M?-XSASDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
MTLITABY THOUGHT: "Some Questions in the
Preparation and Conduct of Initial Offensivey ColoneL-Generel A. Babadthanyan
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SUBJECT sVmii^ITARY THOUGHT: ome Questions In the Preparation and. Conduct of Initial Offensivey Colonel-General A* Babadzhanyan
DATE OT
APPRAISAL OF
CONTEST
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Followingerbatim translation of an article titled "Seme Questions in the Preparation and Conduct of Initial Offensivey Colonel-General A. Babadzbanyan.
This article appeared in1 Third Issuepecial version of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) which Is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets and" is "issued Irregularly. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.1 Third Issue was sent to press on
Headquarters Comment: The Special Collection srticle which isfootnotes on pa^es k,ndas urittcnbvColocel-General Pavlovskiy, and was disseminated a it may be of
Interest to note that the footnote on page^^srersto tbe Intermediate version of the three known versions of Military Thought.
V.4)
A.
Offensive Operations
by
Colonel-General A. Babadzhanyan
The constant quantitative and qualitative growth of missile veepons and the increase ln the quantity of nuclear warheads allotted for the execution of an operation are causing continuous changes in tbe methods of combat operatlona of ground troopa. These changes are now occurring so rapidly that, et tinea, that which only several months ago waa new end progressive becomes obsolescent and ceases to correspond to tbe requirements of tbe day. Specifically, tbe methods of execution of the offensive operations of tbe initial perioduclear/missile war have undergoneapid development. The purpose of this article, which is on tbe orderesponseumber of articles published in previous Issues of tbe Speclsl Collection, is to examine some of the queations ln the preparation and conduct of initisl offensive operations.
As is welluclear/miasile war will be of an exceptionally decisive nature. Tha availability of modern, powerful combat weapons permits even an enemy tho Is being defeated and is dose to destruction to deliver tellingtrikes against the deep rear area and groupings of the armed forces holding the upper hand. In order to fully deprive the enemy of any opportunity to use nuclear weapons, it is not enough to deliver strategic aasaed nuclear strikes against bis territory. Ho nuclear' strikes can guarantee the complete destruction of all tbe enemy's weapons of nuclear attack or eliminate hie capability to deliver strikes.
Tbe fulfilment of thia mission can be guaranteed only by tbe swiftest capture end occupation of enemy territory. By this very means can our country be made completely secure free) strikes by the enemy's ground nuclear weapons end tbe enemy deprived of bases for his submarine and surface missile-carrying fleet which can still operate on tbe oceanertain period of time after the land forces are destroyed.
destruction or those maneuvering capabilities which modern ground troops have,tbat the proposed depthodern front offensive operation of 1CO0 kn la not fantastic.
Even now the weaponsront and the Deans ofront can ensure the destruction of the enemyepth of upm. The question of supplying the front with missilesreet range of fire is in the stage of practical resolution. In addition, missile troops of strategic designation will undoubtedly ba used in the front tone daring the initial periodar.
In comparison with the pest sex, the depth of the enemy ope rati coal formation has, et present, also Increased. Certain elements of the enemy's operational missile rear services are locatedistance of up0 km from the front line.
The only thing that still causes one to doubt the reality ofission of such depthront is the limited capabilities of tha operational rear services. The fact is that the capabilities of th* rear services have not under gone any substantial changes during the past several years end, to soma degree, bar* even decreased, if one considers the probable destruction of railroads and tho mass destruction of motor vehicle roads. Decisive measures are necessary to Increase tbe capabilities of the rear services for delivering material, in the first place, providing tha rear services with units and large units of aircraft, helicopters, and motor vehicles with large load capacities, and tha extensive introduction of pipeline transport. Only In this case can tb* rear services ensure tha execution of deep and swift offensive operations.
Thus, It will be necessary to carryuccessive front offensive operations Is order to attain tb* Immediate strategic goals In Europe: one operation on tho Southwestern TVD and two on the Western TVD.
At the present time, various opinions exist es to bow the strategic offensive vill be executed orgs ti rat locally.
Tne authors of tba book Mcdarn War. believe that in the system of operation* In ground theaters tha first position will be given to front operations, not to the operations of groups of fronts as it vas in the pest var.
Id tha article "The Question of the Theory of the Operationroup ofolonelOzIot considers lt necessary to create high commands In all TVD'a and to subordinate to thea not only front formations bet also the other types of armed forces operatingiven TTD (missile troops, tbe navy, long-range aviation, snd troops of the PVO of the Country).
A cctm^oalse is expressed is the point of vlev presented by Colonel-General I. Pavlovskiy^ tbat offensive operations in the initial periodar can ba executed by fronts and groups of fronts.
Let us exsmlne this question. During ths years of Vorld War II, beginning with ths Soviet Army ccamteroffensive near Moscow1 to, ell the main offenaive operations were carried out,ule, not by separate fronts but by tbe united efforts of several fronts. Usually, the goals of an offensive operationtrategic axis vere achieved by the effortsrosts. The conditions of the past var required this, when am enormous density of weaponsuperiority of no lessimes over the enemy were neededreakthrough of defenses. The affarte of several fronts vera usually concentrated ootrategic or operational alls, the geographic conditions of which provided the capability for close operational coordination among the fronts.
In the conductuolear/mlssil*oncentration of enormous masses of personnel andot required to carry out an offensive. Bran now the density of troops hss sharply decreased, while the zones of offensive of formations haveimes. All of this Indies tee tbat under modern conditions, the efforts of one front are sufficient for those axes vhere in the past war it vas necessary to concentrate the efforts of several frcete.
Consequently, th* troopa of on* front vill now operate,ule, on each of th* strateglo or leportant operational axes. It is our vlev that under these conditions tb* combining of several frontsroup Is not advisable, if only because operational coordination
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between fronts operating on independent strategic or important operational axes is not always possible,or is almost impossible. The General Headquarters (Stavka) will organize strategic coordination between tbe fronts, or rather, implement strategic coordination of ths efforts of strategic nuclear/missile weapons with the operations of the fronts.
On the basis of the above, we conclude thatuclear/sdaslle war tbe main role in attaining the goals of armed eombat ln theaters will belong not to tbe operatlonaroup of fronts, but to the system of simultaneous and successive front operations. This doee not preclude, of course, the conduct of operetionsroup of fronts at individual stagestrategic offensive operation on axea where operational coordination of several fronts is feasible.
In our view, the Halted number of frontsuclear/missile war also makes tbe formation of TVD cctnmand* inadvisable. It le known that, at the beginning of World War XXj tbe number of fronts was limited (fire fronts) snd cca-responded exactly to the number of strategic axes which existed at tha time (Bortbern, Horthwestern, Western, Southwestern, and Southern). Odder these conditions the frosts fulfilled not only operational, but also strategicoo*.
The ccccand* of three axea were created InWestern, and the Southwestern; they were called
upon to carry out the operational-strategic direction of the fronts (which generally numberedot various periods). The complexity snd tbe intensity of the situation at the fronts of war frequently forced the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command to directly control the fronts, bypassing the commands of the axes, thereby an king them useless. As is known, after existing for abcut one year altogether, theae ccnaaoda were abolished.
Inuelear/nisslle war tbe number of fronts on tbe indicated axes will be leas than ln the pest war. The conditions for allitary operation* will become still acre coaplex. The maneuverability of troop* and the mobility of the front line will increase bytimes. All thisasis for considering the creation of command* of axes or of TVD'suture war inadvisable.
In ourho formation of TVD commands la possible only in remote tbeetere where tbe control of the armed forces will be difficult for the General Headquarters, for example, in the Tar East (as it was in the past war) or on other continents when our troops arrive there.
However, granting tbe possibility of creating strategic commands in remote TVD, It is not possible to agree with tbe proposal that tbe naval forces operating in tbe waters adjoining the theater should be subordinated to these ccesasnds. The mission of supporting ground forces Is secondary far the navel forces, ln comparison with the mi as loos of blockading enemy countriea and of disrupting enemy ocean and sea Intercontinental transport, which missions sre frequently carried out ln remote ocean areas or even on other oceans. For the fulfilment of theseroad strategic maneuver by submarine forces Is required. The subordination of all navel forces to the TVD command could thus fetter sad limit the Havy's capability of fulfilling its main missions. Of course, tbe part of the naval forces which will be operating in support of tbe troopsVD (the destruction of enemy strike missileand aircraft-carrier naval forces, the disruption of enemy amphibious landing operations, the participation in amphibious landing operations of TVD troops,ust be subordinated to the TVD command.
The thought expressed by some authors of articles concerning the creation of operational-strategic command* in our theater* of military operatlona was undoubtedly influenced to some degree by tbe presence of such control element* oo the territories of tbe countries of th* Imperialist coalition. Hovever, such an analogy la not Justified here. The fact of the matter la that tbe American Joint Staff in essence controls the armies of the countries which comprise the Imperialist coalition. But the Americana ere notosition to effect centralized control of ell the armed forces that make up the coalition and which are dispersed on almost all tbe continents of the world. Therefore, they formed intermediate control elements, commands of tbe TVD.
Under ourhen theater* of military operation* are located oo two continents (Europe and Asia) and are connected by land borders with well-sata bile bed means of ccssaunlcatlon* and supply, it will hardly be necessary to fare euch an Intermediate commandVD command.
Several words on the initial offensive operations of fronts. These operations can begin under various conditionsituation. Tbe shifting of fronts to an offensive can be precededhreatening period. It will take placear startsignificant Intensification of tension in toe relations between tbe principal countries of the Imperialist coalition and those of the Socialist Gamp, aod when it becomes clear that the political relations of the tvo camps will inevitably bringilitary conflict. Tbe threatening period can also take placeorld war starts through involvement of the principal countries in the courseocal war in one of tbe areaa of the world.
War can also be startedurprise enemy strike, when there will be no threatening period. The most characteristic versionurprise attack can be the delivery by tbe probable aggressorass thermonuclear strike sgainst tbe socialist countrie. under tbe guise of carrying out large training exercises.
A surprise attack is tbe most advantageous method ofar. It may be assumed that war will be unleashedurprise attack, if the imperialists decide on thle. Therefore, in the practical activity of our armed forces and ln their operational and combat training, it is necessary to embark decisivelyourse for tbe preparation of troopa for tbe entryar which is not precededhreatening period. If the armed forcea are reedy to begin military operetions when there is no threatening period, then they will always be able to do so when therehreatening period.
An important situational condition, under which fronts can begin their initial offensive operations, is the location of tho troopsront in relation to tbe enemy before tbe atart of military operations. ront (group of forcea) which, prior to the start of military operatlona, la located directly on tbe border beyond which the countries of the Imperialist coalition ere located, will come into contact with the ground enemy immediately. ront locatedistance from this border st tbe start of military operations can shift to the offensive only after reaching the line of contact between the aggressor troops and tbe armies of countries friendly to us.
In all casea, tha trooparont will shiftoclalva offensive immediatelyountarotrlke ortrike tourprlao enemy attack. ounterstrike,trike to frustrate an enemy attack, will he carried out on the basis of the decision of the higher party and goveroBent leaders of the country; the aeln role In carrying it out will be played by the nlsslle troops of atrategic designation. It Is understood that government leaders will also sake tha decision for the front troops to shiftecisive offensive.
Thereide-spread point of view that front nuclear/snsslle weapons must also participateounterstrike tourprise enemy attack, which are measures of the Supreme High Ccemsnd. In our opinion, the front weapons will not beosition to participateounterstrike or in tbe first nuclear strike for the foil owing reasons:
nuclear/missile weaponsonsiderable number of the fronts, which are locatedistance from the borders adjacent to tha enemy prior to the start of military operations, cannot be used because of tbe comparatively short range of the operations;
nuclear/missile weapons of these fronts, evon thosa directly lo the border zone, will not ba able to participate in Immediate operations, because considerable time (up to several hours, and, under certain conditions, up to several days) will be required to bring them up to combat condition (basically, for the assembly and checking of alas lies and warheads ).
In addition to ths above, It Is necessary to take into account tha following consideration, n offensive operation, tho planned transport of missiles, special charges, and missile fuel will be greatly hampered because of the mass destruction of communication lines and the destruction of certain depots which had become known to the enemy. Therefore, it la not advisable toignlficant amount of theeaponsront at the very beginning of an operation. They should be saved for subsequent use in the course of aa operation and in completing it.
The extensive use of nuclear/missile weaponsow approach to solving tbe problem of the combat compositionront. IS the peat war, tbe combat compositionront waa determined by tbe necessity ofwofold or threefold (and sometimes even more) superiority of forces snd weapons over the enemy on tho axes of strikes.
Under modern conditions, the criterion for determining the compositionront la its capability to inflict destruction on en opposing enemy grouping with nuclear weapona and to complete its rout with notorized rifle, tank, and airborne large units. Figuratively speaking, one can say that combined-arm* and tank large units will now play the rolebroom" by means of which the front's offensive zone will be cleared of the remaining enemy troops after they are routed by nuclear weapons. Under conditions when, as the result of nuclear strikes, tbe correlation of forces can rapidly and sharply change in favor of tbe side that baa executed then, an offensive operationront can be carried out successfully even when th* initial correlation of force* end weapons was equal.
Tbe combat composition offront ln an initial operation will depend on the method of unleashing the wer.
ar startsurprise enemy attack, the front will then be forced to start combat operationsalted number of large unit* in constant readiness. During tbe course of an operation, the front will be reinforced by fully mobilized large unite and by large unit* in constant readiness srrivlng from the zone of Interior (ln accordance with the plan for the strategic deployment of the ground troops).
If, however, military operation* develophreatening period, then tbe first front operation can etartarger number of troopa: large unit* in constant readiness and those fully mobilized. In elltecessary to consider that th* approach of troop* from the zone of interior can be frustrated or delayed by the eneay by mean* of direct strike* against these large unit* and also by therue tion of communication route*.
Missile large unite and unit* are tha skeleton of the operational formationront, without which tbe oonduct of combat operations under modern condition* Is Impossible. Therefore,order district (group ofhe composition of th* missile troop* must be such ea is necessary for achievement of the objective* of tbe first operation. In addition, the composition of the mlaalle troop* and theirof ammunition must compensate for th* ahortag*cb Iced-arms end tank large unit* when these are put out of action on the field of battle or when their arrival from tha zone of lnterior i* diarupted or delayed.
Let us dwell briefly on ths Bethods of operations of the troopsront In Initial offensive operations.
Toe following factors will exart an Influence on the methods of conducting Initial offensive operations: the limited number of front troopa; disorganization of tbe enemy's governmental control and the control of his armed forces, and, consequently, the Isolation of the enemy's troops and the putting out of action of entire elements of hla operational formation; the enemy's lack of prepared and occupied lines of defense; and tbe existence of large arose of radioactive contamination.
The above-listed factors create favorable conditions for an offenslvo by several strike groupings on axes. An offensive on separate sxes ensures the splintering of the enemy frontispersal of his attention and efforts. At the same time, an offensive on axes la much more complicated than an offensive vhlch is carried out with close lateral contact between unite, large units, and even armies. During an offensive on axes, each grouping will beifficult situation and will have to operate Independently with ita flanks, and even its roar area, exposed. In view of this, the significance of preparing our command cadres for such operations becomes clear.
In the years of World War U, an offensive was conductedolid front in close combat formations,ethodical breakthrough of enemy positions and defense zones. Actually, combat operations were conducted in tho zona of effective fire of the infantry and artilleryonaom on both sides from tbe line of contact, if on* does not consider sporadic aerial strikes against the dapth. Under these conditions, the effect of fire against tba enemy was exploited IsBedlately. Close coordination in timing and location was executed between tha fire weapons, the infantry, and tanka.
Under modern conditions, th* sharply increased capabilities of fire weapon* have led themontradiction with th* capabilities of tho Infantry and tanka. Th* infantry and tanka have become Incapsbla of Immediately exploiting tha effect of nuclear/missile strikes against tha entire depthefending enemy. To ensure rapid seizure of the entire depth of the enemy defenses by active
combat operations and to achieve tbe objectives of the operation in the shortest period of time, it is necessary to increase sharply ths rate of the offensive which, hy tbe Directive of the Minister of Defense for Operational Trainingas ordered to be increasedmour period. Thisery high rat*. It is sufficient to state that the distance coveredk-hour period in the executionarch consistsnly two times greater than the distance vhlch muat be covered by attacking troopsJ*-hour period.
In planning an operation, is it possible to guaranteeate of,m per day, will be sustained every day? Certainly not. There will be days In an operation when troops will be able to advance only negligibly, days when they will not move at all, and, possibly, days when they will even fall beck. wo are speaking of those days when front troops will be repulsing enemy counter strike a, conducting meeting engagements with the enemy, forcing water barriers, and overcoming substantial zones of rsdioactiva contamination and mountain passes. Consequently, on the other days of the operation, the rate of advance must be such so as to compensate for the days of slow or of no rate oft must approach the speed ofarch.
in the offensive operations of the past war, the moot decisive results were achieved by encircling the enemy operational groupings and subsequently annihilating and capturing them. However, at tha end of the war, especially in the Vistula-Oder operation, the ineffectiveness of encirclementorm of conducting an operation bad already become obvious. Those enemy groupings, aroundolld ring of encirclement waa not closed, turned into so-called "roaming pockets" and quickly ceased to exist. But those enemy groupings that were encircled by our troops (for example, the Poznan and the Schneldemrra groupings) continued to fight while surrounded until the end of the var,ubstantial number of our troops to them.
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'd)
Ve cannot agree with the statement1 thatodern war encirclement and destruction of large enemy groupings can be employed along vith tba delivery of swift, deep strikes on separate axes.
Under the conditions of highly maneuvering combat operations, it will be Inadvisable toarge enemy grouping vhlch la diaperaedarge area. The Halted nuaber of trooparont vlll not per nit the creation of inner end outerf encirclement and the conduct of methodical coabat for the purpoae ofing of encirclement, breaking up the encircled grouping, and destroying it piecemeal. Such operation* threaten looa of the rate of the offensive and, possibly, even Ita frustration. It le auch mere advisable toaorcea to intercept the main routee of retreat of an enveloped enemy and subsequently destroy him vith nuclear/missile veapona. ID thla, tha main body of tb* front troops Bust nova forward without delay and without glancing hack at the encircled enemy grouping.
In the most general terms, this is bow we visualize the initial offenaive operation* of tho initial periodar. Undoubtedly, seme of the problems we have examined require further consideration and critical analysis.
Original document.
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