MEMO FROM RICHARD HELMS TO DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING MILITARY TH

Created: 2/23/1962

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MEMORANDUM FOH: The DIruc'.cr cf Central Intelligence

MILITARY TEOUGfcT: "To Develop the Theory of

Soviet Militaryy Admiral V. Trlbuts

Enclosederbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Artllcea of the Journal "Militaryublished by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handledeed-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

0 JUN

approved for release

Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Repretentative of the President

Special Assistant to tho President for national Security Affairs

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director for Intelligence The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief ot Staff, Intelligence Headquarters, u. BV Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Amy

Director of Naval Intelligence Departcent of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research Department of State

Director, Division of Intelligence Atomic Energy Cocsnission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Dlreotor for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Dlrsctor for Scientific Intelligence

USSR

SUBJECT tnLITART THOUGHT: "To Develop the Theory of mmmfwSoviet Militaryy Admiral V. Trlbuta

DATE OFOF

reliable.

Follow Lugerbatim translation of an article titled "To Develop the Theory of Soviet Militaryritten by Admiral V. Tribute.

This article appeared In0 Third Issuepecial version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) vhich is elaaaified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and is issued irregularly. It ia distributed within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander. 0 Third Issue was sent for typesetting on

Tho article cited on- pageas disseminated

To Develop tbe Theory of Soviet Military Art

by

Admiral V. Tributs

The decision of the Minister of Defense, Marshal of tho Soviet Union a. Ta. Ualinovskiy, on the publicationpecial Collection of Articles of the Journal "MlllTarT Thought", in which materials dealing with tha most pressing problems of today In the development of the theory of military art will be published,alute. This decision will find wide approval and support from all command personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The development by marshals, generals, and admirals of new military-theoretical problems, and the publication and comprehensive discussion of the corresponding materials, will facilitate the development of Soviet military art and the working out of unified views on the nature and methods of waging armed combat with the use of means of mass destruction, missile weapons, and the newest military equipment.

It must be noted that up to the present time the development ln our Armed Forces of the most acute and pressing military-theoretical problems has beenimid nature. This work, which is very important in content, scope, and rate of execution, is still limited.

esult of this,umber of years we have not been able to overcome the gap which has arisen betweenlevel of development of the means of destruction and their delivery vehicles and the theory of military art. The latter obviously lags behind and does not keep up with progress in the area of means of mass destruction, missile weapons, and combat equipment in general.

In developing the theory of military art, we must proceeduite clear understanding of the fact that under modern conditions wars will not proceed as in the past.

They will bear little resemblance to previous wars. In view of this, one should speak not so much of the necessity for revising the theory of military art, which will lead us only to partial solutions, asew, revolutionary approach to the development of the most vital military-theoretical problems which have appeared before us ln recent years.

Modern armament which permits, in essence, an unlimited Increase ln the speed and scope of destruction, demands notevision but the fundamental development and creationew theory of military art, conforming completely to the potentialities of the latest means of combat. At present it must be developed in conformity first of all with the means of mass destruction and missile weapons, the development of which leadsadical change in the structure of the armed forceshole.

Among modern military problems, one of the moat Important places undoubtedly belongs to the problems of the situation of threat and the initial period of war. To approach the solution to these problems correctly, it must be quite clearly understood that the situation of threat and the initial period of war are not farfetched, but are completely objective strategic categories. It is impossible, therefore, to agree with those authors who assert that under modern conditions war can begin suddenly and that the situation of threat will not occur at all. Such assertions are patently false. The situation of threat will always occur but its characteristic indicators and duration may be extremely diverse. Specifically, there may alsoariant of the situation of threat when its duration will be very, very short.

However, one cannot even conjecture such helplessness of our military leadership and Intelligence in which the direct preparations of the aggressor for surprise attack on our Homeland will not be detectedertain extent. Thereignificant number of indicators which we must know, consider, and know how to uncover. These indicators will enable one to proclaim in advance the period of threat, accomplish the necessary measures for the

final completion of preparation for war, bring to complete combat readiness all forces and means for the delivery of immediate and crushing strikes on the aggressor, and also for the organization of defense, protection, and speedy elimination of the consequences of the first strikes.

The threat situation may be characterized bytatus of international relations thatesultharp aggravation of contradictions between the states of the Anglo-American imperialist coalition and countries of the Socialist Camp, the threat of the immediate outbreak of war will become so real that it will be necessary to reorganize the armed forces, the economy, and the entire life of the country quickly ln accordance with wartime demands. The situation of threat does not appear at once and its tension will increase in accordance with the aggravation of contradictions, complication of the international situation, and the execution by the aggressoreries of military, economic, and other measures directed at immediate preparation for military attack. On the eve of the Second World War, the German-Fascist command carried out similar operationsong period. This Complex was to some extent known to the leadership of our country and the military command.

Specific signs of the rise of the situation of threatomplicated number of socio-political, economic, mobilizational, and military measures being executed by the probable enemy with the goal of the immediate unleashingar. Not only the birth, but also tho nature, of the situation of threat may depend on these measures.

At the present time, for the imperialist states, socio-political measures acquire exceptionally important significance among the various directions of preparation for future war. Characteristic indicators of the birth and development of the situation of threat in this area may be, for example, acute activation of ideological indoctrination of the population, arousing inational-chauvinistic and revanchist mood, intensification of propaganda of an alleged military threat from the states of the Socialist Camp, and broadening cue activities of various fascist and pro-fascist organizations. To these ends, the enemy will make broad use of radio, television, the press, and various forms of socio-political activity.

At the same time, active preparation of the population for various types ol! defense will be carried on.

In the area of economics, there may take place such phenomenaharp Increase in the rate of output of military industry, expansion of its reserve potential conversion of enterprises of various branches of industry to intensive fulfilment of military orders, limiting the supplies of raw materialstrategic significance for enterprises producing articles for civilian consumption,umber of other measures directed at supporting ;the development of the armed forces and accelerating the preparation for war. The nature of the ocean and sea transportation of the probable enemy and activities oferchant fleet will change.

The relatively high readinessortion of the forces and means of the probable enemy in peacetime which supports the possibility of sudden initiation of military operations, does not preclude the necessity for him to conduct mobilization, even though itartial one. Its basis will obviously bo the extensive preparation of the forces and means of the second and subsequent strategic echelons of the armed forces which are impossible to maintain under peacetime conditions. These measures will Include the callup from the reserves of enlisted and officer personnel and the intensification of their training, transfers of leading command personnel, dispersal of material-technical stocks, taking military vessels out of storage, mobilizing ships of the merchant fleet,mobile shore bases and new bases on the unimproved seacoast, etc.

One of the most important indicators of the situation of threat may be measures of the enemy in preparing his naval forces for specific operations: changing the areas and nature of operational and daily combat training of aircraft carrier large units and misslie-carrying submarines, movements of aircraft carriers under the guise-of training cruises, training exercises, or movements to bases and ports of states continguous to us, appearance of aircraft carriers and miBsile-carrying submarines in zones of ocean

and sea theaters of military operations from which they can utilize missile weapoos and carrier aircraft against our coast and rear areas of the country.

Significant changes in the nature and setup of military communications, radio counteractions,an be observed. The deployment of forces and means of various types of defense and protection, especially antimissile and antisubmarine ones, will obviously assume wide proportions.

It is especially important to consider that there willignificant intensification of all types of intelligence and the activiation of intelligence operations of the enemy with broad use of various technical means. The number of flights of his reconnaissance aircraft and pilotless means of observation, and also violations of our air space will increase. The number of enemy submarines conducting systematic observation of the coast and possibly also the number of violations of our territorial waters by various vessels and ships will increase.

This enumeration of possible indicators which can accompany tho beginning and complicationituation of threat is far from complete (the majority of them,to one degree or another, appeared before the start of the Second World War. Careful monitoring, study, and comprehensive appraisal of these indicators in their dynamics and interdependence has, for us, very important significance. In this it is necessary to bear in mind that the basic measures executed by the enemy with the aim of preparing for the immediate unleashingar will be carefully concealed and conducted with great secrecy.

In view of this, the activity of our intelligence, which ln the threatening period must be activated to the maximum extent, gains paramount importance. It must uncover the nature of the enemy's preparations toar and make it possible for us to frustrate all attemptsudden attack on our Homeland. The

development of modern technical means ot intelligence will have decisive significance in the first place to assure effective operations of submarine and air forces against enemy aircraft carrier and missile carrier large units.

Considering the intentions of the probable enemy and his preparation for the sudden and perfidious unleashingar, we must orient ourselves to the least favorable variant of the situation, when the duration of the situation of threat will be extraordinarily short.

Considering these conditions, our Navy is facedumber of difficult requirements:

-the basic forces of tho fleet (submarine and aviation) must be continually maintained at the highest level of combat readiness for immediate use of their weapons;

-indispensable stocks of weapons and means of material-technical support must be dispersed and made Invulnerable to strikes on them by the enemy beforehand (in peacetime);

-duty forces and means and also forces and means of all types of defense, antiaircraftntisubmarinentiminend protection must beigh level of readiness for their immediate use;

-efficient organization and method of preparation of missile weapons for their immediate dispatch to large units, units, and vessels, which stillignificant amount of time, must be worked out beforehand;

-advanced organization and performance, in specific threatened areas of ocean and sea theaters of military operations, of systematic and reliable reconnaissance, with the aim of uncovering first and foremost the nature of the operations and intentions of missile carrier and aircraft carrier forces of the enemy;

-maintenanceigh level of readiness of the means of controlling forces and the entire communication system.

Under modern conditions the initial periodar acquires extremely great importance. Our entire strategy must be purposefully directed so that in this vory period of armed combat we may make maximum utilization of the full might of nuclear and other means of destruction and thoroughly predetermine the fate of the enemy.

The top-priority mission in the initial periodar must be the frustrationudden attack by the enemy and the Infliction on him of immediate and crushing strikes with the use of all the latest means of destruction.

The determination of the specific content and duration of initial operations does not enter into our mission. Very many diverse variants may be proposed for this. However, one thing is clearthat the main content of the combat activities of our armed forces in the initial period of war will consist of missile operations in which missile and strike forces of the fleet missile-carrying submarines and missile aviation will also take part.

The effectiveness and success of combat operations ln the initial periodar,reat extent, will depend on the degree of understanding of the missions assigned to us and the knowledge of the peculiarities of war under modern conditions. It seems expedient to us to point out that further elaboration of problems of tho Initial periodar must lead to the singling out in the theory of military artpecial and relatively independenthe initial periodar. This will make it possible to raiseigher level the elaboration of problems, both of the situation of threat and the initial periodar.

Without touching on the general and extraordinarily important problem connected with determining the structure of the armed forces, which will be solved under the influence of the new situation, when the basis of their entire striking power even now is the missile troopa, we shall attempt to throw light on some questions relating to the Navy.

Undoubtedly the structure of the Navy under the influence of the development of weapons and technology has changed sharply and will change in the future.

Now the basic striking power of the Navy will be

composed of submarine forces equipped with missile weapons

and long-range torpedoes, and also missile aviation. At

particular stagesar, these strike forces may be

strengthened by allocating missile large units from the

reserve of the Supreme High Command. Tbe basic composition

of the Navy will also Include the forces required for

protection of the coast and our own sea communications

lines. These will be surface vessels equipped with

missiles and antisubmarine weapons, and coastal missile

units. Finally, the-Navy must have special forces required

to accomplish the missions of antisubmarine and entrains

defense (antisubmarine defense vesaels and aviation and

ntelligence forces (reconnaissanceumber of other forces.

Not onlytructural but alsoualitative sense, the modern Navy will radically differ from the Navy of the period of the Second World War and the subsequent years.

We must bear in mind thatuture war we will have to deal with an enemytrong Navy, who places great significance on ocean and sea axes with the goal of preparation for and execution of audden attack by aircraft carrier and missile carrier forces. Therefore, the simplification and narrowing of the missions of the" Navy which are going on are premature and completely unjustified measures. On the contrary, under modern conditions the mlsslona of the Navy* will become especially critical and more complicated, and the role of the Navyuture war, if the imperlaliat aggressors unleash it, will, undoubtedly, grow.

First of all, it is necessary to point out that our Navy will perform missions of an offensive and defensive character In cloee coordination with the missile troops and other types of armed forces in complete conformity with the unified strategic concept and war plan. Obviously such missions may be:

-destruction of the main aircraft carrier strike'large units, missile-carrying submarines and groupings of antisubmarine forces of the enemy;

-frustration and disruption of ocean and sea communications lines by destroying convoys and transports at sea and annihilating naval bases, ports, and economic centers located on the coast;

-supporting our troops in their offensive and defensive operations in coastal areas, in the capture of straits and the coastline in straits zones;

-protection of our own naval communication lines.

The destruction, of strike aircraft carrier large units and missile-carrying submarines of the enemy will have paramount significance for the elimination of the threat of strikes launched by the enemy from the direction of the ocean and sea. This is one of the most important missions of the Navy, the fulfilment of which becomes most pressing during the initial periodar.

The destruction of various coastal objectives. Including naval bases and ports, and also tho destruction of enemy vessel forces located in them, will be executed by naval forces, both Independently, and jointly with the missile troops.

The accomplishment of the enumerated basic missions of the Navy in ocean and sea areas contiguous to tha theaters of military operations in Europe will support our troops in the execution of swift offensive operations. At the same time we shall note that in various naval theaters of military operations, depending on the general course of armed combat, other missionsost diverse character may face the Navy.

In the series of new missions now facing the Navy, it is necessary to single out an especially important mission, which is that we must assimilate missile weapons at an accelerated pace and learn to use them skilfully aad

effectively from submarines, surface vessels, aad aircraft, as well as from the shore. New weaponseal and formidable force only when they are thoroughly and skilfully mastered by the personnel of the araed forces. This applies in full measure primarily to missile weapons.

At the same time one also cannot underestimate those types of weapons with which we are still armed and which for some time will not lose their combat value. It is. natural that we not only do not have the right to lose' the skills acquired in their effective utilization but are obliged to improve them continually.

In the article of Colonel-General A.ighly important question is raised connected with an estimate of the possibility for our troops to carry out the defense of the coast against landing forces. However, in our view, these questions did not receive properin tho article. Its author proceeds from the assumption thatuture war the enemy will not be able, and will not try, to conduct large-scale landing operations with decisive goals, and therefore the author approached the solution of this question of defenseanding, in what may beomewhat oversimplified manner, with which it is in no way possible to agree.

From an analysis of the operational training of the armed forces of the Anglo-American bloc, exercises and maneuvers conducted in recent years, estimates of ths nature and direction of construction of naval forces, and from official documents, one la forced to the conclusion that the probable enemyuture war not only wlll_.no.fc reject such an effective form of conducting; offensive operationstrategic scale aa_large-scale landing operations, with the aim of capturing territories and broadening the front of armed combat, but on the contrary will execute them very widely. The execution of such operations by the enemy is possible even in the initial periodar. Therefore, one should not be guided by the fact that the enemy will not try to invade the European

1. Special Collection of Articles of theJournalFirst Issue,

or any remote theater of military operations by means of large forces. Our attention must be directed to tho study of the operating methods of the enemy In landing operations and to devising effective methods forand elimination of hla attempts to execute such operations.

Special attention in thia must be paid to the etudy of enemy methods of landing airborne forcea, aubaequently reinforced by amphibioua landing forces.

The postulation ofission is, in our view, more correct. Profound and comprehensive knowledge of these questions will make it possible to organize successful combat againat enemy landings. It la known that our defense against landing forces is organized and set up basically with forces of the maritime front which are responsible for preventing enemy lnvaaiona from tha direction of the ocean or sea. The Navy, participating in this defense, fulfils the missions peculiar to It.

From the arguments ofollows that the baaic strike against theforcea, with the aim of routing him, mustonly after he has landed on the coast. Thisfundamentally false assertion.

At present we already have the potentialIt lea to detect enemy preparationsarge-scale landing operation. In tho future these potentialities must be Increased by utilizing new technical moans. But this is not the only thing which permits us to eliminate auccessfully the enemy's attempts toarge-scale landing operation. The main thing ia that missile weapons and the modern development of naval forcea offer us wide possibilities for pinpointing enemy landing operations both on hla territory and at sea,efore the landing of his troopa on our shore.

Thus, the main efforts of defense (operations) against landing forces must be transferred from our shores deep into the enemy's maritime operational zones, into his territory, and into bis rear areas where landing operations are prepared and forces doalgnated for participation in them are concentrated.

Defease (operations) against landing forces must be givenaiting, but an active offensive character. The mission must now consist of not permitting the landing of enemy troops on the sea coast, their consolidation there, and creation of bridgeheads for further advance. This is all the more important as every sea landing operation is accompanied and supported by large-acale airborne landing operatlona. The destruction of landing forces located at sea, landing and disembarking means at ports and bases, and not permitting landings of onemy troops on the shore, will greatly facilitate the combat activities of our ground troops in offensive and defonsive operations on coastal axes.

In his article, Colonel-General A. Gastilovlch raises the extraordinarily important question of control. this question is not developed, apparently in view of the author's opinion that "from the viewpoint of the substance of control of operations, new forma of armed combat will not bring about fundamental changea". If we consider that the most vital aapect of control, ita heart, la the working out and adopting of new solutions, then we shall hardly ever detect any aort of evolution in it, either in the past or the present.

Actually thia question is considerably more complex. Ve think that the opinion of General A. Gaatllovich as aet forth above doea not conform to the objective character of the changoa occurring in the entire sphero of control, ita principles, substance, organization, methods, and means.

Obviously, it is not by chance that problems of control, especially ita automation and the use of electronic computers, is of late in the center of attention of our military-theoretical thought. It seems to us that the substance of control has goneefinite evolution iu the past and at present Is undergoing extraordinarily great changes. Tho moat Important of these is the fundamental growth of tha significance of centralization of control and ita concentration in strategic spheres, which ia the result of the influence of equipping the armed forcea with new means of deatruction. One should proceed to the solution of the latest problems in the area of control primarily from this point of view.

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