STUDIES IN
INTELLIGENCE
A collection ol articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects ol intelligence.
All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence arc those of
the authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in (he contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an aniclc's factual statements and interpretations
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A coaching by the voiceommonemergency.
YOU AND YOUR WALK-IN F. M. Begoura
. jtft&rn of Apprc^chhey have come Into our diplomatic missions, militaryother official establishments; they have come to non-official concerns, to private cltlwns; they have come to the local services and been turned over to us; they have walked in directly to our Intelligence field stations or to ourofficers under deep cover; they have walked inWhen they appear behind tbe Iron curtain, or more broadly speaking In hostile areas, the problems they pose may be exceedingly difficult to manage.
Our handling of walk-Ins over the years has ranged from very good to abominable. Out of this experience some aspectsalk-In case that are particularly sensitive to good or bad handling can be distinguished. They fall mainly Into the categories of advance preparation, first contacts, and early planning for exploitation.
Advance Preparation
Thereertain amount of preparation that can be done Beyond that, success depends on officer competence, usually acquired by experience. What characteristics does the school of human experience grind out? Herodotus said of Themis-tocles that he surpassed all others in the faculty ofmeeting an emergency. This is the characteristic we are looking for when it comes to handling walk-Ins Given officers with the necessary personalroperof the walk-In still requires preparatory steps within the field station, with. agencies, and with respect to foreign liaison.
Be ready for the unexpected. Within the station, there shouldsychological preparedness for walk-ins. Keep tuned to the possibilityalk-In may happen In your area at any moment. Latin America these days may be rela-
lively calm aa (ar as Soviets are concerned, but numbers of Castro's disaffected friends will be knocking at many different doors for some time to come. Times change in this respect We go through Soviet periods, Hungarian periods, Czech periods, Iraqi periods, Cuban periods.'
Know the ground rules. After attitude come the ground rules. Know the various prescribed operating procedures.
community these days are considerable; unless you are aware of the rules, the case can be hurt from the beginning. The CIA station chief, who, when an enemy Intelligence officerhimself, decides to leave the walk-in waiting while heeeting of the defector committee is needlesslyting his task. Time enough toeeting later; the espionage and counterespionage businessIAThis does not mean that the legitimate Interest of other agencies in the matter should be slighted, but the CIA officer must exercise Initiative and leadership.
Think in political terms. The newspaper headlines change from day to day. Mr. Khrushchev smiles or he scowls, he jeers or he jokes; the Iraqi and Cuban regimes fall or stand-such things form the political crux which In many instances has prompted the walk-In. Are weime of tension, with Khrushchev agitating about Berlin, or Mao threatening the Taiwan Straits? Thisifferencean comes in and says heoviet intelligence agent or working for the Chinese Communists. He Is played against thisWe alsoew dimension in certain areasof United Nations Interests. The political factor Is an important one to keep In mind.
Know the liaison equities. Know the do's and dont's with respect to the local foreign service. How far can you goconsidering the liaison relationship? In whatdo we feel that we must tell them, and when would holding out fall within acceptable risk? This applies particu-
' And the Berlin wall can be expected to cause many defectors who otherwise would have escaped In Germany to show up In diverse odd places around the world.
laxly In our larger stations that tend to be scctlonallxed:may have an external liaison unit that deals with the local services and an internal unit working on other activities. The walk-In may come to this latter, not the one dealing with liaison. Does It know what the real equities are? Its initial handling may prejudice the liaison reUtlonshlp and may hamper efficient subsequent handling of the walk-In
Prepare handling facUitttt in advance. There to nothing more disheartening than*an ad nJV*performance,^Ike the^ following: The telephone rings:
"We've got one I What about the house?"
"No, we can't use that bouse.'1
"Is there anyone who speaks Arabic?"
hink Joeew words of Albanian. Will that do?"
"No, not This guy only speaksou cant plan for everything, but you can planertain number of things. This may meanuiet Inventory of. organizations ln the area. Iserson In another Installation whoikely language? Maybe you have his name recorded and haveit of checking to avoid the ludicrous situation of having someone walk ln whom nobody can understand or question.inguistic inventory In advance.
it about how we transport people, how we guard them. Get the simple technical equipment ready, so that you can pick It up and go. Try toecure room set up, already bugged.tandard operatinga dusty bureaucratic one, but one that has beenew dry runs.tation of any site you may have certain officers that work together best. Earmark those officers for handling particular cases. These are tbe things that count in making the most of opportunities. Thinknilateral handling andiaison-type handling. You may have to use different officers, you may have to use different facilities; but prepare for It In advance. Don't get Joe and Charlie and Pete half way downtownar and then suddenly remember: "Oh my gosh, Charlie's never been exposed to tbe local Eddie, you go see If you can catch him before they get
down there,on't want himr Charlie has already arrived, and you ask yourself how to explain this one.
Work out walk-in procedures with our diplomaticmilitary installations, and other offices. It is tragic toood walk-In or defector turned away by some unwit. ting clerk when he tries to make contact with us.
See that reception procedures are made known to our con, tacbUfl the hostrdnto hopefully they will consult us if theyalk-In they cant handle If possible, we want to work up from this minimum, when w* get early access, to the point of guiding the liaison service and in effect directing the case. The custody problem isough one because we have no legal status We can get Into very sticky situations if we areall right throw him Into the cellar and well work him overouple ofit. In some areas you may Induce cooperationiaison service by feeding it Information derived from walk-ins In other areas. It may stop to reflect, "There's more to handling these walk-ins than Just throwing them In Jailand It may draw the correct conclusion that it should check with us the next time It has one.
First Contact
Many walk-In cases become successes or failures literally within the first five minutes. The Initial moment of contactost critical time, and this Is where the Intuitive reaction to emergencies Is Important. The case officer whose Instinct is lo go scuttling behind his cover for fear of being "provoked" is not likely toalk-in very well Ituestion ofalance between preservation of some security and possible operational gain. The right balance varies; behind the curtain, obviously, no matter how important thegain, security is paramount. In certain areas security Is muchactor. But Inevitably all first contacts Involve this search for balance.
Think In advance how you would operate within theof your cover, official or non-offlclal.alk-In should appear. How much leeway do you have within that cover to do the things discussed below? Next, and the decision can only be taken on the spot, consider where you may be able
foul
toorittle farther. Meeting the man outside In your car mayersonal indiscretion; talking with him inside an official Installation may lead to considerable dim-culty with respect to your cover agency. Most agencies dislike to have spy business done on the premises, but there are times when It has been done and has been well worth while.
What do you ask him? First, who is he? It Is surprising how many times this obvious requirement is honored ln the.uarteT*ong cab^flving sTiun" physical description but no name at all. In another the walk-in was reported to haveame but to have said Immediately that It was not bis real name. Was any probing made for lt? Any attempt to elicit It? Any attempt to get' documents? ittle tradecraft. If he says.on't give you mysk, "Well sir, do you have any means of Identification?" Maybe he says,ave my passport, but I'm not going to show you the name." He shows you the passport, and maybe you see the number. Or later in the conversation, he makes reference to "theser claims. "My report onave right here." ee that?
We are looking for Information that we can check. That is why we want the man'sand all theand that Is why we want him to write It out in his native script. The man has presented himself in Paris and his name is Kim and he claims toorean; how helpful In this in terms of tracing? Full names are particularly Important for Russians. Chinese Communists, and Satellite nationals-Headquarters' flies are Improving every day, andare fast. We have been ln the business for quite aof years; we haveot of cases. The Soviet service and the Chinese service may be ubiquitous, but so are we. Sometimes, through speedy cable communications, you can literally break the case while you are talking to the walk-In. In one Instance the data obtained from the walk-In was taken out of the meeting, slammed on the wire, checked, andwithin four hours; and the next Interrogator broke the man with the Information. We do have the facilities, but something has to be put Into the machine before you can get something back.
tout kVeaVa
Another point on checkable Information: attempt within the station to identify sources or check records that may throw immediate bght on the man who has walked in. For instance, if he says. "I'm an importer of Chinese art objects here insirectory of the Santiagoof Commerce?ook at the local phone book enables you to check some of the Information quickly Be
memorizing.
What is he? What does he profess to be. and what do you think he is? What position, what rank, what functions; what nationality? Surprisingly enough, headquarters gets some cables which omit any reference to nationality.
What does he want? Sometimes you hare to ask him. Some of our people tend to lurk behind their cover, talking busily but never quite getting to the point. Why does he want this? What is his claim In this respect and what do you think the real story is' Once more, are there any docu-menu; Is there any other evidence pointing to the real reason as against the professed reason?
Has he brought anything along? It Is sometimes forgotten to ask, "Now you say you're here for this. Do you havething with you that wouldnother aspect is to check whether he Is armed.oviet soldier came In buttoned upreatcoat. After an hour or so, he opened it because the room was getting warm, and you couldistol in each pocket. He was Anally convinced that he was in good hands and could safely relinquish his weapons.
Dont be afraid of alienating the walk-In by asking logical questions. He has come In with something in mind. Acalm attitude canot out of him. If you are dashing around the room barking orders and telephoning, the man who was not panicked when he came in will be after you have worked with him ten or fifteen minutes. Any walk-in Iserrific mental strain; this has been true In all cases we have had. One of your Initial alms, then, isto calm htmit.
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Your Wolk-m
Seme case officers axe put off by people who are dirty, who behave In an erratic manner, who reek of garlic, who seem offensive or disreputable. Our persona] prejudices should not be allowed to get in the way. The espionage business Is one of tension. The cork may blow any time,alk-Inerson whoense has blown his top. There haveumber of defectors, particularly Intelligence officers on the other side, who later did wind upanitarium. Re-gardjesj^ofjjany, humane aspects.-our busmSs^w'lth-'Sfelk-lns Is to achieve certain intelligence objectives. To do this, we have to dealery wide range of people, many of whom do not fit into normal patterns.
First, try toecure and quiet spot where you can talk. The embassy corridor Is not the place to discussget him off to one side. This is an essential part of preserving the securityossible operation. Walk-ins art very strange: the man who says that under no circumstances will he go back may in two hours, after you have worked on him. agree to return and stay in place. If only during that first ten minutes you had not kept talking to him in the corridor, and the official fromf the Ministry of the Interior who knows you had not come ln and seen you there! Thinking about the security of the operation, you come again to the risk point. Is there any risk Involved when you tell him to come on Into this particular office? Perhaps; but great undertakings do not succeed unless some risk Is taken. The business of espionage and counterespionagetaking some chances about certain things, Including one's personal cover. Though cowboyism Is not in order, reasonable chances can be taken.
A word aboutrovocation Is in essence an Inducement to act to your own disadvantage; but the term has taken on distorted meanings Officers sayidnt dareas afraid of beingont let thisscare you so much that you can't operate within your cover. If the object of the provocation is to see whether anyone In the cover Installation will talkan who comes ln and says, "I'mf the Polishhen the moment you shake his hand or say hello you've been provoked. An analysis of the possibility that this walk-In Is aattempt should be made as soon as time permits, but
not at the expense of initial development of the walk-in on the evidence at hand. Just keep in mind that provocation pays off for the opposition only when it is able toeaction on your part.evealing reaction, there can be no provocation.
The atmosphere of the Initial conversation should be friendly, businesslike, sympathetic, person-to-person. Limit the number of people In contact with the walk-In to thoseefuTite.Tscheme. He.,shoUld have,ne point of focus. At the beginning, If the man has been torn or blasted from his roots in whatever organization or culture he comes from, we want to giveoint upon which he can reassemble himself psychologically. It Is much -better, In general, not toost of Interpreters, or bosses, or clerks, dashing in and out. This distracts him.
Try to get along without an Interpreter, especially from outside the station. Many walk-Ins are antagonized by being outnumbered byf neither of you speaks the other's language but you both speak French poorly. It will be difficult, but probably not Impossible, to handle the case without outside help. Try to do it even at the risk ofit longer and at the risk of some misunderstanding unless you have your own linguist. You may want to act as ahandier, handling the case until the fluent Polish speaker arrives and takes over.
Try to establish some basis of rapport; we sometimesit too formal. The rapport mayrofessional one: the man may be an Intelligence officer and intelligencethe thing he wants to talk about. If this Is the topic of your Initial conversation, your attitude varies according to your cover. On the other hand, he may say, "That's astamp book you have on your desk.tamp collectoraybe this Is the time to take the heatust got some new Issues from Guinea; do you haveive him some tie to which to cling. Establish some basis of rapport even If it has toit contrived. Use your tradecraft and elicit things rather than beat them out of him.Don't be too impatient. The thing may be Important, time may be of the essence, but don't let it show. Balance the needs of the handling problem against the urgency of theAlmost without exception, the thing to do Is to
calm him down; you will find that what he saysighly emotional state contains many errors. Sometimes thebecomes very tight. For instance, the man comes in and Identifies himselfOB officer. He has been workingertain operation which you Immediately recognizease of your own. You Ye meeting the agent In an hour, and you're meeting himafehouse. This Is one of the situations that separate the men frprnthe boys In thejnatter of getting ^flrW*ruflgs%mi first W^-
The question ot asylum often comes up very early. It Isricky one. but sometimes needless difficulties are created. You dont hare to be able to say on the spot. "Yes, we are going to giveobhe walk-In Is pushing for it. always, and may say. as some hardnoses have. "Money, transportation, citizenship,ont talk. I'm not going to tell you anything unless you assure me that this Isill tell you that I'm an intelligence'm the resldenturaow you knowm. How about theont be thrown off guard first thing by this; recognise that he Is plugging for all he can get. Remember that you have some maneuverability. We should not make commitments'on which we will back down later. This Is true not only for moral reasons, but for highly practicalgets around.
So you walk the tightrope with respect to commitment on asylum. Tbe basic policy is to grant political asylum to any genuine defector from the Slno-Sovlet bloc. The key point Is that this does not necessarily mean asylum In our country. And the emphasis Is on any genuine defector: "Yes, you will be granted political asylum if you are what you claim to be, if you are not working for the othertc You have toot of hedging. Itery poor tactic to say, "Well take you to our country if you're valuableut It la extremely difficult toactic that works with everyone. Know the basic policy, and be preparedertain amount of maneuvering and bargaining, sometimes rather bizarre. It Is surprising how quickly tbe man comes down in his demands In order to get what he essentiallyfrom his former colleagues or masters.
Operational Planning
While talking to the man, start making plans. Try to begin the operational planning, even though you may not be the officer who will ultimately be responsible for It. Don't try to plan all the way through to the top echelon, but plan for the immediate future. Think about your own cover andand how long you are going to maintain yourtJJtude. Think about the political.about the local liaison aspects. Start ticking off to one side Items which have possible significance with respect to the walk-Ins bona Odes. Consider the provocation aspect. Look for indications that heabricator. Start an assessment of his value. And. most significantly of all. think about those aspects which have an essentially perishable nature.
Do any operational exploitation possibilities which he has directly Indicated or Implied appear to be perishable? Forsuppose be had just beenig farewell party for his brother case officer, who Is being transferred back to Russia, and this was what threw him over thethe other chap, who also hates the regime, la leaving In an houralf and he'd be all alone. This Is the time you might want to ask. "Now how about It, would he like to come overaybe you'dea answer. It wouldhame to let this wait three hours while you sit In the safehouse, and then have htm say.ish I'd called up my old friend Boris before he left thend you, caught short, "You mean he'd have come overhe was very
Will he return to nil Installation to obtain documents or materials* The key Items are cryptologlcal materials.an comes In and says, "I'm the code clerk" orun the machines In that room upon't say, "Very Interesting. Well get to that later. First tellable was once sent to headquarters sayingase appeared to have excellent psywar possibilities for exploitation against ahostile nation and the walk-ln's position in the embassy was that of codereal aberration In operationalFirst things first, and we are still hopefully going for the operational Jugular, which Is commo, commo-crypto.
four Walk-in
Obviously, what we'd most like is an In-place source If he will not stay in place, however, perhaps we happen to beosition toecent stitch job on the pads. We just might want him to go in and get them, bring them out lor an hour, two hours, three hours, and then take them back and leave
All intelligence agencies are at fault In that everyoneittle bit about something that by all the rules of the game he .shoiUdjnot,kncy^abput. This can^apply^sp in the sensitive field of conrnioerypto. The walk-in even fromthe com mo field might be able to supply the precise bit of Information that would break the code. You can get quick answers from headquarters on the business of Importantor materials, cryptologlcal materials especially.
One caution: don't use thisay of having him prove his bona fides. It doesn't prove his bona fides necessarily and it may Just boot the whole case out the window.
Will he return to his installation as an agent? We are far more Interested In ln-place agents than we are ln defectors. Ifercent rule, this Is aboutercent true thesean has to be atigh level before we really want himefector rather than in place. The penetration Is the guts of the business as far as we areThe defector Is valuable, but his knowledge ability with respect to current Information Is obviously dead thehe leaves his Installation The In-place source Is the one that truly puts us In business.
Will he undertake an operational mission? The mission might be to contact someone else, or to trap or enticeelse from the Installation. It might be to Induceto move to the point where we could trap himun at him. Occasionally the walk-in can serve as tbe catalyst for putting to operational use material that has been months in the collecting. We have had our target selected, have gathered quantities of data, but have never been able to get an approach to him.alk-In appears who can provide this missing link.
WUl he write orriend? There are always new twists to the well-worn letter and telephone technic, ues. Occaslonally you can put the recipient on the spot, especially If you have compromising information. Does he report the
letter In which you make reference to certain things he would not want his superior to know about? You would have told him. In essence, "If you dont bring this to the attention of your chiefs, we will. Wellopy to the homeometimes hell come over, sometimes not. In any case you have made him extremely uncomfortable.
What does thU do to other operation*? An aspectthat ahoulfcbe corisldered^early.iWfche lm- -
mediate effect on our own cases when the hostile serviceaware of the defection. Can it affect our double agents or penetrations of this service or of other targets? Does It influence the conduct of our staff officers or contract agents? Once an Important Soviet defection culminatingeries seemed to raise the temperature so high that we reluctantly put armed guards at all meeting! with penetration or double agents, fearing assassination to be not beyond the realm of possibility.
What effects might there be on our operational techniques? The mere fact of the defection gives rise to security scrutiny in the opposing service, and the security review of the ease may lead to an erroneous conclusion that the only way we could have got to the man was through technical means This results in tighter audio countermeasures which In turn may affect our other operations. One of the saddest things In CI work la to have the opposition draw the rightfor the wrong reasons.
Perishable and Priority Information.
Has he Information In the CRITIC category? It Is within the range of possibility, and should be looked for. But the Information has to be of vital top-level interest to meet CRITIC criteria. We would look rather silly dashingRITIC cable Just to announce that so-and-so walked in. On the other hand,oviet army officer comes In and says, 'Tomorrow at Ave o'clock In the morning we're closing the ring around Berlin, and that'sant outhen get It on the wireurry. Use common sense; dont panic.
Priority CI information? He may have Information onpenetration of our Installations. The opposition's key targets are In our own country. Does the man say his service has two agents in our headquarters? Find out who they are
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andable on the way. Next In importance arebehind the Curtain. If be can identify any persons In these who are opposition targets, flash the Information back to headquarters. In some Instances we have done quite well in getting the Information to our authorities In time to have the target Individuals pulled out. He Is likely to know Instances of enemy control of our *nts-n jjOpppal-Intelllgence semcenas told us of at least one man who had been doubled against us, In one startling case the officer Interviewing the walk-In was making notes, and the walk-in noticed he was left-handed.ew minutes he said, "You. must be Captainhe officer nearly collapsed; this was the cover name he used in handling our most sensitive penetration of the Soviet target. It developed that the walk-in had been running the agent against us from the
High on the priority list also Is information about special techniques, particularly audio and other devices, being used against us. The walk-in mayome from the technical support laboratory. Last week we finished Installing ln your Cairoew type of cavityew this or that It Is in the ambassador's office. It uses an entirely different principle,tc.
Assessment of Bona Tides
Exhaustive psychological assessment isrerequisite to operational use of the subject; the ultimate explanation of the man's motivation is not an essential for his effective use. We try to get the best practical assessment In advance. It may be advisable to take some risks, and balanced Judgment is required. The motivations of all of us could be subjected to considerable scrutiny, and we might not at the endong series of Interrogations havetory satisfactory from all angles. This does not keep us from being reasonablyofficers.
There is no cut-and-dried means to assess people. The longer one has lived the more one knows about people. The more experience one has had in intelligence operationswith Intelligence people the better one should be able to assess them. We can have the psychiatrist look at the man,
Vow/ Walk-in
we may utilize the polygraph; but the essential thing is the assessment by the handling officer.etsumber of the assessment techniques, questions, etc. for walk-ins. These are sound pragmatic guidelines as far as they go. Other points for consideration are: Does his story ring true? Over-all, Is It plausible, Is it likely, is Itbut possible, or Is it all but impossible? Still one does
willertain ring to his story.
Does he appear to be what he claims he Is? Does hisappearance Jibe with his claim? Howmabout hisThe way he phrases his thoughts? *Hls vocabulary? Does he claim toere salesman and then start talking about dead drops, doubles,selativelye evasive; glib; apathetic; confused? Watch out for possible misinterpretation due to languageThere are people who may be very smooth In thelr natlve language butomewhat different personality In another. This presents some difficulty In the assessment process.
What kind of person does he appear to beeneral psychological viewpoint? Is he mentally tough? Is heIsharmeroor? Does he talk like the nuclear physicist that he claims to be? Does he talkan who has three doctor's degrees? What type ofhave you been able to establish with him? How smoothly has It gone? Is It man to man? Is It professional? Some of these mayittle out of line as strictly litmus-type tests of bona fides, but since you are the person in contact your reactions inevitably come into the assessment.
Are there any Indications that he has been sent by another service? How about hisven the best-planned provocation operations have little points of weakness. Turn
'Technical analysts eaay raqulra two weeks tor exhaasUve examlna-Uon of Identity documents, but preliminary analysis,UM latins of Ink and paper samples can be done ua two days. Borneumcs imperfecUoos are deliberately IntrodocedalsadocumenU to mislead us. In Imitating tbem. Into tfrtni away our own agents. See David V. Brtgane'iride or False" in Studies IV I. p.f.
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that nrouri'i are there any Indications that he was not seni by another service? Has he divulged any Information so sensitive in our evaluation that It Is unlikely another service would use It as build-up material in the case? If the man comes in and says I'm corning over from such-and-suchservice, and you say what's your position and what are your operations, and he reels off twenty operations ln some particular country, two here, Jwo^thgrc. jipreUuUVanyuch In order to build up thean comes In and says here is the story on the Soviet atomic energy program at such andlace, chapter andot of Itor we canot from lt Is It likely" that the-Soviets would give away so much material in order to try to establish the bona fidesortion of the bona fidesan?
Are there any Indications that heabricator? Many of us have been taken In by fabricators. Their generalis to over-sell. The man docs not merely have theplans for weapons deployment by rail; he Justalso to have, access to the missile designs, he happens to have this and he happens to have that He does not have Just one source sitting In some outlying province but hehole net of twenty-five people.
Is there any Indication that the walk-In Is mentallyThis may not mean that he has no value. It Just may mean that heougher handling problem and that hebe used for certain things.
Some Don'fi forzndlen
Don't bring non-staff personnel Into the affair unless It Is absolutely necessary. Don't expose more staff personnel than necessary either. Convenience is not enough; better to sweat with him for three or four hours than to bring inmerely because It Is convenient
Dont leave the walk-In alone Otherwise he may dash out and hopaxi, you trailing along behind trying to get him back. Every time this rule has been broken It has been one of tbe major contributing factorsreat flap There has seldomalk-in who at one time or another fairly
early In the game did not have second thoughts, andIt he isosition to go back he will. Ii you are there with him maybe he can be talked out of it, or maybe he Just won't have the guts to get up and try to walk out the door. Don't leave him alone.
Don't make specific commitments on the visa business. Don't try to convert the walk-in from Communism o-
ht-to1offlaM' waS#&pposed*to debrief* the defecting intelligence officer about what he did for the service. He spent the first hour arguing about the horrors of Communism to this chap, whoardenedandairly hardened Intelligence officer. The walk-In was not convinced; in fact he figuratively keptthe interviewer over his shoulder and throwing him. They wound up almost at blows. We are not trying tothem overnight. What we want from them Initially fe Information. Their political attitude may be changed later, or maybe never.
Don't press him for an immediate signature of the asylum statement. On the other hand, if he volunteers or shows no great resistance, by all means get It sooner rather than later. In some circumstances you can say "Fine,an assure you now that you have been granted generalasylum; would you please,ome walk-Ins do not want to sign ithile, some may not be Interested In signing itery long time, and some never. Most will eventually.'
Don't become so psychologically intoxicated by the glamor of It all and by your own tremendous performance that you drop your guard. With an enemy intelligence officer one might succumb to the temptation to discussomplicated double agent case he had handled from
handwritten and signed statement requesting asylum, de. nounelng the defectors own government, and affirming that if be reappears in IU Jurisdiction It will be because he has been kidnapped affords us considerable protection PenetraUon agents and provoca-teurs usually are most reluctant to sign such papers; the signedreduces the chances of redefecUon; and it protects us against charges ol kidnapping or coercion.
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ihe other side. Pretty soon you are needlessly telling hlra how you handled your side of It.
Don't give the walk-In material for feed-back. This ishazardous when you may be dealing with aThe clever fabricator putsittle bit. you pounce on It and Indicate to him your area of interest, etc. Some fabricators have had our officers on the hookouple of weeks simply by running from one session to anotherting "for'each from the material they received at the last. -
Dont send half-baked cables to headquarters. Calmittle and take time to prepare one carefully. Itood Idea to get your cables out fast In certain situations, but don't drown headquartersot of words that stillot convey the essential detail.
Original document.
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