Lebanon's Hizballah: Testing Political Waters, Keeping Militant Agenda pjpjjpj
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Isual-track strategy ofmore (molted in Lebanese politics, while enhancing its null taut posture In Lebanon and abroad. Tke group his broadened lis dialogue with the Lebanese Corera-menl, expanded ties to legitiaaale political ntayers, registered aa an ofbctal political party, and aacaoesssced its participation later this sumenet inirst legisla tire election laean. Nerertbeseas, HiibaHah remainsommitted to its fundamentalist and arrti-WnMmi agenda. Tbe group haa redoubled Its military eflorts la toutbera Lebsuion against Israel, ami expanded iu terrorist capabilities around (be world, and has shown increasattg interest in building ties to Islaosk eitienaists outside Lebanon. Wethat Hizballah's leaders will eembaue ibis two-pronged political strategy as It allows tbrtn to gain political legjliawcy without Mcritktag their radical objecti*
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The reconstituting of government authority in Bet cut and tbe si rang Syrian backing lor the im piemen tattoo of tbe Ta'if national reconciliation accord has brought unprecedented pressures to bear on Hizballah The group, which had been operating almost unfettered by Lebanese authorities in West Beirut and tU southern suburbsas removed its armedfrom the capital's sirecU and relocatednumbers of fighters and arms lo southernand the Bekaa Valley. These stoves were prompted by the Lebanese Government's success in reuniting lhe capital and breaking tbe power of the other militias. Hizballah haa even allowed Lebanese miliury units into its strongholds in southernIn addition. Hizballah -like other majorbeen under pressure from Syiia loin lhe Lebanese Government.
Expanding Political Rok
Hizballah has worked over the past year toence in domestic politics and improve iu relations with Syria in response to the new order in poll-civil -war Lebanon. This policy direction was chartedby Abbas Musawi. who was elected Secretary
General of Hizballah's Leadership Council, the group's supreme governing body, in1 and by Husaynead of Hizballah's political bureau. Advocates of expanding relations with other Lebanese factions and sensitive to Syrian interests, Musawi andook the initiative toialogue with senior lebanese officials. Malawi's meeting with then Prime Minister Kara mi in2 was the firstizballah chief has been received by ahead of government. In the pasl year, Hizballah officials have held disctwiotu with the Lebanese Government on various issues, such as securityfor Beirut, assimilation of some Hizballah fighters into the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF1 guerrilla operations in the south, and economic aid for the Shia community. BJ
As part of iu effort to break out or iu political isolation. Hizballah also expanded iU dialogue with other Lebanese political groups. Hizballah officials have held high-level meetings since Musawi's ejection with several Lebanese leftist and nationalist parties, including the Diuzc-dominatcd Progressive Socialist Party, the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Parly, and the Popular Nassentc Organization.
h iipolitical contacts have also included iuduring the civil war. Aa extraordinary meeting late last year between Hizballah spiritual leader FadlalUh and the leader of the Christian Phalange Party bolstered HizbalUh's claim that ii was apolitical organization and noadical fringe gi
Musawi also engineered the receoi licensing of the group as an official political partyrejected the notion of licensing the party.
The aasassirtalion of Abbas Musawj in southern Lebanon in2 and Ihe subse quent election of hardliner Hasan Nasrallah asGeneral has not appeared to change the groupi interest in political participation. Less than two weeks after Musawi was killed. Nasrallahossible interest in participaling in the upcoming legislative election. Nasrallahonune that the group would cntct candidates in thb election
fighting to liberate Ihe Israeli-occupied south,made it domestically unpalatable for Lebanese leaders lo crack down on the group. Divided by sectarian loyalties and reluctant to act againstwithout Syrian approval, ibe Lebanesehas failed to move against Hizballah, and in some cases has adopted the group's positionihe legitimate right of the "resistance" tol rmi
he Fight ia lebanon
Hizballah's tentative moves to become more active in Lebanon's political process have not deterred the group ftom maintaining ils militant agenda inand abroad. Despite Beirut's implementationilitia disarmament campaign. Hizballah has moved rapidly over the past year to preserve ils militia0 cease-fire wiih ihc mainstream Amal group ended sii months of intra-Shia strife east of Sidon and permitted Hizballah to shift ihe locus of its mililary operations to southern Lebanon. Hizballah ihenublicto dissuadebanese Government from disarming us militiamen, with Hizballah leaders trumpeting the nonmililia nature of its forces By referring lo them as Islamic tesisiance sirugglers
Hizballah has become the most prominent guerrilla force in Lebanon in the wake of Beirut's defanging of the Palestinians inhe LAPs success in subduing Palestinian forces in Stdon. Lebanon's ihird-largcsi city, dramatically reduced Palestinian abilityonduct operations against Israel. Evidently fearing Ihal Ileum would move against il next, Hizballah turned its anti-Israeli rhcloric into deeds. In ihe two months immediately following the action against the Palestinians. Hizballah earned out more operations against Israeli and Israeli-backed forcesad during the past three years combinedizballah has maintained iis aggressive
that Hizballah can help nurture other Islamicgtoups, particularly those in nations deemed pro-West by Hizballah. In the past year. Hizballah cJfieiab have traveled throughout the region seeking to build tiesnde array of extremal groups. According to articles from Hizballah's magazine fjEJ
eying on radical lemcntsmsta, Kuwait. Saudi Arabia. Egypt. Pakbtan. and Yemen:
implications of Hizballah's strengthened position in southern lebanon were dtamaiically underscored in the aftermath of Musawr's assassination inithinours. Hizballah launched kalyutha rockets into raortbezo Israel and Ihc Israeli-occupied security zone. The group abo effectively mobilized to meet the Israeli military incursion that followed the rocket attacks. Hizballah suffered only seven fatalities during the Israeli operation]
attacks have continuedigh rate since Musawt's assassination, raising tensions along the Israeli-Lebanese border. Although the frequency of Hizballah attacks against the Army of South(ASL) and Israeli forces in southern Lebanon subsided somewhat after the Israeli incursion, by hblorical siandards Hizballah almosi certainly willecord for attacks2 The new cycle of Hizballah-inspired violence in May. followed byair raids against Hizballah camps near the Syrian border, heightened regional fears of an Israeli-Syrian con frontal ion. Hizballah's commitment to maintaining its aggressive military campaign in southern Lebanon was underscored in late Mayachmegun attack on an ASI. outpost. The attack occurred only days after assurances from Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati io Lebanese leaders that Iran would use ils influence to calm the situation in the south BjBajjBj,
.uilding Ties to Extremistsizballah also is building lies to fundamentalist groups throughout the region in an effort to promote its revolutionary dogma and confront WesternBoth Musawi and Nasrallah have publicly staled
We believe some of Hizballah's support lo (hescaking place at the behest of Iran,rying to cipand its ties to extremal Islamic groups without jeopardizing its efforts to improve its politicalhe region pjJJJJ
Mosl of Hizballah's assistance has been in Ihe form of political and financial help, and ihe group also may be military (rainine for Islamic extremists.
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nd Maintaining Ihc Terrorist Card
Hizballah terrorisis carried out the2 car-bomb attack against the Isradi Embassy inwhich took place one month after Secretary General Musawi was assassinated ia southern Leba-
Masterad Mugh-
niyah^uamlcJinael Organization (IJOy anof Hizballahong history ol spectacular terroristresponsibility for the operation less thanours after the attack
Hizballah holds the United States equally responsible with Israel for Musawi's assassination and hasto retaliate against American imerestsfJJJJJJ
Hizballah elementsetaliatory operation against US interests in Lebanon shortly after Musawi's death Hizballah executed two successful operations last year against American targetsctober missile attack against the US Embassy in
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aodovember car-bomb attackesuoycd the administration building at theUniversity or Beirut. Iran, which beganlow-level operations against US interestsould be likely to support Hizballah's efforts to retaliate against the United Slates, as long as Tehran would not be directly implicated in tbe attack.
Hizballah's efforts to expand its international support infrastructure have enhanced the group's ability to target US and Israeli interests, particularly in non-traditional venues such as Eastern Europe. Latin America, and Africa.
Hizballah leaders, in fact, may become more deeply involved in terrorismesult of lhe election of Hasan Nasrallah io replace Abbas Musawi. Unlike Musawi. Nasrallah was directly involved in many Hizballah terrorist operations, including hostageairline hijackings, and attacks against Lebanese rivals. Mosl of Hizballah's spectacular terrorist ai-lacks have been undertaken by autonomous security groups in an effort lo shield lhe party's political apparatus from responsibility, bul Nasrallah'scredentials may lead him lo bring icrrorisi-relaied matters under the control of lhe Leadership Council.
Assembly would, for the first time, give (heoiceegitimate Lebanese institution and help undercut its imageand of terrorists. Men cover, Ihe group would be better positioned to seek the assimilation of some of its militiamen into the LAF. and it would be likely to press for the appointment of some members into tbe civil service, especially the foreign service and agencies involved in economic reconstrwrtion. Hizballah's representation in theparticularly if it won seals for southernalso would provide theew pulpit from which to defend its guerrilla operations against Israel.
The election of Hizballah members to the Lebanese legislature would give the group greater political legitimacy and increase its clout wiih government institutions. Hizballah representation in the National
Despite the potential benefits. Hizballah'sin the Lebanese political order risks alienatinghin the group who oppose reconciliation wiih the Lebanese Government. Nasrallahardliner will help dissuade hardcorefrom bolting the group in the short term, but the chancesplit will increase if many Lebanese Shia eventually come to view Hizballah according to the traditional rubric of Lebanese parties Assteps up its participation in electoral politics, Nasrallah. in fact, may feel compelled to try to placate haidlincrs by stepping up the anti-Israeli resistance activiiies in southern Lebanon and perhaps conducting teriorisi attacks abroad
Original document.
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