MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET]t "Defense
of the Operationaly Major-fieneral Yu. Novikov
Enclosederbatim translation of an article wh'.ch appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Militaryoyennayaublished by the Ministry ot Delense, USSft, anil distributed down to the level of Army Commander.
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Original: The Acting. Director of Central Intelligence
cc: Theand Research, Department of State
The Director, Defense-Intelligence Agency
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The AssistantStaff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence Department-of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, U. S. Air Force
The Director, National Security Agency
Director, Division of Intelligence Atomic Energy Commission
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Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
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Major-General Yu. Novikov DATE OF INFO : 1 APPRAISAL
OF CONTENT : Documentary
eliable source <B) .
Followingerbatim translation of an article titled "Defense of the Operationaly Major-Goneral Yu. Novikov.
This article appeared in2 First Issuepecial version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This Journal is publishedand is classified TOP SECRET by tbe Soviets.2 First Issue went to press on
Headquarters Comment: Military Thought ia published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions,RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issued monthlyhile the other two versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in By the end1 issues of the SECRET version had beenf them
Defense of the Operational Rear by
Major-Oeneral Yu. Novikov
The equipping of tho Soviet Army with missile/ nuclear weapons and other modern equipment has compelled us, in recent years, to reexamine, as is well known, many questions of the theory of military art. In particular new principles of the organization and activity of the operational rear have been worked out and put into practice. However, in the process of carrying out this great work, which is directed toward the further perfecting of the operational rear, the defense of the operational rear has, unfortunately, not been studied in sufficient depth.
Meanwhile, in modern conditions of carrying out armed conflict, this matter has acquired great significance. In this article we shall examine two questions of this complicated problem; namely, the defense of the rear against ground forces of the enemy and antlair defense of installations of the operational roar.
In examining the defense of the operational rear, it is necessary to consider two propositions: the striving of the probable enemy to disorganize the rear of our troops and the changing character of modern operations, and the results of this and the conditions of work of the operational rear.
esult of study of the views of the probable enemy, the conclusion may be made that in future operations the neutralization and destruction of tho most Important rear area"installations and disorganization of the work of the rear will be achieved by carrying out strikes with roissllo/nuclear weapons and conventional means of destruction against our rear area installations, and also by wide use of operational and tactical airborne landings for the purpose of carrying the struggle into
will not normally be diverted to the defeat and destruction of enemy groups, which are left on the flanks and In the rear. This task will now be accomplished by the forces of the second echelons and reserves.
Enemy groupings which have retained their combat effectiveness, and which are left in the rear of 6ur troops, can temporarily block communication routes, carry out raids on Important rear area installations, and thus complicate the situationignificant degree. It is necessary to remember that the combat operations of our troops can develop on the territoryountry in theimperialistic military bloc, and it is fully possible that some part of the population ill-disposed toward us will carry out an active role in the rearcf our troops.
In solving the problem of defense of .the_rear, it is essentialin mind the degree of importanceumber of installations and those forces and means which can be used for their defense.
Thereoissile-technical basesront,eparate missile-depot battalions, and missile fuel dumps, located and functioning in the operational rear. The importance of all of these installations is unquestioned. At the front missile-technical bases the assembly of the mlsalle-carrlers and nuclear warheads, the mating of missiles and the storage of reserve (zapas) missiles of the front are performed; from these bases they are transported to armies and to missile large units. The reserve of missile/nuclear weapons located at front missile-technical bases ensures fulfilment of further tasks of the front and the subsequent offensive operation. Moreover, the reserve of nuclear means is stored at bases, and the reserve of an aircraft guided missile is stored at antiaircraft missile-technical bases. However, the forces and means which are at theof all the enumerated installations are sufficient
for the organization of defense against an attack ofmall group of the enemy.
Rear front and forward front bases must also be considered ln the number of Important installatlona of the operational rear. Other rear units andtechnical, medical, and transportare also grouped In the area of deployment of front bases,ule.
A deeper echeloning of reserves of materiel moans, carried out in the course of tho change of the basic principles of organization of the operational roar, would undoubtedlyseful measure. But lt is necessary to boar in mind that now about half of all front reserves are located at forward and rear front bases. This increases the dependence of the armies on dally delivery of materiel means from front depots. It follows thathort interruption of front communication routes can load to the breakdown of tho planned support of troops of the first operational echelon of the front.
Field pipelines, whoso most vulnerable points are the pumping stations, have great significance in aupply ing front troops with fuel. The protection of the pipelines, stretching for hundreds of kilometers, and also of the pumping stations, Is obviously quite complicated. However, this task is entrusted to tho personnel of tho pipeline brigades, who do not have sufficient forces for this task.
For carrying out regular delivery of materiel means,nd maneuvering of reserves, it is necessary toeveloped network of railroad and automobile communication routes. If it isthatront there are not less than two railroad communication routes, three or four basic front military automobile communication routes, and several lateral railroad and automobile routes, then
difficulties of the defense of front communication routes throughout their extensive length become apparent. Moreover, In the rear area of the front lt is also necessary to defend the main communications links of the front and the General Headquarters of the Supremo High Command with their powerful radio, radio-relay and telegraph communications centers.
And finally, ln the rear area there will usuallyospital basos withohousandod in oach, which would no doubt be objects of attack by enemy sabotage-Intelligence groups.
During the preparation for an offensive operation, when troopsight groupingelatively stable position, there are more favorable conditions for defense of the rear. In the course of theespecially during high tempos of advance, the main mass of forces and weapons, and in particular of antlair ddfenso, moves behind the troops, and the rear arearont remains without any protection. This is explained by the fact that rear area installations of the front, by tho nature of the tasks thoy fulfil, must work in tho same placeather long tlmo. The mobility of the main rear area installations must be considered far from satisfactory. Therofore, front missile-technical bases are moved once every two or three days, forward front bases, once every four or five days, and rear front bases are moved only onceront offensive operation.
Thus, in modern operations the conditions of work of tho roar will bo significantly more complicated, than ln the last war, and the role of rear support will increase sharply. Now the success of combat operation of troops, as never before, has become dependent oo reliable and prompt rear support. Ono of tho dcclslvo conditions for dependable andrear, support of troops is the viability of thehe preservation of its ability to support iroops
omplicated combat situation. Therefore theof defense of the rear has become one of the most critical problems, and if it is not solved there will be no guarantee of the success of the work of the rear, and along with this, the guarantee of success of the operation being carried out.
In these fundamentally altered conditions of the functioning and significance of the operational rear, the old, obsolete concepts, characteristic of the last war, unfortunately still survive: In agreement with these concepts, many persons consider that the entire grouping of rear area installations is to be protected by the operational troop formation, and,therefore under no circumstances, are appropriate forces and means to be allocated for the defense of the rear, whtph is required to defend itself with its own forces and means. Wo are already accustomed to the expression, which in our opinion is trite: "the guarding and defense of the rear are carried out by forces and means of thehich,ule, is laid down in documents regulating the organization of these questions in the course of operations.
It is necessary to mention thatumber of theoretical works the question is raised of thein the rear area of forces and means for the organization of its defense and protection. Thus in the fundamental work "The Rear Services In Modernt is indicated that "front and army rear units and establishments are spread outarge area and have limited forces and means, so they are notosition to organize reliable defense of the entire rear area. The accomplishment1 of this task is possible only by the utilization of combat units and large units of the front Oxnay)"
Rear Services in Modern Operations. Publishing Office or the Staff of tho Rear Services of the Ministry of Defense,.
Let us examine briefly the question of defense of the operational rear from enemy air strikes. With full justification It can be said that the amount of forces and weapons usually designated are clearly inadequate for direct antlair defense of large rear area Let us examine two examples from the experience of operational exercises
In the above-mentioned inter-academynly one antiaircraft missile regiment was designated for the antlair defense, of stationary depots of the Central Front,ilometers from the troops and at large "railroad junctions; naturally it could not screen all rear area installations. esult, the "enemy" carried out nuclear strikes withagainst the rear area front bases and largecenters.
In the operational-rear services exercises of the Carpathian Military District, the chief of PVO of the 2nd Front, possessing sufficient forces and means for antefense of the principal areasisposition of
the troops and front rear area, did not organize the defense of the most important installations of the rear, concentrating the main efforts on protection of the troops. After the intervention Of the leadership this condition was corrected to some extent. For protection of the rear area of the front in the departure position,ercent of the antiaircraft missile means of the front, front fighter aviation, and part of the forces of the 7th Army of the PVO of the Country were allocated.The antlair defense of rear areas was also strengthened by the means of the PVO screening the troops of the first operational echelon and theeans of the troops of the second echelons and reserves.
Analyzing this decision, it is necessary to remark on two aspects. Firstly, the main Installations ln the rear area of the front (the rear area front base and itsforward front base, two mobile missile-technical bases, and two separate antiaircraft missile battalions) were screened only by fighter aviation; antiaircraftunits were not designated for their defense at all.
Secondly, installations of tho army rear and the missile-technical bases close to the troops of the first echelon of the front were in favorable conditions, since they were in fact screened by the overall systos of PVO of troops of the first echelon.
This example shows that in the period of preparation for the oporatlon, the army rearhole is protected from strikes from the air, while protectionumber of the most Important installations of the front rear area is not assurod.
The chief director of the exercise pointed out at the critique that when the troops go over to the offensive, the PVO means of the armies and divisions move forward along with the troops and the antlalr defense of the roar area of the front is greatly weakened. In spite of this, the strengthening of the antiair defense of the roar of the front after the transition of tho troops to thewas not provided for in the plan of the PVO troops of the front. ost important falling, ifefect, in the systea of antiair defense of installations of the operational rear, is concealed herein, in our view.
In the pages of the Collections of Articles of the Journal "MilitaryoaplVt^ly contradictory views have been prosonted on the most important question of the defense of the rear:ap occurs between the system of PVO of tho troops of tho front and the system of PVO of the Country during the courserontoperation.
Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade S. Blryuzov, In the article "Antlalr Defense in Modern Warfare and Trends in Itsonsiders that "toward the end of an offensiveignificant gap may occur between organic antlalr defense and Antiair Defense of the Country."
ollection of Articles of the Journal "Militaryo. 3. 10
Marshal of Artillery Comrade V. Kazakov, in the"Troops of Antlair Defense of the Ground Forces in Modernn the other hand, indicates that "ln reality no 'gap' arises".
The importance of this question in connection with the problem under examination in this article Is that in this gap are located such very Important Installations of the rear as the regulating railroad junctions, part of the front missile-technical bases, the rear area front bases, and railroad and automobile communication routes of the front.
The experience of command-staff operational exercises, and in particular the operational rear services exercise ln the Carpathian Military District, confirms that this gap does in fact exist, and that as the front advances, the main part of the means of antlair defense of troopa also moves, with the result that tho already limited forces of PVO of installations of the operational rear are reduced. The control of these means la complicated by the fact that toward the morning of the third day of the offensive operation, as occurred ln the exerclae of the Carpathian Military District, the majority ofmissile units protecting Installations of the front rear area are locatedistancem from the front command post.
Thus, it may bo considered that the operational rear is almost completely deprived of the forces and meansfor the organization of ground defense of the most important rear area installations, and its antiair defense, usually conducted by limited forces, la not assured,in the course of the operation.
I. Collection of Articles of the Journal. H
This is why we consider that, in present conditions, lt is necessary to support fully the proposals of Marshal of the Soviet Union Blryuzovduring the advance of the ground forcesepthm, to widen the zone of responsibility of antlair defense of tho country ororder large unit of PVO by moving their bordors forward behind the advancing troops, with simultaneous movement of part of Its forces for protection of new.
A number of measures must be adopted in order to assure the viability of the operational rear. For this, first of all, lt Is necessary to have special units and large units for defense of the operational rear. roposal Is suggested by the experience of World War XI, when,ignificantly less complicated situation, special units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were placed with combined-arms armies and fronts. Of course, it must be mentioned that the units carried out combat against sabotage-intelligence activity in the rear of the troops, and fulfilled obstruction functions, but did not carry out the defense of the most importantof the front rear area from the ground enemy. At the present time we need large units and units which will be able to provide defense of the most importantof the rear,above all front missile-technical bason, rear and forward front bases, antlair defense of rear area installations from low-altitude strikes, and to carry out combat with airborne landings and sabotage-intelligence activity in the rear area of the front.
In our opinion, it is necessary to have these units and large units in cadre form ln peacetimeith short periods of mobilization and buildup. The above-mentioned organic units and large units of defense of the operational rear, naturally, will not be able to fulfil all tasks of the defense of the rear, but will become the backbone of the forward means of this defense. In specific conditions, depending on the situation in the operational rear, tho commander of troops of tho front will assign supplementary forces and means from among the combat large units to the jurisdiction of his deputy for the rear.
Secondly, lt la necessary to solve the problem of antiair defense of the operational rear. In our opinion lt Is necessary to determine accurately the tasks of antiair defense of troops for the protection ofof the rear. It is ospeclally important to think over thoroughly, and provide for the coordination of, tho forces and means of antiair defense of troops and of antiair defense of the country in relation to therear, so that in the course of an offensivethe boundary of responsibility for antiair dofenso of the country is prosptly carried forward behind the advancing troops.
Thirdly, lt cannot be expected that defense of the roar will be fully provided by any sort of allocated or organic forces and means. It is of utmost importance to Increase the defensive capability of rear units and establishments themselves, equipping them with close antitank defense and means of defense from strikes by the enemy from the air at low altitudes. It would also be advisable to have organic observation and warning of onoray air activity in the main rear services unite and large units.
Fourthly, lt is necessary to organize precise control of all forces and means which provide defense of the rear. For the solution of this problem,in our opinion, two measures must be carried out: the creationnified system for tho defense of the operational rear and centralization of control of it. Under the direction of the deputy com-mandor of front troops for thenified systea must provide defense of tho roar from the ground enemy, anti-airborne defense combat against sabotage-Intelligence activity of the enemy in the rear, warding off low-altitude air strikes, and protection of tho rear from means of mass destruction.
The necessity of strict centralization of the control protection, defense .and guarding of the rear was reaffirmed in the operational-rear services exercise In the Carpathian Military District. Tho chief director of this exercisepointed out that even the limited forces allotted to organic antlair defense for the defense of installations of the operational roar, quickly became uncontrolled because of their separation from the control point of the commander of troops of antlair defense of the frontistancem or more.
We consider that it would be advantageous to combine the control of guarding, defense and protection of the rear ln the hands of the assistant commander of the rear of the front for these problems, and to create ln the headquarters of the roar of thopecial section for guarding, defending and protecting the rear, froolng the first department of the staff of the rear from those It must be remembered that the deputy of theofficer of front troops for tho rear has anlly large amount of work in directing the operational rear. It is known that in the rear services of the front there are upear services units, large units, andspread out over an enormous territory, which, in the courseront offensive operation,housand square kilometers.
In solving tho problems of the control of all the forces and means of defense and protection of the rear, lt is intereating to examine tho pertlnont experience of our probable enemies'. Thus, for example, in the combined-arms largo units and field army of tho USA, lt isthere willenter for control of the rear, of which one function will be tho direction of the activities of the organs of the rear for defense and protection of tho rear areas and elimination of the offects of nuclear attack. In this center of control there is topoclal section for defense and protection of the rear.Original document.