SNIE 58-4-62/THE CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION AND OUTLOOK IN LAOS

Created: 5/14/1962

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

THE CURRENT MILITARY SITUATIONOUTLOOK IN LAOS--

B1

Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organisations Af the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Nary, fhe Air Force.Th^ Joint Staff, and the Director of ihe National Security Agency.

? Concurred in by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD off . Concurring were thef Intelligence and. Research, ^Department of State: The Direct, i.

for, Defense Intelligence Agency; Ihe Assistant Chiefof'Shift for Intelligence, Department of the Arrny; Ihe Assistant Chief of Navalfepartment of thehe Assistant Chief nf Staff,AF; theor Intellujence, Joint Staff; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Repre seiitalive to thend the Assistant Director, Federal liureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being'outside of their jurisdiction.

CKNTRAI. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Ik2

SUBJECT: : THE CURRENT MILITARYAMD COTLCCK IH

LAOS

THE PROBLEM

To assess the military situation and outlook and to estimate Coranunist short-run intenticog in Laos.

THE ESTIMVTE

I. THE SITUATICfl

1. FoLlowing the rout of Bam Tha, Laotian Governaent Influence bas been virtually eliminated from all of north and northwestern Laos. Luang Prebang io still in government hands, its laut main avenue of supply, which ran free Thailand through Bon Houei Sal and dove the Mekong, has been interdicted eastward from Pak Beng. Communist units have been for some time In key positions about the city and could take it at

will. Many of the Laotian troops defeated at Han Tha have crossed the Mekong at Ban Rousl Sal aad are assembling In northern Thailand forbock to Laos. Among the eight Royal Laotian Governmentt Ham Tha were Phoumi's throe beet paratrooper unite. Thetroops will have to be regrouped, retrained, and largely re-equipped. Their morale has been chattered and their combat effectiveness is, at present, nil.

2. Tbe defeat at Nam Tha and the subsequent forced withdrawal into Thailand following the military reverses during January further undermine the morale of the Laotian Government forceshole. Extensive North Vietnamese troop participation and unfounded government claims of direct Chinese Communist military involvement have almost certainly contributed to tbe demorall tat ion of the Lao Amy. Events of the past weekthe ineffectiveness of the Laotian Army and emphasize its lack of motivation and will to resist. They underscore the continuing weakness of army leadership on all levels of command. The most effective element in fighting the Communists is the Meo guerrilla whose harassing efforts are pinning down ouvoral Coasnmist battalions in northeastern Laos. We believe that the Laotian Amy is not capable ofetermined enemy attack anywhere la the country-i/

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ERKM3KF AKL> ASTIOOVEIUwEhT QROUHD

(before Hoc Tha attack)

orth Vietnamese regulars KL ong Le (Souvanna Fhouea) KO ham Ouano (Souvorain Pnoums) PL atriot Lao

Northwastorn Loou

Horthtsuntorn Looa

Vientiane Area

South Central Laos

Gnat hern Laos

ns

os

naO)

nsL)

(it PL, '1 KL)

ns (It DRV,L)

(PL)

RV bns shown in south central Looa nay have shifted to southern Laos.)

In addition to tho units mentioned, the antlgovemraont forces hove numerous artillery or mortar support units and smaller infantry units which operate generally as The government also has severaleecraaissance battalion, as well as tho Meo irregulars operating behind the enemy lines In northeastern Laos.

3. Over the paot few months, the termination of US financial aid hasonsiderable psychological Impact on the Laotian Government leadership. It has also had an adverse effect on the urban economy. The Boun Oum government probably could limp along financiallyew months longer, nevertheless, thi3 US action and the US attitude since Ram Tha probably have convinced some Key Laotian elements of Idle US determination to withdraw support from Phoumi and to bringoalition government. Moreover, we believe that the course of recent events must lead to some diminishing of Phoucrirestige. Whereas his Intransigent attitude had gained considerable support among the more vocal elements of the Laotian Government during the earlier part of the year, his failure to rallyabroad, particularly in Thailand, and his recent military defeats, particularly the one at Ksm Tha, must result in considerable loss ofin his leadership. There is little chance that the present Laotian Government Is capable of mustering sufficient enthusiasm or strength to overcome it3 recent military and political reverses. Mo oppositionhas yet emerged, and Phoumi's control still appears to be intact. He will seek to salvage his position by pointing out that he was absent from Laos during the Kara Tha affair, that the rout was due to Chinese Communist and Worth Vietnamese military participation, and that the US haswithdrawn support from him and applied sanctions which havehis capability to act. Many Laotians will be disposed to accept

these explanations. On the other hand, dissatisfaction may reachoint that there may be an attempt within the government and/or army to decrease the influence of Phoumi and his followersove toovernment more willing to come to an agreement with the neutralist and Communist elements.

H. CCCMUKIST INTENTIONS

k. The Communist attack in the northalculated, well-planned move. It almost certainly was concurred in by the three Communist powers concernedHanoi, Peiping, and Moscow. In reaching their decision to mount the attack the Communist powers almost certainly considered that the risk of US intervention in Laos had lessened significantly and that they could increase tbe lovel of military operations in pursuing their They probably were fully confident that the military capabilities of tho Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces In Laos were superior to those of the Laotian Government forces. They had probably become impatient with the leek of progress toward the establishmentoalition Furthermore, they are probably concerned over the Implications of the sharply Increased role of the US in South Vietnam.

5- We believe that the attack probably was designed toocal tactical opportunity in northwest Laos. The Communists

probably calculated that the defeat of the Ran Tho garrison and the lose of the town would contribute to the demoralization of the Laotian Army and RLG. Moreover, Nam Tho le strategically critical for the control of north and western Laos. In addition, the Communists, particularly the Chinese, probably considered Nam Tha in Laotian Government hands as an impediment to tho expansion of their influence in Phong Saly and among the hill peoples of northwestern Laos end northern Thailand.

6. It is possible tbat the Kaa Tha attack nay indicate that the Communist side has lost interestegotiated settlement and written off the ideaoalition government under Souvanna Phouma in favore factoampaign of gradual military conquest, or an all-cut offensive. Peiping and Hanoi have been somewhat less willing than Moscow to Bettleoalition government. Moreover, in the light of the increased US commitment in South Vietnam, Moscow may have becomethat more aggressive Communist military action in Laos was However, we continue to believe that the Nam Tha attack and the pursuit of the fleeing Laotian Army troops did not mark the beginning of an Immediate military drive to seize all of Laos. Nor do we bellove tbat the Communist side would, in terms of the present line-up of forces, be willing to settlee facto partition.

tbe Communist view, tho attack on Ham Tha probably didfurther negotiationsolitical settlementotential leaderoalition government. Theythat Souvanna wa3 not in Loos; he publicly "disapproved" ofand his troops did not participate. Indeed, the Ccmmunlutaeutimatedictory at Ham Tha would enhance the possibilities

of .'onewed necotiations snd, in addition, improve their bargaining position.

Although the rout of the government forces at Horn Tha andmsy have been more sweeping than the Communists expected, their victory will very soon be reflected In their military and political With respect to the resumption of negotiations and the terms for agreement, the Communists will probably leave the initiative to the other side andtiffer attitude. In the absence of effective military response to the Ran Tha action, which we believe is oeyond tho capabilities of the Laotian Government forces, or of significant progress toward agovernment, there will be an increasing likelihood that the Communists will undertake offensive operations oa the scale of Nun Tha elsewhere in Laos.

The Communist forces will probably follow up their capture of Nam The by clearing the entire area of north and northeast Loos offorces and consolidating their control over the area. The Communist

forces, perhaps with the Kong Le troops ploying -one role, aay further tighten their circle oround the lightly-held royal capital, Luang Frobong, increasing the pressure on the King who hoa, thus for, supported Phoumi. It is possible that Communist forces may cross the Mekong west of Luang Prabang and occupy 3oyaboury province which lies between the Mekong and the Thi.i. border. ove would sharply ralso the level of Thai concern. Troop movements and attacks co outposts recently reported In south Looo suggest that Communist forces may soon seize Sorovane and Attopeu to.secure the overland route between Worth and 3outh Vietnam. Theso major outposts are already virtually surrounded ond neither would beo hold out long under attack. We still do not believe, however, that the Communists will seiee the major towns along tbe Mekong remaining in Laotian Government bands, ot least until they have had time to assess tho political and military effects in Laos of the recent mores end any US reaction.

Original document.

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