CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AOENCY OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The Presidential Election In Poru
SUMMARY
1. The leading contenders for the Peruvlen presidency In the election to be held onune arc:
Raul HAYA de laofarty comparable toin Venezuela as advocatingreform through political action inthe Alliance for Progress and an effectiveoormunlem and Castroism in peasant, labor,circles.
BELAONDEopportunist who also professes to advocate
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MANDATORY REVIEW
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DOCUMENT v
reform, but has conducted his campaignanner calculated to attract all who hate and fear APRA, Including both the privileged classes and the Communists.
Neither candidate nowlear lead ln the race, APRA has long bsen regarded as the most popular party In Peru, able to win in any free electionItB support secured the election of President Pradoelaunde, however, gavelose run in thatand his present campaign has aroused an Impressive popular response. We are unable to predict the outcome, but we consider the election of Belaunde toefinite possibility.
APRA faces the additional hazard that the military may act to prevent the election or the inauguration of Haya de la Torre. The reaction of senior officers to the idea of APRA's coming to power Ib conditioned by their recollection of its earlier radicalism and violence. Having themselves fought with and persecuted APRA in times past, they can expect no favor from an APRA Although it ia not certain that they could carry
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the younger officers with them in an outright coup, they probably will attempt in soma way to prevent an Hay* victory, possibly by utilizing their responsibility for policing the election to falsify the results.
DISCUSSION
5. Perurime exampleatin American country slowly edging towards social revolution. The central question is whether moderate reformers have the capacityand will have the opportunityto set in motion the changes necessary toiolentwithout at the same timeilitary coup by tha conservative elite. The national elections of
une will be important in determining whather the moderate reformers willhance to try their hand during the next six years.
BACKGROUND
6. Peru is run by an oligarchy (mainly whites In Lima and the coastalhe armed forces, and the
Church. The middle class Is growing, but Is notajor force in society. Over half of Peru's eleven million people are illiterate, impoverished Indians who speak their own languages and liveubsistence basisemifeudal land tenure system apart from modern society.* Most of the mestizos, who make uphird of the population, live little better than the Indians, although many of them form part of the large urban labor element.
7. Peru has an abundance of natural resources and an economic growth rate of about six percent (the annual population increase is half ofut the benefits of the economy flow most generously to the middle and upper classes. Per capita national Incomebout the lowest in the hemisphere; only Haiti, Bolivia, and Paraguay have lower figures. The country suffers from extremely limited land resources. Good land is scarce in the mountain regions. Redistribution of the coastal
Aboutercent of the total cultivated area is owned by less than two percent of all landowners.
agricultural lands would Interfere with export crops, 2nd opening the eastern part of the country would require substantial funds for colonization and roads.
the oligarchy's firm resistance to
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change, the social and economic fabric of the country Is gradually breaking down. The peasantry has for many ye^.rs beon pushing against urban and rural wealth. There is unrest among the campesinos on the large haciendas and land-hungry peasants sporadically make Incursions on the private estateson some occasions encouraged bywho work among them. Landless peasants sre moving In large numbers Into the slums and squalor surrounding the coaatal cities (about half of Lima's million inhabitants reside ln the barrladaa) and the tenements areas ln which they live are becoming the arena for agitation against the status quo.
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has usually been ruled bywhich could bo displaced only bychanges which have occurred have takenthe ruling oligarchy and have normallyby the military without much civil disturbance.
Periods of constitutional government have been brief, and democracy as tha US thinks of it has little maanins to most Peruvians. Nevertheless, for almost six years the duly elected government of President Manuel Prado has held sway. If it goes out on schedule onuly, it will be the first elected government In Peru to have run its full term.
10. Presidentember of the traditional oligarchy, gained office by means of an electoral alliance with the broadly based and radical /iPRA party, which controls the present Congress. Despite this obligation to APRA, the essentially conservative Prado administration has done little to cope with the basic social and economic problems of Peru. However, Prado is leaving the government in exceptionally good fiscal condition, largely because of the stabilization program of former Premier Beltran, new investment, and good export markets. Public finances are ln order. Monetary stability is unquestioned. The balance of payments shows
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a record surplus ofillion and privateboth foreign and domesticleigh level. ^
THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE ELECTIONS
11. In June Peru willresident, two vice-Presidents, and an entirely new bicameral& The choice will be up to about two million literate Peruvians, mainly city folk. Seven presidential candidates are seeking power, but only three have any chance of winning. These are:(a) Victor Raul Haya de layear old founder of Allanza Popular Revolutlonarlo Americanab) Fernando Belaunde Terry, personable head of Acclon Popularnd (c) ex-generol and former dictator-President Manuelf the Union Naclonal Odrllstaxcept fornd the Christian
1 total US private investments amounted4 million orercent of all private Total foreign investment from nil sources came8 million. Almost all tha copper, oil, iron ore industries, and most of the lead, zinc, and sugar industries, are US-owned.
In order to win theandidate mustlurality of at least one-third of the total valid votes cast. If no candidate wins this plurality, the new congress in Joint session chooses the winner frcra among the three contenders polling the highest number of votes.
Democratic Party, all parties are the personal machines
of their candidates, pulled together principally to capture
the government.
12. APRA began its careerears agoadical ond violent revolutionary organization. As such lttrong popular following, but was repeatedly driven underground by the Peruvian military. Like Acclon Democratica in Venezuela, however, APRA's character has changed as its leaders have matured. It now seeks to achieve, by politicalundamental but evolutionary reform compatible with the Alliance for Progress. Its principal support comeo from these middle and lower class elements who consider it tha only hope forhange. It is the principal opponent of communism and Castroism In peasant, labor, and student circles, and in the streets. It dominates the predominantly mestizo Peruvlen labor movement and is the only political party with organized support throughout the country. Its greatest support has been in northern Peru, but there are indications that it has begun to attract significant support in the south alBo.
13. AFRA is making its present bid for power with
Important handicaps. Because of its radical past, most members of the traditional ruling group fear and hate it far more than they do the Communists, considering
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toreater and more immediate danger to their position. On the other hand, APRA'fl politicalwith the conservative Prado administration haa alienated some of its former followers who feel that it has betrayed Its revolutionary ideals. Haya's opponents are exploiting this sentiment by pointing to the Prado and Beltran men included in APRfl's congressional slate in order to disarm rightist fears. In addition, APRA'I known friendship toward the US, while reassuring to many, has made It vulnerable to the demogaglc charge of having sold out to the Yankees.
1*. Acclcn popular (AP) was formed by Belaunde
after ho came close to defeating Prado Beleunde's political career Is thntan determined tc become President at almost any cost. The nucleus of his support is among middle class professionals and among APR/.'s enemies. Belaunde presents himself ands liberal
and reformist, but he apparently has no fixed political philoaophy; what "reform" means to him is unclear. He professes friendship for the US and indeed his principal advisors are not anti-US or pro-Coramunir.t. However, heilitant nationalist out for the leftist vote, including that of disaffected Aprlstas, and he has not chosen to disclose his position on any foreign policy Issue.
15. Belaunde has recontly attempted to disassociate himself from charges of working with Communists in the campaign. He evidently has done this in part because he fears that his vagueness about communism was dcirjj him more harm than good, and in part ln deference to the Important support he is receiving from conservative quarters. Nevertheless, he probably expects to retain the support ho haB received from Communista and pro-Communists, and he seems unlikely to drop them from his party's parliamentary lists. Moreover, Belaunde probably believes that he can control the Communists when this becomes necessary.
Union Domccratica Odrllstc (TWO) IsIn outlook, and conservative money Isfor the lavish financing of its campaign. Theseems tailored to attract votes from groupsdivergent political views. Odrla almostmade It known in conservative quarters that heof reform in terms of projects designed tointerests in ttie least possible way, but hesupport social and economic reform In keeping with He still commands considerable strength among
the poor peopleespecially in the Lima slumswho credit him with the greater prosperity which existed under his rule. Odria also finds some support among the CcmmunistB, whom he used against APRA when he was In office,umber of Communists are on the UNO congressional slate.
rty is illegal in Paru. embers. It tried and faileda number of small extremist groups into a Its members do, however, engage inand propaganda activities among Libia's poor
and among agricultural laborers. It dominates the student federation, has penetrated organized labor, and is working hard in the south. It has penetrated both Belaunde's and Odrla's parties. There are aboutommunists and pro-Ccmmunists on Belaunde'selection slates, and about eight on Odrla's.
ELECTORAL PROSPECTS
No candidate nowlear lead In the race. APRA has long been regarded as the most popular party in Peru, able to win in any free election, but Belaunde gavelose run6 and his campaign this year has aroused an impressive popular response. Odria is trailing. He is said to havehysical and mental breakdown. If he were to withdraw, most of hla support would probably go to Belaunde. We are unable to predict the outcome, but we consider the election of Belaunde toefinite possibility.
APRA faces the additional hazard that the military may act to prevent the election, or theof Haya de la Torre. The reaction of senior officers
to the Idea of APRA's coming to power la conditioned by tholr recollection of its earlier radicalism and violence. Having themselves fought with and persecuted APR/ ln times past, thoy would expect no favor fromn office. They have already warned that thay will not tolerate an APRA government. Recent events in Argentina probably have caused them to consider the merits of eliminatingefore, rather than after, the electionsespecially if it appeared that Haya would win. Charges of fraud in the campaignsome incidents have already been confirmedcould 3erveretext, however flimsy, for the military to press for postponing or annulling the elections.
20. On the other hand, there probably are manyajoritywho are not so hostile toward APRA as the senior officers. There may evenew who are prepared to work with lt. APRA's moderate behavior during Prado's tenure, ond its clear-cut campaign against communism, must favorablyart of the officer corps, particularly those younger officers who never knewn lta earlier, more radical
days. The Cuban revolution almost certainly has marie nvny sit back and ponder the benefits oflearly anti-Communist party in power. Even those most bitter against APRA probably are wondering whether or not they want to rick the public disorders likely to result from military interference.
these various factors may serve tosenior officersold attempt to seize power from
n duly-elected APRA President and Congreo believe that those ln control of the military establishmentunless they are subjected to greater restraintswill take some action to provont or deny an Aprista victory. They could, for example, see that false returns were reported, since they have the responsibility for policinglections.
PROSPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS
of the major candidates has laid downprogram of government. However, APRAto make the most determined effort to followparallel to that jnviclcnod ln the Alliance An APRA government would probably be similar
to that of Bctancourt in Venezuelaand would face similar problems. clon DemocroticaPRA once provoked the overthrowovernment which its support had brought to power by pushing reform too far too fast. This experience explains its moderation during Pmdo's administration. In office, it would probably show more initiative than Prado has, but it would be careful not toilitary reaction. Nevertheless, APRA ia committed to social and economic reform, with special attontion to the Indian problem, and to encouraging private anterprlse, including foreign investment. Moreover,robably would have enough ser>ts in the legislature and enough competent leaders and technicians to Implement Its Some Important business elements already ore preporod to support It.
23. overnment by the AP or the UNO probably would mean special problems for tho US. Belaunde, like Hoyn, has acme troinod personnel ln his party, but, given his inclination to ^eal with people of all political persuasions, he probably would be influenced by extremists in his following. While Belaunde might try to work out
some kind of nodus Vivendi with APRA, he would also be likely to work with Coiaraniets when lt suite'1 hlc pur^oooo. Moreover, if he failed tcarliamentary majorityos seems likelyhe would have considerable difficulty ln making his government work.
2k. Whereas APRA has cast its lot with tho US, Belaunde has thus far steered clear of foreign policy commitments. Deaplte his private professions of Interest ln the Alliance pnd of friondnhip for the US, the Communist infiltration in his party and the mrnncr in which he has conducted himself in recent years suggest that he might turn out toew neutralist leader inaerica.
25. Judging by Odrla's performance in office8e is devoted to old-fashioned Latin American conservatism and would not be an effective partner in the
lllonce. Even though heriend of the US and of US business during his ocrller admlniotrotion, he would probably fall back on the ultranationalism used in his campaign to coverailure to effect reforms. The
Inclusion of several Communist candidates on his slate makes it probable that the far left would have his ear on occasion, especially when APRA stood in his way. Thus, it seems clear that another Odrla tenure would onlytep backward for Peru.
FOR THE BOARD OP NATIONAL ESTIMATES t
M
SR3RHAN KENT Chairman
Original document.
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