MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Submarine Operation of
thehe Naval Operation of they Admiral Xu. Panteleyev
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THOUGHT: "Tha Submarine Operation of thaha Naval Operation of thay Admiral Tu. Panteleyev
Followingerbatim translation of an article titled "Tha Submarine Operation of thoha Naval Operation of tharitten by Admiral Tu. Pantoleyev.
This article appeared ln1 Third Zasuepocial version of the Soviet military Journal Voyennaya My si (Military Thought) . This Journal la published Irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by tha Soviets.1 Third Issue went to press on
The Submarine Operation of tbehe Naval Operation of the Future
Admiral Yu. Pauteleyev
Xn the past war the principal enemy of the fleet at sea was the aircraft armed with torpedoes and bombs. Thia is attested to by the statistics on losses of combat vessels by the nations involved. Whereas,umber ofessel couldubmarine and then even pursue it, the evasion of an aircraftessel waa very difficult, and the overtaking and destructioneparting aircraft was completely impossible. It waa hindered in this by its significantly slower speed and by the limited ceiling of. its antiaircraft artillery. Xn other words, in comparison with anessel possessed neither thenor the requisite firepower.
The submarine has actually remained all-powerful ever since World War I.
In our time the aircraft aod the submarine have become the major enemies of that Leviathan of combat fleets, "the king of thehe battleship. And this leviathan, which costs billions, has departed from the seas and oceans in ignominy; all naval powers have stoppedit. The same fate has also befallen other large combat vessels. The missile/nuclear weapon has become the basic means of destruction even at sea. Its development has led to tha division of naval power into two parts: one part, consisting of nuclear/missile delivery vehicles Immeasurably smaller in siza than the old battleships and cruisers, has taken to the air (jethe other has gone under water, into the depths of the seas and oceans (the submarine fleet) .
Weuture armed conflict primarilyattle in the air and underwater. Moreover, where air operational have their own clear-cut organization and definite composition, the concept of "submarine operations" is entirely new and not reflected in our literature, and haa not yet received the "rights of citizenship" in our naval art. Is this right? It would seem not. This conviction evolves from the following considerations.
The etudy of tbe hlatory of military operations at sea in past wars must be carried out neither exclusively nor largely for the purpose of learning and defining the course and results of the evente themselves, but rather for establishing the new trends in naval art which took placeiven war, what the prospects are for their development, and what reaults they might produce.
It will be recalled that "submarine warfare" has been mentioned more than once in naval art. The Germans especially declaimed about this; nevertheless, neither lo the First nor Second World War, after having declared merciless submarine warfare against the Allies, were they able to bring the Allies to their knees. After carryingeries of bandit attacka against hospital veaaela, and after gaining, unquestionably, certain operational-tactical aucceaaea, the German submarine fleet waa atlll unable to achieve any kind of atrategic goals vith
submarlnea alone. Although partly dlarupted, the supplying of Sngland proper was not atopped. The failure of German "submarine warfare" la explained by the fact that their submarlnea,although able to sink enemy vessels at aea, were not able to demolish hla military economy entirely, to destroy the baais for the construction of new veaaela, and to cruah tbe antisubmarine defense. For each transport sunk toward the end of tbe war, the Allies constructed two which were more modern.
Thua, in past ware aubmarlnea primarily carried out operational-tactical miaaiona; atrategic missions were not within their power to accompliah, primarily because of the status of equipment and the organization of the aubmarlne fleet of thoae days.
la it correct at the present time to raise tho question of the organization of purely submarine, operations as naval operations of the immediate future? It seems to us that it is. elay in deciding this question can cause harm to tho future increase of the defensive power of our country.
First of all, let us attempt to define submarine operations. The meaning of "operation"orm and method of achieving operational or strategic goalsery definite connotation in our military art; it is known to the reader and there is no sense in citing it here. Let us agree beforehand that we do not admit the possibility of resolving all missionsar, or the achievement of Its strategic goals, by any one type of armed force. Victory in war can be achieved only through the combined efforts of all types of armed forces in cooperation with one another. Therefore, weubmarine operation as an Integral part of battle by the armed forcesaval theater, carrying out the performance only of particular operational or strategic tasks.
ubmarine operation we mean an operation of submarine forces which is conducted in the depths of the ocean or the sea without rising to the surface. The term "underwater vessel" was not applied accidentally. The designation "underwater boat" appears to us to be too general, inexact, and not at all suitable for operational-tactical language. At the present time there are missile-carrying submarinesisplacement of several thousand tons, submarines for antisubmarine defense, and submarines of other designations. It is natural, therefore, eneric understanding be developed for all submarines, whether the submarine fleet or submarine forces which operate in their own peculiarn tbe depths of the oceans and seas.
A purely submarine operation can take place only when purely submarine missions are carried out in ocean depthsubmarine fleet and where the possibilities exist for their fulfilment by submarine forces. In the Immediate
future, Just as at present, the submarine forces may conduct operations primarily In conjunction with the aviation and, in some instances, also with the surface fleet. But such operations will not be designatedoperations; it would be more exact to call them operations of submarines.
As is known,at present submarines operate in close coordination with aircraft and surface vessels which are supporting their operations. Wereat deal of attention to this problem. Uuch is said about aerial reconnaissance on behalf of submarines and about the support afforded by surface vessels to the deployment of submarines from their bases or to their return. Some of these situations have become prescribed requirements. During any navalhorough minesweep of the channelsaval base is instituted directly prior to the departure of the submarines from the base. Also, In order to support this departure of submarines, all antisubmarine defense forces (protivolodochnaya oborona -PLO) in the area of the naval base are deployed. (We have in mind destroyer escorts and aircraft of PLO.) pecial direct escort is organized to support the departure of submarines from the bases. This great number of ships at sea and aircraft circlingll engagod in driving off enemy minelaylng submarines and in "sweeping away" mines, without even knowing if there are any at all, most blatantly reveal that an operation is being prepared.
Even during the pastumber of measures for the so-called support of submarine deployment started to become outmoded, while aubmarlnes more and more gained the right for complete Independence of action. Today this trend is becoming evident with an even greater force. Of ourse, the execution of all or part of the measures indicated above is not excluded even now in certain cases. However, lt la entirely clear that auch methods for supporting the deployment of submarlnea or supporting their combat activity are rapidly becoming outmoded and it is necessary to seek new measures.
One more example. In order to force the enemy antisubmarine defense line with our submarines, lt is considered essential to carry out decisive strikes from the air and sea against his PLO forces. But tbe execution of this strike makes lt patently clear that our submarines are getting ready to force that particular line. In this manner, our actions will serveistinct combat alert for the enemy PLO. Is it not time for the submarine forces themselves to secure the forcing of the PLO line covertly underwater, without all ths uproar on the surface of tho sea and ln the air? It soems to us thatime Is here, or practically here. Evidently, operations for forcing the PLO line will constitute one of the first submarine operations of the submarine forces.
That kind of operational and strategic missions can ths submarine fleet resolve Independently because of this developing situation?
As is well known, tha military leadership of NATO countries still attaches special significance to its aircraft carrier large units, viewing them as mobilefrom which aircraft can take off with nuclear weapons. According to the plan of tha NATO leadera, theseeing mobile, must be in their positions at the right time ln the Atlantic, ln the Norwegian Sea, and ln tha Indian and Pacific Oceans, from which thay can destroy designated targets on the territory of the DSSH.
Aircraft carrier large units, the fleet's"Enemyre powerful but far from Invulnerable. They can ba destroyed, first of all, by missile strikes of our aviation. But the enemy may try to create strong counteractions with his PVO forces and woapons against these strikes. At the present time It Is extremely difficult to conceal the deployment of large masses or of separate groups of aviation and their approach to aircraft carriers, because the eyes of tha enemy have become very keen and his ears sharp. Ths "sudden" appearance of strike aviation from behind the clouds Is also excluded, inasmuch aa to bank on the inadequacy of enemy equipment or on errors by hla leadership is worse than foolhardy. Aircraft also caunot
"hover" In one zoneong time, awaiting the arrival of the enemy. For the eneray can deploy his aircraft carrier strike large unit (avlanosnoye udarnoyeUS) prior to the beginningar under the most plausible pretexts (cruises,training exerclsea, etc.).
The auboutrine fleet possesses incomparably great capabilities for combat with the AUS. It may be deployed In complete secrecy, during the period of exacerbation of the military-political situation, to those very areas of the ocean or sea, designated by the enemy as zones for the deployment of hia forceatrlka against our installations. And it may very well be that the enemywill not have time to take off for the deliverytrlka, aa they will go to the bottom together with their "airfield" after being attacked by nuclear weapons of the submarine forcea which had been covertly deployed beforehand in the appropriate areas of the ocean or sea.
For the execution of an independent aubmarine operation to sink the enemy atrlke aircraft carriers, is it sufficient to have only atomic aubmarlnes with nuclear weapons? No, it is not sufficient: The resolution of this mission requirea an entirely new organization of large unlta of the submarine forces. In the interests of ammunition supply and technical servicing, aubmarlnes are atlll grouped in large units on tbe basla of class and type (submarines with atomic engines, submarines with dieael engines, submarines with torpedoes, submarlnea with missiles,uch large units are not suitable for carrying outaubmarine operations.
Uponombat mission to destroy anubmarineroup of them) must, at the present time, first of all be guided to the target either by aircraft oreconnaiasanco screen of submarines. The commander of an attacking aubmarine does not aee or know who la providing hla tactical aupport or where it is and ia forced to operate Independently; he watches nothing except the target. Submarlnea beneath the surface do not yet represent dependably controlled large units.
It appears to us that lt Is now essential to create separate submarine large units capable of independently resolving tactical or operational missions. Wo have in mind submarine squadrons of vessols with atomic propulsion.quadron must consist of strike submarines (with missiles andeconnaissance submarines with powerful hydroacoustlcal equipment, antisubmarine defense submarines, minelaying submarines, and supply submarines. Upon receiving Its combat mission for operationsrescribed area of the ocean or saa, the submarine squadron, independently, with Its own submarine reconnaissance forces, must find the assigned target and direct Its strike forces against it. On the basis of his intelligence data, the commander of the operation must plan the main direction of tho strike and determine the forces to be usod against the main target, the operational makeup of these forces, and the forces to be usedtrike along the auxiliary axis. umber of instances the covert laying of mines (anchored or floating) may delay enemy deployment and In this manner support the operatlona of the strike submarine forces. It is doubtful that the existing hydro-acoustical equipment of the enemy will be able to determine accurately the entire depth of tha operational makeup of tbe submarine forces and tha large number of attacking submarines deployed at various dopths. In any event, the ranges of this equipment are atlll much less than the ranges of our modem long-range torpedoes, let alone missiles.
It is evident that an ocean-going atomic submarine, carrying powerful nuclear armaments, must have its own reliable dofenae under water from enemy submarines (antisubmarine defense) and from mines (while moving at correspondingn order that the submarine commander can devote all his attention to tha majorha attack of the assigned target. With tbe development of tbe means of underwater television, sonar, and communications, the controlubmarine squadron becomes possible and submarine battles and engagements with alleconnaissance, deployment, strlkea against protective forces and against the main target -assume realistic forms.
Of course, an operation for the destruction of an ADS may be conducted, as we have already indicated, either by aircraft alone or in coordination with submarines. We do not excludeariant, for it does not contradict the basic views Indicated above. But we reiterate that even for joint operations with aircraft, the submarine forces must be organizedew principle. This is primarily necessitated by the strengthened defense of the AUS and by the rising cost of atomic missilewhich require considerable support in all their operations. (We have in mind reconnaissance, PLO, andhose types of defenseattleship required for itself on the surface of the seas in its time.) It can be said that since "navalas gone under water, all of ita defense must also go under water.
We have already spoken of the impossibility of aviation'song time in waiting zones, of itslower capability than submarines for covert tactical deployment, and of the great dependence of aviation upon the condition and availability of an airfield network. To this must also be added the dependence of aviation capabilities upon the weather. Thus, by no means can aviation always guarantee the complete success of its operation against the AUS on all expansoe of the world's oceans.
The struggle for securing the possibility of the first atrlke in the initial period of war will be an important problem for both sides; therefore, umber of instances, the operational deployment of forces even during peacetime will be unavoidable. Even today submarine forces can occupy necessary waiting positions and from then conduct covert and prolonged observation of the enemy. Aircraft cannot do this. Sonar is Incapable of determining either the hull number or the designationubmarine; for this reason, during an intermittent sonar sounding for submarines It Is difficult to determine immediately the number of submarines operatingiven area, since tho same submarine may be detected several times.
We are correct in asserting that "underwater danger" ia more serious than aerial danger, for it ia more difficult to gain rapidly the particulars of an undorweter aituation than of an aerial one. After Intercepting the enemy, the aubmarine forces are capable of delivering strikes against him repeatedly and ofursuit while reloading their torpedo nuclear weapons underwater. All these considerations apeak for the advantages and the reality of submarine operations.
Although recognizing the vulnerability of aircraft carrlera from the sea, as well aa from the air, foreign authors for the time being are still timid but,are expressing views on the growing obsolescence of aircraft carriers as floating, maneuverableho attention of these authors is turning to mleaile-carry-ing submarlnea which can use their missiles from the depths of seas and oceans and, especially, from the areaa of the Arctic (through the many unfrozen patchea of water in the mldat of ice) where an aircraft carrier cannot operate at all. It is natural, that in contraat to the AUS, with its numerous support veaaela and aircraft, the appearance of our missile-carrying submarines in the ocean and their tactical deployment at great depths can, am we have indicated, be carried out covertly without the knowledge of the aurface fleet of the enemy, his aviation, and, even more ao, the shore facilities for the detection of aubmarlnea. Neither aircraft carriers nor the most powerful aircraft can counteract the arrival of aubmarlnes in the Arctic area. The sinking of one or two submarines during their passage into the Arctic by aurface vessels or aircraft will notecisive effect. In the near future only enemy aubmarlnes will be able to counteract the deployment of our submarines. And only our submarine forces, organized into submarine squadrons and carrying out aubmarine operations, can counteraot this formidable force of the enemy.
We shall discuss briefly the plan of operations for the destruction of enemy missile-carrying submarines in the Arcticnder the ice in the depths of the
Arctic Basin. Here, neither an aircrafturface vessel canubmarine ln the usual manner ln any way. Our submarine squadronarge unit of submarine forcesiven theater) must first of all have its own underwater reconnaissance, consisting not only ofsubmarines but also of technical equipment for submarine detection, installed by special minelaying submarines under the ice (buoys for detecting enemymine obstacles, and nets). The creation of such means is not an Insoluble problem. In addition, our strike missile-carrying and torpedo submarines for combat against enemy missile-carrying submarines in the ocean depths under the ice mustobile underwater patrolirect underwater defense consisting of PLO submarines and submarines for detecting mine obstacles (submarine mineype of submarine mine-sweeper). quadron commander must command such an operation from one of the submarines. Control of tha forces must ba based on reliable means of underwater communication and television. The validity of such an operation has already become apparent; however, the materiel base for its resolution Is still more theoretical than practical. Let us recall that this is not tbe first year that American atomic submarines have studied the under-ice Arctic area.
During the conduct of aubmarlne operations it la absolutely necessary that each submarine know its place ln the formation and Its place in relation to the bottom of the ocean or sea and to the neareat banks and lslanda, first of all for security of navigation, as wall as for the tasks of tactical deployment and placement of technical means of combat (bupys, minos, nets). One of the most important navigational aids for helping submarines determine their position mustell-made naval chart showing depths of tha Arctic basineries of other Important data (underwater currents, the steepness and unevenness of the bottom, as well as its characteristics) . submarine" chart should be in the making now and should be periodically updated with new data (areas of sound channels and other bydrological elements) for the most detailed portrayal of the entire underwater environment. However, the availability of even the most detailed charts
cannot guarantee that there will be an exact pinpointing of the submarine's position. uestion arises concerning the creation of underwater bydroacouatlc beacons for submarines, concealed from ths enemy and operating when triggered by our submarines. Theoretically, the creation ofeacon, operating on the basisoded format, also presents no problem.
We do not deny, of course, the possibility of submarine forces' detecting enemy submarines through the use of technical equipment installed on the ice surface or in the water through holes out into tho ice. But In view of the great mobility and hummocklng of Arctic ice and of tbe vulnerability of these technical means from the air, it should be taken into consideration that these technical means will be used only occasionally. Therefore, they should not be the principal basis on which the reliability of an entire submarine operation is planned.
Thus, we arrive at tha conclusion that combat against misslls-carrylng submarines under the Ice in the Arctic isubmarine operation, ln which ths participation of other types of armed forces Is completely insignificant. On the basis of all that has been stated, it Is now tima to consider tho creation of submarine sailing directions for tha seas and oceans.
Combat with enemy missile-carrying submarines outside the Arctic basin must be planned on ths same principles as those ln the Arctic. To escape aerial and surface pursuit, modern onemy atomic submarines more and more are increasing the depth of their dives, which are now measured in hundreds of meters. In our time, lt is not tha Btructure of the submarine itself, but the depth of the sea or ocean, that will aoon limit the diving depth. Combat by our submarine forces against onemy missile carriers at great depths will alsourely submarine operation with all its Inherent characteristics.
Tha significance of the potential enemy's communication routes from America to Europe, acrosa the Atlantic Ocean and, esser extent, the Pacific Ocean, is well knowo.
is necessary to understand correctly the composition and role of ocean shipments in order toission to the fleet skilfully and to solect appropriate forces for the resolution of that mission without expecting more from them than they can accomplish and, at the same time, not assigning them missions which are impossible for then to carry out. Strikesonvoy on the communications routes, carried outroup of submarines or by aircraft, can destroy part of the guard veaaela and part of tha transports. However, thia will have no perceptible Influence on the aituatlon on the ground front or on the courae of the warhole, foriven Instant only tactical succeaa is achievedime when all ocean communications routesholo will have strategic significance. The resultstrikeonvoy must not bo Judged by individual transport sinkings out of an entire convoy, but bynking of the entire convoy, or at least three-fourths of lt.
It ahould be remembered thatumber of instances even the deatructiononvoy in ita entirety will not by any meana immediately influence the situation at the front,ampaign, or In the warhole. Thia ia all the more reaaon why it is nocoasary toonvoy and not to aettle for partial tactical successes in the battle against communications routes.
How, then, and by what meana, can tbe deatruction of an entire convoy beonvoy whichumber of instances will proceed in separate groups (large units) which do not fall into the zone of one nuclear bomb? In addition, it should be taken into consideration that some of the vessels will proceed without cargoes for purposea of camouflage.
In the Immediate future the resolution of an aaaigned mlsaion only by missile forces from our own territory is not yet very realistic, since an enormous number of missiles will be required even for one convoyransports with its escortigh rate of probability for ita deatruction is desired. In resolving this same mission aviation will require reliable, uninterrupted reconnaissance of the ocean
and, slnco it ie capable ofingle attack, will not be able to reload in the air, but will be forced to return to the airfields. We are by no means deprecating the significance of strikes against convoys by aircraft, but we must also note all the weak spots of this type of force.
Ths matter is different insofar as the capabilities of submarine forces are concerned. Even now, unlike aircraft which can only search for hours, submarine forces can search for convoys Independently underwater for tens of days; they can wait until the convoy approaches, overtake it and, without surfacing, take up advantageous positions; then they carry out strikes against the escort forces, break through them for strikes against the transports, and moreover, deliver these strikes repeatedly with the use of underwater nuclear explosions. Naturally, the strike of one submarine squadron will serve aa reconnaissance and guidance for another, which can, in several hours, deploy for tho completion of the first squadron's strikes against the convoy.
At the present time, and for the Immediate future, lt is difficult to assume that the enemy convoy escort will quickly and easily detect all the submarine squadronsoeployediven zone of the ocean at various depths and be able to determine where, how many, and what type of submarines are deployed. Atomic submarines will always have superiorityonvoy ln speed with all the benefits ensuing from this, including the guarantee of concealment of actions.
The place of departure of convoys and their place of assembly at sea can be established not only by aviation, but by reconnaissance submarines; and ln the future the entire mission for the destructiononvoy can be rosolved completely within the frameworkubmarine operation. It should be kept in mind that the development of PVO means makes aerial reconnaissance very complex and less reliable than reconnaissance with the aid of submarines.
The parametersubmarine operation for the destructiononvoy are already Indicated. In its battle against communications routes th* German-Fascist fleet adopted "wolfpack" methods with the use of reconnaissance submarines. And only the weakness of technical means during the period of World Warhe lack of underwater television and means of reliable covert communication, prevented the Fascists from resolving the problem of submarine operations completely. Allied communications routes were not disrupted. At the present time the means and methods of radlocountermeasures in our country and abroad have improved significantly. The achievements in this field are not to the advantage of guided missiles and aircraft but do not at all affect the ocean depths, where the means of hydroacoustlc concealment and counteraction by submarines areong way from results capable of deciaively breakinganeuver and strike by submarine forces.
ubmarine operation during operations against enemy communications routes becomes plausible ln all respectsiven case we also do not exclude the coordinated operation of submarines with aircraft when this is possible, we say,urely "submarine operation" is more effective when it is conducted with decisive goals ln mind against communications routes whereingle,rolonged and methodical, action is required.
To tha extent that the threat to aea communications routes from missile strikesuture war could, unquestionably, see the appearance of submarine tankers, submarine vessels for transporting troops and cargo, and, finally, special submarine amphlblous-force-landing vessels. During the past war there were attempts in our country and abroad to create submarine transports. Thus, we delivered ammunition and supplies by submarines to the besieged naval bases of Hanko and Sevastopol. True, these were not special submarines,but combat vessels with limited capabilities for taking on various cargoes, but the idea of creating submarine transports and underwater communications routes received its first practical application.
Thus,uture war there will undoubtedly be missions for the destruction of enemy underwater communications routes and for the protection of our underwater communications routes. It Is apparent that missiles and aircraft will not be able to destroy submarine transports in the ocean and sea depths. Of course, it is possible that they could achieve partial tactical successesesult of anatomic explosion capable of destroying one or two submarine transports. However, these successes will not lead to the breakdown of communications routes or to the disruption of deliveries over them.
Underwater communications routes will be at various depths and along different courses, and the submarine transports will proceedispersed manner. Under these conditions, who will be able to find quickly and destroyubmarine convoy? It ie apparent that only properly organized submarine squadrons of the submarine forces areosition to resolve this Important operational and,umber of instances, even strategic, mission. Aircraft and, even more so, surface vessels, certainly cannot do it.
It is necessary to mention certain special missions which, though not tied in with strategic tasks, have come up in the past and apparently will face the fleet in the future. We are referring to diversionary operations of different magnitudes, carried out for the purpose of destroying radar stations and radio stations of communications of special designation, and also to resolve other missions f the most varied nature, especially on islands orparsely populated and poorly protected shore. These missions cannot by any means always be resolvedissile, no matter how it may be delivered. Modern technical means permit an installation to be reliably protected evenround nuclear burst. Very frequently it will be necessary not only to knock this or that installation out of commission, but, what is much more Important, to obtain documents and seize tbe "tongue". Neither an airborne landingissile can accomplish this mission.
For the resolutionumber of missionsiversionary nature the temporary presence of subunits of our armed forces at an enemy installation will be required.
Only submarine forces can auddenly and covertly landorce and also quickly and covertly remove it. In past wars there vere many examples of such use of submarlnea, but tha acale of these operations was limited.
We haveumber of operations, the aims of which, in our opinion, can moat effectively be achieved even today by submarine forces and even more ao in the immediate future. We have discussed the destruction of aircraft carriers and mlsalle-carryiag submarlnea, the disruption of aurface and underwater communications routes In oceans and seas, and certain dlveralonary actions of
Thla is, of course, faromplete liat of all of the missions which could be asalgned to the navy and, especially, to ita submarine forcea. To this should be added the contribution of missiles fired by submarlnea against naval bases, shipbuilding yards, and other enemy military Installations located on ahore and in the zone of interior of the enemy country; alao, missions Involving coordinated action with troops of our maritime front by landing forcea in the enemy's rear. However, it appears to us that while these mlaalons can be assigned to our aubmarine forces today, in the future they can be accomplished with equal auccess by missile units and long-range aviation. In the resolution of these missions, atrategic missiles will completely replace aubmarine forcea, but nothing can replace aubmarine forcea in their battle under the ice and in the depths of the oceans and eeaa against enemy misssubmarlnea, his aubmarine transports, and his aircraft carrier atrlke large units. Therefore, the quoation arlaea aa to whether it would not be better to orient our submarine forcea in the future chiefly toward those types of operations, the execution of which depends entirely upon them, and inlsslle (ballistic or from an aircraft) cannot at preaentubmarine? Without exception, every type and arm of the armed forcoa must first of all execute those missions which lt has been designated to accomplish and which no one elae can accomplish.
It was not Just for sport that our naval reconnaissance seaplanesombed troop concentrations on tbe ground front at Leningrad during the first months of World War II. Of course, during this period no one conducted aerial reconnaissance at sea, since it was impossible ln those days toaval reconnaissance plane with any otherll aviation operated on the ground front. Haay seaplanes were lost, but the grave situation at the front at that time necessitated such sacrifices. Such use of naval aviation cannot serve as an example for the future, for thisnique and atypical case for methods of conducting military operations at sea.
The approach of our missile submarines to the enemy shore to carryissile salvo will always entail their entry into the enemy antisubmarine defense (PLO) zone; therefore, if the salvo is carried outistance, outside the PLO zone, from an area of complete security (moreiles fromhen Is it not better inase to use the ballistic missiles of the missile troops or to use long-range aviation? For the ocean-going atomic miasile submarineery expensive weapon; lt not only carries expensive equipment, but large groups of highly qualified specialists are on board. There is no onetrategic missile and the results will be the same, and perhaps even greater, than from missiles firedubmarine. Why risk an expensive submarine weapon and its entire crew lnoor cause? We night bohy then is tha NATO fleet preparing to fire missiles at USSB installations -specifically from their submarines? It appears to us that this is explained by tha fact that neither the USA nor England at the present time has strategic missiles with the range and, mainly, the accuracy of flight, to Justify their being fired from USA bases against all our Important installations.
If, nevertheless, our submarine fleet will be assigned the mission of destroying enemy shore and rear area Installations, in this case tbe submarine forces must be organizedew manner. Individual submarine operations off enemy shores must be dropped, because the enemydefense has become very effective. The strike
submarine,roup of them, must have their own direct underwater protection from enemy submarines; and their own reconnaissance submarines to clear the approach routes and the firing area, which is covered not only by the enemy PLO submarines but also by his mine obstacles and other technical means. Thus, even ln this case thereeedpecial large unit of submarines, which we have already mentioned.
In no way by our discussions are we preparing to deprecate the significance of missile strikes from submarines against enemy naval bases or other of his Installations. We are discussing only the selection of the most effective, economical, and reliable weapon for the accomplishmentiven mission. It appears to us that with theand perfection of strategic missiles, missions for the destruction of shore installations by submarines will be eliminated.
The role and significance of first strikes inperiodar have been sufficientlyour military literature. The effectiveness ofstrike depends, first of all, upon tha secrecyof the deployment of the forces duringperiod. umber ofit will be necessary to carry out sucheven during peacetime for, so topurposes, without the least violation
sxisting international practices. Which type of weapon can do this with the most secrecy? Who can covertly occupy positions in tbe area of probable deployment against us by enemy aircraft carriers and missile submarines, or ln the area of appearancearge convoy with troops? Obviously, only submarine forces can accomplish this, because as we have already indicated, itery complicated matter to detect their deployment, to say nothing of determining their exact position and the exact number of submarines in the depths of the ocean and sea.
A few words concerning the supply of submarine forces. Submarine vessels are designatedong stay under water, which their equipment already guarantees. It is
also necessary to provide for the replenishmentof certain types of supplies for submarines. Not too long ago the possibility ofet aircraft traveling at an enormous speed and height seemedyet today this problem has been resolved. Surface vessels already take on fuel from other vessels while underway, as well as while in anchorage, from storage containers hidden in the depths of the sea. Submarines, however, still come to the surface to take on supplies, and in so doing deprive themselves of all their submarine qualities. It is time to create special supply submarines for supplying submarine squadrons underwater and underwater depots fromubmarine could take on supplies while lying on the bottom.
It should be kept in mind that the possibility of counting on stationary surface floating bases is becoming more and more problematical. There is an urgent need for underwater submarine supply bases in bays near our shores or for special submarines to furnish supplies away from bases. The technical solution of thia problem isossible.
What kind of deductions can be made from all that has boen discussed?
First of all, it appears to us that the appearance of independent submarine operations in naval art is completely natural. The object and goal of these operations will be such that no other types or arms of the armed forces except submarine forces will be able to engage in or achieve them. We have in mind combat with enemy missile-carrying aubmarlnes in the Arctic, under the ice, or in the depths of non-freezing oceans and seas, and also, the destruction of underwater and surface communications routes. In the future, submarine operations will be able to achieve operational, as well as strategic, goals.
Submarine operations will also be conducted in those instances when the accomplishmentission jointly with aviation, or by aviation alone, is difficult or, for many reasons, temporarily Impossible. We are referring to the
conduct of submarine operations involving; thetho carrier strike large unit (AUS) and thenaval bases and tho forces stationed there, as wellnumber of diversionary operations, including thetactical araphibioua
During the conduct of aubmarine operations with any type of goals,umber of instancea, when it isoint operation of submarines with various types and arms of the armed forcea is not excluded, first of all with the missile troops and aviation; but at the same time it should be remembered that forms of coordinated operations.besides strategic ones, are becoming more and more complex.
In order to support the conduct of submarine operations it appears to us that it Is necessary now toumber of organizational and technical problems:
-flret of all, to work out the organization of atrlka aubmarine large unita (squadrons);
-toystem of covert underwater communications and television in order to ensure navigational security of movement in the depths and to maintain position in an underwater formation, aa wall as to control the large unit during the delivery of atrikes against tbe enemy underwater;
-to create navigational charts especially for the operation of submarine forcea at all depths attainable by them (with an indication on the charta of the temperature, density, and transparency of the water, and the relief of the bottom, currents, and other data);
-to work out and croate materiel-technical meana for underwater navigation (underwater beacons with coded format) in our own aa well as in neutral waters; and also, means of obstruction, placed covertly from aubmarlnes (light nets in combination with nines) ;
-to workystem for all types of underwater supply, for submarines lying on the bottom at points of dispersal
and at definite deptha and not moving;
-tolass of special submarine tankers and submarine transports for tha shipment of combat supplies equipment, and contingents of personnel.
Kona of these proposals is fantastic,umber of them already are coming into being. The task no* consists of creating an orderly system of theoretical postulates and to give clear-cut "ordera" to our technology on the basis of these, lest the realities of combat operations of submarines catoh us unawaros.
In this article we have attempted to present and. wherever possible, to substantiate, certain problematical questions of submarine operations which aro subject to detailed elaboration, because submarine forces must, above all prepare themselves for the conduct of submarine operations as the naval operations of the future.Original document.