INSTALLATION PENETRATION

Created: 6/1/1962

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TITLE: Installation Penetration

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AUTHOR: Walter-

VOLUME: 6 ISSUE: Summer

STUDIES IN

INTELLIGENCE

a collodion ol articles on ihe historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects ol intelligence,

All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are ihose of

ihe authors They do not necessanly reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsemeni of an article's factual statements and interpretations.

Objectives and techniques ofassets in East European official missions around the world.

INSTALLATION PENETRATION Walter Stelnmeyer

Th* increasinglye participation of the USSR's Eastern European Satellites during the mld-lOSO* In Soviet diplomatic and economic offensives against the West and In particular tbe Increasing challenge which the Soviet Bloc was posing toU.S. interests In underdeveloped and uncommitted nationsIneview of our efforts to obtain Intelligence concerning the intentions, strengths, and weaknesses of the Satellite countries, efforts which also now had to contendore rigorous operational climate than before. Aof research, analysis, and experienced operationalbrought the conclusion that one approach upon which Increased emphasis should be placed was that of penetrating these countries' Installations abroad.

This conclusion was basedumber of varied andfactors. Prominent among these was the fact that the Satellite embassies, legations, consulates, trade missions, and news bureaus constituted the Instrumentalities for thatpenetration, political subversion, and espionage that. interests. Another consideration was that the personnel assigned to these Installations were outside their Iron curtains for extended periods of time, two to five Tears, during which the full weight of the Intelligence apparatus could be brought to bear against them.

In formulating an operational doctrine for theof such Installations, It was profitable to draw on the experience of professional West European Internal security services that had traditionally mounted this kind ofand In fact regard the penetration of foreignIn their countries as the classical approach to theof procuring current Intelligence. From time Immemorial the Installations of foreign governments In any European

country have been the object of sustained Interest on the part of that country'! Internal security service,ody of proven operational concepts and techniques for penetrating them had consequently been established.

These European concepts and techniquesseful frame of reference against which to examine collection theories responsive to vs. collection priorities. At the same tune, they were subject to modification to meet the operntine condl-

ope rations might be mounted against SatelliteThe resulting doctrine for Installation penetrationhas been tempered by experience In the school of bard knocks during tbe, and lt can now be said that principles governing the objectives and techniques of such operations have been crystallised.

Objectives

The first objectiveission penetration program Is regular collection, of current political and economic fnfelii-gence from the Installation to question. The best source for such Intelligence would of course be an In-country agent who had access to the minutes of Politburo meetings. But given the difficult realities of operation ln deniedolitburo penetration is all but Impossible, and political and economic Intelligence obtainedatellite Installation abroadelcome substitute for the visionary optimum Most Satellite missions abroad are headedenior officer with status bothinistry and ln the Party. Ills personal rank and the policy functions of his Installation require that ltarge number of directives from the Party and from ministries (Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade) of tbe government. The quality of the Intelligence available through access to these documents Is high.

A second objective Is the recruitment of Satellite officials not only as sources for tbe period of their duty abroad but as continuing agents after they return home. Installation penetration thuseans of establishing long-range assets In tbe Satellites by recruiting, testing, and training them while they are abroad. The Satellite diplomat, foreign trade official. Journalist, or Intelligence officer who has been useful to us abroad will be even more valuable when he goes

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back home at the end of his tour, not Just because be Is then Inside the target country, but because the Intelligence to which he has accessinistry headquarters has greater scope and depth.

The thirdounterintelligencee identification and neutralization of memberi of hostile intelligence services. Since diplomatic and trade missions abroad are usedby all the Satellites to furnish cover for their intelll-

does lead to the identification of opposition In tell igenceomce rs

and sometimes of their local agents, modusom-muncations systems, and operational targets. Once thisIs achieved, their neutralisation can be accomplishedariety ofby police action, sometimes by doubling agents back. Ideally by recruiting the hostileofficer In place.

Fourth Is an objective to be sought only when all possibilities tor recruitment In place have beendefection of senior diplomatic, trade, or intelligence personnel.can obviously yield only those golden eggs already hi the nest; It cuts off the continuing Intelligence that could be communicated by an In-plaee asset. It may be worth while, however, simply toarget country the services of an able and experienced officer, and it may produce, In addition to his store of positive Intelligence, leads to his formerwho are attll in place.

The fifth and final objective in the penetration Is to build up indexes of Satellite officials abroad who are likely in the future to have other tours of foreign duty somewhere in Ihe world. An official may not be developable for recruitment during his current tour, but six months from now It mightifferent story. Political turmoil being what It Is within the Satellites, the "ins" can rapidly become thef we cananormer "In" who Is nowe may be able to recruit hun. But this kind of Identification requires orderly and current biographic indexes of Satellite personnel who travel abroad.

The Probe

The achievementenetration in pursuit of theserestsearch for weaknesses through the syste-

ma tic collection of operational intelligence, the exploitation of these weaknesses, and an ingredient of luck. In thefor exploitable weaknesses the following sources ofintelligence hare proved useful to penetration operations. Tins list Is not exhaustive nor In any order of priority.

American diplomats or business representatives tn theIn countries where Americans have social,diplomatic contacts with Satellite representatives they

:prtme source otfplrsohality andTSsessrncnt^

The foreign diplomatic community in the host country.'The protocol lists of the host country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Identify the Satellite representatives in the country by name and rank. Diplomats of the host country and of third countries have professional and social contacts with these Satelliteand are excellent sources of personality anddata on them. Onoreign diplomat can also be usedatalyst to bring. recruiter and his target together under appropriate and secure circumstances. Whether the target can then be developed to the point of recruitment depends on the recruiter's skill and the validity of our cumulative assessment of the target's personality and predisposition to cooperate.

Liaison with local intelligence and security services. At the minimum these services areource of visa,personality, and photographic data on SatelliteAt maximum they contribute to Joint operations against the Satellite Installations In the country.

Washington name trace. This furnishes the field operations officer all dataerson accumulated la the files of VS. government agencies.

Analysis of the local press. This can identify people who attend the social functions at Satellite Installations, deal with them commercially, etc

Debriefing established agents urith access to SatelliteOf particular value here are Journalists,or leaders in the cultural field who cooperate with us.

Telephoneap, unilateral or Joint, of this primary means of local communication on social, cultural, political, and economic mattersirtual gold mine of operational Systematic and timely processing of telephone tap

r

data can and does yield complete rosters of the membersission and their positions. Even more important. It can furnish penetrating Insight into the relationships among the members:hird secretary falls to display over the tele*abitual due respectirst secretary, this Is reason enough to start suspecting that he exercisesor Party security functions.

The aggressiveeyetetlons mwvr

jV ;matter can develop operational leads to local residents

who, screened and recruited, might ultimately become avenues of approach to the Satellite representatives. Telephone tapshave identified hostile agents and their methods ofith the intelligence resldentura In an Installation. They have also provided personality data and detailed Informationhe contactsatellite official In his homeland. Suchhas facilitated not only the recruitment of target officials but also the quick appraisal of their eventual access to useful Intelligence.

The key to success In the use of telephone taps Is the timely field processing ot the perishable information they offer. And the key in deciding whether to mount one is the need for operational Intelligence; they rarely. If ever, are consistent producers of significant positive Intelligence. The need can be determined only by estimating the potential of this source against other available sources of operational Intelligence.

Physical surveillance. The routine gumshoe technique. If applied Judiciously and In conjunctionelephone tap, can yield important data on the activities and contacts of an installation's personnel. These not only provide leads towho may eventually help In approaching Satellitefor purposes of recruitment but also Identifysuspects. Physical surveillance also serves toegular pattern of activity or norms of behavioriven Satellite official as the basis forecure time and way to approach him In developing hisiscreet and thorough surveillance for this purpose requires both foot and vehicular capabilities. The intentionalof these capabilities, on the other hand, can beeterrent to reduce the aggressive Intelligence

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activitiesiven Satellite installation Thus physicalbecomesefensive technique and an offensive Instrument for Installation penetration.

Photographic rvjvtTiia.net. Clandestine photography of people entering andatellite Installationseful practice, primarily in support ot counterintelligence objectives, especially when the subjects Include members of the mission

and visa photographs of most Satellite personalities are fire to ten years old, and current clandestine photographs area valuable supplement for any locally maintained rogues' gallery used to help double agents Identify their handlers, as well as for Washington rogues' galleries which can be viewed by defectors. But photographic surveillance has also in the past Identified numerous operational leads, particularly to hostile intelligence officers.

Floor plans. The floor plan of an installationseful tool in planning audio and surreptitious entry operations. It Is also usefulasis for plotting who sits where in animple analysis of physical arrangements can sometimes reveal people's realclerk. Party secretary. Intelligence officer, etc.

Service personnel. These people, usually local residents, can if properly harnessed be valuable stepping stones to full-scale penetrationsission. Of particular Importance are the telephone operators, secretaries. Janitors, fuelmailmen, trash collectors, police guards, public utility meter readers, and the mechanics who service thefleet. The aggregate knowledge of an installation that can be gamed from their access to it Is remarkable.

Dcfectori. The detectorarget Installation should be debriefed not only with respect to positive intelligence and operational leads, but for any operational intelligence which can facilitate the penetration program.

If any considerable number of these sources is harnessed effectively, the data they produce will be voluminous enough to require systematic processing. The raw Information must be synthesized and putorm readily usable foroperationally exploitable weaknesses. It is best toIt into two sets of files, one concerning the Installation

52

wto.

Itself, recording by category all Its Importanteries of dossiers on the Individuals in thea separate Hie, esUbUsnTd

when he first appliedisa to enter the host country

Wnt 1ht 'eavesClosure is

olding action; the file Is consolidated and retired to headquarters for future use when Its subject reappears in the

^Typfi"of-

There are essentially only four types of penetration opera* tiont as follows.

Planned recruitment of an tn-place agent. This typeperation Is the one we have had chiefly In mindtargettlng an individual, collecting operational intelligence, finding his wealrnesa, developing secure access and arelationship, and thenuccessful recruitment pitch. It can be carried out unilaterally or done Jointlyocal liaison service. The objective Is to acquire an Important assetatellite official with continuing access to useful Intelligence.

and returnalk-in. This second category

differs from the first chiefly in the manner of initial contact, but the difference Is Important: the man has usually taken the Initiative and come to us because he Is In trouble. We can make tbe most of tbe opportunity If we are ready to act when he comes.ound installation penetration program Is mounted against any targetustained period, when breaks occur and walk-Ins develop, as they will, we can take advantage of them by having done our homework In advance. The walk-ln'a bona fides can be resolved quickly, and if he can be persuaded to go back In place we are prepared to exploit himource Immediately and In full

Audio penetration. Here microphones or transmitters are placed in key and sensitive spotsostile installation and the audio pick-up monitored. Microphones can be Inserted as probesommon wall or floor with areas of Interestostile Installation. Or audio surveillance equipment can beuilding intoatellite Installation Is about to mora Short-term audio operations can be mounted

with battery transmitters concealed in furniture,y agents recruited for instance from the service personnel

Not every Installation, however, is worth penetrating by audio surveillance. Some of the factors to be considered are the Importance of the particular Installation to the Satellite In question, the stature of its senior officer, the number of visitors it has from home, and the counter-audio capability of

tration operations and one high In flap potential. Itype of thing for which Americans generally do notlair. In its ultimate implementation, however, It is productive,access to the opposition's most sensitive safes and flies. If lt can be done without detection we not only obtain photographic copies of current documents but retain theto renew them at some future tune. This capability would be particularly important In the matter of cipher pads and cryptographic procedures.

A mission penetration program is not ofanacea for collection problems. But If the objectives of the program are held Ann and the techniques outlined above pursued with diligence, penetrations of Satellite installations can be achieved, and they will produce intelligence responsive torequirements. This intelligence. In the final analysis. Is our reason for being Ln business; our success Is measured not by the quantity of our operations but by the quality of our end product

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