THE CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION AND OUTLOOK IN LAOS

Created: 5/14/1962

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

THE CURRENT MILITARY. SITUATION AND OUTLOOK IN LAOS

note: this is the enal version of the estimate and additional text will not be circulated.

approved for puiase date:1

Central Intelligence Agency

Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff, and the Director of the National Security Agency.

Concurred in by the

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

onConcurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; TheDefense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operationsepartment of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; and the Director of the National Security Agency^ The Atomic Energy Commissionto the USIB ,and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their Jurisdiction.

CUSS1FICATION OF TITLE IS OFFICIAL USE ONIY WHEN USED SEPARATELY

WARNING

material contain) information affecting the National Detente of the United State) within the meaning of the espionageSC., the tram-minion or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

lit2

SUBJECT: SHU #THE CUKH5ET MILITARY SITUATION AND OUTLOOK IN

LAOS

THE PROBLEM

To assess tbe military situation and outlook and to estimate Communist short-run Intentions in Laos.

THE ESrOtVTE

I. THE SITUATION

1. Following tho rout of Nam The, Laotian Government influence has been virtually cllnflanted from all of north and northwestern Laos. Luang Prebang is still in government hands, Its last main avenue of supply, which ran froa Thailand through Ben Houel Sal and down the Mekong, has been Interdicted eastward free Pak Bong. Cceramist unite have been for some time in key positions about the city and could take it at

will. Many of tho Laotian troops defeated at Han Tba have crossed the Mekong at Ban Houoi Sal and are assembling In northern Thailand forback to Laos. Among tbe eight Royal Laotian Government (RLG)at Ram Tha ware Phoumi's three best paratrooper units. Thetroops vill have to be regrouped, retrained, and largely re-equipped. Their morale has been shattered and their coabet effectiveness is, at present, nil.

2. The defeat at Baa Tha and the subsequent forced withdrawal into Thailand following the ndlltary reverses during January further undermine the morale of the Laotian Government forceshole. Extensive Worth Vietnamese troop participation and unfounded gorernaent claims of direct Chinese Communist military involvement have almost certainly contributed to the demoralization of the Lao Army. 8vents of the past weekthe ineffectiveness of the Laotian Army and emphasize its lack of motivation and will to resist. They underscore tbe continuing weakness of army leadership on all levels of command. The most effective element in fighting tbe Communists is the Meo guerrilla whose harassing efforts are pinning down several Communist battalions in northeastern Laos. We believe that the Laotian Army is not capable ofetermined enemy attack anywhere in the country.i/

1/ (See next page for footnote)

OF GOVERNMENT AND ANTIGOVERNMENT GROUND FORCES

(before Bam Tha attack)

North Vietnamese regulars

Kong La (Souvanna Phouaa)

Kbam Ouane (Souvanna Phouma)

Pathet Lao

Northwesternbos

Northeasternbns

Vientianebns

South Centralbns

Southernbns

Antlgovernment

nsO)

nsL)

8 bns (ItL)

RV,L)

7 bns (PL)RV bns shown in south central Laos may have shifted to scuthern Loos.)

In addition to the units mentioned, the antlgovemment forces have numerous artillery or mortar support units and smaller Infantry units which operate generally as guerrillas. The government also has several artillery econnaissance battalion, as well as the Meo irregulars operating behind the enemy lines in northeastern Laos.

3. Over the past few mouths, the termination of US financial aid hasonsiderable psychological impact on the Laotian Government leadership. It has also had an adverse effect on the urban economy. Tbe Boun Oum government probably could limp along financiallyew months longer, nevertheless, this US action and the US attitude since Ham The probably have convinced some key Laotian elements of the US determination to withdraw support from Phoumi and to bringoalition government. Moreover, we believe that the course of recent events must lead to some diminishing of Phouml's prestige. Whereas his intransigent attitude had gained considerable support among tbe more vocal elements of the Laotian Government during the earlier part of the year, hie failure to rallyabroad, particularly in Thailand, and his recent military defeats, particularly the one at Nam Tha, must result in considerable loss ofin his leadership. There is little chance that the present Laotian Government Is capable of mustering sufficient enthusiasm or strength to overcome its recent military and political reverses. No oppositionhas yet emerged, and Phouml's control still appears to be intact. Be will seek to salvage his position by pointing out that he was absent from Laos during the Nam Tha affair, that the rout was due to Chinese Cceramist and North Vietnamese military participation, and that tbe US haswithdrawn support from him and applied sanctions which havehis capability to act. Many Laotians will be disposed to accept

these explanations. On the other hand, dissatisfaction Bay reachoint that there nay be an attempt within the government and/or army to decrease the Influence of Phoumi and his followersove toovernment more willing to come to an agreement with the neutralist and Communist elements.

TJ. COMMUNIST DETENTIONS

k. The Communist attack in the northalculated, veil-planned move. It almost certainly was concurred in by the three Communist powers concernedHanoi, Peiplng, and Moscow. In reaching their decision to mount the attack the Communist powers almost certainly considered that the risk of US Intervention in Laos had lessened significantly and that they could increase the level of military operations In pursuing their They probably were fully confident that the military capabilities of the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces in Laos were superior to those of the Laotian Government forces. They had probably become impatient with the lack of progress toward the establishmentoalition Furthermore, they are probably concerned over the Implications of the sharply increased role of the US in South Vietnam.

5. We believe that the attack probably vas designed toocal tactical opportunity in northwest Laos. The Communists

probably calculated that the defeat of the Hex Tha garrison and the loss of the town would contribute to the demoralization of tha Laotian Army and RLG. Moreover, Ham Tha la strategically critical for tho control of north and western Laos. In addition, the Caamunists, particularly the Chinese, probably considered Kan The in Laotian Government hands as an impediment to the expansion of their Influence in Phong Saly and among the hill peoples of northwestern Laos and northern Thailand.

6. It is possible that the Ham Tha attack may indicate that the Ccnmunist side has lost Interestegotiated settlement and written off tbe ideaoalition government under Souvanna Phouma In favore_ factoampaign of gradual military conquest, or an all-out offensive. Peiping and Hanoi have been scoevhat less willing than Moscow to settleoalition government. Moreover, in the light of the Increased OS commitment in South Vietnam, Moscow may have becomethat more aggressive Communist military action in Laos was However, we continue to believe that the Nam Tha attack and the pursuit of the fleeing Laotian Army troops did not mark the beginning of an immediate military drive to seize all of Laos. Nor do we believe that the Communist side would, in terms of the present line-up of forces, be willing to settlee facto partition.

7- In the Communist view, the attack on Nan Tha probably did not foreclose further negotiationsolitical settlement or coBprccise Souvannaotential leaderoalition government. They could argue that Souvanna was not in Laos; he publicly "disapproved" of the attack; and his troopa did not participate. Indeed, the Communists may have estimatedictory at Ham Tha would enhance the possibilities of .enewed negotiations and, in addition, Improve their bargaining position.

8. Although the rout of the government forces at Nam Tha andmay have been more cweeping than the Ccomiuniats expected, their victory will very soon be reflected in their military and political With respect to the resumption of negotiations and the terms for agreement, the CoDmunistB vill probably leave the initiative to tha other side andtiffer attitude. In the absence of effective military response to the Ram Tha action, which we believe is beyond the capabilities of the Laotian Government forces, or of significant progress toward agovernment, there vill be an increasing likelihood that the Ccrnrcunlotn will undertake offensive operations on the scale of Nam Tba elaevhere In Laos.

$, Tho Communist forces will probably follow up their capture of Nam Tba by clearing the entire area of north and northeast Laos offorces and consolidating their control over tbe area. The Coarnunlst

forces, perhaps with the Kong Lc troopse role, nay further tighten their circle around the lightly-held royal capital, Luang Prabang, increasing the pressure on tha King who has, thus far, supported Phoumi. Xt is possible that Cccinunlot forces may cross the Mekong west of Luang Prabang and occupy Sayaboury province which lies between the Mekong and theborder. ove would sharply raise the level of Thai concern. Troop movements and attacks on outposts recently reported in south Laos suggest that Ccemunist forces may soon seize Saravene and Attopeu to.secure the overland route between North and South Vietnam. These major outposts are already virtually surrounded and neither would be likely to hold out long under attack. We still do not believe, however, that the Communists will seize the major towns along the Mekong remaining in Laotian Government hands, at least until they have had time to assess the political and military effects in Laos of the recent moves and any US reaction.

Original document.

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