PROSPECTS FOR NASSER
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the prospects for Nasser over the next year or two.
CONCLUSIONS
We do not foresee any significant challenge to Nasser's control of Egypt during the period of this esUmate. His moves are often based on reactions rather than on advance planning. Hence, the years immediately ahead are Likely to be uneasy ones, as he continues his vigorous ad hoc efforts to remake Egypt's social and political structure and tobroader support for his regime. (Paras.
Nasser's defeat in Syria has clearly cost him stature, but he remains the most formidable single leader in the Arab world. He will keep up propaganda and subversion against the secessionist Syrian regime and against rival Arab rulers elsewhere. He will remain strongly opposed to Arab communism. He is unlikely to cooperate in efforts to reduce tension with Israel. We do not believe, however, that he feels any immediate compulsion for direct overt use of force against either Israel or his Arab opponents.
Nasser's basic suspicions of France and the UK probably will not change. For the next few years at least he is Likely to be reasonably restrained in his dealings with both the US and the USSR because of his heavy dependence on the US for food and on the USSR for military and development aid. The nature of his interests and his objectives makes It likely that on many issues his views will be closer to those
of the Bloc than the West. However, he will be alert to detect and will react vigorously against any attempt by either to use aidever to influence his basic internationalor his policies ln Egypt and the Arab world.)
DISCUSSION
THE BACKGROUND Basic AHitudas
Nasser believes deeply tn tbe necessity of major social, political, and economic change ln Egypt and the Arab world generally. He looks uponnd "the end ofs interrelated aspectsevolutionary regeneration of Arab society. He sees manifestations of the old order he is trying to destroy both in certain classes and practices ln Egypt and in the "reactionary" regimes in other Arab states.
In trying to implement his revolution, he tends to respond to opportunities andrather than to follow deliberate plans; he does not concentrate at one time or another on internal reform at the expense of regional progress or vice versa. In the sensitive field of relations with Israel, with "theand with those whom he considers their allies, his moves are often based on emotional reactions rather then on advance planning. In general, however, his essentially pragmatic approach brings him up short of catastrophe and occasionally even overrides his ideological preconceptionsis decision not toa recovery of Syria by force).1
Nasser's own assessment of the pastears mustreater than ordinary mixture of satisfaction and frustration He has wiped out the old order which flourished under King Farouk. Determined efforts by
' Nasser himself recently told Piesldent Kennedy's Special Representative. Chesterhat many Middle Eastern developments are decided without ranch strategic ejgggeJBg andragmatic decision taken on the spar of the moment. He added that in hla opinion moat estimates on the Middle East, both by his own people and foreigners, are overly sophisticated.
Britain and Prance to destroy him have come to naught; Indeed, their own Influence in Egypt has vanished totally. Nasser hashis armed forces andajor program of economic development and has obtained large-scale aid from both East and West. His status as the most Important leader of the Arab world has been established,
owever, his most conspicuous triumphs were achieved some time ago; more recently, there have been few notable successes and many setbacks. Qaslm's Iraq remains beyond his control. Syria has broken away from his dominance. The archenemy Israel continues to survive and flourish. Conservative regimes and foreign influence remain in many parts of the Arab world. Egypt itself has serious economic troubles. Thus, while his revolution has made much progress, some of the goals he seeks must appear almost as distant now as they were several years ago.
Recent Developments
S. With Syria's secession from the United Arab Republic (UAR) lnhe pretensions and inhibitions which had masked intra-Arab rivalry in the past few years were cast aside. Jordan and Saudi Arabia offered support to the new regime in Damascus and entered into virulent propaganda exchanges with Nasser. Oasim also made overturesDamascus and gloated over the blow to Nasser's aspirations for leadership of the Arab unity movement. Nasser set out tothe Syrian regime by propaganda and subversion, he dissolved the United Arab States (UAS)last at the Imam of Yemen, and he renewed his calls for theof King Hussein and King Saud.
asser's defeat In Syria has clearly cost him stature in the Arab world. His aura of
invlnclbuity Is gone, the unhapplness of most Syrians at the price they had to pay for unity under Nasser Is evident to all Arabs, and the Inevitability of unity itself has been brought into doubt. Nasser's traditional enemies arc no longer as afraid of him as they were. The regimes of Syria and Iraq are openlyhis leadership of Arab unity and of opposition to Israel. Some reformist elements are probably now facing up to the likelihood that the change they hope for will take longer to accomplish and the possibility tbat it may hare to await other leaders.
Despite all this, Nasser remains the most formidable single leader in the Arab world. Even the conservative regimes cannot ignore his role as the prime defender of the Arabs against Israel, his status as an acceptedleader, and his ability to obtain aid from both the USSR and the US. To non-Communist revolutionaries and reformers In all parts of tbe area there is still noto him as an effective source of support and inspiration.
Nasser's own attitudes and intentions toward the conservative Arab regimes have probably not changed fundamentally. He feels that until the governments which now rule in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Kuwait are overthrown by elements sympathetic to him, the cause of Arab unity and socialist progress will be insecure. At the same time, he is probably still convinced that sooner or later the conservative regimes will fall of their own weight While he can be expected to lend support to any indigenous movement to hasten the end of these regimes, he probably does not feel any compulsion for Immediate action to oust them.
Both before and after the break-up of the UAR Nasser put intoumber of radical economic measures- Some of these were probably inspired by the feeling that many of the urban middle class elements to which he had looked as the mainstay of his revolution were themselves becomingby money and foreign influences. Others were probably intended principallylow against the foreign communities and against those remaining elements in Egypt who were of the same class as thewho had successfully defied Nasser's control in Syria.
The measures created confusion andin the Egyptian economy, already affectedismal crop year. Most foreign and many non-Moslem Egyptian businesswere liquidated. Opportunities for the acquisition of even moderate private wealth were severely restricted. Three-quarters of the corporate sector of the economy, on which Egypt's economic growth largely depends, was brought under direct governmentt remains to be seen whether or not thesewill seriously affect the moderate progress which had been made In the past few years in implementing development plans while maintaining stable prices and providinglight increase in the standard of living of the masses.
Nasser's Increased dependence onaid has been an equally important though leas dramatic development of the past year or so. He has, of course, for some time relied primarily on the Bioc for large-scale economic and technical assistance for the development program and been almost completelyon it for militaryore recently, his dwindling foreign exchange resources (which have been falling at the rateear for the past three years) have led him into heavy dependence on US PLillion in FY ltMl; an estimated
9 It should be noted that moat of Egypt's economic activity has always lain outside the corporateand remains in private hands.
'As of the end ofasser had receivedequipment valued at0 million and commitmentsS million In economic aid from the Sonet Bloc.
illion lno feed his people and to maintain Internal economic stability. Tbe result has been to make him more cautious not to offend the US or the USSR. He has not. however, shown any sign of being willing to modify his policies or attitudes within Egypt or In the Arab world to suit the interests or desires of any of the Great Powers.
II. THE OUTLOOK Within Egypt
e do not foresee any significantlo Nasser's control of Egypt during the period of this estimate. The relativeof the various members of the small group which has long participated ln his rule has shifted here and there, but none of them is known to have either the desire or theto oppose him actively. Despite an occasional outbreak of localized plotting among the military, the large majority of the officer corps appears loyal. The old upper class, which has long hated Nasser, has been reduced to the point where most of its members are more concerned withthemselves and their assets out of the country than with trying to overthrow the regime. His Arab enemies outside. Egypt dearly lack the capability to ousthallenge by Israel or any of the Great Powers, unless pushed home decisively by force, would merely rally his own people and many other Arabs behind him.
evertheless, there are probably now more disaffected individuals in Egypt than has been the case for some time. Although Nasser remains in close touch with events, he has tended to become less accessibleand less Inclined to trust bisHis revolution isears old; it has brought obvious benefits to the country but it has also left promises unfulfilled; thefervor of Its early days is running down. While we do not believe Nasser is likely to resortraconian program to try to rush through completion of the revolutionto any set timetable, he will continuead hoe efforts to remake the social and political structure and to develop broader support for his regime. In thethe years Immediately ahead are likely to be uneasy ones ln Egypt
The urban Moslem middle class, the most politically conscious group in Egypt and tho one which has supported Nasser most strongly in tho past, stillestedIn the regime. However, Nasser's recent economic measures have almost certainly alienated many of the upper level business and professional members of this group, and, if he presses too hard with his "leveling"such discontent will spread. Should it penetrate into the army, lt could eventuallyerious threat to the regime.we believe there Is little chance ofevelopment at least during the period of this estimate.
Nasser Is still relatively) and vigorous. He will, of course, continueto the possibility ofalthough in his case the degree of the threat is less than that faced by most other Arab leaders. He would most likely be succeededunta of his present-associates, relying for support on the army. In such an event, no great change of policy would be likely. However, the loss of Nasser's compellingand the probability of jealousy and bickering among his successors wouldrender both the Internal and external policies of the regime less effective.
In th, Arab World
willigh degreeand interest ln the Arab worldthe period ahead. Above all, he willto respond vigorously to anyhe considers provocative,by his opponents in the area, byor by the Communist Bloc Should
any of his enemies In the area demonstrate weakness, or should he see an opportunitypectacular personal triumph, he will be quick to take advantage of It. We do not believe, however, that he feels anyfor trnmedlatc action.
asser almost certainly has noexpectations of bringing Syria back Into union with Egypt However, he will beboth with preventing an allianceDamascus and Baghdad or Amman and with promoting the replacement of the present Damascus regime with one moreInclined and ideologically acceptable. The instability inherent hi the present Syrian situation will provide him with ample opportunities to serve both ends, and he Is virtually certain to keepairly high level of propaganda and subversive activity.
will also continue hismatches with Jordan, SaudiYemen. If these regimes appear totheir own, it is possible thathe will again bo willing to accepttruces as he has in the past.should local opposition forces instalesoint wherea fair chanceuccessful coup,support would probably be forthcoming.the time being at least, this iseven in regard to Jordan, despiterisk of conflict with Israelany upheaval there,
will remain deeply suspiciousand eager to prevent any expansionIraqi leader's influence. He willcontinue his propagandamaintain contact with oppositionIraq. He will be active In trying toambitions for control ofwe do not believe he is likely infuture deliberately to initiate ancampaign to bring Qaslm down. Hecontinue relatively content withgovernment in the Sudan. In theof specific provocation, he is likely to leave the conservative regime in Kuwait pretty much alone. He has refrained from openly attacking Ubya on the grounds that, while reactionary, the regime has not gloried In the break-up of the UAR nor used lt to abuse him. Nevertheless, Libya, ruled by an aged and ailing King, rich in oil. andaccessible,empting target; andavorable opportunity occur to extend his influence into it he probably would not pass It up.
The Neighboring Areas
ith the ending of his primaryfor protecting Syrian territory against Israel and the continuing gradual increase in Egyptian military capabilities, Nasser's sense of security in regard to Israel isgreater now than it has often been tn the past. Nevertheless, he will be obligated both by his own ambitions and by Arabto demonstrate his continued hostility toward the Jewish state. In thehe Is unlikely to cooperate tnefforts to settle the refugee problem or to reduce tensions generally. We do not believe, however, that he will deliberatelyany major military clash with Israel during the period of this estimate.
asser will seek to maintain bisand influence with the Algerian leaders, but will probably wait to assess theof the settlement with France beforehis future policy toward the North. African states.
r, with the emergence of anAlgeria and the rise of new leaders and groupings of states in black Africa, thecentral, and western parts of thewilless promising sphere for the extension of his influence. He will, of course, continue to try to block the expansion
1.
also remain generallyto Turkey. His relations with Greece and Cyprus will continue to deteriorate due to the Impact of his expropriation measures against the large and long-established Greek community in Egypt.
The Nonaligned Slalet
will continue to takeany opportunities to participatein the politics of the nonalignedto increase his prestige among theto sustain an image of himself as anworld leader. He will maintainwith Nehru, Sukarno, and otherof the neutralist camp,whose brand of socialist progress heHowever, he Is unlikely to try toany major programs or policies forstates. He will continue tovalue on the UN as afor promoting his policies and forthe interests of the smaller powers.
Toward the Great Powers
believe that Nasser will continueupon his relationship to the Greatsimple terms of self-Interest. Henot believe that he has any verycommon interests with any of them.event, he will be much less concernedsuch Interests or coping withissues than with what he thinks thelarge nations are likely to do for or to him.
It Is unlikely that In the next few years at least there will be any significant change in his basic distrust of France and the UK-Even with the Algerian settlement, he will probably continue to regard France as an enemy of the Arabs and an ally of Israel. Likewise, while remaining suspicious of the UK and keeping up such pressure as he can against lt in the Middle East, he probably will not see much to be gained either from all-out hostility toward the British orajor effort to come to terms with them. He will continue to look on West Germanyseful source of Western technical and financialHe will continue to suspect that European economic integration willehicle for Western "neocolonialism" at the expense ot his policy of encouraging non-alignment, particularly among the newstates. While taking advantage of any opportunities which may occur with regard to Communistor Increased cotton sales, he will not give very high priority to relations with Pelplng.
In some respects, his attitudes toward the USSR and the US will be inflexible also. He will remain distrustful of any sizableactivity anywhere In the Arab world, especially In Iraq or Syria, and will continue to combat Arabe will oppose anything which he considers an expansion of US influence in the Middle East or US support there for Israeli, French, or British objectives. In general, he will not seek or accept anybated on broad understanding and trust with either the USSR or the US, nor will he modify his policies and actions within Egypt or in the Arab world to preserve or to Improve his relations with Moscow orIndeed, he will probably remainto pass up the opportunity to take anJab at US policies even on such remote issues as Panama or Taiwan.
At the same time, he is almost certainly convinced that his security against Israel and the success of his Internal development
essential to an; otherdepend on theof large-scale assistance from both the USSR and the US. Be is probably aware also that, however much the mutual antagonism of the USSR and the US and their broader international commitments may inhibit their actions, both Moscow, and to an even greater extent Washington, still possess the power to affect decisively events ln the Middle East.
or the next few years at least, Nasser will probably be reasonably restrained in his dealings with both the USSR and the US. He will be eager to reach agreementulti-yeargreement, to encourage USand technical aid for his development program, and to pay an official visit to the US. He may feel compelled to balance any visit to Washington with one to Moscow; and In view of the Importance he attaches toof his supply of modern military equipment from the USSR, he will be careful to avoid publicizing any snags that develop in Implementation of his trade and aidwith the Soviet Union. The nature of his intentions and objectives makes it likely that on many issues his views will be closer to those of the Bloc than the West. However, he will be alert to detect and will react vigorously against any attempt by the USSR or the US to use aidever to Influence his basicposition or his basic policies in Egypt and the Arab world.
Original document.
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