2
The Impact on Bol jinc; of OS Reconsideration$ Sales to
Taiwan
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at Play. As the architect of China's US policy, Deng Xiaoping will almost certainly weigh in decisively on Beijing's responseossible6 sale to Taiwan, as was the case when he reportedly made the decision that China would not act to block France's sale of six frigates to Taiwan last year. Deng's decision will almost certainly be affected by domestic political concerns. Deng is currently in the midstigh-stakes political struggle at home and his response presumably will be affected by his assessment of how much mileage his critics could get out ofG decision and the extent to which Washington offered "sweeteners" to key constituencies, such as the Chinese Army- Be almost certainly wants to avoid taking any step in the foreign policy sphere that gives ammunition to his opponents:
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old and risky campaign to accelerate economic reform, Deng's attention is now focused onew leadership committed to that goal ath Party Congress expected this fall. The personnel negotiations are nowery sensitive stage.
Although Deng currently has strong momentum, his hardline rivals are looking for ways to block his efforts or discredit him. In the past, they have gotten mileage out of attacking his willingness to engage with or make concessions to Washington, thereby questioning his nationalist credentials. They may also blame him for.. ox by approving the French frigate
Deng's approach to framing Beijing's strategy on the issue will also be influenced by his assessment of the relative costs and benefits to the overall bilateral relationship; he hasey proponent of maintaining good relations with Washington for" strategic and economic reasons. Moreover, Beijing has shown responsiveness to US concerns over bilateral trade and non-proliferation issues, reflecting the importance it attaches to smooth ties with Washington.]
China's Vice-Foreign Minister Liu Huagiu reportedly was toresentation at this conference transmitting the new spirit and directives of Chinese leaders on Sino-US relations and China's US policy.
The general tenor of China's policy was that Chinato beonflict with the United States. had sanctioned the Foreign Ministry'sreport which established that China needsrelations with the United States and at theto adhere to its principles on sovereignty andissues.[
uncharacteristic Quiet Co Far. In the past Beijing has reacted strongly and rapidly to indications that the United States would be selling, new arms to Taiwan. Since President Bush's public statement onuly that he was6 sales to Taiwan, however, Beijing has been relatively silent over the issue. The only public response we are aware of has beenon-authoritative Hong Kong news service which reportedhinese Foreign Ministry spokesman had called on the United States in general terms to honor its commitments to China regarding sales to Taiwan, in sharp contrast to Beijing's heavy pressure on Israel and France in attempts to block them from selling fighters to Taiwan. Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huoqiu, inugust meetings with US officials, did not raise the issue ot thein the plenary session!
n contrast, the Chinese
demarchod Washington Urmediately oh-the recent leasing offrigates to .
ourse of Action. Although China could react
emotionally with reprisals given the sensitivityfe that China's response
T;7 Cron21l' influenced by the way theany stipulations beneficial topresented. In the past China haa attempted to use economic bait to convince European'"strict military oales to Taiwan; however, France
* de^ced Chat Taipei's even larger economicas contracts becked up byillion
Chlna'a now ar^eoxa ready to sell -he island multirole fighter aircraft.T
In peeking concessions, Beijing would probably deny linkage to6 sale, but might insist on:
Prenotification and consultation on any US arms sales to Taiwan. Beijing might also seek guarantees from Washington that Taiwan would limit its sources of non-US arms acguiaitions.
The lifting of the military sanctions enacted in Junethe return of the Peaces now in USresumption of military-to-military cooperation on projects placed on hold after the imposition of sanctions following the Tiananmen crackdown in
Concessions on the licensing of US-made satellites destined to be launched on Chinese space boostersaivers from any US sanctions resulting froa its receipt last year of Sovietpace launch engines that exceed MTCR guidelines.
Economic incentives such as US support for China's cruicfc accession to the GATT, most favored nation (MFN) guarantees, and easing trade pressurearket access negotiations. Given Deng Xiaoping'a current drive for economic reform, he might personally find such concessions especially attractive.
-- Resumption of, official high-level diplomatic contacts.
China would also certainly press for certain restrictions on the6 sale. Beijing, of course, would probably be less worriedmaller salearger one. Beijing might alao believe it was less threatened if the fighter's offensive capabilities were as limited oa possible. There are several lterations that they might press fori
Elimination of the ground-attack targeting capabilities by precluding the software necessary for the radar's' computer-to process terrain mapping/following
information.
Installation of only air-to-air missile pylons, but no bomb-carrying pylons.
-- Reduction of the fighter's range. 6ombat radius several times longer than cu5ront fighters. Such an alteration,difficult, but theoretically possible throughofs fuel lines^such that it would be . utilize external fuel tanks and reducing theofs internal fuel tanks.
Though, Beijing's .response to date over the6 sale leads us to believe that China may press for concessions, rather than taking retaliatory action, we cannot rule out -the latter possibility, particularly if China's octogenarian hardline elders are healthy enough this fall to use the issue to attack Deng. In pressing France to drop its proposed5 sale to Taiwan, Beijing hasange of diplomatic and economic repercussions. If China decided to retaliate for6 sale to Taiwan, Beijing could:
Claim that because the United States was loosely interpreting its agreements with China, China should be free to do the some. In the past, Beijing has linked US arms sales to Taiwan to China's own arms sales and its associated arms control and proliferationsuch as agreements to abide by the MTCR. In its protest over US plans to lease Knox-class frigates to Taiwan, Beijing referred to the deal as weapons proliferationensitive region of China, laying the foundation for linkage to US proliferation concerns. Beijing might even decide to resume missile sales to countries such as Syria and Pakistan, although the regime is well aware- this would almost certainly result in loss of its MFN trading status.
Threaten to downgrade or even broak diplomatic relations with the United States. China probably feels it has too much to lose by breaking off its US relations, however, and would be more likely to restrict the access of US diplomats to Chinese officials as it did after the United States imposed sanctions in
Retaliate against US commercial interests in China, such
ouDie eage sworn, nowever; nwere to retaliate against such companies it would not only lose jobs and access to US products and technology, but Beijing would have to anticipate losing additional US support for maintaining China's MFN trading status. China could also cancel hundreds of millions of US dollars in annual grain purchases from the United States.
Stage military exercises near the Taiwan Strait. Beijing might hope that,intense military pressure would cause Taiwan to renege on acceptingltbough the regime is probably also aware that such actions could lend credence to Taiwan's calls for US military assistance.
;Escalate Sino<-GlS military arms and technology cooperation. While additional purchases are possible, China's military spending is constrained by other budgetary pressures. The Chinese military, however, would be better armed in seeking budget increases.
tronger role in opposing the United States in the international arena. Beijing would probably become less cooperative on US initiatives in the united Nations
Long Term Implicationa for Gino-US Relations. Assuming6 sale to Taiwan goes through, its long term impact on Sino-US relations will probably reflect the following:
If Washington offered to brief Beijing in advance on the deal, the Chinese would probably expect prior notification of any major US arms sales to Taiwan in the future. The regime might press even further for consultations with the United States on larger US-Taiwan security issues-.
China may calculate future US arms sales to Taiwan will remain limited; additionally, Beijing will haveigh-profile arms purchase from Europe by Taiwan, thereby avoiding major, and uncontrolled, European arms sales to tho island.
might be able to use such an outcome to his political advantage by arguing he had improved US relations while preventing Taiwan from diversifying its arms suppliers and preserving the basic framework, of2 Communique intact. This would especially be true if US concessions included assistance to enhance China's international economic stature, such as support for China's GATT membership.
less likely, Beijing could increase its long-term military presence along the Taiwan Strait, claiming the US was responsible for markedlyenegade Chinese province. This could include permanently supplementing its forces along the coast with newer equipment, such as China's, and deploying larger numbers of short range missiles in the region than is already planneo* for. China io developinghort-range ballistic missile, and will probably deploy it with ground units by the'. f
Implications for Taiwan-US relations. Taiwan-US relations would almost certainly be enhanced by6 sale and Taipei would no doubt be willing to give fav^hrablehe involvement of US companies in Taiwan's Six Year National Developmentto be0 billion* The government has reportedly offered such incentives to the French
Iff,
if they would sell Taiwan fighter aircraft. Taiwan's
in Taiwan.
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