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MEMORANDUM OF MEETING AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON SUNDAY,TTENDED BY THE PRESIDENT, RUSK, McNAMARA, GILPATRIC. LEMNITZER, HARRIMAN, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, McCONE, BUNDY, HILSMAN, BALLHORT TIME) AND CASE.
Secretary Rusk outlined the problem in Laos as it had been left
tho day before, referring to reply cables received from Ambassador
nd IN
Brown and Generalnoted there
was no reply from Bangkok. Rusk advanced the view that Introduction of the maximum sanctions against Phoumi which would be necessary to move him out, would probably result in the loss of all of Laos. He therefore proposed that we suggest that Phoui replace Phoumi as the Deputy Prime Minister ,ind be responsible for negotiations with the three Princes and that 1'houmi concentrato on his military problems. In answer to questions Rusk stated that the relationship between Souvanna and Phoui were just as bad if not worse than those between Souvanna and Phoumi and he reiterated the report from Brown and others that Phoumi's position, militarily and politically, had not substantially deteriorated bo-cause of the Nam Tha incident.
As the meeting proceeded Rusk returned time and again to the above plan stating lhat he would propose discussions of the plan with theouvanna, Phoumi, Phoui and others to get complete agreement
APPRDVtlFOIILLUSI UTtArlUOl
on the procedure. Rusk also reported that good progress had been made
in the lastourseeting in the immediate future between the
threo Princes . The only unrosolved problemeeting place
and that Plaine des Jarres was under consideration. He hoped this
meeting would be arranged at once.
In response to questions McCone reviewed tho CAS report on
IU11
the military situation as outlinedpointing out
probability that Viet Cong had military advantage in seven important
locations each of which was identified. McCone emphasized this report
was raw intelligence and had not been evaluated and an estimate would
be forthcoming Monday morning.
During the course of the meeting McCone emphasized that he
personally took exception tof Rusk's telegram as it
literally placed tho MAAG in command in Laosime when the
military situation was disintegrating dangerously. This point was
recognized as valid by the President, McNamara and Lomnitzer .
McCone also from time to time emphasized the importance, as
being absolutely sure of the line of suc-
cession to Phoumi, as we moved in the direction of eliminating Phoumi.
plan
This was agreed but Rusk felt his veutst as mentioned above would take care of this situation
Hilsman reported no air activity which would indicate planned immediate action in any other point in Laos. McCona opposed this, stating that there were two or three locations where, in the opinion of CIA, the Viet Cong could move with resources in hand in the field and without an airlift reinforcement.
Robert Kennedy suggested that we approach Phoumi with (a) offers of assistanceype that we can give him, assuming that he conform to our direction both politically andnd (b) threats of sanctions if ho did not agree. Rusk countered that this procedure had been followed without effect for many months.
In an extended discussion of the possibilities of dividing Laos and holding Southern Laos with Phoumi or other RLG forecti,was the opinion of General Lemnitzer ipjnA the Vict Cong forces were so strong inLaosajor military effort would be required to clear the situation up. Hilsman volunteered that any such action would require Amorican-Thai occupation of all principal cities and Mekong river communities, freeing the* RLG forces to go out into the country and work on the guerrillas and disperse the Viet Cong forces. McNamara felt the time was not right for the commitment of American forces In Laos. The President agreed.
The President seemed of the opinion that the possibility of a
political settlement was not hopeless, and there waslear-cut
positive indication that the cease-fire had been broken but rather the
Nam Tha incident might have been the result of provocation, and every
effort should be madeolitical settlement. There was general
agreement on this point . McCone emphasized that if this course ia
to be followed then troop movements and fleet movements in Thailand
and actions the Vict Cong may make in South Vietnam should be made
inay as to serveeterrent in Laos and thus strengthen
our negotiating position. McCone pointed out that at the present time
the routing of the RLG forces placed usery weak negotiating
position and this could only be changed by evidence of some intention
on our part of possibly introducing our forces into Laos, concerning the
Discussions/otf movement of fleet and the introduction of troops into Thailand were inconclusive as no message had been received from Ambassador Young, and therefore Sarit's approval of such military moves had not been secured.
The meeting was adjourned subject to call later today or Monday at the will of the President. In tho meantime the President ordered State to transmit telegrams to Ambassadors Brown and Young, summari^int
the views which were developed in the meeting.
Following the meeting McCone arranged to transmit message
urging extreme care on the part of all CIA personnel
to adhere to the expressed policy with respect to the handling of Phoumi
and nsa to deviate under any circumstances or to give Phoumi encourage
the
ment under any condition, and (b) to report immediately/fie Id evaluation of whether the cease-fire had actually been broken or the Nam Tha Incident was could be accounted for by provocation on the part of the Phoumi forces.
John A. McCone Director
Original document.
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