0 APR rszi
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
MILITARY THOUGHT: "Support of the Strategic
Concentration and Deployment of the Armed Forces in Respect toy Major-General of Technical Troops Ya. Shchepennikov
Enclosederbatim translation of an article vhlch appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought"published hy the Ministry of Defense, USSR, anddistrlbuted down to the level of Army Cosmander.
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Richard Reims Deputy Director (Plana)
Original! The Director of Central Intelligence
cos Military Representative of the President
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The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
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'Support of the Stra-and Deploymentespect toechnical Troops
ILITARY THOUGHT: teglc Concentration the Armed Forces in by Major-General of Ya. Shchepennikov
1
COUNTRY SUBJECT
INFO :
DATE OF APPRAISAL OF
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eliable source
Followingerbatim translation of an article titled "Support of the Strategic Concentration and Deployment of the Armed Forces In Respect toritten by Major-General of Technical Troops Ya. Shchepennikov.
Thla article appeared In1 Third Issuepecial version of the Soviet military Journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This Journal le published TrTegularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets.1 Third Issue went to press on
Support of tho Strategic Concentration
and
Deployment of the Armed Forces ln Roapoct to Transport - by
Major-General of Technical Troopa Ya. Shchepennlkov
Transportation support la one of the factors that exerts great Influence on the strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces. Nevertheless, ln numerous works devoted to the theory of strategic concentration and deployment, the position and capabilities of transportation are not fully considered. While noting the direct dependence of the success of strategic concentration and deployment on the preparation and work of transportation and realizing the great probability of serious difficulties in carrying out shipments, many analysts do not, ln their work, makeursory analysis of the conditions of transportation work during the period, of threat; and at tbe beginning and during the couraear, they do not arrive at anyon the Influence of these conditions on theof the strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces ln theaters of military operations and in Internal areas of the country.
Xn this article, the dependence of deployment of the armed forces on the condition and work of transportation and also the basic requirements for preparing the transportation network for the purposes of carrying out shipments forconcentration are examined.
The existing contradictions in individual theoretical problems give rise to the necessityreliminary clarification of certain initial positions.
First of all, it should be noted that the termconcentration and deployment of the armed forces" in the following text refers to the concentration andnot only of operational formations, troop large units,hemselves, but also of materiel (for example,and fuel). In accordance with this, shipments of troops and the materiel necessary for their support are also Included in the concept of "shipments for strategic
In speaking of strategic echelons, we mean that tbe first of these consist of the forces and weapons necessary for achieving the strategic aims of the initial periodar; it is divided into several (not less than three) operational echelons. The first includes the troops and materiel that areull state of readiness for immediate operations, the second Is the forces and weapons designated forthe efforts of the initial operations with readiness for proceeding to areas of concentration after several days, the third is the forces and weapons to be used only several weeks after the beginning of full mobilization, for the development of the subsequent operations of the Initial periodar.
In certainhree possibilities for theconcentration and deployment of the armed forces are considered. The first is most favorable, when it is executed in advance as the threat of war becomes more Intense; the second, when concentration and deployment starts during the threatening period and terminates after the beginning of war; and the third and least favorable, when deployment takes place after the enemy has initiated military operations.
In this article, we shall consider transportation support of the strategic concentration and deployment of troops in the second situation, which is more convenient for analysis and Is the most probable.
Many analysts distinguish the following periods in the course of the rise and development of military operations: the threatening (which may not evenhe initial, and the subsequent. Certain authors emphasize the necessity for dividing the second of these into two parts: the actual beginningar and the subsequent phase of development of military operations during the initial periodhis is motivated by the great difference in the composition of each of the phases of the Initial periodar. We shareoint of view and adhere to it in the following discourse.
To determine even approximately the conditions of the atrategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces after the completion of initial operations is extremely difficult. Therefore, the following analysis of the problems of supporting strategic concentration and deployment into transport is limited to the period of threat and the beginninguclear/missile war.
1. General of the Array A. Gorbatov. "The Nature ofCombat" Special Collection of Articles of"Military ThoughtV, Third
In numerous analyses, the authors, while not rejecting the possibilityudden initiation of war, consider it no less probable that it will be precededertain period of intensification of the immediate threat oferiod of threat. It is necessary to use this period for increasing the readiness of the armed forces and the rear area of the country to repel the probable enemy attack and for creating conditions for the complete and final destruction of the enemyhort period of time.
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regard to the armed forcea, such measures Include bringing the forces and weapons of the first operational echelon (first oftroops, armored and PVO troops) up to full combat readiness and making appropriate changes In their operational formation. At the same time, the troops up to full strength, their provision with materiel, the movement of the second operational echelon to areas of concentration and deployment, and the delivery of various supplies to these areas are carried out. Pulland the formation of new troop large units, units, and rear establishments to be included in the composition of the third operational echelon will commence.
At the same time, during the periodransfer of the national economy to satlafy the requirements of an approaching war is accomplished, including partial mobilization of Industry and transportation, Increasing materiel reserves for the most Important Industrial enterprises, protection of the population, etc.
All of the enumerated measures are accomplished as secretly as possible, which narrows their scope. The period of time for carrying out those measures is directly dependent on the duration of the period of threat, which can presumably consist of sevoral hours to several calendar days.
For an analysis of tbe capabilities of transport forthe strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces, we are arbitrarily assuming an eight-day period Of threat. During this time, it will be necessary to carryarge volume of military (mobilization, for strategic concentration, operational,nd national economic.
The possible timing for commencing the shipment of any troop large unit (unit, establishment) depends on thefor this of both the troops and the transportation means. The estimated time for the completionhipment isby its volume, speed, distance, and the rate of movement on the given route.
Rail transport is best prepared for carrying out nllitary shlpaents;ours after the declaration of mobilization it is capable of carrying out very large military shipments while simultaneously continuing its former operations and coping with new national economic shipments. Military shipments ofsmall dimensions can start several hours after the declaration of mobilization.
It should be emphasized that the use of rail transport for shipping connected with the strategic concentration of troopa depends primarily on two conditions: the observance of secrecy ln these shipments and the magnitude of other shipmenta being carried out during the" very same period. These conditions aaaume special significance in thoae instances when troops are shipped for strategic concentrationoreign section of the theatera of military operations, on railroads with West European gauge. Along with the special difficulty of ensuring the secrecy of shipments, lt is necessary to consider that they will be carried out simultaneously with national economic shipments between tbe Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. At the present time, the volume of the turnover of rail cars at transshipment areaa at the Junctions of railroada of Soviet and West European gauges is already so vast that it takes up fromoercent of the total traffic capacity of tha railway sectors ln these areas (Brest, Chop-Hukachevo, Ungeny). In line with the development of industrial communications between the countries of the Socialist Camp, the volume of turnover is steadily Increasing. It is not possible to cease these shipments during the period of threat, since this will Impede tbe work of defense industry enterprises and, in addition. It will reveal preparations for war. Therefore, we feel that shipments for strategicduring the period of threat must be carried out at comparatively low ratos, not exceeding approximatelyoercent of the traffic capacity of tbe railroad lines.
Since it requires considerably more time to prepare water transportation means (river and sea) for military shipping than railroads, lt la advisable to ship by water transportation (when it is possible to use it) those troop large units and units that require several days to prepare for movement.
aasHMB
The timing for beginning troop march movements onroad is dependent on the speed in deployingpoints on it and the creation of sufficient fuelorder to support the march movementotorized
divisionm, upons of fuel are required, andank division, upons. The march movement of troops for long distancesell organized fuel supply system.The requirement for secrecy should be considered in determining the route speeds of movement of large units and units onroada. Observation of this requirement can often necessitate the executionarch only during the hours of darkness.
Let us consider what is the permissible distance for shipments for strategic concentration executed during the period of threat. -
The maximum permissible (calculated) distance of shipments carried out in the courseefinite period of time is determined on the basis of the calculated rate of speed along the given route, the expenditure of time for preparatory loading, unloading, and other work, and also for the march movement of the troops.
The permissible expenditure of time for the movement of an echelonoading point to an unloading points determined by the difference between the duration of the calculated (threatening) period and the expenditure of time for all other work, the march movement, etc., T).
The results of the determination of the maximumdistance forroop large unit (unit,under various conditions are listed in the table.
1. Headquarters Connent. Probable meaning ofime of movement of troops. See table onor probable meanings of subsequent symbols.
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The expenditure of time for thotroops
and shipping means, arch movement to
point, and for the loading of the firstis
established as within the limits ofo
The expenditure of time for the dispatcha large unit or unit being transported from the loading
area (To) is assumed to beo 4
The expenditure of time for the march movement from the moment of the completion of unloading of the last echelonarge unit up to the completion of its deployment in the appropriate area Cfsr) is assumed to be within the limitsalendar days.
The route speeds of movement (Vm) are assumed to be within the limits ofm per calendar day. The higher limit is for favorable conditions of shipment by rail transport and the lower is for difficult conditions of shipment by river transport.
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Expenditure of time in calendar days
Tpd
3
3 4
-XT
dlatancehipment In kilometers
, calendar days
500
1. Headquarters Comment
Probaole meanings
ength ofloading operations
To ength ofdispatch
ength ofstrategic deployment
ength ofperiod of threat
Vm oute speed
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Aa can be seen from the table, the maximum permissible distancehipment does not0 km. Thiscan be achieved under conditions when the first echelon is dispatched from the loading areaours after the start of the period of threat, the dispatch of all the echelons takes no more than two calendar days, and the time from the moment of completion of the unloading of tbe last echelon to the completion of deployment consists of no more than one calendar day with the route speed of movement of the echelons being transported being equalm per calondar day.
If, however, the total time expended for preparation, loading, dispatch of the echelons, unloading, and marchconsistsalendar days, with the routo speedm, theneriod of throatalendar days duration, the maximum permissible distance will0 km. Andecrease in the duration of the period of threat is more probable than an increase, it is advisable to consider the permissible distance fortom.
Another computation will resultimilar conclusion. As is known, it is envisaged that the build-up of the efforts of the troopsront during the first offensive operation will be achieved by means of maneuver by the nuclear/missile weapons and the commitment to the operation of the troops arriving from the zone near the front and the internal areas of the country. Let us consider the maximum distancebe border (front line) at which the operational formations and troop large units designated for increasing the efforts of tbe front during the progress of the operation.can be located.
To explain this problem, we shall refer to the example shown on tho diagram. The diagramraph of tho movement of troops on which are indicated the possiblo tlmo periods forhe advancing troops of tho front by the troop large units being transported.
The distance of the disposition areas of the troops of an operational formation (combined arms army) designated for Increasing the effortsront in an operationm. The first offensive operation must be carried outepth ofmata ofm per calendar day. The duration of the period of threatalendar days. The duration of the operation isalendar days.
The volume of shipment of an operational formation on available railways (West European gauge) consistsroop trains (eshelon). The first troop trains can be dispatched on each of the railroad lines one calendar day after the start of tha period of threat. The possible rate of shipment of an army during the period of threat larains (echelons) per calendar day, and at the beginning of the operationroop trains. The possible route speed of movement of the troop trains during the period of threatm per calendar day,m per calendar day at the beginning of anin view of disruptions of the work of the railroads. With this average route apaed, troop large units can executemovements following the advancing troopsront. Reconstruction of railroads Is carried outate ofm per calendar day along each of the lines being reconstructed to the extent that the troops of the front move forward ln an operation. Echelons of tanks and so far aa possible other large units are dispatched to the forward unloading areaa aa they arrive. The march movements of troops are supported with everything necessary.
Thus, we create sufficiently favorable conditions for the execution of rail shipmenta and march movements of troops during tha period of threat and during the course of the first peration. But even ln this (see graph, diagramuring the period of threat, before the beginning of the operation, no morechelons will be able to roach the unloading areas, and the remaining echelons will arrive during the course of the operation' and after unloading will proceed tothe advancing front troops byarchover long distances. The last echelons of the Incoming large units will be able to "overtake" the advancing troops only on the ninth day of the operation.
Graphic plar, for shipmentombined arms army in the threatening period and after the beginning of war
Ccnve,:tlonal Signs
s Mno of reconstruction of railways Lines of movement of rifla and tank troops
Unloading areas on reconstructed sectors of railways
Bate of shipments!chelons per celendar:day,m per calendar day.
Dispatch by rail: ratechelons per calendar day,ca per calendar day.
The preparation of troops and transport means for shipment.
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Thus, even under favorable conditions, lt will be possible to use only part of the troops that make up tbe complement of the combined arms army for Increasing the effortsront in the first operation. The other part, consisting of no less than SO percent of the troops, as may be seen from the graph, cannot be used for this in view of the greatof time for their transfer from areas of initial disposition.
One should not count on the possibility of decreasing the expenditure of time by meanstill greater Increase of tbe rates and route speeds for shipments and march movements of troops since there are no sufficient bases for this. lt is possible to decrease the time for movement and shipment only by means of bringing the initial disposition areas of the troops closer to the border (front line).
In order to commit the troopsombined arms army to an operation on the third or fourth day, lt is necessary to execute parallel troop march movements along with and at the ame rate aa rail shipments during the period of threat, and to have the troop disposition areaslatancem from the border.
The calculated distance for the delivery of technical equipment by rail, motor vehicle, and water transporteriod of threatalendar days' duration iswithin approximately these same llmltam.
Consequently, If prior to the beginning of war we willeriod of threat of tbe duration assumed by us, then during the course of this period the shipment of troops for strategic concentration can be carried out onlynail scale and at comparatively alow rates; the permissible distance for rail shipments of troopa whose concentration and deployment must be completed prior to the expiration of thia period will consistm (and less). The distance of troop march movements is limited by approximately the same restrictions. It makes sense to Include ln the number of large units and units being transported only those whose readiness will enable them to begin to move not later than during the first two or three days of the period of threat.
e)fd)
All of the remaining ship of threat will be In progress military operations. It will during the course of the war, conditions. We shall turn to later.
ients Initiated during the period at the moment of the start of be necessary to complete them under completely different an analysis of these conditions
In certain theoretical works it is proposed to consider the beginningarpecial phase of its initial period, after which (in case of lengthy combat) follows another phase which is characterizedifferent content. This position is sufficiently valid.
The beginningar is distinguished by the highest possible intensity of operations. Each of the sides will be striving to achieve victory in the shortest period of time and will exert the greatest efforts for this. Mutuallystrikes will be of maximum power, and their results will be unprecedented devastation. But for this very reaaon, the period of the actual beginning of combat cannot be lengthy. After several daysnuclear/missile.war, both sides will sustain such great personnel and materiel losses that tocombat at its previous intensity will be impossible. The resources of even the powers that are strongestand whicharge territory will to some extent be exhausted. It will become intolerable to expend forces and weapons on the previous scale; on the contrary, in continuing combat, it will be necessary to accumulate them as rapidly as possible for delivering powerful new strikes against the enemy. This is the way the next phase of the initial periodar will ensue: stubborn, fierce, but lengthy combat under sharply changed conditions of'the situation.
In the beginningar, during Its first hours and days, very major changes will occur in the strategic, economic, and political situation in the theaters of military operetlona and in the roar areas of the coalitions that are taking part in the combat. Can one assume that they will not reflect on the previously prepared plan for the strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces? Obviously, such an assumption is not correct. Is lt advisable to amend this plan during the first daysar? In our opinion it is also necessary toegative reply to this question.
The situation at the beginningar will be changing so sharply, substantially, and rapidly that it will bedifficult immediately to take into account the changes that are occurring, to evaluate them correctly, and to adopt ay-decision to change the strategic concentration andof the armed forces. In addition, it is doubtful that this is necessary since during the course of the next days the situation can again change sharply.
Consequently, changes in the plan for strategicand deployment will be unavoidable, but toinal decision on these changes and to proceed to put them Into effect will be advisable only.after the termination of the actual starting phase of the war and the advent of the next phase of its initial period which will have different characteristics.
If one agrees.with this conclusion, still another question arises: should troop movements be continued in the first daysar according to the previous plan or is it advisable to suspend these until necessary modifications have been incorporated in the plan? We feeleneral suspension of the strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces is unlikely at the beginningar. easure is completely possible, however, on certain axes, or in certain areas, under especially complex conditions.
The success of strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces under any conditions depends,arge degree, on the condition and capabilities of transportation; but this dependence is especially intensified at the beginningar.
The beginningar immediately exerts tbe strongest influence on the condition and use of the transportationin theaters of military operations and in the internal areas of the country.
Nuclear/missile strikes on major administrative,and power centers and on strategically important areas will bring about destruction of transportation centers and the annihilation of transportation installations andshipping means, and reserves of fuel and materiel.
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Individual, most important elements of the rail network! (developed centers, transshipment areas at Junctions ofof Soviet and West European gauges, large seaports, sectors of locks on river ways, and major man-made structures outside cities) may, in some cases, also be Independentfor strikes. The enemy will also execute attacks on relatively small objectives on the territories of the fronts: stations and wharves, highways, airfields,hrough traffic on rail lines, main highways, and canals will be Interrupted at many points, oftenong time. umber of sectors of the transportation network will be contaminated. Frequent and sharp changes In the condition on the network, disruption of communications and coordination between transport and other organs of control will strongly complicate the control of shipping. Thus, from the very first hours of war, the working conditions of the network will become very complex and difficult.
But, simultaneously with the rise of difficulties in the working of the transportation network and the significant curtailment of its shipping capability, demands for shipments will also be curtailed with the beginningar.
In the first daysar, when entire areas in the theaters of military operations and in* the rear of the country will be subjected to massed nuclear strikes, mass economic, local, and intercity passenger travel will be significantly curtailed. It is highly probable that during these days lt will be advisable to curtail the sizes of mass militaryalso, both of personnel and of goods, in order to avoid increased losses.
The volume of shipments executed in the first daysar must be strictly limited. Major shipments at high speeds must not be planned. This leads to an accumulation ofequipment, and goods at the approaches to destroyed centers, man-made structures, and in areas of the Junctions of various types of transportation.
Alongtrict limitation of the volume of shipments, their distance should also be limited. We believe that
shipments by land and water transport in the first daysar can best be carried out at distancesa.
In organizing shipments, lt is unthinkable to count on fillingigh degree the traffic and hauling capacity of the routes of communication. In order to ensure the flow of shipping and also to accomplish urgent unanticipated shipments, it la absolutely necessary to have reserves of transportation means.
Thus, it may be concluded that in the period of threat, aa wall as in the first daysar, shipments for the strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces can be accomplished in relatively small volumes, at low speeds,and at distances notaximumm.
Obviously, all this will exert an influence on theof the strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces which, in our opinion, cornea to the following.
In the period of threat, and even more in the flrat daysar, it will be possible to accomplish shipments for strategic concentration and march movements of troops onlymall fraction of their overall volume and for relatively short distances,
In peacetime, the actual capabilities for accomplishing shipments and march movements of troops mist bac. takenount in determining the disposition of forces and weapons
in the probable theaters of military operations.
capabilities must be strictlydetermining permissible distances between tbeof the strategic formation of the armed forces,the areas of disposition, loading, unloading,and deployment of troopa and reserves of materielwith the plan for conducting initial operations.
the shift of military operations into the next phase of the initial periodar, strategic concentration and deployment of tbe armed forces will continue, butlan which has been altered in one way or another to accord with the new conditions.
Success in the further conductar will dependignificant degree on the periods of time needed to ready our forces for active and decisive operations; tremendous Influence on this will be exerted by the degree to which transportation has been prepared for work in wartime.
Advanced preparation of transportation for war, primarily for aupportlng strategic concentration and deployment, assumes especially great Importance today. The preparation of transport should ensure the viability of the entire transportation network and the continuity ofhipping capability sufficient to accomplish previously planned military and economic shipments at the beginningar, with the retention of considerable reserves for the regulation of planned, and the execution ofapability for tho rapid movement of flows of shipments and of transportation reserves; the constant readlnoss of transportation for working under the conditionsar which has begun.
The following are the basic measures directed at fulfilling these requirements; organization of tbe comprehensive use of all modern types of transportation for military purposes, an increase in the operational efficiency of the control of their joint work; prior development of the transportation network, ensuring this by special moans for preserving the continuity of Bhlpplug and the rapid elimination of disruptions in traffic; protection of the network from contamination by radioactive and toxic substances.
The necessity for the comprehensive use of all types of transportation for carrying out shipments la wartime and the organization of their preparation and Joint work accordingnified plan and under unified direction has now beenrecognized. However, in the proposed solutions to individual problems in this organization, considerable diversity of opinion is encountered.
l.3fa)(4
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Certain analysts, ln appraising the possibilitiesvarious types of transportation ln abelieve that rail transportation is poorly suitedln wartime ln view of the great probability ofof through traffic at many points of theand that water transportation can be used only
certain axes. To this, they add that on sea and rivernd river sectors with locks, still longer interruptions of through traffic will arise than on railroads. From this, lt is concluded that the basic shipping work ln ground theaters of military operations and in the zona of e accomplished by motor vehicle and air transportation.*
Ve consideronclusion to be incorrect. It is known that at the present time ln our country, and in the overwhelming majority of the other countries of tbe Socialist Camp, rail transportation carries the greatest proportion of the overall freight turnover. It willeading role ln the future also. According to the plan for the development f our transportation networkbe specific proper- ion of rail transportation in the overall freight turnover will3 percent;5 percent;ercent; motorercent;ercent; and7 percent. Consequently, to shift the largest part of the shipping work to vehicular and air transportation in wartime will be almply impossible ln view of their insufficient capacity for this.
In addition, on main vehicular highways and other Important vehicular roads, the destruction of transportation centers, major bridges,ill also cause interruptions of through traffic. It will be necessary to conduct traffic alongto establish temporary passages and river crossings to overcome contaminated sectors of routes. All this willthe traffic-carrying capacity of vehicular roads and will increase the expenditure of vehicular transportation in carrying out shipping work.
1. "Moderneneral Staff Academy (Akademlya
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The rise of lengthy interruptions of traffic aton the rail network doos not at all mean thatsectors of the network remaining betweencannot be used for shipping. On the contrary,completely possible to retain the working capacitysectors. The same also applies to sectors of
water routes. Of course, destruction of centers, ports, major an-made structures, and the liquidation of part of the shipping means will leadignificant lowering of the traffic and hauling capacity of railways and river routes. But, with proper preparation, they can carryonsiderable share of the shipping work in wartime, especially If lt is considered that the required volume of shipping will decrease in comparison with prewar.
In wartime, the work of rail transportation in zones near the front both in theaters of military operations and inareas of the country must carry the greatest proportion. Because of this very condition, lt la necessary to guarantee the comprehensive use of various types of transportation for military purposes.
A capability for their comprehensive use in wartime should be ensured beforehand both technically and organizationally.
The solution to this problem from the technical standpoint consists of mutual coordination in the development of various typos of communications routes and their Junctions, shipping means, means of transferring goods from one means ofto another and in the coordination of their Joint work. Continuity of shipping is ensured by special measures in cases of destruction of transportation centers, power enters, major man-made structures, and other important.
From the organizational standpoint, unified direction of the preparation and working of various types of transportation in wartime has the most important significance* As is known, in view of their specialization, not one transportation ministry or department and not one sorvlce of the armed forces can direct the comprehensive use of all types of transportation.
Therefore, it seems to us that unified direction of theof the transportation network and the use of lt on the territory of each front and each district located in zones near the front and in the Internal areas of the country should be accomplished by special organs. Obviously, the structure and functions of these organs can be determined only by governmental decisions.
Various solutions to the problem of securing unity of direction In the preparation and employment of the various types of transportation for accomplishing shipping on the territory of the front are proposed.
In certain works the Idea is advanced of using for thisontrol organization, very similar to tbe one used during World War II. In view of the increasing complexity of directing shipments under the conditionsodern war, lt is envisaged to improve this organization by including the transportation department in the rear area staffront.
It is considered, however, tbat this department should direct only the use of various types of transportation, not for all types of shipments but only for transporting materiel and for evacuation.1 Thus, direction of the preparaTTon of all types of transportation for joint work and also of the execu-tion of all types of shipments accordingnified plan are not included in tho functionsrd__Dep art ment-. esult, neither unity in the preparation of thenetworkronthole nor unity in its working is ensured. The transportation servicesront willinstructions on theae problems from various control echelons. Obviously, such organization of direction cannot secure the comprehensive use of all the typesront.
The Rear Area In Modern Operations" Rear Services Staff of Moscow District,.
Other authors consider that the 3rd .Department of the rear area staffront la, by Its"very position, unable to resolve the practical problems of planning and coordinating the work of all the types of transportationront. of thia department, they propose the creationrontnified transportation service (directorate) provided with the necessary authority for organizing the centralized use of all the types of transportation subordinate to the front and with appropriate powers for coordinating problems of military shipping with the necessary ministries and departments. To secure direction of military shipping, it is proposed to work out schedules and plans for shipping which are coordinated among tbe various types of transportation and tonified dispatcher control over shipments.1 The given version of the organization of centralized direction of all typesront, first of all, also does notolution to the problems of preparation of the transportation network. Secondly,irectorate is very unwieldy and inefficient: it will fetter the operations of theservices. Thirdly, the authors of tho proposals do not Indicate the subordination of the transportation directorateront, while tbe solution to thia problem has considerable significance.
A third version of the organization of unified direction of the various types of transportation is proposed. The overall direction of the preparation and use of all types ofla centralized directly ln the bands of the deputy to the commander of troops of the front for tbe rear area with the chiefs of the military transportation services directly subordinate to him. It is considered that the chief of the rear area of the front must be ln charge of all types of(Including operational) and also of the march movements of. troops along the military vehicular roads of the front.
Modern WarJ Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought".hird Issue.
Kovalev, Major-General P. Bakarev, "Problems of Transportation in a
It is proposed to accomplish the organization and control of mutual coordination of the preparation of the various types of transportation and their comprehensive use for supporting operations ln the transportation directorate of the rear area staff of the front. Thus, unity of overall direction of the preparation and use of all typea of transportation coincides with the known independence of each of the servicea, which are specialized according to types of transportation.1
One can agree withersion of the organization;in our opinion, the transportation directorate should not be directly subordinated to the chief of the rear area ataffront. It Is known that up to the present time, thaof military shipments of various types (for example, operational and supply) is charged to various organs (the staffront, the rear area staffront). In this situation, it is advisable to have the transportation directoratesubordinate to the commander of troops of the front. This guarantees unity of direction of the preparation of the transportation network of the front for the support ofand ita use for carrying out all types of military shipping.
New means of action against the transportation network give rise to the necessity for changes in the methods and means of ensuring the continuity of shipping.
odernider dispersal of shipping la requiredi.e. dispersal of communications routes, of various technical installations, and of shipping means.
1. Works of the Military Academy of Rear Servicea..
Parallel communications routes of various types should be dispersed so that ln cases of lengthy Interruptions of traffic on one of them, continuity of traffic on the others Is Along with this, it is necessary to ensure afor transferring flows of shipmentsoute put out of commission to those still operative.
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order to prevent lengthy interruptions of through traffic of trains and motor convoys resulting from tho destruction of major cities (and corresponding transportation centers),and vehicular bypasses should be prepared in advanceufficient distance from these cities. Moreover, provision must be made without fail for the use of those for national economic shipments in peacetime which will enable us to avoid immobilizing capital investments. It is also necessary to prepare in advance rail and vehicular road approaches to places at which temporary bridges and crossings over major river barriers are constructed in case permanent bridgeare deatroyed.
In the period of threat, and even more at the beginningar, the greater amount of loading and unloading work, the preparation of shipping means, support of transportod troops,ust be taken beyond the limits of transportation centers in tbe shortest period of time. For this, lt is necessary to prepare in advance appropriate stations, wharves, and airfields at their approaches and to provide support for them with forces and means.
In order toapability of using for shippingsectors of railways and internal water routes bordering on destroyed installations, it is necessary constantly to maintain an undiminished quantity of rolling stock, fuel, and materiel at these sectors In wartime.
At the beginningar, In order to effectand construction work on routes of communications, powerful, highly productive means, capable of accomplishing these tasks under conditions of mass destruction and in contaminated areas will be required immediately.
The primary efforts of reconstruction personnel, especially in zones near the front and in the rear area of the country, are required in order to concentrate on overcoming large "barriers" which obstruct transportation traffic. The main task In this will consist of restoring communications between the sectors of the network bordering on "barriers". This task can be accomplished most successfully by the comprehensive use of
the reconstruction, construction, operational, and shipping resources of rail, vehicular, pipeline, water, and air transportation for overcoming obstructed areas. All work in the reconstruction, development, putting into operation and use of the transportation network In each area should be accomplished accordingnified plan and becoordinated.
A very important role in overcomingan be played by special means of transporting railroad cars: trailersarge load-carrying capacity (uppecial ferries, ferries made from barges andwith rails laid on them for carrying cars across large rivers when bridges have been destroyed, helicoptersarge load-carrying capacity, etc.
The existence of such means permits a sharp reduction in the volume of work in preparing temporary shipment areas, .the avoidance of duplicate shipments,ignificantin the speed of restoring communications between railway sectorsestroyed installation.
It la obvious that the preparation of transportation for war and specifically for supporting the strategic concentration and deployment of troops has now become much more complex than before and has acquired new peculiarities. Among the most important of these are the following:
1. In the initial periododern war, as in other periods, shipments for strategic concentration andcan be accomplished only by the combined use of various transportation means. Therefore, close mutual cooperation and continuous coordination of their preparation for working jointly In wartime has become absolutely mandatory. One of the most important conditions for success in preparing and using the transportation network for military purposes Is the organization of unified operational direction of the work of all types of transportation on the territory of each front, district near the front, and Internal area of the country.
Paramount significance is acquired by theat the beginning and during the coursear of the viability and working capability of the network and continuity of shipments in theaters of military operations and ln the rear area of the country. In the prior development of the transportation network for military purposes, it has become essential first of all toapability for wide dispersal of shipments, for carrying out freight and other work fromcenters, for the rapid transferlow offrom one type of transport to others, and for tho restoration in short periods of time of communications between sectors of the network bordering on destroyed installations.
The role of special (reconstruction, construction shipping) means of overcoming major "barriers" bordering on communications routes in the very first hours of waresult of nuclear strikes has sharply Increased. The creation of such powerful and highly mobile means during the advanced preparation of the transportation network is now much more logical than prior development of inatallations within centers, Increasing the number of permanent bridge crossings over major rivers, etc.
This means that in solving the problems of strategic concentration and deployment of the armed forces, lt is absolutely essential to consider new indices ofof the transportation network for work during the initial periodar, the actual possibilities for the combined use of all types of transport, theof the necessary working capacity and mobility of tbe transportation network, and the continuity of shipping. Only on the basis of an analysis of these data can oneorrect estimate to provide for strategic concentration and deployment from theof transportation and derive from this estimate wholly valid conclusions.
Original document.
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