National Intelligence Estimate
The Kurds: Rising Expectations, Old Frustrations
This National Intelligence Estimate represents (he views of the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and assistance of the US Intelligence Community.
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
The Kurds: Rising Expectations, Old rrustrationsH
Key Judgments
The Gulf war and rising ethnic consciousness and conflict around the world haveew context foi the longstanding struggle of the Kurds to achieve autonomy if not outright independence. More broadly, Pan-Kurdish identity is being strengthened by developments that predate and will outlast recent events in Iraq and Turkey:
These developmentseakening of tribal ties and the
these factors, the emergence of an effective Pan-Kurdish movement in the next three to five years is unlikely. The Kurds of Iraq and Turkey arc more likely to sustain their struggle for more autonomy on separate but reinforcing tracks Inter-Kurdish rivalries and Iraqi Kurdish dependence on Turkey will prevent lasting cross-border coop-
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Ankara. Baghdad, and Tehran will use repressive military means to contain Kurdish insurgent activity. They will not succeed in stifling Kurdish nationalist sentiment, however:
If Provide Comfort were to end, Saddam surely would bring his
coalescence of Kurdish activism could occur under alteredfor example, if:
Iraq's central government were substantially weakened or thepartitioned.
- States conducted major cross-border raids that would compel Kurds to coordinate their action.
Far-reaching reforms in Turkey permiticd greater intra-Kurdish cooperation than is now possiblc.H
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Implications for the Inited Stain
Operation Provide Comfort willritical factor in determining prospects for Kurds in Iraq and Turkey. Baghdad will move swiftly to reassert control over its Kurdish areas if Provide Comforl is not extended. Ankara's decision will depend on Turkish perceptions of Provide Comfort's impact an Kurdish aspirations, the strength of the PKK insurgency, concerns about relations with Washington, and coalition strategiesis
upport for Turkey's and Iraq's existing borders could clash with the rising political aspirations of Kurdish groups, particularly those in Iraq who are part of the anti-Saddam coalition.J|
The growing Kurdish insurgency in Turkey will place greater strains on tbe US-Turkish partnership, especially if Ankara escalates its military campaign against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) or cracks down even harder on the Kurdish insurgents in the southeast and expects US support in these efforts.
erious Pan-Kurdish independence movementwe deemWest may be pressed to change its longstanding policy and facilitate the peaceful emergenceew ethnic state, while trying to preserve its strategic interests in the existing states.
Discussion
ew Kurdish Problem?
The Gulf war and rising ethnic consciousness and conflict around the world haveew contest for the decades-long struggle of Kurds -who live mainly in Turkey, Iraq, andto achieve self-determination:
The creation of an internationallyzone in northern Iraq has strengthened the resolve of Iraqi Kurds to achieveindependence from Baghdad. Already, Iraqi Kurds have established newof self-government; elections were held in
Comfort, the presence of coalition stales and international relief workers in northern Iraq, and continuing international press attention introduce some new dynamics to one of the world's oldest ethnic probler
Two Ways of Thinking About the Kurdish Problem
Cycles of History
Many analysts of the Kurdish issueepeat of past patterns,umber of factors prevent significant change in the Kurds' situation in any of the key countries.
the same time, Kurds in Turkey are undergoing an important rise in cultural and political consciousness, stimulated in part by the increasing intensity of the eight-year conflict between Ankara and the Kurdistan Workers' Partyhis struggle has particularly importantfor Turkey's stability.
More broadly, weeneralof Kurdisheakening of tribal lies reinforced by years ofand the migrant experience in Europe predated and will outlast recent events in Iraq and Turkey^
Nonetheless, the Kurds' political fortunes during the three- to five-year lime frame of the Estimate will still depend heavily on the governments of the states where they live, on neighboring slates, and on foreignand sympathizers. But Operation Provide
Forces of Disunity. Achievement of Kurdish aspirations will be hampered by differences in language, ideology, and historicKurdish clans and groups havecompeted, rarely cooperating for sustained periods. This proclivity isby the quarrelsome relationship between Iraqi Kurdish leaders Masud Barzani of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)and between them and PKK leader Abdallah OcdhnMrnfM
Prevailing State Interests. Each of the stales in which Kurds live is capable of repressing or manipulating Kurdish ambitions. The common inlerest of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq in preventing an independent Kurdish slate will shape their diplomatic relations and efforts to arm and exploit Kurds in neighboring countries in pursuit of their age-old rivalries.
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However, their policies an autonomy orrights short of independence vary widely and will remain flexible and often unpredict-abli
International Resistance or Indifference.
Since World War I, the internationalgenerally has resisted the ideaurdish state, although Westernand others have exploited Kurdish aspirations to serve their Middle EastForeign governments have remained committed to Turkey and Iraq as states within their recognized boundaries. More recently, the numerous ethnic disputes that have sprouted in the post-Cold War era have probably strengthened the conviction ofWestern stales that fostering minority rights within existing borders is preferable to civil wars that seem to attend most efforts to establish new ethnic states. |
Fragilityurdish State. AnKurdish region in northern Iraq could form the nucleusurdish state that might eventually include territory fromIran, and Syria. Such an entity wouldrecarious existence. Landlocked in largely mountainous terrain, the Kurdish state would depend on its neighbors for access to trade routes, trading partners, and safe borders and would be difficult to defend without more sophisticated weaponry and international guarantees of its borders. H
New Factors Make It Different Now
At the same time, analysts acknowledge important differences in how the Kurdish question will probably evolve ins compared with earlier pcrir
New Contacts Among Kurdish Groups. The1 refugee crisis, the continued presence of Iraqi Kurds in Turkey, thevisits of Barzani and Talabani tothe posting of permanent PUK and KDP representatives in Ankara, and Iraqi Kurds* apparent ability io transmit radio intohave created new cross-border lies. Kurdish newspapers in Turkey, for example, cover events in "southernfforts are under way totandard Kurdish dialect for media usage, and Turkish Kurds also hope to set up Kurdish-language television. Progress in these directions will strengthen Pan-Kurdish identity, even if formal political links arc slow to develop J
The recent achievements of Kurds inIraq have reinforced the commitment of politically active Kurds in Turkey to change their ownoping to emulate the May elections in Iraq, some Turkish Kurdishincluding Ocalan. speak of holding unofficial "elections" in the southeast toocal Kurdish parliament. Iranian Kurds have also become more active this summer, although notcalcof their Iraqi and Turkishjpj
Key Iraqi Kurdish leaders express support for creationnified military force,we doubt that political and tribal leaders will readily give up the control they enjoy over their forces.orce would provide an important psychological boost to Iraqi Kurds and affect outside perceptions of the prospects for statehood.ore effective Iraqi Kurdish fighting force could also intensify tensions with the PKK and generate new conflict with Turkey and Iraq.
Current Weakness of the Iraqi State. UN
economic sanctions, destruction of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, and Baghdad's loss of control over the north have seriously weakened the Iraqi slate. This has inspiredesser extent. Kurds in otherescalate theirfor political rights. Should theresume attacks againsi Iraq, its Kurds would be further emboldened J
Rise of the PKK. The Kurdish organization has developedignificant insurgencyerious challenge to Turkey's stability. The recent liberalization of cultural rights for Turkey's Kurds has provided newfor the PKK to spread its message. Although still committed lo Marxism, the PKK now plays down social ideology in favor of nationalism. The PKK may increasingly appealroad range of Kurds, not only in Turkey but also in Iraq. Iran, and Syria where the PKK operates. iHftal
Pro-PKK sentiment, while difficult toappears to be rising in southeastern Turkey because of the PKK's willingness to confront the Turkish military. It seems likely that the PKK message is also reaching many of the millions of Kurds who have moved from the southeast lo major cities in Turkey, in part because moderates among Turkish Kurds are finding it difficult toore moderate Kurdish agenda. Kurds who oppose PKK terrorism and violenceare frequently intimidated by the PKK. acknowledge that it is monopolizing thebetween Turks and Kurds, and credit it with forcing the Turkish Government to make the liberalization measures it has to dale.asm
Turkey's Changing Self'Image. Turkey's desire to maintain its association withinstitutions and to be accepteduropean state will continue to influence official policies toward ihe Kurds. But its policies have fallen short ofransformation of Turkeyiberal mul-
The rise of Turkic consciousness andrapidly evolving relationships with the ethnically Turkic states of ihe former Soviet Union have created interest in Turkey'sthe leadershipurkic bloc. Pride in an ethnic definition of Turkishness will probably contribute to less tolerance for the cultural and political distinctness of Kurds.
International Acceptance of Sew Ethnic States. The fall of Communism and the resultant emergence of small ethnically based states lead ihe Kurds to hope for international support.inimum, some Western governments may become more willing to support Kurdish demands foror for ihe establishment of federal or confederal arrangements for Kurdish lands if the struggle drags on and intensifies over the next few M
The Most Likely Scenario: Separate but Reinforcing Tracks1
We expect the Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, and,esser extent, Iran to continue to seek greater autonomy and political distinctness from their central governments. In each of
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The PKK: Insurgents Who Use Terrorism
US Intelligence Community regards the Kurdistan Workers' Partylike the New People's Army in theand the Peruvian group Senderoa rural-based insurgency that uses terrorism as one of its tactics.
The PKK also was responsible for three kidnappings of Westerners in southeastern Turkey last year. PKK leader Ocalan warned lhat the PKK has the right to detain foreigners who enter Kurdistan without PKK permission^
. PKK terrorist attacks in southeastern Turkey targetedofficials, village guards and their families, teachers, and schools. Into negative publicity, the PKKmore discriminating0ocusing mainly on village guards, soldiers, and Turkish security officials. This year, however, the PKK has again widened its assaults on civilians,extortion, assassination of perceived PKK opponents, and attacks onestablishments and the wealthy,the safety of civilians in the vicinity of the intended targets, many of whom were murdered or injured.to Turkish Governmentivilians are included amongeople killedJnPKK-related operationsM
The PKK maintains ties to numerous leftwing Turkish groups, most notably Dev Sol, which since1 has killed two Americans and carried out dozens of bombings against US facilities in Turkey. Dev Sol cells may have provided logistic and intelligence support for PKK attacks against Turkish security forces inthis spring. J
The PKK has also carried out terrorist activities throughout Western Europe over the post decade. The group uses Europe primarily for fundraising by extortingmoney from Kurdish and Turkish expatriates,ase for recruitment, andafehaven from Turkish authorities. The PKK also has conducted at least II assassinations in EuropeW
he PKK has sporadically conducted terrorist activities in Turkey's major cities; most analysts expect urban attacks to rise.
three cases, however, they will work primarily within their particular national context. Cooperation could over time become more significant as their community ofand interdependence grows. But we see
important tensions and rivalries inhibiting cooperation in the short run^
Overall, Iraqi Kurds will be in the strongest position. So long as Provide Comfort continues
the Kurds will be able lo preserve their new institutions and de facto autonomy, eventrong central government emerges inShould Provide Comfort end because of the fall of Saddam Husayn. Iraq will likely face short-term instability, during which time the Kurds could take advantage of the turmoil to advance their agenda but would also face risks to their well-being ^
Many Iraqi Kurds believe that Ankara's uneasy tolerance of their political activities will not outlast Provide Comfort. Still, the Iraqi Kurds, dependent on Turkey for land routes, will try to strengthen these links. Turkey's President Ozal and PUK leader Talabani have spoken in favorpecial relationship between Turkey and northern Iraq, including talkone of influence and even, reportedly, placing the former Ottoman province of Mosul under Turkish protection. But Prime Minister Dcmirel and most of Turkish officialdom appear lesswith any hint of border changes or of adding more Kurds to Turkey'smix. Many Iraqi Kurds oppose greater dependence on Turkey and think that Talabani has endorsed such ideas for tactical reasons^
Kurds in Turkey will continue to struggle among themselves and with Ankara to define the parameters of their political debate. Some hope for formal autonomy; others, including PKK followers, are convinced that only secession and independence will protect their rights, meaning that no end of PKK-led violence and Turkish countermeasures is in sight. Still other Kurds would settle for greater recognition and identity within the Turkish state. The would-be leaders ofoderate movement will be intimidated by thetheir lives may be at
stakethey will need encouragement and serious political reform from the Turkish elite.moderate" movement would probably be compelled toodus vivendi with the PKK.^^
Possibly with pressure from the West, the Turkish establishment might be willing to take some steps toward decentralization,development projects in the southeast, or further liberalize cultural and political rights. Most politically active Kurds,will regard such measures asINR believes the PKK could beby an antiviolence Kurdish political party, provided it is allowed to express itself fully and to operate without fear of Turkish harassment. Turkey could still satisfy the goals of the overwhelming majority of Kurds through far-reachingreform, although the time for doing so is rapidly growing short
Iran's Kurds will continue their low-level insurgency against Tehran, but they arc unlikely toajor breakthrough unless other ethnic minorities in Iran also become more assertive and weaken Tehran's military capabilities or divert its attention. Iranian Kurds have indicated some interest in receiving Western support and attention, which could mean that the success of the Iraqi Kurds has expanded theirmmlions,
Competition and rivalries will continue to define relations among Kurdish leaders. Short-lived alliances will be the rule, and each group will give information about the others to central authorities as theyfor position. Current leaders may be served by keeping the Kurdish movements separate. Talabani and Barzani evidently see
strategic advantage in pursuing awith Ankara, the price for which is an anti-PKK stance. Ocalan. an advocate of Pan-Kurdism. will try to undermine the Iraqi Kurdish leaders as pawns of the West. His ties to Baghdad will probably boomerang, furtheynedivisjons between him and Iraq's
Next Most Likely: Governments Effectively Stifle the Kurds
The central authorities in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran will, if circumstances permit and if they believe international opprobrium will be manageable or short lived, try harder to repress the Kurdish insurgencies, as they have done in the past. They unquestionably possess sufficient military power to prevent the Kurds from establishing politicalbut some low-level insurgent activity would continue evenuccessfulMassive military action against the Kurds could radicalize moderate Kurds and would also generate considerableattention:
Turkey's current leadership feels justified in using all necessary military measures to repress the PKK insurgency, and is finding growing support from the Turkish public for the crackdown on the PKK. If Ankara's fears for its territorial integrity were to rise, it would be prepared to undertake even stronger and more massive repression of insurgents in the southeast.
Iraq will continue to use military means to intimidate the Kurds. If Provide Comfort leaves while Saddam is still in power, Baghdad will act forcefully to bring the Kurds to heel. If Saddam were gone,efforts might be tempered in the
short runesire to achieve some political reconciliation with the Kurds for the sake of restoring national unity and with an eye to the international reaction, butew regime could make life hard for the Kurds again.
also will use military force to keep the Kurds, who live close to Azcri-inhabitedthe most strategicallyfrom threatening the state. It has recently increased its military presence in Kurdish
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Alternative Scenarios: Emergenceingle Movement
The coalescence of Kurdish activism in Iraq and Turkey and possibly even Iran is very unlikely over the time frame of thisThis judgment would be altered,under certain circumstances:
If the Iraqi state continues to weaken and Iraqi Kurds work actively to create an international network, the environment will be more favorable for development of Pan-Kurdish consciousness.
The de facto or formal breakup ofwidely feared by Iraq'saccelerate serious Pan-Kurdishwith Kurds outside Iraq lookingto the model of Iraqi Kurdistan.
A massive crackdown across borders by at least one of the three keylikelycompel Kurds totheir military and diplomatic strategy.
A dramatic change to liberalize Turkey's internal politicalwe deemalsoeaceful catalyst for greater intra-Kurdish cooperation and solidarity. J
Decline ofationalist Sentiment
A parallel decline of the political ambitions in each of the key countries seems unlikely, but we cannot totally dismiss the possibility that Kurds could decide that their interests no longer required outright independence or even greater autonomy. This wouldramatic change in circumstances in their countries ofexample, the rise
of pluralism in Iraq afterwc believe thathange would take years to develoi
of Provide Comfort's impact on Kurdish aspirations, the strength of the PKKconcerns about relations withand coalition strategiesis Sad-
for (be United States
In the broadest sense, the Kurdish issue has the potential to become another seriousin the post-Cold War era. The United States and its Western Allies seek policies to preserve the territorial and political integrity of Iraq. But those policies would inhibit prospects for Kurdish statehood, and, if the violence in tbe region is prolonged and spreads, the failure of the internationalto bring about the peaceful resolution will prompt comparisons to tbe Balkansand may lead to charges offor the violence that ensuesj^^^
Growing Kurdish activism is likely to place key US interests in greater conflict. Inlong-term bilateral relations with Turkey will be strained by the unintended consequences of Operation Provide Comfort. Some in the region already perceivein policies toward Turkey and toward northern Iraq, which have beenin ourIraqi Kurds while condoning theof Turkey's Kurds. Nonetheless, ainsurgency that compels Ankara to escalate its actions in the southeast could reinforce this perception J
Operation Provide Comfort willritical factor in determining prospects for Kurds in Iraq and Turkey. Baghdad will move swiftly to reassert control over its Kurdish areas if Provide Comfort is not extended. Ankara's decision will depend on Turkish perceptions
US Policy Towardong-term self-governing zone in northern Iraq could put intorocess that will make more difficult the US commitmentnitary Iraq. Kurds will continue to make requests for incremental gestures ofand, if sanctions against Iraq continue, foristinct economicKurds may also be concerned that the fall of Saddam will shift the focus from protecting Kurds to shoring up the integrity statej
Relations With Turkey US support for Turkey will be challenged by Ankara's human rights failures on theissue. Turkish authorities will expect US sympathy, if not active assistance for their anti-PKK efforts. Should Washingtonthe Turks. US relations with some European Allies could be strained, asin2 when Germanypunished Turkey for use of its military equipment in anti-Kurdish operations. US policies to protect Iraqi Kurds will be hard to mesh with friendly relations with Turkey if Ankara expands cross-border attacks into Iraq or decides not to extend ProvideThe Turkish establishment will question the bilateral relationship if Washington is perceived as pro-Kurdish and if the United States raises more concerns about human rights and democratic practices. In any event. US ability to ease the Turks toward greater political and cultural liberalization
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will be limited. INR believes thai the United Slates and.esser extent. Westerncould influence Ankara toward greater political and cultural liberalization, provided they remain strongly supportiveofTurkcy's security and diplomatic needs.J
Relations With the Kurds
Kurdish groups, whether working separately or together, will seek US recognition. They will try to build on12 experiences of visits to Washington andin the anti-Saddam coalition. While probably accepting that formalfor statehood is not achievable. Kurdish political leaders will press for commitments from Washington regarding protection of their human rights, economic freedom, and political status within Iraq and Turkey. Iraqi Kurds could ask for arms orovernment crackdown looms, But Turkey's Kurds will very likely remain skeptical of US intentions; many already resent US military support for Turkey and believe the United Stales is directly helping Turkey with intelligence support against the PKK. Such attitudes could lead the PKK to target US persons or faciliticsJJJJp^^J
percussions in Iran and Syria
Other US interests in the region could be complicated by Kurdish developments. For example, tensions between Turkey and Iran over PKK camps could increase the risk of sustained military conflict and of drawing in
the Unitedise in Kurdish violence from bases in Syria and Lebanon could also affect US priorities with Damascus, where the bilateral agenda is already crowded with the peace process, terrorism, and human rights ; 1
Other Regional Concerns
US policy toward the Kurds will be closely monitored by other parties in the regions:
Palestinians will look for signsouble standard or inconsistenciesis their own status.
Arab governments will worry that the US commitment to current Arab stateis eroding.
Syria will oppose any policy moves that could awaken Kurdish consciousness or create new domestic social pressures in Syria and will have to manage the PKK issue with both Washington and Ankara.
Israel may be emboldened to work more openly with the Kurds, as it has done in the past, to create countcrforces to Arab nationalism.
Contact with Iranian Kurdish leaders would affect Iran's perceptions of USand deepen the anti-Americanof the IranianB
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Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Information available as ofsed in tin- preparation of this Nationalimatc.
1 be following inirll^rnce organisationsibe preparation of ihrt KstimaH-
Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
Department of Slate
also participating:
Tbe Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
Department of tbe Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence.
Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence.
Headquarters. Marine Corps
1 bit Estimate was approved for publication hi the National Foreign Intelligence Board.
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