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. INTELLIGENCE STAFF STUDY
REfEHENCl
TITll
CAESAR XIV-
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
N T E L L I G E
SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT ON FUTURE WAR (Doctrine and Debate
Thisorkingreliminary and uncoordinated examination ol the predicament of Soviet military thought on the question of general war, particularly with regard toof strategic importance. Other papers on Soviet military doctrine and policy will follow.
This paper is bawed entlrely_on_open Soviet materials, principally the theoretical military journals and textbooks on military scienco addressed to audiences of professionals. These materials taken by themselves are not, of course,uro guide to Soviet strategy, as they are in part designed to serve foreign policy and propaganda objectives. Nevertheless, the materials contain very useful indications of Soviet military thinking on future war, including areas of uncertainty, anxiety, and confusion. We think that we can distinguish betweenof doctrine which are unquestioned and those which are subject to dlsputo, and tbat we can identify the schools of thought among military officers.
SUMMARY and
I. THE MAKINGILITARY DOCTRINE IN THE
Science Under Stalin In the
Thought Undor
Thought Since0
Searchingle Military
Contending Schools of
II. STRATEGIC DOCTRINE FOR THE FIRST
ikoly Trigger of
on tho Importance of First
For the Initial Stage of
III. DOCTRINE FOR WAR AFTER THE FIRST
of Future
Duration of
Weapons of
The Bole of Man in
The Scope of
Docisivo Character of
Strategies: Maximum or
Planning for Theater
Ground
Naval
Aviation and Air
IV. APPENDIX: THE STATUS OF SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE
ON THE EVE OF WORLD WAR
SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT ON FUTURE WAR (Doctrine and Debate
Summary and Conclusions
Soviet military thoughteneral war of the future, as revealed ln the open discourse, has beenluid state in recent years. Faced with the vast destructive potential of thermonuclear weapons and an accelerating weapons technology in both camps, many Soviet leaders have found it no longer possible to formulate modoro strategy and tactics simply by applying time-tosted principles of warfare. Incited bywho appears to outpace most of bis experts insome military officers have been trying to break old doctrinal molds and then to genorate new concepts and fresh interpretations of existing ones. umber of places, bow-evor, those pioneering tboorists havo met with resistance .from their more conservative colleagues.
Far from congealing military thought, Khrushchev's presentation ln0 of his outlineuture war and his "New Strategy" for winning it stimulated debato among tho military on the character of future war and the strategic as well as tactical conceptions relating to it. For one thing, an important segment of military opinionconfidence in certain aspects of Khrushchev's presentation, and ln any case did not regard lt as the complete or final word on the subject. While reaffirming the main lines ofdoctrine, military officers quickly added important qualifications to it. In their view, the USSR could not rely on nuclear/rocket weapons to the extent tbat Khrushchev had implied, but required diversified military forces to cope with the varied and complex situationsuture war. himself, in speechesodified his earlier positions to somo extont along the lines of the prevailing military views. His newly voiced appreciation of the need for all types of forces, bomber aviation,argearmy, among other things, may have been influenced by Soviet military argumentation as well as by external.
Inheory of future war, tho military have had only limited success in reaching agreement among themselves. Over the past two years, the literature hasultiplicity
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of views on future war, placing cheek by Jowl contradictory answers to strategic and tactical questions. ecure in the thought that future war will in many respects rosemblo World War II, havo been pittod againstho predict that future war will be completely different from past wars. Different positions have been taken over suchas the role of conventional forces and weapons, the nature of combat, the duration of the war, the effects of the first nuclear attack, ost of substrateglc matters such as positional warfare and stable defense. Military thought, in short, isilemma: while encouraging widespreadand discussion to improve and refine doctrine, theleaders lament the fact that military opinion is seriously
divided.
On the Start of War: ew general war willstarturprise attack is not disputed. Emphasis is placed, of course', on the possibilityestern surprise blow against the USSR. Although Soviet leaders have presented conflicting vlows on the possible effectsurprise attack, military leaders have tended increasingly to stress the grave danger to the USSRestern first strike. These statements havo reflected much less confidenceoviot ability to absorbtrike than expressed by Khrushchevuch statements may be applicable, in Soviet military thinking, to the United States as well as to the USSR. In this connection, although Moscow has disavowedproventive" and astrategy, important Soviot spokesmen, including Defonse Minister Malinovsky, have hinted strongly at the needre-emptive strategy. Such statements, if nothange in policy, may be arguing for ono. This concept of pre-emption. In our view, would notlumsy last-minute effort to unload attack weapons, but rather the doliberate assemblageilitary force capable of delivering anforestalling blow. In this connection, Sovietwhile not suggesting an ability to destroy long-range attack forces based in territorial United States, doeliefubstantial blunting of US attack forces could be achievedoviet first strike.
War After the first Attack: Thero is general agreement among Soviet spokesmen on some propositions as to how war might
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develop after the first attack. Basic is the doctrine that the war will inevitably involve the widespread use of'nuclear weapons. (While acknowledging the primacy of nuclear/rocket weapons In future general war, however, the military differ among themselves over the role that conventional forces and weapons will play In lt. "Traditionalists" tend to emphasize the importance of conventional weapons while "progressives'" minimize it.)
It is also the general view that war will bo global in scopo and involve large coalitions of states; wholewill become theaters of war; and there will be no borderline between front and roar areas. "Mass, multimlllion armies" will take part in the conflict. The war will be characterized by the "extreme decisiveness of the political and military goals of the combatantt will be waged ferociously and will impose severe destruction on all warring parties. (Boasts of Soviet victory in future war are offset by near-admissions of the possibility of defeat.)
The immediate strategic aims of the USSR in war are if possible tond at the least to repulse, an enemy surprise attack, and tocrushing" Soviot strategic objectives for the warhole are more difficult to ascertain. Tbe "full defeat" of the enemy is dosired, but the moaning of this term is left The primary objectives of strategic strikes are said to be both groupings of enemy forces in theaters of operations and the disruption of tho enemy's roar area. The complete smashing of the enemy's armed forces is stressed at least In traditionalist quarters; but it is not clear whether maximum or 1lmited destruction of Western countries is planned on.
Confronted with divided opinion among its officers on tho problem of conducting war after tho first attack, tho Defenso Ministry appears to hedge In its military policy,commitment to either side. On the one hand, DefenseMalinovsky acknowledges the possibilityhort war and bintscountry-busting" mission for Soviet strategic rockets. On the other hand, ho makes lt clear that Soviet planning for theater warfare is predicated on the assumptions that war will be moreissile duel, will be fought on an important scale after the first nuclear blows have been struck, and will require the coordinated employment of various typos of forces. It is autious, If somewhat ambiguous approach, apparently in preparation for any oventuallty.
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The above-mentioned elements of doctrino that are firmly defined ln the open discourse suggest that the Soviet military leadership hasreater flexibility for militarythan would havo been possible had Khrushchev's strategic pronouncements0 been translated Into doctrine without qualification. But the leadership hasore rigid strategic posture than was evident earlier, sayhen the then Defense Minister Marshal Zhukov left open the(in his public statements)uture war might be fought entirely with conventional weapons.
The elements of uncertainty, division and anxiety that we have detected in discussions on future war over the past two years in themselves have implications for policy. Unable to agreeumber of important respocts on whatuture war will take, Soviet military loaders probably havo had serious doubts and differences about what measures to take now in regard to troop training and force structure. Tbe ferment ln military thinking, moroover, could have beenrelated to the announced military policy changes1 and may foreshadow more changes, ln that certain expressed military viewpoints may become incorporated in strategic doctrine.
MAKING OF MILITARY DOCTRINE IN THE DSSR
A. Military Science Under Stalin lo the Post-War Period
Both the content of Soviet military doctrine and the atmosphere in which it is formed have changed drastically since the days when Stalin's heavy hand checked the growth of military thought. Then, Stalinist pronouncements on the winning of the Second World War were decreed Immutable laws. In an order promulgated intalin declared that "the skillful mastering of the experience of the recent war" was to be the single basis for the development ofscience in tbe future. talinist world, nocould be taken of the need to alter principles of war to fit advances in weapons technology. Mass destructionthen possessed only by the United States but underin the USSR, were miraculously obscured in Soviet military doctrine. Soviet officers were ordered to prepare their strategic analyses on the strengthimple victory ln war would always be assured to the side superior ln "the permanently operating factors" whichthe outcome of war. These were solidity of the rear, moral spirit of the army, number and quality of divisions, armaments, and organizational ability of the "leadingn the Stalinist view, tbe USSR was endowed with superiority in each of these factors.
Commenting on thisED STAR editorial on2 relatedcornful tone that Stalin had regarded himself as the "only expert" on military affairs and military theory. Even his "erroneous positions" on military science, the editorial said, were postulated as "genius-like discoveries" and he was pictured in the literature as the "direct organizer and leader" of all strategic operations of the Soviet army. If military science moved ahead in Stalin's time, the editorial said, it was in spito ofowing to the efforts of courageous military leaders andparty officials. Military officers in such an atmosphere, as Marshal Grechko recallod in the MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL ofere afraid to express their own views and were content to mouth "standard phrases and follow rigidly patterned schemes.**
B. Military Thought Under
Upon the death of tho dictator, the militarywas among the first elements of Soviet society to fool the thaw of tho long Stalinist winter. In tho second halfsolated voices began to question basic military doctrine in public for the first time In decades. The nascent reformers worriod particularly about the need to overhaul Soviet strategic doctrine in order to take full account of. capability to deliver (with impunity to the Americanuclear surprise attack against the USSR. Though the atmosphere had become freer, most military loaders,to operate according to fixed "scientific" principles of war, were loath to abandon cherished maxims of the past. All the same, Soviet military thought had at last embarked on the tortuous road of modernization and adjustment to tho swift developments in weapons technology. And the new political leadership would allow no turning back: "Soviet military science must be moved ahead in every possiblehrushchev told military academy graduates in
In tbe process of the transformation, Stalin'soperating factors" of war wero de-emphasizedifferent form, but wore not expunged from Soviot military science. Military spokesmen continued to acknowledge the great Importance of the stability of tho rear area, the morale of the army, the number and quality of divisions,and the competence of commanders in the conduct of war. But they no longer attributed discovery of these factors to Stalin; rather, they said, those "basic" factors wore well known to such outstanding military leaders of old Russia as Petor I, Suvorov, and Kutuzov. Moreover, the reformersthat these were only some of the factors that maytho course and outcome of war in tho presentstrategic surprise, science, and technology may alsodecisive" influonce on tho warhole.
More important is the belief now that superiority in the so-called decisive factors (which the Soviets tend to claim for the USSR) does not automatically bring victory; the
factors only provide "possibilities" for victory.* Thesecan only be realized by "much organizational and creative work bytotal efforts of commanders, soldiers of the line, and civilian workers In the rear areas. (Maj.. Smirnov, et On Soviet Military Science, USSR Ministry of Defense: Moscow,)
As regards the basic revisions in Soviet military doctrine that have been made, thetand out as majorfirst period registering the impact of the nuclear and thermonuclear weapon on Soviet strategic and tactical concepts, and the second theintegration of the ballistic missile into the Soviet force structure. In neither period wasullof the scope of doctrinal change involved, although such evidence as was made available indicated that the tactical and strategic conceptions of Soviet military planners were now keeping pace with the implications of technologicaland political change. Moroover, with the advent of the ICBMmportant differences in view became apparent among the military officers, on the one hand, and between the officers and Khrushchev, on the other, over the strategic significance of the new long-range rockets and theirfor Soviet military doctrine andstructure. theorists exchanged contrary views onritical question as strategic surprise, while Khrushchev and thedickered (without directly confronting one another) ovor the relative importanco of conventional forces and strategic nuclear/rocket weapons.
Soviet military doctrine, as it emerged from the theorotical reassessments that accompanied the development of the ICBM, was sketched out by Khrushchev in his0 speech. In that presentation, ho defined tho strategic conceptions underlying his decision to reduce by one third the size of the Soviet armedjustification which underscored the new role assigned the nuclear/rocket weapon
they say. superiority in firepower (armament) is essential for victory in combatactical or strategic scale, but does not automatically or necessarily lead to victory. Lt. Col. Popov, RED STAR,
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in the Soviet Union's future political and military strategy. Superiority in "total firepower" was defined as the criterion of military strength; the ballistic missile was designated as tho principal instrument of Sovietnd the newly formed "rocket troops" were named the "main type" of force ln the Soviet military establishment.
The political concept underlying the "newt was implied, was an estimate that the Western states could bo deterred from launching general war by the fear of massive retaliation. Khrushchev's image of the characteruture war, in the event that deterrence failed, was more difficult to deduce from his spooch. Khrushchevictureapid exchange of massive strategic blows between the major antagonists during the first hoursuture war, but he said nothing about subsequent stages of war or the role of conventional forcos ln lt. Rather, he left the impression that there would be only the firstwould take the formucloar/missile duel; and that one of the warring sides would then capitulate.
Tho factajor reorganization of the armed forces accompanied the Khrushchev statements seems tothat the Soviet leader's picture of future war was drawnober military estimate. (During bis speech Khrushchev even assured his listeners that ho had consulted the General Staff beforohand.) The estimate on which the speech was based, however, was not necessarily gearedhe year of the speech, but might have boen relateduture time when the USSR would possess the rocket weapons necessary totheir projected strategic tasks. Furthermore. Khrushchev's0 pronouncements on strategic doctrinal matters wore takenumber of military spokesmen at tho timegenuine contribution to Soviet military science" and have since been similarly applauded by some of tho militaryand leaders.
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rocket weapons for strategic doctrine- But as it turned out, Khrushchev's characterization of future war and doctrine was neither the complete nor the final word on the subject. officers speaking or writing during tbe next fow months reaffirmed the main lines of Khrushchev's doctrine, but added qualifications and personal touches that tended to Invest that doctrine with greater professional sophistication. All acknowledged the new primacy of rocket weapons ln the Soviet military arsonal, and some asserted that the initial perioduturo nuclear war would be of overriding importance. But along with this, many of tbe military spokesmen professed undiminished devotion to some of the classical principles of military theory significantly lgnorod by Khrushchev. Most notably, many stressed the continuing validity of thedoctrine--the view that victory in war requires the coordinated action of all arms of service. In making this point, the military spokesmen may have been concerned merely withole for their own individual serviceseriod of rapid reorganization. But they were alsoa basic military estimate: that the Soviet armed forces could not relyingle woapon system to deal effectively with the complex and varied war situations which they night be called upon to face. As professional specialists they seemed to be recognizing that however effective it might beolitical strategy, Khrushchev's doctrine of massive retaliation did notomplete blueprint for odern and diversified military establishment.
Even after the amondments and qualifications to Khrushchev's outline of strategy and future war werein the months following his speech, one could not say that the major disputed issues were resolved. On the contrary, ovor tho past two years, the military literature has burgeoned to an unprecedented degree with differing viewpoints on future war and expressions of uncertainty about existing doctrines on the whole spectrum of issues which Khrushchev had ostensibly Ironed out ln The whole body of Sovietdoctrine has in fact been undergoing close review as to its adequacy for future war conditions. This process has been fostered by the military leadorship, which has enjoined the entire officer corps to help develop, test, and refine the concepts that will govern the conducthird world war and the preparations for it.
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Military writers have stressed the Deed tothe substance of "certain concepts" which are "now firmly integrated" in military and naval doctrine, but which havo not yet receivedew scientific interpretation inwith changes in the conditions in which militaryare conducted." . Sysoev, NAVALNo. They stress the need to "support and encourage original, independent decisions, bold strivings toward new methods of combat commensurate with contemporary weapons." And shunning the alternative of exclusivelydebate and review, they have insisted that the problem can effectively be tackled only by drawing upon the "widest circle" of officers. (Col. Sushko, ot OMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES," In short, debate made public in military Journals has become an accepted method of developing military doctrine as well as of educating tho troops.
Additional evidence of ferment in Soviot military thought is seen in the extent to which Khrushchev himself has deviated from his earlier statements on war, in the course of explaining the changes in forco structure that took placeesult" of. arms build-up and the Berlin crisis For example, in speeches made last summer Khrushchev acknowledged the needarge standing Soviet army dospite bis earlier claims that Increments in Soviet firepower made this unnecessary regardless of the size of armies in the West. He acknowledged the noed for all typos of services to fulfill the country's defense requirements, although previously he was content to rely almost entirely on nuclear/rocket forces. He called for the further development of military aviation, whereas he had earlier sought its demise. He admitted tho possibilityeneral war would begin along the frontiers in Germany, although he was the author of the formula that war would begin with strategic strikes against the rear areas of the antagonists.
Taken together, these changes add uphift in Khrushchev'step in the direction of tho commonly held viewpoints of So/let military leaders. Again,chaoge of mind amounts to plain evidence that ansegment of military opinion lacked confidence in hisestimate of The Soviet chief himsolf was persuaded inthrough the give-and-take ofamong the military as well as by externalto modify his own strategic outlook.
It should not bo inferred from the above discussion, however, that Khrushchev hasomplete turnabout from his earlier positions. Khrushchev may have begun to think moro like his military lieutenantsumber of important respects, but, as recent ovidence reveals, he has not cemented all tho fissures betwoen his and their conceptions of future war. There is atasic philosophicalwhich may havo implications forKhrushchev and the military. Whereas ho Is inclined to stress woapons and to belittle the rolo troops will play in future war, the military stress the rolo of man as well as weapons inAlbanian press organs on2oint of this distinction with some accuracy In attacking their bete noire: "What disgust and aversion is aroused by Khrushchev's revisionist views in his appreciation of men and technique
ecent messago to President Kennedy on the problem of disarmament Khrushchov said:
In tho nuclear rocket weaponswc have on-tered thisnumerical strength of tho forces does notong way have flio Importance it had in Worldnd II. War now would at once become total, worldwide; and its outcome would depend not on the actions of troops stationed along the line dividing the combatants but on the use of nuclear rocket weapons,with whom the decisive blow can be struck even before vast armies can be mobilized and thrown into battlo. (TASS,
A contrary picture of the importance of troops in future war was painted in an editorial in the MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL for
inal victory over the aggressor can be attained onlyesult of Joint operations of all types of armed forces. Future war, if unleashed by thewill be waged by multimilllon mass armies. Its course and outcome will beecisive extent dependent on armies and the people alike, on theof communications between front and rear, on tbe ability of the Soviet system to pour all forces and means into the struggle with the enemy.
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during war. With undue emphasis on the technical side, he minimizes the decisive role of man, of the soldier on the field of battle, and herong evaluation of the role of the various elements on the battlefield.")
D. The Searchingle Military Doctrine
Soviet military thought as revealed in open sources isilemma. On the one hand, the military leaderswidespread debate and discussion on doctrinal matters; on the other hand, they find the fact that military opinions have not been able to congealingle military doctrine very disquiet ing.
Writing in the1 issue of theJOURNAL, of which he Is an editor, Major General P. Zhilin lamented the absence of agreementingle military doctrine. He wrote that in contrast to the "exhaustive" presentation of the political aspect of militarybetraying his conservative colors, he relegated Khrushchev's0 speech on war and strategy to thisthere are still "many disputable and vague propositions in the elaboration of the military-technical part of thevidence of this, he said, could be seen in the fact that despite numerous discussions in the military press and within the General Staff and Frunze academies,nity of views has not been achieved" on the "laws" and "regularities" ofscience. It has been necessary, he said, to review the fundamental postulates of Soviet military doctrine owing to the political and military changes that have taken place ln the world. But he implored that it is also "necessary, now as never before, tonity of views on all of the most important questions of military art and the employment of troops in war." This unity of views, he added, must be achieved not only ln the USSR armed forces, but also ln the armod forces of all member countries of the Warsaw Pact.
Underlying Zhilin's concern is the belief, widely in evidence in Soviet literature on military science,ully developed military doctrineine qua non for the successful conduct of armed struggle. Military science textbooks published by the USSR Defense Ministry declare that the success of military operations "on any scale" depends
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greatly on how correctly military theory has been elaborated in peacetime and mastered In troop training. aj. Gen. Smirnov, On Soviet Military leaders place particular emphasis on the need tooctrine that would define the requirements for strategic as well as other forces at the startuture war. In his speech atd CPSU Congress last October, Marshal Malinov-sky invoked the highest political authority on this very point:
The Presidium of the Central Committee of the party and the Soviet Government have demanded and do demand that we devote special attention to the initial periodossible war.
Moreover, the penalty for not having atheoryiable, up-to-date doctrine for the conduct of war once the fracas begins has been inscribed in boldin recent Soviet military historiography. umber of millta:the collective that prepared the latest official multi-volume history of World Warcome to attribute the calamitous defeats of the Soviets in the early part of the last war mainly to the Inadequacy of prewardoctrine.*
E. The Contending Schools of Thought
Military spokesmen generally acknowledge that, owing to the presence of stockpiles of modorn weapons in the arsenals of East and West,ar of the future will be waged differently than any war of the past. Sharp differences in view have been registered, however, over the degree touture war will differ from World War II. As we have noted above, contrary positions are taken on such questions as the applicability of experience of past warsuture war, the viability of long
hasotly disputed issue in the historical literature. Because of its relevance to the problem ofthought on futureiscussion of the debate is appended to this report.
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established military doctrines on strategy and tactics, and the role of conventional types of weapons.
Among the theorists, there appear to be basically two schools of thought as to the best avenue of approach to the problem of theory and doctrine on future.war. One school let us call it theto bo conservative, reluctant to make radical changes in time-tested concepts and practices, and relies heavily on the lessons of theparticularly those of World Warworking out problems of military science. The theorists of this school do not rule out but soft-pedal the use of prognosis andtheory. They tend to believe that future war in many important respects will resemble World War II. Such leading military figures as Marshals Grechko and Rotmlstrov* and Army General Kurochkin appear to belong to this school. ophisticated historical monthly of the Ministry of Defense, tends to be its principal public forum.
The attachment of the "traditionalists" to the past itt at once apparent in their writings on future war. Thus, in an article in the historical journal stressing the close relationship between military history and military theory and doctrine, Marshal Grechko declared:
Only those who are ignorant of Marxist dialectics maintain that the newperiod wipes out the past in the field of military affairs and military thought.
Despite the factuture warwill be conducted with new,owerful means of destruction, elements of military art known from the experience of the past war will nevertheless remain /in use7. now all energies on the stucly of the new and striving to look into the future, it is necessary along with this to continue
'Marshaloctor of military science, was ironically one of the most prominent revisionistss.
mastering the experience of the Second World War with the aim of usingthat has not lost significance for contemporary conditions. (Marshal Grechko, MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL,
imilar vein Marshal Rotmistrov expressed the viewastery of World War II experience is essential in working out doctrinal problems of future war:
Successful solution of the problemswith determining the methods of conducting modern battle, operations and warhole Is impossible without skillful theoretical study and the use of the past, especially experience of the Great Fatherland War. (Rotmistrov,JOURNAL, No.
No oneeturn to the Stalinist period. Evon the most stalwartexpect to fight future war in much the same manner as in World Wara return to Stalinism. Thus Marshal Grechko, In his article stressing the usefulness of military history in developingheory of future war, took pains to separate himself from tho slavish, uncreative tradition of military and theoretical writing under Stalin. He called for the serious study ofmilitary failures as well as successes, for the study of tho military experience of the capitalist countries in World War II as well as that of the Soviets, and emphasized that, above all, research into military history must beobjectively. In his opinion military history is too closely tied to the problem of drawingynamic military doctrine to permit the "mouthing of standard phrases andof stereotyped schemes" that characterized the Stalinboth military history and doctrine were utterly stagnant. (MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, No.
The second school ofus call it the progressiveto shun or, at the very least to de-emphasize, the historical approach to workingheory of future war, contending that it will be completely different
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from the post. This school reasons that in tho absence of experience in nuclear/missile warfare, one must not look to tbe past but peer into theforosec and foretell the prospects for the development of armed combat on the basis of profound logical analysis and troop exercises under simulated conditions of nuclear warfare. The articulateof this school appear to be mainly lower-rankinsas Colonels P. Sidorovave been principals in the movement to revise Soviet military doctrine Among the senior offlcors, Marshals Moskalenko and Toromenko seem to share the outlook of this school. Tho official view of the USSR Defensein the pronouncements of Marshal Malinovsky and in RED STARinclined to sympathize with this school. The theoretical Journal, KOUMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, la perhaps the principal forum for expression of the progress ivo vlowpo int.
The progressives teach that ono must theorize about the character of future war through "scientificbased on "theoretical study" (as opposed tostudy) of the tendencies of development of social conditions and military technique. (Col. Sushko, etOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, Ho. T) The school's emphasis on prognosis is summed up in thepassages:
Tho significance of prediction in military affairs has grown unusually great undorconditions. Over tho expanseong period of history, military theory was llmltod to the generalizing of pastof armed struggle. The absence ofprognostication into the future was not very much reflected in its service role. Since tho development of military affairs proceeded slowly and the technical base and the firm material conditions of armedchanged gradually, the generalizedof the past wars could be usedong period.
For this reason, big mistakes in tho past ln evaluating prospective war frequently were corrected during its course. A
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completely different situation has taken place at the present time. The main powers of the world have created and continue to accumulate and modernize weapons which must play an enormous role right in the beginning period of war. Therefore, military science right now must work out methods ofnow superpowerful and superlongrange weapons, despite the fact that these weapons never were used, excepting Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The task of working out new methods ofcan be resolved only by scientific,thought relying onound practical experience of the troops and the generalizing of it. (Col. Sushko, etOMMUNIST OK THE ARMED FORCES,
philosophy ofprogressive school hence puts little store by past experience and takes few time-honored concepts at faco value.
We can no longer be satisfied in any sense with those methods of combat organization which were characteristic of the period ofGreat Fathorland War, including even its final periods. (RED STAR
How sharply different this approach may be from the historical method is illustrated by the following,extreme, statementprogressive" spokesman.
Rocket technique remolds all previousofcharacter of war: in particular, of its Initial period, of battles andof the front and the rear, of tho uso of space and time, of the character of this or that theater of operations, and of other problems of military art. Khrushchev has spoken in detail aboutol. P. Sidorov, KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, )
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The distinction between this school of thought and that of the traditionalists is also sharply drawn in the statement ess extreme progressive than Sidorov) that the method of approach to reality from study of the past represents "the main danger for military theory in thostago of its development." (Col. S. Kozlov, KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, According to this writer, "adherence to the past always entails anof the new anda hostile attitude toward it. This is the main danger of dogmatism." CoL Kozlov soes battling with "dogmatism" and overcoming stagnation and routine in military affairs, as inseparably connected to the primary task of revealing the new in military science. But at the same time, he deplores extreme positions: "Soviet military science also has to "struggle with extremes engendered by the turbulent growth of techniques, with exaggerations of all types, with unfounded conjectures and projection, and an alienation from reality." Finally, he condemns those who, "nihilistically reject experience of thehough warning again, that it has very limited value.
The schools of thought discussed here are of course not mutuallyundoubtedly do not embrace all military viewpoints, and individual military leaders in an effort to be openminded may sometimes favor an opponent'sdepending on the specific issue at hand. o, the schools, as within individual journals, there mayharp difference of opinion expressed over various doctrinal matters.
A case in point is the debate carried on ln the pages of the MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL between9 and The debate was especially remarkable for the vigor and directness of its disputes and its generallyprotracted character. It affords revealinginto the atmosphere of the Soviet general staff. The debate ostensibly centered on problems of World War IIbut tho purpose of the debate in raking over the lessons of World War II was admittedly to help work out a
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theory of the initial period of futuro war.* Tho points of disagreement ofton exceeded in number tbe areas of agreement. And such questions of critical doctrinal significance as the character of the first phase of war, tbe role of weapons and high command, that were aired in the debate wore not resolved.
Unfortunately, the opon materials do not carry enough evidence of the kind required torogressive or traditionalist tag on most of the senior Soviet military Recent policy statements by Marshal Malinovsky, however, do reveal that tbe progressive approach currently has anedge over the traditionalist outlook in Soviet offial-dom. This is seen in Malinovsky's pronouncement of last October on the new study year. (PRAVDA, Theemphasizes the working outheory of future war on the basis of maneuvers and training under simulated conditions of nuclearIts initialmakes no mention of the usefulness of studying tbe lessons of past wars. In addition, the recently stepped-up official attacks against Stalin, for inhibiting the development of Sovietscience, undoubtedly has boon grist for tho mill of the progressives in their efforts to discredit the views of their more conservative colleagues. As recently as2 the Defense Ministry,ED STAR editorial, urgedmilitary officers to keep pace with the malo-stream of developments: "Much remains to be done Inthe consequences of the cult of personality in the sphere of military theory, construction and history."1
.article by UaJ. Gen. I. Rukhle and published in the9 issuo of the Journal servedatalyst. igorous discussion of the article was hold in the Military Historical Section of the Military-Science Society of the Military-Historical Department of the General Staff onccordingeport published In the0 issue of tho MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL. umber of articles addressed to the subject were then published in succeeding Issues of the JOURNAL, culminating in an article, in the1 Issue, by the chief of the General Staff himself. Marshal Zakharov.
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DOCTRINE FOR THE FIRST ATTACK
How war will begin and what the consequences of the first nuclear strikes will be for the warring sides areof greatest concern to Soviet military loaders. Since athis matter has commanded tho most attention in theoretical discussions of future war. Judging fromevidence, tbe heavy emphasis on the Importance of the Initial phaso of war has boon sustained if not increased. And the concern voiced by Soviet military loaders over tho possible effectsestern surprise attack against the USSR would appear to have important Implications for Soviet military planning.
A. Surpriseikely Trigger of War
Entangled as it Ishole series of political and military issues, the question of initiation of war is bound to be handled in Soviet discourseanner that would best servo policy or propagandistlc aims. It would of course bo folly to take such statements at face value. Yet it would be useful to Identify the expressed Soviet views on thisin order to relate them later in this study to other conceptions of future war and to probe their implications for Soviet military strategy.
To begin with, no Soviet spokesman haseclaration of war would precede the outbreak of hostilities between the major powers. Rather, military discourse has repeatedly stressed the likelihooduture general war would beginurprise attack with mass destruction weapons by the West against the Soviet camp. In an article in the1 MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, Major Genoral M. Cherednicbonko cast this view In termsigid formula:
It isefinite lawful regularity that wars in the contomporary epoch are being unleashed by imperialist aggressors bywithout declaration, drawing into the conflict enormous forces from the very first days of the war for tbe attainment of tbe most decisive objectives.
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Writing in tho0 issue of tho somehowever, two other military writers left oponthat olthor side mighturprise attack: "As shown by past experience, wars most often are startod byattack by one of the
While ruling out the possibilityajor power would willfully forewarn its opponentefinite intention to attack, the Soviets have consideredhreat poriod could precedo the first nuclear salvo, if the countries were in the midst of an international crisis. omplaint heard during the Berlin crisis1 was that the USSR iswith "the prospect of war only because it wishes toeace treaty with Germany.")
Soviet military spokesmen have also saidhird world war could begin under any of the following:
war (small-scale war between states)certain cases would "inevitably" and in others woulddevelopeneral war. Soviet spokesmon agreearmod conflict will inevitably developlobalwar should the nuclear powers become involved
in it. (Marshal Malinovsky, speech atd CPSU Congress,
Attackatellite of the Soviet Union. "The armed forces of the Sovietarshal Malinovsky declared in PRAVDA on "are always ready to retaliaterushing blow at the aggressor and we shall smash those who attack us or our allies." (In other recent statements of this nature, however, SovietMaiave exhibited some reluctance to pledge toall satellites indiscriminately. In the heat of the polemic with the Albanians and Chinese, for example, Soviet leaders early this year spoke of defending the "socialist countries which_arc our friends.")
Accidental war, which could bo set off byradars or by "tho 'accidental' appearanceoreign aircraft and tho 'accidental' droppingomb." (Khrushchev, PRAVDA,
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Each oi these possibilities is Invoked in thofrom time to time in order to inhibit Western military activities detrimental to Soviot interests. This is not to say that the various notions on how future war might begin arc without significance for Soviet military doctrine. The fact that Soviet military discourse focuses mainly on the problem of surprise attack (or first strike) against tbo USSR is in itself significantilitary standpoint. This significance will be brought out in the ensuingof other dimensions of the problem of surprise attack.
B. Views On the Importance of First Strike
During tho past two years Soviet spokesmen have presented conflicting views on the possible Impact of aattack on the USSR.
On the ono hand, in his speech announcing the troop cut inhrushchev had denied that "any country" would derive decisive advantage byurprise attack against another nuclear power: "The stato subjected to aof course, the state in question Is abigalways be able toowerful rebuff to the aggressor." Khrushchev clearly had political reasons for saying this. ajor objective of his speech was to assure hisdomestic andthe proposed troop cut would in no way affect the capability of the Soviet Union to defend ltsolf. In denying the effectlvonoss ofattack, he was buttressing the imago of an assured Soviet capability to retaliate in force, even undor the worst possible conditions. In support of his argumont that the USSRuaranteed capability to strike second with its nuclear/ rocket weapons, Khrushchev said that Soviet territory was immense and that Soviet missile facilities (threatened by NATO bases along tbo periphery of the USSR) were located inay as to insure duplication and triplication as well as adequate dispersion and camouflage. Later, in the wake ofncidont, Khrushchev again sought to assure the West as well as bloc loaders at the0 Conference of Communist partios in Bucharest that the USSR could strike second even if tho United States discovered the location of Soviet rocket bases: "It is not possible toocket base out of commission by one, two, or sovoral attacks; rocket
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techniqueounterattack in every instance." In neither instance in which he evaluated the strategicof striking first did Khrushchev seem to vouch for the capability of the West's strategic forces tourprise attack by Soviet missiles, although this possibility cannot be ruled out.*
Another authoritative disparagement of the ultimate effect of surprise attack was contributed by Lieutenant General Krasllnikov in RED STAR of
Soviet military science affirms the following: Regardless of the factudden attack can cause very great harm, it still cannota decisive factor in the course andof the war.
This statement too, when examined in context, seems designed to emphasize the Soviet Union's ability to retaliate, rather than the West's. For the preceding sentences were: "By meansassed sudden attack the imperialists dream ofblows on the socialist countries which would immediately decide the war in their favor. We cannot afford to ignore such intentions of the enemies of socialism."
Statements such as these, in short, implied that the Soviet leadersigh confidenceoviet (but not necessarily Western) strike-second capability. But neither military spokesmen nor Khrushchev have belittled theof surprise attack or boasted of an assured Soviet strike-second capability in public The prolonged reti-cenceonritical issue as this could mean that the Soviet
obvious reasons, Soviet spokesmen do not directly and openly discuss the question of the possible effectsoviet first strike against. The marshals give assurances that the USSR "will never strike the first blow." They have made sweeping threats in the mass propaganda, such as Halinov-sky's boast in PRAVDA on2 that the USSR could destroy "any target, all political-administrative centers of the US"ingle nuclear/rocket attack. But they have not specified that such an attack would be launchedirst strike or surprise attack.
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leaders are less certain now than they wero0 about tho Soviet ability toirst nuclear strike by the West.
In this regard, it is also significant that since the Khrushchev speech ofnd in subtle rejection ofumber of military spokesmen have stressed thedecisive effecturprise attack might have on the warholo. Statements to this point made1 by two ranking military leaders stand out as most important.
In an article summingengthy debate on the initial period of war, developed in consecutive issues of the MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, the Chief of the General Staff endorsed the view that strategic surprise could be ofimportanceuture war. In the1 issue oi the Journal, Marshal Zakharov focused on the danger to the USSR (with possible reference to the West as well) of asurprise attack:
The nuclear-rocket weapon, having enormous destructive force and practically unlimited in its radius of operations, opens before tho aggressor wide possibilities forurprise blow of enormous force. Nuclear weapons permit in the very first hours of the war the delivery of such blows as can turn out to be decisive for thethe war. In 'these conditions, lack of military preparedness for resistance against an aggressor attack can entail far heavier consequences than was the case /in the USSR7 Of highest importance here is the attainment of high vigilance and constant preparedness of armed forces tourprise blow.
Marshal Malinovsky, in his speech tod CPSU Congress onctober has provided the most authoritative opinion on strategic surprise to date. His view of the issue was consistent with the military literaturo stressing the decisive role of strategic surpriseuture war but, like Zakharov's, was out of step with Khrushchev's presentation of Malinovsky seemed at pains to get across the idea that the political and military leadership wore now
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fully in accord in their estimate of the importance of surprise. Thus he took the rare step of invoking the authority of the CPSU Presidium in emphasizing the need to study the problem of the initial periodar:
The Presidium of the Central Committee of the party and the Soviet Government have demanded and do demand of us that we devote special attention to the initial periodossible war. Tho importance of this period lies in the fact that the very first mass nuclear strikes are capable,ast extent, of predetermining the whole subsequent course of the war and could load to such losses in the rear and among the troops as would put the people and the country in an exceptionally difficult position.
In stressing the grave danger* to the USSR should the West succeed in striking the USSR first, the seniorleaders betray their doubts and fears atout the ability of their country toassed nuclear attack. At the very least, their statements reflect much less confidence in the USSR's ability to absorb nuclear blows and to strike back effectively than Khrushchev and General Krasilnikov had expressed At the same time, the statements on the possible decisiveness of strategic surprise may bear on the ability of the United States to withstand such an attack. Wore this the case, the statements could be used ln support of an argumentoviet strike-first strategy and for the USSR'seapons capability commensurate with that task.
More will be said shortly on the probableof tho heightened Soviet concern over the question of surprise for Soviet strategic planning. Suffice it to note here, that the evident Soviet uncertainties about the effect of the first attack has probably contributed to the disarray in military thinking on such questions as the duration of the future war, the kind of role the older component forces will play, the relative importance of conventional weapons, the scale of wartime economic production,ariety of related questions.
JUL.
As revealed in the open sources, the Sovietsfighting awar in the political sense but an "offensive" warilitary sense. They give noin their writings or pronouncements of planningeliberate, unprovoked attack against the West. The fact that thoy plan to fight awar, however, does not ruleout their striking another power first, by surprise, should they deem this important to their security. SSR Defense Ministry book, "War and Politics" (signed to press in, thusirst-strike strategy for tho USSR within the frameworkarolitical sense:
Contemporary methods of conducting wars have greatly increased not only the significance of surprise but also the rolo ofwhich is the basic and most important way of conducting war, and of providing for the decisive destruction of the forces of the enemy and the preservation of one's own forces. Attack in the military sense of strategy by no means contradicts thecharacter of war in defense of the socialist fatherland from the political point of view.
Marx and Engels constantlyust war, defensive indoes not preclude strategic attack operations but on the contrary presupposes them.
According to numerous Soviet military statements, preventing, and at the least, repulsing an enemy strategic attack, andrushing counterblow, will be the most important of the immediate strategic aims of Soviet forcesuture war. From other statements on how the war will develop in its initial phase, it is clear that seizing the strategic initiative and creating favorablestrategic nuclearthe further development of operations are included among tho immediate objectives.
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To prevent an enemy surprise attack, shouldfail, means to destroy the enemy's nuclear strikingas much of it asgood time. The best and perhaps only way to achieve this is by striking the enemy first. Such was the thinkingroup of Soviet military theorists who, dvanced the viewurprise attack could bo frustrated if the enemy were himself surprised as he prepared to strike.
It has not been the policy of the Soviet Union to admit in public tho adoptionre-emptive strategy. On the contrary,umber of occasions5 Soviethave explicitly disavowed it.* Nevertheless, in the period under review, there have been some crystal clear allusions to the need for the USSR to beosition to strike the first nuclear blow, should war become inevitable. Thus, ebate in the military historical section of the General Staff (reported in the0 issue of the MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL),olonel Nazarov made the following statement about the "new problems" in the preparation for war and the conduct of armed struggle in its initial period:
The first problem is insuring for oneself the advantages for theurprise first blow or the(predotvarshchenie) oflow on the partrobable enemy. Thisas history has shown, has become the central one in the preparation of countries for war and in the preparation of armed forces and of the military high command.
*The above-mentioned book, "War andor example, said: "It is well known that, unlike the imperialists,and political leaders of the Soviet Union have many times stated that the USSR will never start wars. They have always denied the strategy of 'pre-emptive blow'."
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In an article in the1 issue of the MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, Army General Kurasov hinted, though in more cautious language, at the need for the USSR to strike first in the event of war. He quoted Lenin to the effect that
it would be "stupid and criminal" not to attack an enemyagainst us," He recalled that Lenin wrote (Works,) that "one must try to catch the enemy In disarray, to strike at the moment when bis troops are assembled." And he noted Lnnin's adage that "in war you do not communicate to the enemy when you are going to attack."
Voicing concern ind CPSU Congress speech last October about the possibilityestern surprise attack against the USSR, Marshal Malinovsky not only called for preparedness to repel such an attack, but hinted stronglyre-emptive strategy. He said that1 the armed forces were called on to work out means of "exploding" the aggressor's plantimely and devastating blow against him":
In realistically appraising the situation, one must hold that It is precisely anuclear attack on the Soviet Union and other socialist countries that theare preparing. This is why Soviet military doctrine regards as the most important, the principal, and primary tasks of the armed forces to be in constant readiness to repulseurprise attack of the enemy and to thwart hisplans. The point at issue is that, in contemporary conditions, any armed conflict will inevitably developniversal nuclear-rocket war, should the nuclearbe involved in it. Thus we are forced to prepare our armed forces, the country, and all the people primarilytruggle against the aggressor, mainly in theof nuclear
The main common task posed for all our armed forces in military trainingas the study and working out of-the means of reliablyudden nuclear attack by the aggressor and also the means ofhis aggressive plansimely and devastating blow against him.
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There are two important differences between the present and past treatment of the pre-emptive question in the open discourse. First, although allusionsre-emptive strategy have been carried in less authoritative sources in the past, only recently has tho concept of pre-emptivo action boon incorporated in the stated mission of the USSR armed forces.* Second, the strident confidence expressed by some military spokesmen prior0 in having ample warning of an Impending enemy attack has not appeared in recent military discourse. Rather, emphasis has been on vigilance and split-second reaction in the expectation that there will be little advance warning. The spokesmen give as the main reason for this the threat posed by American overseas bases. "Theof numerous military bases of imperialist states around the USSR and other countries of the socialist camp determines that the time for bringing out forces to Immediate combat preparedness must be measured not in days or even in hours, buteries of cases literally in minutes andMajor General N. Kiryaev, KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES,
American overseas basos, moreover, are given first priority among the prominently announced targetsoviot countor-strike. The whole system of bases ringing the Soviet camp, they boast, can rapidly be knocked out of commission. But the Soviets havourious reticence with rospoct to SAC and missile bases located within the United States. At the most, they speak of attacking "vory important targets" within tho United States orapability to destroy them by drawing on authoritative American statements bearing
*Thus inalinovsky said only that thearmed forces would "repel the attack of the enemy and deal himrushing, retaliatory
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on Soviet strategic attack forces.* More common in military discourse are references to strikes against such rear area targets as "industrial and vitalcommunicationspolitical-administrativenavalnd "everything that feeds war."
The fact that there is little if any specificof hitting long-range attack eloments located within the United States cannot be explained simplyoluctance toubject that impingestrike-first strategy, for Soviet spokesmen forthrightlv speakounterforcefirstrespect to American rocket and SAC bases overseas.
There are several possible explanations for Soviet roticonco on tho subject of. military targets. It could, for example,ilitary estimate. overseas bases, being mainly rocket bases, reprosent thothreat to tho Soviet camp; whereas the long-range attack forces based within the United States are still mainlya part of which are on air alert, and can be dealt with by existing Soviet air defense forces (whose role is heavily stressed ln the literature). econd possible explanation is that Soviet military planners lack confidence in their ability to strike at ICBM sites and SAC bases within the Unitedat least in goodexisting capabilities.hird possible consideration is that tho Sovietdesiring to give stability to mutual deterrence, find it in their Interest to maintain American confldonco in SAC's retaliatory capability to deterevel low enough to discourage an American surprise attack against the USSR.**
*"The strength of our rocket weapons is also acknowledged abroad. For oxaraplo, commander of US SAC General Thomas Power declared openly that under present conditions any target can be destroyod with an accuracy of up, even If thisisistanceohousand kilometers. Power draws the conclusion: 'In effect all the Soviets neod to put our atomic woapons out of commissionockets. All this in some thirty minutes.'" (Marshal Moskalenko, RED STAR,
method the Soviets have used in maintaining American confidence in Its ability to deter tho USSR is the practice of publicizing expectation of tho vast destruction that the USSR would suffer in the eventow war.
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What is most striking about Soviot statomonts on the problem of the initial stago of war is the uncertainty that underlies them. The fears of Soviet leaders regarding the effectsurprise attack carried out against tho USSR have already been mentioned. We also encountor evidence ofin the fact that some officers have voiced doubts over whethor strategic decisions taken by tho militarycan control events in the first phaseuture war.*
That such fears and uncertainties are in evidence undoubtedly has important implications for Soviet strategic planning. This has been made clear in allusions by topleadersre-emptive strategy. If nothange in policy, their statomonts may be arguing for one. For they seem to compel the practical doctrinal conclusion that the Soviet Union ought either to prepare to accept anuclear attack by the United States or to launch one itself.
harp controversy took place in the military-historical department of the General Staff, as reported on the pages of the MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, over theimportance of the decisions of the military high command on the one hand, and technique (armaments) on tho other, in forming the initial phaso of war. Some officers contended that the military high command can in peacetime predetermine tho character of the initial period of war; opponents of this viewpoint argued that the character of tho initial period of war is above all determined by methods andis, by factors Independent of the will of individual persons. Marshal Zakharov, who summed up the debate in an article In the1 issue of tho MILITARY HISTORICAL JOURNAL, this contention, leaving the questionumber of others unresolved. Ho was content to say that the character of armed struggle in tho Initial period of war is determined by "manyncluding plans and armament.
The Soviets do not, of course, spell out for us tho moaning of pre-emptive action. In Soviot thinking, tho
concept of pre-emption may not necessarilytrategy on which military planning is based. It may have no boarlng on tbe choosing of weapons in the USSR. It may simplyast-minute attempt to unload the country's strategicwoapons in an effort to blunt an impending enemy attack.
oncept of pre-emption, howevor, wouldan irresponsible attitude on the part of thinkers so committed as are the Soviets to the principle of total We believe it much more likely that their concept of pre-emption is indeed expressed in planning, is organic to their war planning. In this senso the concept not only means the launchingorestalling first blow (as opposed to an unprovoked first strike against an opponent); it alsotratogy that would dictate tlie assemblageilitary force that Is capable of delIvoring an effective forestalling blow, oven thoughlow would not absolutely dostroy the enemy's capabilitios.
As to current Soviet calculations of the effectsoviet first strike against tho United States, we can only guess in the dark. The military do not come to grips with this question directly in tho open discourse. At the most, one could point to indirect Indicators of Sovieton this matter, without drawing any firm conclusions. In electing, as they appear to do,re-emptive attack strategy, the military leaders imply the belief thatblunting of the enemy's attack forces could be achievodoviet first strike. This hypothesis is but-ressed by their expressed confidence in an ability to dostroy the whole system of American overseas bases, as well as by their statementsurprise attack could bo decisive. On the other hand, their statements bearing on strategic targeting In the first phase of war seem toack of confidence in an ability to destroy tbe long-range attack forces based within territorial United States. This would seem to suggest that, in their vlow, an important part of. long-range attack force would survive even under the most adverse conditionsoviet nuclear attack. lt seems obvious that the level of destruction would be higherre-omptivo blow thanetaliatory blow, so the inability to effect total destruction would nota pre-emptive strategy.
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III. DOCTRINE FOR WAR AFTER THE FIRST ATTACK
Tho Soviet military leadership, from all indications, is preparing the Soviet armed forces for future war on the guiding assumptions that it will Involve moreissile duel betwcon the major powers and will continueargo scale after the first nuclear blows have been struck. On tho same assumptions, the military leaders have sought to workody of theory on the character of the entire course of future warasis for Soviet war planning. The fact that they have not had complete success in thishas already boon noted in this study, as has theof groups of officers to tako traditionalist orpositions. In the sections that follow, we shall first outline the specific conceptions of how war will develop after tbe first attack, distinguishing, as we go, between points of agreement and controversy in the military Then we shall assemble evidence of probable Soviet strategic objectives for warhole and of methods of attaining them.
A. Characterizations of Future War 1. Duration of War
The questionuture war's durationontentious one in the Soviet military establishment. There is no hard and fast doctrine on this matter, although there once was. Uphe notion that future war would be very long and attritional was not disputod in the military literature.* In fact, as lateefense Ministry textbook, "In Aid to Officers Studying Marxist-Leninisthird world war as lasting longer than World War II. Butany views have been expressed on the subject. Some writers, principally military economists, continued to predictuture war would be lengthyof the fact that both coalitions possossed immonse human and material resources as wellarge territory, which could not be knocked out by nuclear blowshort time. (Major General Lagovsky, SOVIET V. Uzonyev, KOMMUNET OF THE ARMED FORCES, No. 6,
for upgrading the importance of surprise nav have
implied short war.
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On the other hand, others have mused over the possibility that war might be concluded with tho first nuclear broadsides. One source went so far as to acknowledge the feasibilitylitzkrieg in the future under the "rightut went on to discount it at least as aWestern strategy against the USSR with its vast territory and possibilities for dispersion of means of defense.*
Tho likelihooduture conflict will take the formlitzkrieg or single-stage war Isinority viewpoint in the Soviet military, however. Even the outspoken progressive experts on military science now tend to discount this notion. Colonel S. Kozlov, one of theof0 textbook on "Soviet Military Science" that entertains the possibilitylitzkrieg, 1 wroteabout unnamed Soviet officers who privately looklitzkrieg as the war of the future. (KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES,
Prevailing military opinion, avoiding both the extremes of blitzkrieg andengthy war ofar which will continue beyond the first stage but which will notlong and drawn out like World War II. spokesmen tend to agree that at leastinitial phase ofby definition, will end when one of tho sides attains its immediate strategicbe very short. Khrushchev's picture of tho initial phase of future war, drawn inad scheduled the delivery of the decisive strategic strikes "not only during the first days but during the first minutes of the war." Similarly even certain of the more conservative military typos (who, incidentally, expect much to be done In the initial phase, including the completion of troop mobilization and transformation of the economyar footing) say that the first stage will be counted in "hours or In days." (Colonels Kolgushkln and Bershadsky,JOURNAL, No. 8,
military science does not deny the blitzkrieg method of conducting war. It points out, however, that tho successful conductlitzkrieg requires an advantageous combination of economic, political and military (Defense Ministry textbook, "On Soviet Military)
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. noteworthy Is the fact that senior mili-
tary leaders, notably Marshals Malinovsky and Moskalenko, have of late conveyed the impression for the first time that thev expect not only the initial phase of war but the warhole to be short. They divulged this outlook in the course of dramatizing the swiftness with which strategic objectives could be attained with the use of ballistic missiles. Moskalenko in an article on Soviet rocket power in RED STAR ofxplained the new outlook in terms of tho revolution in weapons technology.
Until the appearance of rocket-nuclearthere were no means with the aid of which it would be possible to attain the decisive goalsar within brief periods of time and in any theater of military operations.
In the past the strategic goalsar were attained by means of consecutive or simultaneous solutions of tactical and operative tasks in theaters of military operations on land, and this was accompaniedonsiderable loss of time, effort, and means.
Today our armed forces dispose of powerful strategic rockets with nuclear charges which make it possible to attain thegoalsar within short periods of time.The rocket troops are capable of conducting operations of varying scope in any area of the globe, and they can exert an essential influence not only on the course but also on the outcomearhole.
And Malinovsky underwrote hispeech befored CPSU Congress in October
The use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons with unlimited possibilities of delivering them to any targetatter of minutes
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by means of rochets makes it possible in the shortest period to achieve deci-sive military results at any range and over immense territory.
2. Weapons of IVar
Khrushchev's pronouncement of0 that nuclear/rocket forces will play the main role in future war is now an unquestioned article of Soviet military doctrine. Unchallenged though lt may be, this canon is open toInterpretations as to its meaning for the ways in which war may be conducted after the first strategic strikes.
Soviet military spokesmen do not,ule, go so far as to say that future war will simplymissile duel or a "push-button war." (Khrushchev had implied that war would takeorm Innd againote to President Kennedy on disarmament While acknowledging the primacy of nuclear weapons, the military neverthelesslace for conventional types of forcesuture general war. They differ amonghowever, over the kind of role that conventional forces and weapons will play In it.
Progressive-minded individuals, on the one hand, minimize the importance of conventional weapons and similarities between methods of waging the future war and hose of the past. In their view, only nuclear/rocketcan fulfill strategic missions in modern warfare. (Marshal Yeromenko, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No.ven in tactical situations, they say, battles will beby blows dealt by nuclear weapons; and they picture battles as generally being fought with nuclear weapons. (Lt. Col. M. Popov, RED STAR,
Traditionalists, on tho other hand, tend to emphasize the Importance of conventional weapons. They raise the possibility that conventional weapons might evenrimary role in secondary theaters of operations, or in the main theaters at certain stages in the war. Typical of this viewpoint (its popularity is indeterminable from available evidence) is the following estimate by General of tho Army P. Kurochkin:
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A future war is unlikely to have identical forms of struggle in all theaters ofoperations. The most powerful weapons will obviously be concentrated in the chief theaters and directions. But in the other theaters and sectors of the struggle it is not excluded that military operations mny be conducted in the main with conventional Thus the battle itself In thesewill acquire forms which will bo in somo degree similar to thoso whichthe Second World War. (MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, No.)
Defense Minister Malinovsky himselfore balanced, open-minded view of the relative Importance of modern and conventional weapons in his statements on policy for Soviet force structure, as will be seon in discussion of Soviet strategy for theater warfare later in this study.
It should also be pointed out that Soviettakes into account the possible uso of chomlcal-bio-loglcal warfareuture general war. Attention has been drawn to the fact that advances in rocket techniques may radically increase the military effectiveness of chemical and bacteriological weapons "whose development in the West is proceeding intensively." (Major General N. Talensky, AFFAIRS, Curiously, discussion of CBW is limited to the use of such weapons by the West and defense against them by Soviet forces.
3. The Rolo of Man in War
The new emphasis on weaponry notwithstanding, military thought stresses the role that men will play ln modern warfare. Undorstandably, troop indoctrination in the USSR emphasizes this point in an effort to buoy up morale and toenso of purpose and importance to officers and men. There is, however,echnical military dimension to thisas well. Doctrine now categoricallyit had beforefuture war will demand the participation of "mass, multimillion armies." (Marshal Malinovsky,1 speech) Khrushchev had evidently tried to got the military to break with this old maxim in playing down the need for large armies In his0 presentation. His viewpoint found
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expression in articles by some military officers inhus, Major General G. Pokrovsky (in SOVIET, hailing the announced troop cut as consistent with the general trend of the history of warfare, arguedar of the future would be waged with .smaller land armies than in the past. Even Colonel I. Grudinin, who treated the troop cuteacetime measure, foresawcertain" increase in the size of the armed forces in case of war. (RED STAR,
Inowever, tho old maxim reappeared in tho military literature. ew war, General Krasilnikov wrote in RED STAR in November of that year, "mass,strong armies will participate."
Inhere wore stirrings among tbe military about the practicability of large-scale mobilization in wartime. ilitary economist seemed to question theof those who believed that massive military mobilization could bo realized after the shooting had started. Ho wrote:
The constant Increase of military action at tho rear of warring countries causes great losses among the civil population and cuts down on the number of reserves which can be mobilized. An increase in the strength of the armed forces of the warring coalitions is possible only under conditionsreat increase in the number of countries activoly participating in the armed conflict. (V. Uzonyev, KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, No.
By it had become clear that the question of the need for large armies in wartime (at least) was resolved for Soviet military doctrine. RED STAR1 carried what appeared toefinitive article on the subject, and the military literature has since not questionod the "mass, mlltlmillion armies" concept. The(adopted inhatountry's military potential dependent primarily on firepower rather thanof troops has been retained at the same time, however.
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4. The Scope of War
Another basic tenet of military doctrine is that future war will be global in scale and involve large coalitions of states in armed combat against one another.onsiderably greater number" of countries are expected to be drawnew war than took part in the last. (Lt. Gen. Krasilnikov, RED STAR, Europe, America and "other continents" will become "theaters of war."*
Military opinion envisages the conduct of theater warfare throughout the courseuturelong or short it may be. Theorists picture the wartrategic attack by "nuclear-tipped rockets,or combined strikes by those and other means." At the same time, they say, "several fronts would spring up intheaters of military operations" in which tho other types of service would go into action. (Col. P. Sidorov, KOMMUNIST OP THE ARMED FORCES,)
R. Grldasov, RED STAR, Major General N. Talensky may have bad Communist China in mind as well as the United States when he wrote, in an article in KOMMUNIST ofhat there cannotthird and winning partyuture war.
**Tho.authors of0 textbook "On Soviet Military Science" wero taken to task by Col. General N. Lomov (RED STAR, or "incorrectly" implying thathypothetical) short war, there would be no land, sea, and air battles, that tho war would simply consistissile exchange.
age from Khrushchev's book, thoy say that there will be literally "no borderline between the front and the rear area; the territory of each state that is involvod in the war willheater of military. Tevlev, RED With somethoy add that the war will bo waged on land, soa and in the air simultaneously and in many theaters of operation. (Major General . Semenov, "Short Outline of theof -Soviet Operational
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5. Decisive Character of War
Military doctrine also teaches that the warring sides will strive for total victory in war. Discussions of future war often mention the "decisive" political and military aims or goals to be pursued, and emphasize the severe conso-quences that will bofall the warringnot in equal measuro. uture war, according to Marshal Malinovsky,
will be,
with respect to its politicalecisive armed clash of the two opposing social systems. It should be quite clear to us that the sharp class nature ofar will predetermine tho extremeof the political and military goals of the combatantheof moans of mass destruction and annihilation will impart to war an un-precedentedly destructive nature. (PRAVDA)
Discussion of the consequences of war generally appear in political contexts and cannot readily be evaluated for the meaning it might havo for serious Soviet military It is noteworthy, howovor, that no Soviet source has indicated that the prospect of war is agreeable to Soviet military leaders; nor has the tenor of military literatureholeighly optimistic outlook with respect to the outcomeuture goneral war for the USSR. Military leaders, on the contrary, tend toloomy picture; in keeping with the mainstream of propaganda, they predictuclear war would entail great disasters for all participants, indeod for all mankind. Thus, Marshal Malinovsky wrote in PRAVDA onuturo war would do "irreparable damage to all countries." Spokesmen frequently assert that the USSR would vanquish the Imperialists and capitalism would meet its demise in tho event of war; but only infrequently do thoy speak in termslear-cut military victory. Thoy never directly admit the possibility of defeat of the USSR
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in war, although several public statements carried in the mass propaganda media during tho past year have come close to such an admission.* It should bo noted however, that the Soviet losses that have been explicitly conceded referar initiated by the West. The Soviet leaders' estimate of the losses that the West might be able to inflict on the USSR after being subjectedoviet first strike, of course, has not been discussed.
The statements acknowledging that tho USSR would suffor greatly in tho event of war obviously are publicized for propaganda effoct--to underline tho sincerity of the Soviet government in its striving toew war and to stabilize mutual deterrence. Tbe extent to which tbe statements reflect actual military estimates of anticipated levels of destruction cannot be determined. It can only be surmised from the general tenor of open militarythe fearsestern first strike, the appreciation ofweapons effects,together with the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the expressed fears on the consequences of war are quite genuine.
B. Alternative Strategies: Maximum or Limited pestruction
Soviet strategic objectives beyond the immediate strategic aims of the war are difficult to distinguish with
Malinovsky, ind Congress speech last October, expressed agreement with Kennedy's statement (as did Khrushchev in tbe previous month) that tho superpowers are "capable of destroying oach other." Although the Defense Minister went on to make tho customary boast that the USSR would destroy any aggressorew war, ho did not assert that tho USSR would survive it. The mass propaganda also came very close to admitting the possibilityoviet defeat in war when TASS, onuoted Togliatti as saying that "neither of the two sides can say that it has tbe slightest confidence that it will survive an armed conflict with Its opponent." RAVDA version of the Togliatti speech in which tbat statemont was made significantly omitted it, but carried another forceful statement of tho same tenor: "War must be averted at any price."
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certainty. The "full defeat" of the enemy Is desired, but the meaning of this term is not spelled out. It is not clear how close the Soviet forces must come to total annihilation of thearmed forces, his civilian population, and his overall war-makingaccomplish the "fullof the enemy.
The Soviot strategic attack effort, as explained in open sources, will bo diffused. Groupings of onomy forces in theaters of military operations and important targets in the enemy's rear area will both be "primary objectives" of strategic strikes. The destruction of the enemy's forces in the field Is seenajor prerequisite for victory. At least in traditionalist quarters, emphasis has been placed on the complete smashing of the enemy's armed forces. (Marshal Grechko, On the other hand, this principle no longer enjoys the overriding emphasis which was placed on it before0 doctrinal revision. Onco the guiding strategic concept, lt must now, under "progressive" influence, share primary importance with rear areain official (public) doctrine.
The present emphasis on rear-area bombardmentto be predicated on tbohat at the very least, the destruction of rear area civilian-military targets would bring victory more quickly than if the full weight of the Soviet attack were directed against groupings of armed forces in the field;hat under optimum conditions, heavy rear area attack might bring the swift capitulationumber of countries, thereby precluding the need for major engagements with enemy armed forces In the field and the complete destruction of those forces.
With regard to tho fight against enemy rear areas, open discourseariety of strategic designs, with propagandistlc aims. Which one or whichof the following strategiesart in Soviet war planning cannot be determined from the open sources alono.
(1) Maximum retaliatory damageoviet phrase) is ono likely alternative suggested by tho public Soviet statomonts.
a. In Wostorn Europe, certain countriesto Soviet nuclear strikes may, because of their small
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size, be "knocked out of the war" with the first salvos. "Whole countries will be turned into llfoloss desertswith ashes." (Malinovsky, These countries will be tho ones which. or NATOattack forces and therebyrave danger to the USSR.
b. Regarding the United States, the USSR will "wipe fron the face of tho earth any aggressor, wherever he may be" should he "try" to encroach upon the Soviet camp. (Marshal Malinovsky, PRAVDA, Up untilhe propaganda pictured only the NATO alliesoviet attackcountry-busting" scale. But in and again in the following two months, Khrushchev by implication directed his "country-busting" threats against tho United States as well.
(2) Limited destruction of dlfforont countries, on the other hand, can also be seentrategic objective underlying cortain statements made ovor the past two years.
European allies of themay not be designated for complete destruction; thorough destruction of tbe Western coalition maytrategic aim of war. The brunt of theattack might be directed againstnd its overseas bases, whoroas less drastic meansused to neutralize the European allies (Bhould theystrikes against the American bases on their soil). appears to be made ln the followinghave at our disposal the necessary means of combat not
only torushing blow against tho territory of the United States, but also to render harmless tbe aggrossor's allies and to crush. military bases scattered all over the world." (Khrushchev,)
for the United States, many threatsretaliatory blows bear the implication that thiswill suffer more limited destruction than itsand overseas bases because of its great size andpopulation and industry. It han never been said
by Soviet spokesmen about the United States, as it has about Western Europe, for example,pecified number ofweapons would knock out this country. The distinction is apparent in the following statement by Army General Ivanov,
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madeessage. veterans over Radio Moscow last September:
About ten Soviet nuclear bombs would boto wipe out countries like Britain, Vest Germany and Prance. Tbe United States would not escape either.
Tbo picture painted above of mlxodassumed toeliberate and coordinatedis designed to keep the West off balance as to where to expect the main direction of Soviet strategic attack. On tbe other hand, if lt is not the resultoordinated effort, tho picture could possibly reflect indecision or differences in view among tho Soviet military planners themselves over basic objectives and capabilities required to attain them. Indeed, it is difficult to know whether Soviot strategic planning, as revealed in the open sources, is purposefullyor merely confused.
It may shed some light on the problem to study tho contradictory nature of tho alternative strategies of maximum and limited destruction of enemy countries. First, if maximum destruction of NATO allies in Europeingle nuclear salvo were planned (logic tells us, as it probably hashe war in Europe would be short; there would be noof massivo land engagements betwoon Western and Soviet armies; and there would be no need to occupy enemy territory (which according to Malinovsky would bo reduced to "lifeless deserts and heaps of rubble"). Soviot doctrine, stipulating that the Immediate strategic aims of war can now be achievedery short time, is consonant withtrategic But doctrine callingmass, multi-million" army would appear to be anomalous forituation. Yet both points of doctrine are simultaneously espoused by the military leadership.
Soviet writers have offered Justificationsassive Soviet land army that tend, if soraowhat weakly, to reconcile itcountry-busting" strategy. The high attrition rate due to onomy nuclear strikes and the depth and breadth of operations (oven if conductod with small units) are given as reasons for needing "great reserves of command personnel and enormous contlngonts of rank and file troops." (Lt. Gon. Kraslluikov, RED STAR,
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Also, argument has boon advanced that great numbers of troops may be needed for defonsive operations on Soviet soil:
In addition to tho troops that will conductcombat operationsroatof troops will bo needod foranti-atomic and anti-chemical defense, to guard the communications, to liquidate tho consequences of the employment of means of mass destruction, to destroy airborne and navaltc. . Yevlev, RED
On the other hand, if only partial destruction of the NATO allies were planned, there would beowerful Soviot land army, and the belief that there would be intensive thoator warfare on ground, sea and air. In this event, large groupings of NATO forces would be expected to survive the initial nuclear exchange and there would be important, inhabited territory to be seized andby Soviet forces. Logic tells us, though it does not assure us, that the USSR would prefer to leave as much of Europo as possible intact in order to have benefits to reap in the event of victory.
Taking the problom of conflicting evidence ofstrategictep further in our discussion, we can draw some tentative conclusions about the strategic outlook of the Soviet military leadorship.
In his policy statements: Marshal Malinovsky has acknowledgedpossibilityhort initial period of war ifhort warhole; he has given strong hintscountry-busting" policy with respect to Western Europo, if not to tho United Statos as welle will wipe any agree-sor from the face of earth"). At the same time, ho has carved out an important rolo for the conventional arms of sorvice in p. future war, taking into account the possibility that war might last well boyond tho Initial nuclear exchange.
Clearly thisarkedly cautious if somewhat contradictory approach to tho problem. The Defense Minister is preparing Soviet forcesumber of eventualities. Ho Islexibility that would have been denied the Soviot armed forces had KhrusLchcv's strategic blueprint of
0 been translated without modification intopolicy. He would not gamble, as Khrushchev seemedto do, on relying almost completely on nuclear/missile weapons. In his view, nuclear/missile weapons might beto the task of deterring the enemy from going to war; but should war break out, other weapons and forces would be required to see it through to victory.
C. Strategic Planning for Theater Warfare
Soviet strategy has not exaggerated the importance of the newest weapons. The mass application of atomic weapons does not at all eliminate waging future war in the form of land, soa and air operations. Without these forms of armed forcos, and without their correct inter-coordination, it is Impossible to wage war successfully. The construction of the Soviet armed forces as well as their operational-tacticalis boing conducted in accordance with this precept." . Somenov, "Short Outline of the Development of Soviet Operational
Such is the credo of Soviet military science, the keystono of doctrine for tfaoator warfare.
The inter-coordination of nuclear/rocket andforces is contral to this credo. The theator war-faro missions assigned to the nuclear/rocket forces of the strategic command and to the other types of forces in tho USSR are at once different and complementary. In the Soviet view, the nuclear salvostrategic and tactical scale serve as an entree for follow-up operations by othor types of forces. Through its nuclear/rockets, accordingrominentview "the strategic command influences the subsequent operations of groups of armed forces, predetermining their successhole." actical scale, nuclear/rocket strikes solve the main tasks and the operations of other types of forcos realizo and improve on what was accomplished by the nucloar/missile attacks. (Col. S. Kozlov, KOMHUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES,
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Soviet military leaders foresee an essential If secondary role for Soviot ground troopsuture war. "It is only with the help of tho groundhey say "thatsuccesses galnod with the new means of warfare can be secured and expanded." (Marshal Yeremenko, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Untilhs ground troops played the loading role in Soviot strategic planning and wore regarded as the "main type" of araod forces. Now, however, the Strategic Rocket Forces, as the basic force for the employment of nuclear weapons, are officiallyas the "main type" of service. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, some of the more conservative military thinkers envision the ground troops as playing even the principal rolo in "secondary" theaters of operations.
According to authoritative Soviet statements, the ground troops havo themselves been transformeduclear/rocket force. Rocket units of "operational-tacticalith rangos up to "many hundredavo supplanted the artillery as tho "main fire striking force" of the ground troops. In an article In RED STARhief Marshal of Artillery Varentsov presented ano meansthe tasks of operational-tactical rocket units:
Dealing blows to targets situated in close proximity to our tanks and infantry,the most Important groupings of enemy means of nuclear attack, major control points of operational significance, important communication centers, andof atom-carrying aircraft that are located in tho deep operational rear.
At the samo time, military doctrine has stressed the limitations of even tho tactical nuclear/rockot weapons, warning that thoy alono cannot bring victory in combat. "It is not profitable to use atomic weapons against targets which aro very widely deployed andilitary loc-turor. "Some targets cannot be destroyed by nuclear weapons when one's forces arc In close proximity to those of tho onemy. Moreover,esult of highly developed engineer fortifications (inzhincrnoo oborudovanie mostnosti) much of
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the firepower of the enemy can remain intactegionto an atomicLt. Col. Abramovalk over RADIO VOLGA to Soviet forces ln Germany)
Reasoning thus, the military leadershipto equip the ground troops with conventional types of weapons. Marshal Malinovskyoint of this ln his speech befored CPSU Congress last October:
We are not relaxing attention to thetypes of weapons, in particular to artillery. Our motorized rifle division is considerably smaller ln number of personnel than It was at tho end of the last war, but Itsof rockethas Increased over fourfold. As regards tanks, there are more of them ln our modern motorized rifle and tank divisions than in the mechanized and tank corps of tho Great Patherland War, and in the corresponding divisions of any NATO country. /Tnuch attention is being paid to the airborne troops and military aviation transport.
Doctrine, it would seem, assigns the ground troops the task of destroying enemy troop concentrations not taken out by strategic missilo strikes. But it Is not clear %licther the doctrine envisions massive and extended land campaigns or only smaller, "mopplng-up" operations for the combined ground and supporting air teams. Estimates of tbe strength of onomy troop formations that might survive the blows of the strategic rockot forces are not glvon. Aof writers appear to be open-minded on this question, allowing for operations of both large, head-on engagements and small detachments.
Seizing the enemy's territory is implicit in tbe mission of the ground troops of following-up strategic strikes and consolidating victories, but is seldom mentioned. The subject was broached, howevor, 0 textbook on military science, which spoke of capturing tho "economic material bases" of the enemy, and included among the goalsilitary campaign ln future war the gaining ofcontrol ovor the enemy's torritory. (MaJ. Gen. M. V. Smirnov, otOn Soviet Military Science.")
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Khrushchev in0 had publicly the idea of occupation of an opponent's territory, breaking with the military doctrine which stipulated that "despite now weapons, troops occupying the opponent'swould determine the outcome of war." (SOVIET His motivation in doing so may not have been entirely political: he may not have boon able toterritorial occupation with his strategy of "country-busting." In his0 speech he Justified the Soviet troop cut not only on the grounds that firepower rather than numbers of troops was the chief indicatorountry'spotential, but also on the grounds that the Soviet strategy was toorce capable only of destroying au enemy, not of occupying his territory. ountry bent on aggrosslon, desiring to conquer another people, he said,arge army.
2. Naval Warfare
Tho Importance of the Soviet naval armuture war against the United States has recently beenin Soviet statements. As depicted in Soviet military discourse, the war will be carried to the Unitod Statos via nuclear strikes from rockets, submarines and possibly manned aircraft. No mention is made of the possibility ofground warfaro ln this country. Tho stratogy that is discussed for tbe second stage of war against the United States is to Inhibit forces and material based there from crossing tho ocean. Khrushchevoint of thisstrategy ln his address tod CPSU Congross last October. He stated that an enemy attacking thethe Unitedachieve supremacy of the seas in order to be successful. But this requirement could not be met by the United States, said Khrushchev, owing to the enormous capability of tho Soviet submarine fleet to interdict foreign shipping and to dony command of the seas to tho enemy. In stressing this point, he repeated the claim firsteek earlier in an IZVESTIA article on Soviet atomic submarines
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that the Soviet underwater fleet Is equipped with "target-seeking" rockets for use against moving targets.*
Soviot military writers have dealt with the question of dominance of the seas in the past but have not in recent years posed ltequirement for victory over the USSR. They have always regarded America's geographicalfrom its allieserious liability, however. Vasllevsky, for example, in an article in RED STAR on7 stressed the Soviet advantage of not having the American problem of vital communication lines over the sea with its allies.) And they have consequently regarded the increased vulnerability of surface vessels, owing to modern weapons developments,remendous advantage to the USSR.
Despite Khrushchev's indiscriminate dlsparago-ment of surface ships in the past, Soviet naval leaders spenk of important and varied roles for surface vessels ofclasses as well as submarinesuturo war. The atom-powered submarine equipped with nuclear rocket weapons is now regarded as tho "backbone" of tbe Soviet navy, and thearm is portrayed as its main striking force. But voices are heard cautioning against placing excessive emphasis on the submarine at the expense of other naval weapon systems. to Rear Admiral V. Prokofiev:
Soviot naval thought opposes the onesided exaggeration to an cxtromo of anyarm /of the navy7. Naval combat operations will develop over onormous ocean and coastal areas and will require the
Soviet submarine armament Is Kid to include long-rmafs ballistic rockets with nuclear warheads, self-homing rockets (winged rockets) for firing at various naval targets, and an assortment ofself-homing, andfor attacking surface ships and submarines. An atomicwith its rockets can destroyargo naval baseargo industrial centor,ormation ofcarriers." (IZVESTIA,
cooperation of all forces as well ascombat support for the main strikingsubmarines. Surface ships ln particular will have toarge number of tasks, vhich in contemporary warfare conditions have becomecomplex. (RED STAR,
The genoral missions of the Soviet navy,with rocket cruisers, atomic and conventional submarines, and cutters armed with rockets, have been citedumber of different Soviet sources. These are
to conduct battlestrong naval enemy, destroying its striking power;
to break ocean and sea lines of
to destroy ports, naval bases, and other installations on the shore;
to Influence the achievement of the general alms of the armed conflict; and
together with other arms, to defend the shore from enemy invasion from the sea and from strikes from the diroctlon of the sea.
Concern over. Polaris submarine hasong time been registered in Soviet military discourse. (Malinovsky boasted that tbe Polaris submarines will not escape destruction, ln an Army-Navy Day article ln PRAVDA of. Against these and other KATO submarines, the Soviets will deploy their naval air arm and killer Thus rocket-carrying naval aircraft, whioh were demonstrated for the first time at Tusblno ln1 are said to be capable of detecting at great distance andenemy ships of all types, "both on the surface and (Marshal Vershlnln, RED STAR,nother source has said that, uture war, underwaterwill be one of the basic methods of defending sea borders against the approach of enemy submarines: "The hew power and the new weapons open for the /Soviet/ atomic submarines great opportunitlea for the struggle against the enemyIZVESTIA,
3. Aviation and Air Defense
The Soviet air forces will also be assigned varied and important support missionsuture war. Air force leaders havo consistently declared that mannod aviation will play an important rolo irrespective of developments in rocket technology, even when Khrushchev and cortain military loaders voiced contrary viows. Now there appears tooncensus among tho party and military leadors on tho nood to develop manned aviation for offensive strategic andmissions as well as defensive missions. Tbe change in Khrushchev's view is striking:
"In equipping the armed forces with rockets and an atomic submarine fleet we do not discount the air force but continue to develop and improve it." (Speech delivered at22nd CPSU Congress,
"The military air force and /surface/ navy have lost their previouslmost tbe entire military air force is being replaced by rocket equipment. We have already sharply cut and it soums will continue to cut sharply and even discontinue, the manufacture of bombers and othor obsolete 0 speech.)
The new optimistic view of the usefulness of bomber aviationuture war seems to spring mainly from the new possibilities given it by rocket armament. Soviet officers describe air-to-ground rockets, which they now claim for the USSR air forces, as "bomber aircraft weapons" which permit the bombers not only to avoid entering the anti-air defense zone of the target but "to avoid approachingnd thoy ascribe to such rocket-oquipped bombers alowered vulnerability." (Col.. Ponomarev, RED STAR,
Bomber aviation is apparently slatod for aor support rolo in the fulfillment of stratogic as well as sub-strategic missionsuture war. According to Karshal Malinovsky, tho Soviet air force is capable of delivering nuclear strikes against an aggressor "jointly with the strategic rocket troops." (Speech oftd CPSU Congress) This capability, he says, dorives
from"now" Jot aircraft, includinghich carry rockets capable of destroying enemy installations "many, hundreds of kilometers from the spot where the rocket is launched." (PRAVDA,
As for air defense, other elements of the air forces, notably, fighter aviation, "working in cooperation with the anti-aircraft defense forces of theill strive to repulse air attacks, (Malinovsky,1 speech) Military doctrine provides thatuture war, "the crushing of the nuclear-rocket and rocket-carrying forces and the nuclear air force of the enemy will become one of the main /strategic/ tasks." (Lt. Gen. Krasilnikov, RED STAR, Accordingly, the air defense forcos must give timely warning of tho threatuclear attack and detect and destroy approaching enemy forces before the deadly payloads roach their targets. Thoro is no disputing theso basic imperatives in the military literature.
The time factor is ropoatedly underscored as bolng vital to tho success of the operation. Inasmuch as the outcome of battle will bo docided In "not only minutes but even fractions ofhe enemy must be "wiped out on the first attack or the first launchingocket." Biryuzov, RED STAR, Air forceare admonished that to permit oven one target to reach the objective can have "very unfortunatend that the NATO forces have powerful means of long-rango attack and will use radar interferencewide scale" to provent counteractions by Soviet forcos. (Marshal Savltsky. RED STAR,
Now, the Soviets say, tho anti-aircraft defense of the country is based primarily on the anti-aircraft rocket troops. But they already look forward to the time when aantimissile force will also protect the USSR. In evident anticipation of this capability. Marshal Malinovskypreviously announced that the USSR had solved tho problem of destroying mlssilos inclaims that the Soviet air defense forces "possess equipment and weaponsof destroying enemy air and siace methods of attack at great heights and distancos." (PRAVDA,
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projected roleissile defense system for the USSR is worth mentioning. For advanced weaponsnowoveted place in Soviet military thinking on the waginguture war as well as on the problem ofit. Frequently in the militarywell as in Khrushchev'sis drawn to the need for the USSR toeapons superiority over the probable enemy. The concept of superiority, in so far as it is revealed in the literature, is derived from an assessment of qualitative criteria as well as numerical comparisons. They say that "if ono sideore effective weapon, it is possible for that side (all other things being equal) to hold the upperhand over the enomy which possesses inferior weapons." (V. Uzenyev, KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED Reasoning thus, thoy emphasize scientific and technological capabilities as such, and are very much concerned with gaining lead time over the United States ln the development of weapons and counter-measures. "The Soviet Government is not limiting itself to those military means which the adversary alreadySSR Defense Ministry book, "for undoubtedly this would be insufficient. Any preempting of the adversary's potential in the creation of the newest means of combat not only givessuperiority in case of war, but also makes itfor the aggressive imperialist forces to unleashE. I. Rybkin, "War and Politics") And they warn, furthermore, that "slowing down in any of the links of the complex system of defense or ln the constructionroad scale oftechnology, can lead to the most difficult consequences for armies and countries." (General V. Kurasov, MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, No. If we mayonclusion from this brief discussion of the concept ofsuperiority, it is that the Soviet Union is notcommitted toubstantial lead in the quantities of modern weapons: it may relyonsiderable degree on technological (qualitative) advances in theof weapons for future war.
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IV. APPENDIX: THE STATUS OP SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE ON THE EVE OP WORLD WAR II
The searchynamic military doctrine which will facilitate accurate prognostications for the future war isalutary effect on Soviet military historiography. The trend toward greater objectivity is becoming moreas more and more participants in World War II are being encouraged to write memoires and tractsorthright and objective manner. Soviet military leaders who put much store by past experience insist that tho objective truth must bo found and stated in tho writing of military history in order that the proper lessons can be learnediable doctrine prepared for the contingencyuture war. Whether truths will be stated even If politically inconvenient, however, ro-malns to be seen.
In the process of rewriting military history, one of the central issues debatod has been tbe question of the status of Soviet military doctrine on the evo of World War II. ontentious quostion, it served the purposes of the various debaters who were intent on impressing others with the Importance ofully elaborated, up-to-dato theory of future war and the inevitable penalty to bo paid in tho absence ofheory. Because of tho relevance of this quostion to our study, and because of tbo insights theaffords us into the process of reassessing established doctrines in the USSR, we shall by wayostscript outline the principal arguments on the status of pre-war military doctrine that were published9
Inrior to tbe publication of tho latest official multi-volume history of World War II, Maj. Gen. I. Rukhle setharply-worded debate in the pages of the MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL, ree-wheeling criticism of both the pre-war military doctrine and tbe specificof cortaln Soviet military theoreticians. Most of the participants in the discussion In the JOURNAL materials were inclined to support Rukhle'seventually became the officialthere were some notable departures.
Tho following views on tho subject are presented inorder to give the flavor of the debate as lt unfolded on the pages of the MILITARY-HISTORICAL JOURNAL.
Inukhle's position was debated in the General Staff military section, and an account of the debato was carried in the0 issue Of the journal. ol. Nazarov recalled that pre-war military doctrine had considered tbe possibility of surprisehad not drawn the necessary conclusions:
he possibility ofarurprise attack and striving to deliver the first powerful blow was examined In tbe theory of military art between the first and second world wars. Howevor, neither ours, nor foreign military theory, foresaw all tho consequencesurprise blow, and neither worked out measures for Its prevention.
Col. Verzkhovsky, in the some discussion, was fully sympathetic with Rukhle's position:
Before World War II, this problem /the initial period of the war/ was not worked out indegree. Purhaps thisertain role in our failures in the first days of the war.
Lt. Gen. Skorobogatkln, on the other hand, attacked Rukhle for berating pre-war military doctrine. The same issuo of the JOURNAL reported him as saying at the meeting:
I cannot agroe with Rukhle's assertion on tho backwardness of Soviet military science before World War II. Soviet military science worked out, earlier than the German, not only the thoory of battles and operations In depth, but also organization of troops, as well as the practical decisions of this theory. We bad the first mechanized corps, we earliest of all began to apply air strikes and tothe use of tanks in large formations (soedlnenla). All these problems wereworked out by our military aclonco by
In tho Rod Army large scale maneuvers were conducted with tho participation oi mechanized corps. But later, the mechanized corps, in spite of the theory, were During the war we could notories of reasons realize our theory in the first period; later, however, it justified itself.
Rukhle's position won out, for the time being, and found its expression inf "Tho History of tbe Great Patriotic War of tho Soviet (Signed to the press. According to that authorative source, Sovietdoctrine was inadequately developed to meet the situation encountered in the early part of tho war. The followingrepresent the gist of the official position on thedoctrine:
Soviet strategy /on tho ovo of the war7 recognlzod the defenseecossary form of armed struggle but subordinated its role to the offensive. As regards tbe question of defense, our theory was not fully worked out. It considered defense as possible and necessary in separate directions, but not on the whole strategic front. Instrategyorced withdrawal possible, but only on separate sectors of the front andemporary phenomenon connected with the preparation of an offensive. The quostion of withdrawal of large forces from the threat of an encirclement had not been worked out.
The question of the counteroffensivearticular kind of strategic offensive bo-fore the great patriotic war was not posed despite the rich experience of the counter-offensive in tbe civil war.
A major shortcoming in the training of the high command cadres of the Red army on the eve of the war was the absenceanual on attack.
Tho whole organization of the defense of the state border proceeded from the factudden attack by tho enemy was..
The Issue was not yet resolved, however. Inssue of the months after theof the official history of theGen. Mernovissenting view. Like General Skorobogatkln, he defended the stature of tho pre-war doctrine:
We consider that Soviet militarystudied the new character of armednd had provided for the strategic deployment of armed forces in the event of enemy surprise attack as well as in the caseeclared war. For this purpose it was recommended that there be an army of defense in constantirst strategic echelon. These views were basodorrectat that time of tho nature of futuro wars as wars of long duration involving multi-million mass armies, with the deployment of subsequent strategic
The pendulum swung the other way in the following spring, howovor, when Lt. Gen.the1 issue of thetbe knuckles of Mernov for being anfor the pre-war military theorists:
Gen. Mernov in his article tries to deny tho mistakes committed in the pre-war period by certain of our military(Melikov, Bideman, Tsiffer) inof the initial period of war, inln respect to the organization of defense. These theoreticians, as Rukhle correctly observed, "mistakenly thought that the initial period of the war would involve operations of small armies'the right to be deployed."1 (pravo razvernut'sla) Thoy did not foresee the possibility of the application by the enemy
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of secret methods of mobilization andof armed forces with the objectiveurprise attack at once by the main forces and therefore considered that the initial period would be characterized by operations of small armies under defense which would be effected by the strategic deployment and actions of the main mass of armed forces. Not denying this position, General V. Mernov writes: "Maintenance in constant readinesstrong army of defense along thewould have facilitated the transition of the army of peacetimear footing under any circumstances." In our view, thisistaken point, since it was made without account of the situationespite the opinion of General Mernov, we also consider that the prewar theoreticians insufficiently studied tho now character of armed forces and in particular, the rapid and deep invasion by enemy armies.
Major Gen. Cherednichenko came to Rukhlete and Kolchigln't support in the same issue of the JOURNAL, once againthe shortcomings of the pre-war doctrine and the mistakes of tho strategists in the first days of the war:
Rukhle in his article, in our opinion, has correctly observed the mistakes of military theoreticians in the prewar years, including V. Melikov and R. Eideman, on questions of
the Initial period ofarmed
forces by the beginning of the war turned out not to have been (deployed) in anstrategic and operational way, battle-ready, or prepared to rebuff aattack by the ground and aviation forces of fascist Germany. All this had serious consequences on the course of the initial period ofvents at the beginning of the war would haveifferent character if our armed forcos had in good time been battle-ready and properly deployed; ifand artillery had immediately directed counter-strikes against the advance groups
of the fascist troops, their artillery and aviation; and if fronts and armies had at once developed active and organized combat operations to frustrate the aggressor's attack. There vere possibilities for this, but they were not utilized.
Our army, having suffered serious losses at tho start of the war, needed to retreat deop into tho country. Such operations cameurprise to the operational and strategic leadership as well as to the troops. Groatapid evaluation of thesituation, the posing of correct tasks to the fronts, aviation and fleets and the organization for fulfilling these tasks were required, under tho new conditions, of the strategic and operational leadership. in the first days of tho war, because of incorrect evaluation of tho situation, tho Soviet forces were givon unfulfillable tasks, and their position was furtherand made more difficult.
Finally, Marshal Zakharov, in an article concluding tho debate in the1 issue of the JOURNAL, alsotho official positionriof but sharp criticism of the pre-war doctrine:
It must be said that on the eve of the Groat Patriotic War, despite tho fact thathad already had experience insurprise attacks in the West, little attention was paid to the conduct of beginning operations in our military theory. Anbig omission from theory and practice asas such an important question asoperations under conditions in which the enemy takes tho initiative from the outset of tho war; /Tn short7 measures forurprise attack were not foreseen. Therefore, since tho situation at the start of the war was unforeseen by our side, the Soviot high command had to take hasty, partially improvised decisions, not responding quickly to thesituation.
Original document.
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