Director of
Central
Intelligence
Confiagmmltt*
South Africa: Weathering the Storm
Information available as2 was used in tne preparation of this National tntettigence Estimate.
The following intelligence organizations panicipated
io the preparation of this Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency
Tha Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
efso participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
Department of We Army
The Director of Naval intelligence.
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Cfwf of Staff. Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force
The Director of intelligence.
Headquarters. Marine Corps
This Estimate was approved for pubUcauon by the National Foreign lmeSiger.ce Board.
I Impact of ANC Suspension of Talks
.'A fluty of political activity has occurred in South Africa since theational Congress 'ANC) suspended its participation In the Conventionemocratic South African ANC delegation delivered the ft,group's demands to President de Klerk's office. These include banning all
dangerous weapons, repealing repressive laws, and disarming andil Special security fortes to barracks Significant breakthroughs atnitial meeting seem unlikely because tensions remain high.p)
^'Nonetheless, Nelson Mandela has said that Pretoria need not satisfy allANC demands before the group would consider rejoining CODES A. Senior ANC spokesmen, moreover, have reaffirmed their commitment to asettlement and have rejected calls for arming township militants. Icjag
trategy
Pretoria is anxious to resume formal negotiations. The broad wording of the ANCs requests should help Pretoria lo meet them. De Klerk has tahen several steps In this direction:
Foreign Minister Botha will soon meet UN Secret try General Bouirot-Ghali. whom the ANC has asked to Investigate the recent massacre and monitor township violence.
Pretoria announced It will welcome international factfinding missions but will not accept 'direct international
De Klerk hasespected South African Justice, who isommission to Investigate the violence, toerson with solid International credentials to Join his Inquiry,m)
Nonetheless, the situation In South Africa almost certainly will deteriorate further. The ANC will go forward with lu program of mass actions. Factional violence and attacks against government targets will intensify as extremists seek to exploit the setback in negotiations. For now. de Klerk probably will resist growing pressures to impose nationwide emergency security measures. He will not hesitate, however, lo take steps to retst 1st whites or blacks intent on using violence to disrupt negotiations fcya0
Key Judgments
South Africa: Weathering the Storm
The recent surge in factional violence and the African National Congress (ANC) suspension of talks have dealt the negotiations process abut wc believe notThe climate for talks is unlikely to improve significantly for some time, and the implementationultiracial interim government it likely to slip beyond the nextonths.South Africa remains on the pathajority-led government. The ruling National Party (NP) and the ANC remain committed toegotiated settlement, and the Conventionemocratic South Africa (CODESA, process, possiblyestructured format, probably will weather the current storm.r)
Recent events notwithstanding. CODESA has made remarkable progress in six monthsange of issues affecting South Africa's transition. CODESA has become institutionalized and stronger even as the main actors have become more antagonistic. The CODESA managementfunctions independently to guide the talks. The personal relationship between President de Klerk and Nelson Mandela, although still importanthe talks, is increasingly less pivotal as decisionmaking becomes more widely dispersed throughout the bureaucracies of the government, the ANC and CODESA itself
Nonetheless- the period of sweeping, conciliatory gestures has ended. South Africa's transition will occur in fits and starts as the key players try toettlement Some contentiousas the structures of aeconomy andrxriodically slow progress in the talks, but the central struggle will remain the apportionment of power in the new South Africa:
The NP will press for extensive checks and balances at every level ofand considerable decentralization of authority to regional and local structures.
The ANC and its allies will resist formulas that give disproportionate power to minority parties or significantly weakest the aubority of the central government.
Both the government and the ANC are aware of the power of Zulu nationalism. They will go to great lengths to accommodate Chief Buthelezi's wishesinal settlement because he has the power to disrupt an agreement,at.
in
f
wilt have more problems with bis constituent* during ibis period than de Klerk.base of support will be threatened by persistent factional violence in the townships and by charges thai the government, with which he is negotiating, is fomenting the violence. In contrast, de Klerk's overwhelming victory jn the March whites-only referendum gives the NP considerable latitude in the talks, as longettlementsufficient protection of white interests. Incidents of rightwing violence and actions by rogue policemen remain likely, but prospectsuccessful military coup are virtually nil.j>
A lengthy disruption of talks wouM stretch out the transition proceaa and make it even more violent. The ANC and iu allies, however, are no match for the white-controlled security forces, while the NP cannotew system work without the ctwperaiioe of ibe ANC and itsalt to the talks probably will be temporary as the principal actors try to restart the process and avoid unprecedented bloodshed and irreparable damage to the economy. Once an imerim government is inollapse of the transition processesulting civil war are possible but we believe unlikely.
Our judgment that the transition program will stay on track is based more oa ihe previous behavior of the key players and the assumption that they fully appreciate the disastrous consequencesreakdown than on any current compelling evidence. In the event that such rationality docs not prevail or that politics internal lo the participating groups override it, the talks would collapse, touchingave of poiiticai violence and international condemnation. Mounting instability and racial conflict would spur white secessionist movements, white emigration, and renewed foreign disinvestment,evere economic downturn and soaring black unempioymcot and poverty,*
The United State* and other foreign governments can play an important role in keeping reform and transition on tract Pretoria wants political support and economic investment. The ANC views its international standingey strength. Both sides know that an abandonment of the present course would undermine the favorable stance that Washington and other governments have adopted
recem surge in uetksial violence and (ba African National Congress (ANC) stispention of talks ai the Iv-organization Convention forDemocraiic South Africa (CODESA) have dealt the netotiatinicrioas but probably not fatal blow, and the dimste for talks is unlikely lo improve significantly for tome lime. Nonetheless, the two dominant players at CODESA, the ruling National Party (NP) and the ANC. will remain committed toegotiated settlement because they have no choke other than civil war. Negotiators already have made significant progressange of issues affecting South Africa's iransilion. although the implementation of atransitional government is likely to ilip beyond the oeatja>
ftjhricalfactional fightingeo supporters of the ANCersistent threat to CODESA but will nee brieg the oilapse of the current government or tad rforu toewon Violent .hue and black extremist CTjcaition lo the talks .stwmall minority of South Africans. Most whites and blacks appear willing lo give their leaders enough latitude io negotiate compromisesrelative moderates, iocludinte Klerk and Nelson Mandela, come under severe pobtical pressure during periods of heightened violence.esult, additional temporary breakdowns and logjams In the talks are virtually ensured.
EJiraeois across the political spectrum probably will continue u> use violence at times lo advance their political agendas. For example, some ANC supporters will resort to intimidation to enforce participation in mass protests, and Inkatha supporters willvoid becoming marginalized ia theand to demonstrate the power of Zulu national-jsm. Despite ^support lastor ibej^caBed National Peace Accord, which eaub-Irshec multiparty structuresonwusaiot- of mmtgg u> cope with the violence, none of the mainonsistent effort to halt the oVataifrfcjra)
We do not believe or have evidence io supportcharging that President de Klerk is directing etTorts to foment violence and thereby weaken ibe ANC. On the contrary, bis efforts to purge ihe security forces, particularly ihe police, of righlwingcra have been so rxonounccd that the local media have openly speculated on the possibility ofoup.rowing body of credible reporting indicates thai rogue rightwlng sympathizers within the securily force* are providing support and assistance, including arms, to any force* thai are instigating violence. Moreover, acommission recently lambasted ihe security services for noi doing enough to stop the killing,
Clttaio
The furor over the rectal massacreack squatter camp ccrnrms that the period of sweeping, eoocoa-tory cestare* has coded, and the political stakesrueling process ahead. Violence almost certainly will surge atootwhen talkseadlock, accompanying breakthroughs in the process, and marring peaceful moss actionihe parties begin lowith ihe core issues that will determine the shape of (he new South Africa, indudlng:
The distribution of power at the national, regional, and local levels.
The timetable for the Iransilion.
The structures of the postapartheid economy and securily forces.
The selling of the product of negotiations to diverse constituencies,
The distribouon of power issue will permeate each Phase of the iscgotiatsons. Some imes-rwirtsealthe pansespatson cf minor parties, the role of traduonal leaders, reuv.egrat on of the nominally
independent black homelands, and the conductationalseize center sUge at limes and win periodically stow or temporarily halt progress in ibe talks But moat of these issues are secondary to the central struggle between the NP and the ANC-led alliance to apportion power. Other keytimetable for tho iransilion and the structures of the poslaparlheid economy and securilyare pan of the broader struggle for powers*,
A crucial test lie* ahead as the NP and ANC work oat ibe modalities of the new constitution Thewith coalitionit could get ISof the voteonracial electiononstlto-lion-drafting body. Bui it doubts il coutd winercent or more. The ANC. for Its part, doubts it could win more than two-thirds of the vote.deciding what portion of Ihe conaiitution-draftrng bedy will be required to adopt provisions of the constitution has far-rescntng implies bom for the ultimate balance of power. Moreover, the NP will press for proteciion of white interests through esten-sive checks and balances at every level of government and through strong regional and local government. The ANC and ils allies will resist formula* that give disproportionate power lo minority paities orweaken the central governmentp
Any timetable for the iransilion process that the Nationalists and ihe ANC agree on prohably will slip. The NP will try io extend the period at least several years,ultiparty interim government rulingcountry as representatives draft Ihe AnalIts preferenceonger transition reflects white fears of losing powereliefrolonged transition would be necessary before the ANC and its allies learn ihe skills to governThe ANC. facing considerable pressure to produce tangible benefits from negotiations, will pressuch shorter iransilion. with the Interim government and coruiiiulion-dtafiing phase lasting lessear. (yag>
The struggle over these issues will continuetrain relations among key players. The ANC and itsSouth African Communist Party and Ibe Coneress of South African Tradea general strike to press iheir demands and
The Key Players
Sotioaal Partyurrentlyf "is in whiteonwhites-only referendum on reform byercent inoll in May Indicates Iff would winercent of votes in nonracial generalhas held power
AJHcan National Comgtea (ANC) Membership of. but would winercent of nationwide vote, accordinguch of support drawn fromillionormal allies Include Congress of South African Trades largest labor federation withillionSouth African Communist Party, which0 members, lew/p
Inkatha freedom Party lIFFf Claimsillionreponderance of support fromillion2 poll luggtsts IFF would lakeercent of vote in
Conserve/ite Party: targets of numerous rightwinf groupsegal opposition party, holdseats In whitearty unity floundering after resounding defeat In March whiles-onlyonpartlcl-pent in Ihe Conventionemocratu South Africaut has agreed to bilateral talksplit from NF2a)
Black Consciousness Groups: Largest black ex-clutivitt groups are Pan-Africa nisi Congress and Ataman People'soth are boycottingolls showAC claims0 members and AZAFO0 ipat
Con
Whitns endill They loin the Talks?
Elements of fringe groups on both ends of ike political spectrum will probably Join the talks at seme point but are unlikely to exercise significant Influence. Hardliners In the white Conservative Party and the black Pan-African-ist Congress so far have prevented theirfrom participating in Ihe Conventionemocratic South Africa. As the political costs of standing on Ihe sidelines rite, theseat least breakaway factions will try to Join the talks, perhaps as elected membersonstitution-draftinc body.grouparge constituency, but the pros pecmoother, more peaceful transition would be Improved If representatives of these groups were drawn Into negotiations.
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already havean action campaign to mobaliie support. Healed rhetoric, a: ticr.eiinto personal attacks between de Klerk andincreasingly characterize the talks.wc see little chance lhat the long history of mutual recriminations between Ibe ANC and Zulu Chiefnkatha movement, another impor-tant player in COOESa. will end. Butheleii nof cooperation between the ANC and theand fears being marginalized or.ee an irieriro government and corsiituiion drafting body arcBoth the government and the ANC are aware of the power of Zulu nationalism. They will go lo great lengths to accommodate Chiefinal settlement because he has the power to disrupt aa agreement. Nonetheless, political violence fueled largely by the ANCInkatha rivalry willJc^aa)
Getting lo Acreement
Temporary breakdowns or logjams in the negotiating process are inevitable. The ANC willemonstrations, and strikes lo influence the talks
and assure its constituents that it will not cave in to white demands just toettlement.eneral strike be implemented, the ANC and its allies could bring the ccnaornyirtual standstill for several daysime Most ANC leaders realize, however, that mass action isool lhat can be usednd that Urge-scale. prcJongedtohave unintended consequences, touchingave of bloody violence, further damaging the economy and poisoning the climate for fruitful talks. fc^a>
Nevertheless, the evolving negotiating stances and underlying interests of the keyihe NP and thea settlement ia within reach. Despite public rancor and tbe lough bargaining that lies ahead, the CODESA process ii fund*sound and would survive the loss of President de Klerk or Nelson Mandela. CODESA hasihe negotiating process, strengthening it even as the main actors become more antagonistic. ThereUtionahip between de Klerk and Mandela, althoughmportant to the talks, is increasingly less pivotal as decisionmaking becomes more widely dispersed throughout the bureaucracies of Ihetbe ANC, and CODESA Itself
inal constitution may still be years away, the broad elementsiable settlement will Include:
A majority-led central government. The winnerree and fairthaplay ihe leading role in ibe executive and legislative branches of gewernment.
Continued white political and economic influence. Elementsoalition government would persist, and whiles would retain key positioni as top civil servants, military officers, and economic acion.
Protection o/ minorityystem of extensive checks and balances would be written mto the constitution,ignificantly em powered iodependent judiciaryill of rights
Strong regional and local governments. Despite longstanding ANC opposition to federalism, some form of regional and local government would be instituted.
Conti
Progress lo Date
. ;
frJlM Plenary Session.ates draft declaration of Intent that setsonable guidelines for CODESA endeavors...
% ratify general rules andeach
%key compromise on Implementing decisions...
five working groups to hammer outconsensus reports on free political participation.
broad constitutional principles and theion-draflingprocess. interim government, rein-
corporation of black homelands, and time
. Second Plenary Session. Four of five working groups completeeadlock over division of poweronstltuilcm-drafiing body dominatesCODESA structures subsequently streamlined to facilitate compromise and pave way for third plenary session, perhaps in July.
wing and homeland armed forces eventually will be integrated into the South African Defense Force, as opposedholesale merger of forces into aSouth African armed fceee. Jjaatf
Compromising on Economic Issues Economic issues willackseat to political ones in coming months but will assume greater prominence once an interim government is in place. The tnstaila-liort of an Interim government would Strengthenconfidence by demonstrating the viability of power sharing and open the way for large inflows of foreign aid that will boost the economy and help redress deSricMtes in black living standards.the recent formationovemment-business-Ubor forum win broaden participation in tbe talks process and ease uncertainties over the country's economic future Byonseosas, if only on broad pottapartheid economic policies, an economic forum would remove some of the tmcertaiities that deter potential investors. It would also facilitateby the ANC and other opposition group* toelatively moderate course on economic Issues.
Brlngtag Corwrituents Along
As Ihe talks progress and the prospeciational election nears, de Klerk and Mandela willweigh compromises with an eye on their respective constituencies. Both leaders recognize lhat they must ultimately sell ihe product of the talks andurable settlement requires broad-based support.the political process would eventoatly collapse and perhapsivil war.
Mandela probably will have more problems with his constituents during this period than de Klerk.factional violence in ibe townships and recurring charges that the government with which he isis fomenting the violence will threaten to erode Mandela's base of support for the talks. Many blacks already fear tbe ANC will give away loo much josl loettlement,
Economic F,
Parallels Political Talks
Theiied forum for negotiating post-apartheid economic Issues Is laktng shape. Rep-resemaiif! from government, business, andhope lo hold ihe first plenary session of the forum In July. In preparation, ihey haveworking groups lo discuss fob creation. Industrial strategy, and mocroeeonomic policy.
The forum is expected to examine proposals for ratructurtng ihe economy' lo promote growth and to correct ihe socioeconomic disparities of apartheid. Until an interim government ishowever, it probably will haveodest Impact on government policies. Pretoria is unlikely at this stage to undertake majorinitiatives that woulduture t. Once Nocks are represented In an Interim government, the forum couldey venue for crafting economic policies.
The Talks Bog Deon or lora-el
The negotiating process can survive pnalonged delays,low pace will tocreasc the chances of future breakdowns, as well as strikes, demonstrations, andaccompanying factionalaimed at breaking the deadlock. Most likely, any halt* lo the talks would be temporary because the NP cannotew system viable without thecf tbe ANC, and the black opnosition is no match for the wbite-corHrollcd security frjrcea.esult, we(be central actors would seek new compromises to restart the talks in order to avoid unprecedented Woodshed and irreparable damage lo the economy,gf*
Alterna lively, if the main actors are unable toeadlockritical Issue, such as the formula for cecistcnrnaking in thebody, the talks would coUapse. touchingave of political violence andondemnauon The ANC alliance probably would notilitaryimmediately but would conduct massivedemonstrations and generalounting instability and racial conflict undoubtedly would ipur white secessionist movements. Massive whitecapital Sight, and renewed foreign disinvestment would ensue,evere economic downturn and soaring black unemployment and poverty Lgaffl
Opportunities fortates and Other TUrd Parties
The United Slates enjoys considerable influence with most of Ihe principalouth Africanontinuous stream of South African visitors to the United States,ide range ofwfll continue to look to US policymaker* and espctts in every field for advice and assistance.the prospect of US investment in South Africa once an interim government ia in place wPl provide an incentive to keep the reform process on track Jyujh>
ecent travels by de Klerk to Ruiai* and the Far in and by Mandela toAfrica andreflect tbe emphasis both leaders place on improving their own and South Africa's inlernationa]he Commonwealth leaders ia April lifted all remaining sanctions, opening the way for Europeans to raves', in South Africaore positive business climate it established. Business leaders in Germany and Japan, two of South Africa's largest trading partnerv have indicated that further Isrvestmcal awaits the forrnauoa of an interim governmant ic^f^
Original document.
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