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CENTRAL IBTELLIGENCEAOEBCr
2 MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT: : FPOBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CHINESE NATIONALIST
MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE CHINA MAINLAND i-
The attached estimate bas been approved by the Board of National Estimates pursuantonsideration of It by tbe USIB represe ctat ive 3.
This esticate has been placedhe agenda of the USES meeting schedulednesday,arsh
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CHESTER L.eputy fcssL_tant Director National Estioar.es
fOHAlUASl DATE:
2ISTRIBUT1GN A
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
2
SUBJECT: : PROBABLE CONSEQUENCESHINESE
NATIONALIST MILITARY OPERATIONS ON TEE CHINA MAINLAND
TEE PROBLEM
To evaluate the IntectlcDs acd capabilities of the Govercnent of the Republic of China (GRC) to undertake United oilitory operationsbe China ccinland2 and to estimate the prospects for and ccnaeoueaces of such operations.
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A> Public dissatisfaction and deoorallzatlon is widespread in Cccxjunlst China and there has been sore weakening of discipline aoong local officials and low-level party cadres. Nevertheless tbe regime's control apparatus is still intact and effective. Prcs ent Indications are that the reglne will continue to be able to isolate and repress any likely Internal challenge to its authority.)
B. Evcd if QIC sccclal forces teaus could be succciisfulLy estahllshed on the ncinland, they would sLpostccr-taliily be
destroyedhert tire. Very few people, and no significant
niLitnry units, unuldhejib-aence of_ "hlch^wo. be lie vc would be_ io-
poaslhle without large-scale US support.
refuual to support or sanction the GRC proposalsforces operations would place additional strains on US-
GBC relations. We believe that the GRC leaders,despite their Halted capabilities, night undertake scco kind of special force
T^S'^^'insribe^Inland2 cverTwiThout US approva 1.
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the GRC were to undertake aiUtory operations or.or without US support, Coocuolst China end thelaunch nojor propaganda and political canpalgons againstand the US. Peiping night undertakeretaliatorythe Taiwan Strait area. Moscow would be cost unlikely topolicies toward Cccnunlst China or tho US so long as thecot with no notable success. In the unlikely eventcontrol of tho cainlnnd were threatened, the Soviet
leaders would almostnly support t^ regime tf^xtent oec-essary, while exploiting the opportunity to otteopt to bring Peiping': policy and outlook in line with that of the USSR.
SECRET
DISCUSSION
I. TEE SITUATION CN TEE MAINLAND*
ecade of extreme effort exacted froa the Chinese people, food shortages continue to be acute cad the Chinese Ccn-ounist reglce has had to cdalt cnjor ecoocoic failures. Public dissatisfaction cad demoralization have becoae widespread cad iLcrele andnong local officials and lower level party cadres have declined. However, this disaffection is characterized by apathy rather than by active resistance oa any significant scale. Although actual uprlslags hove been reported, these have taken place priaarily la minority areas, especially in western China. With the exception of Tibet, there is no evidence that these uprisiags have lasted long, that they involved significant proportions of the population, or that they were nore than local affairs. Food riots have been reportedunber of localities, but they were quickly put down and did aot expaad into an actual resistance effort.
The reglne's control apparatusthe party and the araed rorcesis still Intact and effective. referential standard of living and intensive political indoctrination have kept oray
* The situation in Communist China will be analysed in detail in, "Communistow scheduled forpril
discipline relatively high. However, troops have aot been entirely isolated froa the suffering of the civilian population or the disillusioacent end dissatisfaction which this has produced. Also there are reports of serious and decora Li zing corruption acong cadres and rear service persoonel in the distribution of food and supplies. Ue believe that privotioo and diesatisf action within the arced forces and acoag party cadres cust go well beyond cay-thing previously experiencederious threat to the regice is likely to eoerge. here is no indication that events are tending ln this direction aod we caa perceive no lLcinent danger to internal stability.
3. Public corale in Ccccucist Chiaa is low and will reanin low so long cs the present eccaccic sluop continues. Until the winter wheat is harvested in late spring, Peiping willituation of deepening crisis. Another poor harvest would further lower oorole and increase deaoastrations of open dissatisfaction end localized incidents of violent opposition to the regies. present indications are that the reglae will continue to be able to Isolate and repress any likely internal challenges to its authority.
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II. CRC INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES
h. The goal of the lenders of the GRC, particularly Chiang Kai-shek, Is, and has always beea, to re-establish their rule over all Chi an. Their pervading fear and overriding concern is that the US cay aow he driftingwo-Chinos policy. At the sane tine, the hopes of the GRC leaders have beea greatly buoyed up by the ocute economic difficulties on the China cai-lacd, and by their conviction that public discoateat there is reachingproportions. In the past thoy believed that their best chance of recovery of the coicland was in the wakear In which the US defeated the Chinese Ccecunists. Now, however, they see la the worsening situation on the Dtialand an opportunity to take action to iticulote public uprisings and provide anleadership to which the discontented Chinese could rally.evolopcect, in the view of the GFC leaders, could gather sufficient ccDentun to evoke US support.
5. The GRC leaderseccoe increasingly insistent and specific In their requests for US aid and approval of probing operations against the ccinlaad, ond they have increased the size of the laltlol cccaltcent they propose to neke In operations
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ogainot the coioland. The top leadership, particularly Cbfaog, listttitude toword recovery of the colnlcnd, aoc they profess to be determined to undertake sizable dllltory operations on the cclalaad In their view, the test of US uiiiiagaosa cod determination to stand with tho Republic of Chide cod against further expansion of cennunisn lo the For East is involved ln the US response to their proposals. US re fusel ta support or sanction the GFC proposals for special forces operations uould place additional strains on US-GEC reln-tloas ond lead to increasing pressures for assurancesenon-strotions of US support of the GRC objective of returning to tha cainlaad. Ue believe that the GRC leaders eight undertake olr
drop or raiding activities larger than acy heretofore attested against the cciniand, within their independent capability, even
without US approval. We do not believe that thoy will be put off -
by counterproposals such OS conduct of further Intelligence probo or the development of underground networkshe naInland as preparatory stage of Initiotlag larger accle operations.
6. 1 the CflC, with US cooperation, bes cade repeoted efforta to air drop teana5 cen to seek out and stinulcte reslstonee on the reinland. These efforts hove lead to no signi-cant success. In0 Chiang Kai-shek appealed to President
an teams Into selected areas of south China were completed by the fallut the GVC has declined to implement these plans.
?. The GRC forces have for several years carried out training exercises in amphibious operations. Inhiang ordered planning for an arcphibious assault which would initially commit four divisions but would ultimately employivisions. He instructed his planners not to count on US aid. Chiang abrost certainly was aware that the GRC lacked theto carry out such an attack without IS assistance. Hence, his invasion plans probably were intendedeans of pressuring the US to support his plans for large airdrops.
8. Xn2 the GRC made the most specific request to dote for CS support ofthe mainland. The request was forlanes equipped with ECM gear to confuse the Chinese Ccmramist air warning system, and for OS approval of an operation involving airdrop of five special forces teams, totaling
en, into five inland areas of southhe GRC leaders have sought to assure the US that they would not actannor which aught involve the CS. At the saneheir actions hava ride clear that they regard parundlitary operations as "political" and, therefore, not subject to CS approval ofoporations against tho mainland.
9. The special forces, which total aboutarc the nucleus of tho GRC guerrilla end unconventional warfare capability. The morale and professional ability of the special forces are rated by tho US military observers as good to excellent. They are an olito group who enlist for lifeor until releasedand they draw preferential pay. They arerained and have been given extensive training in night drops and in mountain andwarfare. Military govemcent personnel ere trained to accompany tha special forces units. In addition, the GEC has one Airborno0ne infantry division which has had
some jump training0uorrilla force of
J
on, largely stationed on the offshore islands, who have had no jump trcining.
v Those areas as presently constituted are within an area ofilos from Hong Kong.
2/ f these are in MaP-supportcd units.
10- By using all aircraft available to it, the GRC could, .Ifand unopposed, theoretically deliver and dropwith scall anas equipmentC0 mile radius of Taiwan and re supply that forceons per day for about six weeks. ractical matter the GRC probably couldght drop of at least one of the teams of the type envisaged and under favorableperhaps several cf them, although such drops would probably have to Ve abort of the areas designated in the present GRC plan. We believe, however, that tbe GRC is sensitive tc the very high risks lnvnlved ineven such drops as are realistically within its own capabilities. The high risks cf suefc an operation would he somewhat reduced by theof ECM equipment.
In the post the GRC has had no significant success in itsefforts to establish small intelligence teams on the mainland or to execute small sabotage missions on the mainland, even ln nearby areas. Meat nf the groups dropppd on the mainland have never been heard free. Scire made radio contact, butev remained ia operation longeronth. No drops have been mode
The GRC has the tteoretieel capability of conducting anoperationorce ofO troops. This capability also assumes little or no resistance. The effectiveness oforce If landed would be seriously restrictedimited logistics capability. An amphibious operation of any size would almost certainly be detected
by the Chinese Communists.
HI. COWSEQUEirES OP TEE FHCFCSED GEC MILITARY OPERATIONS OK THE MAIMIAHD
13. The chances that the proposed GPC operations, with or without the kind of US support rao.ufir.ted, will he successful ln triggering cninland resistance arc extreoely poor ot the present tine. Even If the GRC groups could neke an Initial '. they would cl-nost certainly Ve sought out acd destroyed by Chinese Conaunlst nllltary ood security unitshort tine. At best, the GRC special forco teans night find temporary refuge ia rugged and thinly populated areas. While there Is widespread dissatisfaction with conditions no the calniaed, very few people, and nocilitary units, would be likely to Join the GRC forces ln the absence of clear cilitary success. Wc believe that suchwould be Impossible without large-scale US support.
lU. Pelplog's ionediate response to CRC cilitary operations of any significant size and duration would be toiolent propaganda and political car^aign agniost tbe OS and the GRC. They night also engage In scce retaliatory cilitary action ln the Taiwan Strait area. We believe It unlliicly that they wouldattacks against Taiwan, because of their concern aboutUS reaction.
Any significant GPC operatlma vould probably have tbe temporary effect of bringing Peiptap; ond Moscow somewhat closer together; if the two Bloc powers were on the edgeplit, the incident night tip the "balance for the tine being against it. The Soviets would probably not be completely averse toPUni.lt China embarrassednited indigenous rebellion which they might hope would bringeadership change in the Chinese Party. They would be cocceraed, however,ebellionfron Taiwan would escalate to nore dangerous lntematioool proportions andost certainly conclude it was preferoble_ that an uprising be quickly suppressed.
While the USSR would engageropaganda canpolgn against the GPC ond the US, the Soviet leaders would be costto alter their policies toward China or the US so long as the GRC operations net with no notable success. Tn the unlikely event that they did meet with success, the Soviet leaders would almost certainly support the Chinese Communist regime to the ex-teat necessary to put down the rebellion while exploiting theto attempt to bring Chinese policy and outlook more in line with that of the USS?..
17- Itighly improbable that tbe US would be able< disassociate Itself ln international opinion froo responsibility for any significant ORG operoticns cgcinst the mainland. Although, it Is unlikely that the Bloc could succeed inorncJ condemnation of tho US in the UK, it could probably stir up eaough criticism among UM nocbars to complicate seriously tho CRC's cbility to weather next session's China representation fight.
16. Xf tho proposed GfC operaticn resulted in tho immediate destruction of tho Chinese Nationalist troops involved there would probablyerlcus, but not critlcol decline In the morale of GRC military and government officials. If the operation net with some Initial success, tut was subsequently contained and destroyed, the GRC would clrsost certainly put the onus for tha failure on the US; relations between the GRC and the US would consequently decline. In either case GKC officials (the President obviously excepted) would probably become core resigned to concentratlnc. on policies geared to the strengthening of the GRC position on Taiwan rather thaneturn to mainland.
Original document.
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