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Directorate of Intelligence
Ihictligtricc Memorandum
Office of African and Latin American Analysis2
South Africa: The Boipatong Massacre and Reining in the Security Forces
Summary
We have no reporting that indicates President de Klerk or senior security officials ordered theune attack at Boipatong. nor do wc believe they issued such orders.ocal YjsXaf Inkatha apparently conducted the raid, which stemmed mainly from Inkatha-ANC enmity. We doubt-but cannotdirect participation of rogue police or soldiers. I
we
areeading in some areas in an effort to weaken the ANC and undermine necointtiom
is unlikely, oat de Klerk can take steps-such as facilitating independent probes into political violence and allowing international monitors-that would improve his credibility among both btecjrsand whites on the issue of government complicity. I
FOR RELEASE DATE:0
Assessing Ihe Boipatong Massacre
Tneune massacre of more thanlacks inownship south of Johannesburg, has amplified allegations that the South African Government is aiding Chief Buthclezi's Zulu-based Inkatha movement in bloody fighting with African National Congress (ANC) supporters. The ANC withdrew from multiparty constitutional negotiations one week after the massacre, accusing Pretoria of engineering the incident and of assisting Zulus implicated in it.
Although the massacre is still under investigation, at this point we can say with confidence that most of the attackers tn the incident wereof whom are Inkatha members or supporters--from the KwaMadala hostel near Boipatong and that the incident centered on organizational enmity with theyewitnesses and security personnel on the scene after the massacre blamedf the hostel residents for the raids on Boipatong and the adjoining squatter camp. In testimony before the Goldstoneespected South African statutory body investigating political violence, the commander of one of two small Army patrols in the area when tbe attack occurred admitted that his men stopped trafficighway separating Boipatong and the KwaMadala hostel to allow someulu warriors-carrying various weapons and headed toward the hostel-to cross the road. I
Several credible motives for the attack have surfaced.
KwaMadala hostel residents had battled residents in nearby ANC-con trolled areas on several prior occasions, according to press reports. Tensions were especially high onune, the day after the ANC and its alliesationwide general strike which was aimed at the government but had strong anti-lnkatha undertones.
Accordingress statement by one hostel resident, the Boipatong attack was in retaliation for the murder the week before of the girlfriend of one hostel member.
Some hostel dwellers have admitted going to Boipatong on the night in question
to arrack an ANC "self defense" unit there, but then attacked residents indiscriminately after they could not locate the unit. Police have since arrestedostel dwellers for mvolveamntin the raid, making it perhaps the largest such case in the country's history. ^
1 In detomining responsibility for the massacre in Boipatong, we have rebed in pan for objective
informationreliminary statement by the Goldstone COniirussion. Journalists have uncovered some useful data, but we believe the media has grvenjoomuch credence to claims of government involvement by the ANC and angry blacks in
We have no evidence that contradicts the Goldstone Commission's contentionuly that it had found nothing so far implicating President de Klerk, his Cabinet, or senior security officials in ordering the attack. Although eyewitnesses say police vehjeies ferried Zulu attackers and smashed down flimsy dwellings, we doubt police would use such high-visibility tactics during an authorized covert mission. Moreover, following the Goldstone Commission's statemenis, the ANC shifted from accusing dc Klerk of direct
The ANC and the local media have also crnicired de Klerk for going to KwaZuluune-thc anniversary of6 Soweio uprising, the day of the general strike and the day before themeet wiih Buthelea. The ANC said it does not believe the two met to plan the attack, but has argucd-ln oar view, eon vine ingly-mai Inkatha warlords could have viewed the meeting and accompanying harsh criticism of the ANC's mass proles! campaignreen light to initiateHH
on balance, we doubt that such involvementome black survivors of the raid claim to have seen or heard whites participating in the attack, echoing unproven charges in many earlier incidents of political violence. However, an independent inquiryritish
NOFOKN NOCOSrtACT ORCON
legal expert found no evidence of complicity by the Sooth African Policeoreover, based on maps showing the relatively close rnroximity of the KwaMadala hostel to the areas where the attacks occurred, we do not believeorce of several hundred highly motivated Zulus would have needed outside logistics help. If whites riarticipated, they may have belonged to any one of an estimatedxtremist groups that have proliferated since de Klerk began his reforms.
tP doubt, initial allegationsnit of ex-Namibian soldiers, employed by thestationed inside South Africa, wcro among the attackers. One important factorsuch charges is that members of the unit, initially accused of participationhearings before the GokSstone Commission, do not speak any SouthWitnesses in Boipatong have not made any claims of hearing languages otherEnglish, or Afrikaans during the
We have no information that Buthelezi engineered the massacre. The KwaMadala hostelell-known Inkatha stronghold, and Buthelezi surely knew about tensions in the area. He almost certainly would have anticipated the severe damage that the massacre of mostly women and children in fact has done to Inkatha's already poor international image. He also must have calculated that evidence that hostel dwellers were acting on his direct orders might well emerge during any trials of Zulus charged in the
Although no definitive picture has emerged yet on the actions and motives of security personnel around the time of the Boipatong attack, we believe that the'
inwmpcic-ncg, .unwillingness take personal risks, and pro-lnkaihaave the
relatively free hand in the raid, and has left the SAP, open lof complicity despite the absence rj; hittd evidence,
- The British legal expert tasked by the Goldstonc Commission to assess the police investigation of the massacre found great shortcomings and failures in police planning and command systems.
NC warlord Ernest Sotsu told the press that on the day before theolice captain ignored ANC warnings of an imnvinent attack in the Boipatong area, saying that he already had such information and had deployed his men accordingly. When the ANC contacted the captain the next evening with fresh information on the impending attack, police allegedly came to the township and tear gassed youths manning roadblocks to force them off the streets.
olice spokesmen claim that on the night of the massacre their attention and manpower were diverted to another local township they had been warned would be attacked. This has also been their explanation for why the police only arrived in Boipatong about half an hour after they first received reports of the raid and long after the attackers had vanished.
The comrnander of an Ajmy patrol-the second in the area-said he heard shots and screams and thusarge-scale attack was underway, but added that hisan unit was vastly outnumbered and could only take cover. Reports that the attack unfolded sporadically for over an hour make his unit's allegedfailure to summonquestionable.
- Police spokesmen recently testified that the regional SAP riot control
headquarters had accidentally erased tapes of police radio conversations before, during, and after the massacre. Widespread skepticism about the testimony pronrpted embarrassed police to explain later that all tapes used since the recording system was installed last March are blank because officers were unaware that they could only be used on one side, and that use of the second side resulted in the erasure of the firstpJJBB
Reining in Security Personnel
The Goldstone Commission's final report on the Boipatong incidentthe ANCshighlight the incompetence and problematic attitudes of SAP and SADF personnel without concluding that rightwing security mavericks partidpated in that particular
lacks comprisedercent of the overall force, althoughercent of the officer corps. So far only one black has reached the rank of brigadier, immediately below that of general. ff^pfj
ScBrat.
De Klerk has tried to offset resentment toward some of his moves, such as banning security force personnel from belonging to any political party, with actions aimed in part at minimizing the ranks of disgruntled police.AP manpower has increased byercent, which has helped ease grueling work schedules. The SAP budget has nearly tripled during the same perui^ohjclude funds for significant salary hikesreatly enhanced benefits package.
Cleaning Up the Military. De Klerk has employed similar means to try to make the South African Defense. Force (SADF) conform to his new standards foi dealing with the black opposition, even though the military differs from the police in some key respects. Although
The task of re-orienting South Africa's security forces will remain formidable. Growing hit-and-run attacks by armed black factions and individuals are demoralizing and angering the
6 havc ixco kuled M$y equaling last year's total. If this trend is not reversed, even more police are likely to seize opportunities to help Inkatha, especially bylind cye.pj|
Despite the SAP's more wriservative makeup, the SADF mav continue io he the bw^ thorn in de Klei^xsicjr in conung years. His drastic cuts in the military's budget, his favontism for the NIS, and pervasive fears among white Army careerists about their futurelack-led regime have made some SADF components fertile ground for rightwing dissension. In addition, although the SAPiercer reputation and uglier image than the
_ Srrrcrf-
; of all personnel who arc potential threats to de Klerk's reform program isiable option for him at this poini
Although the opposition of many senior security personnel to the reforms is well known within government circles, forcing them to resign solely because of their political views would probably meet with substantial resistance from even prorefonrusts in the security forces, as well as most whites.
Moreover, despite the recent forced retirement of SAP generals, the high proportion of lower-ranking white security personnel who are skeptical about de Klerk's sweeping changes virtuallyomprehensive purge.
hile the oddsilitary or police coup attempt are currently remote, prospects would increase dramatically if de Klerk beganass purge of conservative security personnel.
Nonetheless, we believe de Klerk-aided by independent investigators such as the Goldstone Commission-car. weed out roeue security personnel over rime and improve his credibility among blacks and whites on the issue of government complicity in violence. Some positive steps we believe he undoubtedly is considering include:
making an example of security personnel implicated in incidents such as the Boipatong massacre by publicly supporting the maximum punishments allowed under South African law.
Publicizing the findings of internal SAP and SADF intruiries into individual cases of misconduct
Allowing the Goldstone Commission free rein to explore all aspects of abuses and unauthorized actions by security personnel, and making good-faith efforts to follow up on their proposals.
Continuing to cooperate with live UN Secretary General's rccommendations--accepted in principle byermanent presence and role for respected foreign monitors of violence.
PerrnanenUy attaching governmentfrom the judicial branch-to key security components, such as the SAP's Internal Stability Division and lite SADFs Special Forces, to serve as de Klerk's eyes and ears.
The recent scandal invofvBig an apparent unauthonrrd ptot by Army intelligence officers toormer police official living In London who haa confessed toit squad innd has Joired thethe work de Klerk has yet to do.'
APPENDIX
Backdrop to Boipatong
The Boipatong massacre occurred against the backdrop of Qve years of black factional fighting that has become an obstacle to political talks and risks escalating into ethnic civil war. The unprecedented antigovernment violence46 has been followed by even more deadly black factional fighting among mostly Zulus in Natal Province, where gangs of ANC "comrades" have battled Inkatha-aligned impis,egiments, for supremacy in black townships and villagesB ANC-Inkatha fighting worsenedbroadened into ethnic clashes pitting Zulus against non-Zulus--when it spread to Tiansvaal Province inlthough most observers believe Chiefdered his Inkatha followers to initiate clashes in Transvaal in an attempt to demonstrate that his support was not confined to Natal, this mterpretation ignores prior tensions in the area. As early asuthelezi was distraught over infonnation that ANC supporters--of whom Xhosas form theTransvaal had begun to harass and attack Zulus, according to US Embassy reporting. In earlytwo weeks before serious righting in Transvaal townships erupted--rhe ANCationwide general strike accompanied by considerable ana-Inkatha rhetoric. Buthelezi's forces in the Transvaal, mostly migrant Zulu laborers living in all-male hostels, then launched an offensive against non-Zulus, according to most reports. During one four-week period in July and August,lacks died, and the killing has continuedigh rate; overall,ave died in theonths since Mandela was freed.
In addition to the ANC-Inkatha rivalry, Boipatong and other townships southwere the scene of increasing turmoil wirhin the ANC alliance in theto the massacre. According to press reports, tensions were growing between leadencivic associations and former ANC military wing members returningwho have joined many ANC "self-defense units" (SDUs) charged withsupporters from Inkatha and government security forces. The core of one suchby ANC warlord Ernest Sotsu in Sebokeng, located near Boipatong, is somewho reportedly defended ANC supporters from attacks launched by residentsKwaMadala hostel early this year. (Before tne massacre, the hostel reportedlyocal refuge for Zulus fleeing ANCome former ANChavend setting up and commanding SDUs to usurping power fromleaders, causing concern among senior ANC leaders. Only days before iheANC supporter in Sebokengournalist that it had been clear who the enemythe internal ANC rivalries had grown lo the point where he was.much more fearfulkilled by 'anfter the
Boipatong massacre that thegunmen had
umber of union leaders aligned with the ANC Early this month, Mandela and ANC firebrand Chris Hani, head of rhe South African Communist Party and former second-inof the ANCs military wing, admitted publiclyNC was investigating and attempting to correct problems caused by some SDUs. I
Original document.
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