CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON IB. O. C.
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MKHCRAKXM FOR: .The Director of Cantral Intelligence
SUBJECT
ITARl THOUGHT; "Planning the Utilization of Nuclesr/HiBslle Veaponaront Offcnalvay Colonel-General V. Chlzh [mi
1. Enclosederbatim translation of an article vhlch
Voyennayaublished by the distributed down to the level of
iclel Collection of Articles of the
Helms Deputy Director (Plans)
FOR RELEASE
2
Original: The Director of Central Intelligence
cci The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Aeaiatant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of naval Intelligence Departnent of the Havy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence U. S. Air Force
The Director, Rational Security Agency
Director, Division of Intelligence Atomic Energy Commission
national Indications Center
Chairmen, Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Coanlttee
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for Rational Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
Director, Rational Photographic Interpretation Center
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Planning the UtiUxstion of Nuclear/ Missile Weaponsront Offensivey Colonel-Genersl V. Chiih
DATE OP INFO: 1
APPRAISAL OF
CONTENT : Documentary
eliable source (B)
Followingerbatim translation of an article titled Planning tho Utilixation of Nuclear /Missile Weaponsront Offensivey Colonel-On. Chizh.
Thia article appeared in1 Third Issuepeclal version of Voyennaya Myal (Military Thought) which la classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and lo leaned irregularly. It Is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army CoBtcander. 1 Third Issue was sent to press on
Planning tbe Utilisation of Kuclear/frtlsslle Weopocarpnt Offensive Operation
by
Colonel-General v. Chlth
As is known, aodarn operations are characterized by the large scale utilization of nuclear/missile weapona, by highly nob lie troop operetions, and by sharp and rapid changes ln the situation. The mass employment of nuclear/missile weaponsore rapid attainment of operational goals than has been tbe case in the past. There is every reason to suppose that the duration of operations will be sharply curtailed. In any case, tbe protracted battles, la at lag many days, which were characteristic of the Sscond World War have, we consider,hing of the pest. According to tbe experienceumber ofront offensive operation will continue for an averageoalendar days.
Alongignificant curtailment ln the duration of conducting an operation, its depth will increase sharply. Whereas in tha last war the depthront offensive operation was within tbe limitsa and onlym in exceptional cases, under modernront operation will be conductedepth0 km. Such depth can and must be attained mainlyesult of tbe decisive exploitation of tha results of nuclear/missile strikes. At the present time, tbe problem of increasing tbe rates of troop sdvancea in one calendar day has already been raised. High rates of advance will nowecisive role ln the attainment of operational goals.
However, in spite of tbe recognition of the dominant role of nuclear weapons, we still do not fully take into ecoount all their capabilities in planning operstlons. we have cases in which many problems in tbe preparation end conduct of modem operatlona are decided from the standpoint of tbe past with Insufficient regard for the particular featuresclear/alssile war. The nuclear warheads released for an operation will, as the Minister of Defense
point* out, often be hastily expended as quickly as poaalble by using obsolete method* of artillery preparation against insufficiently reconnoitered targets.
2be enornoua role of tbe new meana of combat, which they can playuture war,ew approach to the planning of their use. With the modem scales of using nuclear/missile weapons, they should not be looked uponeans for supporting the combat operations of ground troops. How, these weapons are the main and decisive means of combat, determining the possibility of accomplishing the majority of the tasks confronting the troopsront in an offensive operation. Consequently, problems of the employment of nuclear weaponsetermining role in the planningront offensive operatioo.
The operational directive of tho General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command on its conduct serves as the organizational impetus in the planningront offenaive operation, following the directive, after be has understood the task and has carefully appraised the situation, the troop commanderront reaches an operational decision in which, in relation to the use of nuclear weapons, he defines!
sims and tasks for which nuclear/missile weapons are to be used in the operation snd the allocation of nuclear warheads in accordance with the operational tasks;
objectives to be destroyed by nuclear weapons, and the sequence and timing for the delivery of nuclear strikes against them;
number of nuclear warheads allocated to the srmles for the operation and the order of participation of the army Bdsslle units in the massed nuclear strikes of the front;
primary and alternate siting areas of thelarge units (units) and the airfields atdelivery aircraft of the air army are based,and timing of their employment; the orderof the front's means for using nuclearthe
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readiness periods of the missile units and aircraft for the delivery of nuclear strikes;
reserve of nuclear varbeads;
measures for material-technical and combat support and other problems.
The authors of soma articles. In considering the problems of planning an operation, express the opinion that, in connection vith the appearance of nuclear/misalle veaponaront and army, tvo plana should be worked out j lan for tbe front (army) offensive operationlan for tha utilization of nuclear/mlsslis weapons In the operation.
We share th* point of view of Colonel-General To. Ivanov and consider with him that there can be no separate plan for tbe utilization of nuclear/missile weapons, nuclear/missile weapons and combined-arms large units and formations cannot be used when Isolated from one another. The main elements In the operational formation of the enemy's troopa will be destroyed bye weapons, and, as Is known, the combined-arm* large units will complete their rout. Operations by ground troops are nov impossible under any conditions without the aggressive use of nuclear/missile weapons in both operational and tactical elements. One basic problems for decision by the troop commanderront on the operational use of nuclear weapons must be reflected in the plan for tha front's offensive operation. The various special technical problems connected with th* preperatlon and tbe delivery of nuclear strikes vhlch do not coma into tho operational plan are reflected In tha appropriate plans of tbe chief of tha missile troopa and artillery of the front (army) and of tbe commander of tbe air army.
Tn our opinion. It la necessary to Introduce clarity Into the problem of who must work and on what in planning for the use of nuclear/missile weaponsront (army) offensive operation.
It is knows tbat the main role in planning for the use of nuclear/ missile weapon* Is played by the operational directorate (department) of the staffrontb* staff of th* missile troopa and artillery of tbe frontnd tha staff of the air army. Let us examine their functional responsibilities in planning an operation.
The operational directorate (department) of the ataffrontn the ba'sla of the Instructions of the commander and chief of ataff of the front (army),work* out the specific problems of the nuclear /miss lie preparation and supportront troop offensive, allocates the objectives to be destroyed between the missile troops and aviation, determines the yield of the nuclear charges, the types and height of bursts, the safe distance of friendly troops, estimates tbe expected results from the nuclear strikes, andadiation situation mapecord of tbe Irradiation of tbe large units.
In performing these tasks, the operational directorate (department) coordinatea Its work with other directorates (departments) snd receives from them essential date. Thus,
e. with the Intelligence directoratehedetermined in
locations of the enemy's weapons of nuclear attack, depots, and assembly bases for nuclear warheeda and data on their preparation;
disposition areas of major operational reserves, the places in these areaa where troopa are moat denaely located, the degree of engineer preparation of the areas, end tbe probsble directions of operations by tbe reserves;
locations of major control points (of armies and groups ofhe nature and durability of the installations
thoy occupy;
--the procedure for receiving intelligence date before and during the offensive operation, ln support of the employment of nuclear/missile weapons.
Data on targets must be presented ln tbe form of the precise topographic-geodetic coordinates of the targets (and not in the form of areas approximatedap). Only then can tbe use of nuclear/ missile veepons produce the desired result;
b. with tbe staff of tbe missile troops and artilleryront (army) and tho staff of an air army, the following are coordinetedi
troopi ere determined In detail; ln addition, together with tbe operational directorate, the chief of chemicel troopa collaborate* in keeping up the radietloo situation nap end the record of irradiation of large unite; irradiation doeea cuat be considered ln en amy for the reglnent andront for tbe division end for front units (large units).
The staff of the missile troops and artillery of the front (army):
--in conjunction with the intelligence directoraterganlzea reconnalsssnce agalnat objectives on behalf of tbe missile troops of tbe front (army);
the basis of the tasks assigned by tbe ccerander of troopa of tbe front (army) to the missile units (largellocates nuclear warheads among the missile units and subunits sod designates specific objectivee to be destroyed by them in accordance with their fire capabilities; conveys tasks to those who are to perform then;
accordance with the nature of tbe objectives designated for destruction, calculates tbe necessary yield and height of nuclear bursts, ensuring tbe specified degree of destruction of the objectives;
--orgs ol tea tha preparation of siting sreea end ensures the timely delivery of missiles to the missile units and subunits;
with the staff of the rear services decides the question of tbe procedure for the delivery of missile fuel;
--orgs nl res tbe tour of duty for launchhe siting
In addition, the artillery staff of tbe frontn planning the combat use of the missile troops, decides such questions ss the orfc^nliatlon snd carrying out of topographic-geodetical preparation and engineer preparation of the siting areas, meteorological support, ballistic and technical preparation; tbe organization and safeguarding of tbe movement of the missile units to tbe siting areaa and of their movement during tbe course of the operation; the organization of direct
control of the missile units and of thoir fire; the clarification of problems of coordination by th* adtroopa with aircraft and cruleelo the Joint destruction of objectives.
The staff of the air srmyi
--allocates nuclear warheads among delivery eirereft and cruise missiles, designates specific objectives for destruction by then and organises the delivery of nuclear strikes ln accordance with the plan of the front's offensive operation;
the necessary calculations (yield and height of nuclear bursts) to ensure the prescribed degree of destruction of the objectives;
aod provides for continuous duty by delivery aircraft and for the tinely delivery of nuclear warheads to the airfields on which the aircraft are based;
direct control of the large units (units) using nuclear warheads and also their ccnbet support and cover;
problem of coordination by the aviation units end cruise alas lie unite with the alsalle unitsront (amy) In tbe Joint delivery of nuclear strikes.
The procedure for planning tha employment of nuclear/ad sails weapons in an operation,suggested by us, eliminates the necessity for preparatloo by the directorates snd departments of the front's (amy) staffaris* of memoranda and consideration* for the front commander.
We have discussed only ooa side ofe have defined the role of the directorates and departments of the staffront (srmy) and have shown the content or their work in planning for the employment of nuclear weapona in an offensive operation by the front (amy).
The other side of planning consists of the resolution of separate problems connected both with direct planning and with tbe execution oftrike*. Let u* *mm8nus* some of thesei
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In the allocation of nuclear warhead* for the taaka of tha operation and in the designation of specific objectives for destruction by then, lt la necessary to proceedasic rule: it Is better tomaller number of objectives with certainty, but those that are mora Important and have been veil reconnoltered, than to hit at allarge portion of the objectives without attaining the required reault in doing ao.
According to tha experienceeries of exercises, nuclear warheads can be allotted far tasks as fell ova: for tba first nets nuclear/missile strike (for the conduct ofoercent; for accomplishing the Immediate task ofo SO percent; for accomplishing the subsequent task ofoercent] for the front'stoercent. Of course, thisoat tentative calculation. The specific allocation of nuclear warheads in accordance with the taaka of an operation must be made according to the actual situation.
Tbe nature of the objective and the particular features of tbe disposition of its separate elements have an exceptionally important significance in determining tha type, amount, and yield of the nuclear warheads needed for Its deatruction. ror example, the enemy's weapons of nuclear attack, battalion* of "Honestedstone" end of aany other veapona, can be deployed in concentration areas or assume combat formation, with their launching mounts, at the waiting or launch sites. The moat profitable objectiveuclear atrlka willoncentration vhere these weapons are located mare compactly andonger time. Tha destruction of weapons of nuclear attack at their launch eitea will be impossible in most cases because of their short stay at these sites.
In all cases, on* must strive in the first instance to destroy depots of nuclear warhead* and their assembly bases, and also tba radio-technical means of control and guidance of missiles, without which th* launching mounts aro nothing more than heaps of metal.
In the allocation of objectives for deatruction to tha various meana of delivering nuclear warheads to their target. It is necessary to consider the distance of the objectives from the caln Una of resistance, tha degree of their cover by PVO weapons, and tba nature of the objectives (their mobility). The Inclination to plan nuclear
atrikea againat mobila objectlveo beforehand, vat indicated by Marshal of tbe Soviet Union v. I. Cfauykov Is hla critique of0 coamnnd-steff exerclaea, la nothing acre than aelf-exception.
far tbo destruction of stationery and relatively Immobile objectives. It la advisable to designate nlsslle units, and for tha destruction of BOblle objectives, aviation. To deliver atrikes against objectlvea located near our troops and also against targets of snail dimensions vhlch refer primarily to tha enemy'a veapona of nuclear attack. It is necessary to select Banns of destruction vhlch are aora accurate in their ccasbat characteristics (cruise missiles and solid fuel ballistic missiles).
In order to allocate objectives for destruction between the sdaslla troops and aviation correctly, lt la necessary, first, to consider fully their characteristics and combat potential; and second, from tha total number of objectives, vhlch almost always exceeds the capabilities for their destruction, to select the most important, tha destruction of vhlch vill ensure tba attainment of the assigned goals.
In determining tba type and heightuclear buret it is necessary to consider not only tha probability of destroying this or tbat objective, but also th* possibility of radioactive contamination of the terrain is areas is vhlch operaticca of front (army) troops are impending, aa tbe result of one's own nuclear bursts.
As ia known, depending on th* location and nature of tba objectlvea (targets) to be destroyed, and also on the level of destruction required, either aurface or air bursts can be used.
Surface bursts should usually be plans* for the destruction of troop* located in solid sheltersnd also for putting out of commission military-industrial and other objectives vith very sturdy structures. Tn addition, lt Is advisable to use surface bursts (along with the deatruction of the objective) to create tones of radioactive contamination of the terrain, with high level* of radiation.
However, in each specific case it la necessary to consider carefully tha meteorological conditions (mainly tha windbe location of friendly troopa, and their subsequent operations,
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together with tba ccnf lguratlco of tho front lino. In deUverlng atrikea against objectives located near our troops, aurface bursts nay be used only when thereteady wind ln tbe direction of the enemy and under conditions ln which troops will not enter thesa areas before the level of radiation falls to within safe Units.
Air nuclear bursts should be planned for the destruction of troops without cover and also of objectives vhlch do not have sturdy structures, ddition, air bursts are used In ell other cases when it Is necessary to exclude strong radioactive ccsxUminatlon of tbe terrain. Low air bursts can be planned vhen lt is necessary to avoid strong radioactive ccotasanation of terrain and, at the same tine, to destroy asumber of sturdy structures as possible.
The solution to the problem of selecting tbe type of burst to destroy one or another enemy rear area objective also depends on the task which has been assigned. If, for example, it ie necessary toail Junction out of actionhort time, with the intention of using it subsequently for the needs of the front during tbe operation, it is sere advisable toigh air burst.
In conducting an offensive operation, more air than aurface bursts are usually planned and in the conductefensive operation this le reversed. In swuntalns, it is more advisable to use air bursts,because the protective qualities of the ground configuration are thereby lessened.
for the delivery of nuclear/missile atrikea. It is tho greatest effect from nuclear/missile strikes can be achieved if thay are deHvexed simultaneously, ortrictly limited time. Therefore, tbe troop commanderront establishes the timingimultaneous nuclear strike against the target by all nuclear warhead delivery means. In accordance with this timing, the staff of the missile troops end artillery and the staff of the air army must calculate the time at which each missile (aviation) unit (large unit) should begin launching*eparately. The staffs of the missile and aviation large units (units),depending on the flight-time of the missile (delivery aircraft) to the target. calculates the launch-times for each launch assembly (take-off time of delivery aircraft).
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The timing ofie strikes during an operation Is calculated so sb to deliver tha greatest destruction against this or that enemy objective, for example, it is most profitable to destroy infantry and tank groupings et the moment vhen they are deployingounterstrlke or in concentration areas vhen they leave cover and prepare to move. It is advantageous to destroy airfields at vhlch delivery aircraft are based at tbe moment vhen the greatest number of aircraft has built up or when nuclear bombB are being loaded, etc.
It le thus, in our opinion, that tbe planning for the use of nuclear/missile weapons In sn offensive operationront (army) must be carried cut.
Original document.
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