MEMO FROM RICHARD HELMS TO DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING MILITARY TH

Created: 1/23/1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

MILITARY THOUGHT: "Intelllgence-to toe Level ,

of Moderny Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Chuykov

Enclosederbatim translation of an article which appeared In the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Militaryoyennayaubllahed by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

In the Interests of protecting our source, this material should be handledeed-to-know basis within your office. Requasts for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

HELMS

FOR RELEASE

uW BS2

H')

Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Aeaiatant to the President for National Security Affairs

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Director for Intelligence The Joint Staff

Assistant, Chief ot Staff, Intelligence Headquarters, U.ir Force

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence Department of tho Army

Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy

Director, National Security Agency

The Director of Intelligence and Research Deportment of State

Director, Division of Intelligence Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

COUNTRY SUBJECT

I^SSRL ITAF

Y THOUOHT: "Intelllgence-to the Level cf

y Marshal of the Soviet Unionhuykov

DATE OP INFO: 0

A reliable aource

Pollcvlngerbatim, translation of an article titled "Intelllgence-to the Level of Modernritten by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Chuykov.

Thla article appeared in0 first Issuepecial version of the Soviet ollitary Journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This Journal is published Irregularly and is classified TCP SSCRiT by tbe Soviets. The First Issue0 was the Initial Issue of this special collection.

were published aa The_^lead^cxjace|s

and

onPageere disseminated

by

Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Chuykov

The development of new equipment, the use of nuclear explosives, and of such delivery Teblcles as missiles, have confronted military science with one of the urgent problems of tho present daythat of preserving the combat effectiveness of troops. The solution ofhis problem in almost all the armies of the world takes the form of perfection of the organization of troops and of their technical equipment, of the development of means of antiaircraft defense, of reconnaissance (razvedka) equipment, of methods for the entiatomic protection of troops on the field of battle, andumber of other measures.

All the types of operational and combat support of troops must be developed and perfected in harmony with tbe development of the armed forceshole, cine can have perfect organization of troops, unexceptionable means of controlling them, excellent missile equipment at all levels of the military organism, and strong and mobile aeons of antiaircraft defense, but if we forget one aspect of troop support, especially the development and perfection of reconnaissance equipment and the issue to intelligence subunits of this equipment, this will Immediately influence all spheres of combat activity of troops, and especially that of the use of missile weapons.

Even soype of support of the troops asdefense will also depend entirely on tbe ability of reconnaissance equipment to detect targets in good time and to warn the means of combat with the enemy in the air.

Our probable enemies are devoting very great attention to the development of technical reconnaissance equipment at both tactical and operational levels. They are Introducing in divisions and armies,ery wide scale, such reconnaissance equipment as: radar, television, heat sensorsnd photographic equipment for ground snd aerial photography. Prom divisional level upwards, all this reconnaissance equipment Is available in both ground snd aerial versions. Specially equipped aircraft and helicopters have been introduced into the Tables of Organization and Equipment (shtat) of divisions and armored regiments. Intensive work is being conducted on the evolution of pilotless equipment for aerial tactical and

operational reconnaissance. Several modifications of pllotlesi equipment for aerial reconnaissance have already been developed and tested.

In tbe armies of the north Atlantic bloc countries, no less serious attention is devoted to the training of Intelligence units for reconnaissance and diversionary operations In the rear of our troopa. Thus, In the armies of Great Britain, intelligence regiments specially assigned to tha conduct of reconnaissance against tha disposition of our troops have been introduced into tbe composition of an army corps.

NATO member-countries must include in the composition of theirigned to the allied armed forces, reconnaissance equipment vhlch is capable of performing reconnaissance tasks against objectives vhlch are liable for destruction by nuclear veapona.

The development and improve ment of reconnaissance equipment vlll permit more successful use of missile units and of aircraft to combat the enemy's means of nuclear attack. Attention must therefore be paid to reconnaissance not onlyype of combat support for the troops in the development of theoretical situations at command-staff and troop training exercises; It is mainly necessary to possess the necessary reconnaissance forces and equipment during peacetime and to prepare and perfect them carefully.

In aotuel fact, hov do our present army and division intelligence subunits differ from those of the Sacond World Wort The difference lies only In the fact tbat amphibious tanks and armored carriers have been brought Into the composition cf the intelligence subunits of divisions and armies,esult of vhlch these subunits have acquired greet mobility. Jlovever, Just as there was previously no technical reconnaissance equipment la intelligence subunits, there Is still none today. The Tables ofn and Equipment do not provide intelligence subunits vith equipment for optical reconnaissance, or vith infrared equipment, beat sensors, or other technical reconnaissance equipment.

It should be noted that the technical reconnaissance equipmentront has not experienced, any fundamental changes. Agent networks and radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance, with the exception of aerial reconnaissance, are not capable of carrying out reconnaissance tasks for tbe missile troops with the necessary precision in determining the location of the targetarticular area.

It must be admitted with complete frankness that modern reconnaissance equipment, in the form in which it appeara organizationally and In the way in which it la technically supplied, has lagged far behind the level of development of weapons of destruction. Without belittling the role or ths significance of tried reconnaissance equipment or of its methods of operation, one can say without exaggeration that this equipment can no longer fully meet the tasks imposed on reconnaissance in furnishing missile units with intelligence data.

Existing divisional and army intelligence subunits (units) permit the organization of reconnaissance by observation, at best, with the help of ordinary binoculars, by the execution of raids snd ambushes, and during combat by tbe dispatcheconnaissance detachment or of separate reconnaissance patrols whose range of operation is limited by tbe capabilities of existing means of communication which may reachms, which is obviously insufficient. Under the moat favorable terrain and weather conditions the artillery reconnaissance equipmentivision and of an army can carry out reconnaissanceepth ofoms, and, with their help, it is possible to obtain information on mortars, field artillery, theof the enemy, and the progress of engineering works, but only up to the limits of direct visibility.

We venture to assert that the function of the intelligence service Is not valued highly enough by us; were this not the case, there would not be soap between the capabilities of weapons of destruction and of those of reconnaissance equipment.

It Is necessary to remember that In many respects modern operations will differ from those of previous wars. Some of tbe special features of these operations. It may be assumed, will consist of the tendency of both sides to carry out continuous combat operations directed, first.of all, at the destruction of the means of atomic attack both on the ground and in the air; the destruction of the means of atomic attack before they are used will result in unprecedented reconnaissance activity by both sides with the goal of not only locating these means but of destroying them by oil possible sabotsge methods, both during the period of preparation and during the actual course of the operation.

The constant threat of destruction by nuclear veepons will result not only in the maximum possible dispersal of troops in areas of disposition but also in the carrying out of combat operations In broader zones.

Ho one will deny that the preservation of the combat effectiveness of troops In modern conditions, and consequently the successful execution of any operation, and especially the use of missile units, will,arked degree, depend upon tha timely performance of the following tasks:

acquiring knowledge of the grouping of delivery vehicles for nuclear warheads and, equally, of the plants producing fuel components, of assembly bases end warhead storage

acquiring knowledge of the control and guidance systems of guided missiles and pllotless weapons;

immediate destruction of the means of nuclear attack, without timing this to coincide with specific operational-tactical periods.

With existing technical reconnaissance equipment,ivision nor sn army can perform the tasks listed above, because they do not have at their disposal sufficient personnel and, even more, enough reconnaissance equipment. There isendency toward the reduction in force of intelligence subunits

which have already been reduced to the raxlmua. We haveingle organ, even at the center, which Is working on the problems of the technical equipment of intelligence subunits at the tactical and operational level.

One asks how the coaznander of an army or the cceaanding officerivision who lacks the most essential intelligence information and the equipment necessary to obtain this information can make well-founded decisions and utilize successfully his own means for the destruction of the enemy's means of atomic attackt

With the existing organizational structure of military intelligence, almost all the technical reconnaissance equipment vhlch la capable of obtaining Information on nuclear veapona is basically presentront. The tasks of annihilating means of nuclear attack will be decided oo by the commanding officerivision and by the caamander of an army. Hence, in the very organizational structure of the intelligence organs thereift between Intelligence assets and the command echelons vhlch organize the Immediate fulfilment of Important operational and tactical tasks.

The lack of technical reconnaissance equipmentivision, corps, and even an army during the Second World War resulted In tbe fact tbat these echelons solved the majority of the Intelligence tasks by requests to higher headquarters.ivision forwarded ita requests for intelligenceorps, tbe corps to an army, and ords misslngj.

The principle of solving intelligence tasks fay means of requests to higher headquarters has outlived itself long ago and is obviously not suitable in modern conditions. Firstly, it Impedes the activation of all intelligence assets at division and armyecondly, and this is most Important, lt impedes the development and introduction of modern technical reconnaissance equipmentivision and an army; thirdly, this principle hasover for inactivity by subordinate headquarters In the problems of organization and of carrying out reconnaissance.

Toe limited availability of intelligence personnel and equipment and the eagerness of commanding officers at all levels to receive intelligence information on objectives of direct interest to them in the shortest possible time, saxes lt urgently necessary to make the concept of the prospective operation (battle) the basis for the organization of reconnaissance, in order to ensure that all available intelligence personnel and equipment are used in the most purposeful manner from the beginning to the end cf the operation (battle). Such purposeful use of intelligence personnel and equipment can be determined only by the commander (commanding officer) who has detailed knowledge of the intention and plan of tbe prospective operation and battle.

Regrettably, there are still commanding officers of divisions and commanders of armies who do not allot proper significance to Intelligence problems, who farm out ell tbe work pertaining to Intelligence organization to the intelligence chiefs, which bringsack cf purposefulness In intelligence.

In order to accomplish the tasks of discovering the grouping of the enemy end especially of hie nuclear weapons. It is necessary to have strong, technically well-equipped Intelligence subunits st division snd army level which ere capable of performing tasks which are within the range of their own means of destruction. The need for the availabilityariety of technical and other reconnaissance equipmentivision and an army is also expressed by the fact that information obtained from one aource should not be considered as reliable until it is confirmed from two or three sources.

At the present time statements of opinion sre appearing in periodicals on the formation of some type -of joint .centers for the utilization of reconnaissance equipment, for the collection and processing of intelligence data, of fire delivery centers snd, about tbe endeavor to provide more reliable ccsaaanl cat ions for all intelligence organs of the front with artillery headquarters, etc. All of this appears to be linked with the noble intention of finding ways to resolve the basic problemthe reconnaissance of the means of nuclear attack and the provision to the missile units of targets for destruction. However, this has nothing in common with the problems of intelligence organization. The

resolution of the problems of intelligence organization end the acquisition of intelligence data should be sought not by the creation of soote type of improvised centers, but by the correct distribution snd structural organization of reconnaissance asseta able to perform intelligence tasksivision, sn army,ront, tnd also in the centralized utilization of the reconnaissanceof the arme of troops.

Tbe real centers for the organization of intelligence must be combined-arms staffs in the form of intelligence sections, departments, and directorates (otdeleniye,owever, in order not to exclude the chiefs of other arms of troops from the intelligence system, provision must be made for an organizational structure ln the composition of these arms of troops, with Intelligence equipment capable of performingtasks for the given arm of troops.

The approximate layout of the organization of intelligence should be as follows. The combined-arms staff, with the active participation of the arms of troops, organizes reconnaissance, collects, analyzes, and collates all intelligence data. On the basishorough analysis It determines tbe general grouping of nuclear means, tbe grouping of tanks, ths means for control of nuclear weapons, and the grouping of the pilotless weapons andof the enemy. On the basis of this information, the commander (commanding officer) decides on the execution of the operation (battle). The chiefs of arms of troops, having received specific teaks and targets for destruction, study these targete together with the divisional, army, and front intelligence chiefs before delivering the strike, and organize additional reconnaissance of the objectives (targets) with their own and with the comblned-arma assets. From this it follows that ln the combined-armsingle intelligence plan must be developed which provides for the use of all the intelligence personnel and equipment of the arms of troops. Specific intelligence tasks, such as: the topographic and geodetic work of the artillery, engineer reconnaissance of terrain, of tbe passability of roads,ust be reflected in great detail in the intelligence plane of the appropriate arm of troops. In our Opinion,rinciple of organization and execution of intelligence will permit the tasks of reconnoltaring those objectives of the enemy which are liable for destruction by nuclear weapons to be fulfilled more successfully.

Conditions for the conduct of modern operations urgentlyost attentive and serious review of the organizational structure

of nllltary intelligence organs from top to bottom.

The idea of providing command echelons with reconnaissance equipment in accordance with the tasks levied on any particular troop element must be Implanted in the organizational structure of the intelligence organs. Therefore, in the composition of an armyivision, lt is necessary to have reconnaissance equipment that could obtain data of Interest to tbe commander of tbe army and the commanding officer of tbe division. This necessity results from the fact that tha role of armies in modern operations end, correspondingly, the role of the divisionattle, baa increased. Tbe DOdern army (combined-arms and tank) Is capable of the Independent performance of operational tasks concerned with tha destruction of the enemy in vide zones andreat depth, and of the conduct of combat against the enemy's means for nuclear attack. The absence from an army (combined-arms and tank) of organic (shtatnyy) reconnaissance equipment puts the army commander and tha army headquartersosition of dependence upon the frontand this paralyzes their initiative in questions of tbe conduct of combat against the nuclear means of the enemy.

The high mobility of the use of nuclear veaponaule there vlll be only one firing from each position) callsighly mobile means of reconnaissance. Todayeans Is aerial reconnaissance, which is capable of penetrating enemy positionsreat depth, and of obtainingrief period of time the most reliable documentary (dokumentalno-podtverzhdayemyy) intelligence data on sizeable areas.

For this reason, the composition of combined-arms and tank armies must Include organic means for tactical aerial reconnaissance. These must be capable ofreat number cf tasks, for example, of carrying out visual reconnaissance by day and night, of taking aerial photographs of objectives (areas) and of correcting the fire of thortillery. Aerial reconnaissance in eupport of the army must be carried outepth of not lessms. Reconnaissance aircraft must carry one-step photographic processing equipment capable of independent processing of the results of aerial reconnaissance directly in the aircraft in order to shorten to the minimum the time needed for processing and montage. In our view, in order to perform the tasksombined-arms or tank army must have in itsactical aerial reconnaissance regiment f%ords missing/.

The oeans of radiotechnlcal intelligence are mainly concentrated at the front. Combined-arms simles have very wear radio intelligence companies, whileules have none at all. Bsdiotecbnical intelligence can obtain highly valuable data on enemy troop groupings, on bis posts and radar means for guiding missiles, pilotless means, ond aircraft. On the one band, the fact that radiotechnlcal intelligence equipment is evailable only in the front significantly reduces tbe potentialities of radio Intelligence, since the front's means are not capable of intercepting tactical, operational, and slrcraft radio nets, and on the other hand,because the transmission of radiotechnlcal Intelligence data to an army, and also, occasionally,ivision, requires much time.

Because of this, the need has grownubstantial Improvement ln the radio-and radiotechnlcal intelligence of an army ln order that the latter may perform the taska of uncovering radio nets from battle group to field army level Inclusive, and tbe radar stations of guided-miss lie subunits and the control centers snd posts of bis pilotless weapons, and of tbe tectlcal aviation located la the tactical and immediate operational depth. For the performance of theae tasks lt Is necesssry to IntroduceAZ (oaoboye naznacheniye-special designation) radio battalion Into the composition of an army (combined-eras and tank) and to give It organisational strength.adio battalion should be equipped with more highly-perfected radio snd radiotechnlcal equipment, with good protection against Jamming, which should be mounted on mobile means with good cross-country ability.

In order to Improve tbe capability of sn army's long-range radio Intelligence surveillance of ultra-shortwave and radio-relay nets, helicopters equipped with radio reception end tracking (prlyemo-sleahechnyy) apparatus are needed In the composition of OSKAZ radio battalions.

The presence of breaches, gaps, and exposed flanks in the operational and tactical disposition of enemy troops creates conditions for the deep penetration of the enemy's positions by strong reconnaissance detachments with the aim of reconnthe approaching reserves of tbe enemy and of his nuclear

ins, with the destruction of the latter. To perform reconnaissance

tanks against exposed flanks and breaches and for penetrations into tho deep rear areas of the enemy with the ale ofand destroying means of nuclear attack, it la desirable toeconnaissance regimentombined-arms army, and to retain itank army. It is desirable to hare reconnaissance battalions laed-rifle and tank divisions.

Tha reconnaissance regimentombined-area and tank army mustniform organization, and must include in its composition no less than three reconnaissance battalions: two battalions to carry out reconnaissance as reconnaissance detachments and one battalion to carry out reconnaissance in depth. Reconnaissance battalions, in their organization, armament, and equipment, must be capable of tho independent performance of reconnaissance tasks both as whole battalions and by companies, as well as by platoons,onsiderable distance from the main forces of the first echelon of the army. As regards firepower, the armament of the battalions must be powerful and mobile, and the tanks must be equipped with perfected equipment for underwater operation-

Troop exercises have shown that groups specially trained for reconnaissance in depthost valuable source of Intelligence data on enemy means of nuclear attack. eep reconnaissance battalion should provide, from its own composition, for tho formation ofo ko reconnaissance groups. The presence ofattalion in the composition of on army will provide for reconnaissance of the enemy's means of nuclear attack upepthms.

In the compositionegiment there must also be suitable communications facilities to ensure the control of deep reconnaissance groups and of the roconnaionance detachments of the armyepth of not lessms. Tbe composition of an army must include aircraft and helicopters specially designated to land deep reconnaissance groups in the enemy's rear area. The technical equipment of the helicopters must enable them to make night landings on unprepared terrain.

Tbe need for effective reconnaissance equipmentivision Is dictated by the factivisional area of advance of up toms Is already established by the Field Service Regulations.

The possibilityivision will operate on evenin the future is not excluded, under thesedivision will have to perform independentlytasks such as: reconnaissance of thenuclear weapons; discovery of his troopof the nature of his defense in tactical depth;water barriers for the purpose of enabling tanks tothe bottom,umber of other tasks. To performtasks, the reconnaissance battalion ofmust have in its composition not lesseep reconnaissance company,

engineer-chemical and radiation reconnaissanceommunications platoon,aintenance subunlt.

A reconnaissance battalion must be capable of carrying out reconnaissance both In companies and in platoons, and groups equipped for movement away from roads and able to force water barriers without additional crossing equipment. Under modern conditions these demands are beat met by amphibious tanks and combat reconnaissance patrol vehicles (boyevaya razvedyratelnaye dozoroayaR DM) which have high cross-country ability over any terrain and which can pass any water barriers. The armamentattalion must not impede Its mobility. It must be equipped with recoilless weapons and machine guns mounted onhe armament of each individual battalion and company must enable it to engagerief battleigh volume of fire In the interests cf reconnaissance. Battalion subunits must be equipped with the requisite optical, infrared,and lightweight radiotechnlcal means of reconnaissance.

The reconnaissance equipmentront element (zveno) should consist primarily of technical means andompetent agent net capable of performing intelligence tasks throughout the entire depth of the front's offensive operation. The organizational structure must ensure tbat intelligence data are rapidly collected, processed, and transmitted to Interested commanding officers and troopa without passing through unnecessary intermediate channels.

For the performancearge number of reconnaissance tasks in the discovery of means of nuclear attack and for the carrying out of continuous additional reconnaissance of targets already detected, it ia desirable to have in the compositionront

one or two regiments of operational, and one regiment of tactical, aerial reconnaissance. In the composition of each regiment of operational reconnaissance there should be squadrons of day and night photo-reconnaissance aod infrared equipment. Tbe need for night reconDSlsssDce in each regiment is due to the fact that troop regroupings and the occupation and shift of firing positions of the means of atomic attack will be carried out by the enemy primarily during the night.

For the allocation of tasks snd the control of aerial reconnaissance assets, it la necessary to bare sn serial reconnaissance department in the intelligence directorateront headquarters.

To process the results of aerial photography, insteademporarily established center for photo-interpretation at tbe intelligence directorateront, there should be an appropriate number of photo-Interpretation officers in the operational reconnaissance regiments capable of carrying out tbe operational end tactical photo-interpretation of targets and of determining their coordinates.

At present, aerial radiotechnlcal reconnaissance equipment is located at the sir srmy end ln the radiotechnlcal regiment (OSSAZ)ront. To centrslize the control snd processing of intelligence data, it is advisable that this equipment should be concentrated ln tbe rodiotecbnical regiment (OEHAZ) withoadiotechnlcal reconnaissance aircraft, which will enable it to conduct reconnaissancehour basisepth ofms. Tbe radio intelligence (OSRAZ) regimentront should be left at its present composition.

For the conduct of intelligence collection against enemy means of nuclear attack and nuclear weapon storage depots located In the operational depth, and for their destruction, it is advisable to have one or two battalions of speclsl designationront, with the goals of acquiring experience and of creating reserves of Intelligence officers, it la necessary, even ln peacetime, toompany of special designation in the compositionilitary district.

Tha experience of troop, ataff, and specialshews that In modern short-dura tion ferae ofcontrol of reconnaissance equipment, the timelyintelligence information, and Its dlssemination toand troops sssume very greetof communications vith the reconnaissancecommand and heedquartera networks is not alwayssuch cases, such time is expended in the receipt ofand consequently the value of these data is partiallyneed has therefore arisen for the creation of

intelligence comninlcation nets, providing communications with reconnaissance organs which have been dispatched, with tbe chiefs of intelligence of subordinate staffs, snd with deep reconnaissance groups and reconnaissance aircraft. In order to ensure stable communications with all reconnaissance organs it is necessery to have the requisite communications equipment, which should be included In the Tables of Organization and Equipment of divisional, army, and front communications units.

It is especially desirable to stress that our troops do not yet have radio aeto which are light-weight, compact, rapid and of high-speed operation nsuring tbe stable communications which ore so necessary in providing communications with deep reconnaissance groups; this significantly impedes the operations of tha groups and tbe maintenance of communications with them.

In our view, the realization of all these men our es will permit more efficient use of ell reconnaissance equipment, timely receipt of intelligence data, and more successful utilization of modern means of warfare.

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