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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
MILITARY THOUGHT: "Utilization of the Missile
Troopsront (Aray) ln an Offensivey Colonel-General P. Koshevoy
Enclosederbatim translation of an article vhlch appeared in the TOP SECRET Specie! Collection of Articles of the Jc-Arnal "Military Thought" '( Voyennaya Myiil'T^vibl'lBhed by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.
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Richard Helms Deputy Director (Plans)
Original: Tha Director of Central Intelligence
c: Military Representative of the President
/Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The. Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence XJ. S> Air Force
The Director, National Security Agency
Director, Division of Intelligence Atomic Energy Commission
National Indications Center
Chairman, Guided Missiles end Astronautics Intelligence Committee
Tha Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Director for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center
SUBJECT
'ARY THOUGHT: "Utilization of the Missile Troopa Front (Amy) in an Offensivey Colonel-General P. Koahevoy
OF INFO: July is6l
A reliable source
Followingerbatim translation of an article titled "Utilization of the Missile Troopsront (Army) In an Offensiveritten by Colonel-General p. Koshevoy.
This article appeared in1 Third Issuepecial version of the Soviet military Journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). Tola journal le published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander. 1 Third Issue was sent to press0I.
Utilization of the Ml agile Trooparont (Amy) In an Offensive Operation
by
Colonel-General P. Koshevoy
In modern warfare, along vith the decialve role of nuclear/missile weapons, extremely important tasks are entrusted to the ground troops.
In close cooperation with other types of armed forces, especially with the missile troops of strategic designation, they are called upon to perform one of the most important tasks of armed combat, which Is the annihilation of the enemy's troops on the ground and the occupation of hla territory. Successful accomplishment of this task Is considerably facilitated by the presence of the moat modem means of combat within tbe composition of the ground troops: missile large units and units of operational-tactical designation and highly maneuverable motorized rifle end tank troops, also equipped with missiles.
After the ground troops were provided with nlsslle large units and units, their fire power increased immeasurably. Fire, vhlch now consists basically of nuclear strikes, has acquired nev qualities: there hasharp increase in Ita power and effectiveness. While the role of fire formerly consisted of supporting tank end infantry operations directly on the field of battle, today miaslle large unita and units of tho ground troops are capable of destroying major installations and groupings of troops in the entire depth of tbe operational formation of the enemy.
Due to the high effectiveness of the nuclear/miss lieront can now fulfil its tasks in an offensive operationreatly reduced number of forces and conventional fire means.
At present, the front Is usually made up ofrmies, including one tank and one air army, one or two front missile brigades, as well as large units and units of special troops. Altogether, in this case, there vill beoivisions,housand pieces (orudiyo) and mortars, and upirplanes within the compositionront.
In comparison with tba closing period of World War II, there hasonsiderable decrease Is personnel snd piecesront, but on the other hand, missile troops have emerged in the form of front and army missile brigades, ss well es tbe missile battalions of notarized rifle end tank divisions.
A front of the above-nentioned complement containsoaunching mounts,oront, Ifl tormyo hk organicnd also one or two regiments of front cruise missiles.
By mesne of these weapons nuclear strikes can be delivered against enemy objectivesepthm. Thus, under conditions when nuclear/miss lis weapons have become tbe principal means of destroying tbe eneay, tbe problems of tbe use of these weapona sre the basis of tbe decision of tbe front (army) troop cemmander in an offensive operation. The operationhole cannot be planned without ensuring, ln all respects, the most effective utilization of tbe missile troops.
The newest means of armed combat and the radical changes lc the methods of combat operatlona to which they have given rise, demand from commanders snd staffs of all levels exceptionally accurate and mobile workinimum expenditure of time ln all command and ataff echelons. In view of this, we consider that the established practice of the conmander workingecision on the basis of the information reports of various officials is coapletely unacceptable under the new conditions.
The commander of the trooparont (army) must be quite familiar vith tba condition and capabilities of tbe missile troopa, because only then can heeil-founded decision for using alsallec, without spending tine listening to information reports.
It seems to us that in the period cf preparation for Bn operation, it le best for the commander of tbe troopsront (aray) to make hla decision in the presence of the chief of staff, the chief of the missile troopa and artillery, tbe coaaender of tbe sir amy, and the chiefs of tbe operational aad intelligence directorates. Each of tbe above-mentioned persons aust, if necessary,rief and clear description of the enemy objectives, tbe readiness and
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capabilities of the missile large units and units, tha availability of nuclear/missilo varheads, and answer other questions of interest to the ccamander.
In bis decision, the commander determines the procedure for the use of tbe nuclear warheads issued to the frontstablishes
enemy objectives or groupings of troops, the number of warheads, the yield, snd tha time of strike, and also indicates tbe ground taro (center) of the nuclear strikes which are intended to destroy the most important enemy objectives.
The staff of the front, together with the chief of the missile troops and artillery and the commender of the air army, organizes the execution of the decision of the troop commander; they organize the reconnaissance and preliminary reconnaissance of enemy objectives, plan the fire tasks, determine siting areaa, and carry out theof missile large units and units. After this the staff of the missile troops and artillery, tbe staff of the air army, and other interested directorates and departments can plan in detail the thorough support of the missile troops. This procedure of work was applied in special exercises conducted in the district (okrug) and, in our opinion, corresponds fully to the new requirements pertaining to tbe control of troops.
The initial data, on vhlch the decision to use missile troops Is based, consist of intelligence Information on the enemy targets and objectives destined for destruction by nuclear weapona, the condition of our missile troops, and the availability of nuclear warheads. Without this information. It is impossible to plan tbe use of the adssile troops.
In the Western Theater of Military Operations,ront's zone of offensive, the enemy may operateroup of armies consistingr 3armies (uprmy corps, lfl tonfantry and armoredeinforced by units of guided missiles and free rockets, cruise missiles, and tactical aviation. Within the composition of this grouping there will presumably be about IkObjectives which must be destroyed by nuclear weapons of varying yield.
It .must be taken Into account that in preparing and carrying out an offensive operation, we will not always have sufficient information available on the position of tbe objectives snd, because many of then are highly mobile, intelligence information may rapidly become obsolete. At the start of nuclear preparation, ve will be able to have Bore-or-lesa correct information on onlyercent of tbe objectives against which lt is necessary to plan and deliver nuclear atrlkes. Tho remainder will be deetroyed by massed and Individual nuclear atrlkes, aa they appear.
By using all the front, armyreater part of the organic missile launchers, ss well as the front cruise missiles, it is possible to deliver SO touclear strikes simultaneously during tbe nuclear preparation and in the-beginning of the nuclear support. This obviously la not adequate for the simultaneous destruction of all enemy objectives. It will be necessary to destroy pert of them by missiles of strategic designation or by front and army missiles in the course of follow-up strikes.
There may be instances when the front will have sufficient ballistic and cruise missiles available forimultaneous strike sgainst all detected eneay objectives. But more often, the number of detected objectives requiring destruction by nuclear weapons will exceed the number of available missile launchers end warheads. Therefore, naturally It is necessary to deliver strikes first sgainst those objectives whose destruction will lead to sn sbrupt weakening of the basic enemy grouping, disorganize the control of his troops, and,on the whole, change tbe correlation of forces to our advantage.
It should be borne lc Bind that. In the preparation for an operation, more tine will be spent in working out the decision snd planning for the use of alaslie troops than in tbe perfornance of these tasks during the course of combat operetions. During tbe period of preparation and planning of tbe operation, ve can have at our disposal more complete data about the enemy objectives, more time for carrying out preliminary reconnaiaeance of the objectives and for transmitting the tasks to those who will perform them.
In the course of the operation, however, tbe decision for delivering nuclear/missile strikes must be made without any delay and be transmitted quickly to the missile brigades, bettelions, and batteries. This is possible only when there Is mechanization and automation of the data receiving process and of tbe control of troopshole.
Experience gained frca tbe special exercise conducted in the district with missile large units indicates that lt will takeours to clarify tbe plan for tbe utilisation of nuclear/missile weapons snd to transmit lt from tbe front to the launch batteries. At tbe headquarters of the missile troops and artillery thia work was performed in one and one half hours; transmitting tba tasks from the front headquarters to the missile brigades consumed kC toinutes, and the work performed at the level of the missile brigade and launch battery also consumed kO toinutes.
It la completely obvious that the time expended oo ell the above-mentioned operations must be sharply decreased.
We maintain that in tha staff of the missile troops and artilleryront, all the work connected with clarifying the tasks shouldaximum ofinutes and at tbe level of tbe missile brigade end launch battery;o Uo minutes, of whichoill be used for technical preparation of tbe launching assembly for tbe launch. As various guidance devices and technical communlostions means are perfected, this period of time will be increasingly shortened.
During the course of an operation, aa well as during its preparation, it le best that tha decision forassed nuclear/missile strike be made by the commander of troops of tbe front (army) in the presence of the chief of staff, tbe chief of the missile troops and artillery, the cascender of the sir army, the ccennder of tbe cperationel directorate, and the chief of intelligence of tbe front. rief exchange of opinions sod after clarifying the conditions of ths situation and tbe capabilities of the nlssile troops, tbe troop ccanainder must determine the ground lero of the nuclear strikesap for the sdssile troops and aviation and set the time for their delivery and tbe yield of the warheads to be used. Tbe chief of al sails troops and artillery of the front and the cotaandar of the air amy, on the basis of tbe concender's decision, ensure the preparation cf the appropriate ccesnnds and their trans elation to those who will carry then out.
Of course, the choice of tbe method for workingecision depends largely on the personal characteristics of the individual military commander. However, we are convinced that the suggested method ln which tbe commander of troops of the front, proceeding
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from an analysis of tbe aituatloo vhlch haa taken shape, personally and immediately makes the decision for the deliveryuclear/ missile strike, requires the least expenditure of time.
In the exercise conducted In the district, after the commander bad announced his decision, the staff of the missile troopa and artillery of the front spent about two hours in obtaining the coordinates of the targets, distributing tha missions among tbe units, and le relaying tha commands and preparing ths batteries for launching. This includedoinutes for work vitbln the staff of the missile troops and artillery of tbeoinutes for relaying the commands from brigade to battery,oinutes for preparing the duty batteries for launching,oinutes for preparing the batteries In waiting positions.
It is perfectly obvious tbat such squandering of time cannot be tolerated, especially since tbe lion's share of it is wasted in the staffs and in the transmission of commands by technical communications meana.
We believe tbat under the conditions of highly dynamic combat operations, the time expended, from the moment of beginning to work out the decision at tha front to the moment of firing at tbe launch batteries, must not exceed one hour. This result can be achieved if no more thaninutes are used by the staff of the adsslle troops of ths front In preparing all the commands and transmitting them to tbe front brigades snd staffs of the missile troops of the armies,oinutes are used to transmit the commands at the level of tbe missile brigade and launch battery, and no mors thanoinutes are used for the work of the launch batteries.
Why do we contend that no mere than one hour should be expended for carrying out the tasks enumerated above?
If the decision forassed nuclear/missile strike against an enemy grouping which is advancingounterstrike is made by tbe commander of troops three hours in advance of the strike, during tbe period vhen ths enemy troops are still marching to tbe line of deployment, then there is no guarantee that the intentions of the enemy will be discovered and that hla Una of deployment will be determined correctly. It is quite possible tbat during this period of
time, tbe direction of movement of tbe enemy grouping will be changed and lt Vila not ba oa the line supposed by us. esult, the nuclear/missile strike will be deliveredacant area. However, if thereeserve of time available. It is essential that it be used in the moot effective way possible for tbe preparation of the strike: to determine the most probable areaa of concentration or congested movement of tbe enemy troops, especially his nuclear weapons, and to prepare the necessary data for conducting fire with conventional and nuclear charges.
If, however, on the basis of accurate Intelligence information, the commander makes his decision one hour before delivery of the strike, by this time the enemy columns will be located somewhere withinom from the line of deployment. In this case, any significant change in tha direction -of their Eovement is unlikely and the probability of destroying the enemy groupings will therefore be sharply increased.
A nuclear/missile strike can be delivered immediately upon determining an enemy advanceounterstrike. But even in this case, the destruction of the columns will be guaranteed only if no more than one hour elapses from tbe time of their detection to the launching of the missiles. This is explained by the fact tbat during tbe movement, for example, of an infantry or an armored division along three lines of march, tbe length of each column reachesom and the rata of speedom per hour. If we determine the coordinates of the heads of tbe columns an hour before the strike end subsequentlytrike against them, the columns will be destroyed.
The best time forassed strike la at the moment of the enemy's deploymentounterstrike. In this case, the personnel and combat equipment are outside their concealment and are disposed in relatively compact combat formations. As deployed,enemy infantry or armored division occupies up tom along theom in0q.nd baa tba greater part of its forces In tbe first echeloniew toowerful Initial strike.
uclear strikes are delivered against tbe firsttrikes against tbe second echelon of the division,otal yieldhousand tons or acre, the bulk of tbe personnel and combat equipment will be put out of action.
Massed strikes against troops advancingounterstrike or for other operations must, in our opinion, be preceded by strikes of nuclear and conventional weapons In areas of various defiles and other sectors of terrain that are difficult to traverse. In order to broke tbe movement and produce congestion of enemy troopa.
Thus, delivery of massed nuclear/missile strikes in the course of combat requires quick and decisive actions, principally from those who make tbe decisionounterstrike and organize its execution, and also smooth-functioning staff work, reliable intelligence, stability of toe technical means of communications, and timely transmission of commands to those who will carry them out.
Proper organization of the control point of the chief of tha missile troopa plays sn important role in the control of sdsslle troops.
In conducting exercises with missile troops, we have avoided locating the control points in tents scattered at considerable distances from each other. The mobile control point of tha front has been located In special buses, built on the chassis of MAZ-5C1 vehicles. All the motor vehicles of the troop commander, chief of staff of the front, chief of the missile troops and artillery of tbe front, and the chiefs of tbe operational and Intelligence directorates were interconnected by gangways. Officers of the staff of the missile troops and artillery were located in three specially equippeduses with trailers.
Convenient, compact placement af tba control pointecrease in tha amount of telephone lines for Internal communications and the wide use of selector loudspeaker communications which ensured individual as well as collective receipt of information regarding the situation, simultaneous assignment of tasks to the officers who are to fulfil tbem, etc
Selector communications were established with all the directing officers (napravlenets) of the armies and missile large units of the front, with the planning group, the Intelligence department and with the operations group of the chief of the missile armament department located at the command post (komandnyy punkt--KP) of the front, in the course of the exercise, telegraph apparatus, equippedecure communications deviceere deployed in direct proximity to the directing officers1 buses.
It was established at the exercises that it is possible to shorten considerably tha time needed for transmitting orders to the troops and receiving information from the troopa, if all the directing officers wore located in one specially equipped bus in which were concentrated the receiving and transmitting ZAS and signal-coda device (signalno-kodovayaapparatus and the direct telephone channels for radio relay and radio cceesinications. In tbe exercise, direct telephone channels for radio, relay communications were organized and signal-code communications (SKU) devices were used for communications with the missile brigades and the chiefs of missile troops of the azalea.
On the whole, experience from the exercises indicated that radio and radio relay means of ccemwnlcatlons utilizing ZAS and SKU ensure stable and flexible control of the fire and maneuver of the missile troops. Wire communications, including high frequency (vysoxayawere found to be unsuitable during combat operationsighly mobile nature.
nevertheless, the use of the above-mentioned methods of organising ccmmunications only partially solves the problem of ensuring dependable control of the missile troops. We are of the opinion that In order toadical Improvement in communications, the chief of the missile troopsront must have his organic means of communication, which would ensure the estoblishment of radio ccnmjunications with the missile troops up to and including missile battalions notadio network, but only on point-to-point nets. In addition, the control point of the chief of the missile troopsront (army) must be equipped Inay as to ensure the transmission of ordersinimum expenditure of time. It Is also necessary to perfect control devices and the preparation of offlcera' working areas, to work out the sequence of issuing commands, etc. All this will undoubtedly shorten the time expended in the transmission of commands.
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odern offensive operation It la tItally Important to organize correctly and maintain continually coordination of the mlaalle large units and units ofectical designation vith cruise missiles and aviation.
In order to coordinate the delivery of nuclear strikes by missile large units and aviation it is necessary to determine for them tbe objectives to be destroyed and to establish tbe order and tbe time of delivery of the strikes. These questions must be resolved more thoroughly and concretely during the conduct of fire preparation and also fire support for an offensive during execution of the Immediate task of tbe front.
Due to the fact that cruise missiles and aviation are capable of destroying tbe enemy ln considerable depth, zonal distribution of objectives for destruction among the missile troops and aviation la not adviaable since one zone may contain objectives vhlch it la more advantageous to destroy by Missiles than by aviation and vice-verse.
The allocation of objectives vlthln zones should be so calculated aa to reduce tbe effect of nuclear bursts on the flight of the cruise missiles, and for this reason It Is adviaable to assign to then independent objectives, which are separated by some distance from objectives of belliatic missile strikes. In caseeedassed nuclear strike by ballistic and cruise missiles against objectives in the same area, tbe latter should deliverinutes before oroinutes after the ballistic mlesllee. It is also important that there be no nuclear bursts along tbe flight paths of the cruise mi aa lies, otherwise tbe missile nay turn itself or depart from Ite course. The launching times of all types of missiles should be designated on tbe basisoordinated time of strike and of the individual flight tine of each of than.
The unexpectedness ofmassed nuclear strike in an offensive operation la one of tbe most lis^ortant conditions of tbe effective use of nuclear weapons by the mlaalle troopa and aviation. It can bo achieved if the flight of delivery eircraft over friendly territory is carried out eimultaneously with the delivery of nuclear strikes by missile large units or shortly thereafter, and must be done with changea ln altitude which will make it more difficult for the enemy's radar stations to detect the delivery aircraft in their approach to
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the objectives to bo destroyed. Therefore, ltometimes necessary Jo sacrifice the advantagesimultaneous strike, especially since, in order toreakthrough by the aircraft to the objectives, lt is necessary to create corridors in the enemy's PVO system for them beforehand.
In organizing coordinated action between missile large units (units) and aviation, it is necessary to establish restricted zones for the flight of sircraft over the combat formations of tbe missile large units (units) and over regions to be subjected to nuclear strikes by other means.
The utilization of "nuclear/mlasllo veapona depends largely oo timely engineer support of the combat operations of ths sdsslls troops. Missile troop* must reach the area of combat operations without hindrance, at high speeds snd,ule, et night, and shift rapidly to new siting areas during the course of an offensive, Tor this reason. It is necessary to transport missiles over long distances to the missile troops, which requires special transportation conditions.
Experience from exarclsas bos Indicated that In order to transport missiles to the armies and front missile brigades, lt Is Imperative topecial route in the rear area of tha front, which must have engineer preparation, well-organized traffic and control services, and appropriate forces for the protection of transports with missiles. This route should be maintained by tha forces and means of tbe front.
Similarly, each army should designate one route for the transport of organic missiles from the army miss lie-depot battalion (rsketno-parkovyy division) to the army brigades and battalions. Army routes should be maintained by tha forces and means of the army.
pecial experimental exercise, we established that by using helicopters snd photography it Is possible, in the course of an offensive, to raise tho speed of engineer reconnaissance of supply routes to approximatelym per hour, compared to theom per hour maximum by motor vehicles.
As yet unresolved sre such Important problems ln tbe engineer support of the combat operations of tbe missile troops as the preparation of siting areas and areas of concentration of missile large units and unite with regard to enaurlng their anti-nuclear protection and camouflage. Taking into consideration tbe high speedsroop offenslTe (for their ownt is known that missile large units and units must not remain in one spot for more thanours. Therefore, their engineer support must be so organized that all personnel and ccssbet equipment can be satisfactorily concealedours. On the basis of this requirement, it seems to us that lt la also necessary to proceed In providing the missile brigades with engineer equipment.
Camouflage of missile troops, in our opinion, should be up to the front. Therefore, lt Is intolerable that front camouflage battalions have nothing far camouflaging missile troops. They should at least be equipped with dummy launching mounts.
A few words regarding the organizational structure of missile brlgsdea. Experience Indicates that in order to Increase the fire power aa well aa to ensure the viability and tbe constant readiness of missile large units to conduct fire, mlselle brigades should be composed of three battalions. Tba shifting of brigades of this composition ln the course of sn operation should be so organized that tvo battalions are in constant readiness to conduct fire, end the third, meanwhile, le moving to the new position. This ensures continuity of the fire accompanying the troopa in the course of en offensive.
The general conclusions vhlch ve have set forth, based on the special exercise, represent only an Initial attempt to investigate the use of missile troops and their control in the oourse of an offensive operationront (army). The joint creative efforts of the generals and officers of our Armed Forces are required ln order to complete the study of these important problems.
Original document.
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