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are welcome aod may be dueced io ine Chief,
Russian President Boris Ye!uthority and reformistare coming under increasing assault by conservative and nationalist opposition leaders. Yel'tsin's most visible critic and potential opponent is his own Vice President, Aleksandr Rutskoy, who for now is trying to influence policymaking from inside the administration. Outside Yel'tsin's administration, however, stand the lesser known leadersandful oforiented right-of-center parties or movements, who have more formally declared their opposition to Yel'tsin and their aspiration to lhe national leadership. In the months since the failed August coup, some of these leaders have attempted to form coalitions and alliances to strengthen their minimal clout.
Thus far, personality differences, clashes of ambition, and policy disagreements among these opposition leaders havethe cohesion essential to an effective coalition. As anone oftheirlikely toerious threat to Yel'tsin in the near term. Socialized under the Soviet system, they lack experience withrue understanding of democracy as it is understood in the West. Many of themthis deficiency in authoritarian styles, which are in stark contrast to the democratic programs of their parties. Such styles nonetheless appealopulace that desires bothand strong, decisive leaders. Still, the fact that the opposition leaders are vocal and attract sizable blocs ofmeans they cannot be dismissed as long-term threats to Yel'tsin, particularly if the nation's economic situation further deteriorates.
In the monihs since the abortive August coup, tbe euphoria surrounding Russian President Boris Yel'tsin's triumph and rise to preeminence in Moscow has evaporated and given way to demands for tangiblein day to day life. Substantive policy disagreements, as well as Yel'tsio's failure to consult adequately with most democratic parry leaders, have caused some of the Russian President's erstwhile collaborators to inch away or. in some cases, to openly declare themselves to be opposition figures. |
In the West, the best known ally-turned-critic is Yel'lsin's Vice President, Aleksandr Rutskoy. In recent months he has become the champion of traditionalists and nationalists who are opposed to the radical thrust of Yel'tsin's reform programsP While Rutskoy has increasingly criticized Yel'lsin's policies and other members of the government, he has not yet openly challenged Yel'tsin himself. Rutskoy still appears to want to work within the government to steer policiesess radical direction. V
Beyond this internal criticism and the potential leadership challenge that he faces ftom Rutskoy, Yel'tsin must copeore formally declared opposition: leaders of center-right parties or movements who are vocally criticizing and seeking to alter his reform policies. In this category, we
see at present five people who could eventually prove to be the primary troublemakers for him:
Sergey Baburin. leader of the cooservaiive Rossiya bloc in theparliament and chairman of the board of the Russian Popularmovement.
Nikolay Travkin, chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia (DPR)
Viktor Aksyuchlts, cochairman of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement (RCDM) and chairman of the Russian People's Assembly.
- Mikhail Astaf'yev, chairman of the Constitutional Democratic Party: Party of People's Freedom (Kadets).
Zhirinovskiy, chairman of the Liberal Democratic
For now, we believe that these men represent little more than anfor Yel'tsin, and his response to them has been minimal.making vague declarations about the need to work wiih politicalthe Russian President generally appears to ignore them. Heto consult with party leaders in regular meetings butso rarely.
Many of these opposition leaders are self-proclaimed democrats who have proved autocratic in approach, despite their democratic programs. All were socializedystem that lacked many of the basic human rights and freedoms that characterize democratic societies. The fact lhat they have no experience with or true underslanding of democracy often isin an autocratic leadership style and micd-set thai arc incompatible wiih democratic society as understood in the West. (
Nevertheless, because they exude the strength and decisivenessvalued in leaders in Russia, these leaders may ultimately have greater electoral appeal than would Western-style democrats. For now thispopular appeal does not translate into significant political influence because of frequent splits wiuiin their parties; an inability to build aalliance of like-minded forces; and their lack of competitiveness with Yel'tsin in the popularity department. Moreover, rising distrust ofas self-in teres ted and corrupt makes it unlikely thai the Russianwill place much stock in the ability of any political party to lead them out of ihcir economic morass. Indeed, in the aftermath of theParty's (CPSU) fall from grace, the concept of the political party may remain suspect for some time. I
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Vintage Zhirioovskiy
Vladimir Zhirinovskiy is infamous for his outrageous publicollection of his provocations follows.
"Any illegal rallies in Moscow will be brokenill use fire trucks. If that doesn't help, I'll use tear gas. If that doesn't work, I'll send people injackets and tell them to fire in thefresistance persists--shoot
them! That's it. That will be cruel,
but at least there will be order in the couniry.ear me andme. And let them be1
"I'll bury radioactive waste along the Lithuanian border and buyfans and blow the sniff across the border at night. They'll getsickness and die of it When they either die or get down on their knees, then I'll stop it.ictator.m going to do is bad, but it is good for1
"The Germans must pay for every murdered Soviet citizen and therefore we should not be reducing our army in Germany but rather increasing its numbersillion1
"The Japanese will never get the Kurilmayuclear strike1
"There could be an act of nuclear retaliation againstountry that supports the Afghan Mujahidin who have the cheek to keep Russian lads inI give (the Pakistani Ambassador}ours. If our Russian boys are not [home} withinours,ill send the Pacific Ocean Fleet tohores andtart it will wipe Karachi from the face of the1
Coalition Building Attempts
All five of these patty leaders are ambitious and appear to relish theand their self-image as kingpin. However, they also appear tothat their parties' influence can be augmented by joiningver the past year, we have seen evidence of at least three efforts atbuilding involving some of these groups. I
The Civic Accord Bloc
ta1 Travkin, Aksyuehits, and Astaf'ycv announced that their parties were uniting to form Civic Accord; the coalition initially was part of Democratic Russia and supported preserving the union. The three party
2. Zhtrinovskiy hus hinted thu he might be interestedoalition withhe describedindred spirir. However. Baburin has not reciprocatedin addition, all of the democraucally oriented party leaders havewith Zhtrinovskiy.
leaders joined forces to prevent leftist radicals from dominatingRussia and to promote the creationew, democratized central government-1 |
In the political turmoil in Moscow following the unsuccessful August coup attempt, arguments over Russian sovereignty and the future of the Soviet Union exacerbated the gulf between the three Civic Accord leaders and leaders of other parties within Democratic Russia. Civic Accordpreserving the union and an indivisible Russia, while the DR was more willing to allow regions to secede. Because of personality conflicts and disagreements on issues of Russian Federation unity, the Civic Accord trio stormed out of the November congress of Democratic Russia,the organization. The following month, they found themselves even more at odds with the prevailing political sentiment in Democratic Russia and with Yel'tsin when he dealt the final blow to the USSR bythe CIS. The Civic Accord bloc never gained momentum or cohesion, and by the end ofravkin announced that his party had broken off relations with the other two parties. He implied that Aksyuchits and Astaf'yev were extremists with whom the DPR should not be associated
The Russian People's Assembly
Travkin's announcement that Civic Accord was finished wasoot point, since the other two parties in the bloc had already decided toew coalition earlier that month.ebruary, the Congress of Civil and Patriotic Forces, sponsored by Aksyuchits's RCDM and Astaf'ycv's Kadets, convened and established the Russianhe main tenets of the RPA are strong state powercitizens' rights andreat and indivisible multiethnic Russia,nified army. Astaf'yev stresses that the RPA does notto unify all of Russia's patriotic organizations, but rather to provide an umbrella "only for those patriotic groups that occupy right-of-centerhe new group has distanced itself from extremiston both ends of the political spectrum, eschewing cooperation with leaders like Zhirinovskiy, whom they regard as neo-Stalinists and neofas-cists. According to Aksyuchits, who was elected chairman of the board of the RPA, the RPA will oppose the current Russian leadership andRussia. Vice President Rutskoy, the widely publicized keynote speaker at the2 Congress of Civil and Patriotic Forces, did not formally associate himself with the new RPA that grew out of it.
SK'"*RET
Proposed Travkin-Rurskoy Alliance
Ineading lo the Congress of Civij and Patriotic Forcescreation of the RPA, Travkin and Rutskoy signed their own
Constraints on Coalition Effectiveness
Thus far, most attempts at coalition building have been ill-fated because of several factors that tend to divide the coalition leaders or otherwise limit the effectiveness or longevity of their alliances:
Clash of Ambition. Many of these leaders have displayedand thus alienated other coalition members and splitalliances. Friction often develops between coalition leadersof control.
Notorious for his domi-
neering leadership style, Travkin has refused in the past to be affiliated with any organization he could notistory which leads us to judge that his purported new alliance with Rutskoy may be short lived.
Inflexibility. Most of these leaders have taken obstinate stances on particular issues and have shown little willingness to compromise their views to expand their bases of support or prospects for coalitions with other parties. They appear to be more interested in convincing eachthe Russianthe virtue of their individual causes than in seeking common ground to consolidate their support.
Internal Party Splits. For all five of these groups, it is difficult to gauge to what extent the views of the top leaders reflect those of the majority of their nominal supporters. In the case of Baburin's Rossiya bloc in the parliament, for instance, members often stray in numbers from Baburin's lead in legislative votes. Even more telling is the lack of support Travkin, Aksyuchits, and Astaf'yev received when they stormed out of the Democratic Russia congress last November: jeered by the audience, they reportedly were followed byortion of their respective party memberships. I
Outlook
Four factors underpin our judgment that none of these would-be national leaders will, in the near term,arge constituency and gain the power necessary toerious leadership challenge to Yel'tsin or guide tbe country's political course:
The absence of any organized political party behind Baburin'sparliamentary bloc of deputies.
The less-than-democratic leadership styles of Travkin, Aksyuchits, and Astaf'yev.
The total lack of democratic credibility on the part of Zhirinovskiy.
The fact that Yel'tsin's popularity, though slipping, still significantly exceeds that of any alternative leader.
Moreover, competing ambitions and numerous other divisive factorsthat coalitions of these parties will lack thein themount an effective challenge to Yel'tsin and his government.
Currently, the main strength of the opposition party leaders is their ability to organize public opposition and to rally legislative support to impede Yel'tsin's initiatives both locally and at the national level. They serve to remind Yel'tsin that in pursuing his destabilizing economic reforms, he must contend with growing pocketbook worries on the partopulace used to strong central control against economic and political chaos.
We believe, however, that the party leaders will continue activitiesincite public unrest, exacerbate an unstable situation, and makemore difficult for Yel'tsin. The confident and decisive aurasuch as Baburin. Travkin, and Zhirinovskiy could appeal to aweary of parliamentary decrees that have not put food onMany Russians now value democratic credentials in theirthe electorate may place greater value on strength and decisivenesseconomy continues its free-fall.
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Original document.
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