of meeting with Secretary McNamara and Secretary Gilpatric, General Carter and Mr. McCone2
Held for the purpose of reviewing recent discussions with KllUan Board, Bureau of the Budget and others concerning intelligence community problems and the coordination of the Community
Honolulu meeting on Southeast Asia will be calledabouth, exact date to bemost welcome[ McCone welcome but not necessaryto attend.
ACTION: Notify FitzGerald. Date of this meeting remains uncertain. He should be prepared to attend.
discussed at length the absence ofon progress or lack of progress in Southeastreported an intelligence effort substantially as reportedGroup onune, commenting in particular thatand CIA had taken constructive steps but that nocould he expectedew months
Mcnarriara complained he had absolutely no knowledge as to tne success of the strategic hamlet project, whether advancing or standing still or going backward; whether accepted by SVN population; and expressed uncertainty concerning the effectiveness of strategic hamlets against Viet Cong actions.
ACTION: DCI agreed to
an immediate report answering questions McNamara. DDCI to handle.
3. DCI noted General Carroll's request re organization of the USEB indicating this should not take place priorlso DCI reviewed Service intelligence representatives' positions on major issues, all of which were familiar to McNamara. SecDef indicated that he felt parochial approach intelligence problems would not be corrected until DIA firmly established and TJSD3 reorganized.
4. DCI reviewed briefly statue NSA and the COMJNT/ELINT effort, referring to various statements made by Director of BOB and recorded ln July 2nd Memorandum for the Record and the KiUian Board, recordedh, Memorandum to the President. DCI particularly emphasised reports made to Killian Board (but not to DCI) that NSA bad indicated intention to increase personnel
for NSA and all Services to
McNamara Indicated very tight control of Defense Intelligence community personnel, DIA billets to be filled so far as possible with equal reductions Service billets; no increases in Defense intelligence community personnel without specific approval of SecDef and he not inclined lo approve increases. DCI indicated possibility of duplication in SIGINT effort, particularly in ELINT field, stating he intended conduct review at once. Also referred to Killian Board recommendation that entire unit SIGINT collection and processing should be controlled by NSA. DCI stated that careful control and direction of SIGINT collection and processing probably would reduce, rather than increase, billets. McNamara Indicated absolutely no interest in DCI assistance ln planning or management of Defense Intelligence Community activities, budget, personnel or operations.
ACTION: DCI initiate team to review SIGINT operations independently of SecDef and prepare recommendations to SecDef and President for implementing appropriate plans for centralised control of SIGINT activities centered ln NSA, If study so warrants.
6. Reference Killian Board report, DCI reviewed NRO with particular reference to FIKEFLT which obviously was handled "out of channel" by DOD. McNamara questioned use of OXCART, stating thereritten commitment from Kennedy to Khrushchev that flying of manned aircraft over Soviet territory would not be undertaken by Kennedy Adrninlstratlon. McNamara expressed grave doubt on use of OXCART, and if done probably would have to be done without specific knowledge of President. McNamara further raised the question as to need of OXCART reconnaissance in view of approved satellite reconnaissance. McCone stated he had evsry intention of using OXCART and had so advised the President.
ACTION: DCI should immediately review all correspondence and commitments between the President and Khrushchev on this subject.
DCI reviewed necessity ol* research audio-surveillance and urged SecDef support In this field, indicating close cooperation between CIA and DIA. Also reviewed BIGDISH which SecDef confirmed was cancelled. An announcement to be made.
DCI advised McNamara of proposed presentation of Soviet long-range capabilities,8 and suggested McNamara have available at the meeting summary. missile and bomber capabilities,s question would be raised. SecDef and DCI reviewed several schedules usedasis for planning by SecDef. DCI noted all gave Soviets much higher capability than those contained in
DCI raised question of Cuban charges of military plane overflights out of Guantanimo, suggesting SecDef examine the matter carefully and issue appropriate denials.
Ineel that the SecDef has an agreed plan for the reorganization of the Defense Intelligence community and he does not intend to expand the entire community; that the build-up of DIA would be coupledecrease in the Service Individual intelligence efforts and personnel, that plans of reorganization extend over the next several months, that he has no immediate agreed plan with respect toINT activities and the role of NSA but Is expecting General Blake to treat with this subject, that he is not particukrly Interested In DCI assistance on his Internal problems and (although he did not express it) obviously feels that tbe DCI role should be confined to the Interface between tbe Defense intelligence community and the balance of the National Intelligence community.
In this respect lfeel thatiews differ sharply from those of the President, the BOB and the Killian Board.
JOHN A. McCONE DirectorOriginal document.