Created: 7/6/1962

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Current Intelligence Weekly Summary







The Soviet leaders appear to anticipate an early andconclusion of the Geneva conference on Laos which reconveneduly. In his speech that day and againuly, Khrushchev cited the Laos coalition agreement asthat "mutuallysolutions" can be found for other questions provided there is good will on all sides.

Prior to the resumption of the conference, SovietPushkin told tbe British ambassador in Moscow that he anticipated no difficulties and looked forward to an early agreement. Pushkin alsoto British delegate Macdonald in Genevauly that the Soviets were prepared to close out the conference in eight to ten days. He said he would not introduce any new issues, but hedged on the question of US troops in Thailand.

At the opening session, Pushkin and the Polishmade only perfunctory references to this issue,for the record, and gave no indication that the USSR would make withdrawal offorces from Thailand afor signing the Geneva accords. TASS reportedcomment the US announcementS marines will be withdrawn from Thailand.

Pushkin, however, told the British delegate that the most difficult question to be resolved at Geneva is theof rival Laotianforces. His claim that this was an internal Laotian matter was consistent with the position taken by the Communistlast year opposingproposals that theControl Commissionthe integration andof Laotian forces.

Berlin and Germany

uly reception for Austrian Chancellor Gorbach, Khrushchev reaffirmederman settlement can and should be reached in the near future. He warned of the dangers in postponing thisand said,"There is no getting away from the overdue problemsermanerman peace treaty." Inulymessage toKennedy, Khrushchevhope that jointefforts will eventuallyin ensuring peace and eliminating the danger of war.

Ulbricht'sune speech to an East German Communist central committee plenumfurther evidence that bloc leaders wish to continue the bilateral discussions with the US. Ulbricht attackedand other West German "revanchists" forbitter struggle" against an understanding between the US and the Soviet Unionerman peace settlement. He claimed that Adenauer not only is Intent on disturbing the bilateral talks between the US and tbe Soviet Union but actuallythe opponents ofKennedy." Ulbricht also rejected the ideaour-power conference to deal with the recent border Incidents in Berlin, as set forth in the Western notes to the USSR ofune.

pravdaulyas's report from warsaw on gomulka's interview with life magazine last november. this interview, which was never published by life, appeared in the polish communist party paper trybuna ludu onuly. gomulka urged closer relations between the us and the soviet union and maintained that onlyoviet-american agreement can outstanding international issues be solved and war averted. the polish party boss concluded his review of the major east-west problems with the comment that the "time is indeed ripe" for asolution" of the german question.

however, gomulka noted that the socialist countries, anxious toeace treaty with both east and west germany, are being forced toworsea separate peace treaty with east germany. gomulka repeated the standard communist position on the berlin "free city"and claimed that the "right of access" to westought to be fully guaranteed to all countries.

in this connection,remarked that "should the western powers insist on keeping their troops in west berlin, nothing will hinderhe timing of the publication of gomulka's remarks on this question reflects moscow'sto assure the west that some compromise on the issue of western troop presence in west berlin is possible.

in hisune call



described relations between himself and the us commandant asut repeated his previous position that civilian advisers accompanying the us berlin commandant on visits to east berlin would have to show their identification in accordance with east german

regulations. toward thethe conversation,

tension and

to minimize incidents.

"particularlyolovyev commented that the four berlin commandants should got together more often and that they could do much prevent

president kennedy's visit to mexico"

soviet propaganda gave only moderate attention to president kennedy's trip to mexico,that the country's traditional policy ofin the internalof other states obviously displeased the us. moscowto brand theailure because of the mexican government's refusal to endorse us policy toward cuba. tass alleged that mexico refused to join the us in preparingew invasion of cuba under the "flag of collective action" of latin american countries.



new government, with souphannouvong as acting, has moved to setease-fire committee andfor military andunification. in accordance with the "troika" formula adopted at the plalne das jarres. the committees are composed of representatives of the three factions.

geneva conference

at geneva, key figures have expressed the hope that the conference on laotian neutrality, reconveneduly, will reach an early conclusion. soviet cochairman pushkin saiduly that he was not


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to introduce any new


and that the USSR was prepared to conclude thein eight to ten days. Souvanna has mentionedmid-July"

There are indications, however, that Communiatto the conference will strongly oppose any reference in the final agreements to the integration and demobilization of the rival forces. The bloc delegations at theuly expressedopposition to any Laotian commitment, claiming that these were internal matters. On the samehinese Communist journalist, presumably speaking with the knowledge of thestated that Pelplng would not accept any discussion of internal problems andmentioned armed forces integration.

On the question of SEATO, Souvanna told Pushkin andcochairman MacDonaldulypecificof the "umbrella clause" could bo eliminated from the neutrality declaration if the member nations took formalof tho Laotian Government's desire to renounce thoof military alliances.

International Relations

The coalition government, in implementing its declared policy of extending recognition to all countries, has once again brought into question the international legal status of the divided nations. Itits Intention todiplomatic relations with East Germany, Communist China, and North Vietnam; Laos already has ties with their non-Communist counterparts.

Laotian recognition wouldajor step In East Germany's campaign to achieve International standing. Laos would bo the second

but first non-Communlst--nation to enter into full diplomatic relations; Yugoslavia took this step This wouldencourago party boss Ul-bricht to intensify pressure on other neutralist nations to adopt the "Laos formula." West Germany, adhering to the "Hall-steinould in all likelihood withdraw itsshould East Gnrmany and Laos establish full diplomatic relations.

A similar situation obtains with rogard to Chinesein Vientiane. Both Pei-plng and Taipoi have refused to accept concurrent diplomatic representation, oach regime being strongly opposed to any "two China" concept.

Tho recognition of North Vietnam may give rise towhich couldrflrectly affect the settlement of the Laotian question. It is possible that Southopposed to equality of representation--may make its signature of the Geneva accords conditional upon Laotian refusal to grant full diplomatic recognition to the Hanoi regime.

North Vietnamese Troops

Tho chiof of the USAssistance Advisory Group has received unconfirmed reports that North Vietnamnso troops may havo begun leaving Laos. to those reports, four North Vietnamese battalions withdrew from the Mahaxay area onay and additional North Vietnamese were flown out of Nam Tha onune. The reports did not indicate destinations.

While the North Vietnamese now may beithdrawal, there is no firm evidence that any troops have actually left. The first few weoks after the signing of the new Genevaon Laos would probably bo the period chosen forovement.






President Sukarno announced publiclyuly his readiness to resume preliminary talks with the Dutch on the West New Guinea dispute. Foreign Minister Suban-drlo earlier had assured the US ambassador in Djakarta that the Indonesian delegate, Adam Malik, could bo In Washington for such discussionsuly. In line with Sukarno's demand for tho transfer of West New Guinea'sto Indonesiaubandrlo said he hoped the transfer could be accomplished in less than the two-year periodIn the Bunker proposals. Subandrlo also said he hoped the Dutch would not request aIn New Guinea while the talks are in progress and stressod that the discussions could break down on this Issue.

Subandrlo stated In mid-June that if negotiations shouldndonesia would declare war on the Netherlands. Present larger scale preparations may be premised on that eventuality. He assuredJones that no majorwould occur while talks are in progress but stated, in effect, that infiltration operations will continue even if discussions are resumed. First Minister DJuanda told Jones onune he thought the West New Guinea situation would not be solved by either peaceful or military means butixture of both.

Paratroops were dropped onune at Merauko, and onuno supplies were dropped tonorth of Kalmana.

There Is no evidence that the most recent Indonesian para-troop drops have lessened Dutch readinoss to resume negotiations.

is continuing preparations for expanded military operations in 'est New Guinea. The Dutchthat by mid-July Indonesia will possess the full capability to stage an amphibious attackorce totalingen, and to make airbornespreadew days, utilizing,

the rtfpia innoneyian military build-up and increasinghave given the government little ground forrolongod resistance. Public opinion in the Netherlandsto support the government's effortseacefuland Is unlikely to endorse the prospectast-ditchstand.

psgfl 10 Of is

3 Juljr 62

current intelligence weekly summary

current ihtbllioence weekly summary

current intelligence WEEKLY sobcars



6 July 62



Prime Minister Baud's concern over the Pushtoonistan dispute with Pakistan has led him, despite his awareness of the dangers Involved, to rely increasingly on the USSR for economic aid and other forms of assistance. Soviet influence in Afghanistan's military forces and economic development programs is growing, and Kabul'spolicy ofalance between Soviet and Western interests in theis being undercut.

The Pushtoonistan Campaign

Daud has in the past been tough-minded about serving Afghan national interests, developing the country'sstrength and economy by securing as much aid as could be absorbed from both East and West. On the Pushtoonistan question, however, he has shown himself to be emotional anddevoting badly needed energies and resourcesause that has only scattered tribal support.

The Afghan Government's prestige among the tribes on both sides of the border was seriously damaged01esult of defeatsby the irregular forces it sent into Pakistan in an attempt totrong Pushtoon resistance movement. When Pakistan closed Afghanistan's consulates and trade offices servicing Afghan transit trade inabul responded the following month by breaking diplomatic relations and closing the border. This move has hurt Afghanistan far more than Pakistan and has furtherDaud's problem. He now must recognize that he lacks the assets to wage an effective campaign against Pakistan.

Nonetheless, Daud almost certainly bas no intention of abandoning the Pushtoonistan campaign. Recent reportsthat he is considering the establishmentushtoon "government-in-exile." He thus seems to be looking for new methods to keep the dispute

6 July 62


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