and the anti-party group
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Agency
KHRUSHCHEV AND THE "ANTI-PARTY GROUP"
Thisorkingeconstruction of tho challenge to Khrushchev by the "anti-party group" led by Halenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich.
This paper represents one of tho two principal types of papers which appear in the CAESAR, POLO and ESAU series. One type, which now comprises the bulk of our papers, deals with important current intelligence problems such as the present state of the Slno-Soviet dispute, or of the Chinese Communist leadership, or of Soviet militarysubjects of three of our five papers thus far Tho other type, represented by this paper, offers aof an Important period in Communist history when enough information has come to hand toood account. We believe that this effort to get history into place is also of value to tho analysis of current problems.
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
Very shortly after the defeat of the anti-party group innough became known about their attempt to oust Khrushchev to putairly coherent picture of events. atter of weeks, it was fairly clear that Malenkov, Molotov, andhadhowdown in the presidium, and that Khrushchev at one point had found himself in abut had nonetheless managed to defeat his opponents by summoning the central committeelenum. Much new information has come to hand sinceof lt consisting of details which clarify the incompleteavailable
The reconstruction of events offered ln this paper differs from previous versions in that the addition of this new material has filled in many important gaps; but the basic outline remains the same. ummary, which by definition omits details, would reflect therather than the differences. For this reason, we make no further summary of the7 events. We offer the paper to those who are interested in as nearly complete an account of the7 events as we are now able to construct.
The attempted coup against Khrushchov In7 had its antecedents In the struggle for power which hid been taking place in the presidium since Stalin's deathll the four principals in the JuneValen-kov, Kaganovich anddeeply Involved in this struggle and, at first, independently of ono another; but as Khrushchev continued to riso at the expense of the other throe, tho lines of the conflict came to be drawn between the first secretary, on the on hand, and Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich on the other.
Over the past four years, much new data on the7 attempt of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich to oust Khrushchev has come to light, and it is now possible toetailed account of wh.it happened. It should be recognized, however, that evon this version cannot bedefinitive. Tho information provided by official Soviet sources is filled with distortions and omissions, and gives only one point of view; that of the victor, who is always right and becomes more so as time goes on. Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich are usuallyas greater villains than their five allies, the difference in treatment is quantitative rathor than qualitative. This has tended to obscure the divergencies between the eight members of the group whichexisted, and to oversimplify the substantive problems in dispute7 and before. In addition, the issue of the anti-party group, artifically kept alivoas often boon used for purposes which have no relevance to tho7 events per so. Atd PartyKhrushchov used the anti-party group to attack ftalin on the one hand and the Albanians and Chinese on the other.
Official sources have boon supplorentod by the many ruir.ors to which any political event in the Soviet Union gives rise. The only criterion for judging theof these reports, which uro often vague andis the extent to which thoy conform tofacts. Such corrobor.ition is available for most of the reports used hero, fowevor, the account of the Juno presidium Reefing is primarlly bused en unofficial sources, and hence is more open to questionho rest of the paper.
There wore Indicationsivalry between Malenkov and Khrushchev at loast as fur back9 when Stalin brought Khrushchev front the Ukraine to reorganize the Moscow party organization and to Join the centralsecretariat. The rivalry was intensified after Stalin's death In3 when political maneuvering within tho presidium began in earnest and Malenkov was forced by his colleagues to share the powers bequeathed him by Stalin. Malenkov took over the premiership, leaving Khrushchev the most powerful member of the secretariat. During the next two years, the first secretary moved constantly to the front at the expense of Malenkov. He built up his strength in the party apparatus, garnered more and more publicfor himself, became the major spokesman on agriculture and set up the virgin lands program, tho initial success of which strengthened his hand politically. As Khrushchev's prestige mounted, Malenkov's correspondingly seemed to Undoubtedly, as Stalin's heir, Malenkov was regarded by many of his colleagues as the main political threat, and their fear of his ambitions may have indirectly helpedwho was in any case the more skillful politician. Aimed primarily at producing more consumer goods,New Course became one of the focal points io the general debate on the allocation of economic resources. In addition, lt encountered serious economic difficulties and was held responsible by many for the disarray in the industrial sphere. Malenkov's consumer goods program ran into conflict with Khrushchev's virgin land development over investment priorities and setompetition for resources which did little to diminish the rivalry between the two men. Anothor area of disagreement appears to have been the issue of government-versus-party control.
In any event, Malenkov was no match for tbe first secretary, and ln5 Khrushchev forced him out of the premierhslp for the ostensible reason thatconsumer goods program had threatened the primacy of heavy industry. On this issue, Khrushchev probably had the support of Molotov and Kaganovich, as well as other members of the party presidium. At the same time, the policy debate provided Khrushchevseful weapon for removing his chief political rival, of which he took full advantage. Although the policy shift may in itself have calledigh-level scapegoat, tho fact remains
that Malenkov, Khrushchev's chief opponent, was demoted, while Mikoyan, also an advocate of increased consumer goods, was not. Andalenkov, who held the less influential position of deputy chairman of theof Ministers, clearly had lost most of the power he once had.
Molotov Versus Peaceful_Coexistence
Since Stalin's death, Molotov had undoubtedly been uncomfortable with the forms and intent of the "peaceful coexistence" line which had dominated Soviet foreign policy. He was uneasy even over the relatively cautious demarches initiated by Malenkov, and, after the latter resignedolotovtough" speech to the Supreme Soviet which seemed toeturnarder line. when Khrushchev not only returned to but expanded the policy of peaceful coexistence, Molotov's reluctance to go along turned into stubborn opposition.
The particular issue which brought him into direct conflict with Khrushchev was the proposed reconciliation with Tito. Throughout the springe apparently kepttubborn resistance to this policy and even after the Khrushchev-Bulganin trip to Belgrade In May ande continued to regard Titoeretic and the concessions made toistake. For his position, Molotov was censuredlenum of the central committee in With the possible exception of Voroshilov, he seems to havo been alone in his defiance, for official accounts indicate that he got no support from either Kaganovich or Malenkov.
Thereafter, as Khrushchevirmer direction of foreign affairs, and as the policy of peacefulbegan to be applied more and more boldly, thoMolotov was consistently pushed into the One reason for this was Molotov's obviousby personal inclination and because of his close identification with Stalin's foreignwith the new Soviet image in foreign affairs. Moreover, the frequent clashes between Khrushchev and his foreign minister appear to haveersonal animosity between the two mon which may also haveactor in Molotov's loss of influence. Khrushchev at any rate
seemed to takeaSure in reminding Molotov that his voice was no longer as powerful as it had once been, and frequently made fun of him in public.
In addition, Khrushchev's domestic policiescaused Kolotov nuch uneasiness, and he was no more receptive to the first secretary's virgin lands program than he had been to Malenkov's policy of increasedfor consumer goods. In general, hetubborn resistance to any major changes aimed at partially liberalizing the regime, and he dragged his feet whenever possible. His opposition to liberalization at hoire and peaceful coexistence abroad probably resulted not onlyonservative "Stalinist" mentality which saw in allorm of revisionism, but also fromthat such measures as Khrushchev was implementing might lead to instability at home anderiousof the party's hegemony.
Molotov's continued intransigeance apparentlyKhrushchev that his wings would have to be clipped further. In the summerommunlstetter from Molotov "recanting" his statement tbat the USSR had not yet builtstatement which other evidence suggests was not Molotov's belief,lip of the tongue. This artificially inflated issue was an obvious effort to add ideological deviation to the list ofsins andurther step ln the downgrading of the Old Bolshevik. Ath Party Congress inoth he and Malenkov were obliged to repudiate the policies they had earlier advocated, and Molotov heard his conduct of Soviet foreign policy described as Ion the eve of Tito's return visit to Moscow, Molotov was replaced by Shepilov as foreign minister.
Decline of Kaganovich
The ouster and vilification of Kaganovich isironic. There is much evidence that he was an early patron of Khrushchev and helped him on his way to the top. After Stalin's death Kaganovichirst deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers; his influence increased and, until the ende apparentlythe regime's top industrial specialist. He
undoubtedly sided with "hrushchev on the issue of heavy vor&us light industry' ln Decontberince, as a advocate of rapid inciustrial growth, ho must have
i*ejjuri:-id Muiunkov's consumer goods concesnlcns as recklessly unorthodox.
Ins part of tho governmentwhich followed Malenkov's demotion from tho 'Cugunovich was appointed chairmanew State Conmittoe on Laborges, an important assignment. Thee Xhrushchcv and Bulganln went to the Genevainaganovich reportedly was left in charge on the homo front.
However, Kaganovich, tha embodiment of the militant Old Holsli-'vlk, undoubtedly shared some of t'olotov'sin adapting to the new policies introduced after Stalin's de.ith, and may have become increasingly disturbed over tho Khrushchev experiments. His four public speeches3ontinuing orientation toward astyle cfather reluctant endorsement of the post-rtalin newendency toough foreign policy. Tho most remarkable in this rogard wasovember speechhich stressed tho continuing validity of classical Marxist-Leninistsomewhat discordant noteime when Kopp^unist and otherJournals waretho "isolation of theory from life." In contrast to Molotov, who actively resisted,'rs to havo become increasingly less.flexibleesult of hiu uneasiness and disorientation,. He was later accused of having obstructed work ln the presidium with his long confused speeches. He opposed the virgin lanes program, and as chairman of the State Committee on Labor and Tages reportedly accomplished nothing, his one goal being to dissolve the committee. This dogiinflexibility, which limited his usefulness In the Khrushchev era, explains why, towards the end Kaganovich appeared to be undergoing gradual eclipse at tho hands cf younger economic administrators, particularly lorvukhin,orresponding decline of his influence in the Inaganovich was released from hisas chairman of the Coitinittee on Labor and Vagcs, and in September was appointed Minister of thoower ranking post.
DeStalinizatlon
Khrushchov's secret spooch ath Party Congress in6 appears to havo boon the first major Issue that found Halonkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich in any way unitod against the first secretary. Shortly before thoKhrushchev reportedly told the presidium that he Intended topeech In closed session denouncing Stalin. This bombshelliolent reaction from Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov, who, according to Khrushchov later, came out strongly against the exposure of the "cult of personality" and of the "violations oflegality." Khrushchev attributes their opposition to fear that their role in the purges would also be revealed; this was perhaps one factor, but lt also applied toand in any case the problem was undoubtedly more complicated than that. Stalin hadradual downgrading since his death, apparently by common consent;ramatic expose such as that proposed by Khrushchovlfforont matter and probably seemed, to those who opposed lt, both unnecessary and unwise. They may havesuch an abrupt deStal-inlzatlon might create more problems than it would solve. However, Khrushchev as usual steamrollered his Opposition and throatonod to make tbe speucb to the entire congress. So Halenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov finally gave In and agreed to let Khrushchev take up "the question of the cult of the individual"losed session.
Closed session or no, tbe oppononts of deStallnlza-tion were clearly unhappy about the whole matter. Ath Party Congress, Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov wero very reticent in commenting on tho cult of personality, which Kaganovich doscrlbed as "no easy question." As the policy of deStalinlzation began to be implemented, their uneasiness must have increased. has accused them of obstructing investigations into tho purges and of opposing rehabilitation of purge victims, ponomarev relates that Kaganovich and Molotov strongly resisted the ideaew dcStalinlzed party history, and Molotov continued to praise the old "short course" in the press.
Thus by the summeralenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich all had good roason to bo dissatisfied with Khrushchev's leadership. All three had sufferedloss of power und Influence since Stalin's
fact vhlch Khrushchev did not let there forget. Perhaps even more Important than their frustratedthey had become Increasingly concerned overpolicies and style of leadership. At the same timo, thore was little unity among the three men, and over the past four years thoy had more often than not found themselves on opposite sides of tho fence. As individuals with little In common, Khrushchev had roducod thorn at leisure. Although they did not achieve real unity untilhe lssuo of deStalinlzatlon did bring them somewhat closer together and madeertain unity of action.
Khrushchevumporary Setback
During the fallhrushchev seemed to beon the defensive. He appeared to be modifying bis positions somewhat, particularly in regard to Stalin, and his major preoccupation seemed to bo maintaining the status quo rather than trying new or unorthodox solutions toproblems.
While Khrushchev himself probably recognized the need for adjustment to the problems arising from the deStallnlza tion campaign and the crises in Poland and Hungary, his unwontod moderation may also have been tbe result of strong pressure from his oppononta in the presidium. It seems likely that they took advantago of the difficulties caused by Khrushchev's deStalinlzatlon campaign to reassert their influence and to put the "collectivity back In the "leader ship."
Inolotov and Kaganovich accompanied Mlkoyan and Khrushchev to Warsaw for tbe talks with Gomulka; the following month, Kolotov was appointedof State Control. Although the Hungarianwas apparently handled primarily by Mikoyan, Suslov and Khrushchev, Malenkov accompanied the first secretaryigh-level meeting of satellite leaders in Budapestanuary. During this same period Khrushchov's position was reported to bu shaky: in mid-November and again in December there wore rumors that he would be replaced. Tbese rumors subsided when the December plonum took placehree-day postponement and no personnol changes were made. In early January thereumor circulating in Warsaw that be had rotained his leadership byslim majority" at tbe plenum.
Shortly thereafter, however, Khrushchev again emerged as the dominant figure on the Soviet scene, and Malenkov did not participate in theanuary talks with Kadar in Moscow. Khrushchev's public appearances and the programs with which his name was associated began to multiply. By February the first secretary appeared to have fullyhis preeminent position, and he had no trouble pushing his economic reorganization plan through tho central committee.
The December6 Plenum
The economic reorganization plan was one of the end resultsrocess set in motion by the6 plenum, which met to discuss economic problems. There seems to have been general agreement at the plenum that the regime faced serious economic difficulties, but there apparently was disagreement as to whether the fault was in the goals of the draft Sixth Five-Year Plan, approved byh Party Congress in February, or in thoof the economy. The two were not mutually exclusive, but in the minds of the protagonists probably became nearly so.
The industrial administrators, critical of tho very high goals and the pattern of investment allocationsIn tho Sixth Five-Year Flan,orerealistic plan and some relief from tho tensions produced by high growth tempos.
Those opposing thisparty functionaries and militaryconcerned lost the goal ofup with the west" in per capita output be relegated to the museum of Communist antiquities. In their viewreserves existed in the Soviet economy to enable the plan to bo met, and the real culprits were theadministrators whose departmental empire-building, featherbedding and red tape prevented full realization of the USSR's economic capabilities.
The conflict endedtandoff, and the plenum appar ently decided that both criticisms had merit. It decided, on the one hand, that the Five-Year Plan should be revised as proposod by the administrators, but reportedly it ordered also, in an unpublished decision, an Immediate examination of the problems of interdepartmental barriers.
3Et3ftBX
Tbo party presidium members were probably as divided on these issues as was the plenum. One Soviet source bas reported that Molotov defended the Five-Tear Plan and that Khrushchev attacked Industrial administrators forinterdepartmental barriers. Malenkov probably sided with the industrial administrators, since he had longretrenchment and correction of disproportions in theital necessity. Saburov, more than likely, was unsympathetic to attacks on the plan, since he had helped develop it and had been responsible for presenting it toh Party Congress. The plenum, reflecting on his performance as planning chief, replaced him with Pervukhin as chairman of the State Economic Commission for Short Term Planning of the National Economy.
Judging from subsequent events, it seems likely that Khrushchev argued against any substantial downward revision of the plan, that Saburov criticized "administrativend that Molotov and Kaganovich may have seen in the attack on interdepartmental barriers amove toward further decentralization. Malenkov,and Shepllov may also have resisted anyalthough it is possible that they only opposed the plan in its final radical form.
The plenum, therefore, set In motion two apparently separate sets of activities, pervukhin, aidedeam of top-level administrators, proceeded to create the annual planstensibly In accordance with the plenum's directives. Another group, composed of all the members of the presidium, both full and candidate, tackled the problem of interdepartmental barriers.
7 Events
ervukhin presented7 annual plan to the Supreme Soviet, which dutifully adopted it after three days of "debate." Planned growth of industrial production was cut from8 percent achieved6ercent, the lowest in anyyear If the annual plan was any forecast of the changes to be made in the Sixth Five-Year Plan, scheduled for revision by midyear, then the victory of the managerial elite was complete, Pervukhin's group apparently went even further with economic retrenchment than the December party plenum had intended.
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Meanwhile the group working on the problem of administrative deficiencies had partially discarded the traditional Soviet method of merging ministries and had workedadical solutionharpin the central ministerial apparatus in Moscow and an expanded co-ordination of activities within ruglons. Tbe new plan was designed ln part to break up theemplros, blast entrenched bureaucrats from their chairs, and distribute both men and administrativewidely over the geographic face of the Soviet Union. It was also designed to "release" the economic reserves tied up by Interdepartmental barriers, bureaucratic red tape, and other administrative deficiencies.
Although neither Molotov nor the economiccan have been very enthusiastic about this scheme, apparently noither he nor any of the others whoopposed the plan expressed their disagreement while lt was being drafted. The issue was brought up for final considerationresidium meeting which took place shortly before the central committee plenum onndebruary. The opponents of the reform againsilent; however,. on the eve of the plenum, as Furtseva later revealed, Molotovhort note to his colleagues registering his opposition to theon the grounds that the country was not yet ready foreform.
Khrushchev Regains the Initiative
The Supremo Soviet ended its work onebruary and the central committee's two-day session began the next day. Although Khrushchev had remained very much ln the background at the Supreme Soviet, the plenum whichappears to have been completely dominated by him. The adoption of the reorganization schemeersonal triumph for him. At the same time ltefeat for his political enemies and the destruction ofolitical base. In addition, Khrushchev was able to bring about the appointment of one of bis supporters, Frol Kozlov, to the party presidium.
During tho spring, Khrushchev initiated the practice of sending personally signed congratulatory telegrams to agricultural workers and officials and in Marchin the firsteries of much propagandized
regional agricultural conferences. At the end of the month, his theses on the economic reorganization were published for discussion.
During the month of May, Khrushchev's publicized activities reached an all-time high. In the volume of personal publicity and in the number and diversity of policies associated with his personal sponsorship, he surpassed all the other members of the collectiveput together. Early in the month he presented his theses to the Supreme Soviet, was namod chairman of tho commission elected to draft the law and again addressed tho session after the law was passed.
At an agricultural conferences in Leningrad onay,anner clearly revealing his continued dominance over agriculture, Khrushchev boasted that the USSR could overtake tho United States in per capita output of meat and dairy products in the next few years. It was also at this conference that he discussed the possibility of discontinuing the compulsory deliveries from privateubject which had not yet boon fully decided In tho presidium. In between these activities, he wasby CBS on television andlaqueroup Of Leningrad workersighly laudatory inscription. No Soviet leader had received similarsince Stalin's death.
Formation of the Antl-Party Croup
Precisely at what moment Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich decided to Join forces for an attack on Khrushchev can only bo conjectured. However, thoeconomic reorganization, which would seriously weaken tho political power of the managerial ulite, theirelement of support, must have made it clear that thoy would havo to act soon or not at all. In addition to the throat to their position inherent In the reorganization itself, tho adoption of the reform clearly reflected Khrushchev's renewed preeminence and his continued ability to Impose his policies arbitrarily against tho wishes of his colleagues. Tho combination of past grievances and this latestmost serious toovershadowed the differences between the three men and made united action at once possible and necessary. Hence it was probably in tho spring7 that Molotov,
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Malenkov and Kaganovich first made tentative plans to oust Khrushchev. Of the three, Malenkov was allegedly the practicalprobably meant that he recruitedMolotov was tho Ideologist.
A few ominous indications "that Khrushchev wasto implicate the Molotov group ln Stalin's excesses may well have given itseeling of desperation. Malenkov had roportedly received warnings that Khrushchev Intended to accuse him of complicity ln the Leningrad affair. residium meeting which took place not long before the June plenum, the rehabilitation of Tukhachovsky and other military figures was discussed and unanimously approved. Khrushchev, as he toldd Party Congross, thon asked Malonkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich whether they were sincere now, in voting for the rehabilitation, or then, whon thoy had concurred ln tho execution order. Clearly this,
The Anti-Party Group Recruits Supporters
At the presidium meeting onune, the original group of Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich was supported by five other members of the presidium; at what point their support was obtained Is unclear. Undoubtedly the Industrial reorganization plan had also created great dissatisfaction among many important political figures in Moscow, including members of the central committee and presidium. Their bureaucratic empires wore being dissolved and many of them were personally threatened _with transfer to the hinterlands far from tho comparative luxury of Moscow. To many, the radical degree ofenvisaged in Khrushchev's schome must haveangerous move, possibly putting ln jeopardy Moscow's control of industry and hence weakening the party. Khrushchev's claim that tho USSR could overtake. in per capita production of meat and0 saddled the Soviet economytrenuous agricultural program on top of the economicand threatened to further intensify disruption of the economy resulting from unrealistlcally high goals. Undoubtedly destallnlzation and* the autumn events in Poland and Hungary had already created some general apprehension.
According to the official line, which must however be regarded with some caution, the anti-party group recruited supporters "with Jesuitical finesse" and launched its attach "trusting in contacts previously made." The group has frequently been accused ofa program; however, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, torogram or platform to which all eight men would agree. From the point of view of tho three loaders, Malenhov, Molotov, anda tactical alliance was probably sufficient for their purposes and moreover much easier to achieve. It appears likely that byomewhat differentto each member of the presidium, the anti-party group successfullyeneral uneasiness over Khrushchev's policies into political support for its move to oust the first secretary.
Many of the reports describing the June meeting indicate that the attach on Khrushchev at that moment tooh by surprise many of tho presidium members whosupported the opposition. This suggests that some, although generally aware that an attempt to remove Khrushchov was in the offing, may not have known that it would take place when it did. Others, while agreeing in principle to support the factionalists in opposing some of Khrushchev's policies, may have known nothing at all about the more ambitious plan to remove him from the leadership.
Bulganin, by his own confession, joined the anti-party group well in advance of the June presidium meeting and clearly participated in the plot to oust Khrushchev. His officeeeting place for the conspirators. By virtue of his position as premier, he was made the nominal leader of the opposition. If his involvement is clear, his motives are less so. Bulganin had been the chief beneficiary of Khrushchev's rise to power. The first secretary's policies had apparently received his consistent support, although he may have como to share some of the general anxiety about Khrushchev's course. He did not speak up In favor of the economicat the February plenum, although ho later contended that this measure also had his support. In addition, Ignatiev charged later that Bulganin was dissatisfied with his status in the party and had Joined theout of ambition; it is Just possible that he was tired of playing second fiddle to Khrushchov.
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Voroshilov, publicly identified atd Party Congress for the first timeember of the anti-party group, was at that time linked with Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich inay as to imply that he had been one of the original conspirators. This is difficult to believe, If only because he was in the Far East from the middle of April to the end ofthe very time when the three leaders began to lay their plans. Moreover, by Khrushchev's account, Voroshilov's relationship with the other three was far from cordial. Voroshilov has himself admitted, however, that he supported the policies of the anti-party group. As an Old Bolshevik who had served for years under Stalin, he may well have shared some of the doubts of the "dogmatists" about the wisdom ofcourse; he had openly opposed the deStallnlzation. His fear of being implicated in the purges, assuggests, may also haveactor. Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich, by skillfully playing on his doubts and fears, may have foundsomewhatsusceptible to theirpresented arguments. Atd Party Congress, Voroshilov denied the charges that he had been aor that he knew of their factional activities. While Voroshilov's memory may not be altogetherit is entirely possible that he did not know of the plan to oust Khrushchev until the presidiumat which point he wavered but finally gave his support, or that he was persuaded that policies could be changed only with the removal of Khrushchev. In any case, most reports Indicate that he vacillated throughout. they undoubtedly know that Voroshilov would be Inclined to waver, the three ringleaders appear to have considered his support important; the prestige he enjoyed in the party wouldseful tool.
Shepllov's immediate expulsion from the presidium and central committee7 suggested that he had been deeply implicated in the anti-party conspiracy. However, later accounts, coupled with the accusations of career-ism and doubledealing thrown at him, indicate that he changed sides fairly late In the game and that his ingratitude came as an unpleasant surprise to Khrushchev. Longrotege" of the first secretary's, Shepilov had apparently given his firm support topolicies, both foreign and domestic. It is true that he was openly unenthusiastic about the economic
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reorganization and is known to nave Joined Uolotov and pervukhin inriumvirate of opposition. It was apparently opportunism rather than ideology that determined his position: according to the official version, Shepllov switched loyalties when he decided that victory lay with the Insurgents, who, as he thought, would be able toajority. On the basis of this calculation he gave the anti-party group his full and unequivocal support and stayed with them until tho ond. Because of his well known sympathies,the othors had probably not attempted to recruit Shepllov, who moreover wasandidate member of the presidiumote, but they undoubtedly would havehis support. Shepllov was the only member of the party secretariat to Join them, and had, moreover,ties with the cultural intelligentsia.
Tho Inclusion of Shepllov clearly illustrates the heterogeneous cbaractor of tho anti-party group, since he had little In common with its other members. was closely identified with Khrushchev's foreign policy, which cannot have endeared him to Uolotov. His liberal tendencies, which earned him tho name of "Dmitrind in particular bis leniency towards writers, were clearly at odds with the more hard-line attitude of his fellow conspirators.
Judging from what appears to havo boon the lino-up at tho June presidium meeting, itair guess that the factionaliats considered Porvukhln andto be potential supporters, somewhat in tbe same category as Voroshilov. pervukhin had vehementlythe economic reorganization, which, among other things, eliminated his Job. This, be later confessed, encouraged the opposition to count on his support. In addition, pervukhin had clashed with Khrushchev on tho issue of hydro- versus thermo-electric power stations. Saburov was probably counted as less certain than Pervukhin. Althoughalenkove had supported Khrushchev's policies over the past few years; on the other hand, he had recently been removed from bis position as head of Gosplan. On the basis of later evidence, lt seems likely that the anti-party group did not expect support from eithor Mikoyan or Suslov and almost certainly not from Kirichenko. Most of tho candidate members of the presidium wereappointees, but they had no vote. According
to one report, Malenkov bad hoped to obtain the support ofvaluable ally, even thoughandidatewas unsuccessful.
The Anti-Party Group plans_Its Strategy
The anti-party group evidently intended to keep the attack against Khrushchev wholly within the confines of the presidium; to do this, it needed the supportajority within that body. As it turned out, Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich did have more adherents than Khrushchev, but this support, while probable, could not be considered altogether certain in advance. Even if the potential majority did materialize, the group could not be sure that its allies would not withdraw their support if pushed too far or if faced with determined oppositionarge body of Khru-shchevites. The unstable coalition put together by the anti-party group wouldseful weapon againstonly if supplemented by skillful tactics. Timing would obviously be an important factor; the oppositionplanned to move against Khrushchevoment when his allies, both real and potential, would beinimum, while the anti-party group would be at its strongest. The factionallsts might also have reasoned that the weaker their opposition, the more strongly their potential allies would come out in their behalf. Clearly,Juneropitious moment; on that date, many of Khrushchev'swould be away from Moscow. Suslov had been away on vacation sinceay; Kirichenko would belenum of the Ukrainian central committee; Saburov was scheduled toEMA meeting in Warsaw. Among the fullthat left only Khrushchev and Mikoyan to face five dissidents, in addition tootential ally. Of the candidate members, Kozlov would be in Leningrad, preparing for the celebration of thethMukhltdlnov also would probably be in hisof Uzbekistan; Shvernik was scheduled to attend celebrations ln Ufa. The anti-party group may also have expected that Zhukov would be in Leningrad, where in fact he was untilune, playing host to General Gosnjak, the visiting Yugoslav Minister of Defense. Ofpresumed supporters, this left only Furtseva and Brezhnev in Moscow. It is true that many of the leaders scheduled to be absent onune were also due to return very shortly, but the anti-party groupexpected Khrushchev to give ln at once, thus
presenting Khrushchev's adherents both in tbe presidium and in the central committeeait accompli and rendering them virtually helpless. (This is, in any case, the strategy officially attributed to the anti-party group.)
Bulganin and Khrushchev were in Finlandtate visit4 June, during which time the anti-party group, minus Bulganin, probably laid its final plans. When Bulganin and Khrushchev returned, they were met at the airport by Halenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, Mikoyan, Pervukhin and Saburov. At some point after Khrushchev's return (some reports say on the samealenkova presidium meeting to decide which members of the presidium would attend tbe celebrations In Leningrad onune. Khrushchev reportedly questioned the need foreeting, since the arrangements had already been made, but finally agreed; and the presidium met onune. Tho meeting probably did not begin until late, because during the day Khrushchov was Interviewedapanese editor; the presidium members known to be in Moscow (including Zhukov, by this time)elegation of Hungarian journalists; and Saburov left for Warsaw. Probably nooe of these developments would have taken place had the battle already begun.
Showdown In the Presidium
The fight apparently began at once, with Halenkov questioning Khrushchev's right to preside over theas Khrushchev bad apparently been in the habit of doing by virtue of his position as first secretary. An acrimonious debate ensued. In thoote was reportedly taken which removed Khrushchev and placed Bulganin, who had abstained during the vote, in the chair. Continuing in the same vein, Malenkov, as principal spokesman for tbe insurgents, reportedly stated that Khrushchev had consistently violated the principles of collective leadership, and he demanded that the first secretary resign. Malenkov accusedof having carried out many measures without the concurrence of the other leaders, particularly inmost recent instance being his speech In May announcing the abolition of compulsory deliveries from private plots and the goal of overtaking the USA in per capita production of meat, milk, and butter
This debate soon turnedajor policy battle, In the course of which most of Khrushchev's innovations5 came undor attach. The opposition appears to have concentrated its fire on the reorganization and Khrushchev's milk and neat goals, but tbe discussion seems to have eventually extended to the larger questions of resourco allocation and investment priorities. meat and milk goals were assailed as unrealistic and untimoly; be was accused of takingurely practicalf "trying to put economics abovend Molotov is said to have calleddemagogue without any ideological basis." His agricultural policies lnwere denouncedrightist deviation" which threatened the "Leninist general lino on the preferential development of heavy Industry." His foreign-aid program is also said to have boen attacked as detriroental.to the Soviet economy. The economic reorganization, it was charged, would leaderious dilution of political power andprocess which Khrushchev'sundoubtedly thought had already gone too far. While it seems an over-simplification to state, as does theparty line, that the anti-party groupomplete return to hard-line Stalinist policies, it is not unlikely that the factlonalists, us they were reported to have done, advocated tightening up controls. Judging from their past record of opposition to deStalinlzatlon, tbey probably attacked Khrushchev on this issue; there is also some evidence tbat the question of government versus party control may have arisen.
Molotov led the attack on Khrushchev's foreign policy, which he reportedly assailod as "Trotskylst and opportunist." Shepilov also joined in the fray,Khrushchev's hard-line speechroup of writers onay. Later it was revealed that Shepilovooklet,nique file of hisn which ho had entered bits of scandal about his colleagues. Heput this to good use at the presidium meeting.
Bulganln, Voroshilov, and eventually pervukhln also participated in the attack, although somewhat moreand not, according to most reports, until thohad been raging for some tlac. Pervukhln Joined in denouncing the economic reorganization, accusingof having an "organizational Itch" and hintingbias" (presumably ln favor of the party) in the idea of reorganization.
tsjKva*-'-
The real battle, however, focussed od the attempt to remove Khrushchev from his posltloD as first secretary. Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich had reportedlyew list of candidates for the secretariat and thein which one of them was to become first secretary and Khrushchev was to be offered the ministry of Although some of the anti-party group may have been unaware previously of the plot to oust Khrushchev, they nonetheless appear to have ultimately concurred in demanding that he resign. Khrushchev's energetic self-defense must have made it clear to them that he would not yield to pressure from his colleagues on policy matters andhange intheir motive for supporting thebe effected only with his removal. They may also have felt that In supporting the anti-party group thus far, they had committedirrevocably.
Khrushchev, however, aided by Mikoyan, defendedvigorously and categorically refused to resign. Re apparently argued that the presidium's demand was illegal, 'i since only the central committee could remove him. shchev's lntranslgeance must have come as somethingurprise to his opponents; they had probably assumed he would bow to the demands of the majority, as Malenkov over his consumer goods program and Molotov overhad done Since the first secretary'sal strength in the central committee would clearly guarantee him an easy victory, the anti-party group vehemently opposed Khrushchev'^ demand that the matter be submitted to that body; keeping the battle within the presidium was obviously their only chance of success.
In Stalin's day, the use of force would have been tho next step. Bulganin had in fact placed guards around the Kremlin, and in particular around the building where the presidium was meeting, with orders to let no one through without specific instructions from him. Since their whole strategy suggests that the factlonalists expected an easy victory, the guards seem to have been intended moreotential than an actual threat. But when Khrushchev did not give in, their use would have seemed logical and Indeed Imperative. However, the more vacillating supporters of the anti-party group,perhaps already been pushed farther than theyintended to go, may have got cold feet and opposed the use of Stalinist methods to bring about Khrushchev's removal.
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At thisew development occurred which strengthened Khrushchev's hand. The central committee members residing in Moscow were informed of the battle within theby FurtBeva, although possibly by another presidium member. Khrushchev's "healthy core" in the presidium was undoubtedlyin rallying the central comnltteo to the support of the first secretary, but lt is not clear which of his supporters was the most active. Furtseva is generally credited with havingajor role; apparently she not only got in touch with the central committee members residing In Moscow, but also alerted the provincial party bosses and summoned them to Moscow immediately. Another version circulating in Warsaw afterd Party Congress assigns this role to Mikoyan and polyansky, while Furtseva rendered an equally Important service by conducting ain tho presidium. In any case, the provincialcommittee members were urgently summoned to theaccording to one rumor, in special planes supplied by Zbukov. Central committee members abroad were also informed of tho situation and sovoralVinogradov, Ponomarenko, pogov. andtheir posts hastily to return to Moscow. As the central committee members arrived in Moscow, they were vory likely briefed on the situation by either Furtsova or Mlkoyan and given Instructions on how to act, both then and subsequently at tho plenum.
Members of the presidium who had been absent were alsoof them Khrushchev supporters. Shvernik had returned onh; Suslov, Mukhitdlnov, and Kirichenko arrived back in time for the plenum ond; Kozlov, who had been in Leningrad when the presidium meeting began, was there againune, but may have returned in the interim. Saburov. the only returnee to support the opposition, was publiclyin Warsaw onh and so could not have returned beforoh or oven later. However, from his own admission, we know that he took part In the latermeetings, where he seems to haveomewhat ambiguous position. In general he defended Khrushchev's policies and resisted "the attempts of Kaganovich and the others to besmirch the name ofut apparently he did not come out firmly on Khrushchev's side. Hegiving the factlonalists some support, but only "on the basis of easily eliminated shortcomings, which were notundamontal nature."
Meanwhile, before the arrival oi their colloagucs, the central committee ln Moscowelegation ofro the presidium. The envoys, armedetition from the contral committeehole, made their way "literally illegally" past the guards posted by Bulganln andthemselves at the door of the building where the presidium was meeting, demanding to be received by that body. Although tbey were unable to see the leaders, they managed to deliver the central committee petitionthat tbe Issue of leadership currently under discussion In the presidium be submittedentral committee plenum, which alone had the right to decideuestion.
The intrusion of the central committee into the affairs of tho presidium caused an uproar. Khrushchev's opponents heaped abuso on the central comirittee for daring to interfere: Kaganovich, who was particularly insulting, spoke of pressure being put on the presidium; others raged that the contral committee did not trust its ruling body, Although Khrushchev demanded that the delegation bo received, the throe leaders of the anti-party groupime flatly refused.
However, tho tide was rapidly turning in the first secretary's favor. By this time, Khrushchev's strength in tho presidium bad greatly increased with tho return of his supporters, and the anti-party group was probably under pressure from some of Its own erstwhile adherents to agreelenum.* More and more central committee members were arriving in Moscow; as they Joined the delegation in the Kremlin, bringing Its strength up tor more, it became clear that the factlonallsts would have to receive the envoys and probably agreelenum as well. Meanwhile, however, the hard core of thehad beenesperate rearguard action. While agreeing ln principlelenum, tho anti-party group apparently continued to demand that Khrushchev resign first, Judging, probably correctly, that tho
Most reports suggest that Pervukhln, Saburov, Voroshilov, and Bulganln had by this time become somewhat lukewarm in their support of the factlonallsts.
central committee would notait accompli. The announcement of his resignation, togetherolicy statement to be drafted by Shepilov, was to be published Id the press. Khrushchev, however, undeceived by this rather obvious strateagem, rejected this proposal. According to Khrushchev's own account of this episode, his opponents then suggestod that Voroshilov be sent to meet the central committee members alone, apparentlythat his staturo within the party wouldthem. This Khrushchev also refused to accept. He Insisted on going with Voroshilov, stating that no one could deprive the first secretary of the right to meet members of the central committee which bad elected him. In the end, it was agreed that four members of thowould go, two from each side: Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Voroshilov, and Bulganln. The convocation of aalready virtually certain--must have been formally agreed on at this mooting; this marked the de facto end of the anti-party group's revolt.
Contral Committee Plenum
The plenum of the central committee opened onune. Present were members of the contral committee, both full and candidate, and mombers of the auditingtotal. hird of these men clearly owed their careers to Khrushchev; many othors wore probably Indirectly indebted to him. Although the anti-party group may have counted on dissatisfaction with tho economic reorganization to undercut some of Khrushchev's strength in the central committee, they probably did not expect the battle to go beyond the presidium, and there is no evidence to suggest that tbey had attempted to build up activein the larger body. Khrushchev, in addition, had the advantage of superior organization: the central committee had probably been well briefed by his supporters and its loyalty assured. This, added to his existingwhich was probably greatest among the very memberstoguaranteed his victory. The length of thethat lt turnedull-scale rally of support for Khrushchevorum for detailing the "perfidy" of his opponents.
The only item on the agenda of the plenum wasof the issues raised by the anti-party group. Suslov, who apparently presided over the meeting,
eport on the presidium meeting which had just taken place and was probably able to manipulate the speakers Ln favor of Khrushchev. The four Insurgents were each allowed to speak twice during the plenum. One after the other, malenkov, Kolotov, Kaganovich, and Shepllov defended their positions at length andtheir charges against Khrushchev. With the possible exception of Bulganin, who was later accused of having tried to shield Malenkov during the discussion, tbe former supporters of the group apparently did not speak up in their defense and in fact began to gravitate towards the other side. Saburov, under the influence of Mlkoyan and Kirichenko, deserted even before the plenum began. If the anti-party group had any adherents ln tho centralthoy wero either not allowed to speak or preferred to remain sllont.
Tho speechos of the four Insurgents woro followed by those of Khrushchev's well-briefed supporters. Ofembers who requested permission to speak,ere allowed to do so, and the rest submitted written All allegedly supported Khrushchev and fiercely denounced the anti-party group. Following what wasa carofully planned line of attack, one speaker after another rose to defend tbe line laid down ath Party Congress. The members of the anti-party group were attacked not only for their continuous and stubbornto implementation of party policy, but also for their nefarious role ln the purges. Malenkov wassingled out for his role in the Leningrad affair and In the liquidation of Voznesensky, while Molotov and Kaganovich woro accused of having participated in the mass repressions in Innocent cadres. This caused Voroshilov to Jump up from his seat; waving hlB arms ln the air, he shouted to the central committee: "You are young.' We will correct your brains!" 5hepllov,politicalas denounced for hisand doubledeallng.
As the Isolation of anti-party group becameevident, Its adherents, Saburov, Voroshilov, Pervukhin, and Bulganin began to desert one by one. Towards the end of the plenum, each of these four rose to denounce the anti-party group and to "expose" Its activities, confessing at tbe same time their own
errors.* Zhukov allegedly appeared towards the end of the plenum, when he reaffirmed his support for Khrushchev and ition to Uolotov, Ualenkov, and Kaganovich. This was prob he final blow, for on tbe last day of Lhe plenum Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Shepllov recanted and confessed their guilt; Shepllov tried to absolve himself on the grounds that he had only joined at the last minute. According to one report, the factlonalists first tried toartial retreat and to mitigate their demands, but the plenumull recantation, which lt got, apparently ln the form of written statements from the three men. Kolotov alone held out and stubbornly refused to repudiate his position.
The central committee, on the last day of the session,une, drewesolution condemning the factionalof Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich and Shepllov, and expelling them from the central committee; the resolution was adopted unanimously, except by Molotov who abstained. At the same time, the four leaders were all removed from the presidium, as was Saburov, while Pervukhin was demoted to candidate member, and Shepllov was removed from the Voroshilov and Bulganin, apparently treated as lesser offenders because of their recantations, reportedly received official reprimands (which remained secret) but retained their positions. The changes ln the presidium, together with the resolution of the central committee, were published in Pravdauly;uly, Malenkov, Uolotov, KaganovlcfTj Pervukhin, and Saburov were released as deputy chairmen of the Council of Ulnisters.
Somewhat surprisingly, tho fourMolotov, Kaganovich andin tho party. Although their activities would certainly seem to haveexpulsion, and while the central committeespecifically cited Lenin to the effect that party members might be expelled for factionalism, no action was taken against them either then or later. Atd Party Congress inespite repeated calls for tho
This is suggested in tho "confessions" of these four men-Bulganin's at the8 CC plenum; Saburov's and' Pervukhin's at the 2lst Party Congress,nd Voroshilov's statement tod Partylso Khrushchev's speechd Party Congress, 27
removal from the party of Molotov, Malenkov, and Kagano-vlch, these demands wore not Incorporated in the final resolution of the congress. However, it has been rumored that expulsion proceedings are currently under way, as retribution for events which took place four years ago, expulsion nowather belated and irrelevant gesture.
Although the threat to Khrushchev's leadership ended with the central committee plenum ofhe anti-party group as an issuo has been kept very much alive, and, over the past four years, tbe propaganda campaign against the factlonallsts has been repeatedly revived. The gradual unmasking of the other fourinaburov and Pervukhln inndlnore or lessopportunity for virulent attacks on tho grouphole. Whether Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich are expelled from the party or not, the anti-party group seems likely totandard item in the party's propaganda repertory for some time.
Original document.
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