MEMO FROM RICHARD HELMS TO DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING MILITARY TH

Created: 2/13/1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Theentral Intelligence

MILITARY. THOUGHT: "Some Problems In the Preparation

of the Rear Area for Support of the Armed Forces In tbe Initial Periody Colonel-General F- Malykhln

Enclosederbatim translation of an article vhlch appeared In the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Militaryoyennayaublished bv the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Arsry Ccecander.

In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handledeed-to-knov basis vlthln your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to tha originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

cc: Military Representative of tha President

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director for Intelligence The Joint Staff

Assistant Chieftaff, Intelligence Headquarters, U. S. Air Force

Aasistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of the Army

Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research Deportment of State

Director, Division of Intelligence Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Ouided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Aasistant Director for Current Intelligence

Aasistant Director for Research and Reporta

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

USSt

SUBJECT BP-QLlTAitY THOUmfPi "Some Problems in tbe Preparation of tbe Rear Area for Support of the Armed Forces in the Initial Periody Colonel-General F- Malykhin

DATE CP

APPRAISAL OF

CONTENT

reliable 'aource

Followingerbatim translation of an article entitled "Some Problems in the Preparation of the Rear Area for Support of the Armed Porcea in the Initial Periodritten by Colonel-General F. nblyfcaln,

Thla article appeared in0 Second Issue of aof the Soviet military Journal Voyennoya Hya! This journal ia published irregularly and isSECSET by the

in different theaters of military operations end of those groupings of the Armed Forces vhlch ere carrying out combat 'missions in the deep rearj

the provision of reliable trsnsportetion networks for the rear area snd for the front, end between theaters of military operations, for supplyingith everything necessary and for carrying out strategic and large operational regroupings;

the difficulties of ensuring protection of the rear area of the Armed Forces from tha means of mass destruction over the entire territory of the

In modern conditions the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, as never before, depends upon the timely preparation aod stability of rear area support. Far this reason the theoretical development and serious scientific investigation of problems of the rear area support of tbe Armed Forcos at Its present stage must be viewed as the most. important tacks.

The modern rear aervicea of the Armed forces representuge organism which must be arranged Inay as to support continuously, with minimum losses, the combat activity of fronts, the Antiaircraft Defense Troops of the Country; and reserves of ths Oeneral Headquarters of the Supreme High Ccesnand In preclae conformity With their mlsalons and the situation.

those ettached by the state or overall materiel, technical.

the rear aervicea of tbe Armed Forcea, in our opinion, poo understand both, the,forcea end equipment Included organizationally

In the conplco-nt of tbe Armed Forcea and t

command f

to the Jurisdictionilitary

ond medical'support and for the"servicing of miasile and ground troops, troops of antiaircraft defense of the country, and the air forces and the navy.

Depending upon the nature of the missions being fulfilled, conditions of workords missing? and the organizational order, the forces and means of tbe rear area of tha Armed Forces fft% divided Into the following/ elements: troop, operational, and central.

fya9 troop element? Is composed of rear services units

ords missing/ mteriel-technlcal supplies andor 3

1.

words missing/ of supporting tbe combat activity of large

4

Tbelement of the rear la ccepoaed organizationally of special organs of control of rear services large units, units, and installations of fronts, armies, fleetsnd PVO districts. It is designated for organization and Implementation of measures for materiel, technical, and medical support of troops, preparation, restoration, and utilization of transportation routes, and other work in support of the combat activity of troops.

The central element of the rear servicesarge number of various large units, units, and installations, bases, depots, arsenals, repair plants, and other production enterprises of tbe Ministry of Defense designated for the rear services support of all the Armed Pdrces of tbe country (their variousnd st the sane time constituting the reserve of the Supreme High Command andof the types of Armed Forces.

Tbe central organs of tha rear services of the Armed Forces utilize the transportation network, of the national economy In accordance with the full needs of the Armed Forces, and also the forces and means of State reserves and the mobilization potential of Industry prepsrsd during peacetime and assigned to their Jurisdiction by specialdecrees.

ords missing/in the preparetion_of the rear services of the Armed Forces for warfare is extremely large. In this article we shall endeavour to set forth our point of view only on the most Important problems, having,in our opinion, prlenry significance for fulfilling practical missions of preparation of the rear services for the support of the Armed Forces in the Initial periodar.

In these problems we refer first of ell to the changing role of stocks of materiel, determination of their eize and princlploe of their echelonment, the preparation of communication routes, and means of transport, and problems of developing nev forms of control of the rear services of the Armed Farces.

With the growth in size of arad.es, adoption of new, moreaeans of araed combat, increase in offensive tempos, and the intensity of defensive engagements, the materiel requirements of the troopa increase correspondingly. During the First World War the Russian Army expended about one million tons of ammunitionotal of several tens of thousands of tons of fuel. During the period of the Second

World War tbe total expenditure of erxaunltion by the Soviet Armed Farce* comprisedore thenn tone.

The materiel expenditures of the Armed Forceauture war epparently will Increase even more. The high level of technicalof the Armed Forces baaignificant increase in the estimated units of supply expressed ln weight. Thus, the weightnit of fireodern front (without aviation) currently smounts? thousand tons, and fuel servicing exceedshousand tons-Calculations indicate thatoalender days of an offensive operation, developing epeeda ofmalendar day, end; for the period of Its preparation, the troopsront may expend upwards ofhousand tons of fuel andhoussnd tons of various ammunition. To this should be added the probability of Increased combat losses from weapons of mass destruction. It follows that the quantitative growth of materiel expenditures conforms to an objective law.

Along with the quantitative changes in modern conditions, ssof equipping tbe Armed Forces with new types of arms,changes In materiel requirements have takenfuture war willuclear/missile war, In which theof Armed Forcea will be missile troops of strategicthe basis of tbe firepower of each of the types of Armedbe their missile weapons. In connection with this, thetroops with missiles, missile fuel, end other special materieltroopa acquires primary significance.The need, hovever,types of ammunition, 'especially for tube .artillerybombs, is decreasing u! If leant ly at the present

Speaking of the decrease of the Deeds of tbe troopa for theae typesunition, we ere basing it on the foot that fire preparation end the support of operations during breed use of nuclear/miss He weapons will undergo greet changes. An offensive will be carried out at great speeds with broad utilization of nuclear veepons. nuclear/weapons will also farm the basis of defensive fire.

Ho less serious qualitative changes have also taken place in tho fuel requirements of tbe Armed Forces. The proportion of aviation fuel in the total expenditure of fuel has significantly decreased,imultaneous colossal growth In the fuel requirement of ground equipment. The supply of troops with mlaalle fuel hss acquired tbe greatest significance.

uture war, much very complex equipment vill be used. For this reason one of the main missions of the rear services Is thesupply of the Armed Forces with technical equipment for the use, repair, and servicing of nuclear, missile, and radioelectronlc equipment, tanks, motor vehicles, and other material.

While, during the Second World Mir, this equipment comprised altogetheroercent of the weight of expended ammunition, fuel, and rations, its present proportion has grown tooercont.

The preceding statements permit the conclusion that under modern conditions the basic types of materiel supplies for support of tbe Armed Forces may be considered to be: missiles and assorted nuclear ammunition, missile fuel, artillery ammunition, fuel for ground equipment and aircraft, technical equipment, and rations.

The uninterrupted support of troops with these types of materiel supplies as the first priority in modern conditions is one of the chief factors in their high combat readiness, and depends upon tbe status of tbe supplies and accumulated stocks In casear.

In our time the significance of materiel supplies haa grown Immeasurably.

The role and alze of stocks depends first of all on tbe volume of materiel expenditures, the urgency with which needs may arise, .and the capacity of the transportation system to guarantee uninterrupted delivery of freight from the place of production to the consumers. Under modern conditions, vith Increased requirements for materiel supplies and the groat vulnerability of the routes of communication and transportation, guaranteeing the uninterrupted flow of goods vill be extremely difficult, snd in certain instances altogether impossible. Namely for this reason, stocks of materiel supplies created In advance in all elements of tbe Armed Forces will, aa never before, be essential for guaranteeing the constant combat readiness of troops. This is especially laportant for guaranteeing ths strategic deployment of the Armed Forces and conduct of operations during the initial periodar, when industry will only ba converting to military production, tho transportation network vlll be occupied mainly vith movements for the concentration of troops, sndumber of areas say be disrupted by the first massivetrikes of the enemy.

Arguments are new In process concerning the size and order of echelonnent of stocks created In peacetime. Certain comrades advise maximum reduction of stocks with the aim of supposedly easing the burden of troopa further. We are against such en approach to the resolution of this Important problem.

The correct determination of the essential scale of materiel stocks accumulated in advance haaubject of special concern to governments, general staffs, und the rear services elements of thoir armed forces throughout the course of the entire history of warfare.

In our opinion, during the development of plans for the rear services support of the Armed Forcea in the initial periododern war, careful consideration should be given such factors as:

strategic goals facing "the armed forces along(theaters of military'

the total volume of materlol requirementsords missing/ of the Armed Forces;

tbe probable period of conversion of current production to military. ..

tbe degree of preparation of the transportation system of the country, for uninterrupted work In carrying out planned movements of troops and bringing up of materiel supplies under conditions of the initial nuclear /missile strikes;

the economic potentialities of the country pf the combinednd the state of combat equipment development (the possibility of rapid.obsolescence of accumulated ammunition, technical, and other supplies).

On tbe basis of the experience of tbe last var, and after

consideration of the postwar changes of the factors indicated above,auna that, in preparation for var, lt is essential to create stocks of materiel in advance directly within the troops, with the armies and fronts planned for deployment, and under the Jurisdiction of the central organ of the rear services of the Armed Forces. consider the following to be the optimum sizes of these stocks applicable to the western axis:

of the central organ of tho rear services, calculated on the three-month requirements of all the Armed Forces of the country, taking mobilization buildup Into account.

When determining tbe size of the stocks, which ere eligible for prior creation and regular maintenance within the troops, in urmy sod district depots (depots of groups ofe proceed from the feet that in the firstoalendar days after tbe initiation of war, the main types of transport will be converted primarily to operational movements of troopa for supporting strategic concentration and deployment of future fronts.1 On overland comounlcoticcarge number of barriers and centers of persistent conteminatlcn will be formed. ortion of the peacetime stocks will be subject to contandnation or will be annihilated by tho initial nucjear strikes of the enemy. For this reason the delivery of notorial supplies during the course of the first and even pertly during the second offensive operation of the front will be oxtremely difficult. In volume it apparently will not exceedoercent of the monthly requirements of the troops, vhlch might cover only the combat losses and form some reserve for supporting tbe combat effectiveness of troops until tbe moment of establishmentystem of uninterrupted supply of the operating army for the delivery of everything necessary from the depots and beaes of tbe center.

In the determination of the size of stocks, which it la feasible to accumulate in advance and maintain at central bases; takingccount all the above-listed factors, we tookase the time necessary for the buildup of the mobilization potential and for the conversion of industry to war production.

As is known,three months were required during the last world war for the conversion of Industry to the military needs of our country, during the course of which bases for production of combat equipment and various military materiel were crested ln interior areaa. Already

ur Armed Forces began to receive regularly everything necessary for combat ond life from current production. It Is this very period that ve are taking into account, proposing minimum quantities of supplies at the center for supporting the Armed Forces at the beginninguture war.

We may hear objections that the last var vas started vith extremely disadvantageous conditions of enemy superiority; the organization of military production in the summer1 waa combined vith the evacuationarge number of enterprises to the Cast; in addition to this, our supply organs did not have sufficient practical experience in theof these complex missions, etc.

All this, undoubtedly, should be considered. However, it ie impossible to overlook the nev difficulties connected vith the enemy capability of carrying out nuclear/missile strikes against 'Important economic centers over the entire territory of tho country. For this reason vo tuke into consideration the potential possibility of annihilation, or heavy destruction,umber of enterprises snd bases and, consequently,ubstantial decrease in mobilization potential and State reserves in the first daysar.

Under modern conditions, vith the great vulnerability of the lines of communication, the correct determination of the echelonment of stocks of materiel supplies will have exceptionally important significance. The accepted order of echelonment and location of stocks has -direct influence on the creation of conditions of autonomy ond independence of troop operations and on the viability of tbe system of rear area support during widespread utilization of weapons of mass destruction.

We consider thateploying front, asestern axis, stocks should be echeloned In the following order:

the troops (in regimental and divisionalobile stocks on motor vehicles in amounts required by the troops for three or four calendar days of medium intensity combat;

armyimilarly mobile stocks for two calendar days;

front depots (of military districts, groups of troops)alendar day. requirements of the grouping being supported.

A modern divisionighly mobile, fully mechanized large unit, capable of engaging In combat under complex conditions, along sn

X4,

axis,anding force, etc. For this reason it is very important to create definite conditions of autonomy for the division, opportunities to conduct combat while cut off from bases of supply, with broken cooimiDl cation* lines, and in other instances of complex combat situations. In tbe interests of eesing the burden of the division, during the last years its rear services have been significantly decreased snd stocks of materiel supplies have been substantially lowered. Further decrease of stocks ln tbe division, in our opinion, is already impossible. Aa long aa the basic means of transport continues to be land transportation, based on highly vulnerable routes of communication, the lowering of the mobile stocks be lev the level of three to four calendar day requirements of the division will inevitably harm the combat effectiveness of the troops. This pertains especially to fuel, without which modern, fully mechanized troops may become Immobile targets for the enemy.

It is known that the expenditure of fuelalendar day when the speed of the offensive is So to ICO km may amount toj diesel fuel for heavyuellnga, and for mediumviation gasoline for armoreduellnga, motor vehicle gasolino for combat and transportuelings. If with such expenditure the divisional supply of diesel fuel drops to two fuelings, and aviation and Other gasoline5 fuelings, then in caoo of disruption of transport, the troops will not be able to continue tbe fulfilment of their combat missions after onealf to two calendar days.

For this reason we categorically object to those who, viewing the idee of casing the burden of the troopsoal In itself, rooommend levering tbe fuel stocksivision to onealf to tvo calender day requirements.

Ve consider that the very minimum mobile stocks of fuelivision must bei motor vehicle* fuelings, diesel5 fuelings .1

Tbe combined-arms and tank armies, under modern canditiooa, form the basis of both operational internal and operational interfrontal maneuver. For this reason, it is extremely essential to have et the

AH fuel calculations were carried out on the basis that motor vehiclesruising rengem, sod for tanks, taking into consideration the fuel in all fuel tanks making up the fuel aystem of

In connection withowering of atocks with the troops ond at mobile army bases, as well as in connection with the significant decrease of other forces end materiel of these elements of the rear services, there haseceasity to alter the echelonment of stocksront. In tbe Interests of bringing these stocks nearer to the troopa supported, we consider that up toercent of them should be maintained In forward bases of the front, which, with greet strain on the communication lines, can move their sections forward. The remaining Uo percent of the stocks of tbe front may be kept in rear area bases of tbe front for the regular replenishing of forward bases, for deliveries by air transport to armies, and for the direct support of troopa carrying out missions in the depth of the rear area.

ystem of stocks echelonment in the zone of operations of the front. In our opinion, more readily satisfies the requirements of uninterrupted support of troops under the complex conditions of modem operations.

Certain comrades consider tbat in order to avoid unnecessary transshipment, bases should not be foraed in the deep rear aresront. Thus, for example, it is proposed to have one front misslie-technical bass with two sections, vhlch must deploy In an area alongm fronto 1J0 km in depth. cheme, seemingly very simple at first glance, may become, in actual conditions, vory complex* and will not guarantee tbeof assigned missions. It does not satisfy the requirements of maximum dispersion, stability of supply during the sudden appearance of barrlera on lines of ccasnunlcatlon, and hinders support of missile iarge units deployed in the depth of the rear

In view of the great vulnerability of rear area lines of ccexsunl cation, remoteness of theaters of military operations, and the long-range ability of modern neons of attack, the problem of correct echelonment of stocks of the central organ of the rear services of the Armed Forces has arisen sharply at the present time.

The investigation of this problem leads to the conclusion that

town

our time tbe stocka of the center ehould be maintained in two echelons: ln the border zone and in tbe zone of inferior. By the border zone, we mean tbe groups of our troops located on the territory of countries of the Peoples' Democracies, the territory of Warsaw Pact countries contiguous with our borders, and, for military districts, the border areas of tbe USSR.

Tbe moving out of bases of the center on the Western axis beyond our borders, with the moving of stocks nearer to troops supported, will permit us in initial operations to avoid dependence bu^rainerable railroad meeting points of Soviet and European gauges.

During the ecbelonment of stocka in border areas, their distribution along the axes of probable troop operations must also be provided for, taking into consideration requirements of groupings of the Armed Forces for materiel stockaarticular axle.

Altogether In tho bases of the conter in tbe border zone, there should beoercent of tbe total volume of stocks of the center which ore accumulated ahead of time. It is advisable to create tbe remainingo ho percent) in the zone of interior, located ln scattered places sheltered from oucleer/miseile strikes of tbe enemy. These stocks will be utilized to support tbe full mobilization of the Armed Forces, troop operations of the antiaircraft defense of the country, missile troops of strategic designation, and other groupings fulfilling combat missions in the zone of interior.

During the distribution of stocks created ahead of time, speclsl attention should be given to their preservation during eneayith weapons of mass destruction. The preservation of troop and army stocks is assured chiefly by the mobility of bases and depots. Insofar as the stocks of the front snd bases of the center ere concerned, ln the interests of great security, they should be located st an appropriate distance from probable targets of nuclear strikes, in sheltered places and carefully concealed. Unfortunately, at tbe present time thia vital principalong way from being observed everywhere.

It appears to us, that we should not be carried eway with the creation of large bases, the sheltering and concealment of which would require huge resources. It is considerably more advantageous to create smaller bases, to spresd themarger territory, snd place themistance from possible targets of enemy nuclear/mi Belle strikes.

Tho stocks of materiel supplies of the center need not be located

reserves, but which are earmarked even in peacetime for support of troops in the initial periodar. The military coenmnd must take part in the determination of the size and points for locating these stocks. Tbe stocks of the center must be constantly kept prepared for movement, and ramps and approach routes must be prepared In advance on the various fronts for all types of transport.

Under modern conditions large shipments of materiel supplies, from the central bases and depots, can be accomplished by airoo it is very Important torepared network of airfields in tbe area of these bases, approaches to them, transportation for bringing up freight to the airfields, andabor force with loading-unloading equipment.

Such preparation haa special" significance for missile bases, dumps of mlaslle fuels, and special articleselonging to the armament of missile troops. The most advantageous way to move materiel supplies of this type will be over great distances from tbe deep rear directly to the points of their utilization.

Thus, the most Important problem of supporting troops in the initial periodar and during the strutegic deployment of the Armed Forces is the accumulation of the required stocks of materiel supplies ahead of time, their proper location and echelonment, and their reliable protection from enemy atrlkes. The timely sndresolution of this problem will form tbe most important, materiel basis for armed conflict in the initial perioduturehis will also reflect,ignificant degree, upon the successes"bf our Armed Forcea during the subsequent course of the war.

The conditions for conduct _pf armed combatuture war bringeries of nev, highly important problems in the realm ofof coBEJunlcation lines snd means of transport.

In the interests of assuring the required viability of the roll and motor vehicle roads which form the basis of the transportation system in Internal areas and In the prefrontal cone, lt is essential, still in peacetime, to carryumber of Important measures.

Among these measures are the following, above ell:

the developmentetwork of roads on the required strategic and operational axes;

the construction of deep and local bypasses of large Junctions, administrative-political,aod industrial-economic centers;

the preparation of alternate crossings over water obstacles;

the preparation of modern types of transport.

In the postwar period our country has significantly broadened the program of construction of lines of communication.

A large measure of capital investment Is directed toward tbe fulfilment of these missions. With the goal of looking after tbe Interests of the Armed Forces, tbe appropriate elements of the Ministry of Defense must Very vigorously piece before the planning elements of the national economy the missions for ensuring dependable camunication lines for the vitally Important strategic axes which run through economically less-developed areas of tho territory of the country. These very important measures Must be given foremost attention by State planning organs, as well as by organs of the Ministry of Defense.

We consider one of tbe most Important problems in the preparation of the rear services of tbe Armed Forces for war to be tbe long-range developmentetwork of communication linea in precise conformity with strategic plans being developed for the conduct of armed combat.

Under conditionsolernhen' tability of the operation of networks of communication lines In internal areaa of tbe country becomes the moot important factor in the maneuvering of armed forces and in enaurlng the fulfilment of strategic missions by them, views on the preparation of coraounlcation routes for operation ln wartime change radically. At present the mission of constructing deep and .local (depending upon the importance of the target) bypasses of centers of communication routes, large stations, transshipping,and other narrow polnte and sectors, as well ea bypasses of large administrative and industrial centers, should be pushed to the fore. Only by having such bypasses prepared ahead of time is lt possible to count on assuring uninterrupted operation of transport by rapid transfer of tho flow of trains and motor vehicle march columns to alternate routes or to adjacent axes.

It Is no less Important to carry out preparatory measures ahead of time, enaurlng uninterrupted military movements across large water

barriers. In our opinion, the resolution of this problem may be achieved by Implementationomplex of various measures. Cf these, we must first of all mention the construction of main alternate bridges, the cutting and filling of roadbeds, and also in certsln Instances, the laying of load-bearing aurfeces on the approaches to points where temporary alternate crossings are being erected. To shorten the periods for reeatebllshment of traffic In cases of destruction of bridges by the enemy, it is essential, already at the present time, to develop broadly the procurement and accumulation of stocks of materials for erecting floating rail and motor vehicle bridges and ferry croasings. In addition, it is essential to have auch materials directly under the control of the Ministry of Defense for concentration alongost important oporotional axes, as well as undor the Jurisdiction of tho Ministry of Transport Construction for maintenance of rear area roods where barriers are most likely to occur. In the fulfilment of thisignificant reserve for the decrease of capital investment may be tha adaptation of- floating river equipment for the erection of temporary floating rail and motor vehicle bridges and ferry crossings. In terms of capacity of the river tug fleet and freight-carrying capacity of tbe towed fleet in river basins, the Soviet Union st the present time occupies first place in Europe and second in the world. This fleet is growing rapidly. During the period18 alone, the freight-carrying capacity of the self-propelled and towed river fleets increased by moreillion tons.

In tbe makeup of tbe river fleet therearge number ofreight-carrying capacity0 tons, open double-bottomed metal barges withfreight-carrying capacitiesons, and other cargo vessels, entirely suitable for rapid erection of floating bridges of any length. For the rational utilization of this reserve and appropriate preparation of vessels, it appears essential to develop their fixed tonnage for series production and to achieve tbe introduction of certain design changes, especially in the superstructure.

Closely related to tbe resolution of tha problems listed ie tbe need to organize vigorous protection of major transport installations from the means of enemy attack (allotment of antiaircraft defenset Is extremely essential at the Initiation of military operations to screen basic installations (large centers on main lines of strategic designation, rail meeting points of Soviet and West European gauges, large bridges) reliably with antimissile and antiaircraft veapona. It appears to us that this problem must be worked out beforehand by tbe Joint efforts of elements of PVO Troops cf tbe Country sod tho rear services

In the resolution of problems concerning the stability ofof the rear services support of the Armed Forces andmaneuvering of troops under modern conditions, thethe transportation process has very important significance. presentortion of our Armed Forces along the westernlocated beyond the territorial llioits of the USSR. Forwe must closely tie in the execution of all missionsthe preparation of networks of communication lines and moanson our territory with analogous measures carried out onof ccmmunlcation linespertains

especially to the readiness of rail and motor vehicle roads, as well as to sea transport in maritime theaters of military operations.

Modern warfare- creates such- difficulties in the organisation of troop transport that the fulfilment of these missions can be achieved only under conditions of combined utilization of all types of transport. Even in the last war, depending on conditions, various types of transportation were utilized. Under modern conditions the necessity of our intensive and cooperative operation of the various types of transport bOB increased even more. For this reason the preparation of communication routes and means of transport for operation inshould be carried out at once, proceeding precisely from the problem of their combined utilization.

V, Let us examine in somewhat more detail the possibilitiestilizing measures for tho preparation of each of tbe types oftransport.

!Rall_ Transport. The utilization of railroadsuture war will depend cn the conditions of the theater of military operations, the density of networks end other factentioned above. If we take the Western Theater of Military Operations, then within its limits, on tho territory of countries of the Socialist Camp, the density of railroad networksmquare km, and ln capitalist countries it7 km. ensity of railroads in thia theater of military operations, even under conditions of the use of nuclear miBsile weapons, permits hope of the possibility of carryingignificant volume of military railroad shipments within the confines of tho rear areas of fronts deploying there and in tbe prefrontal zone. Railroad transport in tbe internal areas of our country willasic role in the total volume of shipments when it la prepared beforehand.

An extremely complicated mleaion for the rear aervicea of the Armed Forces will be enaurlng continuity of the tranaportatlon proeeaa from tbe centera of production (bases) to coneumera. In thecf thia mlsalon, we oust emphasize, above all, such measures as ensuring dependable operation at tbe meeting points of railroads of Soviet and West European gauges, and the organisation of trana-1ceding operations at points where barriers have resulted from enemy strikes (in the destruction of bridge crossings over large vater lines and railroad tunnel sectors).

For ensuring uninterrupted supply of our Armed Forces operating ln the period of the Second World War on the territory of European countries, along our Western borders vera organized ten transloadlng areaa,arge number of transloading stations vera set up.

undamental systea of transloadlng areas may also be adopteduture war, but it must be organized vith consideration of the new conditions of nuclear/alas lie war. Each transloadlng area at the meeting points of railroads of Soviet end West European gaugesuge military installationuge installation of tbe national economy. It must Include several stations with sectors of deep extensions of railroad lines of variousranchingof motor vehicle roads andommunicationsarge quantity of loading-unloading equipment, and specially prepared placea for changing the trucks of tha rolling stock, as wall as transloadlng bases with depots snd means for transporting freight. The degree of prior preparation of transloadlng'areas^ for operations under conditionsuclear /miss He war'will"ecisive influence on the feasibility of maintaining uninterrupted delivery of materiel supplies from the zone of Interior to tbe distributing stations of tbe fronta.

Sometlmea proposals are introduced to reject transloadlng areas and to resort, at tbe initiationar, to the altering of gauge* of West European lines to Soviet gauges. In the period of the Second World War lt was not uncommon to resort toeasure. Thua, in the zones of operation of the Be loran and the First Ukrainian fronts, to the line of the Vistula River, moat of tbe railroad lines wore altered; later the following main Lines were fully altered: Kaunas-Insterburg-Koenlgsberg-Marienburgi Blalystok-Tlussez-Cetrolenks-Deutsch-Eylauj Biest-Wareaw-Poznan-Berlln-Lvor-rT^emyzl-Krakcv-Katowice-Dreslau. Experience shoved that to rely upon the alteratico of basic

main lines is not sdvieoble. Thla must bo resorted to only in exceptional cases, in individual secondary sectors. The alteration of basic main lines may lead to broad gauge lines' cutting the entire network of railroads of European countries into isolated areas, and this will drastically limit the utilization of local transport in rear areas of the fronts and in the prefrontal zone. Along with this there vill be insufficient native rolling stock and locomotives in the eventharp increase in the length of the network, and lt will be Impossible to utilize West European gauge rolling stock. Besides, the smaller dimensions of the auxiliary structures on West European gaugo railroad lines vould make it more difficult to utilize our rolling stock, especially in the organization of two-way traffic on two-way bridges and tunnels. In connection with this ve consider lt more advantageous to concentrate on ensuring the stable operationiversified network of transloading areas at meeting points of railroads of different gauges.

A nev and extremely complex problem in ensuring tha continuity of transport networks between the front end the rear vlll be the organization of the surmounting of obstructed places along railroad lines, especially in the internal areas of the country. The most rational form for organizing this operation appears to ba the creation of temporary trans loading areas (vremennyy peregruzochnyy rayonn the composition of the VPR it is essential to have various special railroad formations, as veil aa motor vehicle, road, pipeline, loading-unloading, and other equipment. The basic mission of the temporary transloadlng areas"must be the ensuring of continuity In the flow of freight without a* substantial decrease in theuring the surmounting of obstructed places until through railroad trsffic is restored.

Ws consider that such organisations should be provided for in the mobilization plans of railroads for operations on railroads of Internal areas of the country. To support transloadlng at water barriers, as well as at tunnel sectors of railroads on the territory of Western countries (outside the borders of operatingt Is essential to have rather strong reserves of this equipment which could be moved up to an area where neededhort period of time.

It is expedient to have mobile formations of temporaryareas In the reserve of the rear services of the Armed Farces for aiding fronts to surmount obstructed places.

The voluoe of reconstruct loo work on rallroadauture wr will significantly exceed the work carried out during the period of the Second World War.

Taking this into account, it la essential to begin serious work on preparation for the restoration of internal reilroade and tboss In the prefrontal zone. In the complex of preparatory work, primary significance is attached to the creation and training of apodal formations, the prior creation of stocks of repair-reconstruction materials, and others. All these problems in Internal areaa of the country will be resolved by elements of tbe transport ministries. However, it is essential for us to submit our requirements now and participate in tbe measures which ere being carried out.

Here intensive conversion to diesel-electric traction takes on special significance for railroad rolling atock, will increase significantly the transport capacity of railroads, and will facilitate reconstruction operations. ignificant Increase must be obtained In the proportion ln the car pork of large-capacity flatcars and tank cars for the transport of petroleum products. It la extremely essential to create, Id the nearufficient park of speclsl cars and flatcars for ths transport of missiles snd missile equipment, and also tank care for tbe transport of the components of liquid missile fuel. Tbe problem ofufficient perk of trucks and steam loeomotlvee of West European gauge which nay be utilized for noveaent fromareas along railroads of West European gauge in the first days of a. war,ajt.Bjgnlfr-. "

Water transport in maritime theaters of military operations and when there are internal water routes along the axes of combat operations, and ln the cone of Interior, will carryignificant volume of troop transport, especially the transport of supplies.

For the preparation of water transport, tha problem* ofof transloadlng areas and outfitting then with equipment capable of carrying out rapid transloadlng of armaments and all types of supplies from an unequipped shore to vessels anchored in theand vice verso, should be decided beforehand. It is necessary to carry out scientific-research and experimental design work for the creation of *peclal equipment of sea-going river vessels for the transport of modern types of weaponsunition and the development of transloadlng equipment on board tbe vessels.

our opinion, it is expedient tort of the vessels in tbe ccnspoeition of the naval fleets and flotillas adapted so that they are capable of operating at sea and on large river waterways. This will make it possible, in many instances, to avoid the rather difficult operations of carrying out transloadlng work In roadsteads.

Motor vehicle roada and motor vehicle transport deliveriesarge role in currying out transport of troops and ouppliearont already during the past war. There were also frequent instances when motor vehicle transport was utilised for delivery of materiel supplies to the fronts in accordance with the plans of the central elements of tbe rear area, and for urgent transportersonnel replacements. Thus,2 the vehicle park of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVGK) transported upillion tons of various freight to the fronts, and altogether faronthsillion tons of freighthousand personnol repla cements.

In connection with the large volume of motor vehicle shipments of the center in13 period, the following special military motor vehicle roada of the center were prepared and serviced: Gorkly-to-Hoscow, Hoe cow-to-Leningra d, Moscow-to-Volokolsmsk, Moscow-to-Mozhsysk, Moscow-to-Yukhnov, and others. During the final stago of the war the Hoscow-to-Wsrsaw-to-Berlin highway ins in operation.

In modern conditions lt is most probable that there will be, ot periodic, but constant use of motor vehicle transport along the entire extent of the basic axis from the zone of interior to tbe operating fronts. Motor vehicle transport will bot^bnly have to supplement or duplicate railroad transport, butertain period will fully replace It along Individual exes.

In modern conditions large motor vehicle highways will be utilized not only for delivery of materiel supplies, but chiefly for theof troops in motor vehicles and by mechanized traction, reserves, and all types of repleceroents. For this reason the role of motor vehicle roads is now growing and qualitatively changing.

In connection vith this the problem of developmentetwork of hard-surfaced motor vehicle roads arises sharply, in addition, it is necessary to strive to lioprove correspondingly the transportability and pa suability of motor vehicle reeds on our territory and on the territory of countries of the Socialist Camp allied vith us. In an adverse situation the holding up of motor vehicle transport in narrow places end delay in tho flow of freight will he unavoidable.

Tha Intensive transport traffic, and enemy actions against important installations of basic motor vehicle communication routes demands the carrying cut of serious measures for their maintenance in usable condition and their reconstruction. We suppose, tbat during the first days of the war the basic motor vehicle highways of the centep nmet be serviced by special road-reconstruction and maintenance formations, which must be capable of carrying out work of technical concealment, reconstruction, and maintenance of the rear areaehicle roads.

In the interests ofigh degree of readiness of tbe road service for operations in the initial periodar, it appears expedient to carry out large-scale preparatory work in peacetime, taking into consideration the utilization of all forces and means of the military establishment as well as civilian organizations.

A special role in tbe preparation of military motor vehicle roads will be played by auch measures as prior buildup of stocks of construction-repair materia la, the procurement andn neceesary^locations, of spare structural cceg)CuenM;fw..reccns'i^cticai of auxiliary structures, the preparation and proper setting-up in peacetime of civilian rood organizations equipped with machinery, the development of bypasses of the most vulnerable places, etc.

Tho motor vehicle park of our country has grown significantly during the postwar period, and Is more thanercent modernized by the receipt of more highly perfected motor vehicles. For equipping the Soviet Army, especially the motor vehicle transport large units and units of central subordination, there will appear, in ever Increasing quantities, larger freight-capacity motor vehicles vith large trailers, semitrailers with independent transmissions, and motor vehicle trains. The introduction of this equipment willharp Increase in the freight capacity of transport units and large units and will significantly decrease loading-unloading operations. From thlB it follows tbat it is essential for ua to

submit,imely manner, the military requirements for newly designed models cf motor vehicle equipment, in order that during mobilization the motor vehicle park of the national economy might, with great effectiveness, be utilized in alXelements of the rear services of the Armed Forces in wartime.

A task which cannot be postponed la tho developmentsystem of the Ministry of Defense of essential types ofsemitrailers, and motor vehicle trains for transport ofof missiles, missile fuels, and other special freightmissile troops. Here we aro speaking of apodaltransport suitable for operations in the central element

Pipeline transport is on economical, high-capacity method ofransport that has low vulnerability. These positive qualities of pipeline transport are extremely important for the creationtable system of supporting modern mechanized Armed Forces in In the Soviet Union and the countries of the Socialist Camp friendly to us, the network of pipelines la Increasing from year to year. At the presentarge program for the development of permanent pipelines is being planned. The Seven-Yeer Plan for developing tbe national economy of the USSR provides for the construction of new petroleum and petroleum product pipelines, which will ensure an almost three-fold Increase in tbe length of the main pipelines* Together with this, the construction of the petroleum pipeline from the Trans-Volga region through Bryansk, with branches to the borders of Czechoslovakia and Poland, which baa been started, will have special significance not only for the national economy but also for supplying the Armed Forcea in the European theaters of military operetions with fuel.

m modem conditions it appears extremely essential to force the construction of pipelines within the framework of the (Jouna ll for Mutual Economic Aido achieve the uniting of the basic main lines and local petroleum pipelinesingle network of the countries of the Peoples' Democracies. The stability of the support of the Armed Forces In theaters of military operations may substantially facilitate tbe creationystem of field main pipelines as an extension of permanent lines. For this reason we consider that the development, ln every possible way of the production of field pipeline equipmentipe diameterm haa good prospects. Systems of such

pipelines our delivery capacity of each llooons, must guarantee the delivery of basic types of fuel,overloading,epthai end axire from the terminals of permanent pipelines or from operating sectors of railroads.

Air trsnsport, even in tho last war, in various instances, played an important role in the transport of troops sod their materiel support. It is sufficient to indicate that the forcea of the Civil Air Fleet and Long Range Aviation, based upon incomplete data for the period of tbe war, transportedhousand tons of freight sod moreillion personnel.

Air transport during the period of the Second World war was utilized primarily centrally In tbe capacityesource of the Supreme High Oomcand. However, even during that period there were instances of temporary assignment of certain units of transport aviation to the fronts. Thus, out ofrsnsport aircraft in the Far Eastern Theater of Military Operations during the summerere detached for tbe servicing of tbe Tranabaykal Front. During tbe time of preparation end conduct of tbe operation by this front,5 thousand soldders and offlcera, uphousand tons of fuel,housand tons of miscellaneous freight were moved by sir trsnsport.

In view of the exceptional prospects for tbe use of air transport under future war conditions, an important modern problem la the long-range increase ln freight capacity of the transport aviation pool and ensuring the capability of aircraft to operate from snail dirt airfields. It le expedient, even now, to determine tbe basic axes for utilization of military transport aviation according to the plans of the central elements of the rear services. In order to ensure these shipments lt le essential to have powerful central military transport aviation for transfer of troopa and to determine beforehand the quantity of this aviation needed by the rear aervlces st the beginning of a' war. This will permit timely planning cf the utilization of transport aviation of the center, tbe preparation st the necessary points of material stocks, materiel support, airfields, snd other means enaurlng the uninterrupted operation of transport aviation.

In line with this it is essential for elements of the rear service* of tbe Armed Forces to unfold more broadly the work of resolving problems of airfield-engineering, mater lei-technical, and special support of military transport aviaticn itself.

The enumeration of problems in the preparation of the lines of communication and transport la not by any means limited to those indicated above. However, even those listed, shov with sufficient convict ion, the necessity of adopting decleive measures for further development, of transport.

*

The investigation of the problems of tbe organization of rear cervices support of the Armed Farcesuture war acquires entirely new significance at the present time.

First of all these questions arise.

Who in tbe Armed Forces must exercise control of all the means allotted by the State for the rear services support of missile troopa, the ground troops, the air forces, and the navyt

What organs are needed in the system of the Armed Forces for the correct distribution and organization of rational utilization of the means of materiel support in the interests of the oversrmed conflict?

In our opinion, the only correct resolution of those questions lies in the centralization of the entire matter of tbe rear area support of the Armed Forcea. There are sufficient grounds foronclusion both from tbe scientific-theoretical viewpoint and from the experience gained from past wars.

Int the height of the Civil. LeninThe Draft Directive to the Central Committee on Militarytha neceosary condition for the .success of this war is thecomond of all detachments of the Bed Army and thein the direction of all farces and resourcesrepublics, specifically, of the entire apparatussupply, as well,transport, as tha most Important

material factor of thoUnderlined byCollected' Works,

The fulfilment of this demand of the leader of tbe revolution and founder of the Soviet Army permitted the utilization of the available extremely limited materiel resources of the country in the interests of protection of the young socialist republic during the period of the Civil War with maximum expediency and effectiveness.

During the period of the Second World Var, the Generalof the Supreme High Command was in charge of all resources which the State Committee for Defense allotted for the conduct of armed conflict, carrying out ita functions for" the rear area support of the Armed Forceslngla central element of the rear services of the Ministry of Defense.

It follows tbat there is every basis to consider the strict centralization of the entire matter of roar area support of the Armed Forces as an objective necessity. Being guided byonclusion, it is appropriate to object to tbe authors who fight for tho creationerritorial system ofords missing/ support in place of the existing elements of the rear services, organized along the principle of channels of military command..

The completeness and efficacy of satisfying the materiel requirements of the Armed Forcesuture war will dependignificant degree, as Indicated above, on the prior accumulation of mobilization stocks. State materiel reserves, and the creation of mobilization capacities of Industry corresponding with the proposed groupings of troopa and the directions of the srmed conflict which evolve. The correct fulfilment of these most important missions, connected with the plans for the development of the national economy of tbe country, is only in the power of central elements, it willrsstic mistake if we permit decentralization in this matter smong various elementsimited sphere of activity, according to zones. The division of these missions according to types of Armed Forces is likewise intolerable.

Ensuring the stability of the network of cocas ml cation lines, for use in wartime by various types of transport, in our country as well as In the countries of the Socialist Camp allied with us, amy be achieved only under conditions of unified centralized planning end management. The fulfilment af this mission Is tied in with large capital expenditures carried out in accordance with the general plan for the development of tbe national economy of our country and the Warsaw Pact. For this reason the Impossibility of banding over these functions to any elements responsible only for one axis or one area of possible local operations of an operational or eventrategic grouping of the Armed Forces, Is completely apparent.

]

the front! In the rear area support of troopa, vbsn the timely Information of the Headquarter! of the Rear Service! of the Aimedmanatingoncretely established situation,uddenly arising necessity to change the supply plans and carry out in Interfrontal maneuver. Herein we allow for temporary subordination to the operational group! of the appropriate central ha sea created beforehand in the prefrontal tone, tha operational groupa of the Chief of the Rear Service! of the Armed Forcea ln specific theater! of military operations any be formed alio for the fulfilment of certain narrower mission* (organ!cation of use ofapacities, putting right the operation of the transportation network on occupied territory, etc.).

The activity of central organ* of tha rear service! of the Armed Force!uture war haa not aa yet Dean sufficiently explored, and It la essential to carry out appropriate work In thia sphere. However, we are absolutely convinced that If Uimcet expedient during tha organization of rear area support to takeystem which has proven ltaelf| General anedquartersroops. This system meets the raquirenenta of contraation to the greatest degree, correspond* to tbe structural organization of the Armed Forces, and Is relatively economical end efficient.

Original document.

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