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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence
MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "Problems in
the Development of Antiair Defense of the Ground Troops and Ways to Resolvey Colonel V. Zemskov
Enclosederbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought"'V'Voyennayaublished by the Ministry ot Uetense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.
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THOUGHT (TOPProblems in the Development of Antlair Defense of the Ground Troops and Ways to Resolvey Colonel V, Zemskov
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Followingerbatim translation of an article titled "Problems in the Development of Antlair Defense of the Ground Troops and Ways to Resolvey Colonel V. Zemskov.
This article appeared in2 First Issuepecial version of the Soviet military Journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. 2 First Issue went to press on
Headquarters Cociment: Military Thought is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issued monthlyhile the other two versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in By the end1 issues of the SECRET version had beenf them during
1.
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in the Development of Antlalr Defense of the Ground Troops and Ways to Resolve Them* by
Colonel V. Zemskov
Under modern conditions, the role of antiair defense has grown so much that the course and outcome of ground troopdepend arge extent on its effectiveness. This is conditioned by the fact that our probable enemiesuclear offensive, in which the leading role is assigned to missiles and aircraft, to be the main substance of the first strategic operation of the united Armed Forces of NATO in the Initial periodar. The goal of such an offensive Is to achieve,hort period of time, nuclear superiority, supremacy in the air and seizure of the strategic initiative from the very start of the war. Its scope can be judged from the experience of theATO maneuvers whore, during three calendar days of the nuclear0 nuclear strikes were conditionally delivered, and up0 aircraft, andarge number of cruise missiles, "Thor" ballistic missile launchers, URS (upravlyayemyy reaktivnyyuided missiles) and NURS (neupravlyayemyy reaktivnyyree rockets) of the ground troops participated. Effective combat with this large number of carriers of nuclear charges represents one of the most important tasks of the ground troops in conducting operations during the entire war.
In the light of this, lt should be noted that the work being reviewed has great theoretical and practical Its authors, examining the most important problems of ground troop PiO,asically new tenet as the basis of
tn the Development of Antiair Defense of Ground Troops and Ways to Rosolvo Thorn. Military Publishingagesnserts. .
investigation, which consists of the fact that antiair defense has now outgrown the framework of support and is one of the main component parts of the substance of troop combat operations, directed toward the destruction in the air of the enemy's basic carriers of nuclearhis aircraft and missiles,
Proceeding from this concept, in the first chapter the influence of modern troop combat operationsof antiair defense is correctly brought to light, and the basic requirements for it, resulting from the peculiarities of the operations of the air enemy under the conditionsuclear/missile war and the employment of new attack weapons by him, are validly formulated. It is stressed that the antiair defense weapons of the ground troops, by their active operations to destroy enemyand missiles, actually participate in the struggle for nuclear superiority over the enemy.
The process of changing weapons of air attack has unavoidablyound determination of the line of further development of the antiair defense weapons of the ground troops. This most important question is examined in the second chapter.
For combatting operational-tactical ballistic missiles, It is proposed to have specialand for destroying high-speed piloted aircraft and cruise missiles at all altitudes, antiaircraft guided missiles of three types: (ZUR-D) (zenitnaya upravlyayemaya raketa-dalnyaya)and short range (ZUR-S) (zenitnaya upravlyayemaya raketarednyaya) and (zenitnaya upravlyayemayaa layhese types of missiles must comprise the basis of the antiair defense of ground troops. Close actionguided missiles (ZUR-B) (zenitnaya upravlyayemayalizhnyaya) manual and mountedtankovaya) are recommended as the basic means of combat with low-flying,
low-speed, aerial targets.
Concerning snail-caliber antiaircraft artillery and flgbter aviation, in tbe work it is pointed out that so far they have not yet lost their significance, but they will be ousted by antiaircraft guided missiles, as the weapons having the greatest future promise. It Is possible to agree with this only in regard toartillery. he authorsadhere to tho idea that thereeed to Improve antiaircraft artillery, even to create new models of multiple small-caliber antiaircraftwith autonomous radar sights. The question arises, is there any sense in expending considerable scientific-technical and productive efforts to create new models of these weapons? Isn't it better to work out more quickly, and introduce into the troops, the most effective antiaircraft guided missiles of all types?
The conclusions of the authors concerning fighter aircraft*In our opinion, are premature and not quite correct. Modern fighter aircraft, armed withto-air" class missiles, are, at the present time, one of the basic means of antlalr defense. In the future their significance and proportion in thesystem of antlalr defense will undoubtedly decrease. However, it is impossible to fully replace them with antiaircraft missiles, and Is hardly advisable,both fighter aircraft and antiaircraft missiles have their merits and doflatencies, which can beand, consequently, continuous reliable antiair defense may be achieved only by joint use of all the forces and weapons of the PVO.
The tactical-technical requirements for all the weapons of ground troop antlalr defense are. In our opinion, basically determined correctly in the book. But the proposed combat altitude ofand medium-range antiaircraft guided missiles is the sameoom. It seems to us that these
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may bo used tor both zonal and direct covering of troops and objectives. Therefore thoir grouping must have an operational-tactical oractical nature. Recommendations on the grouping of missile units are also argued vith adequate conviction and may be incorporated into the basis of practical activity; in creating them lt is necessary to observe theof deep ochelonaent, including the larger part of them in the first, most powerful, ochelon of the PVO.
In modern operations, observance of the principle of continuity In covering troops and objectives attains exceptionally great significance. In investigating this question special attention should bo given to the organisation of coordination of antiaircraft guided missiles with fighter aviation in order to insure true continuity of troop PVO in an offensive and theof the employment of antiaircraft missile units during combat operations conductedempo of morem per hour.
However, the possibility of further increasing the tempo of an offensive is not sufficiently considered in the worm. Only one version of displacement is given and
it is stressed that continuity of troop cover will be disrupted with an average offensive tempo of morem per hour. Consequently, during pursuit, when troops will be moving at higher tempos, this task cannot bo performed at all. However; the organization ofof antiaircraft guided missiles with fighterwith the goal of insuring continuity of troop cover during an offensive operation, has not boon examined at all.
Under modern conditions, in view of the fact that the most varied, including high-speed, weapons of aerial attack exist, the problem of organizing coordination between antiaircraft guided missiles and fighter aviation has become considerably more complicated. On the whole, in the work the basic propositions are correctlyon these three types of coordination:
principle, the method for determining the required number of active PVO weapons for front troops, proposed by the authors, is acceptable. lightly overestimated version of the composition of the front troops was used as the basis of the calculation. from operational-strategic exercises of the last few years shows that the composition of the front troops usually includes onlyop tooombined-arms divisions, and not, as indicated onnd in the future, in our opinion, the composition of the front, as the number of nuclear weapons allocated for an operation increases, can only decrease somewhat, but not increase. Besides, in the given version of theit is not pointed out which operation is being carried out by the front, defensive or offensive. some abstract version of the amount of active PVO weapons required by tha front troops is proposed. This would be justified only if the authors considered thatactor as the nature of the operations of the troops being covered does not influence this. But, onhey themselves point outthe nature of the use of the troops being covered in an operation and a battle" should be taken Into consideration. Moreover, ontables, two more versions of the composition of the active PVO weapons of the front are given, but here separately for offensive and defensive operations.
On the whole, despite the fact that this question isreat deal of attention, it is still statedontradictory manner and without adequate bases. In our opinion, when determining the requiredf active PVO weapons, it is most correct first of all to take into consideration the nature and the proposed scope of the front operation, and inases to be guided by this, togetheronsideration of other factors.
Up until recently many varying opinions and views existed on questions of tho control of PVO troops and their coordination, both in theory and in practice.
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reat deal of attention Is given to an examination of the problem ofautomation of the processes for controlling active PVO weapons. It is stressed that when solving this problem the required speed for transmitting data and commands, maximum centralization of the control of the basic active PVO means, and correct organization of coordination among them must be The rapid development of aerial attack and PVO weapons already requires an. immediate practical solution of this problem. But having resolved it in the shortest possible time, it will be difficult to count on the successful fulfilment of tho tasks that face the PVO troops. The recommendationsby the authors on this question, taking intoprojected tendencies in the development of communications and control equipment and prospects, of domestic science and technology, can, in our opinion, also be incorporated into the basis for resolving the problem of the comprehensive automation of the processes of controlling PVO weapons.
Support of the combat operations of tho PVO troops of the ground troops is examinedpecial fifth. chapter. In this, special stress Is laid on radar support.
In modern operations, success in the antiair defense of troops depends,reat degree, on the timely and complete receipt of necessary intelligence and target designation data by all the active PVO weapons simultaneously. Having analyzed theof the existing system of radar support for PVO weapons of the front and army, the authors have come to the correctit is not only not capable of providing all the active PVO weapons with data simultaneously, but Is not even capable ofeach of them singly) .
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work does not take into consideration those means of reconnaissance and target designation that themissile large units and units have at their disposal. At the present time, and in the near future, they should be examinedery substantial reserve of radar equipment in the hands of the chief of the PVO troops of the front (army). The indicatedcanery important part in case operating radar posts, in those areas where combat formations of antiaircraft missile units and large units aro deployed, are put out of commission. It seems to us that this question deserves investigation and practical verification in the troops.
In the reviewed work the authorsreat deal of attention to providing PVO troops with missiles and, in our opinion, came to the correct conclusion, that it is impossible precisely to plan the expenditure of missiles by days of an operation,because it depends on the intensity of the air enemy's operations. And this factor, as is known, cannot be predicted accurately inowever, when presenting practicalthe authors depart from this conclusion and still propose planning the expenditure of missiles released for the front by days of the operation, and even hold to the tentatively planned expenditure of missiles by days of the operation for the front. It seems to us that the authors are acting Incorrectly in artificially limiting the expenditure ofmissiles and antimissile missiles. Obviously, it will be limited mainly by technical capabilities. If there iseed to plan the expenditure of missiles by days of the operation, then it is more advisable to take the technical capabilities for assembling, equipping and delivering the missiles to fire subunits and units as the basis of the plan, taking into consideration the extremely tentative nature of the air enemy's operations.
Effectiveness in the operations of PVO weapons,arge extent, depends on their rapid and high
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the whole, the proposed organizationrigade of medium-and short-range antiaircraft guided missiles corresponds to modern requirements, but even the brigade, in our opinion, must have no less than three regiments or battalions (with three fire units in each) in its composition. By having brigades composed of three regiments t will be possible to achieve continuity in covering troops during an offensive conducted at an average tempom per hour.
In the last chapter the fundamentals of the ntlair defense of troops in offensive and in de--fensive front (army) operations of the initial periodar are set forth. Under these conditions, the PVO of the troops and rear area objectives offronts will be carried out only with those weapons that are at the disposal of the troops of the first strategic echelon, tieformations and large units of the border military districts and groups of forces. In the reviewed work, the requirement that themissile units, fighter aviation and radio countermeasure means existing in groups of forces- and in border military districts, must be at full strength, deployed, and be in constant combat readiness toactive combat with enemy weapons of aerial attack, is correctly formulated. It should be stressed that this requirement has an extremely importantwhen the aggressor is preparingurprise nuclear attack. Experience from the past warshowed that the success eft the attacking side was usually explained not only by,the factor of surprise, but also by the:'Incomplete combatof the armed forces.
In conclusion, it is essential to stress that all the deficiencies noted by us arepecific nature, and cannot lower,ighly positiveof the work. The reviewed book is the first one onrtBeV given subject in the postwar- period. The authors deserve great credit for being able to create
a really problematical and perceptive work. It does not reiterate principles that are common knowledge, but creatively, on the basis of an analysis of tho modern requirements of oporatlonal art and scientific-technical capabilities, trends, probable paths of development, and solutions to.the vitally Important problems of the PVO of tho ground troops, are brought to light,and practical, acceptable recommendations are givqn. The work examined by us may be adopted as the basisractical resolution of the basic problems of PVO of tho ground troops, not only for the present time but also for tho near future.
Original document.
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