THOUGHT: "The Initial Perioduture War and the Special Features of the Conduct of Military Operations During Thisy Colonel-General N. Pavlovskiy
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THOUGHT: "The Initial Perioduture
the Special Features of the ConductOperations During ThisyN.o-one-
OF INFO : 1
A reliable source
Followingerbatim translation of an article tir.i^
This article appeared in1 First lesueoecia
The Initial Perioduture War and the Special Features of the Conduct of Military Operations During This Period
Colonel-General N. Pavlovskiy
Our Party and the Soviet Government are striving to achieve the lessening of International tension, the curtailment of the arms race, and the prevention of war byeace-loving; foreign policy. The Soviet Onion is doing everything which lies in its power to achieve this goal. One of the convincing proofs of this is the visit of our governmental delegation, headed by Nlklta Sergeyevich Khrushchev, toh Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.
However, as is known, the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union is clearly not to the taste of the aggressive circles of the imperialist states which have grouped themselves around the United States of America, who continue, as they have in the past, toolicy of exacerbating international relations, of stepping up the arms race, and of preparingew war. As soon as the efforts of the Soviet Union and of other peace-loving states directed toward the lessening of international tension .begin -to produce perceptible results, these states once again bring the world to the brink of war by the most extreme measures. In the last analysis, this can lead to the outbreakew war. History is already acquainted with many such examples so unfortunate for the fates of nations.
Under these circumstances, the main task of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union is the further improvement of combat readiness for immediate operations with the aim of disrupting the attack of the enemy nd of crushing him decisively.
The constant qualitative changes in theof the Soviet Army and Kavy which are taking place before our very eyes callreat deal of work on the further development of Soviet military art by all generals, admirals, and officers, in accordance with the present-day requirements for the conduct of armed combat.
One of the most Important problems of military science,the study of which is given much attention both in our country and abroad, is that of the Initial periodar. This is, of course, fullysince the outcomeuture war will dependonsiderable degree on the results of the first clashes, the first strikes of the combatants. For this reason, the study of the problems of the Initial periodar and the preparation of the types of armed forces for the conduct of military operations during this period have great theoretical and practical significance for us.
But In order properly to understand, and to resolve the problems of the initial perioduture war, we mustlear conception of the nature of thla war. We will therefore try, if onlyeneral way, to review this problem.
The natureuture war. In examining the natureuture war one must first of all take into consideration the existence of and struggle between the two world systems, the socialist and the capitalist. In spite of the tremendous efforts of the Soviet Union toolicy of peaceful coexistence, which we have touched on earlier, the struggle of these two systems, under certain conditions, may become sharply
exacerbated, and tbe taperlalists will then atteapt an attack on the USSR or on the other countries of the Socialist Camp, which represent the chief obstacle to the achievement by tbe imperialists of their aggressive goals. Such an attack can scarcely be confinedocal var. It will most probably leadorld var in vhlch the states belonging to the tvo opposing vorld systems vill take part.
Consequently, in speaking of the possible natureuture var, ve start from the premise that it vill beorld-wide, coalition character. In this war, because of the existence of irreconcilable contradictions between the socialist and capitalist systems, any sort of compromise will be almost Impossible. Both sides will pursue the most decisive political and militaryhey will strive to achieve total victory.
To wagear powerful modern weapons (sredstvo borby) and massive armed forces will be needed, together with the utmost exertion of the entire moral and physical strength of the peoples and economies of the belligerent states.
. In recent years, the opinion has been expressed in the West, and sometimes even in our own country,uture war will be of short duration and may be concluded in the course of several weeks, or even several days. Such prognoses are based on the faot that modern weapons are capable,hort period of time, of inflicting such heavy damage upon the enemy that it can be presumed that he will be unable to continue the war; thus, the objectives of the war can be achieved considerably more rapidly than has been the case in past wars.
At the sameontrary point of view also persists, whose proponents claim lt as axiomaticuture war, like the world wars of the past, willrawn-out character.
In considering these points of view, Marshal R. Ta. Malinovskiy, the Minister of Defense ofB, ln his report to the All-Army Conference of Secretarlea of Primary Party Organizations inointed out that both suffer from the fact that they solve the problem of the durationarne-sided fashion. It would be more sensible not to go to extremes in this queatlon. Ve should, the Minister of Defense said, develop and perfect weapons and methods of armed combat primarilyiew to achieving victory over the aggressor ln the shortest possible time, but at the same tine it la also necessary to make serious preparationsengthy war.
Veutureissile/nuclear war, since the primary means of destruction will be nuclear weapons, and tbe chief means of delivering them to the target will be missiles of various types and designations.
The employment of nuclear weapons and of other means of mass destruction willense and desperate characterar. In order to seize and retain the strategic initiative, and also to ensure the achievement of the aims of the war, each side will develop vigorous military operations by all the scans at its disposal from the very beginning of the war, ln order'to inflict upon the enemy the maximum losses in personnel and material resources, and also ln order to effect tbe greatest possible destruction on his territory.
The military-geographical disposition and tha large territories of the countries which make up the military coalitions, and also the long range of modern seans of destruction, make it certain that the war will be waged over huge areas. The war will be waged not only ln the European and Asian theaters, but will embrace other continents and wide naval theaters of operation. Military operations develop
bothront and also deep In the rear of the belligerent states. The tremendous spatial scope (prostranstvennyy razmakh) of the war, the necessity to protect and defend objectives and lines of communication far to the rear, and also tha probable growth of losses, will leadituation where the strength of the armed forcesuture war will far exceed those in all past wars.
The increase in the combat capabilities of all types of armed forces brought about by the swift development and widespread introduction of new means of destruction will lead Inevitablyhange in the methods of waging war. In this connection, particular significance for our armed forces in the achievement of the goals of the war will lie in the operations of missile troops, the decisive delivery of mass nuclear/missile strikes designed to destroy and to annihilate vitally important objectives deep in the rear of the enemy, the deatruction of the basic groupings of his armed forces, and the suppression of his will to resist.
The effective antiaircraft defense of troops and objectives in the rear of the country willo less Important significance for the successful conduct of the armed struggle. It must be capable of giving timely warning of the threatuclear attack, and of detecting and destroying ln tha air the missiles and aircraft of the enemy. It can be stated immediately that the success of nuclear/missile strikes on ths one -band, and of tha operations of the antiaircraft defense forces and weapons on the other, particularly at the beginningar, will determine its further developmentreat extent.
In the general course of armed conflictheater of military operations, an important role will be played, as in the past, by the activities (operatslya) of the ground troops, the most
characteristic features of which will be: theuse of nuclear weapons and of other meansdestruction; exceptionally high mobility(dinaroichnost) in the combat operationstroops; an increase in the spatial scopespeed of operations; the absence ofand the conduct of combateriesat times in areas isolated fromat varying depths, frequently with
conduct of large head-on clashes (vstrechaoye stolknovenlye).
In the naval theaters ofo loss decisive and intense struggle will develop between the forces of the two sides. This struggle will be directed toward the destruction of the enemy fleet at sea and at its bases. Groupings (gruppirovka) of warships, above all, of missile submarines, aircraft carriers, naval bases, and ports of the enemy will be subjected to strikes by naval forces employing all modern weapons. Along with this, naval forces, chiefly submarines, will wage continual war on lines of communication and in some cases will deliver nuclear strikes on targets of military and economic significance in coastal areas.
The widespread employment of nuclear weaponsuture war, primarily through the use of missiles, but also from aircraft and submarines, together with the highly mobile operations of ground and airborne troops, will permit the performance of tactical, operational,-and strategic tasks in shorter periods of time than has been done in the past. Here, we must remember tbat In spite of the tremendous destructive capability of nuclear weapons, the achievement of successuture war will be possible only through coordination in the use of all means of armed conflict. It is thus, in short, that we view the most characteristic aspectsuture war. It is quite clear that the conditions and means of waging this war will impart particular significance to its initial period, which we shall consider in more detail.
Thaessential quality of the initial period of a Today, scarcely anyone can doubt that tha results of anted conflict in the initial periodar vlllecisive significance for its vhole subsequent course.
If ve turn to history, ve can find in past vara many examples in vhlch, right up to the outbreak of military operations, the belligerents vere working to complete the preparations necessary for the seizure of the Initiative from the very beginning of the var and the consequent predetermination of the further course of the var in their favor. And, despite the fact that there vere not at tbat tlmo sufficiently effective means of armed combat,ule, the side vhlch seized the initiative in operations achieved victory over its adversary. Let us consider some historical examples.
In the Russo-Japanese var, both aides, foreseeing the inevitability of the war, undertook etrenuous preparations long before its outbreak. In this, however, Japan far surpassed Russia and began the warormal declaration on the night4urprise attack on the Russian squadron at Port Arthur. Tbe results to vhioh this Russian procrastination in preparing for var led are veil knovn to everyone.
The First Vorld War was also prepared for in advance. The main states which participated in the war took every step "to carry out concealedand to forestall the enemy in the deployment for and the launching of military operations. However, neither side succeeded in this. The difference In timingrokakh) and in the time taken to mobilize and to deploy the armed forces of the main European powers was insignificant, and both sides began military operations under relatively equal conditions. esult neither side was able to seize the initiative in the very first days of the war and to achieve decisive successes either at the beginning or in the subsequent course of the war.
Events developed quite differently ln tbe Second World War. Hitler's Germany, vhlch had secretly mobilized its armed forces beforehand under the pretext of conducting maneuvers, concentrated and deployed then on the national border vith Poland. The Polish command, not having correctly evaluated the military capabilities of fascist Germany, vas not prepared for war. Mobilization was begun in Poland only onugust, and9 the German fascist army invaded Poland from various irections and defeated the Polish Army decisively. In tbe course of three weeks the Polish Army was completely destroyed and Poland was occupied by the German fascist troops.
The German fascist army was able to achieve the same decisivo results in the war against tha other Western countries. Evenountry as ours needed soreear to eliminate the consequences of the failures of the initial period of tbe war and toreakthrough in military operations in our favor.
Failure to evaluate tbe part played by the initial periodar or the incorrect appreciation of its content and special features have ledituation in vhlch some countries and their armed forces have turned out to be inadequately prepared toar, .have suffered huge losses, or have lost the war at its very beginning.
In the initial perioduture war the qualitative and quantitative status of modern means of armed conflict will create conditions for the achievement of Incomparably greater results than has been the case in any war ln the past. It should be clear to all of us that the surprise massive use of nuclear woapoos can Inflict huge losses In human and material resources on the armed forces and on the entire country undergoing attack, can disorganize front and rear areas, and governmental and military control, and can disrupt the systematic
deployment of the armed forcea and the carrying out of mobilization in the country.
All this obliges us to study the initial perioduture war with care and seek out the most effective means for the conduct of armed combat during this period.
It should be noted that before the Second Vorld War we bad no properly evolved theory for the conductar in Its initial period. The views which prevailed at that time concerning the conduct of operations during the initial periodar wore based for the most part, on the experience of the First World War.
At that time the initial periodar was taken to be the segment of time encompassing events from the moment of the declaration or beginning of the war until the commitment of the main body of the armed forces. It was assumed that theconcentration, and deployment of the armed forces would begin after the declaration of war of after an attack by the enemy. This was considered to be the main constituentof the initial periodar. It was assumed that military operations would be restricted to the conduct of reconnaissance operations and to border engagements by covering troops (voyska prikrytlya).
This view of the makeup of the initial periodaregative influence on the preparation of our armed forces for war, and also on the development of plans for their strategic deployment. The incorrect evaluation of the changes which had occurred in the methods used by the imperialists in preparing andar, and also of the possible nature of military operation in the initial period, resulted in the insufficient combatof the border military districts and a delay la the shift of the national economy of our countryto military production. All this cost us huge losses in people and in material resources.
The Second World War brought substantial corrections
tn the understandinK- of the initial period. The mobilization and deployment of the main body of the armed forces of the aggressor countries and the switch of the economy to military production were carried out ln good time, before the beginning of the war. The war beganeclaration,urprise attack. Thus, the basic constituent of the initial period of the last war was even then not the mobilization and deployment of the armed forces, but the conduct of active military operations from the very beginning of tho war.
The development of weapons and methods of conducting armed conflict, and the nature of tha preparationsuture war by the imperialist countries, give grounds for supposing that its initial period will differ considerably in itafrom past wars and even more from former theoretical concepts.
Wa consideruture war will most probably beginurprise attack by an aggressor employing tho maximum possible quantity of nuclear weapons. In the course of this attack both sides will strive to inflict on each other by tbe most energetic strikes, such losses at the front and ln the rear that the achievement of the immediate strategic alms of the war in tho shortest period of time will be ensuredesult.
For our armed forces such alms might be the repulse of the enemy attack, the seizure of the strategic initiative, and the creation of favorable conditions for the further development of decisive military operations. In the course of achieving these alms, our armed forces will have to solve such tasks as the destruction of military and Industrial targets, the disorganization of the governmental and military command of the enemy, the disruption of tha strategic deployment of his armed forces, the defense of our armed forces and objectives in the rear areas of the country against nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction, and also the occupation of -
Thus, the following conclusion on. the initial perioduture war suggests Itself:
by the Initial perioduture war one must understand the period between the beginning of the outbreak of war and the achievement of their immediate strategic objectives by tho forces of the first strategic ochelon (troops ln constant combat readiness round, air, antiaircraft defense, and, in the first rank, missile troops);
the main constituent of this period will be the conduct, from the very beginning of the war, of active military operations by peacetime forces and weapons, including formations mobilized up to wartime tables of organization and equipment and units maintained ln skeleton strength on ready-reserve status. All types of armed forces will take place ln these operations. The leading role will be assigned to the missile troops of strategic designation.
As to the duration of tho Initial period Itself, one must keep ln mind that lt cannot be determined ahead of time. Its length will depend on the time required to achieve tha Immediate strategic objectives of the war, on the nature of these objectives, on the conditions under which tbe war breaks out, on the course of deployment of the armed forces, on the results of military operations, and alsohole series of other factors. Only one thing Is clear -that the objectives of the initial perioduture war can be achievedonsiderably shorter time than has been the case ln the past.
For the correct determination of the nature of military operations in the initial period of the war, and of the methods of conductingnowledge of the. probable enemy, constant study of his true Intentions, of the grouping of his armed forces, and particularly of his means of nuclear attack, and an
objective evaluation of his combat capabilities are of great significance. It is quite obvious that the determination of the methods of operation of our armed forces and the effectiveness of their blows will also depend upon tbe timely disclosure of the true plans of the probable enemy against the countries of the Socialist Camp.
It must be saidreat deal ofgiven to the problemsuture war,to its initial period, in the
forces of the imperialist countries. The military loaders of the aggressive blocs, headed by the United States and England,ecisive role to the initial periodar, and particularly to the first operations.
In determining tho methods of conducting armed combat in the initial period of the war and in the preparation of the armed forces, very great Importance is attached to knowledge and consideration of the conditions in which the aggressrve imperialist blocs, canar against the countries of the Socialist Camp.
The combat characteristics of modern weapons, and also the practical actions of the leaders of the imperialist blocs, provide reasons for considering that the most probable method ofar against tbe Soviet Union willurprise attack from various directions with the widespread use of nuclear weapons. In this case the war will immediately become worldwide in character.
It is not excluded tbat war may be unleashed by the imperialists with an attack on one of the countries of tho Socialist Camp. Naturally, the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Socialist Camp will be forced to enter this war, with the aim of providing assistance and defense to the frlondly country which has suffered the attack. In this case, the war cannot be confinedocal conflict, but will turnorld war.
Finally, there may also be other conditions ln which the imperialists willar, conditions which will undoubtedly leave their imprint on the nature and means of operation of our armed forces. We must study all these conditions attentively so that we will be ready in good time to take effective and decisive countermeasures ln any situation.
The probable enemy will take as his main objective that of depriving us of the capability of using nuclear weapons from the very beginning of he war. For this lt Is contemplated that strikes will be delivered throughout the whole depth of our country in order to destroy our stocks of nuclear weapons and missile-launching installations, to destroy our airfields, annihilate our bomber aircraft, and inflict decisive destruction upon our armed forces.
Simultaneously with the fulfilment of these missions, we know that lt is planned to deliver strikes against our most Important administrative-political and military-industrial centers, naval bases and ports, railroad junctions, and other objectives ln order to disorganize the administration of the country, to disrupt the mobilization and deployment of our armed forces, and to shatter the military and economic potential of tha country and the morale of the people.
For the fulfilment of these missions it im planned to bring to bear the maximum quantity of forces and means capable of using nuclear weapons, in order to Inflict immediate and decisive destruction upon us and to achieve their plans for seizing the German Democratic-Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and of carrying the war to the territory of the Soviet Dnion.
In the imperialist countries, particularly ln the NATO countries, in accordance with these aggressive plana, the buildup of armed forces and their training for war aro being carried out, theaters of military operations are being equipped at an accolerated rate, reserves of material and technical resources are being
set up, and nuclear/missile basos are being equipped.
It Is necessary to say that the rapid development of modern means of combat is constantly bringing about great qualitative changes in the armed forces, both vith us and vith the capitalist states. oevaluation of the places and roles of the various types of armed forces and arms of troopsuture var are taking place, the methods ofattle are changing and considerable adjustments are being made in operational plans. Many postulates of military art which appeared correct only yesterday must be revieved and decided upon completely anev today. In this connection, ve should like to recall the statements of the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet. Zakbarov. Speaking before the students of the Academy of the General Staff at tbe beginning of the present academic year, he stated that we must all vatch intently the changes taking place in the armed forces of the probable enemy. Investigate everything nev searchlngly, summarize it intelligently, and drav the appropriate conclusions for ourselves.
The combat readiness of the armed forces. The successful attainment of the strategic objectives of the Initial periodar is possible only on condition that the armed forces and the countryhole are comprehensively prepared toartrong enemy. We must always remember tho lessons of the past var, vhlch shov that the errors andvhlch ve permitted in preparing the armed forces and in considering tho possibilitiesar vith fascist Germanyrastic effect on our conduct of military operations, and put our countryost difficult position.
The consequence of these miscalculations vas that our armed forces vere not brought to the necessary state of combat readiness in time and that wo began combat operationsisorganized fashion,esult of vhlch ve suffered large losses. It must be said outright that under present clrcumstancoa such mistakes could have catastrophic consequences.
This is why tho chief requirement for allforces at tho present time Is thea high and constant state of combat readiness. know, in the orders and directives of theDofonse on combat and operational readiness,task which is set before our armed forcesis to be ln constant combat readiness lndisrupt an attack by the enemy and toand active combat operations with theseizing the strategic initiative at theof a
It is true, we admit,eriod of threat (ugrozhayemyy period) may-precede the unleashing of a* war by the enemy. However, one must not under any circumstances base-ones calculations on the possibility of carrying out all the measures Involved in bringing the armed forcestate of combat readiness during this particular period. The imperialists may attempt to use their presont means of attack completelyand thoy have the complete capability to do this. Therefore, in order not to allow oneself to be caught unawares, one should orient oneself on the absonceeriod of threat or on one of extremely short duration, counted perhaps only in hours.
Justification: for tha institutionhreat situation (ugrozhayemoye polozheniye) ln the country mayharp aggravation of the international situation or the receipt of reliable information on the clear threat of an outbreak of war. This period must be used to the maximum for bringing the armed forces totate of combat readiness as will permit them to begin combat operations immediately.
For this, all the measures to be carried out in tha period of emergency by each sub unit, unit, and large unit and by each headquarters and establishment must be worked out and planned ahead of time. But this is not enough. All steps must be taken to ensure that the projected soasures are executed in tha shortest period of time with the maintenanceigh degree of organization and orderliness. For this, already
inituation must be achieved in which all the personnel of the armed forces know and can carry out accurately the responsibilities with which they will be entrusted in the period of threat.
It is not necessary to list all the measures which can bo carried out in the period of threat. In each sub unit, unit, large unit, headquarters, or establishment they will be different. We will cite Just the main ones.
First of all, the maximum speed in delivering signals and instructions to units and large units concerning the introduction of the threat situation must be ensured. For this all rapid means (bystrodeystvuyushchiy) of communications will be employed, observing secrecy precautions for the transmissionafeguarding of military secrets.
With the introduction of the threat situation, the activity of all types of intelligence must be increased immediately with the aim of discovering the enemy's direct preparations for an attack, changes in the grouping of his forces and means, particularly of his means ofuclear attack, the possible intentions and the timing of his operations, and also other Information peculiararticular axis or theater of military operations.
In organizing reconnaissance one must take into consideration tbat with the changes in the characterar and with the introduction into the armed forces of means of mass destruction, reconnaissance tasks and the methods by which these can be accomplished have become considerably more complicated. Errors committed in this sphere can have an immediate and most drastic effect upon the conduct of military operations.
Upon the receiptignal or orderreadiness, all armed forces area state of complete combat
The chief concern of the command at all levels
and headquarters during the period of threat must be the
protection of troops from the uuciear weapons of the
enemy, For this purpose it is necessary to foresee end
to organize the withdrawal of troops, aviation, and the
fleet from their permanent dispositions (aesto
to nev areas which have been prepared in advance, at the
same time bringing themeightened state of readiness.
This applies particularly to the troops, forces, and
weapons of border military districts and fleets, vbose
disposition the enemy has more opportunities of discovering.
In some cases, troops, forces, and woapons of the border military districts and floets will immediately occupy the areas and positions assigned to them vith the view of going into action, dlreotly in accordance vith plans which have been worked out beforehand.
The protection of stocks of material and technical supplies against destruction by tho nuclear weapons of the enemyo less important measure, to which particular attention must be given at all times, and particularlyeriod of threat. There is no doubt that the appropriate organization to protect material stocks will be already envisaged during peacetime. However, vith the introductionhreat situation steps must be taken, vhere necessary, to disperse them further and to organize tho transport called for by the plans and in order to supplement the stocks of tho troops or to establish stocks in the directions (napravleniyo) vhere military operations are forthcoming.
One should not exclude the possibility of taking steps during the period of threat tovard the partial mobilization and deployment of some part of tbe forces, particularly from the personnel of the ground troops, and also toward the conversion of individual branches of industry to war production. However, it must be borne in mind that this must be done with the observance of extraordinary measures of caution and secrecy. Ve should not rely on the possibility of conducting widespread measures for mobilization during the period of threat. The deployment of the armed forces and their concentratlor
in theaters of military operations will be carried out mainly from the beginning of the war and under very complex conditions. Hero, the problem of military transport will be very critical.
Zt must be taken into consideration that at the beginningar the operational movement of troops and the movement of material and technical supplies will be conducted remendous scale. At the same time, the enemy will try to break up tha operation of our communication lines by nuclear strikes and to disrupt this movement. The possibility cannot be excluded that,esult of nuclear strikes on road junctions, bridges, and other vulnerable points and objectives, the main rail and highway arteries ln various directions may be put out of commissionengthy period of time, vhlch will seriously complicate the deployment and concentration of our armed forces.
The solution of this problem must lie in three courses. First, lt is necessary to envisage and to organize the combined use of all types of transport: railroad, highway, air, and water, to achieve their complete lnterchangeablllty, and also to envisage broad mobility of tbe reserves of all transport facilities.
Secondly, we must achieve the maximum viability of our communication lines under the conditionsuclear war. To this end the reliable antiaircraft defonse of communications must be organized. In doing this, particular attention must be paid to the protection of the more vulnerable points along tha lines of communication; against strikes by the enemy transloadlng areas, railroad stations, highway and rail Junctions, bridges, tunnels, viaducts, and other structures. To ensure the viability of communication lines, measures for combating enemy paratroops and diversionary groups must be worked out ln good time.
Thirdly, it is necessary to provide for the organization and execution of rapid repair and restoration of portions of the lines of communication which have been destroyed, and for the conatruction of
new sections of railroads and highways, bridges, bypasses, and the laying of pipelines. To carry out these large and labor-consuming tasks, construction and repair units, railroad troops, the construction organizations of the transport ministries, sovnarkhozes, and also troops and tho local population can be enlisted. The successful carrying-out of reconstruction and construction operations on communication lines will be assisted by the timely creation of stocks of building materials and ofbridging construction.
For dofense against the means of mass destruction and for the elimination of the effects of nuclear strikes, commanding officers and headquarters will organize measures for antiatomic, antichemlcal warfare and antl-bacterlologlcal defense in the sectors or areas of action of their formations and also along the lines of communication, and will assign the roquislte forces and resources.
All those measures for assuring the viability of communication lines are planned lo advance.
In speaking of the combat readiness of our armed forces, lt must be kept in mind that by this we do not mean just the ability of sub units, units, and large units to assembly quickly at the alert signal (po trevoge) and to occupy the areas assigned to them. This is only one of the elements of the combat readiness of troops, orces, and weapons, and It is very important. But It is not all-important. The combat readiness of troops Is made up of very many elements, the fundamental one of which is combat coordination (slazhennost) and constant readinessmilitary operations during the mass employment of all modern means of combat, to fulfil any task which may be assigned to the unit or large unit at the beginningar. Units or large unitslthough they assembly quickly at the alert signal, are not capable ofombat mission, cannot be considered combat ready.
The fundamentals of combat readiness are: igh degree of field training of the troops; having combat
equipment in excellent condition end being able to ube it; well-organized control of troops and their readiness for rapid assembly; the presence of stocks of the material and tochnlcal supplies necessary for the supply of tha troops in case they are alar ted, and, ln addition, for Internal military districts, readiness to mobilize and to be transported or to carry out marches over long distances.
The high state of readiness of the armed forces for the conduct of operations ln the Initial period ar will dependreat degree on the level of training of commanders, commanding officers, and staffs, and on their ability to direct troops confidently and firmly under the complex conditions of the situation.
Another of the most important conditions ensuring the readiness of our armed forces for the successful conduct of military operations in the Initial periodar is the timely preparation of tha territory of tha country and of the probable theaters of military operationsuture war. Modern powerful, long-range means of destruction greatly widen tha borders of tha theaters and present new demands for their preparation (oborudovanlye) .
What are the minimum necessary measures which must be taken already, in peacetime, to equip and prepare theaters of military operations?
The basic measuros for the preparation of theaters of military operations can be given as follows: the development of lines of communication and the ensuring of their reliability and viability under conditions of tho mass use of nuclear weapons; the construction of launch sites for missiles; the construction of airfields; the developmentommunications network; the creationnified radar and radionavlgatlon system; tha equipment of bases and depots for the storage of materiel; the camouflaging of tbe most important targets ln order to exclude their detection by any type of reconnaissance
including technical means.
in short, are the requirements for the combat readlnoss of the armed forces and the most Important measures to be taken to ensure lt.
The nature and means of conducting Military oporatTpns ln the initial periodar. The nature of, and means for, conducting military operations in the initial periodar will ba determined by the situation ln which tha war may break out. However, lt can be said with complete confidence that under all circumstances massed nuclear/missile strikes will form the basis of military operations. Tha reserves of nuclear weapons accumulated duringwill be used immediately to the mantissas possible degree to inflict decisive damage on the enemy in order to force him to capitulate or toituation of complete chads in tha country, and to make tha development of active military operations and the carrying out of mobilization measures as difficult as possible for the enemy.
As has already been said, tha most probable method by which the imperialists willar against the Soviet Union willurprise nuclear/ missile attack. The unleashingar In thia maiint#i- mcaiKs exceedingly complicated conditions for us, and we must prepare our armed forces for this before all else.
The chief task of the armed forces in tha event of such an attack will consist of preventing mass nuclear strikes by the enemy, of instantly delivering crushing strikes by nuclear weapons, and of initiating vigorous military operations hy all types of armed forces. In other words, we must disrupt the attack of the enemy and immediately seize the strategic Initiative with all the forcea and means at our disposal.
Thus, by the disruption of the attack of the enemy ono must understand the sum total of military operations conducted by all the armed forces. The
fundamental basis of the execution of this task vlll consist of nuclear strikes by the strategic missile forces, by the missile units and large units of the ground troops, and also by aircraft and missile.
Successful operations by the missile troops,their first strikes, vlll determineof the armed conflict In the initialthe war, and also during the course of Its Missile forces are the forces of
future war. It is for this reason that theirnow given such great
Amport ant role in disrupting the attack of the enemy vlll be played by the forces of the PVO of the country and by the antiaircraft forces and weapons of the ground troops and the navy. They must fulfil their task of destroying the missiles andof the enemy in the air and of thus preventing him from striking the vitally important objectives of our country and armed forces.
Ve should also not minimize the role and significance of our ground troops in the disruption of tbe enemy's attack. Having as their armament nuclear weapons and other modern means of armed combat, and igh degree of mobility and maneuverability, they are capable, by swift actions, of inflicting decisive damage on the troop concentrations of the enemy, of moving rapidly deep into his territory, of seising vitally important areas of the country, and thus of making more difficult the basing of the missiles/and navy of the enemy, of disrupting the conduct of mobilization measures, and of depriving him of the ability to make up the losses vhlch he has suffered.
The role of our air forces in disrupting the attack of the enemy vill consist mainly of supporting the combat operations of the ground troops and fleet, and also in conducting reconnaissance. Long-range aircraft vlll be used to make strikes on targets located deep in the theaters of military operations
which are weakly protected by antiaircraft defenses.
The efforts of the navy and particularly of its missile submarines and aircraft, disrupting the attack of the enemy will be directed primarily toward combating the carrier strike large units (soyedineniye) of the enemy and his missile submarines and surface vossles.
In speaking of the disruptionurprise attack by the enemy, the decisive significance of the first blow, which must be the' most powerful, should e particularly stressed. The industrial and economic centers of enemy countries, the missile, aircraft, and naval bases of the enemy, his stockpiles of nuclear weapons,uclear-powered submarines, missile vessels, and aircraft carriers, the most important groupings of his ground troops, radar facilities, and other objectives will be subjected to its destructive action.
A first strike using massed nuclear* weapons delivered at the right time can considerably weaken the strikes of the enemy, can paralyze bis operationsertain time, and under favorable conditions, can force him to cease active military operations. The success oftrike will be determined by the degree of combat readiness of all the forces and weapons used to deliver it, by the validity of Information on the objectives to be destroyed, by their proper selection, and by the skilful use of nuclear weapons to fulfil the basic tasks.
Of all of the tasks of the initial periodar, the two most important, which will be carried out by the combined efforts of all types of armed forces and with all possible means, must be singled out. These are the fight against means of nuclear attack and the disruption of the deep rear of the enemy.
The mass employment of missiles with nuclear chargesarticularly at the beginningar, may very seriously complicate the activity
ountry and of its armed forces. Therefore, the fight against means of nuclear attack, and in the first place against missiles, now assumes significance of the first order.
This fight must be conductedystematic manner, both in the theaters of military operations and in the deep rear of the enemy, using the combat capabilities of all types of armed forces. The organization of the fight against means of nuclear attack will be one of the most important tasks of any operation. The chief role In its fulfilment will belong to the missile troops, since the achievement of decisive results in the fight against means of nuclear attack is possible only when nuclear weapons are usedarge scale.
One of the requisites for the fight against means of nuclear attack will be the constant conduct of reconnaissance, the timely preparation of forces and weapons targeted on definite objectives, and decisiveness in the conduct of military operations. The protection of one's own means of nuclear attack against the strikes of the enemy will also have great significance for the success of this fight. This is achievedeliably organized system of antiaircraft defense, and also by dispersing and concealing the disposition of missile launch sites, aircraft, and depots and assembly bases for nuclear weapons.
The complexity of the fight against means of nucloar attack results from the fact that themeans for the destruction of ballistic missiles (ballistlcheskaya raketa) in flight are still In tbe developmental stage. The deetructlon in the air of cruise missiles (krylataya rakata) and also of modern, high-speed, high-altitude aircraft, especially during their mass use,ell-known difficulty. Therefore, the basic method of fighting means of nuclear attack, at least in the near future, isestruction on the ground (on launch sites, bases, airfields, depots, and at places of production) in conjunction with their destruction in the air. In the fight against missiles and aircraft of the enemy's
the greatest results can be achieved by Inflicting strikes on aircraft carriers, and on surface and submarine missile-carrying vessels at sea and at bases.
The solution of the task of fighting moans of nuclear attack is inseparably bound up with another taskthe disruption of the enemy's rear. uture war, the objectives in the enemy's deep rear will immediately be under direct strikes by the means of mass destruction, and its disruption will be the most important task of our armed forces from the very beginning of the war. Enormous destruction and property and personnel losses resulting from the mass use of nuclear weapons will result in the crippling of governmental and military control, in the upheaval of the military and economic power of hostile states, in the destruction of transportation systems, in reduction of the combat effectiveness of the enemy's armed forces, and in the demoralization of the population.
The disruption of the enemy's deep rear will require the performance of a number of important tasks. In the Initial periodar such tasks can be: the annihilation of reserves of nuclear weapons and missiles, the destruction of Industrial objectives producing these weapons and also of the most important economic, administrative-political, and scientific-technical centers, and the annihilation of national reserves of finished military-industrial products. The successful performance of these tasks canerious influence on the course of tbe war at its very beginning.
Missile weapons, and in the first place strateglo missiles, are the main means of delivering strlkos against objectives in the enemy's deep rear. Operational-tactical missiles and long-range and front aircraft (avlatslya) will be used to deliver strikes against objectives in the enemy's rear which lie within the zone of their range, against naval forces, especially missile submarines, for the destruction of sea and
ocean comraunicatlon lines vith the aim of isolating hostile nations from the theaters of military operations and from sources of raw material. Ground troops can also fulfil tasks connected vith the destruction of enemy objectives in his immediate rear by tha delivery of strikes by missiles and aircraft. Airborne troops also can take an active part ln the performance of this task.
Uilltary operations concerned with the disruption of tho enemy's deep roar are planned beforehand on the armed forces level and vlll be carried out under the irection of the Supreme High Command. Operations in the initial periodar are planned in the utmost detail, especially in connection with the infliction of the first strike.
The feature distinguishing military operations ln the initial periodar from those of the very beginning of the war Is their wide range. Both sides will strive to inflict raasa strikes with nuclear weapons, not only on the troops ln tha theaters of military operations, but also, as has already been noted, on the deep rear, ln order to ensure the attainment of the Immediate stratogic goals ln the shortest period of time, to capture the initiative more quickly, and to ensure its firm retention.
Immediately after tha first missile and aviation strike, or during tha courae of this strike, groupings of ground troops will turn to tho offensive ln tha sain directions. On those sectors of the frontituation which is unfavorable for the turning of troops to the offensive takos shape at tha beginning of the war, they will conduct defensive operations ln order toreakthrough into the depth of our territory by the enemy groupings, to inflict destruction on them, and, with the approach of tha reserves, to turn to the offensive.
The navy will develop active combat operations in the naval theaters, where the principal task will be to inflict destruction on the enemy's navy at sea and at its bases.
The troops of antiaircraft defense of the country will conduct combat operations for the destruction of the aircraft and the annihilation of enemy missiles in the air.
Thus, combat operations at the beginning of the war willystem of operations which are interrelated and directedommon goal by all types of armed forces, and which are planned and coordinated with one another even during peacetime. The appropriate forces and weapons are earmarked beforehand and the supplies of material and technical equipment necessary for the conduct of these operations are also provided for-Corrections are made, when necessary, in the plans which have been worked out, in connection with the changes which have taken place In military districts, groups of troops, fleets, and the armed forceshole.
Let us dwell on the characteristics of the combat operations of the various types of armed forces ia the initial periodar.
As has already been stated, the decisive role in performing the tasks of the initial periodar belongs to the missile troops of strategic designation. They will deliver massed nuclear/missile strikes for the fulfilment of strategic tasks in support of armed, combathole. The objectives of nuclear/missile strikes are industrial and administrative-political centers, aircraft, missile, and naval bases, nuclear ammunition at storage and assembly points, and the most important groupings of the armed forces.
Nuclear/missile strikes can also be delivered in support of armed combat in the theater of military operations with the aim of annihilating the basic groupings of enemy armed forces, of destroying and annihilating important objectives, and of breaking up the concentration of his forces and weapons in the theater. The successful performance of these tasks will create favorable conditions for the conduct of military operationsiven theater. Here the timely exploitation of the results of nuclear/missile %
strikes by other types of armed forces will have Important significance, massed nuclear/missile strikes and the coordinated efforts of all types of armed forces should bring about the decisive destruction of the enemy in the initial period of the war and the achievement of the immediate strategic aims.
At the very beginningar, the enemy will alao strive to achieve his aims through the mass use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, military operations in defense of the country and of the groupings of armed forces, against enemy nuclear strikes, take on paramount significance for us. This task will be performed mainly by the troops of the PVO of the Country. Zt Is precisely for this that they are primarily intended.
Military operations in defense of the country against eneay nuclear strikes in the initial periodar will be conducted in accordance with plans worked out earlier on the basisystem ofdefense set up during peacotlme. This system must always be ready to repel surpriso strikes by enemy means of air attack.
Vith the introductionhreat situation or with the receipt of the first information concerning preparation of an air attack by the enemy the entire system of antiaircraft defense is brought to Increased combat readiness. artial regrouping of forces and weapons for the reinforcement of tbe defense of the most important axes, areas, or objectives can be executed if necessary, and fighter aircraft can be dispersed. Part of the radar posts are moved to alternate positions. Command posta and control posts (punkt navedenlya) are brought to complete readiness to control the troops.
The repulse of the first enemy mass aviation and missile strike will be carried out by the maximum possible quantity of forces and weapons of the troops of the PVO of the Country, fronts, and fleets. In the first place, tho duty moans (dozhurnoye sredstvo) of antiaircraft defense will begin to function. Their
efforts will be Intensified Immediately by the large units and units of antiaircraft missile troops, fighter aircraft, and antiaircraft artillery which have been brought to combat readiness.
After the repulse of the enemy's first mass strike, tho entire system of antiaircraft defense may immediately be made ready to repel subsequent strikes. In case of need, the movement of antiaircraft weapons and aviation will take place ln reinforcement of the defense of important areas and objectives, the supplies of materiel are replenished and the coordination procedure is spelled out.
Simultaneously with tho delivery of nuclear/missile strikes against the enemy decisive military operations will be developed in the ground theaters in the initial periodar. In the course of theae operations, the following basic tasks can be performed: the destruction of enemy groupings, the capture of vitally important territories and areas where the means of armed combat aro based, and also the holding of the territory of our own country and of territory taken ln the course of the war. Tbe essence and paramount taak of armed combat in the ground theaters is the destruction of operational-tactical attack weapons.
Ground troops and the missile large units and units Included ln their complements, aircraft, and airborne troops are the main force ln the fulfilment of tasks in land theaters. Long-range aircraft and largo units of the troops of tbe PVO of the Country noar the front (prifrontovoy) can also be used to participate ln the performance of theae tasks. umber of cases the missile troops of the Supreme High Command will bo used for the performance of Strategic tasks.
Ullitary operations in ground theators will be conducted mainly in the form of offensive operations by ground troops with the participation of other types of armed forces. Defense can be usedemporary form of combat operations only ln
separata directions of ths secondary theaters or ln theaters with special terrain conditions. In some cases, the defense of large units and armies will also be used in the main theaters, butule these will be actions forced upon them in the course of offensive operations.
The operations of the missile troops, the delivery of nuclear/missile strikes against the enemy, and the immediate exploitation of their results by advancing troops must be made the foundation of operations by ground troops. The most important aims of the offensive operations of the Initial periodar may be the destruction of tha enemy troops deployed at the beginning of the war or concentrating ln groupings, and also of the strategic reserves brought into battle ln the course of the operation; the disruption of mobilization and of the concentration and buildup of armed forces ln the theater of military operations; tho seizure of Important economic and political centers, and also of areas of operational or strategic significance. The specific alms of an operation vlll be determined in accordance with tha situation which has developed.
The alms which have been mentioned can be achieved through the execution of several successive operations throughout the depthrontroup of fronts,esult of which favorable conditions should ba created for tho future successful conduct of armed combat. The first offensive operations willecisive significance in the destruction of enemy troops, ln tha seizure of the Initiative, and ln the attainment of the immediate strategic alms of the initial periodar.
Theae operations can begin under various conditions. In the main direction of the basic theaters of military operations, we will have to conduct offonslve operations against an enemy who has propared for aggressive operations strongly and ln good time. umber of directions, the operations will often begin with meeting engagements, but thoy can also be conducted
against aa enemy who baa gone over to the defensive hastily.
It la also necessary to take into account conditions in which the enemy la able to drive wodges Into our territory in sevoral directions. Inery complex situation can be created in which the switch of our troops to the offensive will be preceded by the conduct of defensive operations.
With all tho diversity of conditions governing the conduct of the initial offensive operations, everything will be tense in character and will be markedierce struggle to seize the initiative. Combat operations will be accompanlod by the mass use of nuclear weapons by both sides, with the aim of achieving maximum results at the very beginning of the war. This requires skilful and immediate exploitation by our troops of the results of mass strikes by nuclear weapons for the swift development of tbe offensive. Together with this, well-conceived organization of the system of measures to roduce the effective action of the enemy nuclear weapons and to safeguard our own troops Is necessary.
The first offensive operations will be started,ule, by those forces of border districts and groups of troops which can be brought to complete combat roadiness right from the beginning of thehortage of these forces will necessitate their particularly skilful use in the main directions and the employment of weapons of mass destruction, in the first place, against objeotlves whose destruction will best promote the advance of the troops and the executionkilful maneuver, with the aimapid movement into the depth of the enemy's positions. The reinforcement of fighting (deystvuyushchiy) fronts will be carried out in the course of the operation with the forces and weapons arriving from the interior of the country, and also through maneuver from other axes.
The mobile charactor of combat operations in the
initial periodar makes necessary an operational troop formation which will assist their rapid change of formation, the transfer of efforts from one direction to another, and the development of the offensive where lt will achieve the greatest success. The transfer of efforts from one direction to another will be achloved by redirecting the strikes of nuclear/miss lie-weapons in conjunction with the maneuver of large unita of ground troops.
Tho operational formation of the front in tha flrst,-offenslva operations will most frequently beingle echelon. In this case, at the beginning of the operation it is necessary to have strong reserves undor the orders of the front commander. Tba second echelon,ule, vlll be created in the course of tha offensive with the arrival of new formations. Part of then the complement of the troopsront can be deployed along the border in the initial periodar to repel possible enemy strikes, and to support theand switch to the offensive of the front strike groupings (udarnaya grupplrovka).
In splto of the fact that the first offensive operations will be conducted by comparatively limited forces, they will have great spatial scope.
The absence of an enemy defense systemwill permit the first offensive operationsbeginning of the war to be carried to a In tha main directions, the depth of acanilometers with aoffensive zone upilometers, andin mountain and desert areas. The destructionbaslo enemy groupings and the seizure oftoepth will facilitate thethe strategic tasks of the initial period of thethe shortest period of time. The performance ofwilligh rate of advance by theuse of the weapons of mass destructionhigh mobility of the groung troops will permitof strikes ln depth against the enemy andabout an advance at high speeds. Underan offensive can attain anilometers and
The distinctive feature of the first offensive operations lies in the fact that at their outset the main forces of both sides will not come Into contact with one another, and that therefore the offensive will most frequently develop from the march. The front's first echelon troops, which can be deployed in departure areas or areas of concentration before the beginning of military operations, must be atistance that they can be moved quickly to the national frontier and go over to the offensive, exploiting the esults of strikes by nuclear weapons.
It can also be that the troops moving up to the border from areas of permanent disposition will begin combat operations on the basisrief order or signal from the senior commander with reference to one of the operational variants envisaged by the plan.
Under conditions when the enemy forestalls us in the deployment and in the delivery of strikes from the air and by land groupings, the front's troops must inflict destruction with strong counterstrikes against the invading enemy and go overecisive offensive which will be preceded by powerful strikes by missiles, aviation, and artillery against the enemy's groupings and against his missile-launching sites, aviation, and reserves. After the infliction of destruction on the enemy's basic grouping, the front's troops must develop the offensive in depth unceasingly, with the aim of utterly destroying the enemy's troops and of fulfilling the assigned missions.
The offensive operations of -the initial periodar can be conducted in various ways. ase when the enemy's defense is not prepared, his groupings of troops are dispersed, and his large reserves are located in the depth, lt is not advisable to deliver swift, deep strikes in several directions. During this, it .is necessary to concentrate the main efforts in the direction where the maximum results can be obtained in tho shortest period of time and with the smallest losses. ethod of operation
ensures the greatest degree of diffusion of tbe enemy's front, tbe dispersion of bis efforts, the destruction by units of the approaching reserves, and tha seizure of Important areas and objectives in the eneny's territory in great depth. During this, swift penetrations by strike groupings to tbe greatest possible depth will have particularly important significance.
Such groupings, exploiting to the utmost tha results of nuclear strikes and avoiding involvement n prolonged engagements with the enemy remaining ln the rear and on the flanks, must destroy tbe large enemy reserves, capture the areas where nuclear delivery means are based, disrupt communications and control, seize vitally Important areas and objectives, and thwart the deployment by the enemy of his armed forces.
Other ways of conducting offensive operations can also be employed, fortrike ln two directions, tbe onclrcloment and annihilation of large enemy groupings with the simultaneous development of an offensive ln depth,trike in ono direction. The methods and ways of conducting an offensive operation must always be determined by the particular conditions of the situation.
Together with the conduct of offensive operations ln the Initial periodar, defensive operations can be carried out ln separate directions or in secondary theaters of military operations.
These defensive operations, .which .weemporary type of combat operation, can be aimed at disrupting tha enemy's offensive, preventing his intrusion into our territory, inflicting the greatest possible losses on him, gaining time for tha concentration and deployment of troops, and thus create favorable conditionswitch to the offensive.
Defensive operations can also be conducted in the courseeneral offensive vhlch has already begun. In this case, the defense vlll be conducted on separate sectors of the front by units and large units, and possibly by individual armies and vill be conducted in support of the offensive.
The planning and preparationirst defensive operation in those directions or theaters vhere, at the beginning of the var, the execution of extensive offensive operations is not proposed, are carried out during peacetime. The most probable variants of combat operations, subject to tho possible conditions under vhlch the operation can begin, are outlined in the plan. Besides the usual measures, the organization of cover for troop deployment in the border zone is provided for. It is quite clear that not all the conditionsituation can be considered in the plan. On the eve of the var or at tbe beginning of military operations, therefore, it can be made more precise.
The defense vill be built up and conducted differently from the last var. There vill not be the defensive lines and zones vhlch vere set up in the past. The basis of defense must not be the creationolid front, but nuclear/missile strikes, the extensive use of fire maneuver and of maneuver by forces and weapons in combination vith the holding of important areas and sectors and the use of various obstacles.
Those forces and weapons vhlch vlll be in the border military districts at the beginningar vill be used to execute the first defensive operations of the initial periodar. The intensification of efforts in the course of the operation vill be conducted, in the first place, by the maneuver of forces and weapons from other directions. It is advisable to use the troops arriving from internal distrlcte mainly for the final destruction of the enemy In the course of the offensive.
The operations of the defending troopa will be distinguished by greet intensity aad high aggresslve-neaa. From the very beginning of military operations, both sides will strive to achieve decisive results by nuclear weapons otrikea. efensive operation In the Initial periodar, success can be attained only by the skillful concentration of basic efforts in directions where the enemy's offensive is expected, by mass nuclear strikes against his troops, by the means of nuclear attack, and by the extensive use of maneuver.
This success will also depend in large measure on the outcome of combat with an enemy grouping breaking into the positions of the defending troops. The destruction ofrouping must be carried out by decisive counter-strikes.
In the first defensive operations, the troop grouping which will be used to deliver the counter-strike will be assembled earlier, but the counterstrike itself will most often be inflicted from the march. It must begin with strikes by missiles, aviation, and artillery using nuclear weapons against the main enemy grouping. this, the troops of the counterstrike grouping go over to tbe offensive. These troops must operate decisively and advance at high speeds until the complete destruction of the invading enemy grouping is achieved.
Ve will briefly consider air operations in the initial periodar.
As is known, the development of missile equipment and its introduction into all types of armed forces, and also the significant increase in the effectiveness of modern weapons of antiaircraft defense, haveecrease in-tho role of the air forces, and especially of bomber aviation in armed combat. Ve are at present going through the process of replacing the long-range and front bomber aviation with strategic and operational-tactical missiles; however, we consider that aviation will keep its significance for some time yet.
Long-range aviation vlll have to carry out tasks concerned mainly vith the destruction of objectives vhlch are weakly protected by antiaircraft weapons, and front aviation will be concerned with the support of ground troops and with ensuring that long-range aviation successfully overcomes enemy antiaircraft defense ln the area in the vicinity of the front (prifrontovaya polosa) by neutralizing control points, tha radar network, and the active means of the PVO.
One of the conditions of success of an operation in the initial periodar Is that heightened combat readiness be attained rapidly, and also that timely escape from an enemy strike can be achieved by the takeoff of the aircraft or by their transfer to other airfields. ule, the escape of bomber aircraft from an enemy strike must be completed by the delivery of strikes against his objectives, irrespective of tha time of day.
The basic method of.operation by bomber aircraft' la the delivery of successive, massed strikes. At tha beginning of the first strike, intensive air and radio-technical reconnaissance is conducted with the aim of obtaining Information for subsequent strlkos by missiles and aircraft, and also of detormining the degree of destruction of the enemy objectives. Strikes delivered subsequently take into account the results of previous operations and nowly arising tasks.
Nava1 operations. In tho initial periodar the navy will conduct-operations in the first place with the aim of destroying ths enemy's missile submarines, of inflicting destruction on his carrier strike large, unitslso of disrupting sea and ocean transport.
Naval operations will be conducted primarily by the forces of large units of submarines and naval aircraft with the participation In some cases of large unlta and units of strategic missile troops and long-range aviation.
first naval operations will have particularly important significance ln the performance of tasks ln the Initial periodar. Advance and systematic study of the combat composition of the enemy's navy and of those of his objectives which it is intended should be hit during the delivery of the first strike at the very beginning of tha war will aignificantly influence their success.
Thia strike must be carried out by naval forces ln the minimum amount of time after the receiptignal regarding ono of the earlier planned variants. It is delivered against objectives whose destruction would lead to the frustration of the enemy's nuclear strikes from the sea and the significant weakening of his navy. For tha navy, in the first place, such objectives will be missile submarines and the carrier strike large units of the enemy and also his naval bases and most Important ports, with tha warships and transports which are there.
The maximum possible quantity of forces and weapons, with mass use of nuclear warheads, is used for the delivery of the first strike. trike against enemy objectives in remote areas will be delivered by strategic missile large units, by submarines, by long-range naval aviation, and also by large units of long-range aviation assigned to tha support of the navy. The destruction of enemy coastal objectives will be carried out,ule, by missile troops, and in some cases this task can be assigned to missile submarines.
For the performance of tasks ln closed naval thsaters and in the closest areas of open, seas, surface vessels armed with missile weapons and mine-torpedo aircraft will also be usod.
In order to keep the enemy undor tension during intervals between mass strikes, it is advisable to conduct combat operations by small groups of submarines and aviation, and also to make methodical missile launchings using various means of destruction.
The successes attainedesult of previous military operations must be consolidated by followup operations. Their aims will depend upon the success of the first naval operations and on the further tasks of armed combat at sea.
In speaking of armed combat in the initial periodar, it is necessary to emphasize that none of the types of military activities or of operations which will be conducted in this period can be examined in isolation from one another. All of them will be coordinated according to target, time, and place and will be united by the single plan and direction of the Supreme High Command.
Active and decisive operations on the fronts and in the deep rear of the enemy in the course of the operations during the initial periodar must lead to the undermining of the enemy's ability to withstand the disorganization of his rear, the seizure of the initiative by us, and the attainment of the immediate strategic aims of the war.
The subsequent course of the war will dependarge extent upon the results of armed combat in this period.
We believe in the inevitability of our victory, the complete destruction of the aggressive imperialist states, and the downfall of the entire world system of capitalism. But this victory will not come into being by itself. We must prepare ourselves and our glorious armed forces for it tirelessly and with all our power.Original document.