Director of
Central
Intelligence
Saddam Husayn: Likely To Hang O
Intelligence Estimate
This National Intelligence Estimate represents the views of the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and assistance of the US Intelligence Community.
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Director of
Central
Intelligence
Saddam Husayn: Likely To Hang On
information available as of2 washe preparation of this National Intefftgence Estimate.
foBowing intelligence organizations oanicDsted
m th* preparation of this Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency
Tho Defense intelligence Agency
The Nationecurity Agency
Assisurt Secretary Jcxe-ce ax) Aesearcn.
Department at State
The Director tor Intelligence.
Department ol Energy1
The Offce o' intef-geoce Support.
Department of the Treasury
also participating:
The DeouTv ChwH of Staf for Ima-^pnca.
Oeoanment of the Army
The Director of Naval intelligence.
Department ol trie Navy
The Assistant Chief of Stall, intelligence.
Deoartment of the Ar Force
The Director of Intei'igence.
Headquarters. Manne Corps
This Estimate was approved for pubtcation by the National foreign tntefigence Board.
APPROVED FOR FIEUASE
Key Judgments
Saddam Husayn: Likely To Hang On
Saddam Husayn is likely to survive the political and economic challenges of the next year. Although he is significantly weaker than he was before the Gulf war. he appears stronger than heear ago The only real threat to Saddam remaining in power over the next year isudden, violent effort to remove him by one or more people with access to him.
If we arc wrong in our judgment about Saddam's survival, it is most likely in underestimating the current degree of unhappiness in the military and in the Sunni core that have provided Saddam's base of power. Important individuals in the inner circle and in the Republican Guard might be ready tooup againstopular revolt is much less likely.
Saddam will continue to use the Army, the Republican Guard, and intelligence and security forces to stifle dissent, reassert his control over Iraq, and prevent the emergence of any potential rival. The resumption of Air Force fixed-wing flight activity in April probably added to public perceptions that the regime is growing stronger and that citizens are powerless to bring about changcl
Economic sanctions alone are not likely to bring aboul Saddam's removal, but they will contribute to public disaffection with his leadership.may also be increasing popular resentment toward ihe West. Despite sanctions. Saddam has managed to maintain his core supporl group by providing goods and services not available to the masses. Saddam probably believes that Iraq has withstood the brunt of thesanctionsand that international support for sanctions is flagging J
Saddam will continue to test coalition resolve by using economic pressure and increasingly intimidating military positioning against the Kurds in northern Iraq. Should Provide Comfort not be extended, he would be freer to expand his operations in themay hope for Turkish collusion in suppressing the Kurds. He will also be more likely to act against the Kurds if he thinks they arc acquiring attributes of statehood. In addition, his success in restricting international attention to the plight of the Shus in the marshlands of southern Iraq permits him to carryuthless, but probably only partially effective, military campaign against them
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Discussion
Holding On
Saddam Husayn is not the strongman he was before the Gulf war, but bis regime continues to demonstrate an ability to turrne. Indeed. Saddam's petition appears to be gradually improving, and the retime is now more secure than ilearjaj
Tightening Mis Grip
To maintain his personal security. Saddam will coo linue to isolate himself from all but his most trusted colleagues and family members Saddam hasthe military and security services to provide additional protection for him, his family, and his regime. Significant Republican Guard and other key security services still surround Baghdad,ormidable barrier to disgruntled military or other foes of the rcgimoj
Saddam's policy of generously rewarding relatives and cronies, along with fieice and swift punishment of those wiih suspected loyalties, is likely to ensure ihe continued support of bis inner circle. They probably have also accepted his argument that only he can keep Iraq together and are fearful of retribution from the population if Saddam is no longer there to hold the regime intact. In addition, his pervasive security networks combined with the fear of purges,and retribution will serve to restrain other potential opposition. According togJgaiBBgjftsr'fe^ account* that we credit but cannofflonrfrnffiaddam's security services continue to round up suspected coup plotters and disaffected military personnel
The Iranian airsuikc in early Aprilissident camp inside Iraq may have highlighted (heof Iraq's borders, but it also gave Saddam an excuse to resume Air Force fixed-wing flightand bolstered his case for Hftine international
sanctions. Should Iran strike into Iraqi territory again. Iraq would probably react wilh its air defense weapons, including the launching of interceptors if sufficient early wirning were available Theby Iraqi fixed-wing aircraft, which many Iraqis apparently believed had been prohibited under the terms of the cease-fire, is probably taken by Iraqi citizens as an indication that the coalitionasing its oppositionaddam.
lending His Reach in the Soulh
Saddam is moving to reassert his authority beyond Baghdad, especially in southern Iraq, where the Shia rebels sail operate. Saddam is aggressively probing the coalition to see if it is wilting to enforce UN. He is demonstrating growingthat he will nol be punished for his aclions.
Saddam's ability to limit access of international observers and relief workers in the south givesreer hand to conduct military operations in the marshlands in an effort to end the persistent, low-level Shia insurgency. He is also depriving the Shias of adequate food and medical supplies and limiting their access to the holy cities of An Najaf and Karbala'. These tactics will set back the Shia insurgency but will probably no* put it out of
He probably sees the Shiasore serious long-term threat to his regime than ihe Kurds. As his forces extend their sway over the marshes, Saddam will probably begin forcibly resettling Shia villagers in other region where they can be more easily
Pressure on Ihe Kurd*
Saddam hut no) given up his designs lo reimpose complete control over northern Iraq's strategic cities andncluding some oil facilities. At the same time, he seeks toajor confrontation with Operation Provide Comfort:
Saddam can be expected to continue to exploit differences among the Kurdish leaders in an effort to undermine their ability to maintain cohesion and control
He will rely on his internal economic embargo of the north, now in its eighth month, coupledirtual military blockade of the region.
Iraqi forces vill continue to harass UN reliefand impede their efforts in the north
half of Iraq's ground forces are deployedefensive line facing theareas in the north. The layered air defenseincluding mobilebe jitivjied quickly.
Saddam could significantly step up militaryagainst the Kurds with little advance notice But he probably will notilitary offensive while Operation Provide Comfortlace Instead, he will rely on steady military and economic pressure to try io divide the Kurdish political leadership, at some point slice away territory held by the Kurdish Front, and undermine the results of the precedent-setting Kurdish election. He will also step up efforts to woo Turkey into tacit cooperation against their mutualto undermine, if nol end, Turkish tolerance for Piovide Comfott. We estimate these tactics will not bein stopping the drift toward greater Kurdish autonomy
If the Turkish parliament does not extendtbe conventional wisdom thatwould feel freer to expandin the north. He would probablyoperations, but would still want toa major refugee crisis and risking a
Even if Provide Comfort remains, Saddam could decide to act more provocatively if he perceives actions by the new Kurdish Assemblyrelude tothe Kurds acquired greater foreign financial investment, become more involvedand showed some progress in creating amilitary force MM
Coping With Economic Pressures
Saddam has made progress in coping with Iraq's economic problems, has begun to reconstitute Iraq's military, and has begun to restore special weapons programs.amaged economic facilities have been repaired, although the fixes, in many cases, are piecemeal and fragile. Baghdad rejected the terms of UN. which would allow for limited oil sales to purchase humanitarian goods, fund UN monitoring activities in Iraq, and ru>
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reparations for the Gulf war. Were he io accept those resolutions, oil could floweek through the Turkish pipeline, and he could earn0 million over six months, according to the terms of the UN resolution. His other sources of revenue arc likely to remain gold sales, forward oil sales, some concessional loans from friendly governments, and collateralized credit
Saddam may believe that support for UN sanctions is weakening and that he can outlast them He probably views the troubles the UN ts facing in funding its operations, including the guard force stationed primarily in northern Iraq, and the willingness of some Security Council members to modify the terms of UNs evidence that international resolve io continue confrontation with Irac isMM
Saddam's Suriiial Likely O'er the Nrar Term
We believe Saddam is likely to survive ihe challenges to his rule, at least for the next year or io:
No leader has emerged inside Iraq to challenge Saddam liven the hint of dissatisfaction with Ihe regime is sufficient to invite arrest,nd confiscationamily's property. Few Iraqis are willing to run that risk.
Political change, if and when its likely to be sudden, brutal, and unpredictable.
Members of the opposition inand Kurdish, Sunni and Shia. secular and Islamic--have little in common other than their hatred of Saddam and have little support inside the country. They continue to compete for foreign attention and bate made little headway in agreeingoint program of action
Saddam has been abk to deliver sufficient food, medicines, and other consumer goods to the Sunni Arab cities and tribes that have long been his base of support and the primary source of manpower for the Republican Guaid. the Ba'th Party, and the security services. Any easing of sanctions would bolster Saddam's claim that he can protect his supporters from the hardships of sanctions. It
Saddams Seighhon: Adapting to Hit Sunital
Sone of IraqiArab countries. Turkey, andthe military andmeans or the political influence to bt major players in decidingate The neighbors almost certatnly are dismayed that Saddam has sunivtd. and so far they have shown little Merest In reaching anwith Baghdad. Pressure to reestablishrelations with Iraq and to resume economic lies is likely to build the longer Saddam remains inearming Iranurther complication, placing Iraq's Gulf neighbors under cross-pressures to decide which state poses morehreat to their interests: Iran or j. Iraq, for now. weairly consistentf:
Continued expressions In diplomatic circlesopposition to Saddam and his regime.
Reluctance to take significant public mea-sures against Saddam for fear of arousinglatent popular sympathy for Iraq.
Willingness to maintain nominal compliance with Unsanctions, which affect few Arab economies significantly other than Jordan.*
Gradual drift in some coalition states from willingness to support new military action if necessary.
Probable readiness to meddle In Internal Iraqi affairs once the end of Saddam's regime is In..
*S Jonhn'i VioUiMn of UN Sinenon-Atainitj Ihr Kim Won't Plui xht Irak)
would also probably allow him to divert other financial resources to his topof Iraq's military forces and capabilities.
Saddam continues to exploit ethaK divisions to bolster his position asronically, his continued efforts in thissuccessful in maintaining his hold onserve torather than preserve Iraq's integrity in the long run.
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What if Were Wrong?
Our judgment aboul Saddam's survival is based more on our understanding of the history of Iraqi authoritarianism, public passivity, and the behavior of this regime
The greatest likelihood of being wrong is in underestimating the current degree of unhappi-ness in military circles and in the Sunni core that have been the base of Saddam's hold on power.^^
If important individuals in the inner circle or within the Republican Guard are ready to act againstoup by these groups with access to him is the most likely scenario. Weopular revolt is much less likely. Jjpjf
Indicationsoup attempt is under way or has occurred might include:
Dramatic changes in the security situation around Baghdad, particularly the reshuffling Of military forces Into and out of the city.
Announcements by Baghdad of numerous arrests of senior government or military officials.
A shift tn official media coverage to Include frequent references to treachery, deceit, and Other Intrigue.
* Iraqi intelligence will become increasingly bold in pursuing Kurdish dissidents inside Iraq anddefectors and opponents abroad, ln recent months. Iraqi operatives probably were responsible for the attempted assassination of prominentofficials, the poisoning of Iraqi military defectors in tbe north, and the murderarmer diplomat in Morocco. H
Saddam islittletheme of Iraq as victim ofWestern-Pcrsian-Zionist"He hones to exploit these propaganda themes to end Baghdad's diplomatic isolation and case or end sanctions. So far, however, few countries haveambassadors lo Baghdad or shown alo violate UN resolutions on trade. (Twenty-four countries, plus the PLO and Ihe Vatican, currently have ambassadors heading missions inroughly one-third of the prewar Icverjajjgaa
Original document.
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