52 It
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Chinese Communist Advanced Weapons Capabilities
CM HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
DIRECTOR OF CENIRAl INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in byUNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD As2
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Ihe following infeMi'gonce organizations participated in the preparation ol this estimate:
The Cent-olAgoncy and Ae intelligence Ofgoniiottoni olot State. Oefenw. thehe Navy, ike Alt ro.ee. The >OMSA.
Concurring/i
DI'Klot of Intelligence ond Rneatth. Deportment of Siota Ownto'. Defenio Intelligence Agency
AiuuaM CKef Staffntvir-gvnce.i of the Aran/ AiiWonl Chief ofOpetehc-tnDeportixnt Of the Nory Aiiiilt.nl Chief of Staff, tnlelTigcnct, USAJ Dltecloi for Intel Itgnnre, Joint Slat Theneigy Commivtoan DbecMr of the Nottono) Secwey Aovxy
Abstaining:
TheDirector, federal Bureau of Intetfigation, lhe lubjoct being ovblda of Mi turitdidlan.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE
I. CHINESE COMMUNIST
II. EVIDENCE ON ADVANCED WEAPONS PROGRAMS .
Missile Test Range
III. FACTORS BEARING ON CHINESE COMMUNISTPRODUCTION. AND DEPLOYMENT OF
ADVANCED
Soviet
Chinese Communist Scientific
Missile
Aeronautical
Nuclear
Economic
Basic Industrial
Operations, Maintenance, and
IV. PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF ADVANCED
Naval
Air Defense
Alr-to-Surface
Space
Advanced Aircraft Delivery
CHINESE COMMUNIST ADVANCED WEAPONS CAPABILITIES
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the capabilities of Communist China with respect to the development and production of guidedand nuclear weapons over the next few years.
FOREWORD
In analyzing the evidence on Chinese programs forweapons, we have encountered numerous important gaps and apparent inconsistencies. The evidence available to us clearly proves the existence of programs in the missile and nuclear fields, but it is insufficient to permit us tothese programs in the fashion which is possible for various comparable Soviet programs. Similarly, while we have been able to make some Judgments about Chineseand the time periods during which furtherare likely, we cannot reach firm conclusions on these matters, or predict the year in which deployment of aweapons system will probably begin.
In these circumstances, we have considered it useful to present in thisairly full picture, not only of the evidence and the major problems which it leaves unresolved, but also of the basic scientific and economic resourcesto the Chinese Communists for advanced weaponsWe have sought In this way toase of Information to which, in succeeding estimates on thesewe can subsequently apply new Information andanalysis. We expect that, as these Chinese programs
|that any .substantial missile production is under way. We believe that China has no present operational capabilities with missiles, aside from limited deployment of surface-to-air and possibly air-to-air missiles, all procured from the USSR. SS)
1 For the poalUon of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operationsepartment of the Navy, see his rootnote to
1 The Assistant Chief of SUIT, Intelligence. USAF. agrees that tha Chinese Communist* haveery high priority to the development of nuclear weapons; and that they probably regard anweapon! capabilityolitical and military necessity If they are to achieve the IntemaUonal status they seeke alioIn Uie Judgment that no drastic cutback in Chinese elTorU to develop prototype nuclear weapons has occurred, and that sufficient economic and sclcnUDc resourcei are available to Uie Chinese CornmunlsU loew. very Irish piiorlty prelects (paragraphHe believe* the large, scale withdrawal of Soviet technical aid Inndoubtedly hasthe progress of Ute Chinese CornmunlsU weapons program In eerUIn areas Nevertheless, he considers It likely that sufficient technical and Industrial rceoorees are available and are being tunneled Into UM Chinese Communist atomic energy programufficient priority to permit them lo detocaU an all plutonium Implosion nuclear device by IMS. If tbe Chinese detonate their first device In Um next year or so. It would be within their capabilities to develop andhermonuclear device before Uie end of the decade.evice probably would be extremely heavy, and would representoken TN capability. Evenimited TN capability would go far to establish Chinareat power and would have profound psychological Impact, particularly In Asia.
We have evidence to indicate that the Chinesehave mined andignificant amount of uranium ore and that, with Soviet help, they werea plant for recovery of uraniumhis strongly indicates an intent to produce fissionable materials, but wc have no evidence of such production in Communist China. Assuming an accelerated and highly successful program for the production of plutoniumhe Chinesecould detonate an all-plutonium device inowever, in the light of alt the evidence,s unlikely that the Chinese will meetchedule. We believe that the first Chinese test would probably be delayederhaps by as much as several)
ear after exploding their first device, the Chinese Communists could probablyew fairly crude fission weapons. Another two years or more would be
rcquired to develop fission weapons tor missile warheads. If the first test should occur in the next year or so, we estimate that toward the last part of the decade the Chinesecouldariety of fission weapons to support many of their military requirements, but only in limited numbers.
The Assistant Colel of Staff. Intelligence, DSAF, believes that In view of Lhe accuracyystem cost, the availability of tactical atr forces and other considerations, deployment of ISO run.r race mls-slles by the Chinese Communis Is win almost certainly be dependent upon Lhe availability of nuclear warheads. Therefore, while he agrees that lhe Chinese within the neat lew years could begin to deploy short-range surface-to-surface missiles with nonnucloar warheads, he docs not aa-ree that they are likely to do so until nuclear warheads are available.
' For the slew of the Assistant Chief or staff, inteUlgenee. USAF.Chinese Communist thermonuclear weapons capublllUes. see his toot-note to paragraph 5.
We believe that the Chinese would at some point in their program endeavor to, but we have no evidence ofroduction at present. Latest evidence indicatesacility at Lanchou suspected ofaseous diffusion plant has not been completed. If this plant Is In fact intended toaseous diffusion facility, it probably could not produce weaponhe Chinese could probably test anrdeviceear after the activation of afacility.
Within the next few years, the Chinese could begin to deploy short-range (upurface-to-surfacewith nonnuclcar warheads. Deployment of medium-range missiles almost certainly is keyed to the availability of nuclear warheads; such plans probably look to the second half of the decade. In the absence of Soviet aid, thewill probably not undertake to produce surface-to-air missile systems, at least until thes.
In more advancedmissile systems. IRBMs, ICBMs, antimissile systems, and thermonuclearis not likely to achieve independentduring.*
feccn&j-
DISCUSSION
CHINESE COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES
he Chinese Communist leaders arcto establish Chinaajor world power andeader of the Communist Bloc of at least coequal status with the Soviet Union. They regard the Fnr East as China's particular preserve and are determined to be dominant In that area. In general. Pelping would probably prefer to achieve Itsby political and economic forms of struggle, rather than by direct employment of Chinese forces. However, Communist China has no compunctions about openly using its military forces to extend Itswhen It can do so with little or no risk.
calculates that theeven limited capabilities withwould go far to establish Chinagreat power and would have aImpact, particularly In theof Asia. Moreover, In areas whereforces confront thoseby the West, the Chinesealmost certainly considerone side or the other as anThey probably reason thatof advanced weapons wouldaggressive Chinese policies Inand would tend to deter strongThus, they probably regardweapons capability both asilitary necessity if they arethe International status they seek.
II. EVIDENCE ON ADVANCED WEAPONS PROGRAMS
Chinese Communist drive toa nuclear capability apparentlytheir efforts In the guided missileseveral years. Since thes,China hasery highto the development and production ofweapons. There is no firm evidence that the Chinese Communists haveto develop or produce bomber aircraft. We believe that Chinesearge-scale program forof guided missile capabilities probably dates from thes.
Miitile Ten Range Activities
Recent photography has confirmed the existenceuided missile test center in northwest China; its location in this area had been Indicatedonsiderable body of evidence accumulated over the past two or three years. The evidence indicates that construction of range facilities could7 and almost certainly was well under way
The rangchead Is located aboutortheast of Shuang-cheng-tzuail spur oft the Urumchl-Lanchou rail line.
. large, instrumented area, dispersedmile stretch of the Etsinurface-to-surface missile (SSM) launchurface-tc-air missile (SAM) launcharge main support basemaller support base servicing the SSM and SAMarge SSM and SAM assembly area, two revetted storage areas, and several smaller housing andareas. About. southwest of the mam support basearge new airfieldooL concrete runway. Near theare two large communication centers. (See Figure following page 7)
ozena
he three SSM launch complexes have been arbitrarily designatednd "C" Complex "A" appears to be completed and operational. This complex contains two large concrete pads suitable for firing ballisticserved by paved loop-accessontrolrive-through out building.
complex "B" stronglythose at complexxcavation for the pads has been completed, butappears to have been suspended. Launch complex "C" has one padrive-through building. Construction work appears to be nearly complete, and the launch pad could have been used. However, the' operational status of this complex is undetermined.
The ranges of the missile systems to be tested from these facilities cannot bofrom the photography. The launch sites are oriented towards the west, and the down-range instrumentation is also in that direction. The desert terrain to the west would allow the tiring of surface-to-surface missiles to ranges of up. within Chinese territory. The pads, associatedand support areas In launch"A" closely resemble Soviet facilities at Kapustln Yar used, and probably. ballistic missiles. Launch"C" bears some resemblance to other Soviet launching facilities at Kapustln Yar; the type of missile associated with the Soviet complex cannot be ascertained,
The surface to-air missile launch area resemblesaunch facilities at Kapustln Yar, although the twoites at Shuang-cheng-liu are more widely separated and the instrumented area Is larger. Construction work has been completed on the two sites, but only one is equipped with radar and launchers. One of the launchers has been fully revetted, and partial revetments have
been provided around
tne soviet model, anm
. on
appear completed.
t appears that Shuang-cheng-Uuwas originally intended to providesupport for the missile range, fighterand possibly to conduct alr-to-surface missiles (ASM) and air-to-air missilesrograms.
trneid apparently ignea toarge number of aircraft, including the heaviest types, but the limited fuel storage facilities identified do not appear commensurateacility of this size. Posslblo loading hardstands andbuUdings could be intended to serve an ASM
he size of the missile rangehcad at Shuang-cheng-txuery largeThe facilities available at the test center are sufficient toonsiderable physical capability to carry out extensiveresearch and development programs and some troop training. Housing appears ;nle-
_ -* "
ftscnfc*-
facilities clo_not appear to havesed for firings.
There arc no indications that air-to-surface or air-to-air missiles have been tested.
the Shuang-chcng-tzu airfield. These facts suggest that what wasarge, ambitious program for test firing SSMs, SAMs, and possibly ASMSs has' been cut back.
eliable evidence indicates that theagreed toariety of missiles to the Chinese Communists including,i-.e, surface-to-air, alr-to-surface, and air-to-airvidence on activity at Uie Shuang-cheng-txu range,that firings of surface-to-surface ballistic missiles have occurred. The ranges to which missiles have been fired cannot be established with confidence, but our evidence suggests that firings have been conducted to ranges of approximatelyndjn. Although there is no direct evidence we believe that firings of surface-to-air missiles have also occurred.
mated characteristics of Soviet missiles, see Table,
of the lime required for construction and checkout of range facilities, leads us lo believe that test firing of mhuilcs on the rangebegan in9 orevidence provides no basis forfiring rates.
he Soviets probably provided technical assistance at least throughnd the early firings certainly involved missiles of Soviet manufacture. We believe that the range continues to be operational. Theto date has probably been primarily for the purpose of range orientation, practice firing of Soviet missiles, and possibly testof Chinese copies. Some concurrenttraining, at least with surface-to-air missiles, may also have occurred.
www-
TOP CCCPCT
FACTORS BEARING ON CHINESE COMMUNIST DEVELOPMENT. PRODUCTION, AND DEPLOYMENT OF ADVANCED WEAPONS
Soviet Assistance
major factor In the pace ofweapons programs is the kindof assistance provided by thefactor Is also the source ofln our appraisals, since wedirect evidence on Soviet assistancefields of nuclear and missile weapons,rely primarily upon informationother programs and uponour knowledge of political relationsthe two countries.
believe that the Chinese, whileas much Soviet assistance as possible,same time have aimed at anin the fields of guided missilesweapons. They have in thewhile enjoying Soviet help, soughtnative capabilities for theaircraft, submarines, and electronicUntiloviet aidigh levelumber ofWe believe, however, that in theand possibly the missile field thisprovidedore deliberate pace.
he withdrawal of Soviet technicians and scientists from China Inad adverse effects upon Chinese programs toJet fighters, destroyers, and submarines. There is some evidence, although it is less conclusive, that Chinese nuclear weapons and missile programs were similarly affected, and this, plus the serious deterioration ofbetween Moscow and Pelping since that time, leads us to estimate that Soviet aid In these fields was also sharply cut back. However, we believe that the nuclear anddevelopment programs were sufficiently advanced thatomplete halt in Soviet assistance would have caused delays rather than their abandonment.
present state of Sino-Sovietindicates that there Iseturn to former levels ofassistance. Evenonger periodor three years, we doubt that thesignificantly increase Its assistancePelping bowed to Moscow's demandsover the Communist movementitself accepted the necessity olthe Blocew bailsChinese coleadership. Both theseappear unlikely.
therefore believe that, while themay still be extending limitedmay continue to do so, China'sIn advanced weapons will beprimarily by native abilities inand further developing thefacilities already received from thebelief is supportedecentby Foreign Minister Chenehinesethat "by relying mainly on ourin addition to International aid,and technical problems in China'sconstruction and national defensesolved."
chinese communist scientific resources
ince its Inception, the Chineseregime has stressed the paramount importance of placing science and technology at the service of production. The emphasis on production appears not only In industrial research and development facilities, hut also in the Academy of Sciences and in educational centers. Moreover, this philosophy has been imposedorce of scientific and technical manpower which is grossly inadequate.ery few well-trained and experienced scientists, probably, are available for research in all fields; of these, probabiy about GOO received training on the doctorate level in the West. Anlevel graduates have returned from
sce-aef
training In the USSR in the last few years, but this group has yet to gain significantexperience. The total number ofand technicians employed by the Chinese Academy, research facilities, and educational institutions is probably onlyhe comparable figure tor Japan is; for the.
Comparatively little fundamentalhas been undertaken because of the policy of the regime and the shortage of trained personnel. Instead, the emphasis has been placed on engineeringlmost all of which have been concerned with adapting imported devices, equipment, and techniques to the manufacturing facilities of China. Significant gaps are believed to exist inareas basic to advanced weaponssuch as physics, chemistry,computer design, electronics, andaerodynamics.
Until Soviet scientific and technical aid was cut back. Communist China had been making progressell-conceived but unrealyear plan to -aise Its scientific levelleven broadfields considered vital to the rapid attainment of economic and military goals were emphasized, Including electronics, atomic energy, jet propulsion, automation, and precision instruments, alloy systems and metallurgical processes, and heavy organic chemical synthesis. Although the original goals now appear unattainable, we believe that progress toward them will continue,In areas such as atomic energyimited degree ofhas already been reached.
The shortage of trained scientific and technical manpower probably cannot beamelioratedumber of years. The most recent additions of competenthave been trained in the USSR.beginning7 the numbers of new Chinese students entering the USSR sharply diminished, and we believe that few if any were admitted in the fallhinese students, mostly graduates, who have been permitted to remain in the USSR,will complete their courses in the next two years or so. Within about four to six years, China can be producing. In significant numbers, men with good overall technical training, but an additional period of years will be required for this group toackground of practical experience.
Missile Research
he resources available to Communist China for missile research are extremelyScientific competence in missile design is restrictedmall group, trained in the US and other Western countries, who are concentrated for the most part at theof Mechanics In Peiping.he Institute has been headed by Dr. Chlcn Hsueh-sen, whoeading role in the USprogram prior0 and waa considered one of the world's leading aerodynamlclsts. However, there is evidence that the lack of. competent juniors, the pressure ofduties, the demands of Ideological training, and the lack of first rate scientific facilities have combined to prevent theof significant research In the field of guided missiles.
onsidering these severe limitations, we do not believe that the Chinese have as yet embarkedajor program in original missile design. Instead, efforts In the missile field have probably been limited for the most part to copying Soviet missiles. The early developmentative Chinese capability to design, develop, andophisticated missile system would have Involved Soviet assistanceuch larger scale than we believe has been provided thus far. It would havearge-scale program ofand exchange In missile-associated aspectsarge number of scientific disciplines.
There Is no evidence ofarge program. However, the Chinese probably haverelatively modest research andprogramselective basis.
Aeronoutjcal Research
the present time, the Chineseeffort in aeronautical research andis in its infancy. The programdirected primarily toward trainingforces and the production engineersto build an aircraft Industry Inpossible time. There is anof well-trained aeronauticaland aeronautical researchmall aeronauticaleffort Is under way at the InstituteThe Pelping Aeronauticalfounded2 orprimarily on the practical trainingin aeronautical engineering andengine design, andewretained for advanced theoreticalbelieve that the Chinese aircraftbe heavily dependent on foreignmany more years to come, and that itto produce within theany significant military aircraftand engines of native design.
Nuclear Technology'
efforts in the field ofand the extent of Sovietabout0 have beendetail0hetakes into consideration theof Soviet assistance, recentreverses, and new information. Its
the views of the Assistant Chief ofntelligence, USAF, regarding Chinese Communist nuclear weapons capabilities, see his footnote to paragraphage 3.
dO. "The Chinese Communist Atomic Energyated0 (Umltcd Distribution).
purpose Is lo assess the probable timing of the Chinese Communist achievement ofmajor objectives, including theof uranium metal plants, productionand related separation facilities,diffusion plants, and the fabrication of nuclear devices.
As has been previously estimated, wethe Chinese have mined andsufficient uranium ore to supply the needs of their atomic energy program.evidence indicates that the Chinese, with Soviet help, werelant forof natural uranium metal prior to the withdrawal of Soviet technicians Inssuming that construction was well along at that time, the plant could have beenby the end0 and production of uranium metal could have started early
Production of uranium metaltrong indication of Intent to produceand wo estimate that plutonium will be the first material available for weaponWe have no evidence of Chinese constructionlutonium productionRecent photographic coverage of certain suspect areas produced negative results; the locationroduction reactor outside the area of coverageranium metal production rate ofons peron ourof earlyon reactor load could have been produced by aboutuch an amount would be sufficientingle reactor with an initial power level ofW. Full-power reactor operation could have been achieved earlyufficient plutoniumingle weapons test couldear later.
This schedule assumes that theof the reactor and chemicalplant has been In phase with that of the uranium metal plant and that no major diffl-
cullles ate encounlered at any stage In the process. With the further assumption that very little additional time would be required for device fabrication, the Chinese could test an all-plutonium device earlye believe It unlikely that the Chinese will meet the schedule Implied by theseIf the foregoing series ofproves invalid, the first Chinese nuclear test would be considerably delayed, perhaps by as much as several years
1 The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Department of Ihe Nary, believes that the framework of assumpUons on which thla time sehed-ule la predicated Is logical in the abstract but not yet supported by basic evidence sufficient to lend It estimative validity. In the absence of what he considers to be any evidence pertaining to or VneUca-Uve of the producUon of fissionable materials In Communist China and In the light ol the relatively elementary stale of known nuclear researchhe believeseliable estimate of theCommunist program In the development of nuclciir weapons cannot yet be made.
ear after exploding their first device, the Chinese Communistsew fairly crude fissiondeliverable by medium bombers.at least two years and probably more would be required for the Chinese Communists to develop more advanced fission weaponsfor delivery by missiles. Considerable nuclear testing would be Involved in this de-velopment. Thus, if the first test shouldIn the next year or so, we estimate that toward the last part Of the decade, the Chinese Communists couldariety of fission weapons to support many of their military requirements, but only In limited numbcra.
We believe the Chinese would at some point In their program endeavor to produceor use In their weaponsAerial photography of9oot building In Lanchou which had some of the characteristicsoviet gaseous diffusion plant, although no provision for power supply was evident. It was apparent thataseous diffusion process were Involved the Chinese would have toecond building to obtain weapon-grade Overflight photography in2 gave no further indication of provision for an electric power supply or of preparation for constructionecond building This same photography indicates arrested development at the nearbypower station which the Chinese had hoped to put In operationhus. If Indeed the Lanchou site were toaseous diffusion plant, the Chinese probably could not produce weapon-gradehere5 even if construction of another building were started now. The Chinese Communists could test anrdevice withinear after tho activationroduction facility. We have no evidence of any otherfacility In Communist China.
e do not believe that the Chinesecouldhermonuclear weapons capability by the end of the decade.
Economic Factors
ornmunlst China's drive toand toajor military power at the same time has produced an uneven economic development. The Chinese have emphasised heavy Industry, and with Soviet assistance have built up the aircraft,shipbuilding, and armaments Today these industries are generally the most advanced in terms of production technology and skilled manpower. In terms of level of output and variety of product.China's engineering Industries arc roughly comparable to those of the USSR In thend are much Inferior to those of contemporary Japan. However,industries producing military equipment are approaching the general technological level of similar Soviet industries in the, and In some respects are little more
ecade behind other industrialized countries. Communist China's relatively low level of engineering skills and experience render any attempt toroduction capability for advanced weapons- -particularly from wholly Chinesedifficult taskime when the regime has been forced to cut back the heavy Industrial sector of the economy.
documents capturedCommunist forces in Tibetin China's budgeted1 and sharply reducedmaterials to the military. Thelow morale and severe foodthe armed forces in the winter ofhad been at least partially alleviatedsummerhey also indicateslate of maintenance and supply,of equipment and hl*hThese reports provide the firstevidence that the general1 affected the militaryas the rest of the economy.
the efficiency of thearmed forces have probablyit is possible that Chineseadvanced weapons programs haveadversely affected. Even In anresources could probably be founda few, very high prioritythoseesearch andThus, we doubt that there hasdrastic cutback in Chinese efforts toprototype nuclear weapons.firing of missiles at thehas apparently continued, althoughdoes not appear to havelevels. However, the net effectaccumulated evidence Is to castthe existence of any current programmissile production In support of
Boiic Induitnal Skill*
etallurgy The ferrous metallurgical industry Is one of the most highly developed In Communist China, and rapid progress has also been made In increasing the output of noiilerrous metals and minerals. However, high-temperature alloys used in theof jet engines must still be imported. For missile engine production, imports ofspecialty steels and refractory metals might be required, depending upon thecharacteristics of the missile system.
lectronics. Rapid progress has also been made In the electronics Industry, which byad grownodest group of small-scale enterprisesarge-scale industry consisting ofajor plants. With Soviet Bloc technical assistance, the Chinese have produced largely from foreignariety of military electronic equipmentground radars, servomechanlsms, radio equipment, and navigation aids. With no further Soviet aid, we doubt that at present they can produce all of the componentsadio-Inertia! guidance system for short-range, and possibly medium-range, ballistic missiles.
hemicals. The chemical industry of Communist China has expanded rapidly, but Is still grossly inadequate to meet the demands placed on It. It has been heavily dependent on Bloc equipment and technical assistance, and In certain areas suffered severe setbacks with the withdrawal of Soviet aid. There is no synthetics industry of any consequence. The Chinese can probably produce, however, the simpler types of liquid rocket fuels and solid propellants.
achine Tools. The machine toolof Communist China, aided by theof production technology and machine tool designs from the Bloc, has rapidlyproduction in the past decade (fromnits0
GC-ePET-
units. The product-mix is limited and heavily weighted with general purpose types, but some prototypes of specialised, motion machines have been built. Thevolume of specialized tools which would be required toizable production programingle missile system Is not large. But the pace ofroduction program would depend heavily on the amount of Soviet assistance which had been supplied, and particularly the quality and completeness of tooling provided. The domestic Industry at present probably could, albeit withproduce the tooling required formanufacture of relatively simple1 and short-range missile systems. Any more ambitious program for the production of more complex systems would be gravelyif Soviet tooling were not available.
Aircraft. Communist China's aircraft industry, largely developedslimited to the production of earlier model Soviet Jet fighters, small transports, and helicopters. Although information sinces lacking, production rates on ail types are believed to be low. The extent ofdependence on Imported components is not known, but the aircraft industry probably continues to depend on Soviet supply of some key components, such as Jet englne.parts or materials. Much of the basic technology of producing jet aircraft is applicable andto missile production.
Shipbuilding. Communist China has emergedhipbuilding nation ofpotential. The Industry currently is capable of producing merchant ships of up0 CRT. and of assembling the hulls for submarines and destroyers. Someof yards and related industries isIn naval construction, the Chinese depended upon the Soviets not only forassistance but also ordnance, electronics, and high performance propulsion equipment Certain new construction programs of naval vessels were halted following the withdrawal of Soviet aid.
ehicles. ExceplformedIumtanks.no vehicles manufactured within Communist China are designed exclusively for military use. The Chinese probably are capable of producing tracked and wheeled vehiclesfor mounting and transporting ground support equipment for missile systems.these requirements would place anburden on the Chinese CommunistIndustry, already strained by thefor economic expansion and the ground armaments program. Imports from some source would probably be necessary,the adaptability of many vehicles would permit considerable flexibility In the type and source of imports.
aintenance, and Training
The skilled manpower requirements for large-scale deployment and field maintenance of offensive and defensive missile systems probably present the Chinese Communist leaders with problems equal In difficulty to the initial problems of producing the missiles -and associated equipment. The principal factors affecting Chinese troop training are the scale of the deployment program, theadvancement and complexity of thesystems, and the origin of the missiles and associated equipmenthether they are supplied by the Soviets or produced in large measure by the Chinesehe more dependence placed on the USSR for supply of missiles and associated equipment, the more dependent the Chinese are likely to be on Soviet assistance in training und maintenance.
We cannotrecise assessment of the limitations which the manpower and materials needed for training, siteand field maintenance may place upon Chinese missile programs over the next few years. But we believe such requirements
teener
willajor factor in Chinese Communist decisions on force level goals. Chinesein this respect would be greatly alleviated by relatively modest Soviethange in Sino-Sovietwe doubt that such assistance will be forthcoming.
IV. PRODUCTION AND DEPIOYMENT OF ADVANCED WEAPONS
The recently acquired Chinesearmy documents have provided some measure of current capabilities. According to one document. Marshal Yeh Chien-ying. chief of training for the armed forces, stated In1 that Communist China has "no unconventional weapons"ontext which indicated that he was referring to both offensive missiles and atomic weapons.to the Military Affairs Committee inarshal Yeh noted that "we still do not have atomic weapons and spacehese statements, considered in the light of the available evidence, support our belief that the Chinese have no present capabilities with advanced weapons.
In his1 statement, Marshal Yeh also declared that "if therear within several (literally, 'three-five') years, we will have to rely on the weapons we now have onhis statement implies the existence of programs for the future production andof advanced weapons. There is little evidence as to the present status of such programs. No Chinese missile productionhas been identified, nor, asideew SAM sites at Peiping is there any evidence of deployment. However, certain Inferences as to Chinese progress to date can be drawn from the evidence relating to the test range andonsideration of the factorson development and production ofweapons.
IL is apparent that native Chineseare very limited and that the extent of previous Soviet assistanceriticalThe evidence indicates that the Soviets probably agreed to assist the Chinese Inoperational capabilitiesamily of surface-to-surface missiles of up. range, and with other missile types. Considering lhe previous paltern of Soviet military aid, we believe that the Chinesereceived some assistance prior ton the creation of an Independent missile production capability. We believe that the Chinese Communists would probably first seek to produce short-range (upballistic missiles. The relative simplicity of production and the coverage by such missiles ot targets peripheral to China point in this directionShort-range missiles could be fitted with nonnuclear warheads until nuclear warheads became available.
Chinese production of Soviet short-range missiles would depend at least initially upon Soviet aid in setting up productionand In supplying certain precision parts, principally propulsion and electronic components. The extent of Soviet aid cannot be ascertained. We believe that some aid probably was provided, but not In sufficient quantity to bring the Chinese to the point of independent production prior to
Any emerging Chinese productionwould have been seriously Impeded by the Soviet withdrawal of technicaland by the possible stoppage of the flow of critical parts. However, given sufficient priority, these setbacks could be overcome. If so, the Chinese Communists could beginof short-range surface-to-surface missiles within the next year."
Figure, following page.
"For the views of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF. on Chinese Communistof short-range missiles, see his footnote to paragraph 8
SCCRET
ithout nuclear warheads, medium-range.re ineffective against most military targets Therefore, the Chinese Communists probably do not plan to begin deployment ol medium-range missiles in significant numbers before the latter half of the decade.edium-range missile deployed in this time period would most probablyopyovietbut toward the end of the decade could be an original Chinese design. It Is possible that the Chinese Communists mightoken force without nuclear warheadsearlier for propaganda purposes and In order to gain experience with the weapon system.
is no evidence that theprovided the Chinese with any aiddevelopment of tKBM or ICBMWithout such aid, progress madedevelopment of such systems wouldresult of native effort includingdevelopment, design, manufacture,constructionew test rangetesting such systems. Completean ICBM system could not be conductedwithin the boundaries of
have no evidence to indicateChinese have taken even preliminaryan ICBM development program.the lack of an adequate research andbase and the advancedand engineering requirements forwe believe thatr morebe required for the Chineseachieve an initial operationalan ICBM system of nativeophisticated IRBMto the.ask of like magnitude, and wouldnearly asime.
Naval Missiles
here is no evidencehinese Com-munlst program for developmenthip-launched guided missile suitable for deliveryuclear warhead. We believe thatofapability withshort-range ballistic missiles would require aboutears without Soviet assistance. There Is no evidence of Chinese Communist Interest In cruise-type missiles, but submarines could be equipped with such systems in about the same time period, and surface ships somewhat earlier.
Aii Defense Mluildi
t present, the Chinese would probably have great difficulty In producing thecomplexystem without extensive Soviet assistance. Such production is un-likely in the next few years, and surface-to-air missile deployment In Communist China5 is therefore heavily dependent upon Soviet assistance. We think It certain that the USSR supplied the missiles andequipment foresting In the rangchead area and for limited deployment at Peiping. However, the three sites located near Peiping would clearly be inadequate for defense of the area, suggestinglanned deployment program may have been halted before completion.
he present level of Soviet assistance la not known. If Soviet aid Is withheldwe believe that, rather than embarkingativeroduction program, the Chinese Communists will continue over the next few years to rely on their sizable fighter force as their primary air defense weapon. We do not believe that the Chinesecould develop an Independent antimissile capability for many years. The USSR isto provide antimissile systems to other Bloc countries In this decade.
-
6a. There is no firm evidence of air-lo-alr missile deployment in Communist China. However, the Soviet Union may hava suppliedo Communist China9 to counter the Sidewinders employed by the Nationalist Chinese. The Chinese may have received then Infrared homing type which would require no special airborne radar, and possibly the Sovieteam rider missile. Production of theouldno great difficulties, and wc believe that the Chinese could have an independentcapability now or at least within the next year or so. However, without Soviet aid, we doubt that the Chinese can produce more complex AAM systems such as beam riders or radar homing typesumber of years.
Air -to-Surface Missile*
e believe that the Soviets probably agreed to provide ASUS to the Chineseas well as either BADGER Jet medium bombers (compatible with Soviet ASMs of up. range) or assistance In producing BADGERs. Recent photography of Wu-kung airfield revealed two BADGERs which they probably receivede do not believe that any BADGERs have been delivered to China since that time. There la no evidence that ASMs have been provided to the Chinese Communists. We doubt that they will be capable of producing ASMsumber of years without extensive aid, including entire production facilities. Moreover, if theare to achieve any significant ASM capability, additional delivery aircraft would be required. Aside from the two BADGERs, they have0 obsolete BULL piston medium bombers.
Space Programs
Chinese have expressed Interestan earth satellite, but there isofrogram. Althoughcould easily provide assistance forspace program, they are probablyat this time to participate in awould add materially to China'sWhenever tho Chinesecompetence with medium-rangethey mightecond stagetomall satellite primarilypurposes. The developmenta space launching system withoutwould be extremely difficult andseveral years. It Is possible thatwill produce and launch uppersounding rockets In the next few years.
Advanced Aircraft Delivery Systems
China's aircraftdevelopeda currentlyto be limited to the production ofSoviet Jet fighters, smallhelicopters. It Is possible that priorwithdrawal of Soviet technicians inthe Communist Chinese receivedtechnical assistance to enableproduce BADGERetwithin the next few years.superiority to the obsoletelead Communist China to producenumber ln order toorenuclear delivery capability. On theSino-Soviet relations might improveextent that the Soviets would beprovide some additional BADGERs toWc doubt that they willbombers or assistance in makingdo we believe that Commimlst Chinatoative programeavy bomber.
SECRET
table includes Soviet miaailaa which we believe may aav* been givao to Comiaaout China. Use poatititt transfer of otherol precluded. The desigmatsoeahrooa* relet tt sorfece-to-ourfaos baBbUe lisiiliiair missile (SAM) system.ndo air-lo-alr missilesndo an air-to-surface mualln (ASM).
the Sovtat armed force*
bonaoelel range Is given for SSMs. and msiimam slant range for th*ange for AAMs and lhes given fiom launching aircraft.
SAs believed lo have some capability up0 feet; minimum alliturfd capability average*O0 feet
noted, warhead -eights are fee either aa HE or endear payload We do stet believe that the Soviet* havehe Chinese.
' Plus speed of the launchine. aircraft.
Potential Target Coverage of Surface-To-Surface Missiles From Communist China's Borders
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