(PUBDATE UNKNOWN/ESTIMATE) MEMO FROM RICHARD HELMS TO DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIG

Created: 1/1/1962

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

. C

IRONBARK

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET!: "On the

question of the Tasks, Organization and Planning of Military-Scientificy Rear-Admiral V. Bogolepov

Enclosederbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Militaryne Ministry ot Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander,

For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material, Tho word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

In the interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK material should be handledeed-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

Enclosure

Richard Helms Deputy Director (Plans)

',

FOR RELEASE

2

1 SMIfe)

The Director of Central Intelligence

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The Director oF Intelligence and Research, Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Amy

The Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff.S. Air

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence Atonic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Cuided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Doputy Director .for Research

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimatos

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

) IRONBARK

DATE OF INFO

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT

SOURCE

THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "On tho question oi tne Tasks, Organization and Planning of Military-Scientific Work" by Rear-Admiral V. Bogolepov

: 1

Documentary

A roliablo source (B) .

Followingerbatim translation of an article titled "On the Question of the Tasks, Organization and Planning of Military-Scientific Work" by Roar-Admiral V. Bogolepov.

This articlo appeared ln2 First Issuepecial version of the Soviet military Journal Voyonnaya "ysl (Military Thought). This Journal is published Irro-gularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. 2 First Issue wont to press on

Headquarters Commont: Military Thought is published by tho USSR"Ministry of Defonse in three versions,RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issued monthlyhile the other two versions are Issued irregularly. The TOP SECRETwas initiated in By tho end1 issues of the SECRET version had beenf thorn

-1-

IRONBARK

the Question of tho Tasks, Organization and Planning of Military-Scientific Work

by

Rear-Admiral V. Bogolepov

The thoughts presented in this article are the results of some of tho author's experience in the work of scientific-research groups created during the last four years under tho Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

The great and constantly growing significance of science in our country la known. The application of science has become one of the decisive factors in the mighty growth of the productive forces of society. At the XXII Congress of the. Khrushchev stated: "The constant Improvement of the forms and methods of the management of the national economy, the most rational use of Internal resources and potentialities, and adherence to scientifically founded proportions in the development of the branches of thetaking on special significance (underlined by

Life itself domands of the planning and economic management of newuch higher order of scientific substantiation and oconomic calculations. Profound scientific 'work on the problems of developing economics and technology must precede the formulation of plans and the confirmation of economic measures. Economic and technical research must facilitate the correct performance of economic tasks.

Obviously, military-scientific work should bo approached with equally high standards, because it is gradually becoming the cornerstone of Armod Forces

development. Military-scientific work in the broad sense of the word encompasses all research activity on military subjects. However, military-scientific work is normally considered to be only the part of this work that concerns military theory and that does not touch upon questions of armament and military equipment. In this article we shall arbitrarily call this part of general military-scientific work military-scientific operational work (including in it not only operational but also strategic and tacticalnd we shall call the second part military-scientific technical work.

The organization of both component parts of military-scientific work is also different. Military-scientific operational work is conducted by certain faculties and in scientific groups of military academies, in military-scientific societies, and also by the scientific aktlv that is gathered around Military Thought, Naval CoTlc'ctlon, and other military journals^ During the past few years such work has also been performed in the scientific groups cited in the branches of the Armed Forces. Military-scientific technical work is also taken up in part by the majority of the faculties of academics, according to their curricula, and mainly by the numerous specialized scientific-research institutes of the various branches of the Armod Forces, Experimental-design work and,ertain degree, the scientific-research work of industrial institutes serving the Armed Forces, are combined with their work.

In the second field of military science there Is notuge numerical superiority of persons working directly on questions of military theory, but alsobetter organization of scientific work. Military-scientific technical wprk is conducted mainly in specially organized and equipped scientificsuch as institutes, and is fulfilled,ule, by harmonious scientific collectives. At the

sane time, scientific work in the field of military theory is scatteredumber of establishments, is often fulfilled by persons working alone, not connected with one another, and, If lt is fulfilled by collectives, the latter are often selected not on grounds of scientific qualifications, but are staffed by chance (in particular, many scientific groups in the branches of the Armed Forces have actually been selected in this way).

ime when military-scientific technical work has,ong time now, been carried out according to spoclfic plans, often connected with large financial appropriations, and is usually fulfilled under rigid supervision, work ln the field of military theory began to be planned only recently. It is poorly supervised andumber of cases Its quality leaves much to be desired. As anears ago when one of the scientific groups was working on the problem of combatting ocean-sea communication routes and tried to familiarize Itself with existing scientific material on these questions, it was discovered that among the several hundred pertinent monographs, dissertations, graduation theses, and articles, half of them were devoted to one single, important, but Isolated topic, "Combat of Submarine and Air Forces Against Remoto Enemy Communication Routes". Inarge part of the works in this half were compilations that were of no real value. At the sameumbor of vital questions of this combat agAinst communication lines seemed to have dropped out of tho field of view of our naval theoretical literature.

ituation is characteristic not only of work on this problem, but also on other problems. It can only be explained by deficiencies ln planning andertain lack of organization in the selection of the subjects of scientific work. With all the need to give scientific personnel freedom ln the selection of subjects, the overall maneuvering of scientific forces and capabilities must, first of all, ensure

Finally, while porsons working on quostlons of armament and military equipment are constantly Informed on the latest scientific-technical achievements in their field, since without this their work proves to be fruitless, the majority of the theoretical workers In the operational field, because of securityare often not given access to documents that reflect pertinent achievements in the field of scienco and technology.

To summarize, with the comparatively large number of operatives and tacticians working on the theoretical front, with their quite high training and ossentialhe coefficient of the useful operation of our military-scientific network lsnot great: the factual results of its work are much lower than its potentialities. Lately, in connection withreductions, the position of operational scientific work has become even worse, not only absolutely but also relatively. These reductions have had loss effect on scientific-technical work.

With any personnel reductions in the composition of the Armed Forces, military-scientific work cannot be weakened, but, just the opposite, it is necessary to broadon and deepen lt in every possible way,

Here we do not examine the situation of laboratory, experimental and tho experimental-production base of our academies, and especially, scientific-research institutes. This question deserves separate It should only be said that in this field much better cooperation is required than exists now between them, especially with organs of industry.

-5-

only in this way la it possible to compensate for the quantitative reduction of forces. This pertain especially to scientific work in the field of military theory. For, Id general, lt should stand at the head of the military-scientific, including scientific-technical work. Indeed, this Is also demanded by the development of armament and equipment itself.

Of course, changes ln the development of weapons and equipment determino changes in the development of military affairs. But, undoubtedly, military theory also exerts its own reciprocal influence on military theory. Military technology cannot develop swiftly without being oriented by military theory. The latter has to Indicate paths of development to militarythe most effectlvo ones from the standpoint of military art. Only on this basis is it possible to develop practical scientific-technical work in the most advantageous directions.

Now, when science and technology are developing so fast, acute scientific thought must be aimed at not less than ten years ahead. Only with thisis it possible to possess modern armament and equipment of forces at any given moment, because scientific-technical and design work, the testing of experimental models, and the creation of large and small series, on the average, take Just ten years.

In particular, the mattor of research onmilitary effectiveness stands very poorly, including the military-economic" profitableness of various methods of fulfilling particular strategic, operational, and oven tactical, tasks. In conditions of the use of weapons of mass destruction, and thoir delivery to targeta by missiles, almost any one of these tasks can bo performed by various methods and correspondingly with various constituents of forces and weapons, belonging to various branches of the Armed Forces .

forces, weapons, and methods are by no means equal Inoth purely military and military-economic. But, unfortunately, such comparative investigations are mainly conducted in scientific organs of the separate branches of the forces, and this does not ensure their necessary depth and objectivity, not onlyesult of "parochial favoritism" and, thus,iassed attitude toward the capabilities of other branches of forces, but evenesult of the aforementioned insufficientof future possibilities of their neighbors, and likewise as a result of the lackommon methodology of comparison.

The tasks of tho Armed Forces on ocean-soa axes that are quite characteristic in this respect are shown in the table that follows. On the one hand the water has already lost its former "privileged" position, when it served as the only means of communication between bodies of land separated by it. Now the most universal medium, in this respect, is the air. Even though air transport is still limited in respect to weight and dimensions of cargo, andesult of its relative highumber of tasks formerly performed only on the water and from the water, now can well be carried out outside this medium,

he other hand the water medium represents the most diverse field of operations, both for surface, submarine, and air forces and weapons. Moreover, for submarine forces it stillairly high degree of security.

To summarize the general formulation of the question of the preferredot of the "navy" or even of the "ocean-sea forces" but of the forces capable of operating on ocean-sea axes, now comes to the following.

A. To have an effect on any objectives on the water, partially under the water, and also territorial objectives located "across theow it is

1

possible to perform the tasks cited in the tablela, and allnd 3from the shore. But because , umber of cases, these operations from the shore (especially against mobile targets) require too complex andystem of target designation and guidance, it must be thoroughly examined against vhlch specific objectives, vhen and under vhat condition specifically at vhat distances from shore, it is more advantageous to employ veapons, namely missiles, from the shore and vhen lt is advantageous to employ them from "intermediate"irst load them on special, mobile submarine, air or surface "platforms" and send them to sean order to move the weapons closer to tho objectives.

Besides, as regards task la, it is necessary to note the importance of its study ln this respect. Now submarines are recognized as the most promising forces for antisubmarine defense, including, above all, operations against missile-carrying submarines. Taking into consideration the very great significance of such defense for us and the huge forcest, maybe it is more advantageous to direct submarine construction mainly ln this direction? But ln some conditions our missile-carrying submarines (aa the Americans themselves consider) will prove to be more advantagoous than intercontinental missiles? All the more reason that the entire problem must be thoroughly analyzedhole,

Tho question of combat against communication has been studied the most. However even here there Is insufficient clarity in

"* See the book "Fundamentals of Employing Submarine and Air Forcos Against Ocean... (several words

the point that was Just emphasized: with what weapons is it more advantageous to destroy enemy ports andissiles from submarines or intercontinental missiles? And in conditions of nuclear warfare ports are tbe main objective in combat against communication lines*.

The question of the optimal forces, weaponB and measures for performingas been developed even less.

IRONBARK

Vwto of tho Aroedoaolbload toapooo for rfomlflg Then.*

oiad Vmpocd

lo

ColDoldoiUolLi

1

.

if*loot]

personnal

1

j

0

1

oaouai-

oatlOA Llnoa:

;

.

port! aad baata

c

1

I

OM

i

fr tba rn

1

tlrcrafl carrlara (AY) aod oar-rloro (tm)

'0

*

i

oubaarlnaa (PLPL)

1

to

alaallaa

0

;

3.

1

:

T

11am:

-

1

i

Vith or.oif naval

forcao

for araj ' '

'

1

1

1

1 0

T

f4uab#>rUu ji lphabeticalloo corraapond to tho oumiboro ofa taoko.

l* of

mA aUAllUry rolo; potoatiol

IRONBARK

M4)

regards taskombat with aircraft carriers and nlsslle carriers, both aircraft and submarines can and must be used for this. However, tbe employment of ballistic missiles from the ground against them, as well, seems to be promising and requires thorough investigation.

Task. combat with missile-carrying submarines of the onemy, is especially complex and requires all-around utilization (and hence, also, all-around Investigation) of the potontialltiesumber of branchos of the Armed Forces,

Dospite the fact that the next. 3c, antlalr defense and antimissile defense, must be performed mainly by the forces and weaponspecial branch of the Armed Forces, the participation of the Navy Is also useful in its investigation, because somo of its potentialities in this respect, namely, the potentialities of mobile radar patrols,that are brought forward desorve attention.

Undorstandably, in modern conditions, task. antilanding combat, requires special cooperation of tho various branches of forces and corresponding research work.

B. As regards the sore or less similar tasks lb,nd 4b, which relate to sea transport, such short-rangewithin the limits of the possibility of our screening them with air and sea forces, are completely feasible even now. But we are now working enough on the question of the optimum forces, weapons and methods for supporting them, and the main thing Is that wo do not keep this question in the field of continuous attention.

If we refer to long-range transport, namelythen, of course, military science must always be ready to report at the first demand of tho leadership, comprehensive, clear vlows on the most advantageousof forces, weapons and methods for carrying out such transport, with dotalled calculations of the timo periods necessary, and tho cost of creating these forces and weapons. Logically, the following thoughts should be presented here.

-li-

IRONBARK

Long-range (transsea and transoceanic) transport may be carried out on the water, in the air and by special methods.

Large-scale underwater transport has poor future prospects, asesult of Its high cost and vulnerability.

Surface transport Is entirely feasible but requires the support of forces that are superior to those of the enemy. What kind of forces? At present, with therange of aircraft mainly surface means. show that if> we wanted to we could create such forces no earlier thanoears from now, and this is clearly useless. In the first place, in ton years the international situation will have changed sharply. "When the Soviet Union becomes the first industrial. Khrushchev at the XXII Congress"when the socialist system is finally transformed into the decisive factor of world development, when the forces* of peace multiply even more throughout the entire world, then the balance will finally be tilted in favor of the forces of peace and the barometer of the International weather will show: clear. The threatorld war will haverever."

Secondly, the technical situation also changes: it will suffice for autonomous aircraft to appear, to have the significance of aircraft carriers fall off sharply.

Hence the only realistic possibility for ourout such transport consists/of creating sufficiently

autonomous, powerfulnot only for the direct

performance of part of the transport by air, but also

for screening the other part of ltthe transport

carried out by sea. And because we also need these aircraft for other purposes, all efforts should betoward its creation, the more so, because of other reasons, we cannot permit the Americans tous in this field.

In his recent speeches President Kennedy spoke coolly about atomic aircraft. Of course, for the USA and Britain, which possess powerful aircraft carrier fleets, atomicare really unnecessary. But is not the USAtrying to confuse us with its announcements? Do not the remarks of the President remind us of theof the USA and Britain atashington Conference, against submarines, whichlear threat to them? We cannot escape this thought.

C. In actuality the possibilities of performingave already been examined, and as regards tasknto what was said above, an important question is the creation of an amphibious fleet, which, unfortunately, we hardly concern ourselves with.

A few years ago the former Minister of Defense,of the Soviet Union Zhukov, said that since the ground forces themselves possess powerful strike weapons, they are not in need of support from the sea. This, of course, Is not so. If there is no navy at sea, then some kind offorces will have to be created by the army itself, as this is done ignificant degree byrmy, even though theyavy. The-question isatter of what is more advantageous.

This, in brief, isrogram of the necessary of the future forces, means and methods for performing tasks that are before the Armed Forces on the oceans and seas, but the prerequisites to formulation ofrogram, and then only some prerequisites,umber of other important questions have hardly been touchedexample, the cooperation of forces and theiran important question as the most feasible standardization of the organization and control equipment in all branches of the Armed Forces, etc..

Incidentally, it may be said that, while already long before the Second World War the constant and "general" threat of enemy aviation forced the creationnified system of antiair defense, now we are even more in heed of having, if possible, standard organization andof the control of all the Armed Forces (Thcluding observation, communications, secure communications and computer equipment).

As was already stated, the above, as well as other important questions, must be Investigated not onlyfrom the military, but also from the military-economic standpoint. This has almost been Ignored until the present time, which explains the completely inadequate development of the methodology of military-economic calculations. For the calculations must be carried out not only for each separate task but also for "algebraic sums" of particular variants of these tasks. Therefore, it is clear that this methodology must be common for all branches of the Armed Forces, but, of course, taking into consideration the specific characteristics of each of the branches of forces in their particular sectors.

"Freedom is the basic necessity." Under thesituation, complete freedom In selecting theforces and weapons which are really betterumber of cases. It is lacking not only within one or another branch of the Armed Forces, but on the scale of the Armed Forceshole. It is already unnecessary to sayituation inevitably leads to the need for "impulsive" decisions,road field for all kinds of irresponsible statements, unnecessary friction, etc..

Naturally the correct solution to this entire, particularly important problem consists of theof timely, close, joint, creative scientific work of military theoreticians and engineers. The

question le only how to organize this work correctly, Including the correct control and planning of it.

Also, overall considerations and securityhavo forced and are forcing the differentiation of this entire activity above all by the degrees of itsand significance. But it is important that ln each of itshe abovenentloned creative operational-tactical collaboration should be retained. How is lt beat to organize it?

From tho above lt is clear that as the paramount scientific organ, it.also works directly, plans the work of tho "scientificay only exist at the level of the Ministry of Defense, moat likely ln the composition of the General Staff or of its Chief Operations Directorate. Only in this way is itto ensure complex purposofulnoss (perspective) and coordination of the development of the individual branches of the "Armed Forces and thus, of the Armed Forceshole, along with the requisite competence of this organ, and the necessary security of its work.

Occupying Itself only with futureeing completely separated from current operational planning, this organ, Incorporating several tens of the most qualified scientific workers and engineer-specialists on basic types of weapons andust work on three basic problems:

on scientific research into the most promising ways (variants) for 'performing tho main strategic tasks that stand ooTbre the Armed Forces

Sinceechnical organ already exists in the composition of the General Staff ln the form of the Scientific-Technical Committooaybe it would be best to simply reconstruct this NTK appropriately. Another variant could be the appropriate organization of military-scientific work of the General Staff Academy.

on the promising all-around system of armament that ensues therefrom, and equally on the optimal se-quence of its creation;

on the operational-tactical principles for the Subsequent' development of assignments for the main models of weapons and military equipment that ensue from this system of armaments.

Of course, the small staff of this central scientific organ will be able to handle the huge volume of tasks listed only under the following conditions:

km

its foundation is the work of the "scientificther scientific organs such as of the ministryhole, as well as of the branches of the Armed Forces;

if at the same time it carefully follows the achievements of the general non-military sciences capable of having some military significance, and for this its representatives will enter into the top scientific organs of the country that have military interest, in the capacity of observers of their own arm;

if it does not start to disperse the attention given to insignificant things, both in its own theoretical-research work and in its methodological management of the work of the other scientific organs of the ministry.

In order to observe these conditions it is necessary to deal only with the scientific organs (institutes) of the ministry, that work directly with it, and with the appropriate scientific management organs of the branches of forces. In turn, the latter organs must manage all the scientific establishments of their own branch of forces.

As regards the peripheral network of scientific organs of the Ministryhole, and of the branches of forces.

cademies and scientific-research institutes, In each case their scientific work should be directed toward the accomplishment of an immediate primary task of afaculty or Instituteoperational-tactical or technical 'I The cooperation of military theory with research in the field of weapons and equipment shouldbe ensured Just as is done now. In theit may be founded on the joint work of related faculties; in Instituteson the existence In each one of them of an overall tactical department parallel with the specialized departments, etc.. The appropriate staffing of the scientific-technical councils ofand academic councils of academies mustefinite role.

This reveals the double subordination of scientific organs, that actually exists oven now anyway: in allto its Immediate command (institutesto chiefs of the appropriate directorates; facultiesto chiefs of academies,ndpocial respect,cientific-methodological respectto the scientific organ of tho sonlor command. In the final analysis the faculties of acadomles and institutes in this special respect must be directed by tho scientific management organs of the main staffs of the branchos of forces, and these organsto the management of the General Staff scientific organ. The central scientific establishments of the Ministry that do not enter Into the composition of any central directorates must also bo directly subordinate to the latter.

As at present,'the actual plans of their worklong-range and annualmust be made up by each scientific organ, being guided by the directions of its command and senior scientific organ. In order to decreaseconnected with double subordination, the sonlor scientific organs must give basic directions to the Junior ones only through the chain of command, for example, to scientific organs of tho main staffs in the name of

the General Staff. In order to avoid dolay in the planning of these instructions from the General Staff to the main staffs, they must obviously arrive not latereptember, and from the main staffs to the directorates, not laterctober of each year.

In all plans not less0 percent reserve must remain for performingasks that were not envisaged earlier. With the goal ofplanning, to insure first of all tho essential subjects and to eliminate the search for the most important questions, vhen "time limits are already beingach planning stage must have and must constantly maintainurrent level, thought out, systematic lists of the most important subjects for research work In the basic sectors under theirdiction.

Science constantly enters into our life and intoaffalra more and more. The purposeful "maneuvering" of scientific forces and capabilities to point them toward the performance of the main tasks that facilitate progress has vast significance that has already been recognized. In this respect, the newly formed State Committee of the Council of Ministers USSR for the Coordination of Scientific-Research Work is the main aid to the leadership of the country.

There is no doubt that the management of the entire system of military scientific-research work mustentralized way something like this, witharising from the specific characteristics of the Armod Forces. But successful overall treatment of the paramount military-scientific problems can be ensured only by the presence ln the system of this workorrespondingtop military-scientific organ.

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA