Director ol V-" Intelligence
DATE:5
Director of
Central
Intelligence
7
Saddam Husayn: Likely To Hang On
Information available as2 was used in ihe preparation of this National Intelligence Fsiimaie.
The following intelligence organizations participated
in ihe preparation of ihis Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Secunty Agency
The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research.
Department ot State
The Director for Intelligence,
Department of Energy
The Offce of Intelligence Support,
Department of the Treasury
aiso participating:
Ihe Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
Department of tho Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence.
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, intelligence.
Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, Marine Corps
SeVret
This Estimate was approved for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
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Key Judgments
Saddam Husayn: Likely To Hang On
Saddam Husayn is likely lo survive the polilical and economic challenges of the next year. Although he is significantly weaker than he was before ihc Gulf war. he appears stronger than heear ago. The only real threat to Saddam remaining in power over the next year isudden. violent effort to remove him by one or more people with access lo him.
If we are wrong in our judgment about Saddam's survival, it is most likely in underestimating the current degree of unhappiness in the military and in Ihc Sunni core that have provided Saddam's base of power. Important individuals in the inner circle and in the Republican Guard might be ready tooup againstopular revolt is much less likely.
Saddam will continue to use ihc Army, the Republican Guard, and intelligence and security forces lo stifle dissent, reassert his control over Iraq, and prevent the emergence of any potential rival. The resumption of Air Force fixed-wing flight activity in April probably added to public perceptions lhat the regime is growing stronger and that citizens are powerless to bring about changcl-
Economic sanctions alone are not likely to bring aboul Saddam'sthey will contribute to public disaffection with his leadership.may also be increasing popular resentment toward the West.Saddam has managed lo maintain his core support groupgoods and services not available to the masses. Saddamthat Iraq has withstood the brunt of the sanctions andsupport for sanctions is
Saddam will continue io test coalition resolve by using economic pressure and increasingly intimidating military positioning against the Kurds innorthern Iraq. Should Provide Comfort not be extended, he would be freer to expand his operations in themay hope for Turkish collusion in suppressing the Kurds, He will also be more likely to act against the Kurds if he thinks they are acquiring attributes of statehood. In addition, his success in restricting international attention to the plight of the Shias in ihc marshlands of southern Iraq permits him to carryuthless, bul probably only partially effective, military campaign against thcm.P
Discussion
Holding On
Saddam Husayn is nol (he strongman he was before the Gulf war, but hb regime continues to demonstrate an ability to survive. Indeed, Saddam's position appears to be gradually improving, and the regime is now more secure than itear ago.1
lightening His Crip
To maintain his personal security, Saddam willto isolate himself from all but bis most trusted colleagues and family members. Saddam hasthe military and security services to provide additional protection for him, bis family, and bis regime. Significant Republican Guard and other key security services still surround Baghdad, actingormidable barrier to disgruntled military or other foes of the regime.1
sanctions. Should Iran strike into Iraqi territory again. Iraq would probably react with its air defense weapons, including Ihc launching of interceptors if sufficient early warning were available. Tbeby Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft, which many Iraqis apparently believed had been prohibited under tbe terms of the cease-fire, is probably taken by Iraqi citizens as an indication that the coalition is easing its apposition to Saddam.[
ending Hin Reach in tbv South
Saddam is moving to reassert hb authority beyond Baghdad, especially in southern Iraq, where the Shia rebeb still operate.ggressively probing the coalition to sec if it is willing to enforce UN. He is demonstrating growingthat he will not be punbhed for hb actions.
policy of generously rewarding relatives and cronies, alone with fierce and swift punishment of those with suspected loyalties, is likely to ensure tbe continued support of his inner circle. They probably have also accepted his argument that only be can keep Iraq together and are fearful of retribution from the population if Saddam is no longer there lo hold the regime intact. In addition, his pervasive security networks combined with the fear of purges,and retribution will serve to restrain other potential opposition. According to exile and press accounts that we credit but cannot confirm. Saddam's security services continue to round up suspected coup plotters and disaffected military personnel.!
The Iranian airstrike in early Aprilissident camp inside Iraq may have highlighted theof Iraq's borders, but it also gave Saddam an excuse to resume Air Force fixed-wing flightand bolstered his case for lifting international
Saddam's ability lo limit access of international observers and relief workers in the south givesreer hand lo conduct military operations in the marshlands in an effort to end the persbtenl, low-level Shia insurgency. He Is also depriving the Shuts of adequate food and medical supplies and limiting their access to the holy cities of An Najaf and Karbala'. These tactics will set back the Shia insurgency but will probably not put it out of
He probably sees the Shiasore seriousthreat to hb regime than the Kurds. Asextend their sway over the marshes,probably begin forcibly resettling Shia villagersregions where they can be more easily
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Pressure on Ihe Kurds
Saddam hai not given up his designs io reimpose complcic conlrol over northern Iraq's strategic cities and resources, including some oil facilities. At the same time, he seeks toajor confrontation with Operation Provide Comfort:
can be expected to continue to exploit differences among the Kurdish leaders in an effort to undermine their ability to maintain cohesion and control.
He will rely on his internal economic embargo of the north, now in its eighth month, coupledirtual military blockade of the region.
Iraqi forces will continue to harass UN reliefand impede their efforts in the north.
Roughly half of Iraq's ground forces are deployedefensive line facing the Kurdish-controlled areas in the north, The layered air defenseincluding mobilebe activated quickly. I
could significantly step up militaryagainst the Kurds with little advance notice. But he probably will notilitary offensive while Operation Provide Comfort remains in place. Instead, he will rely on steady military and economic pressure to try to divide the Kurdish political leadership, al some point slice away territory held by the Kurdish Front, and undermine Ihe results of Ihe precedent-setting Kurdish election. He will also step up efforts lo woo Turkey into tacit cooperation against their mutualto undermine, if not end, Turkish tolerance for Provide Comfort. Wc estimate these tactics will not bein stopping the drift toward greater Kurdish autonomy. I-
If the Turkish parliament does not extend Providethe conventional wisdom that it willwould feel freer to expand his operations in the north. He would probably initiate military operations, but would still want to avoidajor refugee crisis andeturn of international forces.
Even if Provide Comfort remains, Saddam could decide to act more provocatively if he perceives actions by the new Kurdish Assemblyrelude tothe Kurds acquired greater foreign financial investment, become more involvedly, and showed some progress in creating amilitary
Coping With Economic Pressures
Saddam has made progress in coping with Iraq's economic problems, has begun to reconstitute Iraq's military, and has begun to restore special weapons programs. Many war-damaged economic facilities have been repaired, although the fixes, in many eases, arc piecemeal and fragile. Baghdad rejected the terms of UN, which would allow for limited oil sales to purchase humanitarian goods, fund UN monitoring activities in Iraq, and pay
reparations for the Gulf war. Were he to accept those resolutions, oil could floweek through the Turkish pipeline, and he could earn0 million over six months, according to the terms of the UN resolution. His other sources of revenue are likely to remain gold sales, forward oil sales, some concessional loans from friendly governments, and collateralized
Saddam may believe that support for UN sanctions is weakening and that he can outlast them. He probably views the (roubles ihc UN is facing in funding its operations, including Ihe guard force stationed primarily in northern Iraq, and Ihc- willingness of some Security Council members lo modify the terms of UNi evidence lhat international resolve to continue confrontation with Iraq is flagging.!-
Saddam'slikely Over Ike Near Term
We believe Saddam is likely lo survive tbe challenges to his rule, at least for the next year or so:
No leader has emerged inudc Iraq to challenge Saddam. Even the hint of dissatisfaction with the regime is sufficient to invite arrest, execution, and confiscationamily'* property Few Iraqis are willing io run that risk.
Political change, if and when it comes, is likely to be sudden, brutal, and unpredictable.
Members of the opposition inand Kurdish, Sunni and Shia, secular and Islamic-have lillle in common other than their haired of Saddam and have little support inside live country. They continue to compete for foreign attention and have made little headway in agreeingoint program of action.
Saddam has been able to deliver sufficient food, medicines, and other consumer goods to the Sunni Arab cities and tribes that have long been his base of support and the primary source of manpower for the Republican Guard, the Ba'th Parly, and the security services. Any casing of sanctions would bolster Saddam's claim thai he can protect his iupporlers from the hardships of sanctions. It
would also probably allow him lo divert other financial resources lo his lopof Iraq's military forces and capabilities.
Saddam continues to exploit ethnic divisions to bolsier bis position asronically, his continued efforts in ihissucccssfoi in maintaining his hold on power -will serve torather than preserve Iraq's wiegrity in ihe long run.
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Iraqi intelligence will become increasingly bold in pursuing Kurdish dissidents inside Iraq anddefectors and opponents abroad. In recent months, Iraqi operatives probably were responsible for the attempted assassination of prominentofficials, the poisoning of Iraqi military defectors in the north, and the murderormer diplomat in Morocco.l
Saddam Islittletheme of Iraq as victim of "Western- Persian-Zionist"He hopes to exploit these propaganda themes to end Baghdad's diplomatic isolation and ease or end sanctions. So far. however, few countries haveambassadors to Baghdad or shown ato violate UN resolutions on trade (Twenty-four countries, plus the PLO and the Vatican, currently have ambassadors beading missions in Baghdadroughly one-third of the prewar level.)|
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