MEMO FROM RICHARD HELMS TO DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING MILITARY TH

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ysycRAND'jy re*: The Directorentral Intelligence

KJUTART THOUGHT: "Some Questions in the Further

Development and Improvement of the Ground Troopa" by Colonel-General of the Tank Troopa P. Poluboyarov

Enclosederbatim translation of an article vhlch appeared ln the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of tbe Journal "Kllltary Thought" (TVoyennayeublished by the Ministry cf Defe-se, JSSP, and distributee.'down to the level of Amy Commander.

In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handledeed-to-knov basis vlthln your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document In any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

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ec; Military Representative of the President

. Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

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The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

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COUNTRY SSR

SITIJECT ILITARY THOUGHT: "Some Questions in the Further Development and Improvement of the Groundy Colonel-General of the Tank Troops P. Poluboyarov

DATE OF INFO:1 APPRAISAL OF

Documentary

A reliable source (B) .

Followingerbatim translation of an article titled "Some Questions in the Further Development and Improvement of the Groundritten by Colonel-General of the Tank Troops P. Poluboyarov.

This article appeared in1 Third Issuepecial version of the Soviet military Journal Voyennaya MvjJ: (Military Thought) . This journal is published Irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.

The table of contents of1 Third Issue is also included. This Issue was sent to press on

SPECIAL COLLECTION OF ARTICLES OF THE JOURNAL MILITARY THOUGHT

ISSUE

Poluboyarov

A. Babadzhanyan

P. Koshevoy

V. Chlzh

V. Baskakov Yu. Panteleyev

S. Mlronov, M. Mukhin

Questions In tho Further Development and Improvement of the Ground Troops

Some Questions in the Preparation and Conduct of the Initial Offensive Operations

Utilization of the Missile Troopsront (Army) in an Offensive Operation

Planning the Utilization of Nuclear/Mieslie Weaponsront Offensive Operation

a Front

The Fundamental Scheme of Offensive Operation

The Submarine Operation of thehe Naval Operation of the Future

Urgent Tasks for the Improvement of Aerial Reconnaissance Under Modern Conditions

he Question of Increasing the

Stability of Troop Control

Shchepennlkov

Support of the Strategicand Deployment of the Armed Forces in Respect to Transport

, ul.6 Technical Editor R. L. Solomonlk . Llkhacheva

Some Quest loos In the Further Development

and

Improvement of the Ground Troops

by

Colonel-General of the Tank Troops P. Poluboyarov

The rapid development of nuclear/missile weapons and their broad introduction into tbe armed forcesthe necossltyeview of previously formed views on the nature, methods, and forms of conducting modern operations and on the role and significance in them of various means of armed combat and also of views on the means of further development of types of armed forces and arms of troops. However, in this natural process, sometimes, under tbe guise of being something naw, positions ars expressed whlcb are poorly founded, or entirely unfounded and already repudiated by reality Itself.

Recently ln our periodical press and in certain speeches, tha opinion haa been expressed concerning the advisability of repudiating tank armies and tbe necessity for creating, ln place of tank and motorized rifle large units, unified divisions capable of performing varied missions under the complex conditionsuclear/missile war.

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Taken by Itself, this viewpoint la not new. It was oven put into practice ln the structure of our ground troops and the armiesumber of capitalist countries. Thus, for example, ln tha French Army which, on the ava of tha invasion of German-Fascist troops into France ignificant number of tanks, there wasingle tank division or tank corps. At tbe beginning of the war, there were only two mechanized divisions in Francehird was ln the state of formation. arge portion of tha tanks of the Fronch Army wore dispersed by small subunits

In infantry units and designated for Joint operations with the infantry. This could not help but have an effect on the combat effectiveness of the French Army andarge degree facilitated its rapid destruction by the German-Fascist troops.

In the structure of our ground troops prior to the Second World War thereimilar repudiation of major large units of armored troops. An attempt was made to rectify this serious error but not In time, due to the commencement of war with Fascist Germany. Until the end2 this error continued to have an effect on the operations of our troops, even though we strove to equip combined arms armies with as many tank regiments and brigades as possible. "But such an action did not produce the needed effect, and during the course of tbe war we were forced to create tank corps and tank armies which did play an important role in the successful conduct of all the successive operations of the Second World War.

After tbe war mechanized armies were created instead of tank armlos. Subsequently, lt was necessary to abandon these and once more return to tank armies.

Thus, as was proved by our experience and numerous examples from the armies of other nations, measures for the unification of tank and rifle (motorlzod rifle) large units have thus far not Justified themselves. Are there sufficient bases to affirm that under the system which has arisen, of arming ground troops, these measures will be correct? In our opinion such bases do not yet exist.

It Is well known that the decisive role in attaining the aims of war and of individual operations belongs to nuclear/misslie weapons. The efforts of ground troops are directed toward the most complete and effective exploitation of the results of the application of these weapons with the aim of final defeat of basic enemy groupings and the seizure of his vitally Important centers and areas for basing weapons of armed combat, primarily nuclear/missile weapons. Ground troops complete the defeat of armed forces on ground fronts, seize and hold enemy territory and the most Important installations.

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"One of tho most basic missions of ground troops, one of primary concern to the command andndicated Minister of Defenso Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ta. Balinovskly, "must be the skilful exploitation of the results of strikes by missile troops for the rapid advance of armies and fronts'*.

On tha basis of the nature of modern operatlona, lt is possible to say that in the composition of ground troops the most Important role will be played by that arm of troops which by its combat charactorlstics is able,to the maximum degree, to exploit the results of the effects of nuclear weapons on the enemy, which loses its combat effectiveness to ths least extent from nuclear strikes by the enemy, which can successfully conduct active, highly mobile combat operations at high tempos, rapidly overcome broad zonea of radioactive contamination, and rout enemy groupings ln meeting engagements and battles precipitately.

At the present time such an arm of troops is tha tank troops. This is explained by the specific characteristics and combat capabilities of tanks. Tanks areable than other weapons under tha effeots of nuclear weapons against them, possess powerful armament, high mobility, and armor protection, and can operate Immediately after nuclear strikes; at the same time their crews are quite dependably protected from the destructive factorsuclear burst. The high combat qualities of tanks allow tank troops to exploit effectively the results of nuclear strikes and conduct highly mobile combat operations, to deliver, ln coordination with nuclear weapons and air drops, powerful and deep strikes on the enemy during an offensive, and to guarantee the activity and stability of troops ln defense.

The high combat qualities of tank troops havethe sharp proportional Increase of them in the composition of ground troops and the significant equipping of combined arms large units and formations with tanks. The organizational inclusion of tanks ln the composition of combined arms units, large units, and formations, as well as their full motorization, have significantly raised the maneuverability, striking force, stability of ground troops during enemy nuclear strikes, and their ability to conduct combat operations under conditions of the mass utilization of nuclear weapons.

The equipping: of ground troopa with nuclear/missile weapons and the broad introduction of tanks and other armored equipment into their composition haveecisive influence on raising the combat capabilities of combined arms large units and formations. odern combined arms army is able not only to penetratethe tactical defense of the enemy but also to direct its efforts rapidly to ao operational depth and develop an offensive at high speeds.

Thus, the combat and maneuvering capabilities of combined arms large units and formations have increased significantly. However, ia it possible, on the basis of this, to equate motorized rifle to tank divisions or combined arms armies to tank armies, to assert that the former can replace the latter, and on the basis of this to conclude that tank armies are not needed? In our opinion, this cannot be done because the large units and formations named differ from one another not only in quantity of tanks but also in basic combat characteristics and operational-tactical capabilities.

The modern tank army is an entirely new operational formation and by its combat qualitlos and capabilities is significantly superior not only to the tank army of tbe Second Vorld Var period but also to the postwar mechanized army. It also differs in many aspects from the modern combined arms army. Having in its composition four tank divisions, the tank armyowerful striking and highly maneuverable tank formation, capable of exploiting the results of the mass use of nuclear/misslie weapons lo the best manner. The organizational structure and combat characteristics of tanks contain great capabilities for delivering rapid and powerful tank strikesreat depth, forapid and broad maneuver on the battlefield, forignificant degree of stability during enemy nuclear strikes and for surmounting wide zones of radioactive contamination with high levels of radiation. By its composition the tank army isand much more mobile than the combined arms army.

Tho combat capabilitiesank army allow it to overcome the enemy defense aftor mass nuclear strikes more quicklyombined arms army, to reach an operational expanso rapidly, and there to develop bold, decisive, and highly mobile combat operations, directed in conjunction with missile units, airborne landing forces, and aircraft toward the destruction of the enemy's deep reserves and the achievement of operational alms at the highest possible speeds.

The high maneuverability of large unitsank army, their great antlatomlc stability, and strlko-penetratlon force allow the army to conduct combat operations successfullyignificant distance from the remaining forces of the front and to perform in conjunction with other forces and means tho most important missions in the defeat of enemy troops. The role and significance of tank armies in modern operations was defined very exactly by the Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union R. 7a. kallnovskiy, who stated that tank armies were buudles of arrows releasedightly bound bow string for the swift achievement of the final goals of an operation.

Certain comrades do not see the fundamental difference betwoen tank and combined arms armies and propose doing away with tank armies. In our opinion, this proposal stems from an Incorrect understanding of tha significance of tank troops in general and tank armies specificallyuclear/missile war and from an underestimation of their combat capabilities.

Recognizing tha Important role of tank armies, we are in no measure trying to belittle the significance and combat capabilities of combined arms armies. Yielding to tank armlea ln antlatomlc stability, mobility, and ability to conduct highly maneuverable combat operatlona, at the same time combined arms armiesumber of advantages which allow them to perform many combat missions The same may bo said of tank and motorized rifle divisions .

ife consider that under modern conditions the necessity for tank armies and tank divisions has in no way diminished in comparison with the Second Vorld War but, on the contrary, lt has increased. Speaking of the superfluousness of tank armies, some comrades refer to the complexity of committing them to battle, and the difficulty of securing their flanks and supplying them with various materiel. But these deductions, in our opinion, are not sufficiently confirmed. With the existence of massive, multi-million man armies, the huge spatial scopeuture war and the large variety of missions which ground troops will perform, tank troops and motorized infantry will, for the time being, remain independent arms of troops, and the negation of one or the other of them is premature. epetition of mistakes committed in the past may now lead to even worse results, ffe hold the opinion that even vith the presence among ground troops of nuclear/missile weapons permitting tbe destruction of enemy groupings of any composition, the necessity continues to existtrike force, for tank troops and their basic large units and formations which are tank divisions and tank armies, and their long-range development and improvement should be given due attention also in the future.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the presence of tank troops which are more advanced in technical equipment, organizational structure, and methods of operations, also,ignificant degree, in turn stimulates the development of the infantry which must carry out highly maneuverable combat operations in conjunction with tanks. The attempt of certain comrades to reverse the direction of this process is in obvious contradiction with the real course of development of the means and methods of armed conflict, aa well as with the position that preferential development must bo given to the most modern arms of troops.

The currently accepted organizational structure of large units and formations of ground troops basically corresponds to the modern conditions of conducting combat operations. However, the constant development of weapons of armod combat and methods for their use governs the necessity for its further improvement.

The improvement of the organizational structure of tank and motorized rifle large units must proceed, in our opinion, along the line of an even greater decrease in personnel, unprotected by armor. Increase in antiatomlc stability and viability, strike-penetration force and maneuverability of large unite, and also an increase in their ease of control and capability for conducting Independent combat operationsreat depth and at high speeds.

In our opinion lt is advisable to have tank divisions and tank armies of the same composition. ank army could consistank divisions,ank divisionank regiments of medium tanks. ank army as well as in tank divisions lt is necessary to have organic nuclear/missile weapons. Insteadotorized rifle regimentank division lt is advisable tootorized rifle battalion in each of its tank regiments. It is more advisable to have heavy tank regiments and divisions under army or front subordination and to turn them over in case of necossity to large units and formations during tbe course of an operation.

Together with improving the organizational forms of troops, great significance is acquired by the question of the means of long-range development of tanks and other armored equipment.

In the armament of our ground troops there5 medium tankseavy tanks which more than other combat vehicles guarantee protection of the crew from the influence of the destructive factorsuclear burst and are best suited for operations under conditions of tho mass utilization of nuclear weapons/ and by their basic combat character1stice are significantly superior to foreign tanks of corresponding types and years of manufacture. it wouldistake to suppose that these tanks do not need improvement. Hew conditions of conducting combat operations make radical improvements in the combat qualltlos of tanks essential and force the working out of new directions in their development, because the possibilities of further improvement of tanks by old methods are, in practice, almost completely exhausted. In this connection, the question arises as to along which directions our tank construction must develop, and which types of tanks is it more advisable to have in the armament of ground troops?

In recent years the question of the future of tanka has been broadly discussed ln our military press, on the pages of which are expressed the most varied proposals and opinions, soma of which even cast doubt generally on the possibility of successful tank operations on the field of combat with modern antitank weapons.

It Is well known that the appearance of tanks brought forth the need for weapons to combat them. eapon was first of all artillery: initially conventional, field; later antitank, special. All subsequent development of tanks was carried outoapetitlon between the protective characteristics of their armor and the destructive capabilities of armor-piercing shells. Toward the end of the last war it had already become evident that tho superiority ln this competition was with shells. By this time, capabilities for increasing tha thickness of tank armor and its antlshell stability had approached their limits, but the destructive capabilities of shells radically increased in connection with the use of hlgh-exploslve charges.

The increase in the proportion of tank troops and their role ln performing combat missions under conditions of the utilization of nuclear weapons has given new Impetus to searches for mora effective antitank weapona. In recent years for arming tha armies of NATO countries rocolUess weapons and antitank guided missiles have been adopted, the destructive capabilities of which almost doubly exceed the protective characteristics of tank armor. Work to improve theae weapons continues. At the same time attempts toualitatively new armor have not as yet reached any appreciable results ln practice.

Thus, at tha present time, as in the period of the Second Worldignificant gap exists between the protective capabilities of tank armor and the destructive capabilities of antitank weapons. Basing their reasoning on thisumber of foreign authors arrive at tbe conclusion that tanks are weapons of the past and notodern war, and they propose doing away with the heavy armor of tanks because the armor Is pierced by antitank

woapons anyway, and changing: to lightly armored, but more mobile and maneuverable, vehicles. This viewpoint finds supportertain segment of our generals and officers, who propose the creationight tank and having it in the armament of ground troops as the basic and only combat vehicle. Ve cannot agree with thisumber of reasons.

In the firsthange to tanks with light armor increases tho possibility of their destruction not only by antitank but also by other weapons.

Secondly, the chief weapon of destruction under modern conditions Is not antitank, but nuclear weapons, and for this reason it 'Is first of all necessary to procoedonsideration of tha Impact of tbe latter. During the conduct of highly maneuverable combat operations under conditions of the broad use of nuclear weapons, the most effective means, capable oferson from tha effects of the destructive factorsuclear burst, tm still the armor of tanks. If it is weakened, tanks lose one of their most Important qualities.

Thirdly,hange to light, thinly armored vehicles, the qualitative superiority in tanks will immediately shift to tbe side of our probable enemies, ln whose armies medium tanks continue to be basic

Fourthly, data concerning the destructive capabilities of modern antitank weapons reflect at present only the results of firing range trials in the absence of the effects of firing agalnat these weapons, and consequently, without considering the difference between firing conditions on the firing range and in combat. Under equal conditions of tha effects of nuclear weapons and other means of destruction on tanks and on antitank weapons, tanks vlll beora favorable situation and will be able to carry out combat operations successfully, even with the existence of effective antitank weapons.

Based on the nature of modern operations and the conditions of tank construction in our country and .in the major capitalist countries, ve consider that until new models are developed for the armament of our army, three types of tanks must remain: heavy, medium, and special amphibious. When tanks with higher performance criteria are created, it is possible that ve vill do avay vith heavy tanks and have in our armament, in addition to light tanks, one basic typo of tankut vith various armament systems. It seems to us that it does make sense to create light tanks for airborne troops and reconnaissance units and subunits.

In our opinion, tanka of the future must, as in the past, combine in themselves firepower, high mobility, and armor protection and must guarantee maximum possible protection to crevs from the destructive factorsuclear burst. The preferential development of one or another quality at the expense of other characteristics of tanks might lead to the drastic decrease of their overall combat effectiveness. In connection vith this the basic guides in the vork of building new tanka must be:

urther significant increase of the flrepover of tanks by improving the quality of rifled and smoothbore guns, and subsequently by installation in tanks of more modern guided missile armament, providing the capability to destroy enemy tanks vith certainty at such ranges and with such accuracy as to exceed the capabilities of enemy tanks;

harp improvement in the protection of crewa from penetrating radiation as well as improvement in the protection of tanks from high-explosive charges;

urther decrease in the weight of tanks by new arrangements of parts, the use of light alloys, plastics and other new materials;

-an increase in the maneuverability of tanks and raising their maximum speeds toom per hour and average speeds toom per hour;

ignificant increase in the cruising range of tanks, an increase in the dependability of their operation,ecrease In the amount of servicing during the course of combat operations;

ecrease in tank crewsersonsesult of complete automation of the combat operations and servicing of tanks;

-the equipping of tanks with more modern instruments for firing, sighting and navigational apparatusthe conduct of combat operations at night as well as during the day;

-the maximum standardization of units and assemblies for tanks;

-tho creation of an improved system of driving tanks under water;

-the creation of conditions for transport of tanks by air.

All these measures must guarantee in the future the superiority of our tanks over tanks of the armies of capitalist countries. Tank troops equipped with new tanks will be able even more successfully to carry out combat operations under conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons.

The interests of increasing the mobility of ground troops also govern the necessity to seek means forthe combat and maneuvering capabilities of infantry.

Our infantry in actuality is not only unprotected from the destructive factors of nuclear bursts but also from modern small arms. Its mobility and maneuverability on the field of combat is also very low in comparison with tanks. Tank units and subunits are capable of attacking the enemy at combat speeds equal toom per hour, and of developing an offensivepeed ofom per hour and more. On the other hand, the speed of movement

of dismounted infantry on the field of combat is limited by the capabilities of the human organism and does notm per hour. The armored carriers existing in the armament of ground troops do not fully guarantee protection of the Infantry and its necessary maneuverability on the field of combat.

Thus, the Infantry at present is tho most vulnerable and leaat mobile element of the combat structure of tha attacking echelon of ground troops. Tha great difference ln tha combat capabilities of tanks and Infantry hampers the effective exploitation of the results of using nuclear weapons and conducting offensives at high speeds.

With tho aim of raising the combat and maneuvering capabilities of the infantry it is advisable, in our opinion, to create as inexpensively aspecial mass combat vehicle for the infantry, which would permit lt to follow the tanks without lagging and to wage combat Jointly with them from these vehicles, dismounting only in tho most exceptional instances.

We cannot agree with the opinion of certain comrades who propose, with the aim of raising the combat capabilities of the motorized rifle division, increaalng the number of tanks ln its composition. It is completely obvious that in this case the division will nototorized rifleank division. Xn our opinion, there is no necessity for such an increase in the number of tanksotorized rifle division. ore important problem at the moment is the matter of raising tho combat capabilities of tha Infantry. One of the possible ways of solving this problem is the creation of an Infantry combat vehicle.

An Infantry combat vehicle must be, ln our opinion, fully armored, tracked or half-tracked, capable ofobstructions on tha field of combat and difficult sectors of terrainar with tanks, amphibious, transportable by air, with high viability and antlatomlc protection for the crew and troops transportedhe maximum speed of the vehicle may be: onp toom per hour, onp toom per hour.

The vehicle must have powerful, but compact andmissile weapons, permitting the conduct of effective combat not only against personnel and various fire weapons but also against armored enemy targets.

The crew of the vehicle may consist of two persons. The passenger complementifle squad. The construction of the vehicle must permit the transported troops to conduct combat without dismounting, as well as provide for the convenient accommodation, boarding, and debarkation of the transported troops under various conditions of the combat situation. The weight of the vehicle must be as little as possible.

Vith the adoption ofombat vehicle, the necessity might arise for certain changes intructure of tank and motorized Infantry large units and units. We are not examining this matter in this article, considering that it can be decided only after the vehicle is created. At present we should only like to indicate very briefly whatombat vehicle might do for ground troops.

An infantry combat vehicle will provide first of all the possibility for significantly increasing tho mobility and maneuverability of motorized rifle units and subunits, which then will be capable of successfully advancing behind tanks under the most complex conditions of combat situations and terrain. Operating from these vehicles, the Infantry will not lag behind tanks and always will be able to perform various combat missions together with them.

The high cross-country ability and complete armor of the combat vehicles will permit the Infantry to carry out broad maneuver on the field of battle and conduct combat operations under complex and rapidly changing situational conditions both together with tanks and independently.

Ia equipping tho Infantry with tbe new combat vehicle, the viability and stability of motorized rifle units and subunits during enemy nuclear attacks and their capability to exploit the results of our nuclear strikes and dross zones of radioactive contamination will be raised.

The presence on the combat vehicle of machine guns and missile mounts capable of engaging in combat with armored and openly positioned enemy targets will sharply raise the firepower of the infantry. Conducting combat operations on those vehicles, the Infantry will be able to combat successfully the enemy's fire weapons and personnel and offer more effective support to tanks on the field of combat.

All the properties which the infantry will acquire with the adoption of the combat vehicle will lead not only to raising the combat capabilities of motorized rifle units and subunits but also to increasing the mobility of tank and motorized rifle large unitshole. Thanks to this, the combat qualities of tank and motorized rifle divisions will correspond more closely to the requirementsuclear/missile war.

The high mobility, great strike force, and armor protection of all personnel of the combat subunits of tank and motorized rifle divisions will favor more effective exploitation of the results of the use of nuclear weapons and the delivery of even deeper and more rapid strikes against the enemy. The capabilities of troops for carrying out broad and rapid maneuver from the zone of interior as well as directly on the Immediate field of combat will increase significantly.

The presence in tbe composition of tank and motorized rifle divisions of easily controlled tank and motorized rifle units with equal mobility and maneuverability vlll provide the capability for rapidly creating such combat formations for combat as to satisfy the various conditions and requirementsharply changing situation. These qualities of tank and motorized rifle units vlll permit,

ia addition, the avoidancerior dangerousof considerable forces and weaponsimited area on the axisajor strike and will more fully'instill into the practice of combat operations the principle of dispersal of troops and their operations along separate axes. This principle corresponds to the nature of sodern operations to the greatest degree.

The advance of large units and units in dispersed formationsroad front and along axes undoubtedly will decrease troop losses from enemy nuclear strikes, will make it more difficult for him to utilize weapons of mass destruction, and at the same time will permit our troops to carryroader and more flexible maneuver of forces and weapons with the aim of reaching the enemy's deep rear area and destroying his troops by units in short periods of time.

In conducting combat operations in dispersed formations and along separate axes, tank and motorized rifle large units will accomplish the destruction of the enemy usually in mobile forms of combat In conjunction with missile units, airborne forces, and aviation. The necessityethodical breakthrough of the enemy's defenses no longer arises. The latter will be overcome after nuclear strikes along axes, providing rapid penetration to an operational depth and development of an offensive at maximum possible speed. At the same time, the advance of Infantry on combat vehicles following nuclear strikes also mustegular occurrence in overcoming the defense. Only under this condition can the speed of an offensive be sharply Increased and the results of nuclear strikes against the enemy be exploited to the maximum.

In overcoming the defense, the motorized rifle sub-units and units will be able to attack the enemy from the march, not dismountingine of deployment as has been done up to now. Moving out from the zone of Interior after tank subunits, as they approach the main line of resistance, they will carry out necessary reformations while on the march and in conjunction with tanks will overcome the enemy's defense on vehicles in combat or approach march

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formations. Operating on combat vehicles, notorized rifle units and subunits vlll be able to maneuver mora on the field of combat, more quickly change the structure of combat formations and change if necessary from combat formations to approach march formations or the reverse.

Of course, under varied situational conditions the possibility of tbe Infantry operating ln dismounted combat formations is also not excluded vhen the Joint operations of tanks and infantry on combat vehicles are for some reason Impeded. However, even ln these Instances the Infantry vlll be in more favorable circumstances than nov. After the infantry has dismounted, the combat vehicles vlll not be removed to cover, as is dona vith armored carriers, but vlll support the combat of the infantry vith their fire, advancing after tha combat formations of their subunits. During this,combat vehicles vlll be kept in constant readiness to load tha Infantry and provide itapid means of advancing after the tanks.

Tbe fullost high maneuvering capabilities of tanks and motorized rifle large units vlll come about after overcoming the enemy's dofenses. Tank units and large units, in reaching an operational expanse, vlll break through more boldly and deeply into the depth of the enemy's defenses, knowing that the Infantry on combat vehicles will not lng behind them and when needed can unite their efforts with them for delivering coordinated and sudden strikes against the enemy. All this will increase even mora ths capabilities of tank large units in conducting Independent highly maneuverablo combat operations at speedsr mors kilometershour period.

Equipping tha Infantry with the combat vehicle creates new conditions, differing in principle from tha past, for troop forcing of water barriers.

First of all, after the Infantry combat vehicle has become part of our armament, the requirements of troops for various landing and ferrying means is decreased considerably and operations of the infantry in tbe forcing of vater barriers vlll no longer depend on troops' having these means.

Motorized rifle units and subunits, operating on combat vehicles, will be able to force water barriers while on the march, in the literal sense of the word. Possessing high cross-country and amphibious qualities, the combat vehicles will ensure that troopsater barrier rapidlyroad front, and ensure their rapid deployment and quick forcing of the barrier in combat or approach march formations. Thus, in the majority of cases, motorized rifle subunits and units will be able to surmount water barriers from the march simultaneously with amphibious tanks along tho entire forcing sectorcarrying out preparatory engineering work for preparing crossings (except for mine clearing).

Having infantry combat vehicles will increase the possibilities for carrying out maneuver with forces and weapons while forcing water barriers and for transferring the efforts of advancing troops from one direction to another. The executionubsequent forcing of water barriers from the march will likewise be made significantly easier. Not being tied down by crossing equipment, motorized rifle units and subunits together with amphibious tanks as well as tanks equipped for movement under water, after forcing one water barrier will race toward the next water barrier and force it from the march.

The equipping of motorized rifle units and subunits with an infantry combat vehicle willreat Influence on the nature of troop operations under conditions of strong radioactive contamination of the terrain. Possessing high mobility, motorized rifle units and subunits on combat vehioles will be able not only to rapidly bypass zones of contamination, but also to cross them successfully in directions with the lowest level of radiation. The combat vehicles will provide inigher degree of protection for personnel from penetrating radiation and radioactive dust than armored carriers, much less motor vehicles.

Under modern conditions, together with the maneuvering of troops on the ground, great significance is acquired by troop maneuver in the air. On the basis of this, troops,together with their weapons and combat equipment, must be capable of being transported by air.

The mass movement of troops by air, as is well known, Is impeded because of the absence of light transportable combat equipment and meansarger load-capacity for transporting airborne forces. With the creationelatively lightweight infantry combat vehicle, an important step toward solving this important problem will have been made. The transportability of the infantry combat vehicle by air will permit the transfer by air of motorlzod rifle units and large units in future operations in mass formation over considerable distances and in short periods of time.

Naturally, in the future the question will arise of whether all motorized rifle units of tank and motorized rifle divisions should be equipped with the infantry combat vehicle. The solution of this question is directly dependent on the designated operational missions of the largo units and the economic capabilities of the country. It seems to us that first of all lt would be advisable to equip with these vehicles those motorized rifle units which make up the complement of tank armies and tank divisions of combined arms armies. Subsequently, other large units located in the most important theaters of military operations could be so oquipped.

It should be noted that in equipping the Infantry with the combat vehicle, the question of raising the mobility of tank and motorized rifle divisions Is still not completely solved because there will remain in theirelatively large number of subunits and units of other arms of troops which are not protected by armor and have less maneuverabi iity.

Under modern conditions, In the composition of all tank divisions including those in tank armies, lt would be advisable to have not trailer but self-propelled mounts, mainly with atomic armament, which are capable of more effectively executing various fire missions during the conduct by tank troops of highly maneuverable fast moving combat operations.

Subunits and units of special arms of troops which are Included in the composition of tank and motorized rifle large units and conduct combat as an attacking echelon must

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also possess increased mobility and greater protection from the destructive factors of nuclear weapons. This brings out the necessity of also developing appropriate means of armament and movement for them.

In the near future, apparently, vehicles can be created for ground troops utilizing for movement the so-called principle of the "air cushion". The adoption of such vehicles willharper increase ln the mobility of infantry and their maneuverabilityevel corresponding to modern requirements. The cross-country ability of such vehicles will provide troops with the capability to execute rapid maneuver, to cover large expanses,including significant zones of radioactive contamination and wide water barriers in short periods of time, and to deliver sudden strikes against tho enemy from the flanks and rear.

Units and subunits equipped with these vehicles will find the most widespread uso as reconnaissance units and forward detachments of attacking troops. By exploiting breaks and unoccupied sectors in the enemy's defense, thoy will be able to reach the deep rear of the enemy very quickly and execute not only missions assigned to forward detachments butortion of the missions which are carried out by tactical airborne landing forces.

For ground troops it is advisable, ln our opinion, to build vehicles which would have an average speedm per hourruising rangem, with not less thanoer cent of this by air.

The question arises as to whether or not the increase ln the combat capabilities of the Infantry will reach the point where lt will be capable of performing all combat missions with the same success as tanks. It seems to us that this will not occur for this reason. No matter how good the infantry combat vehicles will he, on the basis of its characteristics lt will be far from comparable to our basic tank. And because this is so, tank large units and units under other equal conditions will potentially have greater combat capabilities at their disposal than motorized rifle large units and units on these vehicles.

The basic advantages of tanks over other combat vehicles will remain: the best protection of the crew from nuclear, destruction, more powerful armament, and greater penetrating strike force. The influence of the first factor indicates that under conditions of equal effects by any of the enemy's weapons of destruction losses in tanks will be less than losses in other combat vehicles. Thus, tank troops will betterapability for executing combat missions. During operations along separate axes or isolated from the main forces, this willecisive significance. More powerful armament will permit the infliction of great losses on the enemy and facilitate the possibility for completing his destructionowerful strike by the tanks themselves. All these advantages taken together will provide tank troops with the opportunity to advanceigher speed andreat depth. It should also be kept in mind that the development of tanks, even though it encounters certain difficulties, proceeds relatively rapidly in our country. By the time the Infantry receives the combat vehicle in its armament, tank troops canew and even more Improved and powerful tank.

It should be noted that the development of the infantry in the postwar period proceeded along lines of increasing its strike force and maneuverability,roperties more characteristic of tank troops.

Our present motorized rifle divisions and combined arms armies, on the basis of these characteristics (without taking nuclear/missile weapons intopproach the level of the large units and formations of armored and mechanized troops of the Second World War. Tank troops also havereat deal during this period in technical equipment and organizational forms and have become different. They are constantly reinforced with new models of combat equipment and armament,ore improved organization, and are capable of carrying out highly maneuverable combat operationspeed of upnd more kilometershour periodignificant distance from the basic forcesront (army). However, these high combat qualities of tank troops have not yet been

fully realized during soveral training exercises, sometimes efforts are in evidence to utilize tank divisions and tank amiesar with notorized rifle divisions and combined arms armies, aod often thoy are drawn into long andcombat instead of being utilized for carrying out active and rapid offensive operationsreat depth. For this reason, together with the further improvement of combat equipment, armament, and tha organizational structure of troops, it is essential to search for and master ln practice such methods of their use as to fully correspond to the changing conditions of conducting combat operations and to permit tha maximum exploitation of the results of nuclear strikes against tho onemy.

Original document.

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