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MILITARY. THOUGHT: "Classical Military Art
and Nuclear/Missiley Major-General of Artillery I. Dzhordzhadze
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THOUGHT: "Classical Military Art and Nucloar/Hlsslloy Major-General of Artillery X. Dzhordzhadze
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erbatim translation of an article titled "Classical Military Art and Nuclear/Missileritten by Major-General of Artillery I. Dzhordzhadze.
This article appoared ln1 Fourth Issuepecial vorsion of the Soviet military Journal Voyonnaya Myal (Militaryhis Journal is publisneo* irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET oy the Soviets.1 Fourth Issue went to press on. tola of Contents for this Issue was .published as.
I4)
by Major-General of Artillery I. Dzhordzhadze
The principles of military art which have been in existence for centuries and which have become classical and seemingly unchangeable must undergo basic changes under the conditions of conducting nuclear/missile warfare.
Moreover, among us there has arisen the idea that research directed at studying the natureuture war and the special features of conducting operations will be done within tho framework of the principles of military art which have already been formed and which prevail over military research and limit the extent and resolution of their scholarly and practical conclusions. In all works of theory which have been published, there is no lack of recognition of the significance of nuclear/missile equipment and of its main and decisive role. However, the whole meaning of the all-determining role of nuclear/missileole which is recognized in theory, disappears when in practice these weapons are scattered among old arms of troops with the purpose of supporting infantry and tank operations.
That is why we consider it necessary to examine the problem oft-iso put,ew.theory, . nd practice of -nuclear/mlssiieVwarfare within'^e'^rame- 'y work of classical "military art or"ew military artthe art of nuclear/missile warfaremust be created to replace the old one.
At first it should be ascertained whether the most effective use of new weapons can be made if they are in the complement of old arms of troops.
*The author has in mind that part of nuclear/missile wariwhich is conducted within the framework of front operations, and he calls it field warfare.
We are excluding this possibility. If motorized riflo and tank troops aro given nuclear weapons, then
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Equivalent In TNTj kllotons
and area of the] Troop elements of the path of the radio- rmy of tho USA active cloud area in km2)
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10
18
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45
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How can one combine in the same area large nuclear bursts which create high radiation levels with strikes by
the infantry and tanks? There is only one
limit the force of nuclear weapon bursts to levels which would not prohibit operations by our own infantry-tank groupings and at the same time would ensure their advance.
Thus, the classical military art of waging infantry-tank warfare forces us tohole arsenal of small nuclear weapons, starting at one kiloton, and limits the use of large bursts. In connection with this, there arises the need to create large supplies of small nuclear warheads, thousands of which would be needed for an operation, and actuallyront. esult there arises the completely distorted idea that there ishortage of nuclear warheads, whereas correct technical and operational calculations on the use of large bursts show that thereuite sufficient amount of nuclear weapons at the front to accomplish all the tasksrue nuclear/missile war.
Fromne can seeield army of the USA can be destroyedwo-megatonalf-megaton burstshree-kiloton andalf-megatonhree-klloton bursts.
VJ In 'hlshould.be stressed that nuclear; iburats,. high yield make it possibleo^^vffean^fe^ enormous area, and thus eliminate the need to seer but and" destroy each individual target. Small nuclear bursts, however, are used to destroy specific targets, and this actuallyeturn to the practice of fire of tube artiller
Small nuclear weapons do not ensure theof the enemyhole, but accomplishart of this task and leave the achievement of the ultimateto the infantry-tank grouping, whereas, by using nuclear weapons of largo yield, ono can completely accomplish the task of destroying tho enemyery short time.
Consequently, there is no justification for striving, by artificial limitation of the technical capabilities of nuclear weapons, to create conditions for simultaneousin the same zone with them and with motorized rifle and tank units and largo units.
fi^..
le inadmlaslble to have tho largo variety of small nuclear warheads howsed in exercises, and their adaptation to the infantry and tanks simultaneously determines the large variety, also, of missile equipment. The correct technical and operational use of powerful nuclear burets, however, limits the amount and variety of missile equipment and makes It possible to regulate Its yields, havingroup of systems which is small in number.
The large amount and variety of nuclear/missile weapons and their adaptation to the old unwieldy system of controlling infantry-tankn tho need toarge number of automated control systems which become completely unnecessary under tho correct conduct of nuclear/ missile warfare. Indeed, if the number of nuclear/missile weapons of great yield which are being used is not large, and if the functions of control of nuclear/missile weapons and infantry-tank groupings are clearly limited, then there will be very fow Installations for automating control of the new weapons, because one can control the old arms of troops without high-speed automated devices.
Thus, one can consider thatarge extent, within the framework of classical military art, the combat capabilities of the new equipment are paralyzed; tbe use of more, effective and economic^nuclear war
yield is limited; unnecessary and oxponsive work Id.ptei to create an enormous arsenal *of missile weapons"re adapted for" the mass use of small .nuclear warheads;nd for all new and old arms of troops (despite the high speed demanded for this) there are being created numerous electronic machines, although there is no need to automate and complicate all the processes of controlling old arms of troops to an Identical degree.
All thisegative effect on carryingew military and technical program.
To give scope to the new military equipment and to determine the correct program for working it out and introducing it, one must decisively, reject the use of obsolete canons of classical military art which obstruct /text continuea on page lOj
rmy
1 Motorizedrmy
Airbornermy
zones vltb fatal does of radiation Continuous single larger zone of nuclear destruction
undamentals of Military Art
Each individual target is recortnoitered and destroyed.
Cooperation of all arms of troops consists of coordination of troop operations in one zone according to target, place, and time.
There is the massing of basic forces and weapons on one or two axes.
The system of controlling Joint operations of individual arms of troops and weapons for combat is awkward; command posts are unwieldy, have little mobility, and are overloaded with support subunits.
There is the presence of millions of ground troops and an enormous amount of varied armaments and equipment within the complementront. There aro enormous materiel expenditures and complexity in supporting operations.
Conclusions
is no basic difference between formernow in organizing and conducting troopand in the procedure and sequence oftargets. Despite tho existenceweapons, everything remains at'tho/levei 'of rwarfare (the only difference is thatammunition is used). The mechanical unification
of the old and new military art has doubly complicated the conditions of conducting an operation, whereas nuclear/missile weapons objectively simplifyonditions.
The simultaneous operation of infantry-tank groupings and of nuclear/missile weapons in tho samo zone paralyzes the technical capabilities of nuclear weapons and gives risehortage of small nuclear warheads.
Tho artificial subordination of nuclear/missile weapons to infantry-tank formations results inarge number of Infantry-tank troops and old weapons
of destruction and limits the development of new arms of troops.
Ill
Groups of targetsarge area (lo continuous zones) are reconnoitered and destroyed. Thanks to the use of large nuclear bursts, the possibilityhortage of nuclear warheads will be eliminated.
Coordination consists of the most efficientof tbe efforts of nuclear/missile and infantry-tank groupings according to zones.
A careful demarcation of tasks and the specialization of control of new and old arms of troops sharplythe organs of control. Touclear/ missile army there mustingle set of high-speed machines. Nuclear/missile strikes which are based on large bursts are simple lu their planning and conduct.
Ground troops are sharply reduced. Toround enemy one must haveuclear/missile and combined-arms army.
mm
efficient use of nuclear/missile weapons. Instead of this, one should work out new technical, operational-tactical, and organizational bases for waging nuclear/ missile warfare.
First of all, the new equipment itself shows that not every war which envisages the use of nuclear and missile weapons can beuclear/misslie war. Thus, if one uses small nuclear bursts for firo support of infantry and tank operations, this will notuclear/missile waromewhat modernized infantry-tank-artillery war.
The calculationsnhow that the most effective energyuclear burst under field conditions is an equivalent within thoegaton range. In our opinion, this indicator should be acknowledged as the technical criterionenuine nuclear/miss lie war. All the other, smaller bursts must be considered of an auxiliary and incidental nature.
The needed yields of largo nuclear bursts and their combination will be determined basically by the accepted plan of radiation contamination of large areas and by the conditions of the combat and meteorological situation.
In the eventalf-megaton nuclear bursts are used against-a" fleld army-of the "USA continuous ra4iatibn zonea'^
deadly radiation levels. This ensuresof enemy personnel and.completelypossibility of his maneuvering, because thewill have tho most fantastic' shapes, forming an
The procedure for conducting nuclear/missile strikes envisages creating continuous zones of nuclear destruction of personnel over large areas with high radiation levels. The personnel of all arms of troops will not bo able to operate on ground with such high radiation levels, and, consequently, even the conventional combat equipment will be useless. Under these conditions, there is no longer the need for additional physical destruction of enemy personnel by other means and arms ofust as there
also is no need for the destruction of the basic part of his combat equipment. Over the enormous areas of the continuous zones of nuclear destruction there is the need primarily to conduct operationshecking and -reconnaissance nature by the forces of bombardment andreconnaissance aircraft in combination with the operations of special groups of airborne forces. Special motorized detachments equipped with special vehicles, equipment, and protective devices can be used occasionally in this
The basic task of checking and reconnaissance operations must be -to detect and destroy enemy nuclear/ missile weapons operating with the aid of remote control and automatic systems without human assistance accordingrior given program.
The procedure and sequence of combating enemy missile troops will also change: at first, antiaircraft guided missiles will bo destroyed and then surface-to-surface ones. This will open the possibility for the operations of all arms of air reconnaissance, whereas now antiaircraft guided missiles exclude the combat work of reconnaissance aviation, and this paralyzes all tho reconnaissance activities of the front.
. Thus, by creating continuous zones of nuclear , estruction, tho nuclear/missileof independently performing the basic task of destroying the enemy over large areas. It is our profound conviction thai the operations of largegroupings in those zones are inadvisable and even impossible.
.*tj*
Consequently, the need arises to limit the zones of operations of the nuclear/missile and infantry-tank troops according to area instead of the existing principle of Joint operations of new and old arras of troops.
Nuclear/missile troops plan androgram of large bursts which create the desired picture of the radiation situation simultaneously over the whole area where the enemy troops are located. The picture of the
zones of complete enemy nuclear destruction will change depending on the given system of layers (aloynost) andthe zones of radiation contamination, as well as the combat and meteorological situation. Variations of the plan for nuclear/mlasile strikes will comprise the basis of the program for conducting large bursts. These programs nay bo fed Into existing computers in advance, and ln an Instant one can receive the best solution corresponding to tbe specific situation.
Thus, over the enormous areas where onomy troops are located, one canadiation situation in the tactical and operational depth ln which enemy personnel would be in continuous radiation zones and would bo broken up by zonos with deadly radiation lovols.
In our opinion, the art of determining and forming such continuous zones of nuclear destruction over enormous areas comprises the basis of military art in nuclear/ missile warfaro.
In the zones of continuous nuclear destruction, one can provide special corridors free from radiation contamination for the operations of our own infantry-tank and other troop groupings.
These troop groupings can be set aside for occupying enemy territory which is free from high radiation levels. They use and develop the success of tho enemy's defeat which was achloved by large nuclear bursts. Therefore, we consider that the main taskthe destruction of opposing onemy forcescan be accomplished Independently by nuclear/missile troops, but the occupation of enemy territory, the consolidation of the success, and support for conducting nucloar/misslle strikes can be done by combined-arms groupings equipped with ordinary weapons.
In our opinion, such an efficient distribution of efforts of new and old weapons according to ground, target, and tasks guarantees success in waging nucloar/misslle warfare. With this, it must be kept ln mind that under the conditions of nuclear/missile warfare ono must Inevitably
force from the battlefields the basic masses of Infantry-tank and other troops equipped with conventional weapons and together with them their complex and unwieldy tactics and operational art and strategy, and one must confirm the new military art based on nuclear/missile methods for waging armed battle.
The purpose of any operation is to destroy tho enemy. And we think that this destruction can and must be achieved, not by Infantry-tank encirclement and splitting enemy troops, but by destroying them with nuclear weapons. The mighty combat powers of nuclear weapons simplify the strategy of destruction and, onbattlefield, remove the borders of tactical, operational, and strategic scales. >
In delivering strategic nuclear/missile strikes, if one must select targets, then in the zone of combat operations of the fronts one must and can uso thoir complete destruction by large nuclear bursts. We consider that we mustecisive end to conducting front operations by old methods. Old arms of troops and methods of their combat use must be improved, and they must be adapted to the best use of the results of employing nuclear/ missile weapons. But one cannot achieve decisive purposes in operations by expanding the capabilities of old arms of troops through equipping them with new weapons but by the unification of everything, new
weapons of mass destruction, missileothereliver them, and reconnaissanceingle,v' nuclear/missile army which is capable of destroying opposing enemy forces by crushing blows. Simultaneously with this, one must reduce sharply the troops equipped with conventional weapons, and unify motorized rifle,nd other conventional troops into homogeneous, combined-arms large unitsimited amount of armament. The basic tasks of these new combined-arms large units and' formations will bo to occupy enemy territory, consolidate the success achieved by the nuclear/missile strikes on areas free from high radiation levels, and to provide ground coveruclear/missile army and for other troops on their own territory. Thus, the combined-arms large units will not be forced to wage battles and combat
with the main enemy forces as this was understood in the past. There will have to be an occasional use of transport aviation to move combined-arms large units by air to cross zones with high radiation levels.
Large nuclear bursts will reduceinimumand variety of nuclear and missilethere will have to be nuclear warheads of half-megaton, one-megaton, and two-megaton, and withhree types of missiles with arange of up0 km. It is technicallyto use fixed strategic missiles for..
Thirty to forty launching mounts are able toontinuous zone of nuclear destruction on the scaleront. As can be seen, the number of launching mounts with ready missiles is not large. However, for their reliable use and support one musthole nuclear/ missile army which should include: nuclear/missileivision for comprehensive reconnaissanceto receive and clarify reconnaissance datachecking and reconnaissance divisions conducting special operations over tho zones ot complete nuclear destruction, divisions of field cover for nuclear/misslie troops, and technical and supply units and large units.
round enemy can be united into twouclear/missile armyombined-armshe decisive and leading role of the commander of the nuclear/missile army is obvious, and therefore he will have to coordinate the operations of these armies, Apparently, there will be no need to create'an "unwieldy front directorate with general control functions. It is enough to.supploment .the command, of the nuclear/missile armyoordination group to establish agreement for operations on land and in the air.
It is natural that the methods and forms of military art which are based on the principles for waging nuclear/ missile warfare under field conditions will exclude several generally accepted classical propositions, and the old
aX4)
and new can be compared in Figure 2,
In our opinion, victory in field warfare will be achieved by that side which first goes over to genuine nuclear/missile warfare and takes advantage of the blunders of an enemy who adheres to the old principles of infantry-tank warfare. Thorough exploitation of enemy mistakes which stem from the old inherited principles of waging war, particularly in the initial period, willery important part of the new military art.
If we begin now to reorganize our armed forces in accordance with the principles of military art of genuine nuclear/missile warfare, then we shall gain several years-and shall outstrip the most highly developed armies of the world in this regard.
- * *
The problems of combating missile and aviation delivery means in the flight trajectory in the air and space are the element of nuclear/missile warfare which has been least
esolved. -
Investigation of the nature and operationsrobable air and ground enemyomparislon of them with the capabilities of our ground troopsharp discrepancy between our forces of Counteraction and the forces of enemy air. invasion.
Used
the et of th. count* it, JK
Pield."
of s andorces ofj ractlon tc] rcentage
Or. oi Avg.
r^n
of the air attack of anrmy of the USA, percentage
weapons
rdasiles
Guided miasile and free rocket aircraft
weapons
of th
trike
(percentage) of the forces of(antiaircraft troopa of ground troops of the Soviet Army in relation to the wholenf larca units (formations) of ground troopa
of ground attack of an army of the USA, percontsBe
weapons
BlssiloB Cruise miesiles Artillery
wenoons
proportion of the strike
of fo the Soviet
of counteraction of
ofto an air enetny
shows the average arithmetical calculation of the proportions of the conplanent of the means of the PVO (according to the ramber of weapons and launching mounts) motorixod riflo divisions, tank divisions, heavy tank divisions, army, and front
These calculations (Tablehow that the proportion of means of enemy air attack in the use of nuclear and conventional weapons comprisesercent and the means of ground attackercent, while our forces ofto an air enemy on the flight trajectory (PVO troops) compriseercent of ground troops,and to the ground enemy,ercent.
Thus, one can observe an obvious discrepancy between the complement of our ground troops and the nature of operations of the air and ground enemy. The operations of the probable enemyypical air-ground character with an almost equal ratio of the yield of strikes from the air and on the ground. The counteraction of our ground troops, however, essentiallyne-sided, ground nature, with an obvious shortage of the forces of counteraction to the air enemy.
Oneifferent picturo in examining the forces of countoractlon of our probable enemy (the army of the OSA)
The proportion of our means of air attackront in using nuclear and conventional weapons comprisesercent and the means of ground attack,ercent.
shows the average arithmetical calculation of thethe complement of tha mans of the PVO (according toof weapons and launching mounts) of Infantrydivisions, letters, 'missing J, infantry corps, and ofof
The forces of enemy counteraction to our means of air attack (antiaircraft guided missilos and antiaircraftowever, compriseercent of his ground troops, and to the means of ground attack,ercent.
Thus, the complement of enemy ground troops almost completely corresponds to the probable nature of our strikes against him. Taking into consideration the pronounced ground-air nature of the possible operations of our troopsrevalenco of ground strikes ovor air strikes byimes, the counteraction of the enemy alsoronounced ground-air nature with the predominance of the forces of counteractionround attack over the forces of counteraction to an air attack.
Consequently, thereharp discrepancy between the complement of our ground troops and the nature of the possible attack from the air, something which is not observed among our probable enemy. This discrepancy which has arisen must be eliminatedharp increase in the PVO troops of the ground troops and in our means of air attack.
The air-ground nature of nuclear/missile warfarenew, specific, and more complex side to thesuccessful struggle in the air and the destructionair enemyecisive element in ensuring
PVO troopsront who are equipped with modern nuclear antiaircraft systems act as the main force in the antimissile and antiaircraft struggle under field conditions. Antiaircraft defense of troops is now built and founded on the use of antiaircraft guided missiles. Therefore, all the old means of fighting against an air enemy can serve onlyupplement to the main PVOheguidednd lu principle the new bases of the combat use of these missiles will determine the nature of the PVO troopshole.
Antiaircraft guided missilestart atighly effective and constantly functioning zonal PVO system with which, instead of covering individual objectives (objectivend periodic operations of fighter aviation, there is brought aboutonstant Cover of
all the numerous objectives, and the numerous linked zones of destruction of the antiaircraft guided missileshole system for the struggle in the air in the zone of tha whole front.
Antiaircraft guided missiles of various types are capable of accomplishing independently the tasks of fighting against"
all air targets, and this excludes the need to use other.
old PVO means in the zone of their operations. s simplifies the conditions of coordination. 'By' its operatlona. fts-hfer" aviation must supplement the PVO of the troops outside tho destruction zones of the antiaircraft guided missiles.
Using electronic computers,we conducted research on the effectiveness of antiaircraft guided missile operations and of. fighter aviationingle zone and in various zonos. It was discovered that ln limiting the zones of operations, the effectiveness of antiaircraft guided missiles increased by more than two times.
Consequently, also under field conditions, It is becoming possible to "employ the most convenient and simple principle of coordination of now and old PVO means by limiting their zones of operations according to the terrain. In connoction with this, the existing belief that supposedly no single means of fighting against .An air enemy can accomplish Independently all the tasks of the PVO of the troops, and that there must be close coordination between completely different types of moansingle zone. Is' losing its forcer. To give indepondonce to the new weapons in an operatlonaT^tactlcal and organizational mannerthis, ln our opinion, is the main task of military science at the nfw^stage of development of our nrmod forces.
The experience of oxorclsos conducted with the uso of electronic computers proved the great effectivenessonstantly functioning systom of zonal PVO. Together with this, there arose an urgent nood for centralized control of tho large forces of the antiaircraft guided missiles. The experience of oxorcldos and the results of thoorotical rcsoarch confirm once more, not only logically but also mathematically, the advisability of unifying allguided missiles and other troops of the PVO whichonal system into single PVO large units and formations.
During rccont years, however, there hasrocess of reducing and splitting all troop large units ofguided missiles and of forming separate subunits and units in place of them. Thus, there haa beenscattering" of antiaircraft guided missile subunits of the troop PVO, and this excludes the possibility ofonal PVO system. All thisharp decrease in
the organs and means of control of the PVOnachalnik).
Right now the PVO of ground troops has boen reduced to its minimum level for the whble history, of its existence. What aro the reasons forisastrous situation for the youngest and most progressive arm of*
In our opinion,reason is that Instead of a
single^correct,for unifying and centralizing
-VO^trobps', Inis being carried out
differential theorysplitting and decentralization.
This has resulted in serious consequences of the chiefs of the PVO, troops-of.and of armies now must control masses ofwithout having any resources for doingwore Isolated from the troops and weresecondary organs of combined-arms .staffs,. 'of preparing the antiaircraft defenso of theawithout being able to direct the PVO
Such an imperfect organization of the PVO system for troops and of its control could not help but lead to an essentially incorrect use of tho antiaircraft guided missilesthe most reliable PVO means, which la called upon to put zonal cover into practice. Hundreds and thousands of miBslles will be spont for nothing because, lacking an organizing princlplo nnd centralized system of automated control,some
of tho targets .will be.fired at'by an( unjustifiably large number of missiles and tbe next- will fly with Impunity over the battle formations of the troops.
By attaching the antiaircraft guided missile subunits directly to the cover objectiveswhich actually also moans including them in the makeup' of divisionsthey are artificially transformedeans of direct cover.
ystem, zonal cover is excluded, and this weakens the PVOhole.
The croation of an automated system of centralized control of PVO troops is one of the most important problems of the present time. Its resolution is made much more difficult if there isf the antiaircraft guided missile units. The movement, building up of the zone of cover, the replacement of units which have been put out of action, and distribution of targets are either all excluded or will be unsystematic and inefficient.
Despite scientific and actually proven principles, it is proposed that the antiaircraft guided missile models which have not yet appearod.also be split among subunits, instead of using thementralized way on the scale of PVO large units and formations.
We consider that the need toystem of zonal PVO inevitably confirms tho noed which arose long ago toVO armyowerful means for antimissile and antiaircraft combat nder field conditions.
Under modern conditions, with the enormousPVO troopa of fronts with antiaircraft missilewould be completely correct to examine the PVO ofthe most massive missile arm of troops and as theechelon ofThe Statehole .and to devoteto its
We mustpecial industry of troop antiaircraft guided missiles, of automated groups,ystem ofpecial institute for antiaircraft guided missiles and automation; we must accelerate the introduction of troop antimissile systems; and we must create computing centers, an academy, and ranges for the accelerated introduction of mathematical methods and machines for controlling PVO troops undor field conditions.
Nuclear energyeans of destruction, missiles as
means of delivery, and electronicseans of control,
are the basic componentsechnical base on which modern
armed forcea, including the PVO troops(for antimissile and
antiaircraft combat ust rest.
e
The change from an army intended to wage infantry-tank warfare to an army intended to wage nuclear/missile warfare must be understood notocument butery serious process arising from several military reforms.
During the history of the existence of organized armies, never has ono felt so sharply the need to make new military reforms as now. Despite the fact that nuclear/missile weapons caused the need to change from infantry-tank warfare to new, nuclear/missile warfare, and thus determined the basic changes in building the armed forces, in our opinion this far-reaching revolution was not marked or consolidated by appropriate military reforms. It is not out of place to recall that with the small numerical strength of the Red Army and its weak armaments, during the period48 military reforms were made under the direction of the military commission of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). The course of military reforms and the five-year plan for building the armed forces were discussed at two plenums of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Partyth,h Party Congresses, and at the 3rd and 4th All-Union Congresses of Soviets.
It is quite obvious that at the same high level one should make new and more complex and Important military reforms to ensure the decisive reorganization of" the armed forces and their readiness to wage nuclear/missile warfare.
We are convinced that military reforms can never be replaced by individual orders, ukases, or measures which make it possible to resolve problems which may be very important but which are still particular problems, expeclally if this concerns the creation of new arms of troops. The formation of new types of armed forces and arms of troops mustcoccur on the basisaw and must be accompanied by a' corresponding change in the role and place of old arms of troops, and this is possible only hy making thoroughly based and, consequently, firm military reforms.
Military reforms must legalize the formation of new nuclear and missile arras of troops and must simultaneously determine the tasks and role of the old arms of troops.
To wage field warfare one must create two new mlesile arms of troops (nuclear/missile troops and troops for antimissile and antiaircraft combatnd one arm of troops equipped with conventional weapons.
The tasks of the stratoglc armed forces and the tasks for waging field warfare must also be carefully defined by military reforms. The strategic armed forces are called upon to destroy and neutralize tho enemy's military and economic potential and to protect our country.
As Is well known, nuclear/missile troopa and troops for antimissile and antiaircraft combat (tho PVO Troops of tho Country) will be organized trategic scale. uccessful combination of new principles of attack and defensetrategic scale, obviously, can and must be spread to the conduct of field warfare.
In our opinion, military districts, which long ago adapted themselves to waging Infantry-tank warfare, also must reorganize themselves In accordance with the new conditions of nuclear/missile warfare. It Is obvious that the internal districts must prepare themselves for strategic nuclear/missile strikes and for antiair- efense, and the border districts must prepare themselves to wage field warfare with the aim of destroying the armed forces on the fronts.
The combination of strategic nuclear/missile strikes and antimissile operatlona conducted by internal districts with tho nuclear/missile strikes andoperations conducted by border districts will be one of the basic tasks of military strategy.
The complete Independence of each district makes for their interchangeability and guarantees the reliability of. fulfilment of any strategic and operational task, even when considerable forces are put out of action.
To ensure the complete independence and reliability of operations of each district, during the initial periodar one must reject the existing methods of rear area support based on supplying the troops with all weapons, Including ^iBBile weapons, before and during the battle
and oust change to tho principle of early supply of troops with all types of nuclear and missile weapons. Early nuclear/missile supply and engineer preparation of troops In the Theater of Military Operations create genuine conditions for the successful and timely conduct ofcoperations during the initial period of the war.
Por the practical instituting of military reforms and transformations in the army one must decisively activate military science. All the problems touching the various areas of reality and practice are resolved now onlycientificn our opinion, military science is illuminatingompletely unsatisfactory way the path for the practice of militaryndonsiderable degree it is still concerned with the scientific basis of problems which have already been resolved. It appears to us that military science concorns Itself more with studying the most general laws. It is no accidentefinition of military science is still prevalent according to which Soviet military science la the sole system of knowledge about the preparation and conduct of an armed struggle to defend the Soviet Union from Imperialist aggression. in the highest degree thiaeneral definition. Military science must be the most specific area of knowledge,doaplte tho fact that it relies on the highest and most complex achievements of technology and the Intellect.
In our opinion, military science isr creating and constantly improving the technicaljrogran ofrogram which la combined with fltemoiT advantageous methods for employing the armed forces and the forms of their organization. The military science of our time fluctuates between the ancient past and the still unknown future. The matter la further complicated because the past stubbornly refuses to relinquish its positions. Under these conditions all our knowledge and experience must be united to workew and more intelligent doctrine of field warfare.
If one must put at the basla of this doctrine some expressed viows, then it la our deep conviction that they ahould be the following:
to save hundreds of billions of rubles by bringing about the beat long-range military-technical program based on the recognition of tbe role of large nuclear bursts and
by ceasing the production of unneeded and already quite worthless email nuclear, mlaalle, electronic, and numoroua conventional armaments;
-r to reduce the armed forcea sharply and to receive enormous economic benefits, and at the same time to make them incomparably stronger and more effective in combat;
-1- to simplify the art of waging armed struggle, to reduce the organs of control sharply, and thus to make lt easy to control troops under the moat complex field conditions
UMH)
Original document.
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