Created: 1/29/1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence


I'urKlamentals of Antimissilef eny Coloncl-Ccncral of Aviation I. Podgornyy

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MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): 'Trie Fundamentals of Antimissiley Colonel-General of Aviation I. Podgornyy



A reliable source

Followingerbatim translation of an article titled "Tho Fundamentals of Antimissiley Colonel-General of Aviation I. Podgornyy.

This article appeared in2 First Issuepecial version of the Soviet military Journal Voyennaya, Mysl (Mlllthry Thought). This Journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET

the Soviets.2 First on

went to press

Comment r Military Thought is published by the USSR Ministry, of"bexense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issued monthlyhile the othor two versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in By the end1 Issues of the SECRET version had beenf them

Tho Fundamentals of Antimissile Defense

(From foreign sources) Colonel-General of Aviation I. Podgornyy

Under the conditionsuclear/missile war, reliable antimissile defense,actor of strategic significance, is becoming one of the most important conditions for the successful conductodern war.

Tho development of defensive weapons takes

aTta^ckJft'eapppB. omprehensive study of the characteristics, potentialities, and direction of the future development of ballistic missiles must be the basis for the correct resolution of questions of the organization of combat against ballistic missiles.

The basis of an aerial attack on objectives of the country consists of attack weapons of strategic designatiqn, which in the USA are divided into three basic groups In accordance with their flight-technical characteristics:

aerodynamic aircraft;missiles;

cosmic devices.

Tho second group is the most promising- and rapidly ; developing. Here the main efforts are being- directedhe production of long-range missiles as tho main striking force. The share of missiles' participation in the performance of the tasks of aerial attack will increase with every year, and in the near future, the ballistic

miaalles in the enemy's arsenal of attack weapons will assume the leading role. The armed forces of tho USA are equipped with ballistic missiles of various classes and various ranges of operation. The intercontinental missiles,Minuteman" andre intended for delivering strikes against objectives located at a distance of rO.OQO0 km, the intermediate-range missiles,Thor" and "Polaris",or objectives located upm away and the short-range missiles,ndgainst objectivesistance of up to m.

In the USA work is being conducted on the creation of ballistic missiles of the "air-to-surface" class. Specifically, it Is intended to armnd "Vulcan" strategic bombersissile of this class, the "Sky Bolt".

At the present time tho strategic missile attack weapons of the potential enemy are deployed in the continental part of tho USA, and also on the territories of their allies in the aggressive blocs. In tha USA,aunching sites for intercontinental bailie- ic missiles have already been built;5 it is planned to increase their numberaunching mounts. On British and Italian territory there arentermediate-range missile launching sitesthe construction ofaunching sites is being completed in Turkey. Theretomic submarines armed with "Polaris" missiles on combat patrol.

Thus, an analysis of trends in the development of weapons of strategic attack and in the proposed deployment of the probable enemy's missile bases permits one to conclude that ln the future the basic means of strategic attack will bo intercontinental ballistic missiles deployed on the territory of the United States of America, and Intermediate-range missiles, the launching sites of which aro located around the Soviet Union and the countries of the

aircraft, euverable and strategic weapons.

will be the Ban-

effort, to use force against the elements that make up the national might of tbe probable onemy is the basis of the official American aerospace doctrine. The first task of aerospace operations is undermining the nuclear /missile might of the Socialist Camp in order to disrupt or weakenignificant degree the strength of our missile strikes. Simultaneously with the performance of the main task, it is planned to deliver strikes against the aost Important administrative-political and military-industrial centers and other objectives, with the goal of disorganizing the control of the country,the mobilization of troopa, and undermining the mllltary-oconoaic potential and morale-of.oople. uclear/missile attack must be massive, and be carried out using the element of surprise andhort period of time. It should be assumed that the most powerful first ballistic missiletrlke will be organized so that the missilos of various ranges of operation will enter the zone of detection of the antimissile defense means at the same time.

For this reason the antimissile defense can successfully perform its tasks if its structure takes; into consideration a capability- for repe-lelng the first nuclear/missile strikes of the initial period of war which are carried out by the enemy with tbo use of various countermeasures directed toward; reducing the effectiveness of the defensive weapons.

The nature of nucloar/miss lie war, withgoals and unprecedented spatialantimissile defense the most serious taskpresent day.


Success in combat with ballistic missiles can be achieved by the Joint efforts of all types of armed forces. Disruption of enemy nuclear/missile strikes can be accomplished by destroying ballistic missiles which are ready for launching on launching sites,as well as by destroying them in flight.

We understand antimissile defense oborona) to be onecombat .directed towaro> the protectioncountry and Its aj'm'ed forceB froai aa enemyby means of destroying ballistic

Combat with ballistic missiles in flightomplex military-technical problem. In order to realize all its difficulty it suffices to sayn PRO it is necessary to deal with insignificant: targets, as far as size and reflecting surface are concerned, flying at enormous altitudes and at cosmic speeds. xample, the nose conaY of an "Atlas" missile, in the Centimeter wave band,eflecting surface ofquareaximum flight speed of more0 km per hour,aximum height of the trajectorym.

This problem can be made even more complex by the enemy if a series of measures that complicate detection, interception and destruction in flight are taken into consideration:

The launching of ballistic missiles under quadrant angles of departure that are less than the optimum, which leadseduction ln tho range of detecting them by the means of the PRO.

The employment of dummy targets which lower the probability of destruction of the nose cones of the ballistic missiles.

reduction of the reflecting surface of the nose cones of the ballistic missiles by using various materials that absorb radio signals.

The use of special transmitters for creating active Interference with the PRO radiotechnlcal equipment, including those that are located in the nose cone of the ballistic missiles or are ejected in containers.

Based on the nature of antimissile defense* the tasks of PRO are:

detection and recognition (raspoznavanlye) of ballistic missiles;

of ballistic missiles in flight;

warning of the military command and the civil defense of the start of an enemy missile strike;

of artificial earth satellites.

Antimissile defense ashole, likedefense, musteries of requirements, the basic ones of which are constant readiness to repel an enemy missile attack, high effectiveness and stability.

Consequently, the construction of antimissile defense must be carried out simultaneously In two Interrelated directions. Ono of these is the croatlonystem of means tor combatting ballistic missiles in flight, tho other is the elaboration of the theoretical principles of employment, combatand organization.

In principle, the destruction of missiles Is possible both in the initial, active sector of the flight and In the final sector of the trajectory.

reaearch^shows that at the presentcreation of means of antimissile defensedestroying missiles lo the passive sector ofbefore entry into the dense layers ofis most realistic.

In the opinions of foreign specialists,at: the present time an antiaircraft missile complex specially created for antimissile defense,uidedmissile can be an effective means for combatting ballistic missiles. Such an antimissile complex must:

detect the ballistic missileonsiderable distance from the area bolng covered and determine the elements of the trajectory of its flight;

pick out the nose coneackground of dummy targets;

carry out the placing of the antimissile missile on the plotted light trajectory of the balliatio missile and secure, with the necessary accuracy, the approach of the antimissile missile to the nose cone;

the nose cone of the ballistic missile.

The total time during which an antimissile complex aust fulfil Its mission laew minutestall its operations must be fully automated. From the technical standpoint the PRO complex must be an aggregate of radar sets, ground equipment, the control system, the antimissile missiles, anddevices.

Tho structure of the organization of combat with ballistic missiles may be examined from the example of the "Nike-Zeus" antimissile system that is being developed in tho USA.



Trackingv5 Tracking and; determining Detection interception ,the impact

Diagramtructural diagram of the baaic elements oi the PRO of the USA.

I- Radar center of the system of ultra long-range (sverkhdalneyeV detection;

Acquisition (obnaruzheniye) radar set

Tracking (soprovozhdeniye) radar set

XI-Target designation (tseleukazaniye) radar set

Ill-Means of the "Nike-Zeus" system:

Recognition (raspoznftuanlyo) radar set;

Target-tracking (slezheniye za tsolyu) radar set;

Antimissile missile tracking (slezheniye za protivoraketoy) radar set;

Complex of electronic-computing equipment;

Launching site of the antimissile missiles.

IV- Area defense center with an electronic-computing equipment complex.

Inew world war, along with the development of new weapons of attack, American imperialism has in recent years been increasing work on the creation of means of antimissile defense. In this field efforts are exerted in two directions: the creation of an early warning system capable of ensuring ultra long-range detection of intercontinental ballistic missiles in flight and the creationomplex of active PRO means capable ofissile warhead.

Scientific-research work on the creation of active PRO means began2 in the USA. esult, plans for several systems were workedowever, with the exception ot tho "Nike-Zeus" system, work" on all the remaining plans was stopped. asis of this system Is composedattery of antimissile missiles, the unit of equipment for which Includes: arget recognition radararget tracking radar set, an antimissile missile tracking

radar not, an Intercept computing device, control equipment, launching mounts, and auxiliary equipment.

It is intended that control of the fire of several batteries be carried out from a so-called area defense center that Is equippedarget designation radar setomputing device, the function of which is the processing of data on detected targets, and target designation for the batteries,

The organizational structure of the subunits of the system is still in the study stage, it is Intended to have several antimissile mlselle tracking radar sotsattery, which will permit the carrying out of aaveral simultaneous guidance operations against, one target.

The sequence of the work of the basic elements of the "Nike-Zeus" system in destroying the nose cones of ballistic elastics Is as follows:

According to the early warning system's data, the target designation radar set detocta the nose cone of the ballisticnd the computing device of the area defense center, on the basis of these data, carries out target distribution and target designation for the antimissile missile batteries. The set worksode. Because of ita great power (up toegawatts per impulse) it has separata transmitting and receiving antennas placedeters apart. In order to ensure protection of thorom radiation, the transmitting antennacreened metal shieldeight ofotera. The maximum range of operation of the set lslfiOO km. The time available for reliable detection of tho target and for determining Its parameters la abouteconds.


The antenna of the recognition radar set, located In the fire complex, Is aimed according to the target designation data.

The need to useet is brought about by the peculiarities of protecting the system from passive interference and dummy targets outside the dense layers of tho atmosphere, whore thoy have the same high speed as the nose cone of the missile.

At the present time the set is in the stage of development n the process of which it Is planned to use the results of the work on the "Defender" program, specifically the study of the electromagnetic characteristics of the nose cones of ballistic missiles. It is planned that the recognition set will work in the declmetrlc wave band and have an operating range ofm.

After separating the real target from the group of dummy ones lt switches over to the target tracking radar set, which is designated for automatic tracking of the missile nose cone and processing of the data necessary to determine the calculated point of impact and the commando for guiding the antimissile missile to the target.

arabolic reflectoriametereters, tho antenna system of the setarrow pencil-like beam, which is nocessaryigh degree of accuracy in determining continuous coordinates of the target. The oporatlng range of the acquisition and tracking (soprovozhdenlye tsell) radar set ism.

The antimissile missile tracking radar set is designated for tho automatic tracking of the antimissile missile, for processing the data necessary for guiding it to the target and for transmitting guidance commands and commands for

detonating, the warhead Of the antimissile missile. In order to simplify tracking of the antimissileadar responder Is installed on*board.

For intercepting and destroying the nose coneallistic missile, the "Nike-Zeus" antimissile missile is used; Ithree-stage wingless7 meters long andaunching weight0 kg. The booster of the antimissile missile, which operates on solid fuel,hrust ofons. The antimissile missileaximum altitude,angemaximum speed of upa/sec. These performance characteristics are obtained both by the booster and by the powerful solid fuel sustainer motor. All the missile-borne control equipment is located in the casing of the third stage of the missile. Control of the flight of the antimissile missile in the atmosphere is carried out by means of external rudders (aerodlnamicheskiynd at great heights it is carried out by moans of Jet nozzles.

The warhead of the antimissile missilo_may_be equipped withbothelements-anduclear charge.

Destruction by ready-made elements occursesultechanical effect on the nose cone of the ballistic missile. The nature of the destructive actionarheaduclear charge depends onaltitude at which it is employed. At heights of up tom the basic destructive factor is the energy of the shock-wave; at greater altitudes it is tho energy of various types of radiation, mainly neutron and roentgen.

According to data from the foreign press, total expenditures of tho USA on the development of the "Niko-Zeus" system haveillion dollars;


the question of developing tbe production of the system has been postponed until the end of Its testing program. American specialists consider that the tremendous success of the Soviet Union ln the field, of missile technology permits lt to have any missiles required with appropriate devices and to outstrip the employment of countermeasuresRO system. Therefore a correct understanding of the potentialities of the PRO system may be grasped only after carrying out test firings against ballistic missiles that create dummy targets and other.

In order toassed missileystem of antimissile defense that Is organized ln advance and built accordingingle plan on the scale of the entire country is necessary.The theoretical bases for constructing an antimissile defense are the foundation onRO which gives the maximum effect with the minimal cxpendl-turer of forces and means muat be built.

Inystem of antimissile, defense, the nature of employment and the technicalof the enemy's ballistic missllos, the combat capabilities of antimissile weapons, tbe quantity and nature of the objectives to beand also their location ln relation to the probable axes of missile approach exert the determining influence.

If we take the Soviet Union, then theof miasile approach for it at the presentthe northern, from the USA, and thoBritain and



The size of the defensive zone of the fireessentially depends on the angles of fall of the ballistic missiles, and its orientation depends on the direction of firing

Thereefinite part of the territory that is covered by the fire complex irrespective of what are the angles of fall and from which directions the ballistic missile firing is being conducted. This part of the territory may be called the internal defensive zone.

The objectives located in this zone will be covered under any angle of fall and direction of fire; the remaining objectives located within the limits of the external defensive zone of the fire complex will also be covered, but only for certain angles of fall and directions of fire.

Obviously, by means of appropriate deployment of the fire complexes, the screening of an area that is considerable in size may be carried out. In this, the grouping of the complexes must be such that the important objectives of the area are definitelywith the limits of the Internal zone.

The grouping of the PVO means must be sufficiently effective to repel massed missile strikes delivered simultaneouslyeries of objectives. For this the number of fire complexes defending objectives or groups of objectives must be no less than the number of: targets expected to be operatingagainst the given objective or groups of.

In creating fire groupings, covering of the defensive zones of the fire complexes of contiguous groupings should be provided for, ln order to create an overall defensive zone for all objectives located in the given area.

influence of the direction of the ballisticl alBBilea* flight on the overall zone of defense


trajeci Iof the missile a1 (maximum angle of

[Flight trajectory at [minimum angle of larture

[Zone of destruction!

.-jThe PRO fir, -Icomplex

Defensive zoneinimum angle of departure of the

:enslve zone at| Limum angle of [departure of the [missile

Internal defensive!

|fonsive" zone

advisability of this formation is determined by the fact that, first, it permits concentration of the effortseries of groupings intrike by missiles whose number may exceed the fire capabilitiesrouping taken by itself; secondly,elatively smaller number of weapons lt is possible toarger number of objectives of various categories.

A system,of antimissile defense, it appears, should be based_on the useofhe baaic ones of which may be:

intended for screening individual areas from intercontinental ballistic missiles andmissiles; possibly these same weapons

j may also be enlisted for destroying artificial earth | satellites in low orbit;

intended for screening Individual I objectives from short-range ballistic missiles,

| mainly for the defense of frontier and maritimeectives.

Concerning the^ntflxcepiion-.of,,axtlficlal earth satellites in high orbit, for this it is apparently necessary to have other fire weaponsreat range of operation. However, the. radar support of theefense fire weapons can be retained by the antimissile defense.

The need to employ two types of antimissile weapons is stipulated by tbe fact that the weapons Intended for combat with Intercontinental andmissiles cannot be employed to destroy short-range missiles.

The small ranges and flight time of operational-tactical missilesheir destruction possible at comparatively low altitudes and short distances

from the objectives being covered. The dimensions of the defensive zones of the fire weapons Intended for the destruction of these weapons will be limited to several dozen kilometers.

esult of this, groupings of these weapons may be used to cover individual objectives and com-pact groupings of objectives, mainly those located in border areas. It is completely possible that it will be feasible also to combat cruise missiles with complexes of this type.

The stability of an antimissile defense system will be determined,ignificant degree, by the stability of its radar system, for theof which the enemy will use both radio interference and strikes against its most important and vulnerable elements. In connection withrouping of the PRO radiotechnlcal equipment must be created so as to ensure that the zones of radar detection are cover ed by the necessary number of sets. These elements of the system, like the centers of ultra -long-range detection, muat without fail be screened bymissile complexes.

The structure of the antimissile defense must bo thoroughly coordinated with the grouping of the antiaircraft (protlvosamoletnyy) defense weapons. In this case the stability of the antiair defense systemhole is increased, and the enemy Is deprived of the advantages that the joint employment of aviation and missiles could have given him.

Obviously, the deployment of the antimissile defense must be carried outefinite sequence calculated so that it ensures covering, first of all, the most important areas and objectives, and at the same time so that conditions are created for the subsequent development of an antimissile defense, which includes', new elements without reconstructing the system created earlier.

It la known that the Americans plan to carry out the construction of their PRO system ln tvo stages.

In the first stage Buch elements of the system are croated aa radar centers for ultra long-range detection and tracking of ballistic missiles, and fire weapons capable of covering comparatively small but the most Important areas are deployed. Therefore, at this stage the system, of fire cover may be consideredoint system , receiving the necessary Information about tho targets from the territorial detootion system.

In tho Becond stage the number of fire weapons increases) their capabilities increase, mainly with an increase ln the antimissile missiles' operating range. With this, the transition from coveringobjectives and fairly small areas to the defenseonsiderable portion of tho country's territory is carried out.

In stating our opinions concerning PRO, we proceed from tho fact that an antimissile system la notbecauae the antimissile and antiaircraft defense are unitedingle system of antlair defense of the country. It is also apparent that control of antiaircraft and antimiaalle defense at the operational level should also be ^unified. The question of tactical PRO elements requires Btudy.

Control of antimissile defense must, ln our opinion, be organized so that coordination of the operations of its individual elements and groupings and the most effective utilization of the antimissile weapons aro ensured. Its material base must be aof mutually connected command poluta making wideacale use of automation for studying and evaluating tho situation, making decisions, and for directing tho combat operations of the forces and weapons. Before the start of an enemy missile attack, it appears that control of the PRO weapons must consist, primarily.

of maintaining them at the necessary degree of combat readiness, of organizing coordination among theof the fire complexes and among the radar centers of ultra long-range detection,and of comprehensive materiel-technical* support. '

In the process of repelling enemy ballistic missile attacks the control of the PRO weapons must consist of allotting targets among the radar centers and fire complexes, target designation, controlling theconditions of tho radar sets, ensuring coordination between contiguous groupings of firs complexes,the expenditure of antimissile missiles, and of other things.

The time available for performing the tasks enumerated is extremely limited. In conformity with the PRO system being developed in the USA, it will onsist of not more thanoinutes from the oment the missile is detected until the moment that t strikes. The "Nike-Zeus" fire complex requiresinutes.

The limited time and the need to take into consideration a large number of factors, when workingecision,igh degree of automation of the control processes byhole complex of electronic computers at the command- ;posts. of all levels. In this, as shown by calculations, tho operating speed of the EVH (elektronno-vychislltel-naya mashina-electronlc computer) must consist of several hundred thousand operations per second.

The high level of automation of PRO, however, will not, it appears, rule out the participation of combat crews at the command posts, during the process of controlling antimissile weapons. Their functions will be to react to unexpected changes in the situation, to introduce additional information, to analyze the developing situation, to clarify the Initial data used in the algorithms of tho machine resolution of

tasks, etc. The equipping of command posts, must ensure, practically, immediate reflection of thesituation and of the status of the antimissile defense weapons.

The control of the antimissile weapons must provide for the cooperation of antimissile defense with the antiaircraft defense. Its goal is to operate against the enemy in the most effective manner with coordinated efforts. The cooperation must provide for:

concentrating the efforts of the antimissile and antiaircraft weapons for the defense of Important areas and objectives;

questions of screening the weapons of antimissile defense;

coordinated use of radar reconnaissance means for discovering tho start and tho makeup' -of an air-missile attack, etc.

Thus, the main features of antimissilewill be: igh degree oftoingle command",atnd echelons of commandwldescale employ moot "'of last-operating KVrf, of the operations ofweapons in the overall system of

Antimissile defenseeliable and fast system for transmitting information. Therefore,when organizing PRO, questions of communications, both fro: the standpoint of necessary technical means and from the standpoint of its organization,acquire an especla important meaning.

The exchange of information among the individual elements of the antimissile defense can be ensured only on the basis of the comprehensive employment

of various means of communication, even the uaeearth satellites. In the PRO system of tho for example, lt la planned to use as.links, cable lines, microwave bandlinks, and tropospherlc communicationin which, the transmission ofcertain levels must be duplicated on

* *

In connection with the creation of an antimissileeries of particular problems ariaes. Lot ua examine some of them.

In antimissile defense, timeliness in the detection of enemy missiles being launched acquires tremondous importance. In the oxample of tho PRO of the USA, it is soon thatystom of early warning may be constructed on the basis of omploying radar sots of ultra long-range detection, moved out to tho probable axeB of missile approach. However, this solution doea not exhaust the problems. ore complete resolution of it is connected with the creation and employment of qualitatively newadar sets based on the principle of back-scatter probing (vozvratno-naklonnoye zondirovanlye) of the Ionosphere, or artificial earth satellites with equipment that permits fixing the moment of launchallistic missile.

Calculation shows that when such warning moansset up, intercontinental ballistic missllose detected aboutinutes before they strike and intermediate-range missilesoinutes before they strike.

for organizing early warning based on the

use of artificial earth satellites are being worked out.

For example, one of themystem made up ofatellites orbiting in six polar orbits whoa planes are successively displaced in relation to one another. Twelve satellites orbiting in each orbit are the "simple cell" of the reconnaissaace system that permits the simultaneous surveyingtrip of the earth'sittle morem wide.

In each satellite, weighing upons, it is intended to have an acquisition radar set operating on an impulse -mode, with a range of upm and a scanning: sector of

In view of the great operating ranges of the radar equipment and the extremely high requirements for accuracy of the radar information, important significance is acquired by the problem of studying the Influence of the Ionosphere on the errors of radar measurement of coordinates of high-flying objects and of working out methods to compensate for them.

It is known that when passing through the ionosphere a distortion of the path of radiowave propagation occurs and the speed of their movement changes. The first circumstance is the reason why errors occur in measuring angular coordinates, the second is the reason for errors in measuring distances Moreover, the size of the error depends on theof the ionosphere.

Under the Influence of factors originating in the cosmos, first of all radiation from the sun, the condition of the ionosphere constantly changes. These phenomena are both regular and accidental ln nature. This leads to corresponding changes of the errors in radar measurements. Besides, within the ionosphere itself, there are dissimilarities of various scales, nature, the regularity of their appear ance, the existence of which has not yet been studied

to the necessary degree.

The accidental nature of Ionospheric phenomena makes lt Impossible to take them into consideration and to compensate for errors ln radar measurements without knowing the laws that are inherent tophenomena and without taking into consideration the current condition of the ionosphere and the

Especially important significance is attained by this question ln view of the fact that nuclear bursts can bring about artificial ionization of the upper layers of the atmosphere and changes in the condition of the ionosphere enveloping the entire globe.

The problem of excluding mutual radio Interference also takes on great significance. The powerful radiation of tbe radiotechnlcal equipment of the antl,-mlssile defense, if appropriate measures are not takent. will create powerful radio Interference for the other radiotechnlcal equipment. On the other hand, the highly sensitive receiving equipment of the antlmlasile weapons may find Itself aubjectadowerful Influence from various radio transmitting and television devices.

In view of the use ln antimissile defense of radar setsreat pulso power the problem of biological protection of personnel has arisen.

The powerful radio frequency, and in some caaea even roentgen radiation, that exist when operating radio equipment, are of danger to the health of Therefore the question of reliable biological protection requires most thorough study and elaboration of both technical means and organizational measures to ensure personnel safety.

It is apparent that the search for rationalof these questions must be along tbe line ofystem of shield protection, and

ystematic measurement of the level of radiation In working areas, with automatic signaling when levels of radiation arise that are harmful to health.

The powerful economy of our country and the great achievements of Soviet science are the materiel base that ensures continuous growth of the strength of the antiair defense of the Soviet Union. At tho present time the antiair defense troopB of the country are carryingew qualitative leap in their

Speaking at the XXII Congress of the CPSU, Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade R. Ya. Mallnovskly said: articularly have to report that the problem of destroying missiles in flight has been successfullyhis means that antimissile defense, for the antiair defense troops of the country, has alreadyask of practical application.

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