AI'l-Cf-iVEy FOB HLLLASL
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Chinese Communist Advanced Weapons Capabilities
SUwr.Wwl by Iha DIRECTOR Of CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CtMCCTtd In by lb* UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD Ai2
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Wowing inlelUgenze organizations potlklpaltd in Ihtl Ihii ail'mcrfei
Tha Control iMeJItoencs Agancy ond ihe intolUgcme ifooniiotlont ol ihao* Siena,rray, iba Novy. ihe AWhe Join! Stall. WCcodKSA.
Coneviring:
Diraeror of inreliigerxb aad lataarch,ol Slate Oiieoot, Detente ViieWganco Agency
aiiivonl Chief ol SMff "o* Inlalllgance. Deprartmenl of iho Army Auiitonf Chief of Ho'ol OrtatoilomepailaieN of the Novy Atatatani Chief of Scoff, hMallioaate, USAF Diretror for IrireUigente. Joini imtt Tka Oiracier.njy Coa-inis.af tie NoJonoJ Jeo-nr, Aoaacy
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Tha Aurtiooi OOiedot, Federal Biiraow of Ifireilloorllon, ih* iub|atl being ootUda of hit lurltdkllon.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Pact
THE
I. CHINESE COMMUNIST
IX EVIDENCE ON ADVANCED WEAPONS PROGRAMS .
Mlttjfe Tcsl Range
BEARING ON CHINESE COMMUNISTPRODUCTION. AND DEPLOYMENT
Soviet
Chineae Communist Scientific
Missile
Aeronautical
Nuclear
Ecoiionilc
Basic Industrial
Operations. Maintenance, and
AND DEPLOYMENT OF
Naral
Air Defense
Alr-to-Surface
Space
Advanced Aircraft Delivery
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chinese communist advanced weapons capabilities
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the capabilities of Communist China wllh respect to tho rJevetoprnent and production of guklodand nuclear weapons over the next few years,
FOfiEWOBD
In analyzing the evidence on Chinese programs forweapons, we have erfcounteretl numemus Important gaps and apparent inconsistencies. Tbe evidence available to us clearly proves the existence of programs in the missile and nuclear fields, but It ts insufficient to permit us tothese programs In the fashion which Is possible for various comparable Soviet programs Similarly, while we hare been able to make some judgments about Chineseand the Ume periods during which furtherare likely, we cannot reach firm conclusions on these matters, or predict the year in which deployment of aweapons system will probably begin.
In these circumstances, we have considered it useful to present in thisairly full picture, not only of the evidence and the major problems which It leaves unresolved, but also of the basic scientific and economic resourcesto the Chinese Communists for advanced weaponsWe have sought In this way toase of information lo which, in succeeding estimates on thesewe can subsequently apply new Information andanalysis. We expect tbat, as these Chinese programs
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proceed, such Information and analysis will permit uslo refine the broad approximations andre-senled in this estimate.
CONaUSKONS
A program to develop nuclear weapons haseen under way in Commurast China since thes.uided missile program since late in the decade. We believe that In both these programs, the Chinese are aiming at independent capabilities.
Prom tho first, however, Chinese progress in both fields has depended heavily upon Soviet assistance. Ourknowledge of the kind and amount of this assistanceajor source of uncertainty in our estimate. We believe, however, that Soviet aid in these fields was providedore deliber. to pace than other types of military assistance.lechnical assistance was substantially reduced anddiscontinued abouty that time, Chinese nuclear and missile programs were probably sufficientlyso thatomplete halt in aid would not have necessitated their abandonment)
China's progress since has rested primarily on native resources, which are extremely limited. Significantumber of research areas basic to advanced weapons development. Efforts in the missile field have up to thoprobably been limited largely to copying Soviet missiles. While the size of the missile test center at Shuang-cheng-tauery large program and the range is operational, the evidence suggests that this program has been retarded,)
espite the priori lies accorded to heavy industrial and armament plants, we believe that any attempt to mass-produce advanced weapons would be difficult for China There is good evidence that the general retrenchment1 affected the military as well as the civil economy, although it is possible that Chinese Communist advanced weapons programs have not been adversely affected. No Chinese missile production facility has been identified, and we doubt
that any substantial missile production Is under way. We believe that China has no present operational capabilities with missiles, aside from limited deployment of surface-to-air and possibly air-to-air missiles, all procured from the USSR )
We have evidence to indicate that the Chinesehave mined andignificant amount of uranium ore and that, with Soviet help, they werea plant for recovery of uraniumhis strongly indicates an intent to produce fissionable materials, but we have no evidence of such production In Communist China. Assuming an accelerated and highly successful program for the production of plutoniumhe Chinesecould detonate an all-plutoniura device inowever, in the light of all the evidence, it is unlikely that the Chinese will meetchedule. We believe that the first Chinese test would probably be delayederhaps by as much as several years.'1)
ear after exploding their first device, the Chinese Communists could probablyew fairly crude fission weapons. Another two years or more would be
1 For ifie position ol tba Assistant Chief of Ksnl Operation!cpailrr.enl of the Nnvy, see hii footnote to
'Tfte Assistant Chttf of staff. Intelligence, USAP. agree* that tha Chineae Corcmunkts havaery high priority to tha development of nuclear weapons iparagraph UI; and that they probably regard an ad> vanced weapons capabilityolitical and military necessity If they are to achieve the IntetnaHonal status ttaty soak. H4 alsoin Uut lodgment that no drastic cutback In Chinese efforts to develop prow type nuclear weapons has occurred, aad that sufficient economic and scientific resjurees are available to tbe Chinese Communists toew, very high priority projects, Ha bellares tha large-scale withdrawal of Soviet technical aid In mld-lMO undoubtedly haathe progress of the Chineae Coramunlrta weapooa program In certain areas. Etevertheleas, ho constdero It likely that sufficient technical and Industrial resources ore available and are being tunneled Into the Chineae Communist atomic energy programufficient priority to permit them lo detonate an all-plutonium implosion nuclear devicef tho Chineae detonate their first device In tha next year or so, it would be within their capabilities to develop anohermonuclear device before the end of the decade.evice probably would be extremely hasvy. and would representoken TH capability. Evennited Th* capability would go far to establish Chinareat power and would have profound psychological Impact, particularly in Asm.
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lo develop fission weapons for missile warheads. If the first teat should occur in the next year or so. we estimate that toward the last part of the decade the Chinesecouldariety of fission weapons to support many of their military requirements, but only in limited numbers.
We believe that the Chinese would at some point in their program endeavor to, but we have .evidence5 production at present latest evidence indicatesacility at Lanchuu suspected ofaseous diffusion plant has not been completed. Ti this plant is in fact intended toaseous diffusion facility, it probably could not produce weaponhe Chlnase could probably test anrdeviceear after the activation of afacility.
Within the next few years, the Chinese could begin to deploy short-range (upurface-to-surfacewith nonnuclear warheads. Deployment of medium-range missiles almost certainly is keyed to the availability of nuclear warheads; such plans probably look to the second half of the decade. In the absence of Soviet aid, thewill probably not undertake to produce surface-to-air missile systems, at least until thes.
In more advancedmissile systems, IRBMs, ICBMs, antimissile systems, and thermonuclearis not likely to achieve independentduring. '
t Chlet Ol Staff, InUnigence. OSAF. bellow* that lo lea of the accuracyystem cost, tne araUabUltj ot UcUoal air farcoa and other oonaldaraUoni, deploymentun. surface to-surface mls-alles try theommoniaU will almcet certainty be dependent upon tba availability of rvjcJrir warhead*hile ha agree* ihat thetUUn Um next tew years could bearln to deploy inort-rang* aurtaor-loaurtace mladla* with norr.aener narheatU, be ooca not agree that tbey ateto dontil nuclear warhead* are available.
'For Use new of the Asatitant Cruet of staff.Af. cegaic-Inf Cblnrao Communist thertnonuflear weapons capabilities, ace his loot-
nolo to paragraph 5.
DISCUSSION
CHINESE COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES
The Chinese Communis! leaders arelo establish Chinaajor world power andeader of the Communist Bloc ol at least coequal status with the Soviet Union. They regard the far East as China's particular preserve and are determined to be oomlcant In that area. In general, Pelping would probably prefer to achieve Itsby political and economic forma oi struggle, rather than by direct employment of Chinese frjrors. However, Communist China has oo compunctions about openly using its military forces to extend itswhen It can do soie or no risk.
Pelping calculates that the achievement of even limited capabilities with advanced weapons would go far to establish Chinareat power and wouldrofound psychological Impact, particularly in theof Asia, Moreover, In areas whereforces confront thoseby the West, the Chinese Communist leaders almost certainly consider intervention by one side or the other as an ever-present possibility. They probably reason thatof advanced weaponi would support more aggressive Chineae policies in these areas and would tend to deter strong Western responses. Thus, they probably regard an adninced weapons capability both asilitary necessity if they are to achieve the international status they seek.
II. EVIDENCE ON ADVANCED WEAPONS PROGRAMS
Chinese Communist drive toa nuclear capability apparentlytheir efforts In the guided missileseveral yeara. Since tho early IBM's,China liasery highto the development and pioduction ofweapons. There is no Arm evidence that the Chinese Communists haveto develop or produce bomber aircraft. We believe that Chinesearge-scale program forof guided missile capabilities probably dates from the.
Missile Test Ro-ge Actrvihes
Recent photography has confirmed the existenceuided missile test center in northwest China; Its location In this area had been indicatedonsiderable body of evidence accumulated over the past two or three years- The evidence indicates that construction of range faculties could7 and almost certainly was well under way In 1BS8.
The rangehcad Is located about. northeast of 8huang-cheng-tiuail spur off the Unimchl-Lanchou rail line. Itarge, instrumented area, dispersedmile stretch ot the Btttnurface-to-surface missile (SSM) launchurface-to-air missile (SAU) launcharge main support baacmaller support base servicing the SSM and SAMarge SSM and SAM assembly area, two revetted storage areas, and several smaller housing andareas. About. southwest of the main support basearge new airfield0 foot concrete runway. Near theare two large communication centers. (See Figures following page 7)
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havei occurred, probably within "recent past.
M three 3BM launch complexes have been axblttarlly designatedndomplex "A" appears to Be completed and operational. This complex contains two large concrete pads suitable for Bring ballisticserved by paved loop-accessontrol bunker,rive-through check-out buiidlrig. [
The two pads under corK at launch complex "B" stronglythose at complexxcavation for tbe pads baa been completed, butappears to bare been suspended. Launch camples "C" has one padrive-through building. ConstmeUon work appears to be nearly complete, and the launch pad could have been used. Howerer, the operaUonal status ot this complex it undetermined
he ranges of Ihe missile systemi to be tested from these facilities cannot befrom tbe photography. The launch sites are oriented towards the west, and therange Irjtru mentation is also in thai direction Tbe desrrl terrain to ihe west would allow the firing of surfaje-toeurface miul.es to ranges of up. within Chinese territory. The pads, associatedand support areas In launch"A" closely resemble Sovieties at KapoaUn Yar used, and probablyoo tun ballistic missiles. Launch"C" beats some resernbiance to other Soviet launching facilities athe type of missile associated with the Soviet complex cannot be ascertsined.
IT. The surface-lo-alr missile launch area resemblesaunch faciUUes at ITapusUa Yar, although the twohuang-cheng'tiu are more widely separated and the Instrumented area ts larger. Construction work boa been completed on the two sites, but only one Is equipped with radar and launchers, One ot the launchers has been fully revetted, and partial revetments have been providedecond. [
support ractntlcs,on model, appeart appeais that Shuang-cheng-tsuwas ortglnaUly Intended to pros alesupport for the missile range, fighter pro-tee Hon. and possibly to conduct air-to-surfac* missiles (ASM) and air-to-air missiles (AAM) programs.
| The airfield apparently was designed ioarge number of aircraft, including the heaviest types, but the limited fuel storage facilities identified do not appear commensurateacility of this size. Possible loading hardatands andbuildings could be intended to serve an ASM
"possible that these fadUties relate to AAM training
he she ot tho missile rangeheud at Shuang-cheng-lzuery largeThe facilities available at the test center areoonsiderable physical capability to carry out exler.sj .eresearch and development programs and some troop training. Housing appearsfor at0 people. 1
But. some of the com-
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(acUIUes do not appear to have been used for firings.
logistic facilities also
characterize the Shuang-cheng-tsu airfield. These facts suggest that what wasarge, ambitious program for test firing SSMs, SAMs, and possibly AS Ms and AAMs has been cut back.
eliable evidence indicates that theagreed toariety of missiles to the Chinese Communists Including, wesurface-to-surface, surface-to-air, air-to-8urfa.ee, and air-to-airvidence on activity at the Shuang-cheng-tiu range,that firings of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles have occurred. The ranges to which missiles have been fired cannot be established with confidence, but our evidence suggests that filings have been conducted to ranges of approximately, andun. Although there ts no direct evidence we believe that firings of surface-to-air missiles have also occurred.
'For estimated characteristics ot Soviet missiles, see Table,
There are no Indications that air-to-surface or air-to-air missiles have been tested.
vidence on the timing and extent of range activity Is inconclusive, f
available evidence, together with our estimate of the time required for construction and checkout of range facilities, leads us to believe that test firing of missiles on the rangebegan In9 orevidence provides no basis forfiring rates.
he Soviets probably provided technical assistance at least throughnd the early firings certainly Involved missiles of Soviet manufacture. We believe that the range continues to be operational. Trieto date has probably been primarily for the purpose of range orientation, practice firing of Soviet missiles, and possibly testof Chinese copies. Some concurrenttraining, at least with surface-to-air missiles, may also have occurred.
ACTORS BEARING ON CHINESE COMMUNIST DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION. AMD OtPLOY/AENT OF ADVANCED WEAPONS
A majotbt pact cf Chinese advanced weapons psograms la tbe kind and amount of assistance provided by tb* USSR This factor is alao the ton re* of considerable uncertainty In ourince we have Utile direct evidence on Soviet assistance in the fields of nuclear and missile weapons, and must rely primarily upon informationother programs and upon deduction from our knowledge of political relationstho two countries.
We believe that ththileaa much Soviet assistance as possible, at the same Urns have aimed at an Independent capability In the field* of guided missiles and nuclear weapons They have tn the past, even while en Joying Soviet help, sought to develop native capabilities lor the proioctlco of aircraft, submarines, and electronicUntil mld-lSSO. Soviet aidigh levelumber of military fields. We believe, however, lhat In theand possibly tht rniaalle field thla akt was providedore deliberate pace.
The withdrawal of Soviet ladraldans and scientist* from China in mld-lWO had adverse effects upon Chineae programs toJet fighters, dea troy era, and submarines. There Is some evidence, although it is less conclusive, that Chinese nuclear weapons and missile program* ware lUnllarly affected, and this, ploa tht serious deterioration of re-laUoru between Moscow and Pelping since that time, leads us to estimate that Soviet aid in tbeae fields was alao iharpjy cut back. However, we believe that tbt nuclear and mrs-sUe devrlopcnrnl programs were sufficiently advanced thatomplete halt in Soviel assistance would have caused delays rather lhan their abandonment
he present state of Slno-SovwtIndicates that there Is little immediate prospecttlum to former levels olassistance. Evenonger period of two or three years, we doubt that the USSH would significantly Increase Its assistancePelping bowed to Moscow's demands for hegemony over the Communist movement or Moscow luelf accepted tht necessity oftht Blocew basil all owing for Chinese coteadershtp. Both theseappeal unlikely.
e merefore believe that, while tbtmay (tin bt extending limited assistance and may continue to Oo so. China's future progress in advanced weapons will beprimarily by native abilities Inand further developing the in forma Hen and facilities already received from the USSR. This belief hi supportedecent public statement by Foreign Minister Chen Yi. Inehineae Communist audience that "by relying mainly on our jwn efforts. In addition lo International aid, aden-tlflc and technical problems in China'sconstruction and national defense can be solved."
Chinese Commonittie Resources
ince lu Inception, tha Chineseregime hasIhe paramount Importance of placing science and tfxhraciBaj at the service of production. Tht emphasis on production appears not only tn industrial research and development facilities, but also tn the Academy of SOencea and In educational centers. Moreover, this philosophy has been imposedorce of scientific and technical manpower which la groaily inadequate.ery few well-trained and experienced scientists, probably, arc available for research tn all fields, of these, probablyeceived training on the doctorate level In the Weal. Anlevel graduates have returned from
training In the USBR In the last few years, but this group has yet lo gain significantexperience The total number ofand teehnlcsant employed by the Chineae Academy, research facilities, and educational frcrtltuUons is probably onlyhe comparable figure for Japan It; for the.
Comparatively little fundamentalbaa been undertaken beeaaae of the policy of the regime and tbe shortage of traded personnel. Instead, the emphasis has been placed on engineering efforts, almost all of which have been concerned with adapting imported devices, equipment, and techniques to the manufacturing facilities of China. Significant gaps are believed to exist tnareas basic to advanced weaponssuch as physics, chemistry,computer design, electronics, andaerodynamics
SO. Until Sonet adanUfic and technical aid was cut back. Communist China bad been making progressell-co need red but unrealisticyear plan to raise Itssclontlfic lever. Eleven broadMelds considered vital to the rapid aUatnroent of economic and mililary goals were emphasized. Including electronics, atonic energy, Jet propulsion, automation, and precision Instruments, alley systems and metallurgical processes, and heavy organic chemical synthesis. Although the original goals now appear unattainable, we believe that progreu toward them will continue,in areas such aa atomic energy and eleo-tronlcaimited degree ofas already been reached.
he shortage of trained scientific and technical manpower probably cannot be sfg-nlncanily amelioratedumber of years Tbt most recent additions of competenthave been trained in tbe USSRbeginning7 the numbers of new Chinese students entering the USSR sharply diminished, and we believe that few if any were admitted In tht fallhinese students, mostly graduates, who have been permitted to remain in tht USSR,will complete their courses in the next two years or so. Within about four to six years, China can be producing, in significant numbers, men with good overall technical training, but an additional period of years will be required for this group toackground of practical experience
Missile Research
he resources available to Communist China for missile research are extremelyScientific competence In mIssue design is restrictedmall group, trained tn the US and other Western countries, who are concentrated for tbe moat part al theof Mechanics in Peiping.he Institute hat been headed by Dr. Chien Hsueh-sen, whoeading role tn the USprogram prior0 and was considered one of tht world's leading aerodynarnlcists. However, there Is evidence that tht lack of competent Juniors, the pressure ofduties, the demands of ideological training, and the lack of first rate scientific facilities have combined to prevent theof significant research in the held of guided missiles.
onsidering these severe limitations, we do not believe tbat the Chineae have aa yet asajkajjktjajor program In original missile design. Instead, efforts in the missile field have probably been limited for the most part to copying Soviet missiles. Tho early developmentative Chinese capability to design, develop, andophisticated missile system would have Involved Soviet assistanceuch larger scale thanbelie re has been provided thus far. It would havearge-scale program ofand exchange In nusiie-associated aspectsarge number of scientific disciplines.
There is no evidence ofarge program. However, tbe Chinese probably haverelatively modest research andprogramselective basis.
Aeronaurkol Research
t the present time, the Chineseeffort in aeronautical research andla In its infancy. The program has been directed primarily towara training the labor forces and tbe production engineersto build an aircraft Industry in tbe shortest possible time. There Is on acute shortage ot well-trained aeronauticaland aeronautical research facilities arc almostmall aeionauUcaleffort is under way at the Institute of Mechanics. The Pelping Aeronauticalfounded2 orprimarily on the practical training of students ia aeronautical engineering andengine design, andew students are retained for advanced theoretical study. We believe that the Chinese aircraft industry will be heavily dependent on foreign research fbr many more years to come, and that it is unlikely to produce within the foreseeable future any significant military aircraft with airframes and engines of native design.
Nocteor Technology'
hina's efforts in the held of atomic energy and the extent of Soviet assistance through aboutave been described In detail0he present estimate takes into consideration theof Soviet assistance, recent Chinese economic reverses, and new information. Its
the views of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Iniclbfcnce,tgardlns Chinese Commanlst nuclear weapom capabilities, are hit footnote lo paragraph S, pat* 3,
'MB lM-arj, Th* Chinas*a to-eccm&erIs to esses* the probable timing of the Chinese Communist achievement ofmajor objectives. Including the eonttruc-Uon of uranium metal plants, produetkmand related separation facilities,diffusion plants, and the fabrication of nuclear devices.
s has been previously estimated, wethe Chinese have mined andsufficient uranium ore to supply the needs of their atomic energy program.evidence indicate* that tb*tth Soviet help, warelant for re-covcrj of natural uranium metal prior to tha withdrawal of Sonet technician* inssuming that construction was well along at tbat Ume, tbe plant could nave beenby the end0 and production of uranium metal could have started early
Production of uranium metaltrong indication of intent to produceand wc estimate thai plutonium will be the first material available for weaponWe have no evidence of Chinese constructionlutonium productionRecent photographic coverage of certain suspect area* produced negativehe locationroduction reactor outside the area of coverageranium metal production rale ofons peron ourof earlyon reactor load could have been produced by aboutuch an amount would be sufficientingle reactor with an Initial power level ofW. Pull-power reactor operation could have been achieved carryufficient plutoniumingle weapons (eat couldear later.
This schedule assume* that theof the reactor and chemicalplant has been In phase wllh that of the uranium metal plant and lhat no major dllTi-
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cultle* are encountered at any stag* in Ihe procesa Wilh the further assumption that very Utile additional tune would be required for device fabrication, the Chinese could test an all-plutonium device early'we believe It unlikely that the Chinese will meet the schedule implied by theseIf the foregoing series ofproves Invalid, the first CRInosc nuclear test would De considerably delayed, perhaps by as much as several years
ear after exploding their first device, the Chinese Communistsew fairly crude fissiondeliverable by medium bombersat least two years and probably more would be required for the Chinese Communists lo develop more advanced fission weaponsfor delivery by missiles. Considerable nuclear testing would be Involved In thisThus, If the first test shouldtn the next year or so. we estimate that toward the last part of the decade. Ihe Chinese Communists couldariety of fission weapons to support many of their military requirements, but only in limited numbera
e believe the Chinese would at some point In their program endeavor to produceor use tn their weaponsAerial pholcgraphy of8oot building in Lanctiun which had some of the eharactarieticeoviet gaseous diffusion plant, although no provision for power supply was evident. It
Aauitant Chief of Naral OperaUona llntaui-leneil. Department of the Navy, believes thai the rrameworti of oaauropUona on which this time ached-ale Itogical In Ihe abstract Cut not jet tu poor tad by basic evidence auSlcWnt lo lead It esUsuUvr validity. In the absence of whai be eoruasers to be any erioroce periaintni to orre ef Um production of assaonable aularkak in Cortsnunssi Chin* sod tc tbe hgb: of tha rataitvety rlrraenury atale af known noclear res*ercb facla-bae. A* MUenaeliable aaUmaie of th* Chi aeac Cotnmuniat pratrain In US*of nueiaar napon* cannot yet be mad*.
apparent thataseous diffusion process were Involved the Chinese would have toecond building lo obtain weapon-gradevernight photography In3 gava no further indication of pro vis ion for an electric power supply or of preparation for constructionecond building. This same photography indicates arrested development at the nearby hydro electric power station which use Chinese had hoped to put In orjeraUonhus, It Indeed the Lanchou site were toaseous diffusion plant, tha Chinese probably could not produce weapon gradehere5 even if conatructlon of another building were started now. The Chinese Communists could teat anrdevice withinear after the activationroduction facility. We have no evidence of any otherfacility In Communist China.
e do not believe that the Chinesecouldhermonuclear weapons capability by the end of the decade.
Economic Factors
ommunist China's drive toand toajor military power at tbe same time has produced an uneven economic development. The Chinese have emphasised heavy industry, and with Soviet assistance have built up the aircraft,shipbuilding, and armamentsToday these Industries are generally the most advanced In terms of production technology and skilled manpower In terms of level of output and variety of product.China's er^trsterlng Industries are roughly comparable to those of thehend are much Inferior to those of contemporary Japan, However,Industries producing military equipment are approaching the general technological level of similar Soviet Industries in the, and in some respects are little more
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a decade behind other industrialized countries. Cornmunlit China's relatively low level of engineering skills and experience rentier any attempt toroduction capabuity for advancedfrom wholly Chineaeifficult taskme when the regime has been forced to cut back the heavy industrial sector of the economy.
Classified documents captured from Chinese Communist forces In Tibet Indicate cutbacks in China's budgeted defensefor 1M1 and sharply reduced allocations o( materials lo the military. The documents reveal low morale and severe food shortages la the armed forces In tha winter, which haa been at Mast partially alleviated by Ihe summerhey alsooor state of maintenance and supply, rapid deterioration of equipment and high accident rates. These reports provide the firstevidence that tha general1 affected the military as well as the rest of the economy.
Altbough the efficiency of the Chinese Communist armed forces have probably been impaired,assible that Chineseadvanced weapons programs have not been adversely affected. Ever. In an economic crisis, resources could probably be found toew, very high priorityespecially thoseesearch and development phase. Thus, wb doubt that there has been any drastic cutback In Chinese efforts toprototype nuclear weapons, Similarly, test thing of missiles at the Shaung-cheng-tsu range bas apparenUy continued, although this program does not appear to have reached planned levels. However, the net effect of the accumulated evidence Is to east doubt en the existence of any current program for guided missile production tn support cf
basic Industrial Skills
e iiiluray. The ferrous metallurgical industry ia one of the moat highly developed in Communist China, aod rapid progress has also been made at increasing the output of nor.ferrous metal! and minerals. However, high-temperature alloys used in theof ]et engines must still be Imported. For missile englno production, Imports ofspecialty steels and refractory metals might be required, depending upon thecharat 'eristics of the missile system.
apid progress has abo been made in the electronics Industry, which byad grownodest group o* small-scale enterprisesarge-scale Industry ovulating ofajor plants- With Soviet Bloc technical assistance, the Chinese have produced largely from foreignariety of military electronic equipmentground radars, servo mechanisms, radio equipment, and navigation aids. WlUi no further Soviet aid, we doubt that at present they can produce all of the componentsadkHnertlal guidance system for short-range, and possibly medium-range, ballistic
CAaaalcali. The chexatcal Industry of Communist China bas expanded rapMty.till grossly madequate to meet the demands placed on It. It bas been heavily dependent on Bloc equipment and technical assistance, and in certain areas suffered severe setbacks with Ibe withdrawal of Soviel aid. There Is no synthetics Industry of any consequence. The Chinese can probably produce, however, the simpler types of liquid rocket fuels and solid propellents.
Machine Toil The machine toolof Communist China, aided by theof production technology and machine tool designs from tha Bloc has rapidlyproduction in the past decade (from0 units0
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. The product-mi* Is limited and heavily weighted wtth general purpose tyres, out some prototypes ol specialised, modern machines have been built. Thevolume of spectaltied tools which would be required touable production programingle missile system Is not large. But the pace ofroduction program would depend heavily on the amount of Soviet anfttsnce which had been supplied, and particularly the quality and completeness of tooting provided. The domestic Industry at present probably could, albeit withproduce the tooling required formanufacture of relatively simpleand short-range missile system* Any more ambitious program for the production of more complex systems would be gravelyIf Soviet tooling were not available.
ilrero/f. Communist China's aircraft industry, largely developedslimited to the production of earlier model Soviet jet fighters, small uansporta, and hebcopter* Although Information iznce* laeking. production rates on all types an believed to be low. The extent of Chi-ntse dependence on Imported components Is not known, but the aircraft industry probably continues to depend on Soviet supply of some key components, such as Jet engine parts or rnaterlals. Much of the basic technology of producing |et aircraft Is applicable andto missile production.
Shipbuilding. Communist China has mnergtdhipbuilding nation ofpotential The Industry currently lT capable of producing merchant ships of up to IS.COO GRT. and of assembling Uu hulls for submarines and destroyers Sameof yards and related Industries Isin naval construction, the Chinese depended upon the Soviets not only for tecn-rutal assistance but also ordnance, electronics, aad high performance propulsion equipment. Certain new construction programs of naval versels were halted following tha withdrawal of Soviet aid.
Except for medium tanks,manulaclured withinare designed exclusively forThe Chinese probably are capabletracked and wheeled vehiclesfor mounting and transportingequipment for missile systems.those requirements would place anburden on the Chinese Communistindustry, already strained by thefor economic expansion andarmaments program importssource would probably be necessary,the adaptability of manypermit considerable flexibility Inand source of Imports.
Operations. AtaWitenonce, and Training
skilled manpower requirementsdt^loyrnent and fieldoffensive and defensive misatkpresent the Chlneaewith problems equal in difficultyInitial problems of producing theassociated equipment. Theaffecting Chinese troop trainingscale of the deployment program, theadvancement and complexity of thesystems, and the origin of the missilesequipmenthether theyby the Soviets or produced Inby the Chinese themselves).dependence placed on tho USSRof missiles snd associatedmore dependent tbe Chinese arebe on Soviet assistance In training
e cannotrecise assessment of the limitations which the manpower and materials needed for training, sueand field mamtenance may place upon Chinese missile programs over the next few years But we believe such requirements
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willajor (actor in Chinese Communist decisions on force level goals. ChineseIn this respect would be greatly alleviated by relatively modest Soviethange tn Sino-Sovietwe doubt that such assistance will be forthcoming.
IV.ANO DEPlOYMfNT Of ADVANCED WEAPONS
he recently acquired Chinesearmy documents nave rxfovtded some measure of current capabilities- According to one document. Marshal Yah Chlen-ylng, chief or training for the armed forces, stated In January 1H1 that Communist China has "no unconventionalontext which indicated that he was referring to both offensive missiles and atomic weapons.to the Military Affairs Committee Inarshal Yeh noted thatill do not have atomic weapons and spacehese statements, considered In the light of the available evidence, support our belief that the Chinese have no preaent capabilities with advanced weapons.
n histatement, Marshal Yeh also declared that "If therear within several (literally, 'three-five') yeans, we will have to rely on the weapons we now have oohis statement implies the existence of programs for the future conduction andof advanced weapons. There Is little evidence as to the preterit status of such programs He Chin ceo missile producUonhas been identified, nor, asideew SAM sites at Helping is there any evidence of deployment However, certain inference* as to Chinese progress to dale can be drawn from the evidence relating lo the test range andonsideration of the factorson development and production ofweapons.
It Is apparent that native Chineseare very limited and that the extent of prevlo^ Soviet assistanceriticalThe evidence Indicates that the Soviets probably agreed to assist the Chinese Inoperational capabilitiesamily of surlncc-to-surfaco missiles of up. range, and with other missile types. Considering the previous pattern of Soviet military aid. we believe that the Chinesereceived some assistance prior ton the creation of an Independent missile production capability. We believe that the Chinese Communists would probably first seek to produce short-range (upoi.)ballistic missiles. The relative simplicity of production and the coverage by such missiles of targets peripheral to China point in thishort-range missiles could be fitted with nonnuclear warheads until nuclear warheads became available.
Chinese production of Soviet short-range missiles would depend at least initially upon Soviet aid in setting up productionand In supplying certain precision parts, principally propulsion and electronic components. Tbe extent of Soviet aid cannot be ascertained. We believe that some aid probably was provided, but not In sufficient quantity to bring the Chinese to the point or Independent production prior to
ny emerging Chinese productionwould have been seriously Impeded by the Soviet withdrawal of technicaland by the possible stoppage of the flow of critical parts. However, given sufficient priority, these setbacks could be overcome. If so. the Chinese Communists could beginof short-range sur'ace-to-surlace missiles within the next year.10
'See Figure, following page.
"For tbe views of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAP, on Chinese Communistol short-range mUtiles, see bis footnote to paragraph S.
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Without nuclear warheads, medium' ranee.re ineOeetlve sralnst most military targe Is. Therefore, the Chineae Communists probably do noto begin deployment of medium-rangeigtufleant numbers before tha latter half or tbeedium-range missile deployed In this time period would most probablyopyoviet ays-tem, but toward tbe end of the decade could be an original Chinese design. It Is possible that the Chinese Communists mightoken force without nuclear warheadsearlier for propaganda purposes and In order to gain experience with the weapon system.
here Is no evidence tbat the Soviets have provided the Chinese wllh any aid in the development of IRBM or ICBMWithout such aid, progrea* made In the development of such systems would be the result of native effort Including research and development, design, manufacture, and the constructionew test range suitable for testing such systems. Complete testing of an ICBM system could not ba conductedwithin the boundaries of Communist China.
e have no evidence to Indicate that the Chinese have taken even preliminary steps In an ICBM development program.the lack of an adequate research andbue and the advancedand engineering requiremenU for ICBM development, we believe thatr more years would bt required for ioe Chinese Communists to achieve an Initial operational capability with an ICBM system of nativeophisticated IRBM system similar to tbeun. SS-ft wouldask of like magnitude, and wouldnearly asime.
No vol Missiles
here is no evidencehinese Com-.mun 1st program for developmenthip-launched guided missile-'table for deliveryuclear warhead,elieve thatofapability withshort-range ballistic missiles would require aboutears without Soviet assistance. There Is no evidence of Chinese Communiat Interest In cruise-type missiles, but submarines could be equipped with such systems in about the same time period, and surface ships somewhat earlier.
Air Defense Missiles
SS Al present, the Chinese would probably hava great difficulty In producing thecomplexystem without extensive Soviet aasUtar.ee. Such production IsIn the next few years, and surface-to-air miatUt deployment in Communist China5 Is therefore heavily dependent upon Soviet assistance. We think It certain lhat the USSR supplied the missiles andequipment foresting in the rangehead area and for limited deployment at Pelping However, the three sites located near Pelping would clearly be Inadequate for defense of the area, suggestinglanned deployment program may have been halted before completion.
Oi. The present level of Soviet assistance is not known. If Soviet aid Is withheldwe believe that, rather than embarkingativeroduction program, tbe Chineae Communists will continue over the next few years to rely an their usable fighter force as their primary air defense weapon We do not believe tbat the Chineaecould develop an independent antimissile capability for many years- The USSR Isto provide antimissile systems to other Bloc countries In this decade
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here Is no firm evidence of air-to-air riuisUe deploy men: in Communisl Chlna. However. the Soviet Union may have supplied some .UM! to Communist8 to counter the Sid Winders employed by the Nationalist Chinese Tht Chinese may have received then lnlrared homing type which would require no special airborne radar, and possibly the Sovieteam rider missile. Production of theouldno great difficulties, and we believe tbat the Chinese could have an independentcapability now or at least within the next year or so However, without Soviet aid, we doubt that tht Chinese can produce more complex AAM systems such as beam riders or radar homing typesumber of years.
Air- to-Surfoce Missiles
e believe that the Soviets probshCy agreed to provide AS Ms to the Chineseas well as either OA DOER jet medium bombers (compatible with Soviet ASMs of up. range) or assistance In producing BADGERs. Recent photography if Wu-lcung airfield revealed two BADOKRs which they probably received Ine do not believe that any BADOBRs have been delivered to China since that time. There Is no evidence that ASMs have been provided to tht Chinese Communists We doubt that tbey ail! be capable of producing ASllsumber of years without extensive aid, including entire production facilities, tdceeover. If tbeare lo achieve any significant ASM capability, additional delivery aircraft would be required. Aside from Ihe two BADGERs, they have onlybsolete BULL piston medium bombers.
ICWT
Spoce Programs
Chinese have expressed Interestan earth satellite, but there isofrogram Althoughcould easily provide assistance forspace program, they are probablyat this Ume lo participate In awould add materially to Chirm'sWhenever the Chinesecompetence with medium-rangethey mightecond stagelomall satellite primarilypurposes. The developmenta space launching system withoutwould bt extremely difficult andseveral years. It Is pfrttlNt lhatwill produce and launch uppersounding rockets In the next few years.
Advanced Aircraft Delivery Systemi
China's aircraftdevelopeda currentlylo bt limited to tht production ofSoviet Jet fighters, smallhtilcopUrs- It Is possible that priorwithdrawal of Soviet technicians Inthe Communist Chineae receivedtechnical assistance to enableproduct BADGERitwithin the next few years.superiority to the obsoletelead Communist China to producenumber In order toorenuclear delivery capability. On theSI no-Sovietmight Improveextant that the Soviets would beprovide some additional BADGERs toWe doubt that they willbombers or assistance in makingdo we believe that Communist Chinatoative programeavy bomber.
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