MEMO FROM RICHARD HELMS TO DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING MILITARY TH

Created: 3/12/1962

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. C.

I 2

KrMOKA.'fiTJM FCR; The Director of Central Intelligence

KTJJTAHY THOUGHT: "Some Factors Affecting the

Planningodern Offensivey Colonel-General Ye. Ivanov

Enclosederbatim translation of an article vhlch appeared In the TOP SECRBT Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Militaryoycnnayaublished by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

Ia the Interests of protecting our source, this material should be bandiedeed-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR RElEfiSE 3cJWl- m2

COUHTRi : USSR

SUBJECT JkxiTARl THOWHC: "Saw Fact or fl Affecting the ^Planningodern Offensivey Colonel-General Te. Ivanov

DATS 0?

APPRAISAL OF

CONTENT

reliable source

Followingerbatim translation of en article titled "Some Factors Affecting the Planningodern Offensiveritten by Colonel-General Ye. Ivanov.

This article appeared in0 Second Issuepecial version of Voyennaya Myol (Military Thought) which is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and is Issued Irregularly. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.

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Some Factors Affecting tha PlanningMadern Offensive Operation

Colonel-General Ye. Ivanov

The concept that the planningodern operation should he based primarily on the capabllltlee of nuclear weapons and their aost effective utilization, which now sppears to be tbe decisive factor' in achieving victory over the enemy, has become universally recognized. However, it would be useful to examine some particular factors affecting the planning of operations.

In this connection, the first point on which we must dwell isof the concept "the main atrlke and the number ofan operation."

In the past, the direction of the main strikereakthrougholid positional defense, which vas typical, was always selected in support of the most effective use of the infantry, artillery, and tanks vhlch were concentrated for the deliverytrike on the weak spotelected axis,ule. In narrow zones, forestruction of the basic enemy grouping. This axis bad precise limits in an operation and required compulsory superiority over the enemy in forces and weapons. This, naturally, had its definite Influence on the content of tbe planning of the operation.

>* under modern conditions, atomic weapons without the aid of other weapons of combat can. In the shortest periods of time, destroy the

basic enemy troop groupings and deprive them of their combat effectiveness and in this way ensure an advantageous correlation of forces for tbe delivery of strikes and the development of aa offensive.

Hence, when workingolution and planning an operation,primary attention must be given to the determination of the sequenceof the utilization of nuclear/mlasile weapons, which would guarantee maximum effectiveness of the latter in the destruction end neutralization of enemy groupings in the entire depth of the tactical snd operational formation.

olution to tha problem, very often on the axes and through the areas where nuclear weapons will be usedordsgroupings of ground troops or in general to circumvent these areas in avoidanceharp deceleration of tbe rates of advanceesult of tbe serious destruction of populated points, of road structures, and of radiation contamination of the terrain.

appears that the concept "main strike" under modsrn conditions

, snd on an operational scale isass nuclear atrlka against the enemy's nuclear weapons and his basic troop groupings which is followed by strikes with tanks and infantry on several axes, and no longerolid positional defense, butefense havinglustered nature (ochagovyy kharakter).

In resolving the problem of tbe quantity of strikes, the mechanical transfer of the experience of the past ear to modern conditions must be decisively rejectedront snd an army because of the still extent conception of the lnsdvlsabUltyront to deliver more than two strikes and of the impossibility for an army totrike on more than one axis. Substantiation of thia leads to assertions which are far from the truth, namely thatarge number ofront, aad even more, en army, will dissipate its forces and will not be able to perform the assigned mission.

If concentration and utilizationarge mass of fire and of considerable masses of troops were required toreakthrough In the past, now It can be carried out such more simply. Bov nuclear/ missile weapons are capable of breaking through an enemy'sver largo arses not onlyront but In depth and to farm in it such breaches and even vacuums as to lead not only to the weakening of the enemy but also to his complete loss of combat effectlvenesa on the axes selected for the offensive. Thus, conditions have been createdin which the operations of ground troops ere possible without amalgamating them into some sortense striking force.

if one speaks of strikes, keeping in mind the axes

of ground troop operations, there can be several of them, both of an . army andront. Their number will be determined by thecapabilities of the nuclear/missile weapons, the advantages of utilizing them, and also by the conditions supporting convenience in tba operations of large units of ground troops.

Tha delivery of several strikesront snd sn artsy, united bycommon concept and directed toward tbe acblevament of the assigned goals of an operation, Is advantageous not only from the point of view of the availability of possibilities for ensuring these strikes by nuclear/missile weapons but also because with this, favorable conditions for achieving surprise sre created. Dispersion of troops in several Brass andarge expanse together with tbe execution of other measures for operatlocal concealment hinders the enemy in the timely determination of the Intentions of the attacker. This will permit concealment from the enemy of not only the actual employment of the troopa in sn operation but also of the naturebe utilization of nuclear/miss lie weapons.

The operations of front (army) troops on sevsrel isolatedreate more favorable conditions for the utilization of the mostorms of operational maneuver,omparatively easy change in the direction of operations, especially during the course of tbe operation'a development,uick transfer of tbe efforts of the troops into the depth. Furthermore, such conditions considerably simplify the use of various ame of troops since excessive congestion and shifting of their combat and precombat formations are eliminated, theyore effective utilization of tha terrain, assist in the better organization of the work of the rear services and in particular,ore rational utilization of the main railroad and vehicular highway networks, and also of bridges and river crossings in support of supply and evacuation.

It la perfectly obvious that .troops dispersedront for operatlona on various axes cannot be equivalent in composition or equipment. The content and importance of their missions will also differ. But they will be unitedingle concept and the efforte of the troopa will be directed toward the achievement of the overall goal of the operation. Moreover, now it is not important how many groupings have been createdront for an offensive, 'butow tbe troops are organized for the most effective exploitation, at high tempos, of tbe results of the use ofie weapons. Therefore, dlaperaloo of troopsront does not at all moan that their efforts are dissipatedesult.

The spatial scope, tempos and the duration of an operation must also be eansdnedifferent manner from that which is still the" practice at the present time.

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of all, the establishment of rigid and constant sixes In relation to the vldth of offenslTa zones loses Its significance, especially for operational formitlons. In reality, vhen planning

ront (army) win be assigned zones, determined not oo the basis of some cons taut size, but rather on the basis of such

N factors as the composition snd condition of tho troops, the availability of nuclear/missile weapons, the possibility of organizing not only simultaneous neutralization of the enemy by fire in tbe entire depth andtrike against the enemy from the front, but also the effect on him of airborne troops and notorized rifle units and large units transported by air, and also (and this Is veryy tbe necessity to support an extensive maneuver of troops In the course of an offensive both for the delivery of simultaneous and successive strikes against the enemy from the moat advantageous axes as well as for protection from his nuclear weapons.

From this, lt is obvious that the principle of planning an army offensive operationoneom videreakthrough of the enemy's defenseront ofom is outmoded. If this principle is examined carefully, It vlll be found to hide nothing sore than an indirect requirement for the necessity, even now, toarge number of men and equipmentufficiently limited area (even if forrief span ofs previously, to accomplish tho tasks of breaking through the enemy's defense by an avalanche of troops and not by tbe power of modern fire and nsneuver.

It appears to us that at the present time an army can, right from the beginning of sn offensive, conduct lt successfully in Its entire zone or evenignificantly wider one than Indicated above. Including an offensiverepared enemy defense.

It la all the more possible that the basic methods of .its operations will be mutually coordinated, in space and time, maneuvering operations of its individual large units, which come into direct contact with each other only in cases when the efforts of several large units are required against some particular enemy grouping, under these conditions, moreover, even the large units of an army may often have to operate as individual units in vide zones. Consequently, In planningan operation, tbe offensive zone of an army should be such as to permit conduct of aaneurering operations both ot tbe beginning of the operation and during its development and toapability to concentrate tha strength of the strike by means of the reserves dispersed in depth. onem, in ths

absenceolid front, will ensure such operations to the highest degree to the troopa of an srmy, particularly under conditions of considerable radioactive contamination of the terrain, which will better assist the fulfilment of assigned missions, snd will undoubtedly lower the possibility of their destruction by the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons.

The necessity for maximum exploitation of the capabilitiesuclear/missile weapons for the speediest shifting of the effortsront's (army's) troops into the depth of the enemy's defense aimed at his final destruction and the seizure of the enemy's means -of using nuclear ammunition and his missile weapon bases, engendersegit lire te desire to sharply increase the rntes of offensive, which is now proposed tO| bemhour period.

In connection withresentation of the problem of offensive tempos, we think thatm can be only anaily rate with tho presence of completely favorable conditions of the development of the operation.

Dally troop movement of Scm can take place only with the absence of any enemy activity and, obviously, this cannot bo counted on for tbe course of the entire operation; this Is confirmed by past combat experience and by the experience of all exercises.

"v High offensive tempos and inevitable losses will, naturally,igh degree of strain on tbe troops and consequently the timely relief of large units of the first echelon, who have bcarne considerable losses and have lost their combat effectiveneaeesult of the enemy's nuclear strikes. This very factor must be carefully appraised in order to correctly plan the conduct of operatlona at high but realistic rates, determined In light of the concretely developing situation. From this it appears that in each specific case, depending on the goals of the operation and the capabilities of the nuclear/missile weapons at hand, tbe Indicated rates can vacillate to one side or the other.

Further, to tbe extent thatesult of the use of nuclear/ , missile weapons by both sides considerable areas of the terrain will bo transformed into solid radioactive fields and because of which the engagement will break up into individual centers of combat over a

wide expanse, it must be assumed that the planned movement of ground troopa will not take place as woe done during the years of the past war. For example, an operation can begin with tbe simultaneous use of nuclear/missile weapons and of ground troops over the entire depth of the enemy's operational formation and will conclude as soon as the surviving centers of resistance have been destroyed, and the enemy's potential for undertaking any serious countermeasures to regain its lost position or to reestablish equality In forcesiven axis has been paralyzed.

With this method of conducting an operation, the degree of fulfilment of the assigned missions must be provided for in the plan of operation not by the number of kilometers covered by ground

v troops but by the possibility of seizing as much of the enemy's

depth as possible through active combat operations including airborne landings, in ordur to paralyze his freedom over significant expanses and to bring to naught his efforts to continue resistance. Under such conditions, tbe most important thing ia to calculate correctly

the time necessaryarticular front or army grouping to conclude the destruction of the enemy In individual areas of resistance.

Of considerable importance in planning an offensive operationis its depth, which also cannot-be of constant magnitude and which depends on the goals of the operation, the scale of use of nuclear/ missile weapons, and the distance from the enemy's key operational-strategic objectives, which the front (army) must seize. In the

of these objectives whichecisive influence in the determination of the depth of the operation and consequently the depth and content of the front's (army's) missions, the enemy's political-administrative and economic centers, Important supply Junctions, and the disposition areas of the enemy's bases of nuclear/ ffli8sile weapons should be included.

The factors which in the past influenced the planning of the rates, the depth, and the duration of operations, such, for example, as the needront (army) to use force against the enemy successively depending on the meano of destruction on hand for this goal, the depth of its operational formation, the possibilityag in airfield basing of aviation, of artillery,umber of other things, which, if they must be considered at the present tlmo cannot be determining because the capabilities of nuclear/missile weapons are

limitless and, therefore, conditions for significantlyspeedier destruction of enemy groupings and the seizure of his

territories are created.

At the present time, as is known, it is customary to plan *s4 offensive operations by missions. In which all intermediate missions composing the substance of the icmediate and subsequent missionsront are included.

Thus, in planning for the executionront'sission, the subsequent execution of the following Intermediate missions is usually envisaged: the breakthrough of the tactical depth of the enemy's defense and tho destruction of his nearest reserves, the seizure of tbe army zone and of the intermediate zones, tbe encirclement and destruction of the enemy by the forces of the front or, in coordination with adjacent units, the forcing of water obstacles, etc.

This type of mission assignment is connected in principle with methodical operations of the troops with their relatively steady movementolid front, from one line to another.

Moreover, modem conditions, operations of the troopsront will be completely different and will not resemble the operations of the period of the past war, since both an offensive and defensive will be conducted on different principles.

The shifting of troops to an offensive will be effected,rom areas removed from the line where both sides are in direct contact; broad maneuver must be incorporated in the methods of troop operation, baaedombination of swift movement in columns with operations in precombat and combat formations along separate axes with subsequent conduct of Individual engagements and battles In individual areaaarge expanse. Moreover, on some axea groupings of troopa will advance swiftly, on others they will conduct meeting battles and engagements, temporarily withdraw, circumvent vast zones of radioactive contamination, changing the direction of advance or waitime.

Deep mutual breaking In by troopa willormal phenomenon. Loss of direct contact of advancing and defending troops will take place frequently. An airborne landing may at times be tho only possible way for the speedy fulfilment of tbe goals of tbe operation becauseords missing) mass nuclear/missile strikes, whole expanses may become Inaccessible for operations from the front of troops for an extended period of time.

Armiesront will sdvance, exposing themselves to enemy nuclear striken, encountering the fierce opposition of his individual mobile groupings in separate areas, with which lt will be necessary to wage heavy battles and engagements, and then to swiftly sdvance at rates close to those of marches, in order to seize the more deeply deployed objectives or to destroy tbe enemy groupings which are covering them.

esult of the nature of combat operations by troopsront, the rates of sdvance of the armies operating in the first echelon, and of the divisions which are part of the complement of the armies will be most uneven. Therefore, under conditions when the enemy's defense has lost its clearly expressed positional nature, when tho mobility of the troops has significantly increased, and combat operatlona ln the ebsence of solid fronts have become exceptionally monouverable, by which both sides, in the course of executing combat operations will strive to deliver powerful deep strikes in order tobreak through into tbe depth of tbe territory along separate axes to seize the most Important areas snd objectives. The seizure of certain lines will notecessary condition far the complete defeat of the troops of tbe enemy whose groupings will also be maneuvering on the battlefield.

The assignment of missions by lines binds the maneuver capabilitiesnot only of tank but also of combined-arms armies and paralyzes tho cecumnders' initiative in their choice of the method of operations ond tbe directiontrike when deciding on missions for the destruction of the enemy.

One should elso keep in mind that the basic fire strike force ere nuclear/missile weapons on whose destructive power tbe success of the operation depends in the final analysis, out these weapona, ss is known, ore not permanently located ln some limited area. They are dispersed in the depth and along the front, practically throughout the entire zone of the defender.

With movement of our troops, the beees of the enemy's nucleer/ missile weapona will be changing all the time, therefore, the arrival of troops of tbe front (army) at some given Una still does not ensure the mission of routing the enemy.

On the boele of tbe above, ve come to the conclusion that the content and character of their assignment to the troopa must be changed and brought Into accord vith tbe new methods of combat operations of troops.

The missionsront (army) must be assigned so that their content does not bind the commander to the seiiura and holding of certain linesolid front, but so as to have their fulfilment ^lead to the achievementerfectly definite operational or operational-strategic result.

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In this, the main uttention of the commander and staff should bo aimed, above all, at the destruction (neutralization) of the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons, on the destruction of his basic groupings and the seizure of Individual areas having Important significance for tho further development of tho operation.

For example, the most Immediate missionront In the

periodar can be tbe destruction (neutralization) of the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons along tbe entire depth of his operational formation, the route of the first operational echelon of the opposing grouping by gaining the main routes of approach cf the major enemy reserves, and prevention of their inflow and unificationtrike against tho troops of the front.

A subsequent missionront can consist of the destruction of the enemy's nuclear/missile weapons that have remained Intact or have newly appeared, the destruction of deep reserves, the seizure of the primary areas of bis missile bases, political-administrative or economic centers, and also the disruption of mObUlzstion measuresarticular area of the country.

in these questions also, we must decisively reject our

accepted practice of strict centralization and detailing of missions. The experience of war shows that the degree of detailing in assigning missions to troops depended, in every case, on the scale and the designated purpose of formation and large units, oo the specific conditions of tho situation and tha nature of the combat activity of the troops. In this, great Independence in operations was

at the operational level andesser extent st the

tactical. During the war, there vasery clear expression of

the tendency toward strict centralization of control In the preparation for en operation and combatelatively smaller degree of centre li sat loo in tbe process of their conduct. At ell levels, centre li sat Ion of control by the senior commanders also took place with regard to tbe utilization of fire and strike means.

However, ln the course of the past war lt bad already become evident that strict centralization of control Is applicable In those s, forms of combat operations where tbe troopsapability for an extensive maneuver, for example,reakthroughrepared positional defense and also in instances when thef the troops ore not adequate for maneuvering. But eo soon as conditions were created for an extensive maneuver of forces and weapons, tho necessity immediately arose to switch from striot centralization to granting subordinates more Initiative end independence ln sccordance with tbe specific situation within the framework of the general operational concept.

Under tbe condltlona of highly dynamic combat operations and abrupt changes in the situation, it would hardly be correct to centralize the control of troops right up to tbe point of indicating to large units end units the methods for fulflling their combat missions, ss sometimes happened during the past war. The Increased combat capabilities of troops, tbe natureodern battle and operation now urgently require granting subordinates greaterindependence and tbe opportunity to manifest Initiative in operetions in sll instances.

Of course, the degree of centralization of control, even under new conditions will depend on the specific situation which hashape, the nature of the combat operations, and tbe preparedness of comnand cadres and staffs at all levels of the military organism.

Under certain situational conditions, the senior commander. In addition to assigning missions to subordinate troops and allocating to them the meane of reinforcement, can define the method by which the aaelgned missions sre to be fulfilled, under others, he can apportion to subordinate troops tbe necessary moano for reinforcement and Indicate combat missions without predeternlnatlon of the methods of fulfilling them end the sequence of the use of forcea and weapons, granting this right to the subordinate commsndere.

However, the general trend In the development, characteristicroop control under modern conditions, must lead to subordinate

commanders snd ataffa using greater freedom and independence than was the case, for example, in World Mr II.

The circumstance,endency has been clearly notedhange the combat composition of the operational formations ofront and armies, In the directionuantitative reduction alsoery great significance for the planning of an operation.

In the past, the basic criterion determining the

compositionront and an army for the successful execution of amajor offensive operation, as is known, was the necessity to create on the main axis, onealf, double or sometimes even triple superiority over the enemy in forces and weapons. Therefore, it was completely natural to have tho desire to achieve ouch superiority by meansaximum increase in the combat composition of formation for the oxocution of not only the initial, moat difficult ml salons of an operation, but also those in the course of its development. In this Vvay, the strength of front and army formations was determined byumber of large units, and also by the capability of the weaponsestruction, chiefly of artillery and aviation to whose level of development the cetholn of ccrabat operations corresponded. Iheae methods, although they were basically maneuvering and fast moving, vere developed in complex situational conditions, and always required for their Initiation and development, the availability of compact groupings of troops and fire, coordination and close lateral contact between them and their separate elements. This ie why army and'front formations included in theirarge number of combihed-arms large units, not counting the units and large units of arms of , troops and special troops. It Is known, that the combat composition* front reachedo kO large units and of an army up tor more large units.

It is perfectly obvious that in vlev of the existence of nuclear/missile weapons and their limited capabilities, front and army formations can no longer have their former composition in motorized rifle and tank divisions. Undor modern conditions, the criterion of the abilityront and an army to execute Its assigned missions vis determined by their capabilities to deliver crushing strikes with 'v nuclear weapons and other fire weapons.

Considering the above-mentioned conditions in total,ompositionront for the West European theaterilitary operations can be defined aaootorized rifle Snd tank largeissile large unitsumber or special units.

With tha Indicated number of large unitsront,perational density will be fromomivision (vhen conducting an operationone of upimes larger than vas accepted in accordance with the experiences of the past war.

In view of this possible compositionront, theas to the number of armlearont and the numberdivisions in an army. We consider that lt is inadvisable for anave, as formerly, less than three or more than fivean army, its composition should also Include no moredivisionsissile large unit and special units. .

composition, in comparisonivisions, is sufficiently capable of strixes and la more flexible from the point of view ofoes not lead to unnecessary super oa titration of tbe operational formation with forces and weapons and, consequently,ossible increase in losses from enemy nuclear strikes. Hence, the need for army corps finally passes away to the degree than an armyorps cease to be in any way substantially different from one another in their composition. With auch limited composition of tbe armies, army corps could be usedront in their stead but this step is hardly advisable If only for tha reason tbat in every respect, the control of an army Is in Its capabilities,ore dependable and secure operational organ for control of iroops under modern conditions, when great military erudition Is requiredommand clement on this scale.

the use of nuclear/missile weapons in an operation is

the most Important and definitive part of the planning of the entire operation, ttributing great significance to this-principle, it is impossible, in our view, not to turn ettentionometimes not thoroughly correct understanding of the role of tho missile troopsront. In concrete terms, we are speaking of certain opinions according to which the initiation of an offensive by front troops should be precededissile operation conducted by thesen other words, an attempt ia being mode to mechanically extend the principles for conducting missile operationstrategic plan to tbe front also.

With ouch an approach to thia problem, the fact ia overlooked that missile large units and units are the rain fire and atrike fores of the ground troops and are Intended not only for combat with enemy nuclear weapons which, aa is known, constitutes one of the basic tasks of any missile operation, but for the support of troop combat operationshole. For this reason, thoy cannot, in principle, be planned separately from the utilization of motorized rifle and tank troops, sviation, tube artillery, and other combat weapons of the armies and fronthole. It is, therefore, all the more important to oophasize the fact that the relative weight of conventional weapons of destruction has shsrply decreased at this time.

The missile troopsront sre varied ln their combat characteristics and are found at various troop levels. It follows from this, that every type of missile has Its definite operational-tactical designation and every echelon of commaod to which they are subordinate assigns then teens ln the required detail.

Thus, we believe, that etrlvlng to conduct missile operations et the level of the front, with the means organizationally included in the composition of the various combined arms elements of the front, has no basis.

Nevertheless, measures for the timely and qualitative planning of the use of nuclear/missile weapons In sn operation are complex, many-sided, and thereforeery correct approach to the delimitation of functions between the commander and staff of the front oo the ono band, and the commander and the staff of the missile troops and the air force (WS) of the front on the other.

However, it must be sold that in problems of control of missile large units and unitsront and in an amy, various extreme points of view are expressed et tines. Some believe that the entire control, including tbe issuance of commands, must be executed by the commander of troope of tbe front (army) through the staff of the front (army) which le directly connected with tbe missile large unite end units, others believe it to be advisable to transfer almost all questions of control to the commander of mlsslls troops and artillery of the fronteaving to the commander of troops of the front (army) the obligation, in essence, to review and approve the proposals of the cccxender of missile troops and artillery of the front (army).

These extreme points of vlev are clearly not acceptable and lt therefore appears more correct that only the commander of. troops of oe front with his staff be able to take It upon himself to decide tbe basic fundamental problems In the utilization of nucleart is his prerogative alone to determine the targets for nuclear weapons, tbe time and sequence of the utilization by the missile troops and aviation, the expenditure of nuclear warheads in an operation, and distribution of them among the armies and missile large units (units) of front subordination.

Of very great significance is the planning of combat with the enemy'weapons of nuclear attack by all possible means (not onlyuclear weapons, as is sometimess well as the organization of control of the means of using nuclear weapons in light of the concrete conditions of tbe Impending operation. In this, the front and army must very carefully work out the problems of ensuring massed fire of several missile large units and units of various subordination for the execution of the most important tasks in tbe course of the operation.

The staff of the front conducts the operational planning for the use of nuclear weapons, argsnlzes end ensures control of ths means of sing them through the commanders and staffs of the missile troops end

Specifically, the staff of the front (army) must

reconnaissance of all kinds in support of the utilization of nuclear weapons, organize the collection and analysis of Intelligence date, organize caamunicatlons for control of the means of utilizing nuclear weapons, organize engineer eupport for the deployment and maneuver of the missile troops, and also organize security and defense of the missile troopa and organs of the missile rear services in areas of disposition and during transfers.

At the same time, direct control nf the missile large units and units of the front (army) and especially of their fire, must naturally be the prerogative of the commander of the missile troops and srtiUery.

On the basis of all these considerations, the following sequence of work can be recanmended.

The commander of troops of the front (amy) determines therouping to be destroyed by nuclear warheads and tbe moat impartsnt objectives to be destroyed, the expenditure of nuclear warheads for the missile troops and aviation, the types of nuclear bursts, tbe order snd the time of delivering the nuclear strikes.

The operational directorate of the staff of the frontwith the staffs of the artillery and the sir

(the representative of the supporting aviation) works out the specific problems of nuclear preparation and nuclear support of the offensive, distributes tbe objectives for destruction between the missile troops and aviation, determines the yield of the nuclear charge, the type and the height of the burst for the destruction of each objective, the safe distance of our troops from the ground zeroe (centers) of the nuclear bursts, evaluates the expected results of tho nuclear etrikes and the possible resultant radiation situation, determines the large units (units) of missile troops and aviation to be used to deliver strikes snd other matters resulting from tbe specific situation.

After confirmation cf the problems which have been worked outcommander of troops of the fronthe transmission ofto those who will execute them and the entire workthorn is organized by the conmanders of the miasile troops of tho sir army peraonally and through their

ork sequence apeeds the planning and transmission of decisions to the troops, snd the combined-erne staff and the ataffs of arms of troops sre freed of the necessity to request snd prepare necessary memoranda and considerations for the preparation of nuclear strikes.

The problems of utilizing nuclear/missile weapons must be the basis of the plan of the operation. It must reflect: the objectives to be destroyed, the time and sequence of the delivery of strikes, the expenditure of nuclear warheads with an indication of their yields, the types and heights of bursts and also the coordinates of thoir ground zeros for each objective, safe diatanco for troops and tbe time periods of their readiness, andentative calculation of the use of nuclear warheads in the course of the entire operation. Only after deciding all these problems do tbe operations of tbe remaining forces and weapons of the front, the combined-erne formations and large unite, the conventional field artillery, the aviation, and other arms of troopa and special troops, become reflected in the plan of the operation.

It la completely obvious, tbat there Is no need whatsoever to drawpecial plan for the use of nuclear/missile weapons aa an attachment to the general plan for an operation. All questions of the organization and_ conduct of an offensive operation areingle plan of the operation. Thisirect result of the leading role of nuclear/missile weapons in accomplishing the goals and missions of an operation.

Weakening the nuclear strength of an opposing grouping of the enemy and depriving him of bis capability to use nuclear weapons is one of the moat important tasks, whose correct solution ensures the success of the offensive operationhole. It is completely obvious, that planning the fulfilment of tho tasks of achieving and maintaining nuclear superiority over the enemy must be carried out within the framework of the nuclear preparation and support of the offensive of he troops of the front.

In this connection, the following should be mentioned. At tbe present time, we employ such concepts as "fire preparation for annuclear preparation for anhile at the same time such concepts as "artillery and aviation preparation for an offensive" continue to exist. orrect clarification of these concepts. It seems to us, isundamental significance in planning the utilization of missile troops and nuclear/missile weapons. But are all these concepts valid and do not some contradictions exist in this problem?

Tt seems to us that they alluite definite content* Fire preparation for an offensivecme what general collective concept and includes fire strikes by nuclear/missile weapons, as well as by aviation snd artillery. irect result of this is that conponont parts of the fire preparation for an offensive aro nuclear, artillery, and aviation preparation.

Fire preparation must be examined and plannedomparatively brief, powerful, mossed, and sudden strike by nuclear/elBSlle weapons, aviation and artillery against the most important objectives of the operational formation of the enemy's troopsepth required by the specific conditions of the situation.

preparation and fire preparationhole for ao offensive is the ability to accomplish lt in the moat limited periods of time nd at the same time to ensure the deliveryowerful fire strike against the most Important objectives of the enemy. Tbe mass utilization of nuclear weapons in short periods of time is the only way to achieve decisive destruction of the fire powern opposing enemy grouping, destruction of his main nuclear/missile and aviation mesas, and also disruption of the control of troops and the disorganisation of work of the rear services.

As to nuclear support of an offensive, depending upon tbe v' expected nature of the combat operations of the troops, lt can be planned to include the delivery of individual, group, end mass nuclear strikes. These strikes must ensure the firs support for the advancing troopa in the most vitsl and Intensiveords missing) for the use of nuclear veapona during the days of the operation, obviously, aro possible only tentatively during the period when the troopa are fulfilling their immediate tasks. Detailed planning of nuclear support against targets and objectives to be destroyed, can apparently be executed onlyays of the combat operations.

Briefly summarising tbe thoughts expressed above concerning the Influence of new factors on the planningodern offensive operation, it is not difficult to reach the conclusion that little rem ins of former concepts. Including those drawn from the experience of World tter II. Ths time has cooeuch more discriminating approach to the use of this experience under new conditions which would sweep sslde everything which to any degree hinders, tbe further evolution of our views, which should not lag behind the development of the modem weapons of armed combat.

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advantage cf the opportunity presented to share thoughts on the pages of this Collection, the publication of which must be warmlyhould like to touch very briefly on an abnormal situation which has been created in connection with the working out of the operational instructions necessary for tha Armed Forces.

The fact is that, such instructions, aa is known, have not yet appeared since the conclusion of World War II, If we disregard tbe

several published drafts which vere not approved even though they were widely used in their tiaa during the training of higher staffs. ituation does not help to bring about unity of views and does not provide guidance for long-range elaboration of theories in particulardirections.

It is not possible to sgree with the point of view whichto so called works which aro not intended todefined recommendations and, consequently, are not toas either regulations or

A situation such as this evokes serious concern and in tbe study particularly of sectors of applied nllltary theory, it leads to the necessity for orienting oneself primarily to analyses of the major measures of operational training, carried out by the types of Armed Forces and the General Staff which, as is known, most clearly elucidate the specificsiven measure. In addition, the lack of official Instructions also gives rise to the situation tbat the level of preparation and knowledge of generals and officers always depends upon the personal views of superior commanders on any particular question. And since these commanders come and go, it Is perfectly obvious what consequences this has.

In passing, lt should be noted tbat in tbe work published by the General Staff called "Bases of Modernt Is difficult to grasp anything different in the nature of tbe exposition of problems from what was accepted as the content of previously proposed instructions. There are fewerccommodations, but it is questionable whether this is really good. And does this better support the training of young cadres who are moving up snd have no combat experience lo commanding formations and in serving in higher staffs?

It seems that it would be far more correct to decide in favor of working out those instructions necessary for training the command personnel of tbe Armed Forces In the conduct of front snd army operations, andetter of fact, those and others as well. At present, it is intended that the Instructions for conducting army operations will be worked out separately from and parallel to the work "Bases of Modern Operations" without any coordination between hem, one in the General Staff and tho other in the Main Staff of the Ground Troops.

The working cut of operational iDetractions must beo that it does notubstitute for the working out of theoretical works in development of and on the basis of these instructions. Therefore, it seems to us, this practice in working out regulations should be judged as an extraordinary inflation of their scope by means of superfluous detail and repetition. That this is very widespread with us can be easily confirmed by looking at previously worked out drafts of similar instructions and even of other works.

Moreover, it Is very important to clarify published instructionsimely manner. Under present conditions, which are unprecedented in rates of development and perfection of combat equipment, one can never be completely sure that the problems have been finally worked out. Obviously, many of them will, to one degree or another but at different times have to be clarified to the extent of the study and revelation of new factors. It is asked, how can thia be best donet To republish the instructions yearly makes no sense but nevertheless, every year changes concerning one problem or another become solidified and they must reach the proper peopleimely manner. Failure to do this will result in the fact that many outdated situations ln the above-mentioned work of the General Staff will continue to exist along with other recoemendatibns that have been elaborated later.

In order to correct this situation, yearly directives shouldssued on operational training, not only stating shortcomings and assigning general tasks for this training, but primarily clarifying those problems and recommendations in previously published instructions which require changes and supplements. In this instance, the significance and authority of these directives will increase iinmeasurably. As for the republication of instructions, this should be doneev years, depending on the necessity.

Experience in working out instructions and regulations shows that it is clearly inadvisable to conduct parallel elaboration of them, since this gives rise to the necessity for numerous and frequently fruitless coordination, hampersreat degree the selection of author groups, and dissipates efforts. It is perfectly obvious that thia work could be fulfilledlgnlficantly more productive and qualitative manner and evenhorter time of thererearranged plan for working out operational instructions and issuinghem before the field regulations, and not vice-versa, as is still the case today.

Original document.

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