (Khrushchev's) own program. It is not known whether Peiping incited this attack. However, in the same week personnel of an institution in central China were reported to have spent the entire week in criticizing the USSR.
Onecember, Moscow moved yet another stepdenouncing tbe Chinese. An Izvestlya article,n discussing Albania observed that "theand those who protectfound themselves
in complete isolation." In other words^tne Albanians were not Isolated. Theecember Pravda article, more logically, had not conceded that the Albanians had any protectors when it asserted that the Albanian party was isolated.
Throughout tho month, there were reports and rumors of Soviet and Chinese communications to other parties designed to restore or disruptepending on one's point of view. Tbe Chinese party, io line with its public position on prolonging consultations, was said to have solicited support for another mooting between tbe Soviet and Albanian parties, together with tbe representatives of the Chinese partyarty from the Soviet camp. ugoslav correspondentumor that tbe Chinese party hadetter to other parties criticizing the unilateral Soviet action against Albania and calling for another conference of thearties. The Soviet party for its part was said to have informed some friendly parties that its condemnation of the Albanian and Chinese parties extended also to those parties which supported them (tbe North Korean, North Vietnamese aod Indonesian parties were allegedlynd to have asked the friendly partios to send to -Moscow copies of any commuoications it might receive from parties of tbe Chinese camp.
Atd CPSU congress, one party, tbe Chinese, had criticized tbe Soviet attacks on Albania, andther parties in attendance (the Albanian was absent) had failed to second the Soviet attacks; of the latter,ad spoken at tbe congress,ad not. Of tbo groupy tbo end of December ten had gone on record as condemning tbe Albanians: the parties of the UK, Canada, and Australiaossible Chinesehe parties of Norway, Denmark and Sweden; the Belgian party; tho Indian party; the Algerian party; and tbe party of Martinique. Of the groupix had gone similarly on record: the parties of Luxembourg and San Marino, and of Nicaragua, Haiti, Guatemala, and Paraguay. Thus by the end of December, there werearties
on record as supporting the Soviet party against theonly one on record (tho Chinese) in support off the parties represented atto
declare themselves explicitly. However, of tho parties regarded as probable Chinese supporters, by tbe end of December most of them had again indicated in one-way or another their inclination to thoVietnam, North Korea, Indonesia, Burma, Malaya, and Thailand, leaving only Laos of this group to bo beardthey had been joined by the New Zealand and Japanese parties, previously regarded only as possible Chinese supporters. Most of tbe remainingthe Irish Republic, Northern Ireland, and the Union of South Africa; Iceland and Switzerland; Pakistan and Laos; and Guadeloupe, tbe Dominican Republic, and Honduras)bly belonged to tho Soviet camp.
V. CONTINUED DETERIORATION (January
Duringbe Sino-Soviet relationshipto movehowdown. In the latter part of the month. Moscow went so far ats to warn Peipingossible break in party relationsossible withdrawal of tbe Soviet commitment to China's defense.
A. Renewed Sino-Albaoian Counter-Offensives
Tbe Chinese leadership's intention to persist in its defiance of the Soviet party was clearly reflected io Pel-ping's pronouncements surrounding New Year's The Albanian party counterattacked Moscow in much tbe sameeek later, the difference again being mainly that Tirana named names and used more offensive language.
The New Year's editorial in People's Dally began by affirming the importance oflong view." Even in the short view, prospects were "very favorable*" 1 bad been better thanwing primarily to the party's policios on the commune programbe virtual abandonment of tbe communes.)* It had beoo established that China could move forward "at high speed" under favorable conditions and could also "stand tbe test of serious" The coming year would be another year of "adjustment" of tbe economy, building the foundationew "leap"in the future.
As for tbe global struggle, the editorial continued, things bad gone very well for thehereas. enemy had discredited himself. The newspaper cited several examples (previously noted) of successful violence in Asia, Africa, and La tin America, and reiterated that these areas wore the "weakest links" ln the imperialist camp.
Turning to the socialist camp and tbe'world movement, tho editorial noted that "Certain events that cannot but grieve one have now occurred" in the camp and the movement. owever, should not divert people from two
Bulgarian party press on the same day Jeered at "'communes'" as an "equal distribution ofhereas, it said. Communismystem of Incentives leading to abundance. It was not specified that these communes were Chinese, but there are no other communes going.
much core Important perceptions: that imperialism, capitalism, and oppressed nations and peoples "still reallynd that this colls for "revolutionary struggle by thehere is no alternative*" Continuing this effort to recall tbe USSR to its larger duties, tbe editorial noted tbat China': "general line" of foreign policy (as opposed to tbe USSR's general line of peacefulalled forthe unity of the camp, supporting tbe revolutionary stug-gle everywhere, and coexisting while opposing imperialisttbat order. It was this general line, tbeobserved, which conformed to tbe interests of thepeople who accounted forercent of the world's population.
"Precisely" because of this revolutionary line, the editorial continued, "imperialists, revisionists, and other reactionaries" were hostile to tbe Chinese party. In language similar to that used in0 after tbe USSR badits technicians, tbe newspaper noted tbat sucb forces had repeatedly launched campaigns against China, and it warned that tbe "recent ant1-Chlna, anti-Communist andeople waves nay develop along more frenzied lines." The Chinese, other Cosmunists, and the (revolutionary) people of tbe world "should be fully prepared forn order to "resist it and beat it back," In this and other struggles, tbe Chinese people and the revolutionary peoples would "grow stronger through tempering." Concluding this long editorial which did not once mention tbe USSR, the newspaper asserted that the Chinese people would be united and would unite with thepeople of the world.
Also on New Year's Day, Red Flag published an article on its favorite topic, the victories and prospects of the liberation movement. Recounting the successes in familiar terms, the article struck againoviet position which Peiping had been assailing for more than twothose who "regard the issue of war and peace as the most important Issue" and the "anti-imperialist and antlcolonlalistas secondary, and who thus put the latter "lnto tbe struggle for peace. Attributing to Presidentiew which Peiping had earlier attributed toand wished again to denounce him for holding, theobserved that in this view "the oppressed nations can jolly well wait until imperialism grants favors to tbem, thereby realizing their demand for independence by peaceful
seans; struggle is unnecessary, let alone armedgain using the Presidenttand-in for Khrushchev and again overstating the Soviet position taken in theparty program and various commentaries, the articlethat in "Kennedy's" view, the "socialist countries should put up their shutters and look after their owngive no support to the revolutions of oppressednd let them "never wintherwise he would accuse them of "exportlnar call themr describe them asll of theseroughly tbe terms Khrushchev bas used about tbe Chinese in attacking their positions on strategy. In contrast to tbe Soviet emphasis on the primary importance of Sovietsuccesses in advancing Communism abroad, "all realhe article continued in language obvi-ously not addressed to the President, have held tbatcountries must combine their domestic construction with their support of tbe oppressed nations; this, it said, was Lenin's way.* The article concluded that it wastrue tbat peoples win liberation primarily through their own struggles-
Alsoanuary, Cben Ylanquet inall foreign technicians working ln China. InChou En-lai went out of his way to expressto 4HB^BHIMMLfl^ who
workod in China ln the past." Cben himself used Rias had Chou in Moscow, to reaffirm China's ability to prosper by "relying on Our own industrious hands." With the tactic noted above of denouncing the Vest while aiming at Khrushchev, Cben also observed that imperialism had recently been "sowing discord to undermine tbe unity of tbe socialistnity which must be safeguarded.
On the following day, People's Daily used the third anniversary of Castro's triumph to holdgain as the "glorious example" for all Latin American countries and as an inspiration to oppressed peoples everywhere. While not recognizing Castro's claim that Cubaocialist country,
.Mikoyan, speaking in Guineaanuary stated that
the USSR had "never separated the struggle for the buildingommunism in the USSR from tbe struggle for the liberation of co^nial peoples." An importantn Conakry two days later, probably to dispute thxs Une.
tbe newspaper contended that the Cuban revolution showed tbat all oppressed peoples can triumph "so long as they dare to launch revolution and are bold enough to take up arms against even the fiercest enemy." The editorial quoted with approval Castro'sfrom Mao--thatingle spark canrairie fire." What most alarmed. about Cuba, the editorial went on, was tbat its successes had further demonstrated tbe correctness of tbe Chinese position tbat itevolutionary people, nothich was really powerful. The Cuban people, tho editorial concluded, were following tbe (Chinese) line oi despising the enomywhile taking it seriously in particular engagements, id the Cuban people could count on tbe Chinese as "their most reliable and faithful comrades-in-arms."
At another baoquct--for Chinese scientists and5 January, Chinese leaders returned to the themeelying on China's own efforts. Chen Yi, apparently the main speaker again, stated tbe position more modestly in one respect, in giving tbe formula as "relying mainly on our own efforts, in addition to international But bo statod It more emphatically in another respect, expressingthat "all scientific and technical problems in China's economic construction and national defense can behe first time that national defense bad been noted in this connection. This was all tbe more striking In that Chinese plans for the developmentodern military establishment depended so heavily on the Soviet scientists and technicians who were withdrawn. Chen admitted tbat tbe task ofowerful China would be very bard, but be said that this vas tbe aspiration of all Chinese and all "revolutionary it was implied, could lookowerful China for powerful assistance toward tbeir liberation.
The Albanian party press stated the Chinese case against Kbrushchev openly anuary. On tbe same day, Hoxhaelegram from Kao wishing him new successes in his "struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism and ln building socialism.'*
The longopullit articleanuary began by noting that Soviet attacks on the Albanian party coincide* with conciliatory Soviet gestures toward President Kennedy and Tito. The real issue, said the paper, was not Albanian
dogmatism but Soviet revisionism. Khrushchev aod hisrevised ite fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, andquestionstbe national
liberation struggle, and means oi^ccession to power;tbey had "trampled" on principles of proletarian Khrushchev's tactic, the article went on, was to describe as "anti-Marxist, nationalistic,r whatever any party or person which opposed thiscourse.
As for the endorsement of tbe importance ofb CPSU congress in tbe0 Moscow declaration, the paper saidew charge, tbe Soviet party at that Moscow conference had promised tbat this statement would not be used to impose the decisions ofh congress on other parties. Similarly hypocritical, the articlo continued, had beenabjuration of the formula tbat tbe socialist camp was "headed by the Soviets Khrushchev even without the formula continued'to seek to dominate other parties. In the Albanian (Chinese) view, the paper said, the Soviet Union was indeed the "head" of tho camp in the sense that its state was tbe oldest and its party the most experienced; but sucb experience did "not begin withhnd the Albanian (Chinese) party looked to tbe earlier record. by abdicating leadership in tbat sense, Khrushchev was encouraging revisionist and separatist forces, as expressed for example in the Italian party's advocacy of polycentrism.
As for tbe general question of which party feared the truth, the article continued, tbe Albanian party bad printed tbe complete text of tbe CPSU program as soon as it bad been adopted, whereas Khrushchev's group had not published Albanian materials. Who then was "afraid of tbe troth"?
As for the general question of "peaceful coexistence,'1 it was "amazing" for Khrushchev to declare this concept to be the "general line" of bloc foreign policy. Following Peiping'c line, the article observed that this concept did not pointeneral line should to tbe principles governing relations among socialist states and to the need to support "powerfully and by all means" the liberation struggle. The Soviet formula, the newspaper contended, reflected the Soviet reluctance to extend such support.
the article continued, Khrushchev contended disarmament was the "most urgento which other
objectives of the worldnationaldepended. This meant (just as tbe Chinese had said at the WPC meeting inhe subordination of the liberationand otheract of "treason" to tbe movement. Disarmament (as the Chinese had said)ong way off, and the oppressed peoples sbould not be asked to wait, but should take tho road oftruggle which should berather than retarded by tho actions of tbe world movement.
Still discussing Moscow's wrong-headed emphasis on disarmament, aod Just as the>Cbioese party had privatelyagainst Soviet sanctions which reduced Chinese defense capabilities,anuary Albanian article protestedSoviet action against Albania. Further, just as Peiping had retreated from an expressed Interestuclear-free zone in tbe Far East whenever it was suggested seriously, so tho Albanian editorial denounced Soviet proposals for complete disarmament in the Balkans.
As for the Soviet position on the question ofto power by Communist parties, tbe article continued,hinese lead, the Soviet emphasis sioceh CPSU congress had in fact been on tbe possibility of peaceful accession. This possibility had beennd this position "does not correspond to reality at all." Io tbis connection, the newspaper went oo, tbe Albanian party had been charged with wishing to export revolution, but all it really asked (like the Chinese) was "resolute support" for thosea revolution. Tbe Soviet party was putting tbe question incorrectly, making the world-wide victory of socialism depend on coexistence and economic competition.
As for the dispute with the Soviet party overfor the Hungarian "counter-revolution"he paper went oo (agalohinese position),was Indeed responsible In part for that event. The "counter-revolution" bad been launched under tbe slogans of de-Stalloizatioo supplied by Khrushchev; the actual content of de-Stalinization had softened up Easter Europe; andhad been gulled by Tito and by antl-Communlst forces ln Hungary.
As for the "personalityhe article continued, again agreeing completely with the Chinese position, the
Albanian party was opposed to any such cult but had never approved tbe conduct and course of de-Stalinlzation anduse of the concept of the cult to imposeviews on others. Tbe attacks on Stalin, (as tbe Chinese had said from the beginning) had given ammunition to all enemies of socialist hich Khrushchev's group must be held responsible. Moreover, tho newspaper said (as thehad oftenhrushchev badult around himself toointiece of "stupidity" such as taking off his shoo (to pound with it) at the UN General Assemblj was presented by his apologists (Adzhubei again) as aexamplearxist attitude."
The article went on to refute Soviet charges about Albanian persecution of pro-Soviet forces inwhich Khrushchev had also made, in less detail, against Tho article counterattacked by charging that Soviet "protection" of Tito* and "Albanian traitors" onlythat Khrushchevtraitor to Marxlsim-Leolnism and an enemy of our party and people."
Referring only indirectly to Chinese support of Albania, the article observed that Khrushchev "tries tothe impression that the entire international Communist movement follows him ln condemning our party." The paperconfidence that those parties which had followed the Soviet lead would eventually repent. In this connection, the article asserted, even Khrushchev's followers ln other parties did not approve tbe Soviet initiative in breaking diplomatic relations with Albania. Although Khrushchev was preparing to take actions "still morehe article concluded,ourse would be "fatal" for him, as the "true Communists" in tbe world Communist movement would eventually prevail*
Ooanuary, wbile Sino-Soviet talks on trade2 wore still going on, Peiping and Tirana announced tbe successful conclusion of their talks on economic cooperation
*Onanuary, Zeriopullitong article oo the Yugoslav enemies of Marxisim-Leninism and Khrushchev's conciliatory attitude toward them, noting that this attitude was consistent with his "violent attacks" on the Marxist-Leninist Albanian party.
The agreements and protocols said to have been signed related to new Chinese credits to Albania, the supply ofequipment and technical assistance, trade and terms of paymentbe use of creditsnd scientific and technical cooperation. Possibly pending the outcome of tbe Sino-Soviet talks, details were not given.
anquet that evening for the Albanian delegation, Chou Eo-lal, tbe principal upeaker, described the Albanian party In the followingquoting at length, because every assertion in the passage was clearly offensive to Moscow:
The glorious Albanian Workers Party isaod militant Marxist-Leninist party,always held aloft tbe brilliant bannerremained loyal to tbeof proletarian iotcraa^onalism, abidedMoscow declaration ^Hmmfmr
statement of the Communist and workers parties 4 p and to strengthen the great solidarity of the socialist camp and tbeCommunist movement. The AlbanianParty has firmly defended the purity of Marxism-Leninism against modern revisionism represented by the Tito clique of Yugoslavia, and it enjoys high prestige among tbe Chinese people and tbe working class throughout the vorId.
The bead of the Albanian delegation, speaking on the same occasion, declared that Albania was "proud" to have such a friend as China, and observed tbat the Albanians were by tbe Chinese struggle against "imperialism, Yugoslav Tito revisionism, and modern revisionism" (lost anyone suppose that Yugoslav revisionism was tbe only kind). On theday, the Albanian press noted that the Albanian people had many friends ln their struggle to build the firstblnese aid, which would permit Albania 2 plan. Two days later the Albanian press,on the friendship and aid of the "glorious" Cbinese party, took note of Chinese successes in building socialism.
is of some interest that Chou, who Is believed not to relish his role as an opponent of Soviet positions, confined revisionism to Yugoslavia in this passage. However, other Chinese spokesmen have sometimes done the same.
China's "great contribution" to strengthening tbe unity of the camp, the creative Chinese application of Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese example for oppressed peoples, and soconcluded grandly that "There is no slander and fabrication capable of darkening this reality."
B. Stronger Soviet Warnings to China
The Soviet party during January Issued several public warnings to the Chinese party, without naming tbe Chinese. Some of these warnings were stronger than those venturednd culminated in clear threatsreak in party relations.
Moscow Radioanuary, "in response to a question" (Khrushchev's, perhaps),commented Ironically on China'sby Chinese leadersod 5going It alone. The commentary, on Soviet aid as serving socialist unity, again misquoted Liu Shao-chi as having saidhat, China was "at present"Soviet aid. The talks noted that morehinese projects were built with Soviet aid during tbe first Chinese five-year, and that "later an agreement was concluded" for tbe constructiondditional majorprojects7otal,; the commentary refrained froa mentioning what bad happened to that. the Soviets had walked off tbe Job0 with only about half oflants built and lo Recounting the Soviet aid (paltry aid, none of It in grants) to Peiping in Its difficulties since tbat time, the talk cited the "deep gratitude" of the Chinese for this aid and asserted blandly that the USSR was "also ready toeconomic aod scientific cooperation with the CPR in the future." As witness, the USSR was to give China scleotific aod technical ^ata and documents ln a number of fields. Thus "experience has sbown" that tbe USSR had remained loyal to the ideals of proletarian internationalism." Experience bad also shown, the commentary said,tbat tbe idea of "buildingseparately" from other socialistgolog It
alone--was "theoreticallyasteful economically
reactionary in nature and dangerous
"This was the second time that this line had been related expressly to China; the first was infter the withdrawal of the technicians.
The Ukrainian Pravda soon followed witb.anresh denunciation of Molotov and others of the "anti-party group" (the announcement that Molotov would return to his Vienna post may have puzzled the Chinese as much as everyonesserted that the Soviet party could not be silent about deviations in "other parties" (the Albanians were specified, but not tbeeclared again thst tbeof the "entire world" rebuffed the Albanians, and, again citing an alleged Albanian demand for special treatmentmall party, reiterated that tbore could be no oxceptions-in loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and proletarianany party, be it large or small." Tbe article spoke at some length of tbe primary importance of tbe Soviet example in enhancing Communist influence and of tbe greatly increased force of this example in the future, concluding that "one must be j hardened cogmatist like Molotov ^HUt to say after all this that our program is
On iz January Pravdariticism, appearingaraguayan Communist party statement, of Chineseon the question of the "unity" of tbe movement. Pra vd alsounisian Communist party statement that every party was "duty-bound" to criticize tbe Albanian leaders.
A Moscow Radio commentary ofanuary observed tbat one of the important results ofd CPSU congress was tbe "complete discrediting" of Stalin's personality cult and tbe "final ideological defeat" of the anti-party group of Molotov and others. In digs at the Chinese, tbe talk noted tbat ono result of the personality cult was tbat afterb CPSU congress no congress was convened for almostears (there wereears between the CCP's Sixth Congress and its Seventh, andore years between the Seventh and tbe Eighth, and the CCP has held only one session of its Eighth Congress6 instead of tbe five it should havehat another result was the retardation of Soviet economic and cultural(Khrushchev's derision of Chinese programs of recent years is wellnd thatd CPSU congress returned to the question of tho personality cult in part because there were "adherents" of the cult ln the ranks of the worldmovement (only the Albanians were namod). The commentary asserted again that the proceedings ofd Congress had the "unanimous support" of the other parties.
A Moscow Radio talk in Mandarin to Chinapoke of the Albanian expressions of tbe personality cult.
r 61 -
The talk observed that "everyone whoound mind" (cf. earlier Soviet and Eastern European remarks about Mao'smust know to be wrong-headed the Albanian (Chinese)on world Communist strategy. On tbe same day, Moscow Radio reviewed Soviet positions on the need for "absolute"from each party in the decisions of multipartyand on tbe need tospecial" jfflHMVon to any party.
Onanuary, retorting to the Chinese Redanuary and the Albanian Zeriopullit articleanuary, Pravdaong article on "peaceful Reaffirming that the "most urgent question of our time" is tbat of "war andnd linking this to tbe questions of East-West relations and the relation between buildingin the USSR and formulating worl^iCoiwAnist strategy, the article took note that the "Leninist" CPSU centralbad been attacked by "antlparty elements of all kinds and colors, from tbe open rightists to theThis waseference to opposition fromeft and right within tbe Soviet party, as the term "anti-party elements" would presumably not be used for foreign Communists; this impression is strengthened by the next sentence, which contended tbat on these issues revisionists, dogmatists, andwhich would apply to both internal andattacking the world movement.)
Molotov contended, the article went on, tbat Lenin had nowhere spoken of peaceful coexistence. (Molotov was right, in that Lenin never used this term, which wasenin had spoken, the article saidf tbe need to exist together with capitalist states until tbe demise of the latter, and he had not envisaged this coexistence as merely an uninterrupted chain of military clashes* (Pravda ignored here tbe question of whether Lenin badoreprogram than Khrushchev is advocating; in our view, Molotov and the Chinese are more nearly right about Lenin's emphasis than is the Pravda article.) The article went on to speak of the work ofd CPSU congress in purging Soviet foreign policy of "alien elements" reflecting the personality cult and opposed to peaceful coexistence, and in particular it defended Khrushchev's many visits to other countries.
Tbe Albanianbe articleattacked peaceful, coexistence as "'capitulation to (Actually it was tbe Chinese who0 bad
introduced this line, contending tbat the essence of modern revisionism was capitulatiou in the name of peace.) Similarly, taking up another Chinese point echoed by tbe Albanians, the article rejected the charge tbat Soviet proposals forwere "'contrary to thef the bloc. The pseudotheoreticians, the article said, used these "absurdto mask tbeir own departures frc^^rorltfm-Leninism, their divisive actions, tbeir adventurism in foreign policy, and their anti-Soviet activity.
Directly contradicting the Chinese, the articlethat the "main thing" was to prevent "war." Tbe article reaffirmed the Soviet position thatJust tbesuffer terriblyew world war. Citing Lenin on the prospects of socialism for endingndthe practice sinceh CPSU congress of speaking of "wars" in general rather than world war only in this connection, tbe article reaffirmed that "wars are no longert pointed to the bloc's successes in containing, halting orumber of imperiaiist-initiated-or-planned local wars (Actually the Chinese had contended that such wars could be contained, and therefore should be fought; tbe Soviet emphasis had been on halting or deterring tbem,tbey might expand.)
Again turning against the Chinese the Chinese charge that the Soviets were failing to take advantage of the new balance of power, the article reiterated it was thewho could not correctly calculate the.balance of power. Twice describing these opponents of the Soviet line asbringing this charge tooewarticle contended that these enemie^wh*^asserte^tha^they^
were in reality underestimating the influence of the bloc and thus were objectively overestimating the capabilities of
Taking up the Sino-Albanian charge tbat the Soviet party was subordinating the world revolutionary struggle to the peace effort, and taking advantage of the fact tbatand Tirana in their January articles bad overstated their case, the Pravda article dismissed the "dogmatist" position that peaceful coexistence meant "abandoning the class struggle, losing revolutionary prospects, and so on," The articletbat it was simply the Soviet position not to create a
revolution artificially, tbat ripeness Is all. Tbe Leninist course, tbe article contended, was not to abandon tbe class struggle but Instead to select tbose "deployment areas" for it which were in tbe Interests of "all mankind." Because peaceful coexistence (tbe strength of tbe bloc has been more often cited in this connection) made it "very much morefor imperialism to ioterfere with revolutions, tbe article said, obviously Soviet policy was to tbe advantage of revolutionary movements.
Tbe article went on to reject tbe "bourgoois" view tbat the Soviet conception of peaceful coexistence is "cold war" (although it is). Tbe concept of peaceful coexistence "excludes the resort to wareans ofbe article said,failing to specify that tbe Soviet line simply excludes world war, and that the line, while usually evading tbe question of Soviot support for other types of war, when necessary affirms tbe Soviet intention to intervene in some types of local wars and to support (by unspecified scans) all "liberation" wars.
Going on toosition offensive to tbe Chinese, tbe artlclo contended tbat tbe essential opposition of East and West did not rule out "cooperation" between them in averting world war aod in economic relations. The article concludedrief statement of specific Soviet foreign policy objectives relating to Berlin, the UN, and so on.
Pravda onanuary (the day following the above article) carried an article by Pospelov whichhreat to break relations with the Chinese party. Tbe subject was Lenin and tbe Prague conferencet which Lenin broke with the Mcnshevlks. Lenin's line on combining illegal and legal activity, Pospelov wrote, bad been opposed by both tbe "rigbtwing liquidators" (Hensbeviks and their supporters) aad the "leftwing liquidators, life-service revolutionaries and sectarians" who scorned legal activity.
Tbe importance oftand against "liquidators" of both types, Pospelov wrote, was not always understood by Stalin. The previous year, he said, Stalin bad described Lenin's "struggle against anti-party elements abroadtempesteapot.'" Almost certainly aiming at those who believed that Khrushchev was giving too much importance
to his quarrel with liao, the article criticized Stalin'sof the workers'iew of "thingsabroad." On the same lines, the article went on to praise Lenin's practice of not slurring over the differences with his opponents but rather revealing them "in all their acute-ness."
The Prague conference, Pospelov went on, decided to expel tbe "liquidators" from tbe party. This decision was opposed, he wrote, by all the "opportunist elements" of the movement, but the "revolutionary" elements defended it. (This neatly turned around the Chinese charge that the opportunist Khrushchev was expelling the. Molotov and tbe Albanian leaders.) The "defenders" of thehad included "foreignho were denied the use of the party's name because they bad not subordinated themselves to tbe party's central committee.
"Since these opportunist groups failed to obey tbe decisions of tbeospelov continued. "Tbey thus placed themselves outside the party," (This is approximately what is said now about the Albanians.) Clearly aiming at tbe Chinese as well as the Albanians, this paragraph concluded:
Thef furnished to other socialist parties an example of irreconcilable revolutionary struggle against opportunismas faromplete organizational break.
The Chinese party had got its strongest warning to date.
Tbere were several postscripts to this warning in tbe remaining days of January, Probably in responseovietelgian party leader1 January article in an Austrian Communist paper denounced Chinese views expressed at the WPC meeting in Decembor, and he emphasized tbat the Chinese views continued to deviate despite "patient efforts made within the Communiut movement fornd onro-Coizmunist paper in Rome carried excerpts from Italian partyLongo's criticism of the Chinesetbe0 meeting of the partiesfor "spreading confusion, doubt, andin the international movement." These two attacks on the Chinese by name were apparently not reprinted in Soviet media, however.
TASS onanuaryong statement byDefense Minister Malinovsky commenting on recent statements
. Secretary of Defense UcNacaara. Inter alia, Ualinov-sky observed that the USSR had sufficient weapons to "defeat any potential enemy if he attacks us or those socialistfriendly to us" Malinovsky did not go on to state wbicb socialist countries were not regarded as friendly, but hispresumably strengthened Chinese doubts as to whether the USSR would remain committed to Peiping's defense.
oviet broadcast to Communist China onanuary indirectly reaffirmed the Soviet position on tbe principle of majority rule in the movement and on theof Soviet protection for other parties of the movement. Every party iso tbe world Communist movement, the paper said, and every party is carrying out its program "under the protection" of the world movement.
It remains to examine the forms of pressure stillto Moscow ln its effort to force the Chinese leadership to retreat or tohange of leadership. Because tbe exertion of these pressures in one or another combination may include or leadino-Soviet break, we think it proper to begin by defining our usage of the word "break/1 We thenthe various forms of pressure andiew as to whether they could force the now dominant Chinese leaders to retreat. We then discuss the prospects for an accession to leadership by forces in the Chinese party which we believe to be pro-Soviet, And we conclude by offering an opinion on the prospects ino-Soviet break,
The words break, breach, rupture, rift, and split have all been used more or less accurately toarked change for the worse in the special complex of relationships between Communist states. Whichever word one uses, It is obvious that there are meaningful degrees of change, just as there are meaningful degrees of deterioration in quarreling, sleeping ln separate rooms, going home to mother,egal separation, and being divorced, not to speak ofor undertaking the murder of the other party.
By some definitions, the USSR and Communist China have already broken, breached, ruptured, rived, split, or whatever. They have been bitterly at odds over theof fundamental points in the received doctrine, and each has accused the other of forsaking the doctrine. Both in bilateral talks and multiparty conferences the two parties have had heated exchanges and have failed to reach agreement on criticalne party (the CPSU) has indirectly warned that it might go so far as to break off relations with the other party; and, while neither party has called publicly for the overthrow of the leaders of the other, each hasstated or indicated its favor for purged leaders of the other party and each has made abundantly clear in private
*Wo ourselves described the world Communist movement as "split" after the0 conference of the parties. Khrushchevote, on the issue of majority rule, which would have formalized tbe spilt; and he dropped the issue of majority rule in order to get all parties to signecember declaration,
exchanges that it would like to seethe principal leader of the other party brought down. Similarly, they have maintained diplomatic relations, but they have quarreled almost as bitterly about state-to-state relations as about doctrine and party the Chinese have protested the parsimony of Soviet economic aid, and the USSR severely damaged the Chinese long-range development program by withdrawing its technicians lnbe Chinese have accused tbe USSR of chauvinism ln the military relationship, they have been unable to cooperate in some proposed military projects, and Soviet military aid, which has not Included the provision of nuclear weapons, has apparently beenery low level sinceoviet scientific aid has apparently been minimal since tbat time; and there have even been border disputes and violations. The most Important agreement between the two states (formalizing the critical relationship of common cause inhe Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, is still ln force, but both parties have violated the spirit if not the letter of it, and It has been increasingly uncertain in what circumstances and to what degree the USSR would honor its commitment to China's defense under the treaty. Finally, neither Moscow nor Peiping has excluded the other frost its definition of the "socialist camp" (the symbol of that commonnd neither has encouraged the other Communist states and parties to think of the two of them as having broken, but one (Peiping) has insisted that the campember (Albania) all but formally ejected by the other, and there have already been the declarations and indications ofby most of thewell as splits in some of
wouldecognized Sino-Soviet break. Observers who have recognized the degree to which there hasreak between Uoscow and Peiping have been properly impatient with those who have minimized tbeso deteriorating relationships asamilynd thoy have sometimes pointed out that many murders are committed by members of families against other members of those families.
By strict definition, however, the word "break" would be reserved for the cessationiven relationship (or of any partelationship) rather than for aln it. In this usage, the ideological aspect presents difficulties, although it is only ln this aspect tbat Moscow and Peiping, thus far, might be said to have broken: hile both profess their allegiance to Marxism-Leninism and both are (and will remain) recognizably Communist states hostile to the non-Communist world, their disagreement ln the
interpretation of the received doctrine Is so fundamental that they can be said to have ceased toommon doctrine. we have preferred to speak of ideology as the language of their argument rather than its content, and to use the word "break" for more solid matters.
In this strictreak In party relations wouldessation of communications and otber intercourse Che parties, . no messages would be addressed from one party to the other and neither would be invited to any occasion sponsored by theotification to the other parties of the movement that the break had occurred, and public attacks by each party on the leadership of the other. reak might or might not entail an effort by either party,ultiparty conference, toesolution condemning the other party (no party can really be expelled from the movement, as there is no international organ like tbeor even the Comlnform to dond it might or might notublic call for the overthrow of the other party's leaders, as it has in the Albanian case, or an actual effort to overthrow them, as may have happened In Albania0 and may again. reak in state relations would reasonably mean simply the closure of embassies and the withdrawal of diplomatic personnel, although it mighttatement expressly breaking relations.
reak in economic relations would moan the cessation of credits (which might or might nota demand for repayment of existing debts ahead ofand not only tbe withdrawal or expulsion of advisors and technicians, but also the cessation of trade (which would amount to an embargo). reak ln military relations similarly would mean the withdrawal or expulsion of all advisors and technicians and the cessation of supply of materieJ. reak in scientific relations would mean the withdrawal or expulsion of all scientists and the cessation of supply of materials and documents. reak ln an important agreement suchreaty of friendship and alliance would mean notification, whether public or private, that one party to it no longer regardsas bound by the agreement.
A break in economic, military, and scientificor the repudiationreaty, might either precede orreak in party or state relations, or might not take place at all If therereak only in party relations. Partly for thismany possiblebreak in either party or party-and-state relations (with thebreak following the party break) has been generallyas sufficient to Justify the use of the world "break"
between two Cosmiunlst. therereak between the Soviet andnd therereak first in party and then ln state relations between Moscow and Tirana (The break in stateis openuibble, in that the Soviet embassy in Tirana is ln some sort of caretaker status, and communication between the two capitals is presumably possible, but theis reasonably describedreak.) ill follow this usage,reak toreak in either party or party-and-state relations. reak in this sense would be clearly recognized by the camp and the movementreak, as has been the case in the break with Albania, with powerful consequences for the otherthe eventino-Sovietforcing declarations, splits, and purges.*
B. Soviet Pressure on Albania
It Is important to Moscow to bring Hoxha down, as the Soviet party has publicly committed itself to the proposition that righteousness (the Soviet cause) will triumph in Albania,rolonged defiance will increasingly encourage other parties to defy Moscow, either ln alliance with tbe Chinese or on their own. It is Just as important to Peiping to keep Hoxha aloft, as ho Is the test of the effectiveness of Chinese support everywhere, even ln areas where the Chinese have the advantage but have not been pressed by Soviet ultimatums to those. in the contiguous areas of North Korea and North Vietnam and in parties dominated by native Chinese such as the Malayan and Thai parties.
The Soviets have already exerted, without good result, almost all tbe political forms of pressure on Albaniato them. They have threatened the Albanian leaders and warned the Chinese against supporting then; they have lined up more than three-fourths of the parties of the world in condemnation of the Albanians; they have broken party and state relations with Tirana, and have induced others to reduce the level of their diplomatic representation; and they have appealed to the Albanian party and people to rise.
observer ha* suggested the possibilityecognizable "break" between the parties which need nota break io any of the aspects of the relationship we have discussed. In hisbreak" could be regardedituation in which the competitive a'spects of theexceeded the cooperative ones. Aside from theof defining this point, wo think thatalance wouId be expressedarty-and-state break.
The latter appeal may yet be answered, as Hoxha's defiance of Uoscov probably does not have the support of the entire party or military establishment, and the people, although generally disposed to support Hoxha against Moscow, remainhowever, pro-Soviet elements throughout Albania appear to have been cowed, at least for the time being. The Soviets may, of course, use up the remaining political pressures, by expelling Tirana from the Warsaw Pact and CEMA and inducing the Eastern European states to break their relations with Tirana, but these pressures, singly or in combination, are
Similarly, the Soviets have used up almost all of their economic pressure, in cancelling credits, withdrawingand reducing their own trade with Albania to almost nothing. They could still induce (or try to Induce) theEuropean states to cut off trade with Albania and tothe rest of their technicians, but there Is nothing they can do about the Chinese. The Chinese arc able if they choose, and they appear determined, to provide sufficient credits and/or goods and services to keep the Albanians going. If Chinese aid should falter, the Albanians would probably try to find alternative sources in tho Vest, and they might have good luck.
It is of course open to Moscow to bring Hoxha down by military action, either directly or through Yugoslavia, as there would be nothing that either Albania or China, militarily, could do about it. However, as for direct action, Albania Is protected by both Yugoslavia and Greece, neither of which (probably) would be willing to afford passage to Soviet forces, (Yugoslavia is the more doubtfuloreover, the Soviet posture in both world and international Communist affairs would be greatly damaged, and the action would almost certainly force the Chinese to break with Moscow, without the compensation of making Peiping appear responsible for the break. As formilitary action, Tito's disavowals of any suchare fairly credible, eak antl-Sovlct Albania would seem somewhat less dangerous to himoviet-controlled (and perhaps Soviet-occupied) Albania, although opinionson this point. eally wild possibilityouble-play in which the ussr would ugoslav invasion of Albania and would then intervene in "defense" of Albania, with the aim of wiping out both the Yugoslav and the Albanian opponents of
*The failure of the Eastern European states to followin breaking relations with Tirana is puzzling. "has already tried and failed to induce them hisis awkward indeed; bW this is hard to believe.
Khrushchev. But we do not believe tbat Khrushchev either could or would do this. In any event, Indirect ailitary action would have almost the same disadvantages as direct action, in that almost everyone would assume that tbe Soviets were behind it.
In sum, the Albanian leaders can probably survive, thus aking ineffectual Moscow's warnings to Peiping throughhe Albanian leaders should not survive, even if they were brought downoup which could not be attributed to Moscow orenuine revolt in the party or by the people, Peiping would still defy tbe Soviets. Indeed, since the Chinese would probably hold the Soviets responsible for the event whatever the real cause, tbe Chinese could be expected to be even more bitterly intransigent. It seems toituation in which Moscow, whatever it does, and whatever it might gain in other respects from bringing Hoxha down, cannot thereby face the Chinese to retreat.
C. Political Pressure on China
Khrushchev has completed the stage of publiclythe Chinese by proxye has publicly criticized the Chinese by nameimited issue (that of supportinghe has begun the process (through others, thus far) of publicly criticizing the Chinese (not by name) on other issues in the dispute; and he has begun the process ofwarning the Chinese (not by name) of the consequences of their defiance. He might, of course, cover the remaining distanceingle step, updating and publishing the Soviet party letters0 to the Chlneso party, and perhapsoff relations with them at the same time.* Whether the process of Identifying the Chinese as offenders on the entire list of issues is slow or fast, we would not expect the mere surfacing of the dispute tohinese retreat, andalmost certainly has made the same Judgment. In making public his complete case against the Chinese, whether before a break or after, he would simply be putting the Soviet in asight as possible for the rest of the world, Communist and non-Communist.
The Soviet party could also call another multiparty conference, of the type of7 andn which toormal condemnation of tho Albanian and Chinese parties. Moscow apparently does not want such ahowever, becausehowdown several
part of this, against the -antlparty group relating their offenses
Khrushchev might take furtherotably Molotov, expressly
encouragement by the Chinese RN
perhaps not only tho Asian parties wJilcb have alreadytheir leaning toprobably refuse to support the Soviet position, tbus publicly splitting tbe movement into two "camps." The Soviet party seems moreto continue to exert (and to increase) its pressure through tbe individual parties responsive to it (more than three-fourths of thehrough the congresses of thosewhich include substantial numbers of foreign Communist delegates, and through the world Communist frontall of which the Soviet party dominates. This combination of pressures too could not be expected totbe Chinese significantly, and would be aimed Instead at "isolating" the Chinese, although it would be hard to crediblyarty which hasillion of tbeillion Communists of tbe world.
A more militant line in Soviet foreign policy might be designed in part to pre-empt the Chinese position. this secondary gain was apparently envisaged in the hardening of Soviet policy in the latter part0 and the early partnd it was not forthcoming; while tbe Chinese ceased polemics on matters of strategy, they persisted in their offensive behavior ln other respects. In any caso. the decision had apparently been made befored CPSU Congress not to make concessions to the Chinese ln foreign policy, as witness tbe entire line of tbe congress and tbe retreat on the Berlin deadline,* ore likely tactic would
seem tourtherconsultation and cooperation with Peiping in formulating specific policies,
Tbe only significant political pressure nowto Moscow seems to bo presented by the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. Some observers believe tbat tbe treaty is no longer of much value to Peiping, as the Chinese discovereduring their venture ln tbe Taiwan Strait, that the treaty could not be used effectlvoly in supporthinese venture which Moscow did not approve. However, even if it is accepted tbat Moscow declined to give Peiping tho de* gree of support which it wanted in that venture (wo ourselves
-Pravda in late2 seemed to be underlining
the point that Moscow would not be pushed to tbe left by the Chinese; the party newspaper quoted both Togliattl and Castro to the effect that world war must be avoided "at any costan extreme statement of the Soviet position.
have made the samehe treaty was io fact cited by both Moscow aod Peiping at that tlme^in statements to the effect that the USSR would Indeed protect China against at* tack (even if Peiping could not count on it io supporthigh-risk Chinese venture). Some observers also believo that this function of theCommunist China againstnot of much value to Peiping, as Peiping does not really expectto its propagandato make an unprovoked attack on it. It is true that Peiping deliberately exaggerates the hostility of the outside world, but we believe nevertheless that Peiping could not havethat it would not be attacked; it might well believe, in the absence of the Soviet commitment, that the Chinese Nationalists, with. support, would attempt tbe liberation of the mainland which Taipei has been promising for years; and Peiping might also fear more aggressive action by India in the Sino-Iodian border dispute. Beyond this, tbe Chinese appear toood possibility of world war at some time in tbe next few years, before they have any considerable capabilities ln modern weapons, and tbe Chinese would wish to have an ally who regarded tbe defense of China as being its own interests. Finally, some observers believe tbat Moscow has already leaked away much of the pressure available lo tbe Sino-Soviet treaty, by stimulating doubts among theas to whether in current circumstances tbe USSR would honor Its commitment to China's defense eltber in local war or world war. However, therereat deal of difference between having doubts about it and being told flatly tbat the USSR no longer regards itself as bound by the treaty, or even (less harshly) being told that the commitment to renderand other assistance by all means at itsn the event of hostilities will henceforth be interpreted lnerms.
it is sometimes said that the USSR could nottbe Sino-Soviet treaty withoutino-Soviet break on the spot, so that this would notorm ofexerted shortreak, it would instead be partndeed, it is sometimes contended that Moscow could not afford not to defend China even in tbe eventreak,
There are provisions in the treatyto mutual consultation, respect for territorial integrity, and non-interference in internalcould be cited toepudiation of the treaty.
issident Communist regime would be preferable to anommunistmight result from Westernencouraged by the new Chinese vulnerability. Both points might well be correct, but the first point would net seem to applyrivate statement of repudiation, made for exampleoviet party letter to theetter enlarging on Malinovsky's remark of2 about socialist states "friendly to us." And the second pointobligatorybe regarded oven by the Chinese as conjectural, well short of an assurance.
Soviet action of this kind would shock the Chinese party and perhaps do much tohallenge to Mao's(of which more later). However, we believe tbat it would not force the present Chinese leadership to back down.
D. Economic Pressure on China
Whereas Khrushchev has not yet exerted tho most promising political prossure available toto the Sino-Sovietlong ago took tbe most damagingmeasure available, withdrawal of the technicians. Since then, he has in effect been exploiting tho contradictionon one hand, Pelping's presentation of Communist Chinaorld power aod as the equal of the USSR in the bloc, and, on tbe other hand, the real and continuing weaknesses ofas an economic and military power.
The Chinese party has had more thanonths to think about the first of the consequencos of its defiance ofthe indefinite postponement, perhaps for decades, o- China's achievement of statusodern industrial and military power. It is true that, assuming better weather than in the past throe years, China's total output might double over the next tenntailing an averago overall growth rateoar, with industry rising at an average rate of aboutercent and agricultureercent.* However,
*5ome observers believe that, withoutt
support, the Chinese margin of production overIncrease will be so narrow that Peiping can never get really
even this optimistic prospectar more modest objective than the Chinese werethe USSR wasup to As wo noted in POLO-XIV, this compulsory reduction of Chinese prospects for technological advancecertainly has not been accepted without considerablesome ChineseMao's intraosigenco in the dispute, but there is no evidence that Mao is now or will soon be prepared to abandon his positions in the dispute, in the hope of inducing Moscow to restoro the level of Soviet support which existed before
As for the question of an economic "crisis" in Communist China which would giveew opportunity ln the near future, we noted ln POLO-XIVhat the Soviet party might chose to put maximum pressure on Maoime of maximum Chinese weakness,. just before or during an anticipated food crisis in Communist China in Even last fall, however, we did not expect the crisis to be the kind of disaster which would force the Chinese party to accede in order to survive, and since that timo the scope of tbe anticipated crisis has been reduced in the estimates of most observers. There thus seems even lessnothe Chineso will have to turn to Moscow for large-scale credits (or an easing of the terms ofof long-terra debts) in order to buy food to avert, aand it may be, as some observers believe, that thehave known this ever since last fall, when we did not. In any case, it is generally agreed that the Chinese have enough money to buy the amount of food they will need ln the spring; they might be forced to cut back their purchases of something else, probably machinery and equipment, which would force some further postponement in their long-rangeplans, but tbey soem to be prepared to accept this.
The economic measures remaining to the Soviet party relate to Chinese debts to the USSR; tbe training of Chinese
"The Chinese leaders seem toat least they tella post-Khrushchev Soviet leadership will correct Khrushchev's errors, including his Chinaif they are right, they will not have lost docades, only the poriod fromo the timehange in Soviet policy, plusear to prepare to receive tbe newof Soviet support.
graduate students in the USSR; tbe flow of technicalto China; and Sino-Soviet and sTno-Satellite trade.
It is open to Moscow totoimmodiate repayment of Chinese debts to the USSR, totaling0 million (tbe short-term debt0 million, run up, was convertedong-term debt, part of0 million total, only last April). This measure would have no effect, however, as the Chinese, citing tbe agreements, would simply refuse to pay, and tbe Soviet de siand--an emptypresumably be made only if the USSR had already decided to break trade relations (anddiplomatic relations as well).
As for the students, graduations have reduced tbe number of Chinese graduate students ln tbegreat majority in technical andn the academico ann the academic Tbe flow ofinformation from the USSR, most of it economic, has also been reduced, Tbe maintenance of even these reducedis of some importance to Peiping ln terms of long-term development. However, these relationships do not present an important moans of pressure now, because Peiping has already taken heavier blows to its plans for long-range development, and the severance of these relationships would not have immediate aod marked Impact on the Chinese economy.
Of all the measures remaining, only the area of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Satellite trade appears at allfor Moscow, in terms of immediate impact oo tbe economy. Nearlyercent of Chinese foreign trade1 waswith the USSR, and, while Sino-Satellite tradesharply1 for the same reasons tbat Sino-Soviet trade fell off, nevertheless aboutercent of China's trade was with the Eastern European states; moreover, many Satellite technicians have remained in China. The cessation of China's trade with cither the USSR or tbe Satellites would
It is not clear whether Moscow or Peiping took tbe initiative in restricting the Chinese students in the USSR to those presont inn any case, none appear to have been sent since that time.
short-run dislocations (much less serious with respect to the Satellite trade) while Peiplng^attenpted to develop other sources offor petroleum products, metals, and machinery and equipment which constitute the bulk of current imports from the USSR. This cessation of trade would also mean the complete cessation of tbe already greatly reduced flow of military items. Moreover, havingecadenew factories with Soviet equipment, China wouldard time getting spare parts and replacement equipment Tbe Chinese would also have to find new export markets for somo of tbe minorals and consumer goods which constitute the bulk of Chinese exports to the USSR; and in Westernthere wouldroblem of tbe quality of some of these goods. Finally, tbey would probably find it difficult to get as good prices and terms of credit from tbe West.
However, there are several Free Worldre-
place the USSR as large-scale suppliers of petroleum products and machinery and equipment to Communist China. As tbe Sino-Soviet relationship has deteriorated, Peiping has already shown itself willing to turn increasingly to tbe West for tbese Contingency planning of this kind requires somo change in tho political demands which Peiping has made on
to make these changes, which need not entail any change in tbe fundamental attitude of Peiping toward the non-Communist world. Moreover, tbe nature of current difficulties makes it easier for the Chinese to make the shift, Tbe Chinese leadershipis concerned with keeping tho regime in power, not with expanding industries. The present retrenchment reduces the need to make substantial long-term trade commitments to either the bloc or the non-Communist world for machinery and
Intoppage of Sino-Soviet and Slno-Satelllte trade would not force the Chinese to accommodate, it would simply induce them to turn more to the West. In view of the dislocations this would entail, such Soviet action wouldurther postponement of China's achievement of the statusodern industrial and military power. However, since tbe present Chinese leadership was willing to accept theandin tbe withdrawal of the technicianshese leaders would almost certainly be able to accept this losser Additional blow. As wo suggosted oarller wltb respect to Soviet repudiation of the Sino-Soviet treaty, Soviet oxertion
of the remaining economic pressures on Peiping* mighthallenge to Mao's leadership, but. in the absence of an unforeseen economic disaster in China, it could almost certainly not force the currently dominant leaders to surrender.
E. Military Pressure on China
By "military" pressure we mean Soviet pressure on the Chinese military establishment, and therefore on the Chinese leadership through the military establishment. Ve see no chance of the use of Soviet military force to impose Moscow's will onlittle Albania has better reason toat least one Chineseleader has said privately that Peiping has no fear that this will happen. There may be additional borderparticularly along the undefined borderreak, but we do not see such incidentsignificant form of pressure to be exertedreak. Tbe issues with which we are concerned are those of Soviet support to tbe development of the Chinese military establishment and Soviet protection of these developing forces
Although the Chinese Communists may have tried and failed to obtain nuclear weapons from the USSR in tbe winter of, by early 8 Chinese political and military leaders (including tne then Minister of Defense Peng Te-nual) were alike committed to tne view that the task of first priority for China was toolid industrial and scientific nase,ery important component ofindustry. As that base developed, Peiping was to build up,airly rapidodern military establisnment with the most advanced weapons systems.
Along with tbe extensive Soviet support to theindustrial and scientific programshole, the USSR
" "some indication of whether the USSR will increase its
in Moscow since mid-December, thus fir (mid-February) wltD oc publicity on the results of the talks.
up toas giving extremelyorm of militaryachinery and equipment, engineers, and large numbers ofChinese military(possibly Including missile production) and the Chinese atomic energy program. The USSR was also providing advisers to many components of tbe Chinese Communist armed forces, and it was assisting substantially in long-term military research. This Soviet support was given primarily to tbe building of Strong conventional forces, but it was to lead also to the eventual acquisitionespectable (if not massive) force of nuclear/rocket weapons,, Chinese military theorists bad been adding to the "base" of Uao's military teachings, as tbeir conventional forces grew, lookinguclearas well.
With the withdrawal of the Soviet technicians inhe Chinese military establishment was bit hard, and it has suffered additional blows mince that time: of military goods from the USSR have fallenery low level,evel of token support; there hasrastic reduction in Soviet aid to military research; tbe military advisers have apparently been withdrawn; and China's economic circumstances have been so hard that some of tbe troops have been short of food and equipment, which of course has affected their training. In tbe absence of tbewith only small deliveries of military goods, andeconomic pressure, vital defense projects have been left uncompleted or have had only limited use, and the Chinese have probably been moving only slowly In building their weapons systems, both conventional and advanced.* For these and other reasons, important components of Chinese forces have beenby Peiping as being much less effective than they were expected to be by this time.
It is open to Uoscow to cut off all support to the Chinese militaryhalt current shipments of military goods, to halt aid -to research, and, as part of ac- -tionsreak In trade relations, to halt shipments of
ffe do not know at what speed the Chinese have beentoward the explosionuclear device, but there isistance between this event and the acquisitionuclear weapons system.
"ma^hinerj and equipment necessarye militaryand shipments of petroleum products, which the military must have in order to operate from day to day. However, as noted previously, the Chinese can turn to tbe Vest forexcept the military goods snd aid to research. Just as we noted with respect to economic pressure on Cblna, tbe dominant Chinese leaders, having absorbed tbe first aod heavy blow to tbe military establishment0 and additional blows since that time, could absorb the relativelyblows nowessation of the small military deliveries and of aid to research (not an Immediate pressure In anynd of the dislocation entailedurn to Western sources.
As for tbe Soviet umbrella, Chinese Communist military doctrine bas long foreseen an Interim period (wbich would have existed even if Peiping bad acquired some nuclear weapons) in which Chinese forces would enter combatajor Western antagonist under unfavorable conditions and wltb inferior weapons. Chinese doctrine for this interim period basefensive doctrine, envisaging the defeat of tbe enemy in China, with tactics adapted to tbe limited capabilities oT" Chinese armed forces and the Chinese armaments industry. It hasave-not, face-saving doctrine, under whichmilitary objectives have necessarily been limited, and it has been highly important to Peiping toowerful friend, tbe USSR, to assist tbe Chinese in local wars and to carry the fight to the enemy's homeland in general wars.
As noted earlier ln discussion of tbe Sino-Soviet treaty, Peiping apparently found inbat it could not count on Soviet supportigh-risk Chinese venture, and It has had reason sinceo doubt whether Moscow would honor its commitment in local or general war. By carrying this process. by threatening to repudiate the treaty, Moscow could reasonably expect to give additionalto Chinese military leaders to challenge tbe dominant leaders of tbe party, but, as noted earlier, it could notexpect this threat tourrender by theloaders themselves.
F. Pro-Soviet Forces in the Chinese Leadership
Tbe burden of the foregoing discussion bas been tbat tbe dominant leaders of the Cblnese party would probablyto stand firm against Moscow in tbe Sino-Soviet dispute even if tbe Soviet party were to exert maximum pressure against
Peiping by suchsingly or inbringing down the Albanian leaders, withholding assistancehinese economic crisis, breaking off Soviot and Eastern European trade with China, stopping deliveries of ailitary goods, and threatening to repudiate or actually repudiating the Sino-Soviet treaty. At the sane time, we have expressed tbe view that some of these actions night wellhallenge to tbe dominant leaders by other forces in theleadership. The question is whetherhallenge could be successful.
As we argued at some length inao Tse-tung has almost certainly lost favor with somo of his lieutenants in the past four years for bis radical domestic policies, for his continued preferment of the party-machine leaders around Liu Shao-chi over others whose reservations about domestic policies had proved to be well-founded, fur certain of his extreme positions in tbe Sino-Soviet dlsputo, and for his aggressive conduct of that dispute. (Anti-Mao forces are not necessarily pro-Soviet, but we think they tend to bo.) The first challenge made by these anti-Mao forces--the challenge lod by Peng Te-huai and probably Chang Wen-tion at tbe politburo level, supported by several lesser figures, io tbe summer9 was both premature and poorly organized. It ledurge of the party, the government, and tbeestablishment, thus depriving the anti-Mao forcesubstantial part of tbeir actual and potential strength. Id summer when the Soviet party struck its heaviest blow against tbe Chinese party by withdrawing the technicians, the Chinese leaders apparently stood together against tbe Soviet party;ew second-level figures have boon missing since that time, there is no evidenceignificantat that time to Mao and the party-machine leaders.
Nevertheless it is reasonable to bellovo, and POLO XIV gave some of the evidence" for believing, that theresome Chlnesu partygovernment figures,
It is only fair to admit that some of our colleagues tnink that tbe evidence is not impressive. It is true that not much of it is 'hard' evidence, but we do not expect much nard evidence until another challenge actually takes place; we had even less impressive evidence before tbe challenge of summer
- S2 -
economic specialists, and professional military men (asto politicala different conception ofnational interests than the one dominant in recent years. In this conception, Chinese national interests would require an accomodation with the USSR in order to develop Communist Chinairst-classpower within tho nextoears (which was the goal before the USSR withdrew itshis accomodation wouldetreat from the "personality cult" (the end of Mao'she withdrawalorld Communist strategy which is wrong-headed (in this view) and which Peiping itself has not the capabilities toeturn to Soviet principles of economicand accession to majority rule ln the world Communist movement (particularlyowerful future China might command the majority). In other words, we tbinlc that there are other pro-Soviet and anti-Mao forces, beyond those who made their challengeho have kept their counsel aod who may be better prepared when the next opportunity presents.*
It is the latter consideration that enables us to argue that anti-Mao forces may make another challenge, despite their failure to do so at the time of tbe Soviotin In our view, these forces had tbe same interest0 as they had hadut they were no better prepared0 than The Soviet action in withdrawing the technicians seemed to comeurprise to all hands and followed too closely the Chinesethat, even if the issue of the techniciansood one on which to challenge Mao, the necessary arrangements had not been made.
continue to regard Chou En-lai as one of these who would like toore cordial and cooperative relationship with the USSR, despite Chou's leading role in recent months in stating Chinese positions offensive to the USSR. We do not agree with those who believe that Chou, who had appeared to be Khrushchev's favorite, has discredited himself with the Soviet party by his recent behavior; we think that Khrushchev can make due allowance for duross, having experienced much the same thing at Stalin's hands, and that Chou would still probably be the first choice as quarterbackoviet team in China.
As we argued in POLO-XIV, there--seems to us little chance that Uao would quietly step down simply at request or asote in the politburo, so the challengers would not act unless they had confidence (whether rightly or wrongly) that they could bring to bear superior military force. If there is to be an early challenge to Uao, in our view it will almost certainly come from those who sinceave been lining up their military support or who will bc doing so in the period before the challenge is made.
The challenge, if it comes, will probably coincide with another dramatic issue, suchirtual break in Sino-Soviet economic relationsoviet threat to withdraw from the Sino-Soviet treaty (or, of course, an actual break between thewhich would permit the anti-Mao forces to argue that there was no longer any hope under Mao's leadership for either the rapid development of China as an industrial and military power or even the defense ofs we noted above, this argument, whether made in theormaller meeting with Mao, would be backedhreat of military force.
We do not anticipate tbat Khrushchev will actuallyin Chinese party affairs, in the sense ofhallenge to Mao by other leaders or even in the sense of authorizing them toestoration of theprogram of support (as it existed beforeew Chinese leadership. But we think that he has already made this point by clearthe fall of tbe dominant
POLO-XIV we suggested the possibilityhallenge to Uao at the time of an anticipated food crisis inrisis exacerbated by some such Soviet actionhreat to withdraw from the treaty. The estimated scope of the crisis has been reduced since the time of writing (earlyo the possibilityhallenge at that time and on that partial ground has likewise been reduced. However, Soviet actions themselves, even in the absenceood crisis, would seem touitable occasion if the anti-Mao forces are properly prepared. oviet denunciation of the Chinese party at next month's plenum might trigger a
Chinese leaders would be followedreat improvement in Sino-Sovietas he has made it blatantly with respect to the Albanian leaders. And we think tbat he would be underlining the point by such an action as breaking trade relations or withdrawing from thesuch an action would in effect be an invitation to anti-Mao forces in the Chinese leadership to make their challenge. If tbey did not, he could take the further step of breaking relations with the Chinese party, calculating in part tbat this step might be enought touccessful challenge, or, if not, that still other Chlnose leaders,onger term, wouldhallenge.
In POLO-XIV wo expressed our doubt that any group of challengers to Mao and the party-machine leaders could line up sufficient armed force touccessful challenge. This belief has, if anything, been strengthened in tbe past few months, with evidence that Mao's man Linheof Defense, has recovered his health sufficiently to be quite active and has taken over the party's military committee, and that Mao's man Lo Jui-ching, the Chief-of-Staff, has taken over supervision of tbo political department, perhaps from the purged Huang Xo-cheng's old post on the secretariat. Possibly relevant also is the deathebruary) of Liecret police figure who may have been close to Chou En-lai and may have been important in any plans to challenge Mao. Thus we reaffirm tho conclusions of POLO-XIV: tbat thore is athat Mao will be brought down by assassination oroup, but tbat it tM more likely that Mao and most of the party-machine loadors will stand together successfully against theirof Sovietaoor dies.**
is true that Peng Te-huai was also regarded as "Mao'snly little less so than Lin Plao; we do not exclude the possibility tbat Lin will turn against Mao, we simply think this improbable.
**ffe havo too little solid information on Mao's health to estimate the chances of his retirement or death in tbe next year or two. If he is indeed suffering from cerebral ischemia, he may well die in the next year or two; senility, however, would not hasten his death. Either disorder would presumably hasten his retirement. Either his retirement or his death should present the Soviet party and pro-Soviet forces in the Chinese loadorship with another opportunity.
G. The Prospectsreak
It has been evident, since at latesthat there was little prospectenuine resolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute under the leaderships of Khrushchev and Mao. When forced to commit ourselves at six-month intervals, however, on the question of whether the dispute would leadreak as we definebreak in either party or party-and-statein the next six months, most of us <not only in this small group, but in larger task forces) have each time agreed that the dispute probably would not leadreak in that period. Thus far these estimates have been correct, In the past six months, however, the Sino-Soviet relationship has movedew stage whichew assessment of the prospectsreak.
As virtually all observers have pointed out, each party would have much to losereak, even if the other party could be made to look primarily responsible for it. Fora break would mean an issue to be exploited by his enemies at home (even if those of his opponents still in power were really no more pro-Chinese thanhe probableof an Asian Communist camp oriented to Peiping, theaddition to this camploc of parties from othercountries, additional challenges to the pro-Soviet leaderships of many parties of tbelow to theof the predominance of the "forces of socialism" and of Communism as the wave of the future, and increased obstacles to direct relations with the pro-Soviet forces in tbe Chinese party. As the leader of the weaker party, Mao would have even more to lose. reak would mean an issue to be exploited by his opponents at home, unfriendly relationsny at all) with the great majority of the parties of the movement,action against pro-Chinese forces by the stronger pro-Soviet leaderships in many of tbe parties, the probable loss of China's military protector and its logical source ofaid in the event of an economic disaster, and, of course, the loss of any possibility of influencing the only strongof the bloc to carry out the militant strategy Peiping,
There may be an indefinite prolongation of the present state of thedisunity short of an open break. There could even be some increase in Soviet pressure on China
reak in this sense. Inelationship, polemics on world Communist strategy would continue. Each party would withhold support from specific foreign and domestic policies of tbe other, while they would continue to cooperate in some areas of foreign policy* and the USSR would continue to give some small economic and military support (perhaps at an even lower level) to Chinese programs. Moscow would contlnuo to encourage doubts as to the degree of its commitment uoder tbe Sino-Soviet treaty and to make clear to Peiping that it would not support the Chinese in' any high-risk venture. Tbe Soviets would try to bring down, and the Chinese to buoy up, theleaders, and the two parties would continue to compete vigorously for Influence ln the movementhole. And each party would continue to encouragehallenge to the dominant leaders of the other by opposition forces in the party. Many observers believe that both parties will bo contentrolongationelationship of this kind indefinitely, in preferencereak, in part because (they contend) each party believes that there is nothing much it can do just now to contributehange in the leadership of tbe other and each thinks tbat the leadership of tbe othor party may be changed in the reasonably near futureear or two) in any case. (In this connection, tbe Soviet partyetter idea, after the Chinese party congressthis year, of the line-up of forces in tbe Chinese party.)
However, we think that Khrushchev would not have launched and pressed on with this new offensive (atd CPSUand subsequently) if be had meant the relationship to continue Indefinitely in that uneasy state between an alliancereak. Moreover, since he had bad considerableof the dominant Chinese leaders, he could hardly havo had confidence that thoy would give in to any combination of pres-sures avallablo to him, so hethe least--have been prepared toreak. While we cannot judge what his estimate may be of the possibility ofhange in the Chinese leadership, he could reasonably estimate tbat be has some chance and that he might as well trythat the challengers to Uao might be prepared to move at tho time
of their foreign policy aims would still roughly coincide even in the eventreak.
Ot the next dramatic Soviet move shortreak, or, if not then,thenreak. If there were no challenge to Uao or if the challenge were made but were unsuccessful (as we thinkhrushchevreak would at least have the consolations of gaining greater credibility in the non-Communist world for his proclaimedf freedom from political, economic, and military obligations to Peiping (in particular, freedom from any responsibility for Chinese, of better discipline in the smaller camp and movement that romalned, and of freedom to combat Chinese Influence in the bloc and the movement openly and with all resources at his command.
Tho Chinese, ever since the Moscow Conference of theartlos inave acted in accordance with the policy they aro reliably reported to havo adoptedarty meeting in to launch no new offensives, but to give "all-out" support to Albania and to respond to everyattack in kind. hinese Communist leader is said to have reaffirmed that policy recentlyrlvatoretaliate openly against any open attack on China.
As suggested above, we think that Khrushchev does intend to exert some combination of the remaining pressures available to him. We lean to the view that he will exert most of these pressures before breaking with the Chinese party, although we recognize theanother observer has suggested -that Khrushchev has already concluded (as we have) that he cannothinese retreat and that he might as well break now, and that the CPSU central committee plenum in2 will approvo some such action as the dispatchircular letter to the other parties stating the Soviet' intention to break with the Chinese. If Khrushchev indeed chooses (as we think) to run through at least some of the remaining pressures
seems to us quite an important gain. Both Western audiences and tho neutrals would be more disposed to believe that Khrushchev genuinely favored "peaceful cocxlstonce" if bo were willing to break with the Chinese party in part on this issue. The Soviet party bas already used this line to good effect,reak would greatly Increase the value of tbe line.
before breaking, trying to force the Chinese to retreat or to make the break, there are several points in that process at which aparty or party-and-statemight come.
If the Soviets wore to use militaryorthe Albanian leaders (which we thinkthat action would probably force the Chinese party to break with the Soviet .party right there, even if no further action were taken against China itself. Soviet sponsorshipuccessful coup would probablyess clear-cut affair, and might not leadreak with Peiping.
As for direct action against China, Moscow has gone through all stages of criticizing the Chinese except that of publicly criticizing the Chinese by name, through Soviet spokesmen, on the full range of issues in the dispute. Tho Soviet party might be able to run through the entire list thisreak, so long as it did not attack Mao's sacrosanct person. Although the Chinese might at first simply reply in kind to an attack on Uao personally, we think that exchanges of this kind would soon leadreak between the parties.
In the economic and military relationships, we think tbat Moscow could probably go through all the rest of the stages in reducing its support of Peiping withoutreak between theof breaking off economic relations entirely, which would mean ceasing all support to tbe military establishment as well. omplete cessation of Soviet support would be in effect an embargo, and might soon be followedreak between both the parties and the states.
A Soviet threat to repudiate the Sino-Soviet treaty would probably notreak between the parties. The Chinese instead would probably challenge Moscow to take the step of publicly repudiating the treaty. We doubt that Moscow would do this; if it did, that action in itself would almost certainly lead to an early break between both the parties and the states.
If Khrushchev, contrary to our expectation, shouldintervene in Chinese party affairs by conspiring with, or authorizing to speak forroup of Chinese leaders
antagonistic to Mao, Mao would certainly break withs noted earlier, we think that Khrushchev has already made this pointsuccessful challengers to Man could expect to be suitably rewarded.
Should Khrushchev exert some combination of these various pressures (shortreak in party or party-and-governntent relations) and still fall to force the dominant Chineseto retreat (we think he willtill fail tohange in the Chinese leadership (hehance, but we think ho willnd should the Chinese party not havo broken relations with the Soviet party at some point in this process, Khrushchev himself might decide (at any point in tbe process) tbat the only significant pressure remaining to him is that of making the break himself. We think that at that stage be would probably be animated primarily by the hopo of imposing better discipline on the surviving Soviet camp and of yetuccessful challenge to Mao by otherleaders.
The various possibilitiesino-Soviet break as wo definebreak in olther party or paxty-and-stateto us to add up to the probabilityreak at some time in the next year or so, iT no large new factor Is introduced. actor wouldhange in tbe leadership of eitherchange that, regardless of which leadors were to succeed either Khrushchev or Mao, probably serve to deter or at least toreak while the leaders of one party explored the attitudes of the new loaders of the other.
With Moscow still roprinting rather than originatingof the Chinese by name, and still issuing only indirect warnings to China of tbe consequences of continued defianco, the Soviet party seems to be marking time before tbe exertion of one or another of the forms of pressuro discussed above.
*KhruVjficnov has more than once spokon in defense of Pong Te-huai since the latter's fall, but evidence is lacking that Peng was authorized (or ovon pretended to bo authorized) to speak for Khrushchev in Peng's challenge to Maohinese intervention in the Soviet party could likewise bo thea break, at Soviet initiative.
We do not know what Moscow is waiting for: conceivably, for the resultshinese party plenum oronference ln Peiping of pro-Chinese parties, both of which are rumored (in mid-February) to be scheduled for the near future. In the meantime,efore taking some new action against tbe Chinese, Moscow may beresh effort to swing Peiping's supporters to its side, as witness Ponomarev's trip to Hanoi (announced onebruary).
As notedino-Soviot break could come at any time, but we think that it will take some months for Khrushchev to work through the process ofressure, evaluating the response, choosing another pressure, and so on. Whatever the pace of the process in the directionreak, if there is no change in the leadership of either the Soviet party or the Chinese party beforee thinkino-Soviet break as we have definedbreak in either party or party-and-statethat time is more llkely-.than not.