MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
THOUGHT: "Increasing the Stability of
of the Troopsronty
Enclosederbatim translation of an article vhlch appeared In the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Militaryoyennayaubliohed by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and'distributed down to the level of Army Commander.
In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handledeed-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.
Deputy Director (Plans)
Original: The Director of Central Intelligence
ec: Tbe Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director for Intelligence, Tbe Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence U.ir Force
The Director, National Security Agency
Director, Division of Intelligence Atomic Energy Commlsaion
National Indications Center
Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
Tho Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center
HTUTARY THOUGHT: "Increasing tha Stability of Control of tho Troopsrontyr-General
OF INFO: l
Documentary I eliable source (B)
Followingerbatim translation of sn article entitled "Increasing tbe Stability of Control of tbe TroopsrontyM. Ivanov.
Tnls article appeared in1 First Issuepecial version of the Soviet military Journal Military Thought (Voyennayahis Journal Is published Irregularly ond lsL classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.
Increasing the Stability of Control of the TTcoparont (Army)
Major-General M. Xvanov
The first laauea of the Special Collection of Articles of tho Journal "Military Thought? correctly otato tho problemeview of the postulates of tbe theory of strategy, operational art, snd tactics in light of the revolutionary changes which have come about in the real* of armament from the moment when nuclear weapons and missiles appeared on tbe scene. In tbe interests of tbe further development of military theory, ve must decisively reject attempts to adapt old forme snd methods of conducting military operations to new conditions, and we must work out comprehensively and profoundly the problems of modern combat and operations end the structure of the organizations pertaining to them, including the control organs.
As is known, the organizational structure of staffs la directly dependent upon methods of conducting combat operations and of equipping troops with the means of combat. At the present time, significant changes have taken place ln armament, combat equipment, tbe nature of operations, and the methods of their conduct. Consequently, there should haveorresponding change ln the organization of staffs. However, this haa not come about and in fact our operational organs of control, from tbe organizational standpoint, still remain et the level of the staffs of the World War II period.
In tbe interests of Increasingff ectlveuess "Of troop direction, the organization of operational staffs must, in our view, at least correspond to the following requirements:
apability for constant control of the readiness of missiles, aircraft, and nuclear warheads and of the location and movement of sll objectives of nuclear attack;
preclude any lack of coordination in the actions of commanders of arms of troops snd services; commanders of troops of the front (army) must work Jointly with their immediate
subordinates In one place, controlling and coordinating their actions; chiefs of directorates and services oust decide all problem together, and not ln Isolation frco one another;
eliminate disunity ln the processing of dataituation; ell information must be coo centra ted in one place, ln one organ so that it can be immediately available to the commander of troops of the front (army);
--to unify control of the weapons of destruction;
promote sufficient viability in the control organs.
At the presenthe organisational structure of operational staffs is based on the same division of labor and distribution of functions in the staff as existed many years ego. Tn this connection, now es ln thereat number of elementsert in implementing control of the troopsront: comblned-erma staff with many independent directorateshe artillery staff, the air army ataff, the PVO staff, the engineer directorate and others. in their work, all these elements depend upon one another and are constantly forced to coordinate their actions, if these organs are located at separate control points, coordination of their actions, even in accomplishing simple tasks, seriously hampers tbe work of the front (army) staff snd leads to an extremely greet loss of tine.
Consider, for example, the planning of operations. As is known, tbe staffs of all the arms of troops, special troops, and services tske part in this process together with the staff of the frontnd tha planning is carried outroad scale. But despite this, it stillingle, centralized process. Although they act on behalf of tbe common goal of the operation, all services snd arms of troops work disconnectedly. onsequence, planning breaks down: the operational plan is worked out ln one place by one orgsn, the plan for the combat use of missiles and the artillery is worked out by anothor organ in another place, the plan for the combat use of aviation is worked outhird organhird place, etc. Because all these plans are closely tied in with one another and require constant coordination during their working out, the planning of operations extendsong period of time.
Hewer, tbe existing system for the collection of dotsituation ia ailtl-staged. Infcarnation material, ss formerly, is transmitted successively from one echelon to another: the reginental staff transmits information to the division staff, which transmits it to the army staff; it Is only the srmy ataff which informs the front staff of the situation. All directorateservices and arms of troops engage ln tho collection of information at the scale of the front (army). Therefore, information on tho situation is scattered among them. After reaching the front command post, the dataituation are first studied and collated in tbe staffa of the arms of troops and the services, then they ore reported and re-reported to various chiefs, end only after this are they reported to the compandor, in order toomplete pictureituation, the front (army) staff and particularly the operations directoraten addition to receiving Information directly from subordinate staffs, is obliged to collect situation data from the staffs of arms of troops snd from tbe services. Coming from various sources, many of these data are incomplete and contradictory, do not coincide in time, and require re checking and clarification.
All this creates excessive red tepe within the Btaff and finally leads to the fact that the collected end processed situation date do not correspond to the true troop situation at any given moment. In the army staff, the data lag behindoura, end in the front staffours. The commander is deprived of the capability to Influence tha course of an operation in time, and often makes decisions accordingituation which, in reality, no longer exista.
In addition, the content of the information received by each service and arm of troops has much in common, and the requestshese data by various consumers create en extremely heavy load on subordinate staffs, upset them, end tear them away from the solution of other important and complex problems unnecessarily.
The necessity for all services snd ell staffs of arms of troops to collect informution, which stems directly from the organization of the control organs, leads to tho overloading of lines of communication, necessitates supplementary channels, and involvee an increase In the expenditure of communications resources at control polntsj this in turn makeB tbe staffs more cumbersome and less mobile. It should also be noted that all inquiries snd reports on tbe situation and.tbe operations of the troops are still made by means of message and radio signal codes, which greatly delaya tbe collection end processing of inf ansa tion.
It to perfectly obvious that such an Information system has completely outlived its usefulness. In order to ensure rapid reactions by the command echelon aod the staffsituation.it is necessary to centralize the collection and processing of information data. All Information must be concentrated In one organ and be put oa an overall map or screen. However, thla can be done only after an appropriate reorganization of the control organs.
Intelligence should be considered separately. Hew demands are alao being made on it, particularly on the process of collecting and processing data on the enemy. Carefully organized and uncoaaing^ intelligence work baa become the guarantee of timely detection of enemy preparations for the use of weapons of mass destruction. Today as never before, the combat readiness of troops andtheir ability to conduct .successfully combat operations depend on intelligence operations The fulfilment of all the tasks aligned to Intelligence demands an even greater centralization of ita resources, single control, and firmer direction. Without this, intelligence organs will hardly be able to play their part.
Even though thla is obvious, the intelligence organs and their forcea and means are still disconnected from the organizational standpoint. On the scaleront, not only tha intelligence directorate, but also the artillery staff, the air army staff, the engineer directorate, the chemical staff and others are engaged in intelligence. imilar situation exists in the staff of tho army and in the staffs of large units. All these Intelligence organs frequently work on their cwn, on behalf of only that arm of troops which they are called upon to serve,and If some of the Information obtained by them does become the property of ell the troops, it reaches them onlyery great delay.
It is completely understandable that auch an organization of intelligence organs cannot, under modern conditions,igh degree of effectiveness in the receipt of intelligence data. The role of this service has grown to such an extent tbat thereirect necessity to combine all these organsingle independent intelligence center, directly subordinate to the commander of troops of the front, and having all tbe means of intelligence at its disposal. '
Therefore, under the existing organization of the field cosmodronthe efforte of all its eleaente are dlauolted; tale gives rise to frequent confusion In the operations of various anas ofap ilea tea coordination af the efforte of the various meens of combat, and creates groat difficulty in the rapid esslgnment of their combat missions.
In order to eliminate these shortccerings, and to ensure stable control of troops on the scalerontt is necessary to centralize drastically the direction of troop combat operations. Tbe organizational structuro of operational staffs must be changed correBpondingly.
It appears to us that from the standpoint of centralization of the control of troops sod weapons of destruction, the reorganization of control organs mat proceed by way of unification of all the directorates (departments) andf the arms of troops snd services which are concerned with tbe direction of troops into single control centers.
In eccordance with this, lt la advisable, ln our opinion, to have within the composition of the field eacmendront (army)i
main command-planning center;
--en operations center;
PVO control center.
The main ccccand-plftnnlng center must be the basic working organ of the cocTBcder of troops of tlie front. Here must be united sll the currently existing control organs of tbe staffs of arms of troops snd the services which are concerned with the planning of operations and the direction of troops. All the planning of an operation must take place ln this center only. Centralized control of all moans of combat, including ground troope, missile weapons, PVO, and aviation, will axoo be carried out from here simultaneously. The complement of
this center will include general* and officers from all arms of troops and specialties. When located at the command post, the chief of staff of the front and all chiefs who are directly responsible for tbe direction of the operation must be located in this center together with the commander. Par rspid snalysls of the situation anda single map of the operational and radiation situation, the aerial situation, snd the situation of theap of the grouping and combat readiness of our missile weapons must be constantly maintained here. These maps should be mountedertical position for observation, in the manner of the PVO screen.
In relation to the remaining echelons of the field commsnd of the fronthla center will be the directing organ. It should direct their activity in order to ensure rapid reaction of the command echelon to all changes in the situation.
Ths nuclear/miBBlle center willnited organ for controlling the weapons of deatruction of tbe front. All tha weapons of nuclear attack must be concentrated in the bands of the chief of this. missiles of all types, bcrncer aircraft and others, which will undoubtedly improve and expedite their use.
Inasmuch as the overall plan far the use of nuclear /missile weapons will be implemented by the main command-planning center, the functions of the nuclear/missile center in thla respect will consist of making all the essential calculations for the use of nuclear /missile weapons, calculations of tbe possibilities for neutralising various targets, of the safe removal of our troops from the ground zeros of bursts, of the probable degree of destruction of the objectives, etc. In addition, lt must keep track of the movement and readiness of tbe missile weapons of the front, maintain aa operational record of the availability and receipt of-snssiles and tha .special charges -for tbea, andraphic chart of their readiness.
The nuclear /miss ile center must have direct ccemunlcatlons with all the weapons of nuclear attack and must coordinate all Its work closely with the operations and intelligence centers which are tbe sources of information.
The operations center should engage In the collection and processing of data on tbe operational and radiation situation, decide questions of combat support. Implement tho transmission of combat tasks to the troops and control their fulfilment.
All information on tbe location and operations of our troopa and on tbe result* of the use of nuclear weapons by both sides will be concentrated, summarized, and thoroughly analyzed in this center. This will permit the creation of the conditions for the uninterrupted processing of all date on tha ground and aerial situations and will bring about completenessigh degree of effectiveness in the collection and preparation of data, permitting decisions to be made rapidly by the commander of troops of the front (army). In order to achieve rapid processing of information, the operations center must have direct communications with all the formations of the front.
The activities of this center will be conducted through the chiefs of axes, who must process the date on the position of their troops on the appropriate operational axes and transmit commands received from the rain ccoxand-planning center to the staffs of tb* appropriate formations (large units) for Implementation.
Since our proposed organization of field commandront (army) assumes the abolitionumber of currently existing services sod directorates (engineer, chemical, and others) and the transfer of decisions on their problems to the operations center, tbe functions of this organ will be much broader than those cerried out by the operations directorate. In connection with this, the operations center, as well as the main command-planning center, mustomplement of highly trained generals and officers from tha appropriate arms of troops and specialties.
The Intelligence center is assigned the collection and processing of all intelligence Information. All the Intelligence resources of the front ere concentrated in tbe hands of this single organ; lt must conduct Intelligence work on behalf of all arms of troops and disseminate information concerning'the "enemy to all centers. Tor the nucloar/mlBsile center, the intelligence center must keep an account of targets (objectives for nuclearake an evaluation and general description of then, keep track of the movement of primary targets, calculate the most advantageous time snd place for the delivery of nuclear strikes, pinpoint the coordinates of the targets and prepare the initial topographic and geodetic data. The chief of Intelligence of tba front should be the head of the Intelligence center.
This center must have direct ccominlcatlona with reconnaissance aircraft aloft, with radio reconnaissance means and with other important sources of Intelligence information.
The PVO control center Is designated for control of the PVO weapons, including tbe fighter aircraft of the front, its mission will include directing tho repulse of massed enemy aircraft and missile strikes. This center must have direct ccoanunl cat ions with all PVO weapons, with the staffs of aviation large unite and with the Intelligence center. It should be headed by the chief of PVO of the front.
tfe shall not stop to consider materiel, technical and other support. It appears to us that their organization mist also be set up in accordance with the same principle.
Thia organizational structure of the field commandrontill undoubtedly permit all its echelons to decide more effectively all tbe complex problems of troop control which are concernedommon goalingle concept. In addition, such an organizational structure of the operational staffs will correspondreater degree to modern methods of controlling troops which are baaed on the use of the latest control equipment.
Jr. our opinion, the organization of all subordinate staffs must also be built In accordance with this same principle.
In order to increase the flexibility of control, along with the proposed changes in the organizational structure of the field commandrontt is necessary to review the means and methods of work of the staffs In the area of collection, analysis and transmission of Information data.
Without goingetailed description of this problem, we believe that the information system must ensure that all interested elements receive tho dataituation as tbe events occur. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to make some changes ln the procedure for sending reports at the level of thermy and front. Alongeriodic presentation, say li.or-.feay, of the more substantial reportsescription of tho positions and operations of the two sides which are now presented, it is essential to organize the transmission of short signals to indicate only the
lines attained "by the units of tho first echelon and the naturecombatmI smtc.)- These signals must be transmitted by thelarge units everyo Uo minutes according to aschedule. In order to send these signals, thecould take data from the battalions which come inthe use of course-plotters (kursoprokl edchik) andevery given moment cnly ths pte&so location of the battalion(tho center of the combat
It must be supposed that this simplification of reporting and elimination of Intermediate elements will permit the staff of the front to hove precise data on the position of the first echelon troopsinutes after the units roach any line. Experience from wars and exercises indicates that these data, especially under complex situational conditions, are sufficient to enable the commander to react instantaneously to the course of events.
In this connection, reality requires the estobliuhmcntrocedure for transmitting information by which each conmand echelon con relay Information on the position of its troops end tbe enemy directly to the next higher staff t the regimental staff to the army staff, the division staff to the front staff, and simultaneously to relay this information correspondingly to the division and army staffs also.
WO have examined above only one of the questions of Incongruity in the organizational atructura of operational staffs due to the changed nature of combat operations. econd problem,vhlch is directly related to the organization of control organs and which, in our opinion, is also in need of review, is the problem of control points.
Tho Increased Importance of uninterrupted control of troopsasis for assuming tbat in future operations staffs will be oca of the primary targets of enemy action. The combatants will adopt every measure to disorganize the work of control organs ond to disrupt tbe direction of troops. For this purpose,.strikes by missiles or aircraft may be delivered, diversionary groups mayent out, and Jamming may be conducted against the means of communication. The capability of using nuclear weaponseal threat of instantaneous removal from action of entire control echelons and large bodies of troops. Therefore, the organization of operational staffs must be subordinated first of all to guaranteeing their vitality and ability to retain control in the most complex situation.
Under conditions of the mass use of nuclear weapons, this my be achieved by creating dispersed, more ramified, and constantly operative networks of control points to ensuro rapid replacement of points which have been put out of action, and breed continuity In the control of troops.
In an operational element, the solution to this problem la reflected by the creation in formations of control points, command and forward command posts, and also rear control points. In thisconnection, it is believed that the existence of these points permits successful controlarge number of troops and weapons of destruction.
In our opinion, such an organization and echeloning of control points in the front (army) cannot sufficiently ensure their vitality under new conditions and, consequently, does not promote increased stability of control.
The creation of several points for the control of front (army) troops is Justified only when each of then functions constantly, is fully Independent and is capable of assuming troop control in the event that another point is destroyed by an enemy nuclear strike. Unfortunately, front (army) command and forward command posts, as they are at present constituted, do not meet these requirements. The basic reasons for this consist of the following.
In the first place, despite its numerical strength,f tho field controlront (army) does not In fact provide for the creation of two full-fledged control points. For this reason, only one independent control element, the command post, is actually createdront (army). The forward cenmand poet is organised by using the forces and means of the command poet. In its make-up it isemporary and poorly organized control organ and, naturally, cannot fully provide the commander with firm direction of troops in the event that the command poat is put out of action.
Secondly, the forward command post isonstantly functioning control organ, because it is usually created only for the period of the conduct of combat operations. During the preparation for an operation, the generals and officers and tbe transportation and cccmcunicatlons means designated for the command and forward command posts are usually located together at the command poet.
linear forratlono and operations of troops will also disappear, engagerjonts will be conducted on axes and in separate areas, and operations in the rear area will frequently .begin before the advance of ground troops from the front.
It is perfectly obvious that in asking decisions inituation it is insufficient to be guided by the picture of combat on one axis. In order to react, both, correctly and quickly to the course of combat operations, the commander must constantly be aware of the entire situation. But this is only possible if, during the course of the entire operation, he is supported by the basic personnel of the front staff who are located at the command poet in the area of tbo main grouping of troops. If,uring the course of an ope ration, the commander is located primarilyorward command post on only one of the sxes, he will be unavoidably detached from the overall situation and will be unable to influence not only the development of the operationhole but even the moat important changes which may arise et any moment away from the forward command poet. Under these conditions, it is difficult to say where the presence of the commander will be required firat--forward, on onehe flanks or in the rear of tho front's troops.
Deep disposition of front (army) troops, particularly of reserves, mi8alio units, airborne troops, and the possibility of committing large units to battleurry from the depth also make the forward move of the commander end the forward command post sensoless,because in essence it causes him to be detached from the main forces. In the control of troops, emphasis must now he placed not on personal observation of the field of combat and on personal contact of the front troop; ccenander with the ccejmanders of large unite, but on controlistance. Of course, even under modern conditions, the commander must visit certain axes for the immediate direction of battle, particularly during tho critical moments of the development of an operation. But thin will take place only incidentally and will not be the system to which we adhere today.
It is also essential to consider the fact that the .evolution of means of control is proceeding in the direction of complex automation of the processes of direction of troop- combat activity, and It must be assumed that staffs will soon be equipped with automated systems. However, the relatively large size of these systems and tho complexity of their apparatus limit their maneuverability and permit their effective use only at the command post.
Fourthly, tho necessity for.uxiliary control pointarise in the course of an offensive operation as well aaeopeclully when we succeed in breaking up theformation and in cutting off part of bis troops fromgrouping, and when the operation therefore disintegrates intoof engagements- However, at present lt is Impossible tobecause of the limited capabilities in forces and means ofstaffs, which are capable of creating only commandcommand posts from their
And, fifthly, as has already been mentioned,esult of changes In tbe situation,critical moments may arise on individual axes in an operation,requiring the personal presence of the commander and his Involvement in tha direction of troop combat operations. But the existing organisation of control points and tbe means of communications and movement available to tbe staffs do not permit tha commander to move rapidly to these sectors of tba front. The forward command post is obviously not suited to accomplishing such tasks since it is too cumbersome, insufficiently mobile, snd it is Impossible to conceal its location in the vicinity of the enemy. However, there is no other organ for this purposeront or army.
Another important condition in increasing tha viability of control points is their reliable securityefense, and combat support. The constant threat of the use of nuclear weapons against control points and the Increased possibilities of an attack on them by mobile units of enemy ground troops, diversionary groups, and airborne troops,indicate the necessity for having sufficiently strong special organic security and support units for the protection of staffs.
During World Warubunits and unite from the troops were usually used for the preparation, support,requently, also for the defense of control points. This led to disengaging combat subunits from tbe accomplishment of important tasks ot the immediate front and was not Justified. ule, temporarily detached subunits and units wore not suitable in their organization, equipment, training, and experience for accomplishing the tasks of prepering and supporting control points. The productivity and quality of their work was low, despite tba factarge quantity of personnel and equipment was detached, part of the equipment was not used because of the impossibility of using It in the preparation of control points, and work was performed separately and was not unitedingle command.
The situation concerning the security, defense, and supportpoints is also in approximately this same state, even attime- ecurlty floc service regiment provided for hyand attached to the front staff,and the battalion attachedarmy ataff do not have organic, engineer, chemical, andsubunits at their disposal. This situation, as in thethe last war, again leads to the fact that it vill be necessarytemporary and untrained special line units and subunits.for thesupport, and servicing of control
Entirely different results can be achieved if these subunits are united and if on tha basis of them, special units are created, equipped vith the necessary weapons, equipment and the other standard items required for the combat support, servicing, and preparation of control points. Tbe personnel of these units vho are trained in advance will alao acquire experience. On the whole, significantly greater effectiveness in the use of these same forces and means will be achieved and the organization and conduct of the security, defense servicing, end support of control points will be greatly improved.
The problem of tbe direction of the entire security service for control points and of the maintenance of the required order in them is still decided by us in the old manner. Up to the present time, apart from the staff comaundants, many staff officers who are insufficiently trained and inexperienced in this respect engage in this work,while having more than one function.
The growing volume of activities and the broadening functions of the commandant's service (icccendantekayas well as theecessity of carrying it out constantly, have drastically elevated the role of this service; it has now acquired the importance of one of the main elements in troop control. This circumstance requires centralization of the direction of the commandant's service, the placingtrong independent organ at its head, and the subordination to it of all the forces and means assigned for the security and preparation of control points, ur opinion, only with; this condition is it possible to resolve more purposefully and effectively the important problems of security end defense, of antiatomic protection, engineer preparation, end the concealed placement and transfer of control points and Constantly to maintain the atricteat order in their disposition areas, all of which will directly affect the viability of control organs.
Therefore, all these argumentaestatement of the conclusion that the existing organizational structure of operational staffs does not provide for the creationront (army)amified network of control points which in turn does not promote an increase in the flexibility and stability of troop control. The organization of operational staffs, It appears to us, must be such as to ensure the creation of not less than two permanently operative full-fledged control pointsront (array) for ell forms of combat operations and to provide the opportunity for the commander, in certain cases, to r" personally and directly participate in the direction of troops in the
For thia purpose, it is essential, in our opinion, to havecontrol organs In the composition of tho field commandfront and.
The first Is tho staff of the frontncluding tho boatc complement of the field command and all tbe above-mentioned centers. On tbe basis of it, it is necessary to develop the cfg-wnd post of tht front (army) as the primary control point, hf-artpijby the
The second is the staff operations group (organic). This control organ must be somewhat smaller In Its composition than the staff but must have an organization similar to that of the-staff. As an independent control organ, the group must have its own organic means of communications and transportation in such quantity aa to make it capable of assuming cccqalete control of all the troops of tbe front in the event that the command post is put out of action. On the basis of the staff operations group, regardless of theecond
-rotcent control point of tho front (army) must be created andbe deputy front"(ariryj troop cocmrKler. Its title and designation will be determined each time by the specific conditions of the situation. Therefore, during the preparation for an offensive operation and in defense, this will usually be on alternate command poet, but during the course of tho operation it can become an auxiliary control point or can carry out the functions characteristic of the forward command post.
In peacetime, the personnel of the ataff operations group should be located and worked in the appropriate control centers,ln order to facilitate tbe work and perfect the skills of tbe officers. During
the training of staffs, this operations group must be preparod and knitted tcgetiier as on independent control organ.
Por the transportation of the ccexoander and hia deputy to any particular axis where their personal intervention in the direction of troop coBbet operations say be required. It is essential to have specially allotted control vehicles inftJS of the staff of tbe front and the staff operations group.
Por -the security and combat support of control points, it is advisable to create special units and subunits and to include them inf the field control of the front (army). In our opinion, they should be called commandant'a units (komendatskaya chast). It appears to be advisable to use organic commandant's regiments and separata coacosndsnt's battalions as the organizational basis, par servicing the command posts and rear control point of the front, it is essential tocemandant's regiment for each of then; for servicing the staff operations group of the front sod the command post of tbe army, to have separate commandant's battalions.
Por direction of the cemmndant's service and of the security, defense preparation, and support of control points, it Is essential to create in the staffs comoandaturas (censranaant'a groups)omplementfficers headed by the ccnSTndant to whom the commandant's units and subunits must be subordinated. These will be organic, independent, and influential organs which possess the necessary forces and means and are capable of maintaining order at control points and of directing their relocation, security, and defense under any conditions.
The daily activity of the cemmacdaturas must be carried out through permanent duty cemmaadants. In this connection, and also fin the basis of the proposed changes in the structure of staffs, we consider lt advisable to abolish the operational duty officer in the staffs, particularly since he is no longerosition to fulfil functions concerned with the collection of situation data which he has been charged with to the present time.
Tbe presence of organic cocmandaturas will permit the concentration' of the direction of ell measures of security of control points in one element and in one place, will bring order to the ccemnodant's service.
and will significantly elevate ita authority. In addition, thia will rcleeee many chief* and offlcera of staffs froa their Involvement In tho arganlzatlon and direction of tbe ccamsindsnt's aervlce and will give then the opportunity to spend more tine on their immediate duties.
Weroad study of the questions which have been raisedore rapid realization of tbe necessary changes in the structure and methods of work of control organs.