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Directorate of Intelligence
Office of African and Latin American Analysis
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NOTE FOR: Mr. Gary Gray
Soraalia Desk Officer Department of State
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emorandum that examines past efforts to resolve Somalia's political crisis and draws some lessons from thero. Given the heightened interest inolitical solution for Somalia, we thought you night be interested in this review.
He hope to follow uppeculative memo that addresses various scenarios for Somalia's future. As usual, please call me3 (STU III) if you have any questions or comments.
African ana Latin American Analysis Attachment
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Intelligence Memorandum
Office of African and Latin American Analysis2
Somalia: Lessons Learned from What Hasn't Worked
Summary
The many and bitter clan and subclan divisions In Somalia will makeaunting challenge, as evidenced by an examination of the number of failed efforts to end the anarchy raging there since former President Siad's overthrow inonetheless, we believe interested parries in the international community can learn from previous failures andositive contribution toward longer-term stability in Somalia, even as the focus of foreign assistance remains famine relief for the mdefmite future. We believe regional enclaves would provide the mtemational community with the best means for establishing areas of stability, thusoundatioiLf^^entual political and economic recovery in Somalia. I
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Created0 from the union of British Somali!and in the north and southern Somalia with its Italian colonial heritage, the country's disintegration since then has resultedong succession of divisive policies inflictedeople already burdened by grinding poverty and torn by deeply-engrained animosities between the country's five major clans andubclans. Former President Mohammed Siad Banc, who siezed power9 and wielded it untilears much of the responsibility for furthering these trends. The imposition of martial law in northern Somalia in they Siad's southern, Marchan-clan dominated government generated widespread local supportecessionist movement Moreover, by fueling clan rivalries, Siad sought to undermine the developmentroad-based political opposition. His regime encouraged clan feuds over grazing and water rights and distributed cash and weapons to traditional clan rivals to keep them from organizing against him. In our judgment, these divide-and-rule policies succeeded primarily inarge proportion of the population with modem, destructiveTrading and raiding insured that no clan remained unarmed--and in raising the level of violence throughout the country. |
Since Siad's overthrow, Somalia-the only ethnically and linguistically unitary country in Africa-has disintegratedatchwork of feuding clans and subclans. The transitional government in Mogadishu installed by the United Somali Congress (USQ-itself split by internal warfare into two majorbeen unable to consolidate its control over even the capital. The Somali National Movement (SNM) unilaterally declared an independent Somaliland Republic in the north shortly after the Siad regime fell, but the north has also been fractured by internal factions and clan animosities.
Frustrated Mediators: Failures of Reconciliation
Rome Tries toelping Hand
Mediation efforts by the Italian government1 underscore thewhen Somali factions doubt the impartiality of mediators. Soon afterMogadishu, Italy, as the former colonial power for most of Somalia, attemptedall sides together for talks in Rome. Although the Italian Ambassadormileage visiting Somali cities in both the north and south, widespreadItaly following Rome's years of support for Siad served to undermine theIndeed, at one time the ambassador's plane
washumanitarian mission to Giismayu,
almost certainly because the Hawiya USC feared Rome was supporting Darod clan supporters of
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lesson. of critical importance lo mediating powers is their acceptance by all concerned somali factions as non-partisanwhich must be continuously cultivated among all somali leaders, who are typically xenophobic and suspicious. the italian experience shows that failure toeputation for objectivity may lead factions to attack foreign emissaries they suspect of favoring rivals. I
eritreaid to bring peace
an eritrean peace initiative late1 initially appeared promising, primarilyeritreans wereeutral party by most somalia. eritreanvisited mogadishu; as recently as1 their negotiators, whowith both usc factions,ational reconciliationbe arranged inwc believe,
however, that the two
negotiate in good faith, each trying to use the eritrean initiative to their advantage as tbey jockeyed for foreign backing. when heavy fighting erupted in mogadishu between aideed and ali mahdi forces late last year, beleaguered eritrean officials in asmera told us diplomats that they no longer believed their efforts could be productive. |
lesson. the eritrean initiative shows how somalia's warlords will use negotiationseans to forestall combat while they build up their military forces, oractic to convince rivals to lower their guard. mediators cannot rely on promises of cooperation or cease-fire pledges alone, but must build verification procedures and good-faith gestures into any negotiation process. |
tbe djibouti conferences
the most promising reconciliation effort was that orchestrated by the government of djibouti during me summern our judgment, djibouti was on the verge ofettlement in june, when representatives from fivethe usc and somali patriotic movementgreedease-fire. six factions attended the subsequent meeting in july, agreeing toransitional govermrKnt with ali mahdi asove that gave his government some legitimacy. I
the djibouti talks were undone, however, because the organizers failed to bring two key actors to die table--the snm and aideed's faction of the usc. the snm, believing it was well on the way to gaining international recognition for its somali!and republic, refused to attend the djibouti talks on the grounds that it was the ruling party of somaliland, not "just anotherideed, elected usc chairman just prior to the second round of djibouti talks, refused to go along with die cease-fire in order to prevent further legitimization of ali mahdi's presidency. moreover, as the talks progressed, it became clear that other factions, like the spm. also were splitting along pro-aideed and pro-ali mahdi lines. i
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Negotiations will fail to produce lasting agreements in Somalia unless every party capable ofolitical settlement is included. Given the sheer number of clan and subclan groups,iecemeal approach that concentrates on regional and subclan reconciliation first, such as that currently being pursued by UN Special Representative Mohamed Sahnoun, appears to have the best chance for being inclusive while avoiding the potential for unwiddiness. |
Enclaves of Peace: Hope for lhe Future or Pipe Dream?
Accord at the regional level in Somalia is notrerequisite for national reconciliation; it also holds out the hope for enclaves of relative stability that can serve as avenues through which to channel relief aid. Efforts to create the Somaliland Republic shortly after Siad's fall and the development more recentlyeemingly effective Majertain administration in northeastern Somalia provide ejjxeftent examples of the possibilities and problems associated with this approach. I
Somaliland
The Somaliland Republic initiallyotential island of political stability that might serve as building blockederation. Oaiming legitimacy because it was the successor to British Somaliland and promising stability because it was controlled by one dominant clan, the Ishaak^heSpmaliland Republic appeared far more stable and cohesive than the south. I
Dissension within the SNM over Somaliland President Tur's inability to gamer international recognition or economic aid undermined unity in the north, however!
Lesson. Somaliland's political disintegration resulted from subclan squabbling for limited resources following Tur's failure to garner foreign recognition and assistance. High-profile economic aid and political support for enclaves not yet afflicted by subclar, warfare might forestall the kind of fragmentation that occurred in Somaliland.!
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The northeastern, Majcrtain clan-doininated comer of Somalia remains relatively peaceful by current Somaliontrolled by the Somali Salvation DemocranTPrc5tTS5DT insurgent group--the northeast apparendy has not experienced the subclan warfare common in the rest of the country. Its main port, Bosaso, has suffered little damage, despite periodic clashes between SSDF forces and Islamic fundamentalists, and reportedly has servedeliable avenue for trade to much of the region. The northeast's relative stability led UN envoy Sahnoun to comment earlier this year to US officials that delivering aid to the region might encourage other factions in the country to emulate the Majcrtain and stop fighting.
Although the Majcrtain enclave might be described as relativelyhe northeast is not without problems of political instability andN doctor was murdered in Bosaso earlier this year, for example. In addition to subclan frictions that have ledeadership dispute within the SSDF, fighting between Islamic fundamentalists and the SSDF has also occurred. Moreover, Majertain leaders fear Aideed will eventually attack southern Majertain lands, according to US officials. Tensions with the USC warlord's Habr Gedr subclan of the Hawiya have sparked fighting in the past and could flare into warfare
Lesson. Peace in tbe northeast is fragile, and certain conditions unique to the region have combined to produce the subclan cooperation noted in Majertain lands. The northeast was spared the destructive combat that devastated Mogadishu and SomaLUand's major cities during the revolt against Siad, and clan leaders and the general population alike appear reluctant to allow the, kind of violence besetting neighboring enclaves. Furthermore, the SSDF leadership hasteady series of threats from Islamic fundamentalists and Aidecd's forces, which we believe has helped the SSDF avoid political fragmentation.
Conflict between Aideed and the SSDF demonstrates that even the relatively stable Majertain lands are not divorced from warfare in the rest of the country. The northeastern enclave will have difficulty fostering stability while facing serious external threats. Majertain leaders would thereforevalue security assistance equally with humanitarian and development aiil.J
Waitinginner: Letting tbe Civil War Run Its Course Let Ihe Best Man Win?
Had Aideed succeeded in seizing power from Ali Mahdi inhe situation in Somalia for the last year might at least have been simplified. His alliance wit
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Somaliland's President Tor and southern warlord Omar Jess might have been parlayedational government that overshadowed other rivals. As the war in Mogadishu dragged on, however, conflicts between other clan-based armies intensified. Tut has been reduced to the status of factional leader among squabbling subclans of the Ishaak. Omar Jess has been forced to fend off rival factions of his Ogadeni clan-controlled SPM, while battling the very capable Majertain warlord General Morgan, Siad's former Minister of Defcns
Lesson.trongman may eventually emerge, the evidence of the last year suggests that continuing anarchy has increased clan and subclan divisions and led to intensified factional fighting. Although one faction periodically has appeared toominant position over its rivals, new subdivisions within the winning clan or coalitions between previously antagonistic clans have emerged to shift the balance of power. Furthermore, although subclan disputes have come to dominate Somalia's current warfare, longstanding unresolved animosities between the country's five major clans will confront any clan warlord looking to win national power]
Or Wait for the Ammunition to Run Out?
The various clan-based armies fighting throughout Somalia arc well-supplied with arms and ammunition, including howitzers, antitank guns, and rocket launchers. I
the large military stockpiles amassed byMengistu are probably the main
sources for weapons and ammunition. Some reports alsolourishing local arms market, while others claim that Libya or Iran have become the primary sources of arms fot one faction or another. pjjBlijM
munitions
the Horn of Africa are plentiful.
Lesson. We have no way of estimating how long Somalia's factions can fight before exhausting their munitions, but available evidence suggests their stockpiles arc extensive. Aideed, for example, overran several ammunition depots in the southeast while chasing Siad into Kenya in the spring. Moreover, warlords have become adept at finding suppliers in the international arms markets. An Aideed lieutenant, Osman Alio, is widely
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The string of railed efforts to overcome Somalia's many, deep-seated problems underscores the difficulty of finding reliable solutions. To end the clan-based fragmentation tearing the country apart, Somali leaders--as well as interested parties in the internationalneed to address the short-term problems of famine and disorder as well as the longer term process of building stable political and social institutions. Although the prospecj^DDear slim we believe some positive steps toward
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longer-term stability are feasible.
Despite the fighting in Somaliland and factionalism in the Majertain region, we believe
for establishing areas of stability. Reporting from for example, that Majertain clan lands in central iomaiia remain relatively peaceful. If the Majertain are able to establish order within their homeland, fend off neighboring warlords, provide access to international relief organizations, andemblance of economic normalcy, such an island of stability might servease for extending order to the rest of the country. Some humanitarian volunteers argue, for example, that mtemational aid for the northeast mightdemonstration" affect, convincing embartledjvarjords Aideed and Ali Mahdi that making peace would reap tangible rewards. I
The collapse of Somaliland suggests, however, that Majertainia may not find lasting stability without outside help. Enclave leaders must persuade rivals to cooperate in order to avoid subclan fragmentation and civil war, and they are unlikely to succeed in this endeavor if they cannot provide economic patronage and political prestige in leturn for such cooperation and support High-profile assistance from the international community--including food relief, development assistance, and possibly diplomatic recognitionprovide enclave leaders with both the material for patronage and the perception of international approval needed to enhance their legitimacy. Furthermore, regional administrations must be secured from neighboring warlords and discouraged from seeking security by supporting armed rivals across their borders. J
In our judgment, long-term political stability in Somalia cannot be achieved without the creation of political and social institutions that can maintain order, resolve disputes, select leaders, and promote unity among social forces. Every political organization we are aware of in Somalia represents the interestsarticular clan, however, and these groups are factionalized along internal subclan lines. Clan and subclan leaders in
Somalia see national politicswinner take all" contest, in our judgment. One clan sreks to attain power so it can use the resources of the state and nation for its benefit.
To break the cycle of violence and clan interest, Somalia's leaders need to develop respected institutions that are given some measure of independence. The process could begin with regional conferences aimed at reconciling subclan disputes, an approach now advocated by the UN.ational reconciliation conference-organized by an impartial body and including all Somaliseek toommon sense of national identity and purpose. Atonference, discussions could focus on developing impartial political andulti-clan police force-that foster clan participation and cooperation. I
Original document.
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