CHINA'S MOTIVES FOR DEALING WITH STATES OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN

Created: 8/19/1992

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Directorate of Intelligence

Intelligence Memorandum

Office of East Asian Analysi2

China's Motives for Dealing With States of International Concern |

Summary

Beijing has expanded relations with some of the world's more intemationJly troublesome regimes over (he last decade io pursue its commercial and defense-industrial objectives-'in paibcular to earn revenues for military modernization Since the end of the Gulf war and the Soviet collapse, which have raised Chinese concerns about Washington's international and political influence, Beijing appears to regard ils lies to such regimes as fulfilling twin objectives. China wants to expand defense-industrial relations as much as possible given its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Prolifcration Treaty (NPT) and the Missile Technology Control Regimet also wants to subtly impress upon the West that Beijing has the ability to either facilitate or complicate diplomatic efforts in Double spots. Wc judge thai China has set limits on its ties to regimes of international concern and will reject formal alliances that would jeopardise Beijing's more important relations with the United States and the West in general. But the Chinese are likely to interpret narrowly their arms control commitments-even slurring them in areas where detection isdeepen economic and political ties where possible ajg^f^

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A History of Questionable Relationships

Over ihe last decade, lhe Chinese have expanded their relations with some of the world's states of internationalhe Middle East, bul in Asia and Europe as well. Before lhe Gulf crisis. China looked to these st2tes primarily to pursue its commercial and defense-industrial objectives, with ihe latter designed lo earn revenues thai would support the modernization programs of the People's Liberation Armyuring the Iran-Iraq war^orexample. China supplied military goods totaling aboutillion to both sole. I

Although China's foreign policy objectives were largely secondary throughout most of. Beijing apparently saw the links il had established to some of the world's more unsavory regimes as an effective tool in ending its diplomatic isolation after lhe Tiananmen crackdown. Whereas many induslrialized sates kept contacts with Chinainimum for over two yean, press reporting indicated that iniemaiional pariahs like Iran. Syria, Libya, and Iraq were willing io exchange official delegations. Moreover, with the rapid disintegration of the former Soviet Union and thus Moscow's influence throughout the Third World. Beijing in our view see* an opportunity to increase its own influence and augment its economic presence--particularly through lucrative defense-indusuial deals

China's concern about US intentions to as sen its will around the world following its victory in the Gulf war has apparently prompted Beijing lo view iu lies io Third Worldource of leverage with ihe United Stales. Vice Foreign Minister Yang Fuchang last year said President Yang Shangkuns trip to Iran and Pakistan underscored Chinas desire "to strengthen its unity and cooperation wiih Third World countries" according to Xinhua. Similarly,im to Bali in May, Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu lold reporters that China will use it* UN veto rights "to safeguard developing countries from harmful policies.

Although the Chinese almost ccnainly do not regard iheir relations with these slatesully effective means of influencing US policy, we speculate that Beijing may hope lo use them lo subtly impress upon Washington China's ability to either facilitate or complicate US diplomatic efforts and nonproliferation goals in trouble spots. In (he first visithinese head of government to pcatrevolurjonary Iran. Li Peng in1 publicly warned his hosts thai US international interests threatened those of Third World nations, according to official Chinese press, in whai also may haveignal to Washington about concerns over its international agenda In that vein, China could threaten not to support UN resolutions authorizing military intervention in Iraq or Yugoslavia. |

We believe that official Chinese visits to key Third World counirie* in the past year haveffering assurances of continued defense cooperm 'bbjbbbbbb|

JYaig Shangkuns entourage on his trip to Iran and Pakistan last laifumber of high-ranking military officials, suggesting lhat lhe trip probably

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Tbe FxonomK Side of China's Arms Control Participation

Beijing's participation in arms control initiatives appears to be motivated in no small way by ihe opportunity ro defend China's arms export interests and those of its Third World partners. China has taken an active role in Arms Control in the Middle East (ACME) talks, but continues to preclude progress on several key ACME provisions that affect its economic interests in the region. ACME participants have reported that the Chinese are particularly reluctant to agree to prior notification of conventional arms transfers or to the banning of sales of surface-to-surface missiles to the Middle East and have refused lo accept full-scope safeguardsondition of supplying nuclear technology lo countries in the region. Although in March Beijing formally acceded to the NPT and agreed to abide by the MTCR. we judge its primary motivation was to retain most-favored-nation (MEN) trade sums with the United States-its largestd regain access lo advanced US technology.

focused heavily on missile and sensuV, technology sales. During his stop in Tehran, press reports indicated Yang, China's senior military leader, discussed defenseissue and mutual concerns abom expanding US international influence

Original document.

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