MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
TUClXSin:: "Perfecting the Methods of Operational Training of Generals, Senior Officers, andy Major-General M. Ivanov and Lt.-Gen. P. Chirkov '
erbatim translation of an article vbich appeared In the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" pvoye'nnaynublished by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.
In the Interests of protecting our source, this material should be handledeed-to-taiov basis vlthln your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should bo addressed to tho originating office.
Richard Helms Deputy Director (Plana)
Original: The Director of Central Intelligence
cc: Military Representative of the President
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence U. S- Air Force
The Director, National Security Agency
Director, Division of Intelligence Atomic Energy Commission
National Indications Center
Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
MILITARY THOUGHT: "Perfecting the Methods of Operational Training of Generals, Senior Officers, andy Major-General M. Ivanov and Lt.-Gen. P. Chlrkov
Followingerbatim translation of an article titled "Perfecting the Method of Operational Training of Generals, Senior Officers, andy Major-General M. Ivanov and Lt.-Gen. P. Chirkov.
This article appeared in0 Second Issue of aof the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl This journal Is published irregularly and isSECRET by the Soviets.
Perfecting the Methods of Operational Training of Generals, Senior Offlcers.and Staffs
With the appearance of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear/missile weapons, in the technical equipment of modern armies, vast changes have taken place which have, of course, intror duced much that is new into the methods of conduct of operations and of warfarehole. In searching for the new in military affairs, numerous comrades have recently expressed ina number of valuable,theses directed toward more rapid exposition of the basic changes that are taking place and theinterpretation and substantiation of the probable nature of armed conflict. The statements by authors of articles in the first issue of the Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" and certain other articles are of considerable interest in this regard.
We fully share the opinions of those comrades who speak outundamental review of the existing basic tenets of the theory of military art, and we think that one of the most important factors assuring successful resolution of this complicated problem Is the^ further improvement of the methods of operationalenerals, senior officers, and staffs. This question acquires special acuity In connection with the numerical reduction of the armed forces and the. increase In demands on the officer corps to master the practical skills In troop command. In his address at the All Army Conference of Secretaries of Primary Party Organizations inSSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Sovieta. Malinovskly, among other tasks of increasing the combat readiness of the armed forces, pointed out the necessity to continue to Improve the organization and the methods of operational, -combat, and political training and to carry out,ositive fashion, theagainst the phenomena of oversimplification and weakness In troop training."
It is greatly regretted that not enough attention is devoted in practice to the problems of the methods of training troops and command cadres. There ts evidence of this in the fact that the forms and methods oftraining during the postwar period have, In essence, undergone no serious changes. The presently existing methods of operational training of commanders and staffs consist mainly of carrying out command-staff and refresher training courses and group exercises with the com--mand complement of district and army troops. ""
All of these methods of operational training, proven in the past, cannot, in present conditions and ln full measure guarantee the qualitative training of command cadres since they aro far fromand perfect. Among the deficiencies we include the following.
In the general system of operational training, tho mastery by generals and senior officers of new combat equipmeit, and particularly of missiles of various designations, has been weak to date. Formally acknowledging the decisive role of nuclear weapons in the destruction of the enemy, and realizing that modern war will be waged with powerful long-range means of combat which in no way compare with the weapons of past wars, generals and senior officers are actually planning and organizing operations as of old, principally on the basis of World War LT experience. Itevelation to no one that methods for reaching decisions, all plans for operations, and other documents that are developed in staffs In the operational training system, differ very little In form and content from what existed during the period of World War n. The methods of training and execution of operations as they are stated in the articles of Comrades Gastilovich and Baskakov, have basically remained as before.1
We ask why it Is that we conduct the training of troops andcadres without regard to the basic changes which have occurred in armaments due to nuclear/missile weapons?
Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Militaryirst Issue.
In our opinion, this occurs because the military-technical training of generals and senior officers Is still inferior. It Is precisely be-cause of Ignorance of the technical characteristics of nuclear/missile weapons and the means of their deliveryarget that many comrades are unable to evaluate properly the role of these weapons In modern warfare, to utilize themattle and operationualified manner, and to assign tasks wisely to the troops utilizing these weapons. By the apt statement of Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovskiy, not all of us clearly realize what changes have been wrought In military affairs by the adoption of new means of combat and particularly of nuclear and missile weapons. One of the vital deficiencies, as la pointed out by the Minister of Defense, is the inadequate knowledge of the combat potentialities of nuclear weapons and missiles on the part of generals and officers. *
Inferior military-technical training of command cadres is explainedumber of circumstances.
Firstly, within the system of operational training to the present time, the practical study of weapons of mass destruction, andof the means of delivery of nuclear warheadsarget. Is not being planned for or carried out. Military-technical information on these weapons has been gleaned by generals and officers from various manuals, textbooks, military Journals, etc. It Is quite understandable that this Information has been superficial and: dictory. The first four-day refresher ti^iningf weapons of mass destruction, and principally ofmlssiles^of various designations, was held0 in tho Baltic Military District onwn Initiative.enerals and senior officers of the district troops participated in this refresher course. Many of them saw there for the first time those weapbns which they "ably utilized" earlier'attlo and an operation.
Secondly, even today there are no textbooks on missile weapons in the military districts. The so-called handbook materials on the organization and tactical-technical data of missile troops that were distributed to military units at various times aro very confusing, contradictory, incomplete, and can in no way serve as training aids in tho military-technical training of generals and senior officerswith the planning for and the use of these weapons.
Thirdly, inadequate reflection on the limitations in the study of even the training data on missile weapons also affects the training of generals and officers adversely. At the present time missile weapona aretoew. The majority of comrades who are directlywith the planning and utilization of these weapons are familiar with these weapons only from the periodical press. It is apparent that ln orderto have our command cadres really master the art of conducting modern operations, it is necessary to review and broaden the limits of study of missile weapons.
All of these circumstances have undoubtedlyegative role ln the military-technical training of generals and senior officers which cannot but reflect upon their practical activities.
The second deficiency existing ln the me^thods of operaUonaJjrain-ing during refresher training courses and commanders exercises wltlp the command complement of the districts the tendency to study the training problems and the conduct of operations by the methods of group exercises.
In our opinion, the method of group exercises for studying the problems of operational art In the system of commanders' training of the command echelonistrict (army) is unacceptable because it does not conform to the categories of the persons studying and it does not assureof the qualities necessary for battle, .such as rapid formulation of decisions, boldness: and resoluteness In'ope rat
On the basis of many years of experience, lt Is known that training of command echelons of districts and armies Is usually carried out ln two study groups (the commander and the chief of staff) ln which all commanders of arms of troops, chiefs of 'directorates, and departments are Included. And within these groups, numberingoersons, consisting mainly of general and officer-specialists (artillerymen, engineers, chemical specialists, rear services troops)and one or two generals (officers) of combined-arms speciality, the training problems of the operation are worked out (determination of the task, evaluation of the circumstances, working out of thehich are chiefly the concern of the command echolon. During the exercises, only the
combined-arms generals and officers are fully and beneficially occupied. As concerns the specialists, they participate only briefly within the framework of their specialities, and for the remainder of the time they are obliged to be inactive. In turn, the generals (officers) of combined-arms speciality also gain very little benefit from these exercises, since the command complement of directorates of the district and armies has sufficient experience for the resolution of such problems as clarification of the task, evaluation of the circumstances, and making the decisions.
onsequence, the method of group exercises so necessaryumber of reasons In higher educational Institutions is not warranted in the training of staffs. Instead of training the command complementistrict (army) in their functional responsibilities and specialities and their skill in the organizationattle and an operation, because of the existing method of operational training, we unwittingly expend valuable time In the resolution of secondary problems and engender In the subsequent practical activity of generals and senior officers unnecessary verbosity, an inclination toward all sorts of meetings and to hear all types of Information and reports.
Proceeding from these considerations, we believe that the method of group exercises utilized In the system of command exercises of the command echelon of the district and army ought to be eliminated and replaced by the method of. military-command marjjamga. Depending upon the composition of the military districts and armies andstablished training goals, the military-command map games can be single-or two-stage, one- or two-sided. These games, especially the two-stage and two-sided, permit the whole command complementistrict and army to realize conditions more nearly approximate to the combat situation in comparison with group exercises and to load all participants to the maximum with creative activity and to elaborate more fully the training problems and the conduct of the operations.
9 the headquarters of the Baltic Military District carriedwo-stage, two-sided military-command game to which were Invited
the command complement of the directorates of the district, of theand air armies of the army corps, of large units of PVO of the Country, the fleet operational group and also certain chiefs ofdepartments of civilian higher educational institutions and retired generals. During the game the commanders of armiesrms of troops, and chiefs of directorates acted as the appropriate commanders and chiefs in the compositionront according to Soviet Armyand theirs the corresponding commanders and chiefs within the compositionroup of "Western" armies. The remaining participants in the game performed the duties which coincided with-their own responsibilities and specialties. In order to preclude contactthe two sides and to create the most favorable conditions for the -game, the sides were locatedthe district headquarters building and in the officers club. In content and method of execution, the game received the approval of the participants. For some reason, however, they were not used in subsequent military-command games of staffs of districts and armies.
A third and no less serious deficiency in the method of opera- tional training of the command echelon is, ln our view, the fact that staffs of districts participate too Infrequently in the arrangements for operational training which are carried out in accordance with the plan of the Center. For example, not one operational exercise was carried out by the headquarters of the Baltic Military District during the past six years. The district troop commander, thendJhe cWefjof^ the operation's directorate have not participated in me^ctlyltTe's^bfional trainingtrategic scale for many yearsf'we excludeheir participation as umpires in the exercises of the Southern Group of Forces.
ituation cannot be called normal. The headquarters of districts must themselves participate in the role of trainees periodically and prepare themselves as troop control organs under the Immediateof the Center. This willignificant increase in theof the work of staffs, the study of new developments in military affairs, the adoption of experience in the organization of large exercises, and the observation of one's own errors and deficiencies which go unnoticed under normal conditions.
We realize that the measures carried out by the Center In operational training with the districts involve definite material expenditures. However, It is possible to find methods which would not require large monetary expenditures.
It Is also necessary to find methods for Improving the specialof army commanders, chiefs of staffs, chiefs ofhose commander-comrades who have direct responsibility for operational and special training of large numbers of generals and senior officers. While the chiefs of arms of troops and services (artillery, PVO, etc.). have Increased their knowledge to some degree at special refresher courses during the past years, the above-mentioned category of persons have, for incomprehensible reasons,out of the field of vision for many years. Do not commanders and chiefs of staffs have need to study the missile weapons and the resultant revolutionary changes they have wrought In the operational art? Absolutely, And, it seems to us, they also need special refresher courses for the study of the latest equipment and the urgent problems In the field of strategy, operational art, and tactics.
Noting the deficiencies in the existing methods of operational. Ing, wehange in the system of conducting the training of
jnerals, senior officers, and staffs since "it'i'a'ob'viouslyproposals for improving the methods of operational trainingthe ^
For practical study of nuclear weapons and methods of weir deliveryarget, military-technical refresher courses for the district command complement, including commanding officers bf"ia"rge units, should be held at the beginning of the training year. During these refresher training courses,aya, there should be study of the "newequipment received by the district troopa, and chiefly of missiles of various The refresher training courses should conclude with formulation of operational-tactical leaflets on problems of the use of this equipmentattle and an operation.
Upon completion of tho military-technical refresher training courses, and within the time limit fixed by the operational trainingwo-stago military-command map game should be conducted with theot the command complement of the district, of the armies and
large units subordinate to the district, and also of the commandof the other types of armed forces and military-educationalthat are located In the district territory, and with the generals of the reserve.
As far as possible, military-command games should be two-sided. In this case, one of the sides (main command echelon) must operate inwith the organization and tactics of the Soviet Army, the opposingaccordance with enemy organization and tactics. This willa study in depth of the troop organization and the methods foroperations of our probable enemies and, by comparative analysis, the detection of tho strong and weak points of both sides.
It Is expedient for both sides in war games to be located in different places (buildings) In order that participants do not have the opportunity for personal contact and so that each side carries out Its Internal control by technical communications means with observance of all rules ofsecurity (skrytoye upravlenlye volskami-SUV).
The decisions of each side will be presented to the director of the games according to an established schedule and, In keeping with thesecombat operations will be developed and new situations will be Introduced In accordance with the operational schedule.
The duration of military-command gamesistrictays
In addition to theseistrict and Its armies should conduct one operation command-staff exerciseays on the spot with the participation of the staffs of combined-arms large units and the staffs of missilo units (large units).
In their content, the operational command-staff exercises presently being conducted do not satisfy the requirements for the conduct of modern operations. The majority of these exercises are being conducted too methodically, without sharp changes In the situation. The staffs beingusually create easy conditions for themselves: the Initial situation is presented beforehand at their points of permanent assignment, themade on the basts of the initial situation are put into practicesubstantive changes during the entire course of the exercise; changes of location of control points do not take place, the entire activity of the
In our practical activities we proceed from the guiding postulate that war can start suddenly. The so-called threatening periodount to several hours or will be entirely absent. Consequently, the system of staff training must proceedore complicatedin which staffs will be brought to readinessimited time and will be dispatched to the reserve command post from which they will assume troop control. Therefore, such undertakings as operational command-staff and staff exercises should begin with calling the staff trainees to alert and Imparting to them the initial situation when they arrive at the designated areas from their points of permanentPrior to the sounding of the alert, it is necessary to take all measures to achieve its surprise effect. Then we will have theto reveal, although not completely, aa accurate picture of the readiness of the staffs for troop controlomplicated situation, and the exercises themselves will approximate combat conditions.
Guided by these considerations, Inhe commandof the Baltic Military District arrived ath Guards Army without warning andirective to the commander which required the army troops to go on combatalert;-'to be brought upto "combatand to be regrouped by the combined method on another axisimited time for fulfillment of the combat task. All of these measures were to be carried out under the conditions of combat operations that had already been Initiated by the enemy. 'Simultaneously, groups ofwere dispatched to the large units of the army with authority to control the conditions of the bringing to alert of each large unit. During this particular exercise, In addition to the directorates of the army, one division at full complement and only the staffs of divisions and one(tank) regiment each in the remaining large units were alerted.
The commander and the staff of the army had to notify thetroops to bring them to the areas of concentration, plan the
regroupingarge distance, brief the troops on the task, and prepare them forew hours after the alert was sounded. These requirements were also laid on the troop staffs. Due to the surprise alert, the command complement of the army and the unit staffs were placedomplex situation and they gained practical work experience ln the control of troops under such conditions. Both the directors of the exercise and the participants had the opportunity to observe their own weak spots and gaps in training In general, and ln combat readiness in particular.
In our view, operational command-staff exercises to improveas organs of control should be conducted in complex andsituations at the front and in the rear, demanding ofthe adoption of new decisions in short periods of time. Inof this situation, there should be practice inpoints by air transport, and also in effecting continuitycontrol among the various command echelons. With theseis obviously advisable to reduceinimum the dependencerear services units and establishments which are included inexercises so that control points will be highly
As an example of how these exercises should be conducted, we can refer to the experience of the front operational-rear services exercise with designated troops which was carried out with partial- pation of Marshal of the SovietA. GrechkoMilitary District in
In accordance with the directive of General Headquartershe staff of the front (district) planned an offensiveand received instructions for its execution. By Initialhe tank army, which was to enter into the composition of the front during the progress of the operation, made up the second operational echelon and was to be brought Into combat on the 3rd or 4th day of the operation. When the operation was already planned, it became known that General Headquarters had the opportunity to transfer the tank army into the composition of the front earlier than the previously designated time and offered the use of It in the first operational echelon on the main axis. The command and staff of the front were placed in
a difficult situation and had to replan the operation anewimited period of time, pass on the decision to the troops, and to carry out their regrouping. In this episode the staffs obtained considerable work experience under complex conditions.
In the course of the operation, by direction of Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, there was repeated Introduction of elements of sharp change In the situation, which resulted in the noed for sharp changes In the tasks of formations and large units and there was also practice In alerting the troops and committing them to combat from the march from their permanent billets.
In the final phase of thoroposal was made tostaff that it develop and execute ah army exerciselimited period. During the course of the army exercise,of Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, acreated wherein the advancing army was forced to change itsof advance bywhich, of course, requiredon the part of the troops and
These exercisesood training school forenior officers, staffs, and troops. It appears to us that operational command-staff exercises should be carried out In Just this fashion.
In the arrangement of preparations for command-staff exercises it Is expedient for the staffsiHtrict and of'armies to'-currywo to three calendar days' staff training on the spot, utilizingmeans to train principally generals, officers,directorates, and staffshole in rapid development of operational documents In accordanceiven situation and in the ability to carry on communications on technical equipment and with cryptographic security documents SUV, during the movement and deployment of control points.
Therefore, during the course of the training year, it isin our view, to conductistrict, as operational training,ilitary-technical refresher training courses,ilitary-command game, andperational command-staff exercises on the spot. Inoalendar days are required for this training.
We also consider it necessary and feasible to have the staffdistrict participate no less than once in two to three years intraining exercise carried out by the Center on aThey can be strategic command-staff exercises on themeans of communications or strategic military-commandinvolving several military districts.istricta strategic command-staff exercise or game, district measurestraining inevitably relate to measures carried out bythe second exercise planned by the district is not
they can be conducted wifFTRe staffs of districts stationed at their points of permanent assignment, and it appears to us that the method for conducting them should be as follows. Having determined the group of military districts that are to participate in the game and the complement of participants from each district, the Main Staff develops the initial situation (tasks) and disseminates it to the participants. The staffs participating in the game are suddenly alerted and proceed to their reserve control points. To supervise the work of the exercise, groups of generals orof the Main Staff and the central directorates,may beto the staffs of the districts.
Ui thetrategic military-command game, inpresent the plan of the operation and to get agreement onwith other districts participating in the game, thethe chief of staff of the district along with commanders of armswiU go by airefinite time to the Center and to ;
The basic contenttrategic military-command game, it appears to us, must be the resolution of such practical questions as bringing troops up to increased combat readiness during theperiod, the removal of these troopsossible .enemy strike, the immediate execution of retaliatory nuclear strikes, the elimination of the resultsuclear attack, and joint operation with the armies of the other Socialist States.
The method proposedtrategic military-command game does not require large expenditures of material means and will undoubtedly have great benefit in the training of the command complement of the districts and their staffs. The duration of conduct of such exercises should be no moreays.
otal ofoays will be required for thetraining of generals, senior officers, and staffsistrict, including the exercises which are carried outtrategic scale.
It is quite obvious that execution of the measures Indicated does not end the operational training of generals and senior officers. The principal method of studying the theory of operational art remains their independent efforts to synthesize and master the developments which are continually appearing In the military affairs.
However, the volume of military literature being published at the present time is so large that one person has practically noto comprehend, nor even to read, all that is published on various aspects of military affairs. Therefore it would bein our view, to plan and carry out so-called operational rallies (aktiv) at least once every six months In the headquarters of districts, with the participation of generals and officers of thedirectorates and departments of the district and Its armies.
The basic aim of such rallies Is to convey to generals and officers of the command complement,omprehensive form, the new changes which have occurredertain period of time Inart, tactics, and organization of our troops and those of the enemy. At those rallies it would be possible,hort time, to familiarize the generals and officers with the basic contents of the most important exercises carried out In the Soviet Army and abroad, to bring changes in troop organization to thoir attention, and also to review the questions and postulates raised in the order of their presentation In the periodical press. Of course, for these undertakings lt Is advisable to make preparation and to pass to the audience only those problems in which the solutions disclosenew tendencies.
With approximately this sarao aim, butiew to special problems, and at more frequent intervals (no less than oncet would be beneficial to plan and to have operational information (operattonaya informatsiya) in directorates and depart-ments in the staffs of districts and armies in order that the generals and officers be continually aware of new trends in operational art.
In connection with further Improvement of the methods of operational training and the raising of the level of militaryof generals and senior officers, thereeed tohe quality of the training aids being published, especially those on nuclear/missile weapons.
At the present time, there Is available to thearge quantity of various forms of tables, lines, and graphs for theof the basic data for the use of destruction weapons and for the protection of troops against them. But all of these aids were prepared in primitive fashion and by amateurish methods, are inconvenient to handle, and are far fromremendous amount of money is expended for the preparation of these aids in the districts. Is it not time toingle, more sophisticated training ajd for the whole armyentralized method and financed by those funds which are being wasted In districts? It seems to us that an affirmative answer to this question will economize on financial expenditures and will provide the staffs with more sophisticated aids for which they havegreat need. '
The proposals suggested by us for the improvement of the methods of operational training of generals, senior offlcers,and staffs claims ln no measure to be an exhaustive exposition of the problem posed. Therefore it would be desirable to exchange opinions In the pages of the military press in order to discover more sophisticated forms of operational training of generals, officers, and staffs, and then use them to fulfill more qualitatively the requirement of the Minister of Defense contained in the directive on operational trajning.
Major-General M. Ivanov
The general task of any cojnmand-staff or staff training exercise on the spot is the training of Commanders and staffs for operations in complex conditions of modern combat reality. Whatever the specific arms established by the command for each exercise and whatever the methods used to carry out the exercise, the final aim boils down principally--to training the command complement, preparing thend continually raising the level of their combat readiness"
It Is understandable that the quality and results of an exercise dependreat extent on the nature of Its preparation andIn the exercises carried out during the past years, there can beumber of negative points common to all of them which, in the interest of the subject, we feel It advisable not to ignore in the future.
The desire to commit tho headquarters, not with their existing, but with considerably Increased, personnel composition,. lions means, and organizational transport Isala results . n tho withdrawal of transport equipment and personnel fromtroops, which In turn disrupts the everyday life of units and subunits. Using the personnel and motor vehicles, attached to the headquarters for the period of the exercise, there Is hasty formation of temporary, disorganized subunits for carrying out such functions as commendant's service and assistance to the 'Military Store"heir personnel are not usually utilized In accordance with their specialties. Commanders and staff officers are placedalse position because the staffs are brought out for the exercise not as they actually are, but "reinforced" at the expense of weakening other troops. Tho most harmful thing here Is the fact that commanders and staffs become accustomed to participating In
training exercises only after definite organizational measures, but the enemy really will not often permit this, especially in the initial periodar.
The best solution would be to have the sUffs being-the exercise with whatever composition they happen to have at the moment and to give them some "reinforcements" during the course of the exercise; to teach the commanders and staffs to command and direct with their available, though limited means, and not to place them in an easier and more favorable situation in advance. The example should be set by higher headquarters, chiefly of districts.
The presenceommand-staff exercise of large numbers of umpires is not always expedient, and occasionally is downright harmful, at times not promoting the successful progress of the exercise as much as distracting and tielng up the participants. We are not even speaking about the factignificant number of umpires, and especially of their vehicles, at control points very often interferes with the camouflaging of the latter.
These deficiencies are plainly noted when, for example, tho commander summons to his field control point (PKP) vehicle or tent one or two subordinate officers but Instead, three or four persons arrive, since each person summoned is trailed by one or two umpires. They usually attempt to Justify the assignment of so many umpires with the excuse that it is done in the interests of training. But these alms should be achieved by classrcwm'studyi y group exercises, and war games. And inommander will never organize this type of meeting, which ln actual conditions would take extra materiel equipment (large tents, transport for their movement, personnel to servicerequently the commander and the staff, In preparing to go on an exercise, concern themselves principally with where to billet and how to provide lights and food for the umpires, and in what vehicles to transport them. But after all, this Is not the important thing.
The main thing Is how to make one's headquarters combat ready and mobile, to set up the headquarters and ensure that Its activities are Inconspicuous to the enemy, thus guaranteeing uninterrupted con-
trol of the troops. Therefore, in preparing for the exercise, its director is obligated to adopt the measures which are necessary to eliminate the concern of the commander and staff conducting the exercise about umpires. One should Include only the minimum number of umpires. For the headquartersarge unit, there should be no moreond notoersons, as usually happens. In order to observe properly the work of contiguous departments and specific individuals it is advisable to combine the work of umpires and to assign one personror the operational and intelligence departments, the rear services, special services, artillery, and aviation. In case of extreme necessity It Is possible to assign an assitant to certain umpires. In this situation, it will be less crowded and the participants will work more independently with more interest. During the course of the exercise, the secondary personnel will be under the management of the commander, the chief of staff, and the chief of the department.ualified officers of the senior staff will be enough to instruct and to check acommander and the staff of, let usivision or corps.
It is particularly desirable to note the role of terminal umpires (kontsevyyf they are present at the exercise. First of all, it is necessary that they be located in operating areas and that the commander and his staff participating in the games should have communications with both the_ umpires and their subordinates by the actual .means that are possible in the given situation. An exercise does not achieve the desired results when the terminal umpires are located at reduced distances. It Is necessary that the terminal umpire fulfiU the will and orders of the commander if they are not incomprehensible. The director of the exercise must so Instruct the umpire as regards decisions adoptedommander. It is not possible to acknowledge the following situation ascorrect. Havingubordinate (final umpire) the tafciPof an offensive in the mountains, the commanderrequired him toroad enveloping maneuver, utilizing the many available routes. The terminal umpire actedand against the commander's orders, hit the enemyet with no success, and during the critique the director
of the exercise rebuked, not the terminal umpire, but the participating commander.
Neither is it possible to tolerate the fact that with the wide use of liaison aircraft and helicopters in all branches of the national economy, through the fault of the command, they are used very little or not at all in command-staff exercises. In the eventestriction in the operation of radio communications, the participating commander and his staff are obliged to utilize only vehicular transport,ime when the helicopter (airplane) would be an incomparable meansiaison if you consider that the troops will usually be located at great distances from one another.
The problem here is certainly not In the real economy of resources but in the fact that in "departing further from sin" and from superfluous "extraordinary occurrences"e do not train the commanders and staffs to fulfill important responsibilities by mastering air transport (selection of landing areas, concern about materiel support). Furthermore, we neither teach nor trainand staff officers in observation, reconnaissance, and orientation from the air. Thisery serious gap in the conduct of command-staff exercises. For corroboration of the above, we shall cite an example from the experience of the command-staff exercise of the Turkestan Military District which was carried outhe day before the start of combat operations the commanderarge unit was summoned for clarification of his task toenior commander's headquarters, which was. locatedreat distance from the large unit. The commander, taking the deputy chief of the operations directorate with him, proceeded by vehicle to the airfield, expending four hours of the night going cross country. Upon arrival at the airfield, it turned out ihat the commander did not have to make the flight. He returned to his command post (P) lnours, justinutes prior to thehe deputy chief of the operations directorate returned by airplane from the higher headquarters to the area of location of his own headquarters on the second day of operations and, in his own words, found the headquarters, but the pilot, not being trained for operations under these conditions, was afraid to land. The officer returned to his
headquarters after the end of the exercise. The above againfact that at the tactical levelot to mention theis necessary to utilize air transport more widely for the controland to train officers and staffshole to use air
Two-sided command-staff exercises are carried out In anfashion, but they demand great flexibility of the command echelon in the course of the exercise and also adequate communications with the umpires of both sides, in order to permit correct reaction in good time to the decisions adopted by the sides. For example, if the "northern" troops depart0 hours from their areas ofto new areas, it Is not possible to evaluate positively the resultstrike by thearried out against these areas after the departure from them of the "northern" troops.
Another example. The results of the action taken by the "northern" side created favorable conditions for the landingactical airborne force In the rear of the "southerners'; which was carried out after the necessary substantiations and calculations. The senior umpire of the "northern" side noted all of this. However, when this matter reached the director of the exercise, he changed the conditions radically, "annihilated" the "northern" airborne force, and "threw back" their left flankonsiderable distance, to the benefit of theuch lack of understanding between the director and the senior umpires cannot pass unnoticedipants, as well as the fact that at exercise critiques, quite correct actions by one or the other side are declared incompetent andwithout any basis.
In two-sided exercises, the sides must receiverecise results of reconnaissance of targets in the depth which, cannot be observed from the ground, especially if there aro no actual means of reconnaissance available to the participating staffs. In order that the exercise proceed with great Interest and in order that theof tasks to reconnaissance and the receipt of its results be made more concrete and substantial, it is expedient in command-staff exercises to use realistically simulated means of reconnaissance, particularly aerial reconnaissance.
Depending upon how and when the reconnaissance,and control of intelligence organs Is organized, the latter are responsible for furnishing pertinent information on the enemy which must arrive at the headquarters via actual means offor example: by radio from an artillery fire-adjusting plane;taff officer observerelicopter, reconnaissance plane, or bomber;econnaissance group dropped Into the enemy roar; radio intelligenceigher headquarters, etc. But the content of this information and tho nature of Its arrival must be as close as possible to thoseeal situation.
Completeness of information on the enemy is frequently dependent, not uponorganized and well-directedbut upon how persistently an intelligence officer follows "on the heels" of the umpire and peers at his map.
At command-staff exercises carried out on the spot, many opportunities exist to organize and carry out reconnaissance with realistically simulated means and even with actual reconnaissance subunits. This is especially Important in two-sided command-staff exercises. Of course, there must be designated persons (umpires) In helicopters, airplanes, and subunits of troop reconnaissance who, depending on the nature of the operations of the crewill be responsible for furnishing the necessary Information and relating this information to the localeiven crew is observing. In the capacity of umpires, In airplanes (helicopters) and in subunits, it is expedient to have the commanders of these subunits, who will be able to instruct their subordinates in the conduct of reconnaissance simultaneously. This means that the subunits included for this purpose must be composed of their own standard complement and notontrived one.
In recent years, units and large units of troops have begun to participate more frequently ln command-staff exercises where, as the backgroundiven exercise, theyefinite theme In the program of combat training and examine some particular problem. Undoubtedly the Inclusion of these troops raises theof the participants of the exercise and compels them to be
more careful in considering the situation and In calculating time realistically; it obliges them to keep in mind the presence of troops; to be attentive also when resolving problems of materiel supply, which frequently are simplified in the absence of actual troops. In the course of the exercise the command echelon must not forget the participating troops, but must train them also. The deputyof troops, in particular, must be responsible for this.
At times, dueumber of reasons (hindrances due to sowing of crops, whichack of sufficient motor vehicle -transport,t is expedient to have the troops participate only in certain stages or phases of the exercise. It is always permitted and is never advisable to decline, to simulate troops as subunits of motorized infantry, tanks, artillery, other arms of troops, and also of aviation. This is always Justified and will make the exercise more interesting and instructive. The execution of command-staff exercises with simulated troops has special significance now for skeletonized (skadrirovannyy) large units and units and for units and large units maintained at reduced complement. However, even with simulated units, the commanders and staffs must operate In realistic areas and not in reduced areas.
In conclusion, it is advisable to note once again that any command-staff or staff exercise will be more beneficial andonly if the staffs participate In the exercise at the strength which they actually have, at the strength in which they will be caughteal situation, without extra preparations calculated for show and effect of equipment. It is necessary to give the staffstrictly limited time period for preparation to go on an exercise or to put them on the alert and place them in conditions close to actual reality.
Lt.-Gen. P. ChlrkovOriginal document.