V 2
t/fWgT
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
The Situation and Prospects in Cuba
Ulbmiffeo br fha DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by lha UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
Ai indico'ed overleaf
2
Sj'PftQ'/SD PORtrPlfA'M
OCT 9
fne following intelligence organizations participated in jhe preparation
The Central Intelligence Agency and lhe intelligence organizations of lhe Deport-menu of Stale, Defense, ihoj*ir"ForcV'Jne Joint Staff, the- FBI, and NSA. "- "
Concurring
Director of Intelligence ond Research.
Direclor. Defense Intelligence Agency' Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department erf the Army Assistant Chief of Naval Operolionsepartment of lhe Navy *
Operation!epartment of theChief of Slaff, ,
Director for Intelligence, Joint Slaff :;
Assistant Direclor, Federal Bureau ofof ihe Notional Security Agency iV ".
" .n
Tne Atomic Energy Commission Representative to theof hii;
(
ET
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PROBLEM
FOREWORD
AND CONCLUSIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
9
n. CASTRO'S RELATIONS WITH THEX THE UNITED PARTY OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLU-
TION
IV. THE MASS
V. PROPAGANDA AND
VI. INTERNAL SECURITY
VTI. THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED2 VIII. THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ECONOMY AND
THE
IX. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND. POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARD THE 19
XI. ORGANIZED
XIL CASTROISM IN LATIN
XLTJ. INTERNATIONAL
XIV. THE OUTLOOK FOR THE
ANNEX
f
4*
THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA
THE PROBLEM
To analyze the situation in Cuba and the relationships of the Castro regime with both the Soviet Bloc and the Latin American republics, and to estimate the prospects over the next year or so.
FOREWORD
Cuba is now, in eflect, surrounded by an iron curtain. Our information on internal developments is not as complete or as reliable as we could wish. On some important matters, it is seriously inadequate. These deficiencies are expressly noted where applicable in the text of this,. In general, the informationis sufficient to support the estimate. The estimate will be under continuing review as additional information is obtained.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
he pattern of events in Cuba clearly reveals thestep by step Communist procedure for attainingcontrolountry. During the past year Cuba has, in effect, gone behind an iron cu:tain. The regime has thoroughly reorganized its political, economic, police, and military systems in the classic Communist ideological fashion. It has also sought to identify itself with the Soviet Bloc in terms that would obligate the USSR to protect it. The Bloc, however, has avoided any explicit military commitment to defend Cuba. )
)
In Cuba there is in process ofingle party organization essentially Communist in character. It isto be the means of directing and controlling theof the government, the economy, and the massthrough which revolutionary indoctrination and leadership are transmitted to the people. Fidel Castro will presumably be the titular head of this organization, but the real political power in Cuba Ls likely to be vested in aleadership including Castro but dominatedroup of veteran Communists. Some degree of friction is probable in this relationship, but an open conflict is highly unlikely.)
The regime has sought to commit the Cuban people to positive personal Identification with it through propaganda, indoctrination, and mass organizations. At the same time, it haservasive system of surveillance and police control. )
The forces available to the regime to suppressor repel invasion have been and are being greatlywith substantial Bloc assistance through theof materiel and instruction. Cuban militaryhowever, are essentially defensive. We believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with strategic weapon systems or with air and naval capabilities suitable for major independent military operations overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the Bloc will station in Cuba combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate This attitude would not preclude the liberal provision of Bloc advisers, instructors, and service personnel, the provision of such defensive weapons and equipment as surface-to-air rnissiles and radars, and such Improvement of Cuban naval and air facilities as would enable them to service Soviet units.)
state has taken over the direct control of alleconomic activities in Cuba, and has developedelaborate organization for
uba is now faced with an economic crisis attributable in large part to an acute shortage of the convertible foreign exchange required to finance greatly needed imports ofand of replacement parts for machinery andof US origin. The Blocuaranteed market for Cuban sugar and minerals, and supplies foodstuffs, other consumers' goods, and industrial raw materials in return, but not in sufficient quantity to meet Cuba's needs. The Bloc has also extended credits for Cuban industrial development, but the actual implementation of these projects Is slow. Castro has now told the Cuban people that they face years of privation. )
The initial popular enthusiasm for the revolution has steadily waned. Many men who fought against Batista have been alienated by the even more dictatorial character of the Castro regime and its increasingly Communist complexion. The vaunted agrarian reform has done little to improve the lot of the peasants Moreover, people are becoming fed up with the privations, exactions, and regimentation thatlife in Castro's Cuba.
Nevertheless, Fidel Castro and the Revolution retain the positive support of atuarter of the population. The hard core of this support consists principally of those who nowested interest in the regime: the newclass and the Communists These are reinforced by the substantial numbers of Cubans, especially those in the mass organizations, who are still under the spell of Castro's charismatic leadership or are convinced the Revolution has been to their advantage )
There is active resistance in Cuba, but it is limited,unsupported, and desperate. The regime, with all the power of repression at its disposal, has shown that it can contain the present level of resistance activity.)
The majority of the Cuban people neither support the regime nor resist it, in any active sense. They areand resentful, but apparently hopeless and passive, resigned to acceptance of the present regime as the effective
4#
)
4*
government in being with which they must learn to live for lackeasible alternative. )
The next year or two willritical period for the Castro regime.2 sugar crop will be the smallest in years; the difficulty of acquiring convertible foreignwill be greater than ever. Want of convertiblewill limit Cuba's ability to purchase foodstuffs and other needed supplies in the Free World. No substantial increase in the supplies provided by the Bloc is likelyn these circumstances It is unlikely that the total output of the Cuban economy2 can rise above1 level. Under consequent privations, the Cuban people are likely to become more restive. Much will depend on whether the regime succeeds in directing their resentment toward the US, or whether it comes to focus on the regime.)
The regime's apparatus for surveillance and repression should be able to cope with any popular tendency toward active resistance. Any impulse toward widespread revolt is inhibited by the fear which this apparatus inspires, and also by the lack of dynamic leadership and of anyof liberation within the foreseeable future. In these circumstances, increasing antagonism toward the regime is likely to produceanageable increase in isolated acts of sabotage or of open defiance on the partew desperateequence of disaffection-repression-resistance could conceivably be set in motion, but would be unlikely to cause major difficulties for the regime in the absence ofexternal support. )
The overriding concern of Cuban foreign policy is to obtain external support and protection against the hostility of the US. The USSR and other Bloc states will continue to render such aid and support to the Castro regime as they consider necessary. If the overthrow of the regime should be seriously threatened by either external or internal forces, the USSR would almost certainly not intervene directly with its own forces. However, interpreting even an internal
threat as UShe USSR would seek to deter the US by vigorous political action, including threats ofon the periphery of the Bloc as well as ambiguous references to Soviet nuclear power. Nevertheless, the USSR would almost certainly never intend to hazard its own safety for the sake of Cuba. )
By the endastro had few admirers left among politically active Latin Americans, except the Communists, extremist splinter groups broken off from the established social revolutionary parties, and certain student and labor elements.)
At Punta del Este the OAS unanimously condemned communism in Cuba as incompatible with thesystem and laid the ground work for increased efforts to combat Castro-Communist subversion. However, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador abstained on the operative resolution excluding the Castro regime from the organs of the OAS. The Castro regime will seek to cultivate those Latin American governments which have shown reluctance to support measures against it and will probably refrain from flagrant acts which could provide the occasion for US or OAS intervention in Cuba.)
he Castro-Communist threat in Latin Americafrom the abilityell-organized subversivecentered in Cuba to exploit the natural tendency of entrenched oligarchies to resist the growing demand for radical social reform. What is seen by radical revolutionary elements in Latin America is that, while others have talked of social reform, Fidel Castro has actuallyadical social revolution in Cuba, and has done so in defiance of the Yankees with the support of an apparently more powerful patron. Relatively moderate reformist regimes are now ascendant in most Latin American countries, but, if the Alliance for Progress should fail to produce its intended social reforms in time to meet rising popular demands, the conviction will grow that Castro's way is the only way to
5
get timely and positive results. Thus, despite Castro's alienation of the moderate reformists, thereanger that the Cuban example will set the pattern of thesocial revolution in Latin America..)
DISCUSSION
INTRODUCTION
he past year has witnessed theopen identification of the Castro regime with communism and with the Soviet Bloc. Within Cuba, this trend has been markedadical reorganization of the economy, the government, the internalapparatus, and the armed forces; by the emergencenified. Communist-controlled, political organization designed to control every other public activity, by theof mass organizations designed tothe general population and to subject every Cuban to constant Communistand control; and, finally, by the public declaration that the goal of the regime is the complete communization of Cuba.
onsequence of these developments is an apparent trendhift In the actual management of the continuingin Cuba. Fidel Castro remains theleader and acknowledged head of the movement, Raul Castrohe"remain important figures In the regime. However, disciplined and experiencedorganizers and Indoctrmators. such as Bias Roca, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Anibal Escatante. and Lazaro Pens, have emerged as important architects of the new Cuba.
II. CASTRO'S RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNISTS
ince his accession to powerastro has collaborated increasingly with the Communists. However, the limited evidence regarding the precise nature of his relations with the Communists is confused,and open to various interpretations.astro said in effect that he was greatly Influenced by Marx and Leninniversity student, but lhat he was
then prejudiced against thethat he held essentially his present ideasut that his understanding of them was then doctrinallyheroper Marxist-Leninist some time after his accession to power He Intimated that he had kept theecret because its announcement would have cost him needed support. This probably is an essentially true account of his present appreciation ofand his personal political development While for all intents and purposes we can now consider Castro as being fully wedded to the Communist cause, his passionate avowals do not necessarily mean that he is considered by the Soviet and hardcore Cuban Communists asompletely indoctrinated,and reliable Communist.
he Cuban Communist apparatus did not commit itself to Castro's cause until it judged that the eventual triumph of thewas assured. It then sent Carlos Rafaeleading Communist theoretician who had known Castro as ato Join him in thc Sierra Maestra. Since Castro's accession to power, the Communist objectives with respect to Cuba have been twofold: (a) to gain effective control of Cuba by taking advantage of the exigencies ofsituation, and (b) to advanceinterests throughout Latin America by exploiting the psychological impact of the Cuban revolution
n achieving power. Castro allowed the Communists to operate openlyoliHc.il party and to resume the publication of their dally newspaper, Hoy. However, theofh of July Movement with them were strained, especially in competition for control of the national labor organization. As late astevolucion,h of July
r
was seeking lo discredit theby denouncing their past associations with the Batista regime.
yastro's radical measures and arbitrary conduct had alienated many of the most competent among his original Castro apparently came to adecision to rely Instead upon the assistance and support which the Communis Ls were eager to provide. The consequent expansion ot Communist Influence in the regime further alienated other elements, so that Castroall the more dependent on the The resulthorough Communist infiltration of the regime, but no challenge to Castro's leadership, since the Communists' opportunity stall depended on Castro'sconfidence in them and the Cuban masses' continued confidence in Castro.
this early periodCommunist leaders were heard toprivately that Caatro and Guevaratoo far too fast. The Communistsapprehensive lest Castro provokereaction within Cuba or aintervention.
USSR watched andefore responding toneed for its support. It thenCastro's aid by undertaking tosugar and by praising the Cubanas an exemplary "naUonal Thereafter there followedariety of trade andbetween Cuba and thethe Bloc,low of Bloc techniciansto Cuba. In the circumstances ofdeteriorating relations with the US,aid was indispensable for the survivalregime and had the effect ofalignment with the Bloc.
nn response to theS attitude expressed by the exclusion of Cuban sugar from the US market, Khru-
shchev went so far as to imply that Castro was under the protection of Sovietmissile power. Ills pronouncement was probably intended to deter any forcible US intervention against Castro and to gain credit in Cuba for having forestalled Intended US aggression, but it was deliberatelyIt avoided any explicit Soviet military commitment to defend Cuba.
norld conference of Communist leaders, held in Moscow,to define "national democracy" as an explicit stage in progression toward With Cuba in mind, theynational democracy"tateon-Communist but stronglyommunist-styleprogram in close coIlaboraUon withCommunists. By this doctrinalthey recognized Cuba as morethan "naUonal bourgeois" states such as Egypt and India (which have been liberated from imperialism, but are still controlled by the national bourgeoisie). At thc same Ume, they denied by implication that Cubasocialist" state like those of Eastern Europe.
he Cuban Communists protested this formulation and since then have sought to have it revised. Fidel Castro,ormally declared that Cuba wassocialist"ontradiction of thedemocracy" formula. Cubanhave taken the same line.
idel Castro finally declared himself ton orthodox Communist. Thbremoved an obstacle to Castro's claim to leadership of the Communist party which, by definition, must rule Cuba before Cuba canull-fledged "dictatorship of thee probably hoped that his speech would facilitate Cuba's acceptance into the "socialisthereby increasing the Soviet strategic commitment to Cuba. From the point of view of international com-
munism. however, the timing of the speech proved most inopportune, coming Just before the meeting of the OAS Council on 4
Castro's efforts toommunist and Cuba with theand other Bloc Communists havecare to avoid, tactfully, anyhis claims. They acknowledge onlyocialist society" In Cuba,with the definition of
sum, the story of Castro'sthe Communists leaves muchseems established that he did notisciplined Communist. and probably from convictionhe has identified himself with theand evidently now wishes to beas fully committed to their cause. likely, however, that both theCuban Communists, partly because herecent and untutored convert and partlyof his Impetuous personal style,about his complete reliability. Insome degree of friction isthe identity of Interests andthat now bind Castro and Whether it ever becomesenough to disrupt the presentclose collaboration will depend onand his understanding ofinterests as well as upon the degreewhich the Communists exercisewtth him. On balance we thinkdevelopment of an open conflictand the Communists is highly unlikely.
til. THE UNITED PARTY OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION
3L. Only three political organizations were aiio-ed toidel Castro's Cuba: hish of July Movement,h ofolutionary Directorate, and the Popular Socialist Party (PSP). The first two ot these
are now little more than prestigious names left over from the brave days oflack organizational substance, although they include many prominent leaders of the regime. The third, the PSP,ong established, large, well organized, and well disciplinedparty.
nidel Castro announcedew party, the United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURS) would be formed. The Idea that the revolutionary elite should be integratedingle, united partywas not new. It was suggested0 and has been under serious consideration sincehe man pushing the projflot has been Bias Roca, the Secretary General of the PSP. Obviously, the organization andof the PSP would be likely to enable it to gain control of the united party machinery, and so, eventually, to gain control of Cuba
n the meanwhile, an interim hierarchy of committees called the IntegratedOrganizations (ORI) has beento "integrate"h ofh of March Revolutionaryand the PSP. The ORI ison the national, provincial andlevels It already provides anfor the coordination and direction of proreglme political acUvlty throughout Cuba.membcr national directorate formally announced in2 includesSP leaders, only one of whomosition in the government. The remainingave been wtth the regime from its earliest days;f them have long held high level positions In the government apparatus. Generally they have shown strong sympathy toward Regardless of these distinctions, the PSP almost certainly exercises predominant Influence tn the ORI.
he PURS is not to be declareduntil the ORI is considered to haveits task. The integrating process is apparently one of screening and selecting
lor partyalso of jockeying for position. True to its essential Communist character, the united party is to be an elite organization, theof thea massundamental requirement delaying itsis the need to subject selected Cas-trolst revolutionary enthusiastshorough Communist indoctrination and discipline. "Schools of Revolutionary Instruction" (EIR) have been established for this purpose, under Communist direction. Thc EIR nationalreported in10 persons had already attended courses and0 would receive instruction
When the united party is established, partybe the first requirement for anypolitical, economic, or militaryin Cuba, and party membership will be the goal of every young Cuban striving to get ahead in the world. In every Cuban organization, the party will be representedrevolutionary orientator" (politicalspecifically responsible for theof the members and for theof revolutionary orthodoxy and
Fidel CastrO'Wtli almost certainly be the titular head of the united party, but the real political power in Cuba is likely to be vestedollective leadership including Castro but dominatedroup of veteran Communists from the PSP. The apparent leader of this group is Bias Roca.<
Castro himself has found it expedient to extol collective leadership, as exemplified in the ORI. and to denounce the "cult of per-
The mysterious Faoio Grobartumored to be th* secret bosi ol the Communist apparatus In Cuba.uba from Polandfte emissary of the Comintern .'or thee Cuban Communist part* He la now one ot the dlreelori of the ne* doctrinal magazine. Cuvcor.iy one who holds no promt-neni office.
ow greatly out of fashion In the Communist world. Yet Castro Isharismatic leader and his personal appeal to the masses is still an important asset to the regime. There remain serious questionsan of Castro's temperament can really merge himselfollectiveand whether his mass appealhange.
IV. THE MASS ORGANIZATIONS
Participation In the politicaldescribed above Is limited to the elite of the revolution. Their leadership isto the population at large through the multiplicity of mass organizations which the regime has established for the purpose of mobilizing popular support. Under theof circumstances, if not by free choice, most Cubans are now associated in some way with one or another of these organizations. They are an effective means of transmitting politicalalso ofsurveillance and control over theirPsychologically, they serve to commit individual Cubans, in the mass,ositive personal identification with the regime through personal activity in its behalf Inwith their fellows.
The oldest of these mass organizations is the militia, which now hasembers. Originally, the militia wasexclusively of Castro's most ardentamong the students and theSince then less enthusiastic folk have found tt expedient to "volunteer" to Join units based on their places of residence orWilling nr not, they are all subjected to indoctrination and mass psychology, which in most casesositive identification with the regime. Itatter of some pride toUl'.iaman in Castro's Cuba.
he regime has no more enthusiastic supporters than those found among the moreembers of the Association of
Youthince its absorption of the university student federation, the age range of this group lsts members are active Ln the militia, the voluntary labor battalions, the literacy brigadesnd the vigilance committees (see. Innion of Rebel Pioneers (UPR) exists for the organization and indoctrination of children
Some Cuban women regardiberation from their formerto the household and exclusion from public affairs, and are therefore among its more enthusiastic supporters. From the first, women and girls have been active in theand the AJR. There Ispecific women! organization, the Federation ofWomen (FMC)The FMC sponsors day nurseries tomothers for other work. Its members have also been active In the literacy campaign.
The constituent elements of the overall national labor organization (CTC-R) have beer, reorganized Intoational industrial unions inducing all the workers, unskilled as well as skilled, in theu respective Industries. Membership has thus been increasedillion. Union leadership is closely controlled by the regime and is now predominantlyeteranLazaro Pena, was recently namedGeneral of the reorganizedince all Important Industrial enterprises are now operated by the state, all laborhave become, In effect, company unions, concerned to elicit "voluntary" workerto the revolutionary cause rather than to enforce workers' demands upon the management.
bout hah* of the rural population has been similarly organized through the state farms and cooperatives administered by the National Agrarian Reform Institutenubstantial proportion of the
remaining independent proprietors areof the National Association of Small Farmersembership in ANAP Is necessary in order to obtain credit, seed, and other government assistance.
Cubans resent the intrusionmass organizations upon theirand their family life. For manythese activitiesenseparticipation in an historicgives meaning and purpose to
V. PROPAGANDA AND EDUCATION
In addition to its use of the massas specialized channels forIndoctrination, the regime takes full advantage of its exclusive control ot all the media of mass communication for general propaganda purposes. Generally speaking. Cubans read, hear, and see only what thechooses to communicate to them.
Fidel Castro's most striking propaganda successes have been achieved by marathon personal oratory before mass audiences in the Plaza de lahe Nationalof the Cubanr onSuch occasions are used for allpolicy pronouncements.Communists such as Anibal Escalante are appearing on TV to expound theof the Cuban revolution to Marxism-Leninism The ordinary TV and radiofare is preparedovernment agency called Venceremos, which is directed by Raul Valdesommunist
Before the revolution. Cubaelatively high literacyall his faults, Batista hadotable founder of rural schools With great fanfare, however, theundertook to eradxate Illiteracy in Cuba and1 the "Year ofThe universities and secondary schools were cloned; the students and others were
i
Into "literacy brigades" and sent forth to alphabetize the illiterate. Theserved three political purposes: (a) to organize,brigadiers; <b) to gratify theand make thorn accessible to regime propaganda; and (c) toropaganda impact throughout Illiteracy-ridden Latin America. Some illiterates provedbut in general the operation wasin achieving these purposes.
eanwhile the Ministry of Education was busy reorganizing the curricula,new textbooks. Indoctrinating teachers, and taking over the remaining private schools in Cuba, especially those of the Catholiceteran Communist, Juan Mari-nello, has been appointed Rector of theof Havana, an Important post In the educational system. All Cuban education Is being keyed to doctrinal requirements andtrong propaganda element. It goes without saying that opportunity for higher education will dependecord of activity in support of the regime.
VI. INTERNAL SECURITY CONTROLS
he mass organizations andmedia are the means employed by the regime to enlist positive popular support. Concurrently, it hasormidable system of police surveillance and control.
n1 the three principal police and Investigativesecret police, the National Police, and the Maritime Police-were separated from the Ministry of: Forces and combined toew Ministry of the Interior. This change was probably intended to recognize the importance of their function, to enhance the coordination and efficiency of their operations, and toCommunist control. The new Minister of the Interior. Ramiro Valdes Menendez, had been the chief of the secret police. He is a
close associate of the Castros and is almostommunist.
The secret police originated as the countersubversive agency of the army. It is now called the Department of State Security (DSS) and functions like any other suchin the Communist world. ThePolice, now called the Directorate of Public Ordernd supported byilitia serving as auxiliary police. The Maritime Police are the Cuban coast guard. Most of the professional personnel of the National and Maritime Police have now been replaced by full-time militiamen.
In addition to these professionalthe Ministry of the Interiorervasive network of volunteer vigilance("Committees for the Defense of thehe regime claims that there areuch committees in Cuba,otal membership of over half apeople. Thereommittee tn almost every residential area or place of employment. These committeesonvenient means of identifying the persons under theirand of procuring Informants among them: it is to the vigilance committee that one must go toation curd.
These vigilance committees are given credit for the wholesale roundup ol suspects which occurred throughout Cubae time of the1 landing. Their effectiveness has probably unproved since then.
VII. THE REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES
addition to its elaborate systemand police control, the regimeImproved the capabUlty of Itsto suppress insurrection or repel In this it has been greatly aided by
BLOC ARMS AXD MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERED TO CUBA
A.-tiller v
48
Wi) to
wvvediumssault Guns. .
ni
m, JJ-Tube. Truck-mounted Rock*'. Launcher.
mm Gun
m
. om
urn Field Cuit.
ji-miD Antitank Cua
j'-aic Antiaircraft Gun
Mortar* acid Machine Cum.
m Antiaircraft Cun.
ID-iiim Twin Antiaircraft Gun
m Mortar
nm Mortar
il.
om Quad Antiaircraft Cun
ra Quad Antiaircraft Machine Gun .
Aircraft.
Jet Fighters.
Rill re. Carbtuca. and Submachine OO
Primeinil Jno*.
MIO-lS/i? MIG-19
IU|4
Air-il (L'lilitvt
5
Prop Trainers..
10
12
Prop Transports.
, Kronstadt-Class Submarine
Helicopter
Patrol Craft
Motor Torpedo Boata.
Not military aircraft by de*ifn, bul capable of being so utillwd.
- Inubmarine chaserotor torpedo boat, are en route.
Bloc's provision of military equipment and Instruction. The Cuban militaryis now in many respects the beat equipped in Latin America.
ime, the regime was threatened by disaffection within Its armed forces as commanders with valid revolutionarywere antagonised by the Communist trend of Castro'sthe Huber Matos case, as early ashe militia was created to meet this threat by providing the regime with armed support on whlcfi it could rely. In the course of time,
the regime has largely eliminatedLn the armed forces, butoat inand purges which deprived those forces of most of their technically competent personnel.
n operational terms, the former Rebel Army has been dissolved. Its remaininghave been absorbed into the militia as cadres. At the same time, there hasignificant differentiation among militia units. Some full-time units have appeared. Manifestly, they are not militia in the usual sense of the word,ew, politically re-
13
liable, standing army. Other militia units are organizedeady reserve available lor field service in anesidue still conform to the home guard pattern. Thus the Cuban ground forces now consisttandingeadyome guardthe largest ground force establishment In Latin America.
nder the supervision of Blocthe standing army has received intensive training in the use of Bloc-supplied arms and equipment. It has acquired capabilities in the employment of armor and artilleryantiaircraft and antitank weapons) hitherto unknown in any Caribbean country. It has completed basic and small unitand is engaged in combined armsat the battalion combat team level.
The ready reserve militia battalions are less heavily armed and less thoroughly trained. Eachull-time cadre ofen. The remaining personnel are available for only one or twoeekonth of active duty training each year. The arms are kept In the custody of the full-time cadre. Since these battalions are based on places of employment, they are capable of rapid
The home guard militia units have no significant combat capability. Theiris to augment the police as necessary for the control of the population. It Is likely that they are operationally subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior rather than lo the Ministry of the Armed Forces.
n addition to the improvement of its standing army and ready reserve forces. Cuba is engaged tn an extensive program ofconstruction such as the erection of beach defenses, the fortification of gunand the establishment ot decentralized arms depots This program apparently con-
templatestrong initial resistance to invasion and protracted warfare in theThe transport and construction costs involvedonsiderable burden upon the economy.
For operational purposes. Cuba has been divided into three self-sufficient territorial commands designated as the armies of the West, the Center, and the East. Each has operational control of all thc standing army, ready reserve, and tactical air units within its area. Within these armies there are corps and division headquarters havingresponsibilities with respect to the ready reserve and home guard militia, but no operational role, except that the divisions, as territorial commands, probably have internal security and static defense responsibilities within their respective districts. The basic combat unit is still the battalion combat team. Active operations are conducted by task forces established according to the requirements of the occasion.
The Cuban Air Force inherited fromonsiderable quantity of6 light bombers,ea Fury prop fighters,3 jet trainers used as fighters. Repeated defections and purges, however, left it very few trained personnel. In the emergency oft could get only six aircraft Into the air. two each of the three types mentioned above. Since then ita capabilities have been greatly enhanced by the delivery of an estimatedic,jet fighters, and by Blocof at leastet-qualified pilots and an undetermined number of airmen. Training in the Bloc and by Bloc instructors nowin Cuba will gradually Increase theof qualified personnel. In an emergency, these instructors could, of course, serve as pilots and crew chiefs.
Cuba's civil air fleet and the transport aircraft of the air force provide ample air
transport capabilities for Internaland for supporting the military insecurity and defense operations. Cuba has received from the Blocrop transports, IStility aircraft, andelicopters. Thes apparently areto replace aircraft of Western origin which are being sold.
ike the air force, the navy has anumber of inherited combat patrol craft, but, after successive mutinies,and purges, very few trained naval Few naval craft are now operational, for want of proper maintenance, including spare parts. Coastal patrol is accomplished chiefly by militiamen in confiscated fishing boats and pleasure craft The Bloc is now in process of delivering small naval vessels which will provide the basis for an improvement of Cuba's coastal patrol capabilities. So far, six submarine chasers (PC's) and otor torpedo boats (PTs) have been received or are en route.
idel Castro remains commander in chief of the Cuban armed forces: his brother. Raul, remains the minister in charge of the military establishment. Raul Castrohis personal headquarters far from the seat of government, in Santiago, where he also exercises political direction of Orient*the home of the Castros and the base of their drive to power. This peculiarseems designed to make sure that one of the Castros will remain free to takeaction In case the other is trapped by some untoward development in Havana.
t is notable that Bloc militaryvfries to Cuba to date have been such as to enhance Cuba's capabilities for defense against external attack and for the maintenance of internal security rather than to contribute to the development of an independent offensive military capability. The Bloc has provided no strategic weapon systems. Although the
Cuban army has been made formidable by Caribbean standards, Cuba lacks the air and naval capabilities required for major overseas military operations, even at CaribbeanThe bomber force Ls still limitedews.
hese Bloc military deliveries have been responsive to the most urgent requirements of the Castro regime, but they probably alsoeliberate Bloc policy. In keeping with its demonstrated concern to avoid any commitment to come to the defense of Cuba with Its own forceshe USSR presumably desires to avoid the possible Soviet involvement inherent in providing Cuba with independent means for taking major military action against its neighbors.
n these grounds, we believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with air.or naval capabilities suitable for major independent military operations overseas, or that it will station in Cuba Bloc combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate This attitude would notthe liberal provision of Bloc advisers,and service personnel, the provision of such defensive weapons and equipment as surface-to-air missiles and radars, and such Improvement of Cuban naval and air facilities as would enable them to service Soviet units. It would also not preclude the provisionoken number ofet light bombers Special Soviet communications andfacilities will probably be established in Cuba.
he Bloc's provision of small arms and light supporting weapons has renderedconsiderable quantities of US armsfrom Batista. These surplus arms are available for delivery to "national liberation forces" in other Latin American countries. The means for such gun-running, by air and sea, may also be provided
15
T
VIII. THE REORGANIZATION Of THE ECON- nurseries which free mothers to work inAND THEfields.
Beginning with the agrarian reformsoon after the regime came to power, the state has taken over the direct operation of the Cuban economy. It monopolizesforeign trade, wholesale trade,communications, and utilities, andubstantial part of retail trade. State operated enterprises accountf the value of the gross industrialThe state directly controlsercent of all farmland. Except for the survivingprofessional men, farmers, andthe remnants of private enterprise are insignificant
he National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA) established Inas the state's original agency for economic management. To meet the needs of its peasant clients, it soon found itself engaged tn retail trade as well as agricultural management As provincialenterprises were expropriated, INRA took over their management too. Itsextended throughout the country; it was conveniently available to undertake any managerial task that occasion required. That its personnel were technically inexpert was no great matter. They were certified to berevolutionaries.
s regards agrarian reform,0 former tenant farmers have actually received title to small tracts of land (lesst was soon realized, however, that tolass of small peasant proprietors would be to invite economic disaster. Also, from the Communist point of view, it would be social retrogression. Instead. INRAeasant cooperativestate farms managed by INRA personnel. The state farms are declared to be the higher form of social organization: they pay wagesof profit or loss, and provide housing,and such communal services as day
here remain in Cubafarmers owningercent of thethey too are in considerable degree dependent on INRA for credit,seeds, equipment, and marketingand are subject to DfRA's plantingThe regime intends the eventualof this farmland also.
ventually, something had to be done to rationalize INRA's amorphous economicand to provide for the orderlyof the urban industrial enterprises which had been taken over by the state.ith Bloc advice, three newwere established: Industries, Foreign Trade, and Internal Trade. These newhave taken over INRA's extraneous functions.eading Communist. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, was appointedof INRA.1
he Ministry of Industries, charged with thc supervision of all manufacturing andIs "Che" Guevara's present bailiwick. Each particular industry is organizedconsolidated enterprise" made up of all the plants in that Industry. The "consolidated enterprise" procures and allocates materials, assigns production quotas, distributes output, and coordinates plans and operations with the Ministry.
or the overall coordinationentral Planning Board (JUCEPLAN) has been established. TheJUCEPLAN is paralleled by thecresied Economic Committee of the ORI, composed of President Dortlcos, "Che" Guevara, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. The local implementation of JUCEPLAN directives
' Rodnruez replaced Fide! Castro tntc. but Castro! tenure ot it aid been purely honorific. Rodriguez, however, wltl use this office to exercise effective control over Cuban agriculture.
is supervised by provincial and municipal bodies called JUCE1 (Juntas for "coordination, execution, andUCEI meetings are attended by the representatives of local economic enterprises and the corresponding labor unions and mass organizations, as well as representatives of the national ministries, CTC-R, and ORI
lthough the JUCEI were established to supervise the execution of economic plans, they are tending to supersede the traditional provincial and municipal governments as the centers of effective local authority. Raul Castro has described them as "state bodies, political-aclmlnlstratlve instrumentshe structural parallelthe ORI and the JUCEI might be likened to that between the CPSU and the Soviet
IX. THE ECONOMIC SITUATION ANO PROSPECTS
espite the confusion Inherent In the revolutionary takeover of thedisplacement and flight of experiencedthe imposition of inept statethe new Cuba enjoyed an9he wealth of the dispossessed was available for distribution. Wages were raised, employment was increased, consumption wasexample, there was an excessive slaughter of livestock and poultry to satisfy the demand for meat among those who had never had much of It before, to the consequent detriment of the prospectsuture supply.
his orgy could not have beenIt set the stage for economicwhich were precipitated by theof Cuban sugar from thc US market In0 and by the impositionSon exports to Cuba ln0 An important effect of these measures was toupply and replacement parts crisis Deipite tne development of Cuban trade with
4
the1ear of economic decline and suddenly felt deprivation in Cuba.
he Cuban economy Is based on foreign trade. Cuba has. depended on external sources (principally the US) for adequate supplies of foodstuffs, other consumers' goods, and raw materials as well as capital equipment It has met Its foreign exchange requirements byofineralsnd miscellaneous products such as tropical fruit, and also by attracting foreign tourists and privateForeign private Investment In Cuba is now terminated and income from tourism is negligible.
espite Its loss of the USCubaecord quantity of sugar:illion metric tons. Thiswas not the result of an Increase tnbut rather of an extraordinaryeffort.1 The Blocillion tons of thb sugar,remium price, but one less than that formerly paid by the US. However, most of the return for this sugar was in the form of goods and services and relatively little convertible currency was obtained Sundry non-Bloc countries (notably Morocco, the UAR. and Chile)ons in barter deals. ons were sold In the Free World for hard currency. Because of the lower prices obtained (including loss of the US premiumhis extraordinaryof sugar produced no more returnormal crop. The amount of convertibleearned was the lowest in modern Cuban history.
he sum of other exports declined in quantity and value. The return from tobacco was the lowest sinceit did
the Cuban harvest had beer. Umited in accordance with quotas set under the Interna-Uonal Sugar Agreement and by the US with respect to the US market Much cane was customarily left standing.1 Cuba Ignored such restrictions and cul all the standing cane.
returnillion in convertibleTotal Cuban dollar earnings from exports to the US amounteduiion.
Cuba has been able to obtain from the Bloc and elsewhere some suppUes of foodstuffs and other consumers' goods, but not in the quantities previously imported from the US and not of equivalent quality. The effort to increase the domestic production of foodstuffs has met with indifferent success. Theof foodstuffs is such that the regime has recently imposed drastic rationing.
During the first half1 there was an acute shortage of industrial raw materials. Some plants had to be shut down, othersonly intermittently,onsequent decline in the availability of domesticproducts. During thc latter half of the year the raw materials shortage was relieved somewhat by increased imports from the Bloc and elsewhere.
serious than the industrialproblem Is the acceleratedof the Cuban industrial plant,facilities, for want ofparts. This critical effect resultsfrom the US embargo, but also fromof convertible foreignhinders indirect procurementsources. The effort required to keepIncreasingly inefficient plantrake upon new investment.solution is seen to be theof equipment of US origin withfrom the Bloc, but this involvescapital expenditure withoutforward progress.
he frustration of the regime's roseate plans for new construction Is exemplified by-itsroviding greatly needed new housing. Inhow-placeproject begun9 remains unfinished. Of the new housing promised to peasants in conjunction with the agrarian reform, very
few projects have been completed. Theconstruction resources have been diverted to military projects.
uba has been promised Bloc credits amounting7 million for the installationew industrial plants during the. Performance, however, has been slow. Only the Czechs have acted with any sense ofhaveencil factory, an electrical appliancew generatoricycle assembly plant (using Chineseut and bolt plant. On the other hand, it hasear to move the East Germans and Bed Chinese from the initial promise of credit to the approval of specific plans, with theiryet to come. The Soviet sponsored projects, amounting0 million, are mainly for mineral processing plants notto become operational.
The Cuban economy will continue toumber of difficult problemsoremost among these is the probabilityeriously short sugar crop We estimate that the cane harvest now underway will yieldillion metric tons of sugar,illion tons1 and an annual averageillion tons in
Unusually dry weather during theseason is one reason for this serious decline in Cuban sugar production, but there are other contributing factors which result, directly or indirectly, from decisions taken by the Castro regime. Theseeduced rate ofin recent years, the diversion of cane land to other crops, overcuttlnghortage of skilled harvesting labor Induced by lowered material incentives and theof labor to other occupations.
he greatly reduced sugar harvest will preclude sugar exports on the scale achievedn response to this situation, Cuba has acted to curtail its commitments to export
sugar to the Bloc. It will probably strive to maintain sales ol sugar in the Free World at1 level, at least. Although the Blocuaranteed sugar market at aprice, sales in the Free World arcin order to acquire urgently neededexchange. In tbe face of continued low world sugaronsiderableof shipments to the Free World would be required to offset the loss of dollar earnings resulting from the US embargo on nonsugar imports from Cuba. It is unlikely that Cuba's earnings of convertible exchange from all sources will be sufficient toet worsening of its convertible exchange position
Reduced export earnings will seriously hamper the Cuban economyhe total value of Imports can be maintained at1 level only if the Bloc is willing tois, to permit Cuba to run up debts on current account, or to accelerateunder established credits for industrial development. In any case, imports from the West (smaller In dollar terms than those from the Bloc, but of critical importance to Cuba) will decline, thus aggravating economiccaused by the exhaustion of inventories on hand and accelerating the deterioration of plant and equipment.
In these circumstances, it is unlikely Ihat the total output of the Cuban economy2 can rise above1 level. If the regime persists In expanding Investment to the extent projected for this first year of Its four-year plan, consumption will have to be further curtailed.
he development of the Cuban economy will depend no: only on the rate at which capital goods are made available under Bloc credits, but also on the success of the regime's efforts to expand and diversify agricultural production. The slowness of Bloc deliveries of capital goods to datereflects no more than the time normally
required to plan and Implement an extensive industrial development program. By the endhe flow of such goods will probably begin to increase substantially. Moreover, Cuba possesses an agricultural potentialof supporting additional Imports ofgoodsigher level of industrial activity. It would appear that only grosscould prevent an Increase in agricultural production in However, considering the regime's performance to date and the general effect of Communist ideology on agriculture, any increase that may occur will almost certainly fall far short of the On balance, the industrial sector of the Cuban economy will probably beginut its rate of expansion will probably be limited by poor performance in the much larger agricultural sector. The present dearth of consumers' goods will lostecause of the priority accorded to investment.
ide: Castro has now told the Cuban people that years of privation and strenuous effort are beforethis privation is attributable solely to the malevolence of thethat this effort is necessary to defend Cuban independence and toust and prosperous society. To the extent that the regime is able to fasten upon the US all blame for existing conditions and to sustain the Cubans' faithetter future, it will be able to mitigate the political consequences of deprivation and disappointment.
X. POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARO THE REGIME
nitially, the overwhelmingof Cubans hailed with enthusiasm the triumph of the revolution against the Batista tyranny. Since then there has been an ever more widespread disillusionment. It was to be expected that the propertied classes would be antagonized by Castro's early urban and agrarian reforms and by the ensuing exprp-
19
priations of property. More serious was the progressive alienation of many men who had actively participated in the revolution against Batista, but who. for the same reasons,to thc dictatorial character of the Castro regime and the increasingly evident ascendancy of the Communists within It. Latterly there hasrowing adverseamong ordinary folk who have noproperty interests and no strong Ideological motivations, but are fed up with the privations, exactions, and regimentation that characterize life in Castro's Cuba.
9ft The severe Internal repression which accompanied the defeat of thestilled,ime, manifestations of opposition within the country. This spell was broken in September, when Catholic crowds dared to defy openly the regime's prohibition of certain customary public religious The militia had to be used to suppress these disturbances Since then, the regime has confiscated the Church schools and the property of religious orders, and has expelled most priestsriests are left The Church has nottrong popular influence inut thisIs strongly resented by those who do care: Catholic youth groups have been the nuclei of several underground resistance organizations.
ne indication of the extenthe volume of emigration from Cuba. Sinceubanhave reachedhese are. for the most part, formerly well-to-do persons having the means and know-how. as welltrong motivation, to escape, but significantly they include some
Th* Church was Identified with the Spanish co^rv.al rttune. and subsequently with the privUtttd cthr Cuban revoluuonary tradl'.ion is anticlerical. Evenost priests were Spanish rather than Cuban. Whileercentffiv population were nominal Catholics, onlyercent *er* active church members.
humbler folk who cared enough to hazard their lives ln open boats. Other Cubans, in lesser numbers, have made their way toexile in such places as Mexico, Jamaica, and Venezuela. In general, the regime has been glad to see these people go. Although valuable managerial experience andskills were lost with them, they were manifestly unreliable.
Most of the members of the former middle class still remain in Cuba; most of them ln varying degrees oppose thc regime. However, some are reconciled, having found positions of personal advantage in theapparatus or other regime controlled organizations. These constitute the nucleus of the new managerial class which also draws recruits from the lower class. This newclassajor element In thesupport of the regime.
The Cuban youth, in general, are the most ardent supporters of the regime. They have been the primary target of regimeYouth occupies the middlepositions In the government,the rank and file of massand has proved highly responsive to the Revolution's ideology and chauvinism. In general, the Revolution appeals to Cuban youthymbol of challenge toauthority.
In pre-Castro Cuba, organized labor enjoyed considerable influence andthe skilled workers who controlled most unionsower middle class social status. These workers have reason to resent their submergence in state-controlled massunions. On the other hand,skill Lsremium in Cuba andIndividuals have the opportunity tolace for themselves in the new managerial class. All industrial workers have been told that they are the essential foundation for the "dictatorship of thethey
are probably more impressed by thecontributions of time and wages now demanded of them by union leaders In the name of the Revolution. There is evidenceesponse in lhe form of absenteeism and slow-downs oncale as to cause the regime serious concern.
ndependent farmers in Cuba were once to be numbered among the regime's enthusiastic supporters. Many are small producers of sugar cane, producing in the aggregate two-thirds of the crop. They were mostly dependent on the big sugarfor the credit, supplies, and market now provided by the INRA. They had resented this dependence and looked to INRA for greater benefits. Most independent farmers now find themselves squeezedrising costs and declining returns, and so closely regulated by the INRA bureaucracy that their independence Is only nominal. Their complaints are answered by suggestions that theyooperative Theirtoward the regime is mounting.
embers of thearc also disappointed by decliningMany are frustrated In their desire ro become independent farmers, in accordance with the original promise of the agrarianWorking on former sugar estates under INRA management, members of theprobably question whether INRA isetter landlord than the sugar companies were.
The rural element with the mostto be grateful to the regime isorkers on the state farms. They were mostly laborers seasonally employed In the cane fields, but unemployed most of the time. Although many of the benefits promised them nave yet to materialize, they have beenense of improved status, have year round employment, are better fed than before, and
have had their hopes kept alive byew state farm housing projects.
espitewidcspreaddisappointmentand disillusionment, it is evident that Fidel Castro and thc Revolution retain the positive supportubstantial proportion of theuarter of the population. The hard core of this support consistsof those who nowested interest in the Revolution: the new managerial class and. of course, the Communists. These are reinforced by those who have beencommittedositive attitude through participation in the mass organizationsfor that purpose. Finally, there are substantial numbers of Cubans who care nothing for ideology, but are still under the spell of Fidel Castro's magnetic personalstill have faith in therealization of the promise of tbewhourge of nationalistic pride in revolutionary Cuba, and who attribute all present short-comings to the implacableof Yankee imperialism.
is equally evident that there isnumber of Cubans, in Cuba, whostrongly opposed to the regime thatwilling to risk their lives to expresseven without much hope ofthereby an early change in theare the subject of the next Section.
majority oi the Cuban peoplebetween these two extremes. Theirstate of mind is most difficult toare grumbling and resentful, buthopeless and passive. Theyuncertain in their ownthe object of their resentmentthe local functionaries of the regime,government in Havana, or theor the Yankees. In any case, theyresigned to acceptance of theregime as the effective government in
being with which they must learn to live for lackeasible alternative.
XI. ORGANIZED RESISTANCE
mong the Cuban exiles in Miami and elsewhere therelethora of anti-Castro organizations, groups, and personal factions. In general, they fall into three major(a) Batistianoa.lements still identified with the Batista regime;any of whom supportPrio's efforts toovernment-in-exile; and (c> liberal reformist groups, mostly associated with the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC).
uring recent months Batlsttanos have been particularly bitter in attacking the DS Government, blamingor Cuba's problems and accusing it of ineptness in protecting the interests of the Free World. They areconspicuous by their wealth and by their isolation from the other exile groups. Their activities facilitate Castro's efforts to Identify al! counterrevolutionary activity as Intended to restore the detested Batista regime.
Ex-President Prio has sought supportroposed Cuban government-in-exile to be headedormer Supreme Courtrder tolaim to legitimatesuccession. He has obtained little encouragement for this Idea in Latin America. The Prio group has negligible support within Cuba, where Prio is identified with thepolitical system whichto some extentBatista coup
The CRC in Miami, headed by Dr. Jose Mlro Cardona,oose coalition of anti-Castro organizations which represents many of the active oppositionists In exile* and claims
'TheoniutuenU of tbe CRCRtiotuciona'lo DtmocratUo (FRO),Dtmocratica CnstlanondRevoluelonarie iMidt-
to speak for the resistance movement in Cuba. It ls both anti-Castro and anti-Batista. Most of its members believe that the originally stated objectives of the Revolution were good, but lhat Castro has betrayed and perverted them. The present program of the CRC calls for the establishmentrogressivegovernment based on the Constitution
ost Internal resistance organizations maintain liaison with counterparts in the US. While looking to Miami for assistance, many underground workers are resentful of the exiles, who have not remained at home to take the risks and endure the burdens of lifeictatorship. Very little is known of the present capabilities of the internal resistance movement whose principal elements are: (a) thc Movimiento deormerly led by Manuel Artlme, who was captured at the Bay of Pigs; (b) the Jforlmlento Rcvolucionario del Puebloormerly led by Manolo Ray, who has nowfrom leadership; (c) the Movimientorutlanohristian democratic movement, based on the Papal encyclicals; (d) the Direcfono Revolutionario Estudiantil (DRE) whose Internal leaders are in prison; (e) the Unidad Revolucionanaoalition of many small groups, and (f) theovember group, largely composed of the followers of former labor leader David Salvador.
he activities c* resistancewithin Cuba are not coordinated. Their actual strength and potentialities aredifficult to determine. None of them has an active membership of more, although they mayuch wider circle of sympathizers. Vet thesedo harass the regime In various ways, even without appreciable outside support or much hope ofhange in the Moreover, resistance activity In Cuba
4r
Is not attributable solely to them. Some of lt is spontaneous.
here is. even In present circumstances, enough resistance activity within Cuba to keep the Department of State Security (DSS) busy, in1 there was an uprising near Guantanamo led by an army captain. It was quickly broken up. Sporadic guerrillapersists in the Escamhray and Los Or-ganos mountains. It consists of sabotage of bridges and communications facilities, andon militia posts Major operations to stamp out these guerrillas were conducted innd again in December. Yet another such operation is now in progress, which shows that to date the problem has remained unsolved. Moreover, militia are constantly required, throughout the country, to guard important Installations against sabotage The DSS has beenout summary executionsateto the worst days of the Batista regime. Even so, somebody has recently been setting Are to cane fieldscale which has occasioned considerable police activity.'
IH. The regime, with al! the power ofat its disposal, has shown that it can contain the present level of resistance activity.
many cane areason practice to bara canereparationTne numing eliminatesi io strip the leaves from the cane stalks and also kills bothersome weeds. The sugar itself In the stalk does not burn, but the heat starts to hyarolyze the sucroie to form Uie commercially less desirable glucose and fructose. Ther cane must be harvested andj: the mill within hours of burning. If the burning occur* before the industry is prepared for ther grinding, orarger area Is burned over ihan can be handled by the local labor force, the iusar will be lost The cane burning referred to tn the text Is definitely antlregtme activity,art
of the planned harvesting program. Consequent:;.
the regime is probably ill prepared tor the prompt
action required to save the augar, although it does
whatever It can in that respect.
XII. CASTROISM IN LATIN AMERICA
US. Latin America is ripe for socialin one form or another. When Fidel Castro came to power, he regarded himself as the manifest leader of the revolution, not only In Cuba, but In all of Latin America. In view of the general enthusiasm felt for him. he had reason to think so.
As in Cuba, however. Latin American enthusiasm for Castro soon waned.leaders of established character, such as Jose Figueres, Alberto Ueras Comargo.Betancourt, and Victor Hava de la Torre, were antagonized by Castro's egotism, thecharacter of his regime, hisin the internal politics of other countries, and his association with the Communists. By thc endastro had few admirers left among politically active Latin Americans,the Communists and extremist splinter groups broken off from the established social revolutionary parties (eg. the MIR inAPRA Rebelde inhose splinter groups, however, generally included the party youth.
Castro is not dismayed by theof Latin American politicians, even that of the reformists among them. He identifies them all with the oligarchies which it Is the function of the revolution to displace. His target is the depressed masses Many of these people, especially in the rural areas, have yet to leam of him, but he intends to make himself known to them through tho politically active left-wing youth of their respective countries.
To this end. Cuban diplomatic andestablishments have been used tomoney, propaganda materials, andin subversive techniques todisposed indigenous political groups. Hundreds of Latin Americans have been brought to Havana, at Cuban expense, toconferences and celebrations. Selected youths have been given instruction, in Cuba.
23
in the arts of guerrilla warfare and otheractivity. Powerful short-wavein Cuba broadcast revolutionarythroughout LaUn America.
n the face of these andatin American governments have severed diplomatic relations with Cuba. The remaining sixBrazil. Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, andthey are fully aware of the subversive activities of the Castro regime and within their own jurisdictions have taken action against them, haveariety of reasons, principally domestic, preferred not to break diplomatic relations so far. At Punta del Este the OAS unanimously condemnedin Cuba as incompatible with the inter-American system and laid thefor increased efforts to combat Castro-Communist subversion. The six states which abstained on the operative resolutionthe Cuban regime from the organs of the OAS were generally satisfied with the action taken by the majority, and were pleased to be ebie to show, at the same time, that they do not take dictation from the US.
astro's response to Punta del Este hasanifesto attributing all the Ills of Latin America to the baneful effects of Yankee imperialism and declaring universalon the Cuban model to be the onlyremedy. The USSR has moved to give strong propaganda support to these themes. However, the Castro regime will probablyto refrain from flagrant acts which could provide the occasion for US or OASin Cuba.
he Castro-Communist threat in Latin America resulU from the ability of asubversive movement centered ln Cuba to exploit the natural tendency ofoligarchies to resist the growingfor radical social reform. Theand disappointments of the Cuban Revolution are disregarded by impatient radi-
cals In other countries, or are explained away as the consequences of Yankee malevolence; the depressed masses are hardly aware of them. What is seen by radical revolutionary elements in Latin America Is that, while others have talked ot social reform, Fidelhas actuallyadical social revolution ln Cuba, and has done so inof the Yankees, with the support of an apparently more powerful patron. Toradicals. Cuban assertions that the Alliance for Progress can never producereform are convincing. Relativelyreformist regimes are now ascendant tn most Latin American countries, but. If the Alliance for Progress should fall to produce its intended social reforms In time to meet rising popular demands, the conviction will grow that Castro's way is the only way to get timely and positive results. Thus, despite Castro's alienation of the moderate reformists, thereanger that the Cuban example will set the pattern of the impending socialin Latin America.
XIIL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The overriding concern of Cubanpolicy is to obtain external support and protection against the hostility of the US. The USSR has implied an intention to protect Cuba from aggression, but has stopped short of giving the kind of commitment involving uncontrolled risksis the US whichwould apparently like to have.
Cuba maintains friendly relations with all tbe states of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. It has diplomatic relations with all except EastThis exception is made in deference to the sensitivities of West Germany, with which Cuba has important trade relations.
onsequence of the close trade and diplomatic relations between Cuba and the Sino-Soviet Bloc, channels of communication between Cuba and the countries of the Bloc have been progressively expanded. Since
any Bloc ships, chiefly those of the USSR, East Germany, and Poland, have been calling at Cuban pores, and an even greater number of Western ships nave been chartered by Bloc countries for trade withhere wererrivals'of Bloc ships in Cuba; the dry cargo vesselsWT and the0 DWT. Twelve Cuban ships ofWT have been making the long voyage to Communist countries. The Cuban airline makes twoeek to Prague; in2 thc Czech airlineeekly round trip service to Havana, thereby establishing the first Bloc air service to the WesternIn accord with press and culturalagreements, Cuba's press service, Prensaas beer, collaborating with Tass and other Bloc news agencies.films have been shown in Cuba, andfrom the Bloc and Cuba have visited each other's countriesariety of purposes.iract radio-telegraph circuit was inaugurated between Communist China and Cuba.
In relation to the Sino-Soviet dispute, many Cubansreater sympathy for Peking's revolutionary zeal than for Moscow's conservatism, of which they have had reason to complain Li its application to their ownthe regime knows that itsis on the USSR and it acts accordingly. At the party level, Bias Roca has dutifullyAlbania and Hoy has refused toChinese criticisms of Soviet leadership. However, state relations with Communist China remain cordial,n Albanianwas received in Havana shortly after the break in Soviet-Albanian relations.
In an earlier phase, Castro sought to identify Cuba with the neutralist bloc. In consequence. Cuba was invited to the Belgrade Conference, at which President Dcrticosin such unneutral fashion a3ffend and embarrass even that company.
uba's relations with most non^Bloc states of Asia and Africa are conducted through their UN delegations in New York. Only the UAR, Israel, and Japan have resident missions in Havana.
Some other Afro-Asian states dually accredit their ambassadors inMexico, or Caracas.
only Latin Americanstill maintain diplomatic relationsare Mexico. Ecuador. Bolivia, Chile,and Brazil, and these states haveJoined in denouncing theof the regime as incompatiblesolidarity. Cuba willignore this awkward fact and seekits relations with these states inavoid isolation from the Americanto retain some entree intoto exert indirect pressure on thehopefully, to split the OAS.
XIV. THE OUTLOOK FOR THE REGIME
The next year or two willritical period for the Castro regime.2 sugar crop will be the smallest in years; the difficulty of acquiring convertible exchange will be greater than ever. Want of foreign exchange will limit Cuba's ability to purchase foodstuffs and other needed supplies in the Free World; no substantial increase in the suppliesby the Sino-Soviet Bloc is likelyn these circumstances it is unlikely that the total output of the Cuban economy2 can rise above1 level. Under consequent privations, the Cuban people are likely to become more restive.
The Sino-Soviet Bloc has an obvious interest to do what it can. by means of trade and aid. to ease the strain on the CastroIt is apparent, however, that the Bloc regards the present level of its economic aid to Cuba as adequate to meet the requirements of the occasion. The record of Soviet eco-
25
3
relations with members of the Bloc shows that the USSR regards local economic development aaocal responsibility properly entailing local effort and sacrifice. and that it is not disposed to impose burdens on the Soviet economy in order toanageable level of popular discontent in client states. Only if economicIn Cuba should threaten toerious political crisis would the Bloc be likely to consider any substantial increase in the economic aid to Cuba already projected.
mproved economic organization and Increasing managerial experience shouldthe regime to drive the Cuban people harder in an effort to increase domesticThe general lack of materialhowever, is likely to result In Increased worker apathy and dissatisfaction.
he regime's Imposing apparatus for surveillance and repression should be able to detect and suppress any active disaffection in the population. Any impulse towardpopular revolt is inhibited by the fear which this apparatus inspires, and also by the lack of any dynamic leadership and any ex-oectation ot liberation within the foreseeable future. In these circumstances, increasing antagonism toward the regime is likely to produceanageable Increase inacts of sabotage or open defiance on the partew desperate men. equence of disarfection-represrlon-resistance couldbe set In motion, but would beto cause major difficulties for the <eglme in the absence of considerable external
n circumstances of tension andonflict within the regime itself, between
Castro and the PSP, la conceivable, but highly unlikely. During the period, the ORI willbecome thc projected United Party of the Socialist Revolution, committed toleadership and party discipline, and under the effective control of the PSP. Fidel Castro, however, does not yet appear to be subject to anybody's orders; he may prove to be temperamentally incapable of subjecting himself to party discipline. In any conflict with the PSP, within the period of thishe would almost certainly be able to command the support of the bulk of the armed forces andubstantial proportion of the Cuban people. At the same time, however, Castro Is well aware of his need forsupport and Soviet aid and protection.
ven though the USSR has carefullyategorical commitment to protect and defend thc Castro Communist regime In all contingencies, it has become deeplyto the preservation and advancement of the regime in Cuba, for reasons of prestige as well as interest. The USSR and other Bloc states will continue to render such aid and support to the regime as they consider If the overthrow of the regime should be seriously threatened by either external or internal forces, the USSR would almostnot intervene directly with its own forces. However, Interpreting even anthreat as US intervention, the USSR would seek to deter the US by vigorous politicalincluding threats of retaliation on the periphery of the Bloc as well as ambiguous references to Soviet nuclear power. the USSR would almost certainly never intend to hazard its own safety for the sake of Cuba.
4t
ANNEX
THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO GUANTANAMO
The US Naval Base at Quantanamo Bay (at Caimanera, in Cuban parlance) wasby an agreement made3 which provided for an annual rental0 in gold, now reckoned This agreement was reaffirmedreaty4 which provided that "so long as the US shall not abandon the said naval station of Guantanamo or the two governments shall not agreeodification of Its present limits, the station shall continue to have the territorial area that it now has, with the limits that it has on the date of the signature of the present treaty."
The base has been extensively developed. It nowaval airupplyospital, and communications and storage facilities. The base provides training facilities for the Atlantic Fleet in time of peace and would serveleet operating base and forward supply point for the Caribbean area in the event of war.
S personnel (includinglive on the base, asand other non-US employees.dditional Cuban and other non-US employees live outside. The pay of the Cuban employees amounts to about S6ear.
The base Is virtually self-sufficient except for its water supply, which comesource about five miles away, under Cuban
control.
4 Cuban shipping entering and leaving Caimanera has to pass through the base area.
he Cuban regime has established strict control over entrance into and departure from the base by land. It has spent considerable effort on military works around the base,an extensive tank barrier on the north side To date these works appear toefensive nature.
Cuban officials have publicly remarked upon the Incongruity of US retention of the base In the existing state of relations between the two countries and have charged that the baseenter of subversive activity.Cuba has never officially demanded US withdrawal from the base. The stated Cuban position is that the US must eventuallybut that the subject will be taken up later, at an appropriate time and place, and will be settled by negotiation.
The Cubans could cut off the wateror prevent Cuban workmen from entering the base. Neither of these harassment* would compel the US to withdraw, since alternative sources of water and labor are available. Such measures would deprive Cuba of dollar earnings especially valuable to it in present circumstances, and are therefore unlikely to be undertaken.
It Is extremely unlikely that Cuba would attempt to take the base by force. The regime would expect the US to seize uponrovocation as warrantS militaryin Cuba that would not stop short of Havana.
2/
DISSEA^II^ATIp!
If^lllcjenco'hh .
price Agency, for hi-f lhe Secretary of forepartment of^mi Army, for
I. This eitfmote wai ditieminqtri copy is for (he information and jurisdictioneednow bo authorized by the following
of Intelligence
Defame Ii
Defense
Chief a'tjUF tot Intelligence, Cepocmeit oi iv Army
the Assistant Chief oBL-o:or Thel
off, Intelli
of me Air'
the Navy fkW e. Auiitanl he**
Notional .
for Central Reference, CM, for any other Deportment or
2.may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance wiih Oppilcab^^Kurity regulations, or returned lo the Central Intelligence Agency byith thef Centra! Reference. CIA
an estimate is diuemlnolecl overseas, the oversea* recipients mayeriod not in excess of one year. At lhe end of fhii period, lhe ihould either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or per-'should b* requeued of rhe forwarding agency to retain it In accordance.
'The idle of ih^ft^Rn-i; when uied separately ftom the text ihould beFFJsftsteBeTCE ONLY "
DISTRIBUTION!
While House
National Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Original document.
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